My Experiences In The World War – Vol. II [Illustrated Edition]

MY EXPERIENCES IN THE WORLD WAR

BY

JOHN J. PERSHING

Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

VOLUME I

WITH SIXTY-NINE REPRODUCTIONS FROM PHOTOGRAPHS AND NUMEROUS MAPS

 This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – contact@picklepartnerspublishing.com

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 1931 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2013, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

ILLUSTRATIONS 6

MAPS AND CHARTS 7

CHAPTER XXVII 8

Visit British Front—Inspection of 77th Division—Agreement on Training with British—Conference in England—London Agreement—Discussion with Foch on Shipment American Troops—Shipping Situation —Recommend Call for 1,500,000 Men—Seicheprey—French and British Propose Limiting our Production Airplanes—Italians and Unity of Command—Foch’s Authority Extended to Include Italian Army. 8

CHAPTER XXVIII 21

Conference at Abbeville—Allied Leaders Greatly Alarmed—Insistent on American Replacements—Infantry and Machine Gunners Urged— Heated Discussions—Lloyd George Makes More Tonnage Available— Agreement Reached—Some American Troops for Italy 21

CHAPTER XXIX 34

Shipping Problems—British Request for Artillerymen—Venereal Question —British Object to Colored Troops—Resume of Troops in France— Inspection of 2nd Division—French and British Urging President for Further Priority Infantry and Machine Gun Units—Aviation—Duty at G.H.Q. 34

CHAPTER XXX 46

Visit Pétain at Chantilly—1st Division Preparing Offensive—Conference with S.O.S. Officials—Agreement Regarding Unified Supply—1st Division Attacks at Cantigny—Germans Drive French Beyond the Marne —2nd and 3rd Divisions Stop German Advance—Inspection of Divisions with British for Training—Call on Foch at Sarcus—Ragueneau on American Characteristics—Pétain’s Instructions to French Liaison Officers 46

CHAPTER XXXI 59

Animated Conference at Versailles—Allies Recommend 100 American Divisions—Allied Fear—Situation Reported to Washington—Refugees— British Partially Accept Principle of Coordination of Supply 59

CHAPTER XXXII 71

Fears for Safety of Paris—Belleau Wood Taken—Pétain's Appreciation —Marne Counteroffensive Indicated—Visit Clemenceau and Foch— French Advance in Counterattack—Anniversary of Arrival in France —Discipline in Our Army—Italian Successes—Foch Requests American Regiments—Cables Regarding Promotions—Information to Press —Letter to Secretary of War 71

CHAPTER XXXIII 84

Movements of Divisions—Allied Morale Dangerously Low—Sixty-six Division Program—Five Million Tons Shipping Required—Very Large Expansion Necessary—Progress of Services of Supply—Military Board of Allied Supply—Letter to Secretary of War on Urgency of Situation —Visit Troops in Vosges—Training with French and British of Slight Value—Physical Activity Required of General Officers—Colored Troops 84

CHAPTER XXXIV 94

Conference with Clemenceau and Foch at Chaumont—Relative Allied and Enemy Strength—Eighty to One Hundred Divisions Recommended— Foch Again Asks for American Regiments—Not Always Impartial— Naval Aviation—Progress of Aviation in A.E.F.—Twenty-two Divisions in France—New Corps Completed—Hospitalization for our Casualties at Château-Thierry Inadequate 94

CHAPTER XXXV 102

Allotment of Liberty Engines to Allies—Horse Procurement—Chaplains— Meeting Supreme War Council—Belgians and Unity of Command— Fourth of July—Troops of 33rd Division Attack with British—Reorganization of Services of Supply—American Troops Requested for Balkan Front 102

CHAPTER XXXVI 113

Conference with General Foch—Propose American Sector at Château-Thierry—Foch Declares for an American Army—Possible Operations Discussed—Kerensky and Intervention in Russia—French Independence Day—Postal Service—German Attack in Marne Salient Expected—Began on Fifteenth and Was Stopped—Our 3rd and 42nd Divisions Do Well—Situation Favorable for Allies 113

CHAPTER XXXVII 122

American Forces Provide Superiority in Manpower—Counteroffensive Marne Salient—1st and 2nd Divisions Arrowhead of Attack—Capture over 6,000 Prisoners—Germans Begin Retirement—Turning Point of War—Other American Divisions Take Pan in Attack—Visit to Units Engaged—Confer with Pétain and Foch—American Sector Decided— Entertain Haig 122

CHAPTER XXXVIII 135

Conference of Commanders-in-Chief—Initiative with the Allies—Plans Approved—Preliminary Operations—St. Mihiel American Task—First Army Organization Under Way—American Troops Ordered to Russia —President’s Declaration of Aims and Purposes of the United States— Harbord to Command Services of Supply—Proposal that Washington Control Supply—Letters from and to Secretary of War 135

