The Indonesian Army from Revolusi to Reformasi: Volume 2: Soeharto and the New Order

THE INDONESIAN ARMY

from Revolusi to Reformasi

Volume 2

Soeharto and the New Order

Joseph H. Daves

Copyright © 2013 Joseph H. Daves

Smashwords Edition

All rights reserved.

ISBN: 1492932299

ISBN-13: 978-1492932291

DEDICATION

For my Father, Huber H. Daves, Jan 20, 1917 - Dec 12, 2003,

A Sergeant in the Army Air Corps serving in the China-Burma-India Theater with Chennault's Flying Tigers

For additional background and introductory comments, please refer to Volume 1 - The Struggle for Independence and the Sukarno Era

Table of Contents

1 The September 30th Movement

2 Soeharto Takes Charge

3 A Postmortem

4 The Massacre

5 An Undeclared Coup

6 The Dynamics of Power

7 Consolidation and the Quest for Legitimacy

8 The Big Brother State

9 A Façade of Democracy

10 Power, Patronage and Corruption

11 Malari

12 The East Timor Occupation

13 The Pancasila State

14 The Dissident Generals

15 The Moerdani Era

16 Divide-and-Rule

17 Soeharto Plays the Muslim Card

18 Desperate Measures

Abbreviations and Glossary

Bibliography

End Notes

1 The September 30th Movement

There are very few events in history when people immediately recognize that things will not be the same again. The cursed night of September 30, 1965 is one of the few events in modern Indonesian history that established such a boundary the moment it took place. The killings of top leaders of the Indonesian army brought to the surface all the sources of conflict in the nation, leading to the rapid and frightening course of events that followed. The moment the army generals were killed, nothing could be the same again.[1]

What happened early Friday morning, October 1, 1965 was extraordinary and unprecedented, even considering the adolescent Indonesian Republic's turbulent and frequently violent history. It marked a turning point, ushering in General Soeharto's three decade authoritarian New Order regime. It was the point at which President Sukarno finally lost control, after years of skillfully balancing the opposing forces of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and right-wing Indonesian Army leaders. His balancing act was bound to collapse at some point. All the pressure and resentment that had accumulated for years within the Army and society erupted into a bloody onslaught of vengeance and death. Indonesia ran amuk. Army leadership was eliminated, the PKI destroyed, hundreds of thousands killed, and Sukarno ultimately felled from power. For more than four decades, the martyred officers and ostensible communist treachery were commemorated each October 1 in a Sacred Pancasila Day ceremony at Lubang Buaya, where the murdered officers' bodies were discovered.

Mystery surrounds what happened on that early morning, when a small group of mid-ranking, dissident officers, referring to themselves as the September 30th Movement (Gerakan Tigapuluh September), kidnapped and murdered six top army generals and a junior officer. The incident came to be known by the clever acronym "Gestapu" - reportedly coined by Brigadier General R.H. Sugandhi Kartosubroto, military spokesman and director for the Angkatan Bersenjata (Armed Forces) daily. The pejorative label, resembling Hitler's Gestapo secret police, caught on quickly. In the acronym-mad Indonesian lexicon, the press and the public at large adopted it as shorthand for the conspiracy and murder of army leaders. Sukarno insisted on his own acronym, Gestok (Gerakan Satu Oktober, October 1st Movement), introduced during an October 9 cabinet meeting. The army-controlled press continued to use Gestapu. The affair was abbreviated as G30S/PKI, serving the Army's interests by linking the movement with the Communist Party.

The Pancasila Monument at Lubang Buaya[2]

Today, nearly fifty years after the pivotal affair, the developments which led to the assassination of army leaders, the bloodbath that followed it and even the conspiracy's details remain obscure, controversial and poorly understood. Although the September 30th Movement's actions are often labeled as an aborted or failed coup, or putsch, there is no clear evidence the conspirators intended to overthrow Sukarno. They claimed to be protecting the President from a planned army takeover.

Much information about what happened has been gleaned from testimony at the military tribunals and includes confessions extracted under physical and psychological duress. The Extraordinary Military Tribunals (Makamah Militer Luar Biasa, or Mahmillub) were neither fair nor objective. Neither were the tribunals simply show trials as some have suggested. Coercion was a factor during the interrogations, but different individuals (including army, police, navy and air force officers) conducted the questioning at different times and places. The trials were held over period of years at different locations and presided over by various military judges.

During their trials, some suspects were defiant, while others blurted out well-rehearsed confessions. Some spoke out against the Army and its anti-communist pogrom. Some were more clearly forthright and honest than others. For example, September 30th Movement leader Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sjamsuri apparently realized he had been duped and appeared genuinely remorseful for his role in the conspiracy. PKI Special Bureau Chief Sjam Kamaruszaman earnestly cooperated with military investigators and appeared eager to tell what he knew in an effort to bargain for his own life. On the other hand, Air Force Commander Omar Dani's testimony was obviously misleading and evasive as he tried to shift blame to others.

Almost all those coming before the tribunals were convicted; many were sentenced to death. Determined above all to blame the PKI as an institution, prosecutors made no effort to resolve the many contradictions that surfaced during testimony. Indeed, much of the trial testimony contradicted the Army's thesis that the PKI masterminded the conspiracy. After studying the unedited interrogation reports and trial transcripts, Helen-Louise Hunter concluded the information was generally accurate despite the ever-present element of duress. The various accounts given at different times and places, as told to different interrogators, are broadly consistent with known events, although there are inconsistencies in times, dates, places, names and subject matter, as would be expected under the chaotic circumstances.[3]

Conspiracy theories abound. In early-1966, scholars at Cornell University advanced the premise that the murders constituted an internal army affair, exactly the position Indonesian Communist Party officials had taken. The Cornell Paper was the earliest attempt to put together the pieces of the puzzle. Drawing from press reports and interviews, it adopted an apologist tone toward the idealistic and frustrated young officers responsible for violently eliminating the political generals, who were undermining the Confrontation with Malaysia, maintaining close ties to the United States, resisting the restoration of the revolutionary spirit of 1945 and broadly obsessed with the Communist problem. The authors concluded the coup was neither the work of the PKI nor of Soekarno himself. ... They both were more the victims than the initiators of events.[4]

Marked strictly confidential, the Cornell Paper received limited distribution among U.S. policymakers and the academic community. Copies circulated and in March 1966 The Washington Post published details from the controversial study. After New Order officials repeatedly condemned the Cornell Paper's findings and its authors, in 1971 the university publicly released the report. The paper received widespread attention, although many of its findings were later refuted. Most scholars discount the Cornell paper, at minimum, as seriously flawed.[5]

The Cornell Paper did not suggest Soeharto was the dalang (puppeteer) in the shadow play, as others later did.[6] Today, the conspiracist case against Soeharto is so widely accepted, it is not questioned by the public at large - although careful examination shows quite a different picture. There is no reasonable basis to conclude Soeharto masterminded the plot. Despite the many (not always objective) allegations and circumstantial evidence presented to support conspiracy theories, no one has produced a smoking gun to prove Soeharto was either directly or indirectly involved in the attack on army leaders.

