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The Conduct of the War Of Sea - An Essay
The Conduct of the War Of Sea - An Essay
The Conduct of the War Of Sea - An Essay
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The Conduct of the War Of Sea - An Essay

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Admiral Dönitz’ essay on the Conduct of the War at Sea is published… for several reasons. It has historical significance as a review of the German Navy’s participation in World War II. Also, from the standpoint of naval science, the opinions of an enemy naval officer of Dönitz’ caliber merit study and consideration. Still more important is the forceful presentation of Hitler’s fatal error in disregarding or underestimating the necessity of sea power as a prerequisite to a major political power engaging successfully in war of any magnitude - or, by the same token, defending successfully its own political and economic boundaries and rights.
In order to assist in the analysis of the essay, this publication includes a biographical sketch of the author, introductory remarks concerning the essay’s background and contents and a list of subjects in the form of a table of contents
Doenitz was interrogated in order to amplify certain portions and theories of the essay, and his interrogation is also published herewith . His reaction to such interrogation and to analyses made of the essay is set forth in the Introduction.
LanguageEnglish
PublisherLucknow Books
Release dateAug 15, 2014
ISBN9781782892601
The Conduct of the War Of Sea - An Essay

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    The Conduct of the War Of Sea - An Essay - Großadmiral Karl Dönitz

     This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

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    Text originally published in 1949 under the same title.

    © Pickle Partners Publishing 2013, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AT SEA

    An Essay by

    Admiral Karl Dönitz

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

    FOREWORD 3

    KARL DÖNITZ 4

    INTRODUCTION 5

    SECTION I — 30 January 1933 to 1 September 1939 6

    The U-boat is developed against England — Development of the sink-at-sight policy — Early U-boat operations — Failure of magnetic torpedo pistols — Heavy U-boat losses — Strategic use of surface forces — New surface ship construction policy — Surface ship operations — Impact of the Polish campaign 6

    SECTION II — 30 January 1933 to 1 September 1939 9

    Advantages of Norwegian neutrality — Preparations to counter British influence in Norway—Occupation of Norway: — Despatch of merchant ships — Naval forces employed — U-boats ineffective owing to torpedo failures — British antisubmarine and aircraft success — Battle of Narvik — Unsuspected British withdrawal from Narvik — Sinking of H.M.S. Glorious — Fortification of Norwegian coast — Weak naval effort in the West — Value of French U-boat bases — War against merchant shipping — Plans for invasion of England: — Active naval preparations — Insufficient German naval strength — German Air Forces' task — Failure of German Air Force and postponement of the invasion 9

    SECTION III — April 1940 to October 1940 13

    Advantages of Norwegian neutrality — Preparations to counter British influence in Norway—Occupation of Norway: — Despatch of merchant ships — Naval forces employed — U-boats ineffective owing to torpedo failures — British antisubmarine and aircraft success — Battle of Narvik — Unsuspected British withdrawal from Narvik — Sinking of H.M.S. Glorious — Fortification of Norwegian coast — Weak naval effort in the West — Value of French U-boat bases — War against merchant shipping — Plans for invasion of England: — Active naval preparations — Insufficient German naval strength — German Air Forces' task — Failure of German Air Force and postponement of the invasion 13

    SECTION IV — October 1940 to December 1941 18

    Introduction of U-boat Pack tactics — Successes of night attacks and of Type VIIC U-boat—Difficulties of U-boat war 1940-41 — Early failure of aircraft reconnaissance — Success of convoy routing policy — Effect of United States' attitude: — Counterattacks by United States forces — Political decision not to operate U-boats off United States coast—Review of U-boat war in 1941 — Decision to employ unprotected surface ships in Atlantic—American preparations for entry into the war — Sinking of the Bismarck — Effect of air attack on Biscay ports — Raider policy and success — Entry of Italy into the war — The North African campaign—Declaration of war on Russia — Balkan campaign — German Navy's part in the Russian campaign: — The Baltic — The Arctic — The Black Sea 18

    SECTION V — December 1941 to April 1943 25

    United States enters war — Early U-boat successes off Unites States coast — State of the U-boat fleet — Antisubmarine warfare — Summary of U-boat warfare in 1942 — Decrease in U-boat sinkings: — Concentration off Gibraltar — Successful cryptology no longer possible — Successful British measures against U-boat reconnaissance tactics—Radar countermeasures — Surface countermeasures — The fast submerged U-boat — Greater U-boat successes in early 1943 — Remote control of U-boat operations — Peak period of U-boat successes — Cooperation with Japan: — Strategic liaison — Penang as a U-boat base — Raiders and blockade runners — The Channel dash — Operations against Arctic convoys — Other Arctic operations — South Russian campaign: — Early German success — Reversal of the situation — Allied success in North Africa — Scuttling of the French Fleet — Allied mining offensive 25

    SECTION VI — April 1943 to September 1944 32

    Failure of the U-boats: — Success of Allied radar — U-boat losses up to 50 percent — Countermeasures — Appointment of CinC, U-boats, as Supreme Commander German Navy—Increased AA armament of U-boats — Failure of new anticonvoy tactics — Production of the Schnorekel — Strategic U-boat successes — Success of the Schnorekel in the Channel — Cessation of surface ship warfare — New shipbuilding program - Small battle unit construction—Italian campaign: — South Italy — Capitulation of Italy — The part of the German Navy — Withdrawal in Russia - Loss of Balkans and Rumania—Naval war in the north: — The Baltic — Spitzbergen operation — Battleship losses — Before Allied invasion of France: — Reconnaissance earnings — Possible landing points — Nature of the landings — Defense preparations — Before Allied Invasion of France — Continued — Defensive mining — Naval reaction to the landings — Premature fall of Cherbourg — Delaying actions at other French ports — Importance of the capture of Antwerp — Effect of the loss of France on U-boat warfare — The air offensive 32

    SECTION VII — September 1944 to May 1945 39

    Fortress Germany — The German will to resist — New German weapons — Naval reorganization — U-boat operations — Construction of prefabricated U-boats — Expectations of a successful renewal of U-boat warfare—Review of the U-boat war — Sinking of the Tirpitz — Other naval operations: — Cruisers and destroyers — North Sea and Scheldt — The Mediterranean — Unconditional surrender — The part of the German Navy in the war 39

    FINAL OBSERVATIONS 43

    APPENDIX 44

    INTERROGATION OF ADMIRAL DÖNITZ 44

    Allied Bombing 44

    New U-boat Types 44

    Invasion of England 45

    The Development of the K.d.K. (Small Battle Units) 45

    Radar 45

    Russia 45

    FOREWORD

    DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE - 15 January 1946

    NAVY DEPARTMENT,

    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,

    Washington 25, D.C.

    1. Admiral Dönitz' essay on the Conduct of the War at Sea is published by ONI for several reasons. It has historical significance as a review of the German Navy's participation in World War II. Also, from the standpoint of naval science, the opinions of an enemy naval officer of Dönitz' caliber merit study and consideration. Still more important is the forceful presentation of Hitler's fatal error in disregarding or underestimating the necessity of sea power as a prerequisite to a major political power engaging successfully in war of any magnitude - or, by the same token, defending successfully its own political and economic boundaries and rights.

     2. In order to assist in the analysis of the essay, this publication includes a biographical sketch of the author (page IV), introductory remarks concerning the essay's background and contents (pages V and VI), and

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