CHAPTER XXXIX 151

Inspect Services of Supply with Harbord—At Headquarters, Tours—Confer with Supply Chiefs—Visit Wounded—Bordeaux Works Immense— La Rochelle—Nantes and St. Nazaire Activities—Brest Well Organized—Other Installations—S.O.S. Monument to American Initiative 151

CHAPTER XL 162

Reduction of Château-Thierry Salient Completed—President Poincaré's Visit to Chaumont—Mr. Hoover Discusses Allied Food Supply—I Take Command of First Army—33rd Division Attacks with British— King George Visits 33rd Division—Bestows Decorations—Withdraw Divisions from British—Vicissitudes of Forming Independent Army —Foch Suggests Control of Allied Supply Under One Head—War Department Appears Swamped 162

CHAPTER XLI 176

Preparations for St. Mihiel Offensive Begun—Composition of First Army —Concentration Half Million Men—French Services Required—First Army Staff Working Well—Colored Troops—Conferences with Foch and Pétain—Two Divisions Left with British—Heavy Artillery Delayed—St. Mihiel Postponed—Urge Maximum Effort at Home— Recommend Withdrawal Allied Instructors in Training—Advance Headquarters, Ligny-en-Barrois—Ruse Near Belfort Successful— Cabled President Wilson Suggesting Possibility of Victory, 1918 176

CHAPTER XLII 187

Thirty-second Division at Juvigny—St. Mihiel Transferred to American Command—Foch Makes Impossible Proposition—Would Break up American Army—Decline Approval—Conference with Pétain—Further Discussion with Foch—Agreement Reached—Americans Assigned to Meuse-Argonne Front—Lord Reading Advocates American Army near British—Diaz Requests Twenty-five American Divisions 187

CHAPTER XLIII 199

Preparations for St. Mihiel Completed—Description of Terrain—Plan of Battle—Order of Battle—Attack Begins—Objectives Taken First Day —Salient Wiped Out—Visit Town with Pétain—Our Victory Inspiring-Congratulatory Messages—Clemenceau on our Front—President and Madame Poincaré Visit Ruins of Home 199

CHAPTER XLIV 212

Red Cross Cooperation—Cable for Auxiliary Services—No Improvement in Rifle Training in United States—Visit St. Mihiel with Marshal Foch— We Turn to the Meuse-Argonne—Simultaneous Allied Attacks Planned —Meuse-Argonne Vital Front—Description of Sector—German Defensive Lines—Concentration Hurried—Complicated Movements—Use of Partially Trained Divisions—Visit to Verdun 212

CHAPTER XLV 221

First Army Takes Command of Meuse-Argonne Sector—Order of Battle —Plan of Battle—Battle Begins—Strong Defense Encountered— Montfaucon Taken—Counterattacks—New Divisions Yield—Success of First Four Days—Difficult Problems—Visit by M. Clemenceau— 27th and 30th Divisions Attack with British 221

CHAPTER XLVI 234

New Proposal by Foch—Would Divide First Army—Flatly Disapprove— Motor Transport Woefully Short—Rail Transportation Inadequate— Shipments Haphazard—Mr. Baker Obtains Additional Tonnage from British—Personnel Falling Behind—Secretary’s Departure—Letters Exchanged 234

CHAPTER XLVII 244

Vigorous Attacks Continued—Terrific Hand-to-Hand Fighting—I Corps Makes Important Gains—1st Division, I Corps, Drives Through— Other Corps Advance—French Fourth Army Stopped—Helped by Brilliant Work of 2nd Division—Heavy Casualties, Much Sickness— Relief of Lost Battalion—Attack Extended East of the Meuse—Second Corps Does Well with British 244

CHAPTER XLVIII 256

Second Army Organized—Liggett takes First, Bullard Second—General Attack Resumed—Côte Dame Marie Captured—Hindenburg Line Broken—Germans Treating for Peace—Diplomatic Correspondence— Foch Fears President Wilson may Commit Allies too Deeply—British Views on Armistice 256

CHAPTER XLIX 266

Situation of First Army in Mid-October—Operations Preliminary to Resumption of General Offensive—II Corps with British—General Attack Set for October 28th—Senlis Conference at which Commanders-in-Chief Discuss Armistice Terms—My Views Cabled Washington— President’s Comments—My Recommendation for Demanding Unconditional Surrender 266