Most key players are dead. Of the survivors, few have an objective view of historical events. The quintessential Javanese patriarch, Soeharto has gone to his grave without revealing additional details about those seminal events that opened the doors of opportunity for him to theretofore unimagined power. Superstitious by nature, many Indonesians - perhaps Soeharto himself - believed Sukarno had lost his wahyu or pulung (divine calling) through the tragic events on October 1, 1965, while Soeharto gained his.[7]

Fresh research since Soeharto's May 1998 resignation has provided a clearer picture of the events surrounding the October 1, 1965 murders. Especially noteworthy are works by John Roosa (Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'état in Indonesia, 2006)[8] and Helen-Louise Hunter (Sukarno and the Indonesian Coup: The Untold Story, 2007).[9] Both books are flawed but shed fresh light on the murky happenings from late-September through early-October 1965.

The Generals' Council

Sukarno distrusted his generals. He had made a devil's pact with the Army that allowed the generals to become powerful and influential under Guided Democracy's autocratic umbrella. By the early-1960s, he was skillfully employing the PKI to counterbalance the Army, often seeming to take sadistic pleasure in publicly tormenting army leaders. Sukarno's determined efforts to divide the Armed Forces contributed to bitter inter-service rivalries and mistrust. For years, the PKI had actively sought to infiltrate the military, an effort aided by high levels of politicization within the services and the police. Officers from the smaller branches were more receptive to PKI advances, driven in part by inter-service rivalries and a barely concealed resentment toward the much larger and dominant Army. Earlier in 1965, Navy Commander Eddy Martadinata had grumbled to Army Commander Ahmad Yani, If needed, the Navy and Air Force are employed as armed forces. When not needed, we are treated like the Women's Army Corps.[10]

The prima donna Air Force Commander Air Vice Marshal Omar Dani actively sought Sukarno's favor, while Indonesian Marine Corps Commander Major General Hartono was had pledged uncompromising loyalty to the infallible Great Leader. Accordingly, the Air Force and Marines enthusiastically supported Sukarno's Confrontation policy, as did the PKI, whereas the Navy sat on the sidelines and Army support for the Malaysia campaign was lukewarm at best. Despite prodding from Sukarno, Army Commander Yani was reluctant to expand involvement in the low-level conflict or dispatch his best units to the Kalimantan frontier.

Top army leaders were predominantly anti-communist, less for ideological than practical and historic reasons. The communist treachery during the Revolution was still a bitter memory to many. At the same time, most officers held Sukarno in reverence due in large part to his mesmerizing oratorical skills and legendary role as the Republic's father figure. Indeed, most military and police officers would have been considered Sukarno loyalists. There was a degree of sympathy for the PKI within the army ranks, especially among the majority Javanese troops. Leftist sentiments were stronger in the other services. Yet pro-communist elements in all the services were probably a minority. The real divider was the extent of loyalty to Sukarno. That ambiguous, almost irrational mixture of anti-communist and pro-Sukarno emotions created anxiety and confusion in the High Command and dangerous ideological tensions within the ranks.

Relations between the President and the Army had soured as Sukarno leaned more toward the left. PKI leaders were Sukarno's cheerleaders in the Confrontation campaign. With the President's patronage, they became more assertive. Sukarno's inclusion of leftist politicians in his cabinet, close association with communist leaders and steady reference to communist ideals in his speeches bolstered PKI self-confidence. In return, Sukarno's close advisors fed the President's growing paranoia that his enemies (both foreign and domestic) were out to get him. Most prominent among the President's inner circle was the ambitious Deputy Prime Minister Soebandrio, who opportunistically aligned himself with Sukarno and the PKI.

The Central Intelligence Agency-backed regional rebellions in the late-1950s, several failed assassination attempts and his own narcissism combined to make Sukarno especially vulnerable to conspiracy theories. He was paranoid about western plots - his apprehensions fueled by health problems and palace whisperers who included Soebandrio, PKI Chairman Dipa Nusantara Aidit and PKI Politburo member Njoto, a supporting minister, editor for the PKI Harian Rakjat daily and one of the President's speechwriters. Njoto was an intellectual who was closer to the President than any other PKI official.[11] Njoto was a talented speaker and poet. He played saxophone and, like the President, was a notorious philanderer. Along with Soebandrio, Njoto played a key role in drafting Sukarno's 1964 Year of Living Dangerously (Tavip) and 1965 Year of Self-Reliance (Takari) speeches, both filled with anti-western, Marxist rhetoric.[12]

Sukarno, Soebandrio and Aidit had all stepped up attacks against the ostensibly corrupt and counter-revolutionary generals throughout September as if setting the stage for the preemptive action. Parroting PKI criticism, on several occasions during September Soebandrio called for operations against the kabir (capitalist-bureaucrats), a widely understood neologism for army leaders. Addressing the Indonesian Student Council on September 13, he declared, In any revolution some people are bound to fall, because they were left behind and had perhaps committed treason against the Revolution.[13] Aidit and the PKI newspaper, Harian Rakjat, incessantly called for the city devils, economic adventurers, thieves and corrupters (other code words) to be executed. Just weeks before army leaders were killed, the PKI Chairman asserted, If we want to restore the body of our revolution to a healthy state and make the tree of our revolution fertile again, the cancer or parasites in the form of city devils, namely the bureaucratic capitalists, thieves and corrupters, must be crushed from the bottom to the top.[14]

The competition between the PKI and the Army - and Sukarno's delicate balancing act - was not a secret. The PKI was the only institution with enough popular support to challenge the Army's physical strength, while the generals were determined to prevent the PKI from taking power at all costs. The atmosphere was one of fear, suspicion, confrontation, and bitter recrimination. The PKI and its leftist comrades were strongly pro-Peking. They and Sukarno identified the United States and its western allies as the evil forces of Nekolim (Neo-colonialism, Colonialism and Imperialism).

PKI officials detested Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Haris Nasution and Army Commander Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani, who, in addition to being anti-communist, had received military training in the United States and maintained ties to officials in Jakarta's western embassies. Chairman Aidit met General Nasution during a reception just two days before the October 1 operation and sarcastically asked the uniformed general which medal he had received for crushing the Madiun rebellion.[15] West Java Siliwangi Division troops under Nasution had brutally suppressed the September 1948 communist-led uprising in Madiun. It was a sensitive issue for Nasution, who communist fighters attempted to assassinate following the Madiun mutiny.

