Chavez vs. PEA salient points: *A land of public domain may be alienated when: 1.

It is officially classified as alienable or disposable by law or presidential proclamation, and that it is open for disposition or concession. 2. It is declared that it is no longer needed for public use or service. 3. There is no law reserving the land for some public or quasi-public use. When dealing with foreshore and submerged areas, they must be reclaimed first. In this case, it was only the Freedom Islands that were reclaimed. *as to the issue that the reclaimed lands have already become private lands because special patents and/or certificates of title in the name of PEA (a government instrumentality) have already been issued covering the said reclaimed lands: Answer: It remained alienable lands of public domain. It only becomes private property when it is passed on to qualified private individuals or government entities not tasked to dispose public lands. (Nota bene: under the PEA charter, it has authority to sell alienable lands of public domain, that is why the Freedom Islands remained as alienable lands of the public domain.) *Alienable lands of public domain can only be leased to private corporations pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Sps.morandarte vs. Ca -art.420 facts:the BOL approved the free patent application of Beder Morandarte. More than 10 yrs.after, the Rep. Of Phil., represented by Dir. Of lands filed a complaint for Annulment of Tiltle & Revision against Sps. Morandarte. Rep.alleged that BOL found that the subject land includes a portion of the Miputak River w/c cannot be validly awarded as it is outside the commerce of man and beyond the authority of the BOL to dispose of. On the otherhand, Sps. Morandarte contended that the Miputak River change its course due to the closure of the river bed through the construction of dikes for the fishponds of the Sps. Lacaya. Sps. Lacaya are the holders of fishpond lease agreement by the BOF covering a part of the land included in the title issued to Morandarte. In line with this, sps. Morandarte claim that only a portion of the property covered be nullified and not the entire title. Issue:WON the questioned property belongs to the public domain & is beyond the commerce of man? Ruling: the court held YES... Applying Art.420 (1) a river is one of the properties of public dominion. It is well recognized that property of the public domain is incapable of registration & its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. In the present case, a portion of land belonging to the pub.domain was merely erroneously included, and absence of clear evidence of fraud on the part of Morandarte will not invalidate the entire title, only on the portion traversed bu the Miputak river be reconveyed back to the state. Lastly, even sps. Morandarte have been occupying the property for more or less 10 yrs., the river and their natural beds cannot be acquired by prescription. Republic of the Philippines vs. CA/Morato FACTS: Morato has filed for patent over a parcel of land which was granted under the condition that he would not encumber it for a period of 5 years from issuance of patent. Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that respondent Morato had encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay. Also, it was then found out that he mortgaged and leased the lots. The government sought for the revocation of the patent issued on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year prohibitory period. The trial court and appellate court decided in favor of the respondents. ISSUE:WON The land is a foreshore land and thus, cannot be the subject of a free patent. HELD:Foreshore lands have been defined to be that part of the land which is between the high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. This is the strip of land that lies between the high and low watermarks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. As a general rule, findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, unless such factual findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 28 The application for a free patent was made in 1972. From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of Appeals, however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land Act. Article 420 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs. Cabangis 30 annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. 31 In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity.

32 The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain. ANECO REALTY versus LANDEX THIS is a simple case of a neighbor seeking to restrain the landowner from fencing his own property. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, Will not unduly restrain the landowner from exercising an inherent proprietary right. Facts: Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots.[3] It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen (17) lots to respondent Landex.[4] The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction[5] with the RTC in Quezon City. Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental complaints seeking to demolish the newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for two million pesos in damages.[6] Landex filed its Answer[7] alleging, among others, that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due to the construction of the concrete wall. Landex claimed that Aneco has its own entrance to its property along Miller Street, Resthaven Street, and San Francisco del Monte Street. The Resthaven access, however, was rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said street. Landex also claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision project. Issue: Whether or not Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its own property. Held: The petition is without merit. Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as here, No interference with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership. Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from fencing its own property. Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. This is clear from the deed of sale between FHDI and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was no longer interested in pursuing its own subdivision project. If Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of the defunct subdivision project of FHDI to the detriment of the new owner Landex. The RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit. Vda. De Nazareno vs Court of Appeals Facts: A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City is said to have been formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Sometime in 1979, Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against Salasalan and Rabaya, which decision was affirmed by the RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 20. The case was remanded to the Municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 and subsequently, a case for certiorari for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25; both of which were dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied.Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands. The report of the Land Investigator, made in compliance with the order of the District Land Officer, recommended the Survey Plan MSI-10-06000571-D (Lot 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public application. Based on the report, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering an amendment to the survey plain of Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of Lands; which was denied.The petitioners, Desamparada vda. De Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazero filed a case before the RTC, for the annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding the parcel of land. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, resulting to the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not the subject land is public land. Held: Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring

property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters. The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the present case as the first and second requirements of the rules were not met. Thus, the Nazarenos cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. By their own admission, the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, this Court held that the word current indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. Petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan MSI-10-06-000571-D which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazarenos Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was controverted by the findings of the ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. In Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the requirement that the deposit should due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Article 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In the present case, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. As the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazarenos labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part of the public domain. Republic vs. Judge Ballocanag Facts:Reyes bought the subject 182,941-square-meter land at Oriental Mindoro from Castillo. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced extensive improvements, planted fruit-bearing trees and employed many workers who regularly took care of the trees and other plants. Reyes so prized this land which he bought and occupied in good faith for thirty years. Unfortunately, a complaint for "Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion" was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic, as represented by the Bureau of Forest Development. It was explained that the source Original Transfer Certificate of Title of Castillo, issued pursuant to Free Patent, is spurious, fictitious and irregularly issued on account of: a) The 162,500 square meters of the land was, at the time it was applied for patent and or titling, a part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, the same cannot be the subject of any disposition or acquisition under any existing law; b) The 162,500 square meters are entirely inside the 140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement in favor of Atty. Marte, issued to him by the Ministry of Natural Resources in 1986 to expire on December 21, 2011; c.) Neither the private defendant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property because the rightful occupant is Atty. Marte. Hence, the RTC rendered decision in favor of the Republic which was also affirmed by the CA. It declared the OCT of Castillo and its derivative null and void, and declared the reversion of the land in question to the government subject to the AgroForestry Farm Lease Agreement, to form part of the public domain in the province of Oriental Mindoro. Furthermore, the two-hectare lot, which appears disposable and alienable, is declared null and void for failure to secure certification from the Bureau of Forest Development. But these decisions simply ordered the reversion of the property to the State, and did not consider the improvements that Reyes had introduced on the property or provide him with any remedy relative thereto. Thus, aggrieved, Reyes filed a Motion to Remove Improvements Introduced by Reyes on the Property. Reyes prayed that he and/or his agents be given at least one (1) year from the issuance of the corresponding order to remove his mango, citrus and guyabano trees, and that they be allowed to stay in the premises within that period to work on the cutting and removal of the said trees. He also asked the Court that in the meantime that these trees are not yet removed, all the unharvested fruits be appropriated by him, as provided for by law, to the exclusion of all other persons who may take advantage of the situation and harvest said fruits.