CHAPTER L 281

Preparations for General Attack—Plan of Manoeuver—Attack Begins November 1st—Enemy Overwhelmed—First Army Forces Crossings of Meuse—Drive Relentless—We Reach Sedan on the 7th—German Delegates meet Foch to Discuss Terms of Armistice—Advance Continues in Meuse-Argonne—Second Army Assumes Offensive—37th and 91st Divisions in Flanders—Foch Appeals to Commanders-in-Chief for Decisive Results 281

CHAPTER LI 294

Armistice—Resume—Decoration Foch, Joffre, Pétain and Haig—Call on Clemenceau 294

APPENDIX 302

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES NOVEMBER 1, 1918 302

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 302

SERVICES 302

SERVICES OF SUPPLY (Continued) 303

FIRST ARMY 303

SECOND ARMY 303

THIRD ARMY 304

I CORPS 304

II CORPS 304

III CORPS 304

IV CORPS 304

V CORPS 305

VI CORPS 305

VII CORPS 305

DIVISIONAL STAFFS 306

ILLUSTRATIONS

General John J. Pershing (From a war-time sketch)

General Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces

General Pershing Decorating General Pétain

American Troops Being Relieved for Rest

American Troops Ready for Departure to the Front

At Chaumont, June 23, 1918

Major General Muir

Major General Wright

Major General Cronkhite

Lieutenant General Currie, Canadian Forces

Major General Dickman

Lieutenant General Bullard

Major General Summerall

Major General Hines

Bernard M. Baruch

Brigadier General Dawes

Edward R. Stettinius

Brigadier General Atterbury

Major General Kernan

Major General Langfitt

Major General Patrick

Major General Connor

Tanks Manned by American Troops Going into Action Near Boureuilles, Sept. 26, 1918

American Troops On Way to the Front, Scringes, Aug. 4, 1918

Major General Allen

Major General Menoher

Major General Haan

Brigadier General Drum

Rolling Kitchen at the Front in St. Mihiel Drive, Sept. 12, 1918

Red Cross Giving Food and Tobacco to Troops Going into the Line

American Troops on Way to the Front. Dun-sur-Meuse, Nov. 6, 1918

Road Scene at Esnes. American Troops on Way to the Front, Sept. 29, 1918

American Troops, Cuisy, Oct. 11, 1918

American Infantry in the Argonne Forest, Sept. 26, 1918

American Artillery Firing on the Enemy with a 340 MM. Gun, Sept. 26, 1918

Outposts in American Trenches

Armistice Celebration, Place de la Concorde, Paris

MAPS AND CHARTS

Location American Divisions, May 14, 1918

Capture of Cantigny by 1st Division, May 28, 1918

Ground Gained by German Offensives of May, June and July, 1918

Strength of the A.E.F. by Months

2nd Division, June 4-July 10, 1918

Location American Divisions, July 18, 1918

Plan for Franco-American Counteroffensive, July 18, 1918

1st and 2nd Divisions, July 18-22, 1918

American Divisions at the Crossing of the Ourcq

American Divisions in the Reduction of the Marne Salient

32nd Division at Juvigny, Aug. 28-Sept. 2, 1918

Location American Divisions, Aug. 11, 1918

Plan of Attack of First Army, Sept. 12, 1918

St. Mihiel Offensive, Sept. 12-16, 1918

German Defensive Organization in the Meuse-Argonne Region

Plan of Attack of First Army, Sept. 26, 1918

27th and 30th Divisions at St. Quentin Tunnel

Plan of Attack of First Army, Oct. 4, 1918

2nd Division and 71st Brigade (36th Division) at Blanc Mont, Oct. 2-9, 1918

Plan of Attack of First Army East of the Meuse, Oct. 8, 1918

Plan of Attack of First Army, Oct. 14, 1918

Meuse-Argonne Offensive Progress to Oct. 31, 1918

Plan of Attack of First Army, Nov. 1, 1918

Meuse-Argonne Offensive, Nov. 1-11, 1918

The Resumption of the Advance in the Woëvre, Nov. 9-11, 1918

37th and 91st Divisions in Belgium, Oct. 30 to Nov. 11, 1918

MY EXPERIENCES IN THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER XXVII

Visit British Front—Inspection of 77th Division—Agreement on Training with British—Conference in England—London Agreement—Discussion with Foch on Shipment American Troops—Shipping Situation —Recommend Call for 1,500,000 Men—Seicheprey—French and British Propose Limiting our Production Airplanes—Italians and Unity of Command—Foch’s Authority Extended to Include Italian Army.

(Diary) British G.H.Q., Saturday, April 20, 1918. Washington disturbed over German propaganda.{1} Came here yesterday at Sir Douglas Haig’s invitation to discuss training of our troops and study operations in progress.