Starting in March 1965 - amid the PKI revolutionary land reform offensive in Central and East Java and reactive Muslim threats of a holy war - PKI officials popularized rumors that a Council of Generals (Dewan Jendral) was planning to seize power. It is not clear if PKI leaders believed the generals were plotting a coup, or simply exploited the theme to advance their agenda. Certainly the PKI had infiltrated military and police organizations and should have had some idea if such a group existed. Whether a Council of Generals was plotting against the President or not, PKI leaders understood an army takeover would likely precipitate action to destroy the party. It was a deadly serious game.

Sukarno took the rumors seriously, seizing on the suspiciously forged Gilchrist Letter as evidence of a conspiracy. (The typewritten draft on British Embassy stationary purportedly from British Ambassador Sir Andrew Gilchrist to British Under Secretary of State Sir Harold Caccia vaguely referenced a joint American-British plot.)[16] On the spot, Army Commander Yani had explained the term Generals' Council was commonly used to refer to the Advisory Council for Assignments and Promotion of Senior Army Officers (Dewan Djabatan dan Pangkatan Perwira Tinggi, Wandjabti), created in 1963 to recommend senior officer postings. (Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) Commander Major General H. Sudirman chaired the Wandjabti while, ironically, Soeharto was vice-chairman.)

Lieutenant General Yani denied army leaders were engaged in anti-government scheming. The President did not believe it. He was convinced a group of conservative, anti-communist generals - including Nasution, Yani, Army Intelligence Assistant Major General Siswondo Parman, Army Finance and Civil Relations Deputy Major General Mas Tirtodarmo Harjono and Army Prosecutor General Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomiharjo - were actively plotting against him. Sukarno especially disliked Parman and Sutoyo, outspoken critics of the PKI.[17] He had taunted Parman about working for the American Central Intelligence Agency.[18]

Generals Yani and Nasution often compared notes with anti-communist civilian counterparts. Yani met regularly throughout 1965 with senior officers he considered his brain trust to discuss national developments and the deteriorating political situation. The Army Commander's brain trust included Parman, Harjono, Army Administration Deputy Major General Suprapto and Junior Minister Major General Achmad Soekendro, all officers targeted by the September 30th Movement. Army Logistics Assistant Brigadier General Donald Ihacus Panjaitan and Sutoyo Siswomiharjo were not part of brain trust although they too fell victim to the movement.

Almost certainly, it was Yani's brain trust that the PKI portrayed as the Council of Generals. All were fervently anti-communist. Of course, it was proper and prudent for the Army Commander to meet with his staff. No compelling evidence has been presented that those generals conspired against the government. Rather, the discussion seems to have revolved around how best to fend off Sukarno and his PKI allies' aggressive meddling into military affairs, contain the government's irrational Malaysia Confrontation campaign, and restrain the PKI land offensive in the hinterland.

Whether a Council of Generals existed or not may come down to semantics. Again, it must be emphasized there is no evidence senior army officers actually plotted against the President. For practical purposes, even if they had, it would have been difficult to muster more than a few units willing to move against the revered Great Leader. The argument that troops brought to Jakarta for Armed Forces Day would be employed to seize power is dubious. The self-proclaimed leader of the September 30th Movement, Lieutenant Colonel Untung, himself was involved in preparations for the parade, while two of the three Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) battalions brought to the capital joined in the September 30th Movement operation. Soeharto and other army leaders were initially unsure about the loyalty of remaining troops bivouacked at Senayan Stadium in South Jakarta.

The Murdered Generals[19]

By late-September, Sukarno was visibly ill; the national economy was in tatters, rife with waste, inefficiency and graft; battered by spiraling inflation and widespread fuel shortages; ravaged by pestilence and prolonged drought on much of Java and Bali. The country produced a fraction of its colonial era sugar and cotton output, and not enough rice to feed the people, who suffered widespread malnutrition and famine in places. The PKI was on the offensive, in open conflict with Muslim groups and the Army. Areas of Central and East Java, and Bali were torn by the violence associated with the aggressive land redistribution campaign. The leftist media denounced the CIA, the United States and western governments on a daily basis. With communist encouragement, mobs attacked western properties.

Rumors circulated about a military coup set to take place around the time of the October 5 Armed Forces Day commemoration. PKI leaders voiced the recurring theme of a child about to be born.[20] Several times during August and September, army intelligence had reported rumors about possible kidnapping or assassination attempts against army leaders.

- In August, Kostrad Intelligence Assistant Colonel Yoga Sugomo warned Major General Parman about a plot to kidnap army leaders. The information was vague; Parman told Sugomo to seek confirmation.[21]

- Parman received another report on September 14 with similar information and conveyed it to General Yani. Temporarily security precautions were taken but relaxed after the reported target date, September 18, had passed.[22]

- Before departing with an official government delegation to Peking on September 29, Education Minister Brigadier General Sjarif Thajeb, a Harvard graduate and former University of Indonesia President, told Yani he had received information from students about a plan to kidnap (mengarap) army leaders. Intelligence Assistant Parman downplayed the threat, reporting that his men had seen no signs of trouble in the capital.[23]

- Army Inspector General Major General Harjono again raised the possibility army leaders might be abducted during an army staff meeting the next day, on the eve of the actual attacks. Yani and his assistants greeted Harjono's report with laughter,[24] confident army intelligence had thoroughly penetrated the PKI Central Committee.[25]

The warnings were ignored. Early October 1, forces mustered by the September 30th Movement kidnapped and murdered six top army generals and a lieutenant, simultaneously seizing government facilities in Central Jakarta. Seven generals were targeted, all identified as members of the putative Council of Generals. The victims were Army Commander Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani, Army Intelligence Assistant Major General Siswondo Parman, Army Administration Deputy Major General Raden Suprapto, Army Finance and Civil Relations Deputy Major General Mas Tirtodarmo Harjono, Army Logistics Assistant Brigadier General Donald Ihacus Panjaitan, Army Prosecutor General Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomiharjo, and adjutant to General Nasution Lieutenant Pierre Tendean. The seventh target, Nasution, escaped his assailants.

The murder of the Army Commander and his principal staff was a devastating blow. Among the targeted officers, Nasution, Suprapto and Parman had played key roles in the October 17, 1952 Affair. Three had attended military training in the United States. Yani and Panjaitan graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Parman attended infantry officer training at Fort Benning, Georgia. Panjaitan had served as military attaché in West Germany. Harjono was military attaché in the Netherlands. Parman and Sutoyo had both performed military attaché duty in London. Acting on Yani's behalf, Parman had attempted to use his British military contacts to avoid escalating the Malaysia conflict.

All seven officers were known for their anti-communist views and friendly ties with American and British diplomats in Jakarta - despite the ongoing Malaysia conflict. Yani had developed a close relationship with U.S. Army Attaché Major George Benson during the late-1950s. That relationship continued through the mid-1960s after Yani became Army Commander and then-Colonel Benson served in the American Ambassador's Special Assistant for Civic Action.[26] There were other anti-communist generals in the Army who might have been targeted, but Nasution and the officers in the Army High Command were the PKI's most visible and vocal opponents. The conspirators considered them to be the primary obstructions to Sukarno and the PKI's policies.