The Supreme Court is disposed to agree with the CA that Reyes was a planter in good faith because he was of the belief that he was the owner of the subject land; in fact, a TCT over the property was issued in his name. He tilled the land, planted fruit trees thereon, and invested money from 1970. He received notice of the Republic's claim only when the reversion case was filed on May 13, 1987. The trees are now full-grown and fruit-bearing. To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the State -- because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is part of inalienable forest land and belongs to the State is already final and immutable -would inequitably result in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith. However, the Court is mindful that Reyes' entitlement to these benefits is not absolute because the subject land currently covered by Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement. To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject land, even if he is legally entitled to do so, would be risking substantial damage to the land. It would negate the policy consideration underlying the AFFLA -- to protect and preserve the biodiversity and the environment, and to prevent any damage to the land. In this light, the only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the property. This is only fair because, after all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon the expiration of the lease or upon its cancellation if there be any violation or breach of its terms, all permanent improvements on the land shall pass to the ownership of the Republic without any obligation on its part to indemnify the lessee. However, the AFFLA is not due to expire until December 21, 2011. In the interim, it is logical to assume that the lessee, Atty. Marte, will derive financial gain from the fruits that the trees planted by Reyes would yield. In fact, Atty. Marte may already have profited therefrom in the past several years. It is, therefore, reasonable to grant the Republic the right of subrogation against the lessee who may have benefited from the improvements. The Republic may, thus, demand reimbursement from Atty. Marte for whatever amount it will have to pay Reyes for these improvements. Sibal vs. Valdez Facts: Sibal alleged that Deputy Sheriff Mamawal, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to Valdez the sugar cane planted by Sibal and his tenants on seven parcels of land; that within one year from the date of the attachment and sale, Sibal offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. Issue: Whether the sugarcane in question had the nature of movable property Held: Paragraph 2 of Article 416 of the Civil Code categorically states, Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personal property. In the instant case, the Sugarcane, although considered as growing fruits, was originally immovable, must be regarded as movable because Paragraph 2 of Article 415 has been modified by special provisions of law, particularly, section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the purpose of attachment and execution, and also for the purpose of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Here, the right to the growing fruits mobilizes by anticipation. PHILIPPINE REFINING CO. vs. JARQUE,COROMINAS G.R. No. L-41506 FACTS: Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co. and defendant Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zargazo. The documents were recorded as transfer and encumbrances of the vessels for the port of Cebu and each was denominated a chattel mortgage. The first two mortgages did not have an affidavit of good faith. A fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz over motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry on May 12, 1932, within the period of 30 days prior to the foreclosure/institution of the insolvency proceedings. Jose Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor. This was granted and Jarques properties were then assigned to Curaminas. A problem arose when Judge Jose Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, and instead, ruled that they were defective because they did not have affidavits of good faith. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law 2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce achattel mortgage on a vessel

RULING: Yes. Personal property includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage includes an affidavit of good faith. The absence of such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against creditors and subsequent encumbrances. Issue: Whether or not Reyes is entitled to the benefits of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The judge was correct. Held: Yes, Reyes is entitled to the benefits of Article 448 of the Civil Code. In the instant case, the issue assumes full significance, because Articles 448 of the Civil Code grant the builder or planter in good faith full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made. Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the first must be noted in the registry of the register of deeds.