Stopped at our II Corps Headquarters at Fruges to-day and find organization well handled by Chief of Staff, Colonel G. S. Simonds. Saw some of 77th Division, now arriving in British area. Visited General Currie’s headquarters at Chamblain l’Abbé.

WE were always made welcome at British headquarters. It so happened that on the day of our arrival Lord Derby, who had just been replaced as Minister of War by Lord Milner, was there en route to Paris as British Ambassador. During dinner the conversation ran along freely as though we were members of the official family. At length, Lord Derby and Sir Douglas drifted to the subject of British politicians. It would betray no confidence to say that during this conversation there was considerable criticism of some who held prominent places. The coalition Government came in for its share because of its attitude toward the military High Command. Lord Derby was well known to be a warm supporter of the British Commander-in-Chief, and from what I knew of the relations between the civil and the military authorities of Great Britain it is fair to presume that this might have been the reason he relinquished his post as Minister for War. He asked why all parties were not represented in our Cabinet, but I did not undertake to give any explanation, although I had often asked myself the same question. It need hardly be recalled that in so far as the Americans were concerned Lord Derby was always most helpful.

The operations on the Lys were still active and the Germans were showing their usual persistence. Marshal Haig spoke in high terms of the fine conduct of his divisions against the enemy’s offensive. They deserved high praise, as they were not at all fresh, and generally occupied a much wider front than safety demanded. Sir Douglas seemed to be confident that the offensive would soon spend itself.

It was stimulating to morale to visit the headquarters of the Canadians, where one soon caught the fine spirit of that superb corps. We talked with the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, his Chief of Staff, and others, and had tea with them. The alertness and confidence of these neighbors of ours were admirable, and the excellent record they had made and were still making gave us as much gratification as though they had been our own countrymen. I remember this visit with much pleasure and recall the prediction of the Canadians that Americans would soon play an important part in the war.

General Currie deplored the fact that the British had so easily given up Passchendaele Ridge, which the year before he had been told must be taken at all cost, and for which the Canadians made the tremendous sacrifice of 16,000 casualties. His divisions were then holding 9,000 yards each, or a little over five miles of front, as compared with from 4,500 to 7,000 yards per division held by Gough’s and Byng’s armies in March. Currie considered that his extension would be excessive in the face of a determined and powerful offensive using shock tactics. Whatever the disadvantages were, it did show the British Commander-in-Chiefs confidence in the Canadians.

I took advantage of the opportunity while on the British front to visit the Nordausques area to inspect the advance elements of the 77th Division, which was one of the divisions selected for training with the British. We took luncheon with Brigadier General Evan M. Johnson, then temporarily in command, and his staff officers. He praised the soldierly qualities of the men, but said they were very much behind in their training. This division had suffered severely from the practice followed by the War Department of taking men who had been under training for some time and sending them elsewhere for special purposes. A total of 30,000 men had been selected from time to time from this division and their places filled with recruits, with the result that the infantry and machine gun units, numbering about 17,000 men, that reported in France were composed largely of untrained or partially trained troops.

While at Sir Douglas’ headquarters, he and I reached an understanding as to the training and administration of American troops that were to be temporarily with the British. In the first place, they were to be allocated by regiments to British skeleton divisions under such a schedule as might be agreed upon. The training staffs of British divisions were to be at the disposal of these regiments, especially for instruction in the use of the rifle and machine gun, and in the handling of gas. After that, and with the approval of their American division commander, each regiment was to be attached to a British division in line, so that each of its three battalions would have the opportunity of serving with one of the British brigades. Our battalions were to be commanded by our own officers, and our regimental staffs were to be attached to those of British brigades. In the next stage, each of our regiments, with its three battalions united under the regimental commander, was to act as a brigade in a British division. The final stage would find the four American regiments reunited to form the division under its own officers, with British artillery until the arrival of its own artillery brigade.

In carrying out this scheme, the tendency at first was for British officers actually to assume command of our units in training. Our officers in most cases permitted this to be done until it was checked by my orders, which directed that American units must be commanded in training by the officers and non-commissioned officers who are to command them in battle, and, further, that American troops would in all cases be commanded in battle only by Americans.

The program probably expedited preparation in some respects, but questions of food, transport, and methods of instruction arose which demonstrated that any attempt at permanent amalgamation would have surely led to friction and inefficiency. Because they were needed elsewhere, none of the divisions sent to train with the British, except the 27th and 30th, remained long enough to carry out the prescribed course.