A Central Javanese Muslim, Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani had been a fellow regiment commander with Soeharto in Diponegoro Division during the Revolution. Yani formed the elite Banteng Raiders (Battalion 431) to pursue Darul Islam rebels in the early-1950s. Favored by Army Chief Major General Bambang Sugeng, he attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1955-1956. He commanded Operation 17 Agustus, the victorious 1958 expeditionary campaign against Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic (PRRI) rebels in West Sumatra. Capping a brilliant career, Yani succeeded General Nasution as Army Commander in 1962 at age forty, advancing over more senior officers.

Yani was a polished and talented officer who spoke English fluently. He was pro-western and solidly anti-communist, but younger, less politically savvy and ethically more pliable than the incorruptible Nasution. Sukarno admired Yani as a strong, handsome and resolute officer. He patronized the youthful general. There were even reports the President had suggested Yani might succeed him. Yani's close relationship with the President had deteriorated in the months before the attacks over the May 1965 Bandar Betsy Affair, the Gilchrist Letter, allegedly implicating army leaders in an anti-government plot with the United States and Britain, and his less than forthright support for the Malaysia Confrontation.

Ahmad Yani

Siswondo Parman

Siswondo Parman had worked as a military police officer under the Japanese and during the Revolution. As secretary general in the officer's union, Parman had clashed with Nasution during the 1956 Zulkifli Lubis Mutiny. He attended infantry officer training at Fort Benning, Georgia in 1958. After that, he was posted as military attaché in London. Yani selected Parman, a committed anti-communist, as his Intelligence Assistant in June 1963. Parman's older brother, Sakirman, was a senior PKI official, who reputedly knew his brother was targeted, but did not warn him.[27] Adding further to that irony, communist rebels had killed Mrs. Parman's first husband during the September 1948 Madiun uprising.[28] Parman's adopted son, Sugiono, went on to join the Army and retired as a lieutenant general.

A West Javanese Muslim, Major General Suprapto had been one of Nasution's Bandung Academy classmates. He served in the Seinendan youth organization and Keibodan police auxiliary under the Japanese. During the Revolution, he volunteered for the People's Security Army (TKR), helped seize Japanese arms in Cilacap and fought against Allied troops at Ambarawa, before becoming staff secretary for Panglima Besar Sudirman. After sovereignty, Suprapto served as chief of staff in the Central Java Diponegoro Division, and in staff positions at Army Headquarters and the Defense Ministry. Following the regional rebellions in the late-1950s, Nasution sent him to Medan as his Army Deputy for the Sumatra Region. In June 1962, Suprapto became Army Administration Deputy with promotion to major general. He had a reputation for incorruptibility, was strongly anti-communist and outspokenly critical of the PKI's Fifth Force initiative.

Mas Tirtodarmo Harjono

Suprapto

Major General Mas Tirtodarmo Harjono had been a staff officer in the Defense Ministry during the independence struggle. Fluent in Dutch, he was involved in government negotiations and participated in the Round Table Conference in The Hague. He served as Indonesian military attaché to the Netherlands in the early-1950s. Harjono worked as a staff officer in the Finance and Civil Relations Directorate at Army Headquarters from 1962 to 1965. Apparently influenced by his U.S. Army Staff College experience, Yani in August 1965 assigned Harjono to the newly created Army Inspector General post with award of a second star.

A North Sumatran Batak Protestant, Brigadier General Donald Ihacus Panjaitan joined Giyugun during the Japanese occupation and was a battalion commander in the West Sumatra Banteng Division during the Revolution. He served as deputy chief of staff in the South Sumatra Sriwijaya Command in the late-1950s and was assigned as military attaché in West Germany before being posted as Army Logistics Assistant in June 1962. Lieutenant Colonel Panjaitan was in Bonn while Indonesian Army officers in Sumatra and Sulawesi were in open rebellion against the central government. His outspokenly anti-communist views were noted by American counterparts: If the U.S. knows of any communists, let them tell us, and we will have them removed. ... We will do anything except shoot Sukarno or attack the Communists without proof of illegal actions on their part. In our country we cannot arrest Communists just because they are Communists; we will remove them, he confided.[29] Panjaitan took a break from duties at Army Headquarters to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1963-1964. Panjaitan's son, Hotmaraja Panjaitan, became an Army Special Forces (Kopassus) officer and retired as a lieutenant general.

Donald Ihacus Panjaitan

Sutoyo Siswomiharjo

A military police officer who served as Colonel Gatot Subroto's adjutant during the Revolution, Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomiharjo was Soeharto's Army Staff and Command School (SSKAD) classmate and friend. After serving several years as a military police battalion commander and as chief of staff at Military Police Headquarters in Jakarta, Sutoyo was sent abroad during the late-1950s as military attaché in London. He was a staff officer at Army Headquarters dealing with soldier welfare in the early-1960s before a promotion to Army Auditor General (Prosecutor) in 1964. Sutoyo was also known for his outspoken hatred of the PKI. Like Mrs. Parman, Mrs. Sutoyo's first husband also had been murdered by communists in September 1948 during the Madiun rebellion.[30] Sutoyo's son, Agus Widjojo, later joined the Army and retired as a lieutenant general.

Kostrad Commander Major General Soeharto and Jakarta Commander Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah might have been logical targets for the plotters since both were based in the capital and had anti-communist credentials. They were career men and relatively apolitical. Neither belonged to Yani's inner circle, which had been on the front line in the Army's high profile political contest with the PKI. The conspirators even named Umar Wirahadikusumah to their so-called Revolutionary Council. Army Operations Deputy Major General Mursyid and Personnel Assistant Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro were not targeted, almost certainly because they were well-known Sukarno loyalists, as was West Java Siliwangi Commander Major General Ibrahim Adjie.

As a lieutenant colonel, Mursyid had served as Operations Deputy under Colonel Roekmito Hendraningrat during the assault against Charter of Universal Struggle (Permesta) rebels in North Sulawesi. He had been responsible for operational planning at Army Headquarters since 1959, during which time he developed close ties to President Sukarno. Pranoto had been a fellow regimental commander with Soeharto and Yani in Central Java during the Revolution. A longtime Soeharto rival and unabashed Sukarno admirer, Pranoto succeeded Soeharto as Diponegoro Commander in October 1959. He was appointed Army Personnel Assistant in 1962.

Who Were the Conspirators?

The 3,000-man Tjakrabirawa (a Sanskrit term meaning Powerful Weapon) presidential guard regiment played a central role during the watershed events of late-1965. Sukarno's decision in May 1963 to replace his Military Police bodyguards and form the special presidential guard unit had annoyed army leaders. The Tjakrabirawa Regiment included battalions from the Marines, Air Force, Police and Army. It was decided, without consulting Army Headquarters, the army battalion would come from Diponegoro Division, rather than the Military Police or the elite Army Paracommando Regiment (RPKAD). Besides bodyguards, the Tjakrabirawa Regiment included accomplished musicians, singers, dancers and food tasters.