LEUNG YEE vs. Strong Machinery FACTS: 1. First mortgage: Compania Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery company and this was secured by a chattel mortgage on the machinery and the building to which it was installed. Upon failure to pay, the chattel mortgage was foreclosed, the building and machinery sold in public auction and bought by the machinery company. 2. Days after, the Compania Agricola Filipina executed a deed of sale over the land to which the building stood in favor of the machinery company. This was done to cure any defects that may arise in the machinery companys ownership of the building. 3. Second mortgage: on or about the date to which the chattel mortgage was excecuted, Compania executed a real estate mortgage over the building in favor of Leung Yee, distinct and separate from the land. This is to secure payment for its indebtedness for the construction of the building. Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed. 4. The machinery company then filed a case, demanding that it be declared the rightful owner of the building. The trial court held that it was the machinery company which was the rightful owner as it had its title before the building was registered prior to the date of registry of Leung Yees certificate. HELD: The building in which the machinery was installed was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed the character as real property. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in the registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building is concerned. Laurel vs. Garcia FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi; 5-chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. VICENTE SAPTO VS. FABIANA Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible. FACTS: The subject property was originally owned by Sapto (this Sapto was a Moro, so only one name) and located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City. He died, leaving three sons Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon. The latter predeceased his brothers, leaving no heirs. Samuel and Constancio executed a deed of sale for a portion of said property in favour of Fabiana in consideration of P240.00. The sale was approved by the governor of Davao but was never registered. The property was transferred to Fabiana and from then on he enjoyed possession from 1931 until the case was filed. Constancio died with no issue, leaving Samuel as sole administrator of the property. Upon the latters death, his widow and two children filed the present action for recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to defendant. The CFI held that although the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana was never registered, it was binding valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs. The CFI also ordered the petitioners to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favour of the defendant. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the CFIs order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was valid. HELD:The SC first affirmed the validity of the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana, ruling, that even though it was never registered the sale was valid, binding, and effective upon the heirs of the vendor. According to the court, actual notice of the sale served as registration. Futher, that the transfer and possession of the property was a clear indication of the validity of the sale. Regarding the issue on the validity of the order of conveyance, the SC ruled that it was valid. In assailing the order, the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI cannot order the conveyance because the defendants cause of action had already prescribed. The SC ruled however, that the action for conveyance was actually one to quiet title. In ruling so, the SC cited American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which states, that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible. The judgement is affirmed, cost against appellants. Torbela vs. Spouses Rosario GR 140528 Dec. 07, 2011 FACTS: The issue is over a parcel of land inherited by the Torbela siblings from their parents. They executed a deed of absolute quitclaim over the property in favor of Dr. Rosario. Four days after, a TCT was issued in Dr. Rosarios name covering the property. Another deed of absolute quitclaim was subsequently executed twelve days after by Dr. Rosario acknowledging that he only borrowed the lot from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the same. This deed was notarized but not immediately annotated.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine government. 2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, and jurisdiction to sell the Roppongi property. Dr. Rosario used the land as mortgage for a loan he obtain through DBP for P70,000.00. He used the proceeds of the loan to build a 4 storey building which was RULING:The Court ruled in the negative. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property initially used as a hospital but later converted into a commercial space. Part was for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the leased to PT&T and the rest to Rosario s sister who operated the Rose Inn Hotel and Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind Restaurant. both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the Dr. Rosario fully paid the loan from DBP and the mortgage was cancelled and ratified property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private by a notary public. However, Dr. Rosario took another loan from PNB. He later appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the acquired a third loan from Banco Filipino and bought out the loan from PNB government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil cancelling the mortgage with PNB. Rosario failed to pay their loan in Banco Filipino 335). and the property was extrajudicially foreclosed. It is not for the President to convey valuable real proeprty of the governent on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is granted. Meanwhile, back in 1965, the Torbela siblings sought to register their ownership over the lot and to perfect their title but couldnt because the title was still with DBP. They showed as proof the deed of absolute quitclaim presented executed by Rosario himself. In 1986, they filed a civil case for recovery of ownership and possession and damages. They tried to redeem the lot from Banco Filipino but failed. TCT was issued to Banco FIilipino.

Article 457- Heirs of Navarro vs. IAC Facts: Pascual was the owner of a parcel of land, its east side bounded by the Talisay River, the west bounded by the Bulacan River, and the north side bounded by The Torbelas claim they have right over the rents of the building through accession the Manila Bay. The flow of both rivers meet and empty into the Manila Bay. because they are the land owners. An accretion formed at the tip of Pascual's land (adjacent to Manila Bay) and he sought to register it in his name as a riparian owner. During trial, Pascual testified that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the land being part of Manila Bay's foreshore, but after he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise. Issue: Does the accretion that formed on the northern part of Pascual's land, where the Manila Bay is located, belong to Pascual as a riparian owner pursuant to Article 457 of the NCC? Held: NO. Requisites under Article 457 are: 1. The accumulation of the soil or sediment is gradual and imperceptible; 2. That it be the result of the action of RIVER waters; and 3. The land where the accretion takes place is adjacent (lying next) to the RIVER bank. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium (the soil deposited on the estate fronting the RIVER bank) should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of Pascual's land, and not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. And besides, Manila Bay is a SEA (according to previous jurisprudence)! Therefore, the land sought to be registered forms part of the lands of public domain.

ISSUE: Who has right over the improvements made on the lot and the rents thereof. RULING: According to Art. 440, the accessory follows the principal. Ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. However, in the case at bar, both Torbela siblings and Rosario are deemed in bad faith. The Torbelas knew Rosario built on the land and even allowed him to use the land to obtain a loan from DBP. Rosario on the other hand consciously built on land he knew was not his. They both had knowledge and did not oppose. Art. 453 states that when both parties are in bad faith, the case shall be treated as though both were in good faith thus the application of Art. 448. 448 allows the Land Owner 2 options in the case at bar. Either indemnify Rosario and appropriate the lot to himself or ask Rosario to buy the lot or the rent rate. This case was remanded to the RTC for the Torbelas to make such decision. Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits such as rent belong to the owner of the building. Rosario has rights over the rent and improvements and shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen an option from 448. LAUREL VS.JUDGE ABROGAR - Art. 416 FACTS: Laurel was one of the accused charged with theft for conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) operations by illegally connecting various

equipment or apparatus to PLDT's telephone system, through which Laurel was able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using PLDT's facilities. Therefore stealing this business from PLDT. Laurel claims that a telephone call is not synonymous to electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal property susceptible of appropriation. He also insists that the "right to carry on a business" and not "business" is a personal property. ISSUE: WON international long distance calls and business of providing telecommunications or telephone services are personal properties.

The fact remain, however, that Grande et al never sought registration of said alluvial property up to the time they instituted an action in the CFI in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. PFDA vs CBAA