The subject of coordination of the supply systems of the armies on the Western Front was also taken up with Sir Douglas. I explained my idea of pooling supplies, and pointed out that he was already committed to the principle, as illustrated by his providing certain equipment and transportation for our divisions that were to serve behind his lines for training. But the proposition of relinquishing control of his supplies, even partially, did not appeal to him. He was afraid that if it should be given general application it would be a one-sided affair. To a certain extent this might have been the result, as we would probably have been the greatest beneficiaries. But if by pooling certain things common to all armies, more tonnage could have been  saved to transport our troops and supplies, it would have meant that much more aid to the Allied cause.

(Diary) London, Wednesday, April 24, 1918. Left British G.H.Q. for London on Sunday, with Harbord, Boyd, and Adamson. Were met at Folkestone by Biddle and Rethers.{2} Also met Stevens and L. H. Shearman at Folkestone, both anxious about coal supply. Little evidence of food shortage at the Savoy Hotel, where we are stopping.

Called Monday on Ambassador Page, who said my offer to Foch had greatly pleased the British. Saw Admiral Sims and find he thinks decreased danger from submarines warrants sending troops by smaller ships. Started conference with Lord Milner and Sir Henry Wilson.

On Tuesday Winston Churchill told me that as the German attack was a month later than expected they had plenty of artillery and ammunition, notwithstanding recent losses. Called on Mr. Lloyd George and discussed Allied supply with him but got little encouragement.

Resumed conference this morning and agreed on details of troop shipments. Had luncheon with Major and Lady Astor. Dined informally at St. James' Palace with the Duke of Connaught, who does not share the gloomy outlook, although he deplores the severe losses.

Following the suggestion of Lord Milner, I went to London to consider further the shipment of American troops. At our first meeting there were present Lord Milner and General Sir Henry Wilson, who had succeeded General Robertson as the Chief of the General Staff, Harbord, and myself. The main point of difference that had developed in previous conferences as to just how far the Americans should be committed to serve in active operations was again considered. I stated that the principal thing was to get our units trained, and that while I was opposed to amalgamation, yet if during the period of instruction the British units with which they were serving should be attacked, or if another great emergency should arise, of course our men would go in. Naturally, the British wanted unlimited infantry and machine gun units, but I could not go further than to consider a limited extension of the six-division plan.

During the conference, a cable from Lord Reading to the Prime Minister was brought forth which stated that the President had agreed to the amalgamation of Americans with the British. I had nothing official at hand later than the President’s conditional approval of Joint Note No. 18 as suggested by Mr. Baker, so I promptly said that it could not be possible that any such concession had been made, and that the classes of our troops to be shipped over and their disposition must be left to me. Of course, we knew that the British were pressing this point by constant appeals to the President and that they were insisting that he should agree to the shipment of 120,000 infantry and machine gun units per month for four months, to the exclusion of all other personnel. While the British conferees had concluded from Lord Reading’s cable that their case was won, I took quite another view and declined to consider the information as conclusive.

As a result of these discussions, we reached an agreement which provided for the shipment in the month of May, by British and American tonnage, of the infantry, machine gun, engineer, and signal troops, together with the various unit headquarters, of six divisions for training with the British Army. It was provided that any shipping in excess of the amount required for this number of troops should be utilized to transport the artillery of these divisions, and that such personnel as might be required to build up corps organizations should then follow; it being understood that the artillery regiments would train with the French and join their proper divisions when the training of the infantry was completed.

In order to meet any emergency which might require an excess of infantry after the completion of this program, it was agreed that all the American and British shipping available for the transportation of troops was to be used under such arrangement as would insure immediate aid to the Allies, and thereafter as far as possible provide other units necessary to complete the organization of our divisions and corps. It was further agreed that the combatant troops mentioned in connection with May shipments should be followed by such service of supply troops and other contingents as we ourselves might consider necessary, inasmuch as the shipment of such troops had been postponed; and that all these troops should be utilized at my discretion, except that the six divisions which the British were to transport would be trained with them.

Upon reaching Chaumont, I found a cablegram, dated April 26th, transmitting a memorandum, dated April 19th, that had been sent by direction of the President to the British Ambassador at Washington in conformity with his approval of Joint Note No. 18 of the Supreme War Council. In this memorandum the shipment of only infantry and machine gun units for four months was conceded, and it was hoped and believed that the number would be 120,000 per month. Their assignment for training and use was to be left to my discretion. The memorandum went on to say that the United States, until the situation changed, had no intention of departing from as full compliance with the recommendation of the Permanent Military Representatives as the nature of the case would permit.

This was the first official information I had received that the Administration had agreed to send any specific numbers of infantry and machine gun units to France.