Sukarno's adjutant, Military Police Colonel Mohamed Sabur (later promoted to brigadier general) was appointed Tjakrabirawa Regiment Commander despite his lack of experience with troops. (Sabur had served continuously as an adjutant since 1950, when still a major.) Subordinate battalion commanders were chosen principally based on their loyalty to Sukarno. RPKAD developed a bitter rivalry with the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, especially after the presidential guard adopted brick red berets similar to those worn by the elite army commandos. RPKAD members and the Tjakrabirawa Regiment's marine battalion had clashed during 1964 at the Central Jakarta Senen market.[31]

The principal plotters were Javanese.[32] All were disgruntled and leftist in political orientation. They included Brigadier General Mustafa Syarif Supardjo, the West Kalimantan battle commander; Jakarta 1st Infantry Brigade Commander Colonel Abdul Latief; Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sjamsuri, the army battalion commander in the Tjakrabirawa presidential guard regiment; Air Force Major Soejono, defense force commander at Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base in south Jakarta; and two Kostrad unit commanders, Major Bambang Sukirno of 454 Banteng Raider Battalion and Major Bambang Supeno of 530 Raider Battalion, that had moved to Jakarta from home bases in Central and East Java, respectively, to participate in the annual October 5 Armed Forces Day event. Abdul Latief and Untung were Diponegoro officers. Supardjo's background was in the West Java Siliwangi Division. Originally from the remote Tulungagung kampung in East Java, Soejono had fought with a local militia during the Revolution. Air Force Commander Omar Dani played a key role in providing sanctuary, materiel and moral support to the conspirators.

June 1963 Tjakrabirawa magazine with Colonel Mohamed Sabur's picture

Mustafa Syarif Supardjo had served with Siliwangi Division during the Revolution. Ironically, as a Siliwangi officer, Supardjo participated in operations against communist rebels in Madiun in September 1948. He served in a variety of positions in the West Java Command throughout the 1950s and early-1960s, and participated in operations against Darul Islam. He was well-educated, spoke English and had spent a year at the Pakistan Staff College in Quetta. Like Omar Dani, he was small, with a slim physique and a pencil mustache. Supardjo was a known leftist sympathizer; the pro-Sukarno but anti-communist Siliwangi Commander Major General Ibrahim Adjie transferred him to Kostrad during 1965. Major General Soeharto accepted Supardjo and assigned him to the Kostrad Fourth Combat Command on the West Kalimantan front, although he kept a close eye on him, starved him of troops and left command authority with West Kalimantan Regional Commander Brigadier General Mussanif Ryacudu.[33]

Mustafa Syarif Supardjo with his wife[34]

Supardjo was subordinate to both Kostrad Commander Soeharto and Mandala Readiness Command (Kolaga) Commander Omar Dani. He was more closely aligned personally and ideologically with Omar Dani. Like Dani, Supardjo was completely loyal to Sukarno and a true believer in the Malaysia campaign. He was frustrated by the Army's sabotage of the President's Confrontation policy. Supardjo allegedly held a grudge against Army Commander Yani due to a humiliating incident when Yani, during a West Kalimantan inspection tour, had reprimanded and slapped him in the face with his gloves over troop conditions and command finances. Supardjo was in regular contact with Omar Dani and, through the Air Force Commander, had on occasion met the President. Supardjo and Dani had discussed the possibility of acting against General Yani.[35]

As an army general, Supardjo was the PKI's prize asset, managed by PKI Special Bureau Chief Sjam Kamaruszaman. Sjam had been in regular contact with Supardjo since the late-1950s and knew he was sympathetic to communist interests. Supardjo usually met Sjam during his monthly visits to Jakarta from the Kalimantan front to discuss political developments. From Sjam, Supardjo was privy to the conspirators' early planning but was not directly involved. According to Sjam's trail testimony, PKI leaders desired a more senior officer to participate in the movement. Sjam arranged for Supardjo's wife to summon him to Jakarta on September 28 on the pretext his child was ill. Mrs. Supardjo sent a radiogram asking him to return to Jakarta. Later she steadfastly insisted the child was actually sick and it had not been a ploy.[36] At Sjam's urging, Supardjo agreed to join the movement.

At his trial, Omar Dani testified Supardjo was the September 30th Movement's true commander. Supardjo evaded capture until January 1967. A variety of persons provided him shelter in and around Jakarta. At his own trial, Supardjo admitted he had been in contact with Sukarno during the fifteen months he was a fugitive. Sukarno allegedly asked Supardjo to rally loyal military forces in his support. Like fellow conspirators, Untung and Latief, Supardjo denied he was a PKI member. He was sentenced to death in March 1967 and executed in 1973 without public announcement.

The thirty-nine-year old Colonel Abdul Latief had a long historical association with Soeharto. He was a Japanese Homeland Defender (Peta) officer who served in Central and East Java during the Revolution. He had participated in the Battle of Surabaya, was a company commander under Soeharto during the Revolution's final months and fought in the celebrated March 1, 1949 attack against Dutch forces in Yogyakarta. Latief continued to serve in Soeharto's Diponegoro Brigade after the transfer of sovereignty and participated in counterinsurgency operations against rebels in South Sulawesi, RMS separatists in Maluku, Darul Islam militants in Central Java, and under Colonel Ahmad Yani in April 1958 during the 17 Agustus operation against separatist rebels in West Sumatra. He had six children.

While serving in Soeharto's Mataram Brigade in South Sulawesi during August 1950, Latief's men killed popular pro-Republic guerilla leader Arief Rate and brutally wiped out his unit. The incident sparked full-scale war between Republican Army units and the guerillas, and turned the local population against the Javanese occupation forces.[37] Latief was known to have leftist views even during the Revolution, but generally kept those convictions to himself. As intelligence assistant in the West Sumatra 17 Agustus Regional Command during 1958-1959, he was involved in mopping up PRRI remnants. During that period, he worked closely with the 6,000-man PKI-affiliated Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth) volunteer force recruited to help track down the rebels, perhaps hardening his leftist orientation.[38]

Abdul Latief graduated from the Army Staff College in 1960, one year after Soeharto. By 1965 he was 1st Infantry Brigade Commander in the capital under Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah and considered one of the Army's rising stars. Latief claimed his old boss, Soeharto, had approached Umar and asked if he would release Colonel Latief to become Dwikora Battle Commander in East Kalimantan. Umar turned down the request on the basis that Latief's mission to defend the capital was more important. Latief had been 1st Infantry Brigade Commander for over three years. With Soeharto's patronage, he expected to take over from Brigadier General Kemal Idris as Dwikora Combat Commander in North Sumatra.[39]

Abdul Latief during his trial in August 1978[40]

Latief was not known to have voiced grievances against any army leaders prior to his involvement in the conspiracy. Along with the other plotters, he denied belonging to the PKI. He was captured at his cousin's home in Jakarta on October 11. In the process, he was stabbed in his right thigh with a bayonet and shot in his left knee. Kept in solitary confinement in Jakarta's Salemba Prison without proper medical attention, his wounds became infected and left him with a permanent disability. Army members occupied his house and plundered his possessions, leaving his family destitute. After years of physical and mental anguish, Latief was brought before a military tribunal in 1978. Unlike fellow conspirators who were condemned to die, Latief was sentenced to life in prison. As part of his defense, Latief delivered an emotional rebuke to New Order cruelty and brutality.[41] He suffered a stroke during 1996 that affected his speech. President B.J. Habibie released Abdul Latief with other political prisoners on March 25, 1999, ten months after Soeharto's own capitulation. He died of respiratory disease on April 6, 2005 at age seventy-nine.

Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sjamsuri, forty years old, the self-proclaimed September 30th Movement Commander, was known to have leftist political inclinations. He was a volunteer in the Heiho military auxiliary force under the Japanese and joined the leftist Digdo (Sudigdo) Battalion in Wonogiri, Central Java during the Revolution (later moved to Boyolali as Diponegoro Battalion 444), a unit peripherally involved in the September 1948 communist uprising at Madiun. Untung's career was set back due to involvement in the Madiun Affair. He continued to serve as a company commander in the Digdo Battalion through the mid-1950s, including a period in 1953-1954 under Diponegoro Regiment 15 Commander Colonel Soeharto. Captain Untung was in the Diponegoro Combat Regiment during the 17 Agustus Operation against PRRI rebels in West Sumatra in 1958.

Still a captain after fifteen years service, Untung's prospects rebounded along with the PKI's growing popularity in the early-1960s. In 1963, he was promoted to major as deputy commander for Diponegoro 454 Banteng Raider Battalion in Srondol (outside Semarang), an Army General Reserve (Caduad) unit employed in the West Irian Trikora campaign (and later involved in the September 30th Movement). As the first officer to parachute into West Irian (in early-1962 near Kaimana on the south coast), Untung was hailed as a war hero. After Sukarno recognized him during the victory celebration, Untung became a devoted admirer. Untung was promoted as the Battalion 454 Commander and transferred in May 1965 into the prestigious post as Diponegoro battalion commander in the Tjakrabirawa regiment.

Untung had served under Soeharto in Central Java and during the West Irian campaign. It has been reported that Soeharto was a guest at Untung's wedding in Kebumen, Central Java in late-1964. Among others, co-conspirator Colonel Abdul Latief maintained Soeharto was in the wedding party,[42] while in his own as-told-to biography Lieutenant General Kemal Idris (then Kostrad deputy) contended he actually attended the ceremony on Soeharto's behalf.[43]

Despite leftist sympathies, Untung was a practicing Muslim and seems to have been genuinely outraged by the high living and corrupt practices of high-ranking army officers.[44] Short and stout, he was unsophisticated and politically naive. His own men described him as puritanical. The disgruntled officer was an easy target for Sjam and his Special Bureau handlers. Sjam allegedly picked Untung to command the September 30th Movement for symbolic reasons (his position in the Presidential Guard), rather than his leadership ability. Untung was easily influenced by others, perhaps another reason Sjam selected him. Fellow conspirators Colonel Abdul Latief and Major Soejono privately questioned Sjam's choice.[45] Indeed, when Sjam announced Untung would lead the movement during a meeting on September 19, no one was more surprised than Untung himself.[46]

Major Untung Sjamsuri (left) with Trikora Commander Major General Soeharto and President Sukarno at the Palace on February 19, 1963 being honored for his part in the West Irian conflict

Fellow conspirator Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Heru Atmodjo maintained Sjam had complete control over Untung and Major Soejono, both simple men with limited education who were easily manipulated.[47] During interrogation, Untung admitted he had been deceived. I would like to state from my heart that I truly regret everything that occurred on October 1 because I had no knowledge at all nor was I informed either by the military which took part in the movement or by the PKI which planned the entire movement the cruel tragedy that would occur and thus this was beyond my humanity. I once again state that I truly regret what has happened.[48]

Untung Sjamsuri during his trial

There were 20,000 troops in Jakarta for the October 5 Armed Forces Day celebration. Soeharto oversaw preparations while Untung helped organize the parade, which was to include one battalion from each of the Java-based regional commands. Two Kostrad battalions, Untung's old battalion, Diponegoro Banteng Raider 454, and another unit from Madiun, East Java, Brawijaya Raider 530, whose commanders shared his own leftist views, were among the units in Jakarta to participate in the parade. Untung had visited Battalion 454 Commander Major Sukirno in Central Java on September 15 and convinced him to commit his unit, which was already scheduled to participate in the Armed Forces Day event. During a meeting between the conspirators on September 23, PKI Special Bureau official Pono confirmed the participation by Brawijaya Raider Battalion 530 under Major Bambang Supeno, along with about thirty Siliwangi armored vehicles from Bandung.[49]

Lieutenant Colonel Untung was arrested near his home town of Tegal, Central Java on October 13 after soldiers recognized him on a bus. Untung initially refused to talk and insisted on being taken to President Sukarno. During his trial, he was repentant but consistently described the mutiny as an internal army affair. He insisted that he and his fellow conspirators had acted on their own and steadfastly denied he was a PKI member. Untung was sentenced to death and in late-1966 executed by firing squad in a remote area outside Bandung, his body interred in an unmarked grave.[50]

The vain and ambitious Air Force Commander Air Vice Marshal Omar Dani was the son of the Regent of Boyolali, Central Java. He was among a large group of Indonesian cadets who had attended flight training in California in 1950-1951. Dani flew combat missions during joint operations against PRRI rebel forces in West and North Sumatra. The dapper pilot attended the British Royal Air Force Staff College in 1956-1957. With the President's patronage, he advanced to become Air Force Commander in January 1962. Like his predecessor, Air Marshal Suryadi Suryadarma, Dani developed a bitter rivalry with army leaders, as he eagerly sought favor with Sukarno. To assert his independence, Dani established a separate Air Force Academy. He was at odds with Army Commander Yani and Kostrad Commander Soeharto, since both men were actively working to subvert the President's Malaysia policy.