THE GIST:PFDA which managed the LFPC was ordered by Lucena City to pay real property tax on the fishing port. The SC ruled that PFDA is exempt because it is a HELD: YES! 1. In making international phone calls, the human voice is converted into government instrumentality not a government owned and controlled corporation but electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the party called. portions of the ports leased to to private entities are not exempt from real property Intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it tax. may be taken and carried away. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. Electricity is personal property under Article 416(3) of the Civil Code, which FACTS:The Lucena Fishing Port Complex (LFPC) is one of the fishery infrastructure enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control by science." projects undertaken by the National Government under the Nationwide Fish PortPackage. 2. Although business or interest of business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the CC, it is still considered to be personal property since it is The Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) was created by virtue of P.D. capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties. (Art. 977 as amended by E.O. 772, with functions and powers to (m)anage, operate, and 416, par. 1) develop the Navotas Fishing Port Complex and such other fishing port complexes that may be established by the Authority. Pursuant thereto, PFDA took over the SULO SA NAYON VS. NAYONG PILIPINO - Art. 448 management and operation of LFPC in February 1992. FACTS: Nayong Pilipino Foundation, a government-owned and controlled corporation, is the owner of a parcel of land in Pasay City, known as the Nayong The City Government of Lucena demanded from PFDA the payment of realty taxes Pilipino Complex. Nayong Pilipino leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino Complex to on the LFPC property. Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. for the construction and operation of a hotel building, to be known as the Philippine Village Hotel. The lease was for an initial period of 21 years ISSUE: renewable for a period of 25 years under the same terms and conditions upon due notice in writing to Nayong Pilipino Foundation of the intention to renew at least 6 Whether or not PFDA is liable for the real property tax assessed on months before its expiration. the Lucena Fishing Port Complex. When the original lease agreement ended, they agreed to the renewal of the contract for another 25 years. However, Sulo sa Nayon defaulted in the payment of their monthly rental. Nayong Pilipino Foundation repeatedly demanded Sulo sa Nayon to pay the arrears and vacate the premises but to no avail. Hence, Nayong Pilipino filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. There is no doubt as to the obligation of Sulo sa Nayon to pay the rentals, however, the problem lies with the improvements introduced by the lessee in case of eviction. ISSUE: WON the rules on accession, as found in Article 448 of the CC, is applicable in the case at bar. HELD: NO!As the late Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, a leading expert in Civil Law, explains: Article 448 is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds, plants or sows on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where the only interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a holder such as a tenant. HELD: NO! The Lucena Fishing Port Complex is a property of public dominion intended for public use, and is therefore exempt from real property tax under Section 234(a)11 of the Local Government Code. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.12 Thus, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lucena Fishing Port Complex, which is one of the major infrastructure projects undertaken by the National Government under the Nationwide Fishing Ports Package, is devoted for public use and falls within the term ports. The Lucena Fishing Port Complex serves as PFDAs commitment to continuously In the case at bar, Sulo sa Nayon have no adverse claim or title to the land. In fact, as provide post-harvest infrastructure support to the fishing industry, especially in areas lessees, they recognize that Nayong Pilipino Foundation is the owner of the land. where productivity among the various players in the fishing industry need to be What Sulo sa Nayon insist is that because of the improvements, which are of enhanced.13 As property of public dominion, the Lucena Fishing Port Complex is substantial value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with the owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. permission of Nayong Pilipino Foundation, they should be considered builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession of the property until reimbusement QUIETING OF TITLE- ACOSTA VS SALAZAR by Nayong Pilipino Foundation. FACTS: an OCT was registered in the names of Spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta The introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give Macaraeg (decedents) who died without issue (without children). On November 1985, Sulo sa Nayon the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a the Salazars sought to cancel the two annotations found at the back of such OCT. builder in good faith. Otherwise, such situation would allow the lessee to easily One of the annotations was made as early as 1950. Eventually, the OCT was "improve" the lessor out of its property. The SC reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is reconstituted and a TCT was registered in the names of the Salazars without the neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the application of annotations at the back. ARTs. 448 and 546 of the CC. His rights are governed by Art. 1678 of the CC. The Acostas questioned the reconstitution, saying that: GRANDE VS. CA - Art. 457 1. The Salazars are not the heirs of the decedents; FACTS:Ignacio Grande, et al were the owners of a parcel of land by inheritance from 2. They have acquired their titles in good faith (source: subsequent transfers which their deceased mother. stemmed from the annotations at the back); When it was surveyed for purposes of registration, sometime in 1930, its northeastern 3. And even if the Salazars had title to the land, they can no longer enforce their right boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years thereafter, a as the action had already been barred by prescription or had already prescribed by gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the laches. Cagayan River. So much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a So, the Salazars filed an action to quiet title. distance of about 105 meters from its original site and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters, more or less, had been added to the registered area. Issue: will the action to quiet title prosper? Grande, et al, instituted an action against Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion alleging that they and their predecessors-ininterest were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof until Sept. 1948, when the Calalung entered upon the land under claim of ownership. The Calalung, on the other hand, claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present. ISSUE: WON the alluvial property in question can be acquired through prescription. ARTICLE 422 - CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., vs. BERCILLES HELD: YES! There can be no dispute that under Art. 457 of the CC, Grande et al, are the lawful owners of said alluvial property as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. However, the accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens System of that ownership is quite another. Facts: - the parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. - the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved and declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road. - the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Held: No. The Salazars were unable to prove that they were heirs of the decedents. So, they have neither legal nor equitable interest to the land. And even if they had title to such property, their claim is already barred by laches. For more than 30 years (from 1950 to 1985), the Salazars had remained quiet and never made any move to question the issue of ownership over the said land before the proper forum. They failed to stop the transfer of portions of the property to the Acostas who were able to secure TCTs in their own names.