The following quotation is a continuation of the memorandum:

It being also understood that this statement is not to be regarded as a commitment from which the Government of the United States is not free to depart when the exigencies no longer require it; and also that the preferential transportation of infantry and machine gun units here set forth as a policy and principle is not to be regarded as so exclusive as to prevent the Government of the United States from including in the troops carried by its own tonnage from time to time relatively small numbers of personnel of other arms as may be deemed wise by the United States as replacements and either to make possible the use of a maximum capacity of ships or the most efficient use of the infantry and machine gun units as such transported, or the maintenance of the services of supply already organized and in process of construction for the American Army already in France.

This concession went further than it was necessary to go and much further than I had expected. Realizing the complications that might arise from commitments so far in the future and the delay in forming an American army that would follow, I did not agree in later discussions at the Supreme War Council with all that the Allies now felt justified in demanding. I was opposed to the action of the Council in assuming the power to dispose of American troops under any circumstances. Moreover, it was not in any sense a prerogative of this body.

There can be little doubt that even before the President’s memorandum was issued Lord Reading received the distinct impression that infantry and machine gun units would be sent to France at the rate of 120,000 men per month for four months, beginning with April. That the President agreed to this in principle is practically certain. It need not be further emphasized that such a concession, even though prompted by the most generous impulse, could only add to the difficulties of our task of building up an army of our own. It is probable that Lord Reading, skilled advocate that he was, did more while Ambassador at Washington to influence the Administration to grant Allied requests than any other individual.

The Secretary of War upon his return caused the Administration’s position to be somewhat more clearly defined through the President’s memorandum, but the statement still left much to be desired in the way of a positive declaration of our purpose to have our own army. It left a very definite notion in the minds of the Allies that the Administration at Washington was favourable to amalgamation and that the main obstacle to be overcome was the military head of the American forces in France. This is doubtless the reason why all the Allied verbal heavy artillery was often turned in my direction.

The agreement made in London, as actually drawn, while insuring the shipment of largely increased numbers of troops did not commit us to sending infantry and machine gun units exclusively beyond June 1st. It provided a reserve of the classes of troops that might be needed by the British until their new drafts should be available, and offered the possibility of our getting  other classes of troops to complete our plans of organization for the auxiliary arms and Services of Supply. The British thought that this program could be very much exceeded and believed it might be possible to transport entire divisions besides a number of corps and S.O.S. troops. The concession we made for May was a radical departure from the wise policy of bringing over balanced forces in complete organizations, but the clamor was so great and the danger of the absolute defeat of the Allies seemed so imminent that it was thought to be warranted as a temporary expedient.

The question of applying conscription to Ireland was then under consideration by the British and it appeared probable, according to views expressed more or less guardedly, that British troops would be required to enforce it. Inasmuch as such a measure would more than likely have affected the attitude of American troops of Irish origin toward service with the British, our argument was strengthened regarding the desirability of keeping our own troops together and organizing them into an American army at the earliest possible date.

(Diary) Paris, Saturday, April 27, 1918. Left London Thursday by automobile, boarded a British destroyer at Folkestone, reaching Boulogne about four in the afternoon. Colonel Mott was there with request from General Foch for me to come to Sarcus. Held conference and went to Paris that night.

Yesterday morning met with Stevens, Morrow, Rublee, and Shearman of Allied Maritime Transport Council. Saw Colonel Percy L. Jones regarding relations with French of our ambulance companies under his supervision. Discussed coal situation with Loucheur, also heavy artillery and airplanes.

Cabled recommendation that call be made for 1,500,000 men.{3} Rumors thought reliable indicate that Germans contemplate building up armies with Russians. The enemy attacked the 26th Division at Seicheprey on the night of 20th-21st and inflicted considerable loss. 1st Division began entering line on the 24th and to-day assumed command of front opposite Cantigny.

Arriving at General Foch's headquarters, we found Generals Bliss and Weygand, and after dinner we entered into a general discussion about American troop shipments:

Foch:

On March 28th you came to offer the services of American troops. I have a vivid recollection of the occasion. As to the American divisions, in what order do you think they should be employed?

Pershing:

The order would be the 26th, 42nd, 2nd. (The 1st had already been sent to an active front near Amiens.) The regiments of the 32nd will be ready by May 1st.

Foch:

I do not think they can be used before May 5th, but the more we put into the line the better it will be. Your 77th Division has arrived, I see. What about the 3rd and 5th?

Pershing:

The infantry of the 3rd has arrived, and that of the 5th will soon follow.

Foch:

What we need now is infantry, especially the British, on account of the present crisis. That is why the Supreme War Council at Versailles recommended that all tonnage be devoted to that purpose for the time being. I hope that America may send over as much infantry as possible during the next three months. The other arms to complete your divisions can come afterwards. What do you think of that plan?