Most army officers viewed Omar Dani as a self-promoter. As Dani's deputy in the Supreme Operations Command (Koti), Soeharto held the supercilious Air Force Commander in contempt. At age forty-one, Dani was several years younger than either Soeharto or Yani, and did not enter military service until after the Revolution. To impress Sukarno, Dani introduced Marxism as a study subject at the Air Force Staff and Command School and endorsed the PKI demand for a Fifth Force. Under Dani, the Air Force Workers Union (Serikat Buruh Angkatan Udara, Serbaud) joined the PKI-controlled Sobsi trade union federation.[51] Apparently with Sukarno's blessings, Omar Dani had given his subordinates the green light to commence military training at Halim Air Base for volunteers from Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth) and Gerwani (the PKI women's movement) as the vanguard for a Fifth Force. Dani had visited the training at Lubang Buaya and even spoke at the graduation ceremony for the first batch of trainees.[52]

Omar Dani made several trips to Communist China on Sukarno's behalf during 1965. The President sent him on a secret mission to Peking from September 16 through 19, just two weeks before September 30th Movement operation, apparently to brief the Chinese on Indonesian plans to transfer two MiG-17 fighters to the Pakistan Air Force and, more importantly, to broker the covert shipment of 100,000 Chinese small arms weapons and ammunition that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai had promised during a visit to Jakarta several months earlier.[53] As Sukarno's envoy, Dani met with Chou during the visit.

Even before Omar Dani's September trip, some Chinese weapons reportedly had been smuggled through Jakarta's Tanjung Priok port hidden with construction materials for the new Conference of Newly Emerging Forces (Conefo) complex. (To expedite the project, Sukarno had exempted Chinese construction materials from customs inspection.) The Air Force possessed those weapons, which were used during the Fifth Force training at Lubang Buaya (again under Dani's supervision). Most were stored at the Mampang Weapons Depot, near Air Force Headquarters in South Jakarta. Major Soejono issued several thousand Chinese weapons to forces in the September 30th Movement operation and progressive youth volunteers at Lubang Buaya. There is no evidence the larger numbers of Chinese weapons promised by Chou had arrived by the time of the attack on army leaders, or that any weapons had been transferred to the PKI.[54]

Omar Dani

During his trial, Air Force intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Heru Atmodjo testified that Omar Dani had been offered opportunity to lead the progressive officers to prevent a coup by the Council of Generals. Dani was said to have declined on the grounds it should be an internal army affair, but pledged to support the movement with weapons, vehicles and facilities at Halim. In his own testimony, Dani said he feared Sukarno would die after his August 5, 1965 collapse. He had held a meeting with senior air force officers to discuss what would happen if the President passed away. Dani maintained he had warned Sukarno on September 29 the concentration of army troops in Jakarta for the October 5 Armed Forces Day event was a potentially dangerous situation - and a group of dissident officers under Brigadier General Supardjo was planning to take action against army leaders. (Thus, according the Dani's account, Sukarno knew Supardjo was secretly in town and plotting against army leaders, but made no effort to notify the Army High Command.)

Omar Dani's statements contradicted Sukarno's contention the attacks had caught him by surprise. Dani maintained the President instructed him to bring Supardjo to the Bogor Palace on Sunday, October 3 to discuss the matter. However, the following day, September 30, Air Force Intelligence Assistant Lieutenant Colonel Heru Atmodjo informed Dani that Supardjo and his group were prepared to take preemptive action against the Council of Generals that same night. Dani summoned senior officers and briefed them. The group reportedly considered an appeal from Major Soejono (conveyed by Heru) to use air force weapons and vehicles - and glibly determined Soejono's request could not be prevented. Omar Dani made no effort to warn army leaders. He decided to spend the night at Halim Air Base, arriving about 3:00 a.m. just before the attacks began.[55]

Heru Atmodjo[56]

In his own account, Heru Atmodjo suggested Omar Dani and other senior air force officers, while not directly involved in the September 30th Movement operation, willingly tolerated Major Soejono's involvement, the training of civilian volunteers at Lubang Buaya, and the use of air force facilities, vehicles, weapons and equipment.[57] Atmodjo had attended pilot training in Bakersfield, California during 1950-1951, along with Omar Dani, Sri Mulyono Herlambang, Ignatius Dewanto and others who advanced to the top ranks in the Air Force. He returned to the U.S. in 1961 to attend a military intelligence course. Atmodjo served as an intelligence officer under Soeharto during the West Irian campaign and was an instructor at the Air Force Staff and Command School (Seskoau) before being assigned as Assistant Director for Air Force Intelligence under Commodore Ignatius Dewanto in April 1965. Although only a lieutenant colonel, Atmodjo was the top intelligence officer in the Air Force and spoke to Omar Dani, Dewanto and other air force leaders as a peer.

Heru Atmodjo denied any involvement with the PKI Special Bureau or the September 30th Movement, although Soeharto and his supporters regarded Heru as a conspirator and sentenced him to life in prison. Atmodjo was released on August 31, 1980. He joined a leftist political party after Soeharto resigned in May 1998 and prepared a thin volume about his experiences with the September 30th Movement, published in late-2004.[58] Apparently relying on interrogation reports, Helen-Louise Hunter asserts Heru Atmodjo was a recruited PKI agent who was deeply involved in the plot.[59]

Omar Dani belonged to Sukarno's inner circle. He was the only service commander amenable to the PKI Fifth Force and Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion and Communism) Council propositions. According to the 1968 CIA study, Dani was not a Communist. It would not even be accurate to describe him as of leftist conviction. Apparently he had no strong political convictions of his own. ... Dani was, above all else, an opportunist ... Slim, handsome, sporting a clipped mustache and wearing his cap at a dashing angle, he looked more like the matinee idol than the air force chief. He was vain, ambitious, completely pliable, and, most of all, susceptible to flattery. ... With his weak character and lack of a following in the Air Force, he would be totally dependent on the President for his position and therefore amenable to Sukarno's wishes. ... He was receiving all that he wanted—in the way of a gorgeous lakeside home, luxury automobiles, and access to the palace social life—from Sukarno.[60]

Sjam, Pono and Waluyo

A descendant of Arab traders, Sjamsul Kamaruszaman bin Ahmed Mubaidah - commonly known as Sjam - was the link between the PKI and the military conspirators, and the central figure in organizing the October 1 attacks. Always mysterious, Sjam allegedly worked as an intelligence agent during the Japanese occupation and was rumored to be a Dutch agent during the Revolution. He belonged to the Yogyakarta-based Pathuk Group, a laskar militia affiliated with Sutan Sjahrir's Socialist Party, during the independence struggle. Soeharto also belonged to Pathuk, so the two men probably were acquainted. During 1947, Sjam moved to Jakarta, where he co-founded a dockworkers trade union and came into contact with Dipa Nusantara Aidit and other PKI officials. Apparently at Aidit's urging, Sjam joined the PKI in 1948, before the Madiun rebellion.[61]

Through his ties to the port workers' union, Sjam allegedly helped perpetuate the hoax that Aidit and M.H. Lukman had just returned from overseas as they staged their high-profile arrival from a passenger ship in July 1950 and passed through the immigration station at Tanjung Priok Port in Jakarta.[62] That episode, if true, undoubtedly helped cement the close personal ties between Aidit and Sjam. The dark-skinned, curly-haired and ambitious Sjam worked in the PKI labor union, Sobsi, and became PKI Chairman Aidit's personal assistant in 1957, when he was assigned to recruit sympathetic armed forces members. The PKI had maintained an underground organization since the early-1950s aimed at infiltrating various government agencies, rival parties and social groups.[63] In 1962, Sjam visited Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea to study people's revolutionary warfare. In 1963 or 1964, Aidit put him in charge of the PKI Military Section, which was renamed the Special Bureau (Biro Khusus).