- the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, - executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00. - By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First Instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered. - the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man, Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA net FACTS: The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the construction, operation and management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc., later became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a shareholding proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the right of first refusal in case of a sale. Through a series of transfers, NIDCs rights, title and interest in PHILSECO eventually went to the National Government. In the interest of national economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should be privatized by selling 87.67% of its total Issues:(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section outstanding capital stock to private entities. After negotiations, it was agreed that 31, paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as Kawasakis right of first refusal under the JVA be exchanged for the right to top by abandoned? YES five percent the highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (2) Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property (PHI), in which it was a stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead. of the City of Cebu which may be the object of a common contract? YES During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, because of the right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG Summits bid. JG Held:- Revised Charter of Cebu City provides: (34) x x x; to close any city road, street Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public utility and, or alley, boulevard, avenue. park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public hence, must observe the 60%-40% Filipino-foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property of PHILSECOs capital stock at bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. 40% of the stock. - Appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of LapuIn the year 2000 case, it was settled by the Court that PHILSECO is a public utility Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into and is therefore required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the an alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The constitution. On the other hand, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or to the extent that its total shares of stock should not exceed 40% of the entire shares not a certain property is still necessary for public use. of stock due to the constitutional and contractual proscriptions. NIDC being a - Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not government corporation may purchase even beyond the 60% of the total shares. ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts. absent a plain case of abuse Petitioner now assails the SC decision through a motion for reconsideration. or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will he presumed. So the fact that ISSUE: some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation Whether or not PHILSECO continues to violate the Constitution by owning long-term ordinance. leasehold rights which are real rights within the meaning of immovable property under - That portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title Art. 415 of the Civil Code was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes HELD: Petitioner cites Article 415 of the Civil Code alleges that PHILSECO patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. continues to violate the constitution by owning long-term leasehold rights. It states -Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, that in the definition of immovable property, it includes: contracts for public works, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property. The Court ruled that patrimonial property of the State." whether or not owning long-term leasehold rights are questions of fact, the veracity of - Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its which would require introduction of evidence and the Court needs to validate these subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title factual allegations based on competent and reliable evidence. As such, the Court over the lot in question. cannot resolve the questions they pose. Second, J.G. Summit misreads the provisions of the Constitution cited in its own pleadings, to wit: ARTICLE 448 PARILLA VS. PILAR Petitioner has consistently pointed out in the past that private respondent is not a Facts:- Parilla leased a portion of land from Pilar for 10 years 60%-40% corporation, and this violates the Constitution x xxThe violation continues - after the 10 years lease contract expired, Parilla still refused to vacate the property to this day because under the law, it continues to own real property and introduced improvements thereon despite demands to vacate To review the constitutional provisions involved, Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 - Pilar filed a complaint for ejectment Constitution (the JVA was signed in 1977), provided: MTC/RTC: Parilla should vacate but must be reimbursed by Pilar in relation to 448 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or CA: no reimbursement because they are builders in bad faith in relation to 448 and conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or 546 hold lands of the public domain. - Parilla claimed that Pilar was also in bad faith because he did not prevent them from This provision is the same as Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. introducing improvements thereon, claimed that both parties are in bad faith thus it It was correctly observed by the public respondents that the prohibition in the must be interpreted to mean as if they acted in good faith, entitled to reimbursement Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code which embraces real rights. Issue: W/N Parilla is in good faith and entitled to reimbursement in light of 448? NO Otherwise, we would be confronted with a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land would Held:- 448 applies only if the BPS believes in good faith that he is the owner of the be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only. land or has a claim of title thereto - 448 does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder: tenant, lessee, J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALSkiong agent, usufructuary FACTS: On January 27, 1997, the NIDC, a government corporation, entered into a - 448 does not apply when there is a contract of lese Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with KAWASAKI, a Japanese company, for the - Parilla here knows that he is not the owner of the land being merely a lessee construction, operation and management of PHILSECO. Under the JVA, the NIDC - 1678 on the law on lease is applicable, not 448 and KAWASAKI will contribute P330 million for the capitalization of PHILSECO in the proportion of 60%-40% respectively. The JVA granted the parties of the right of first ARTICLE 454- ALVIOLA VS. CA refusal should either of them decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint Facts:- Victoria Tinagan bought 2 parcels of land and took possession thereof with venture. her son, Agustin On November 25, 1986, NIDC transferred all its rights, title and interest to PNB then - after 10 years, Alviola occupied portions thereof, built a copra dryer and store, to the National Government. In 1989, as a result of a quasi-reorganization, the tolerate occupancy by Victoria and Agustin National Government's shareholdings in PHILSECO increased to 97.41% thereby - after 15 years, Victoria and Agustin died reducing KAWASAKI's shareholdings to 2.59%. - wife of Agustin (referred as Tinagan) filed a complaint for recovery of possession The Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), both against Alviola created by Pres. Corazon Aquino, deemed it best to sell the National Government's RTC/CA: in favor of Tinagan, Alviola to vacate and remove store and dryer, pay share in PHILSECO to private entities. The APT and KAWASAKI, agreed that the rentals until improvements are removed latter's right of first refusal be exchanged for the right to top by five percent (5%) the - Alviola contends that Victoria ceded her right over the property in favor of Alviola, highest bidder. They further agreed that KAWASAKI would be entitled to name a Tinagans tolerated their occupancy making the landowners in bad faith and they, company in which it was a stockholder, which could exercise the right to top, so Alviolas in good faith, copra store and dryer are of permanent structures thus cannot KAWASAKI informed APT that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHILYARDS) would exercise be removed its right to top. At the public bidding, J.G. SUMMIT Holdings, Inc.submitted a bid of Issue; W/n Article 454 may be applied where the landowner is in bad faith, the BPS in (P2,030,000,000.00) and was declared the highest bidder with an acknowledgment of good faith? NO KAWASAKI/[PHILYARDS'] right to top. However, later on PHIYARDS had exercised its option to top the highest bid and that the COP had approved and executed a Stock Held:- Tax declarations of the 2 parcels of land declared to be in the name of the Purchase Agreement. Tinagans ISSUE 1: WON KAWASAKI had a valid right of first refusal over PHILSECO shares - bad faith on the part of Alviola upon construction of improvements despite being under the JVA considering that PHILSECO owned land until the time of the bidding fully aware that the parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan and KAWASAKI already held 40% of PHILSECOs equity. - bad faith also on the part of Tinagans (wife of Agustin and children) because they HELD: SC upheld the mutual rights of first refusal. had knowledge of the constructions and still tolerated their occupancy thereon First of all, the right of first refusal is a property right of PHILSECO -in pari delicto, treated as if both parties acted in good faith, 448 is applicable not 454 shareholders, under the terms of their JVA. The agreement of co-shareholders to - but 448 will not apply upon the dryer and store being transferable in nature mutually grant this right to each other, by itself, does not constitute a violation of the - to fall under 448, the construction must be of permanent character, attached to the provisions of the Constitution limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino soil corporations. As PHILYARDS correctly puts it, if PHILSECO still owns land, the right - if transitory, there is no accession and the builder must remove the construction of first refusal can be validly assigned to a qualified Filipino entity in order to maintain - proper remedy was an action to eject the builder from the land the 60%-40% ratio. This transfer, by itself, does not amount to a violation of the Anti-