Pershing:

I cannot commit myself to such a proposition. If nothing but infantry and machine gunners are brought over to the total of 360,000, it will be October or November before the artillery and auxiliary troops could arrive and we could not foresee the formation of an American army until next spring.

Foch:

I think your calculation is rather pessimistic, for we could begin bringing your other troops in August, but, without considering that point, we can furnish you with artillery and its personnel, and you can have your divisions reconstituted beginning with October. What would you propose in this connection?

Pershing:

I think we should limit the transportation of infantry to the month of May, and that the artillery and auxiliary troops should come in June. They should not arrive more than a month later than the infantry.

General Foch then made some calculations based upon 100,000 men per month for three months and continued:

Foch:

If we could bring 120,000 in May, that would still leave us 100,000 below British losses.

Pershing:

Under what conditions would you employ the American infantry units?

Foch:

What proposition have you to offer on that subject? To begin with, I would not split up your regiments.

Pershing:

When would these regiments be grouped into brigades and the brigades into divisions?

Foch:

A final decision cannot be made on that subject. That will evidently depend upon the degree of instruction of the units. In the crisis that actually confronts the Allied armies, it is effectives that we lack. The method of employing these units is a question to be handled in due course and according to their efficiency.

Pershing:

I would like to have the conditions under which these units are to be employed determined now and to fix the time during which the regiments and brigades will be used separately.

Foch:

Make your proposition on that subject.

I then explained to him the details of the system that was being followed where our divisions were in training with the French, and the plan agreed upon with the British. I added that it was fully understood that if an emergency should arise while our troops were in training, they would go into battle as part of the divisions with which they were serving. He seemed to approve the method, but returned once more to the decision taken by the Supreme War Council with reference to the shipment of American infantry and machine gun units, upon which the following conversation ensued:

Foch:

I do not doubt the excellency of the method, but in the crisis through which we are passing I return to the decision of the Supreme War Council and I ask you to transport during the months of May, June, and July, only infantry and machine gun units. Will you consent?

Pershing:

No, I do not consent. I propose for one month to ship nothing but infantry and machine gun units and after that the other arms and service of the rear troops to correspond.

Foch:

If you adopt the plan I propose you would have by July 31st, 300,000 more American infantry.

Pershing:

You said just now that you would furnish the artillery and even artillerymen, which would be joined with our infantry to complete our divisions. Then why not consent to transport our artillery personnel along with our infantry?

Foch:

I repeat that it is the infantry of which we have the greatest need at this time. I would like to have General Bliss tell us what were the considerations which led to the decision taken by the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

Bliss:

The collective note recommended to the United States to send only infantry until the Supreme War Council should give instructions to the contrary. The Government of the United States in conformity with this note and with the recommendations of Mr. Baker consented to this plan. As far as the employment of the units on the front is concerned, the question should be decided by General Pershing according to agreement with the Commander-in*Chief to whose army they may be attached.

Pershing:

I have been discussing this question of training our units for the last eight months, first with General Pétain and then with Marshal Haig. The method agreed upon leads naturally to the formation of constituted American divisions.

General Foch stated that he wished to see American divisions constituted and an American army formed as large as possible, but the policy he was advocating would have made it impossible to form an American army without serious delay, if ever. Continuing, he said:

But do not forget that we are in the midst of a hard battle. If we do not take steps to prevent the disaster which is threatened at present the American Army may arrive in France to find the British pushed into the sea and the French driven back behind the Loire, while it tries in vain to organize on lost battlefields over the graves of Allied soldiers.

He was assured that it was fully understood that if an emergency should arise while our troops were in training with the British or French, they would go into the battle and do their part. I then gave him the numbers to be shipped during May and told him that it had been agreed between the British and ourselves to consider the question for June later. I informed him that the British shipping authorities now thought that it would be possible within the next three months to transport to France 750,000 men.

He was surprised to learn that enough shipping had been found to bring over so many, and, while insisting that we continue the May program into June, said that if it was possible to transport any such numbers he saw no reason why whole divisions should not soon be transported. Nevertheless, a few days later he made a still stronger demand for special shipments of infantry and machine gun units.

The shipping situation as brought out in conference with the American members of the Maritime Transport Council did not appear so favorable as we had been led to believe. Only two of our newly built vessels had been delivered and our shipbuilding program was not yet far enough along to count as an important factor, although prospects were that the rate would soon begin to increase. A full study made by our delegates to the Council of the demands to be made upon Allied and neutral tonnage for military, naval, and general needs showed an estimated shortage of nearly 2,000,000 tons. It was obvious that the program for strengthening the Western Front must be carried out if possible. Therefore, all practicable measures for the economical employment of every available ton of shipping, especially for freight, were given consideration at our conference.