Sjam and his two assistants - Supono Marsudidjojo (alias Pono) and Subono (alias Waluyo or Mulyono) - reported directly to Aidit. The PKI Chairman gave Sjam funds to pay salaries, housing and the bureau's operational expenses. Other Politburo members knew the Special Bureau existed, but little about its cadre or operations. Sjam and his assistants avoided overt ties to the PKI and operated legitimate businesses to cover their clandestine activities. Sjam owned a roofing tile factory, Pono ran a restaurant, and Waluyo operated an auto repair shop. Sjam drove an imported luxury car, a bourgeois extravagance hardly befitting a proper party official.

The Special Bureau clandestine activities were tightly compartmented. Sjam and his two assistants assumed aliases in dealing with military officers as they worked to develop cells within the Armed Forces. They each handled a stable of military contacts, but made no effort to turn them into card-carrying party members. Most were Sukarnoist officers with sympathy for the PKI's leftist agenda. At any rate, service members were forbidden to join political parties. The PKI was not the only party to network with sympathetic military officers. Other parties, like the banned Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), did so more openly. Those parties' ideologies were more compatible with military leaders' convictions.[64] During their interrogation and trials, all the military conspirators denied personal ties to the Communist Party, although they admitted knowing that Sjam, Pono and Waluyo represented the PKI.[65]

PKI recruitment focused principally on Java and Javanese officers, although the Special Bureau maintained twelve regional branches. In all, Sjam claimed the Special Bureau had recruited about 700 military officers, the majority in Jakarta, Central and East Java. The Jakarta branch managed over forty officers. Sjam handled Brigadier General Supardjo. Pono handled Colonel Latief and Major Soejono, while Waluyo handled Lieutenant Colonel Untung, and maintained contact with Air Vice Marshal Omar Dani and Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro.[66]

Over several months, Sjam and his assistants systematically indoctrinated the dissident officers, emphasizing the crass behavior of army leaders, their willful neglect of hardships in the lower ranks, and alleged Council of Generals plans to take power from the ailing President. At his trial, Sjam claimed he had drawn up the original target list, which in addition to the seven army generals included former Vice President Mohammed Hatta, Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh and Junior Minister Major General Achmad Soekendro, all resolute PKI opponents. According the Sjam's testimony, Aidit personally scratched Hatta and Chaerul Saleh from the list. Chaerul Saleh and Soekendro were both with a 350-person government delegation in China when the attacks took place. Sjam also claimed he and Aidit had drafted the September 30th Movement announcements broadcast on October 1, including the eclectic list of individuals appointed to the Revolutionary Council.[67]

Through extensive research, including interviews with former PKI officials and political prisoners, John Roosa has provided a dramatically different interpretation of Sjam's life, typically sheathed in mystery and impossibly entangled in conspiracy theory. He describes Sjam as an ambitious pragmatist - bombastic, arrogant, boastful, aggressive, and impatient - more Machiavellian than Marxist. He was Aidit's man and totally loyal to the PKI leader to the extent of sycophancy. Sjam was proud to be considered Aidit's right-hand man and the PKI Chairman reciprocated Sjam's devotion with his full trust and confidence.[68] Carmel Budiardjo's account about her experiences in the Indonesian Gulag also supports the theory Aidit had complete trust and confidence in Sjam.[69]

John Roosa corrects the oft-heard tale that Soeharto was acquainted with Sjam in Central Java during the early-1950s, when Sjam supposedly was a local PSI official. Sjam probably had contact with Soeharto during the Revolution between 1945 and 1947, when both men belonged to the Yogyakarta-based militia, the Pathuk Group. Since Sjam had been based in Jakarta since 1947, it is unlikely he was one Soeharto's social contacts in Central Java in the early-1950s. Roosa similarly debunks the theory Sjam was an official in the Dutch-backed Pasundan federal state in West Java during 1948-1949.[70] Finally, Roosa refutes the widely accepted notion Sjam was a paid informer working for the Jakarta Garrison. According to Roosa, the confusion and speculation that Sjam and his Special Bureau assistants were double agents stems from the fact that they possessed military-issued identification cards distinguishing them as intelligence agents. The truth is progressive officers in the service intelligence departments arranged for the identity cards to be issued so the Special Bureau officials could freely enter military installations, not because they were informers. Thus, reports Sjam was a double agent are probably false, as are broader conspiracy theories that Sjam was a multiple agent working for the PKI, the Army, and possibly for one or more foreign intelligence services.[71]

Sjam was forty-five years old at the time of the September 30th Movement operation. He was arrested in Cimahi, West Java near Bandung on March 9, 1967, by which time six of the ten PKI Politburo members were already dead. He was tried before a military tribunal during February-March 1968 in Bandung and sentenced to death. Sjam was the most cooperative of all of the conspirators. He spoke openly about his role and that of the PKI leadership. He bragged that he was the brains behind the September 30th Movement and was branded a traitor by surviving PKI leaders for his eagerness to talk.[72] During PKI Politburo member Sudisman's trial, Sjam proudly declared, I held the political leadership and Untung held the military leadership, but the military leadership was under the political leadership. So it is I who am responsible for all of what occurred during the movement.[73]

According to Sjam's testimony, PKI leaders genuinely believed the Army High Command intended to seize power in case Sukarno died or was incapacitated. He maintained PKI Politburo member Sakirman (Major General Parman's older brother) had informed Aidit the Council of Generals planned to take power if Sukarno died. When Sukarno fell ill in August 1965, Aidit and other PKI leaders feared he might die. That was when Aidit ordered Sjam to mobilize progressive officers for a preemptive move against army leaders. Sjam admitted responsibility for killing the generals, but blamed the coup attempt on PKI Chairman Aidit, who army troops had summarily executed in November 1965.[74]

While Untung, Supardjo and Soejono were executed shortly after receiving death sentences, Sjam's execution was delayed for nearly two decades. To a casual observer, the failure to execute Sjam is especially puzzling, since it appears he was the one who gave orders to finish off the surviving generals and Lieutenant Tendean. Fueling conspiracy theories, rumors later surfaced that Sjam and Pono were occasionally seen moving about freely in public after their supposed imprisonment.[75] The government finally announced during late-1986 that Sjam and his associates had been executed, although skepticism endured. As the years passed, conspiracy theories about Sjam expanded and multiplied. Some have speculated that he was not executed, that he was released and given a new identity, or that he was sent abroad to start a new life.

Sjam stands before the military tribunal

Roosa