Dummy Laws, absent proof of any fraudulent intent. Even if the foreign shareholdings of a landholding corporation exceeds 40%, it is not the foreign stockholders ownership of the shares which is adversely affected but the capacity of the corporation to own land that is, the corporation becomes disqualified to own land. This finds support under the basic corporate law principle that the corporation and its stockholders are separate juridical entities. In this vein, the right of first refusal over shares pertains to the shareholders whereas the capacity to own land pertains to the corporation. Hence, the fact that PHILSECO owns land cannot deprive stockholders of their right of first refusal. No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land. This is the clear import of the following provisions in the Constitution. ISSUE 2: The JG SUMMIT further argues that "an option to buy land is void in itself therefore the right of first refusal granted to KAWASAKI, a Japanese corporation, is similarly void. Hence, the right to top, sourced from the right of first refusal, is also void. HELD: The mutual right of first refusal in favor of NIDC and KAWASAKI does not amount to a virtual transfer of land to a non-Filipino. In fact, the case at bar involves a right of first refusal over shares of stock as compared to the Lui Shecase which involved an option to buy the land itself because the option amounted to a virtual transfer of ownership by prohibiting the owner of the land from selling, donating, mortgaging, or encumbering the property during the 50-year period of the option to buy. ISSUE 3: JG SUMMIT alleges that PHILSECO continues to violate the Constitution as its foreign equity is above 40% and yet owns long-term leasehold rights which are real rights therefore it continues to own real property citing Article 415 of the Civil Code which includes in the definition of immovable property, "contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property." HELD:The prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only. 52) PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.CA _kiong FACTS: Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City the TCT No 106367 in his name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.It appears that Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from CTTEI, the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. CTTEI, through its employee, pointed out Lot 9 instead of Lot 8. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot.When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee. Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee on July 24, 1987 entered into a deed of sale, wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court of Appeals of such deal. Petitioner assails the following holding of the Court of Appeals decided: 2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are solidarily liable under the following circumstances: a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter, remove these structures, the third-party defendants shall answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the improvements thus destroyed or rendered useless; b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer for the amount representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico. ISSUE 1: Is Kee a builder in good faith? HELD:YES.At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were reasonable, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI. Thus, Kee is in good faith and petitioner failed to prove otherwise. ISSUE 2: WON the holding of the Court of Appeals is correct. WON Art 448 applies. HELD: The holding of CA is INCORRECT. Art 448 APPLIES. The rights of Kee and Jardinicovis-a-viseach other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight modification" in the application of such law, on the ground of "equity". At any rate, as it stands now, Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9. Thus, we delete items 2 (a) and (b) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable. In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition of the Court of Appeals that Kee "is entitled to the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code" is deleted, in view of the deed of sale entered into by Kee and Jardinico, which deed now governs the rights of Jardinico and Kee as to each other. Therefore, Art 448 applied and a DOS was subsequently executed. 71) GEMINIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS_Kiong FACTS:The lot in question was originally owned by Paulina Geminiano. On a portion of the lot stood an unfinished bungalow, which was sold to the Sps. Nicolas for P6,000.00, with an alleged promise to sell to that portion of the lot occupied by the house. The property was later leased to the respondents for 7 years for P40 a month as evidenced by their contract of lease. The Sps. Nicolas then introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease contract, however, the Paulina refused to accept the monthly rentals.It turned out that the lot was the subject of a suit and was acquired by Maria Lee,then sold toSalcedo, who further sold it to Sps. Dionisio.The Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the Geminianos. As such, the lot was registered in their name.The Geminianossent a letter tothe Sps. Nicolas demanding that they vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears.Sps. Nicolasfailed to

heed the demand, so the Geminianos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages. ISSUE: Whether the Sps. Nicolas are builder in good faith. HELD:Being mere lessees, the Sps. Nicolas knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith. Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property. Anent the alleged promise of the Geminianos to sell the lot occupied by the spouses, the same was not substantiated by convincing evidence. And even if indeed the Geminianospromised to sell, it would not make them possessors or builders in good faith. The right of the Sps. Nicolas as lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements.It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the petitioners refused to exercise that option,the private respondents cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. *no mention of art 452-454 in the full text although the case belongs in those articles. BENEDICTO V. VILLAFLORES (October 6, 2010) Facts:Maria Villaflores was the owner of Lot 2-A in Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan. In 1980, Maria sold a portion of the lot to her nephew, Antonio Villaflores. Antonio then took possession of the portion of the lot and built his house thereon. Twelve years later, Maria sold the entire lot to Antonio. However, the said sale was not registered in the Registry of Deeds nor did Antonio pay for realty taxes over the land. In 1994, Maria sold the same lot to FilomenaBenedicto. Filomena then registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds and paid for realty taxes over the land. Consequently, the title over the land was transferred to Filomena. In 2000, Filomena filed a case in court in order to evict Antonio from the land. For his defense, Antonio claimed ownership over the land. The lower court ruled upheld the ownership of Filomena and at the same time, declared Antionio to be a builder in good faith. The CA affirmed the decision and because Filomena didnt want to reimburse Antonio, she questioned the ruling on Antonio being a builder in good faith. Issue: Whether Antonio is a builder in good faith Ruling: Yes. When Antonio built his house on the land, he believed to be the owner thereof on account of the sale between him and Maria despite his inability to register the same. In addition, the improvement was introduced prior to Filomenas purchase of the land. Consequently, Antonio is entitle to reimbursement. BERNARDO v BATACLAN FACTSPlaintiff Vicente Bernardo acquired a parcel of land from Pastor Samonte thru a contract of sale. Thereafter, Bernardo instituted a case against said vendor to secure possession of the land. Bernardo was able to obtain a favorable decision from the court. The plaintiff found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, in the said premises. It appears that he has been authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make improvements thereon. Thus, plaintiff instituted a case against Bataclan in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. In this case, plaintiff was declared the owner of the land but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled to reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work done and improvements made. Both parties appealed the decision. The court thereafter made some modifications by allowing the defendant to recover compensation amounting to P2,212 and by reducing the price at which the plaintiff could require the defendant to purchase the land in question from P300 down to P200 per hectare. Plaintiff was likewise given 30 days from the date when the decision became final to exercise his option, either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements from him. On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff conveyed to the court his desire "to require the defendant to pay him the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare or a total price of P18,000 for the whole tract of land." The defendant indicated that he was unable to pay the land and, on January 24, 1934, an order was issued giving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the defendant the sum of P2,212. Subsequently, on April 24, 1934, the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and without objection on the part of the defendant, ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction. The land was sold on April 5, 1935 to Toribio Teodoro for P8,000. ISSUE WON DEFENDANT BATACLAN IS STILL ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE COURT MANDATED COMPENSATION ARISING FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO TORIBIO HELD NO. Manresa, basing on Art 448 of the NCC, where the planter, builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. The law provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. In this case, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the improvements to pay for the land. The defendant avers that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has not yet been paid to him. Defendant further claims that he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. While the said argument is legally tenable, the same must perforce be denied because defendant Bataclan has lost his right of retention as he failed to pay for the land. The law, as we have already said, requires no more