It was thought, in the first place, that the Allied navies could reduce their requirements of merchant tonnage by a joint examination of the naval programs; second, that considerable shipping could be saved by suspending or reducing military and naval activities in theaters of war other than the Western Front; third, that further reductions in Allied civilian imports might be made temporarily; and, finally, that insistence upon the adoption of unified action in the supply services by the Allies on the Western Front, already suggested, would result in a material saving of tonnage.

I heartily approved of the above recommendations and sent a cable to Washington to that effect, of which the following is an extract:

"April 30, 1918.

I therefore heartily approve the recommendation made by the Allied Maritime Transport Council (which, it is important to note, is a body upon which French and British ministers are sitting) that all of the military programs of the Allies be brought under joint review by the appropriate military authorities to the end that effort may be concentrated on the Western Front. While this is of vital importance to the common cause, it is of peculiar and of almost supreme importance to our own rapidly growing army. If programs are allowed to remain in effect which call for more tonnage than is in existence, the calls for diversion of our ships for food supplies, coal, nitrates, and other things essential to our Allies will become more and more insistent. They will tend to converge more and more upon our program because our program is rapidly expanding and the others are comparatively rigid. Therefore a cutting down of all military programs that do not directly contribute to the common cause and a greater unity in the prosecution of those plans that do contribute to the common cause are essential during the next few months if we are to avoid the disaster that will come from haphazard curtailments of absolute essentials at the eleventh hour.

Of course, certain agreements as to raw materials had to be maintained in order to keep production of ammunition and airplanes going and these required at least 30,000 tons monthly. In general, as with the question of unity of supply, to which all agreed in principle, so it was with sea transportation, but action in the latter case presented serious difficulties. As a matter of fact, in the broad sense the two were intimately connected. It seemed to me that the control of Allied supplies could well be vested in a board (with executive powers) consisting of a representative from each Government. It appeared logical that this board, in consultation with the Allied Maritime Council, should be authorized to allot Allied tonnage. This was fully stated in my cables, but Washington did not wholly accept my views.

Confronted as we were by the lack of trained men at this time, it was evident that we should within a few months find ourselves facing a still more serious situation unless increased numbers were put in training without delay. Supplementing the suggestion I had made verbally to the Secretary, a cable was sent on April 27th, which included also a reference to the numbers of partially trained men in divisions then arriving, as follows:

Regard it most imperative that there be no delay in calling out a new draft and the entire summer season devoted to instruction and training so that new troops may be thoroughly and systematically trained without disturbing organizations when formed. Believe German offensive will be stopped but Allied aggressive must be undertaken as early as possible thereafter and American forces must be in position to throw in their full weight. Recommend that a call be issued at once for at least one million and a half men. Having in mind large replacements of losses that are sure to occur and the delays of organization and equipment of new drafts, this is the smallest number that should be considered.

In reply to this the following was received, dated May 7th:

"With reference to paragraph i your 990, troops sent you have been best available. Divisions became depleted during the winter on account large numbers being taken for staff corps and other unavoidable causes, and lack of equipment for replacements. Conditions will improve early in July so that eventually only those divisions with at least six months training will be sent.***

With reference to paragraph 3 your 990, 643,198 white, and 73,326 colored men, total 716,524, have been drafted since January 1st, including May draft. Draft will be continued monthly to maximum capacity. Impracticable to draft one million and a half at one time. Draft already called will fill all divisions now organized and all other troops for second and third phases. Question of organizing new divisions under consideration. We now have troops of all classes under training in replacement camps.

On the night of April 20th-21st, the Germans made a raid on the 26th Division in the vicinity of Seicheprey. The attack covered a two-mile front extending west from the Bois de Remières. It came during a heavy fog and was a complete surprise to our troops, who were considerably outnumbered. The fighting in Seicheprey was violent, causing heavy losses on both sides. The town was taken by the enemy. The success of the raid may be attributed largely to the destruction by the German artillery of the divisional system of communications, which naturally resulted in some confusion in the division. Although cooperation among the units was difficult under the circumstances, it was finally established and the original front was reoccupied the following day.{4}

(Diary) Paris, Tuesday, April 30, 1918. Congress has wisely passed an act providing for indemnity to Allies for damage by our troops abroad.

On Sunday took up with Colonel H. B. Jordan, of the Ordnance, the subject of heavy guns from French, and with Foulois their production of airplanes. General Crozier, back from Italy, favors sending American troops there. Left for Chaumont that evening.

Generals John L. Hines and Brewster called yesterday, and Martin Egan{5} came for confidential conference. General Liggett, I