than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land. Bucton v. Gabar G.R. No. L-36359 January 31, 1974 FACTS In 1946 Josefina Llamoso Gabar bought the subject land from the spouses Villarin. Josefina entered into a verbal agreement with her sister-in-law, Nicanora Gabar Bucton, that the latter would pay one-half of the price and would then own one-half of the land. Pursuant to this understanding Nicanora on January 19, 1946 gave her sister-in-law Josefina the initial amount of P1,000, for which the latter signed a receipt. In January, 1947 the spouses Villarin executed the deed of sale of the land abovementioned in favor of defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar. Bucton then sought to obtain a separate title for their portion of the land in question which Gabar repeatedly declined to accommodate to because according to them the entire land was still mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank as guarantee for Gabars loan. (Note: The subject land was covered by a torrens title, OCT: Villarin, and TCT: Gabar.) ISSUE Whether or not owners (Bucton) of the property by purchase from Gabar, and being in actual, continuous and physical possession thereof since the date of its purchase, their action to compel the vendors to execute a formal deed of conveyance so that the fact of their ownership may be inscribed in the corresponding certificate of title, had not yet prescribed when they filed the present action. RULING Yes. There is no question that Nicanora Gabar Bucton paid P1,500.00 to Josefina Gabar as purchase price of one-half of the lot now covered by TCT No. II, for respondent Court of Appeals found as a fact "that plaintiffs really paid for a portion of the lot in question pursuant to their agreement with the defendants that they would own one-half (1/2) of the land." That sale, although not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding between petitioners and private respondents, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties. Although at the time said petitioner paid P1,000.00 as part payment of the purchase price on January 19, 1946, private respondents were not yet the owners of the lot, they became such owners on January 24, 1947, when a deed of sale was executed in their favor by the Villarin spouses. In the premises, Article 1434 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[w]hen a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee," is applicable. Thus, the payment by petitioner Nicanora Gabar Bucton of P1,000.00 on January 19, 1946, her second payment of P400.00 on May 2, 1948, and the compensation, up to the amount of P100.00 (out of the P1,000.00-loan obtained by private respondents from petitioners on July 30, 1951), resulted in the full payment of the purchase price and the consequential acquisition by petitioners of ownership over one-half of the lot. Petitioners therefore became owners of the one-half portion of the lot in question by virtue of a sale which, though not evidenced by a formal deed, was nevertheless proved by both documentary and parole evidence. The real and ultimate basis of petitioners' action is their ownership of one-half of the lot coupled with their possession thereof, which entitles them to a conveyance of the property. In Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained that, under the circumstances no enforcement of the contract is needed, since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, and that, actually, the action for conveyance is one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon the appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. We held therein that "... it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title in attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke remedy within the statutory period. The doctrine was reiterated recently in Gallar v. Husain, et al., where We ruled that by the delivery of the possession of the land, the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the appellee, that the action is actually not for specific performance, since all it seeks is to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by his predecessor, and that as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible. Considering that the foregoing circumstances obtain in the present case, We hold that petitioners' action has not prescribed. 2.) Camarines Norte v. Quezon- Art 429 FACTS: November 8, 1989, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. No. 80796 ("1989 SC Decision," for brevity) which resolved the long-drawn boundary dispute between the Provinces of Camarines Norte and Quezon. The Decision upheld as binding upon the parties the decision of the then Chief of the Executive Bureau dated June 16, 1922 ("1922 EB decision," for brevity) delineating and describing that portion of the boundary comprising a land area of approximately 8,762 hectares[2] as belonging to Camarines Norte, not to Quezon Province. Pursuant to the 1989 SC Decision, the Province of Camarines Norte, the DENR to undertake the survey of the boundary line between the two provinces based on the description[5] in the 1922 EB decision. On January 31 1991, the DENR technical team informed Quezon Gov. Rodriguez about the survey it would undertake.[7] However, Provincial Secretary Jorge Vargas (acting in behalf of Gov. Rodriguez) objected, claiming that the 1922 EB decision

should not be made the basis of the survey. He asserted that the survey should be done in conformity with the conditions set forth in Section 42, Article II of Act 2711 (The Revised Administrative Code of 1917).[8] But the DENR technical team proceeded with the survey using as guide the 1922 EB decision. On May 28, 1991, the DENR technical team went to barangay Tabugon, Calauag, Quezon and installed a monument marker along the boundary line determined in the survey. The marker indicates that the area consisting of 8,032 hectares then held as part of Calauag, Quezon actually falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Camarines Norte. This area comprises the nine (9) barangays of Kagtalaba, Plaridel, Kabuluan, Don Tomas, Guitol, Tabugon, Maualawin, Patag Ibaba and Patag Iraya.[9] On October 14, 1991, Quezon Gov. Eduardo Rodriguez and Calauag Mayor Julio U. Lim caused the bulldozing and removal of the boundary marker. Aggrieved, Camarines Norte Gov. Roy Padilla, Jr. filed the present petition for contempt against Gov. Rodriguez and Mayor Lim, alleging therein that by removing the monument marker, respondents-officials disobeyed the lawful judgment of this Court, which act is punishable as indirect contempt of court. In their comment[11] on the petition, respondents Gov. Rodriguez and Mayor Lim did not deny having ordered the removal of the monument marker installed by the DENR. They claimed, however, that the placing of the marker is illegal because (a) it was installed within the territory of Calauag, Quezon and (b) the survey conducted by the DENR technical team was without prior authority from the Office of the President, as required by the 1989 SC Decision. Thus, respondents Governor Rodriguez and Mayor Lim asserted that their action was a reasonable use of force justified under Article 429[12] of the Civil Code to protect the territorial integrity of Quezon from a threatened physical invasion. ISSUE: WON the action of Gov. Rodriguez and Mayor lim is justified under Art 429 of the Civil Code. RULING: NO, because Article 429 of the Civil Code authorizes only the owner or lawful possessor of a property to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. The issue on the ownership have already been resolved by the 1989 SC decision that the area belonged to Camarines Norte, not to Quezon Province. The terms employed therein are clear. In removing the monument marker, the objective of the respondents (Eduardo T. Rodriguez and Julio U. Lim) was to remove the proof that they no longer have any territorial jurisdiction over the area determined by the DENR survey group as belonging to the petitioner (Province of Camarines Norte). x x x. They perceived the installation of the monument marker as an attack on the territorial integrity of Quezon Province despite the DENR technical working groups findings that the disputed area belongs to petitioner. Respondents were thus doing what the Supreme Court decision expressly prohibited or enjoined, that is, the exercise of jurisdiction or political authority over an area held to be part of the territory of the petitioner based on the 1922 Decision of the Chief of the Executive Bureau. Thus, they are held liable for indirect contempt of the court. DAVAO SAWMILL VS. APRORIANO CASTILLO AND DAVAO LIGHT. FACTS Davao Sawmill is a holder of a lumber concession from the government of the Philippine Islands. It operates a sawmill at Barangay Ma-a, Davao City. The land upon which the business was conducted is owned by another person. On the land, Davao Sawmill built a building that houses the machineries used by them in their daily operations. Some of these machineries are placed and mounted on foundations of cement. Meanwhile, a judgement was made in favor of Davao Light in an action it brought against Davao Sawmill for non-payment of electric bills. As a consequence, a Writ of Execution was issued and the machineries were levied by the sheriff as personalties. Davao Sawmill now contends that the machineries are not personalties but real properties as they are incorporated to the building that houses them, which is a real property. ISSUE WON machineries movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the lessee of the land. HELDGenerally, machineries movable by nature only become immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property. Therefore, such result will not be accomplished by the placing of machineries in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary whose right thereof is only temporary. It is therefore imperative to note that one of the essential requisites for Article 415 Paragraph 7 to apply is that the placing must be made by the owner of the tenement, his agent, or duly authorized legal representative. PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., INC., v. vs. FRANCISCO JARQUE FACTS Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza denominated as chattel mortgage. A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza. Subsequently, Francisco Jadraque was declared to be an insolvent debtor resulting to the assignment of all his properties in favor of Jose Corominas. On these facts, Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages. ISSUE Whether or not vessels are personal properties. RULING Yes, vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property. Since the term "personal property" includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Indeed, it has heretofore been accepted without discussion that a mortgage on a vessel is in nature a chattel mortgage. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personal property is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at

the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity. ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR FACTS: After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between elna and Bruno void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds two properties to be excluded from the conjugal properties one of which is the Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, considering that the same was purchased on installment basis by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. The Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly, Elma is hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the name of Bruno, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, being Brunos exclusive property, acquired prior to his marriage.1awphi1.nt Elma filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when Elma and Bruno were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on coownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. ISSUE: WON the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Art. 147 of the FC. HELD: The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. The Family Code provides: Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. (emphasis supplied) Government vs Colegio de San Jose Facts: During the months of September, October and November every year, the waters of Laguna de Bay cover a long strip of land along the eastern border of the two parcels of land in question, the width of which strip varies from 50 to 70 meters according to the evidence of the Colegio de San Jose and up to the eastern border of the pass claimed by the municipality of San Pedro Tunasan, according to some witnesses for the Insular Government; and, according to other witnesses for the Insular Government, the flooded strip includes the aforementioned pass itself, which is usually completely covered with water, so that the people can fish in said flooded strip. The claimant Colegio de San Jose contends, and its evidence tends to prove, that the above-named parcels of land are a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to said claimant, which has been in possession thereof since time immemorial by means of its tenants or lessees and farmers. On the other hand, the Government of the Philippine Islands contends that the said two parcels of land belong to the public domain, and its evidence tends to prove that they have always been known as the shores of Laguna de Bay, and they are situated alongside the highway running parallel to said shore; that the water of the lake has receded a great distance on that side; that said parcels of land had been under water formerly; that at present, during the rainy season, the water of the lake reaches the highway, and that when the water recedes the people of the place occupy and cultivate said lands during the dry season. Issue:Whether the subject land belong to the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan and are owned by the claimant Colegio de San Jose or to the public domain as a part of the bed of Laguna de Bay. Held:In resolving the issue, the Court first defined certain terms and cited some legal provisions. LAKE. A body of water formed in depressions of the earth. Ordinarily fresh water, coming from rivers, brooks, or springs, and connected with the sea by them. LAGOON.A small lake, the hollow bed of which is bounded by elevations of land. Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. Thus, Laguna de Bay is a lake. Now, resorting to legal provisions , in order to determine the character and ownership of the parcels of land in question: ART. 407. The following are of public ownership: (4.) Lakes and ponds formed by nature on public lands, and their channels. And article 44 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:

ART. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by public waters, belong to the public domain. It is beyond discussion that Laguna de Bay belongs to the public domain, being a natural lake existing upon public lands, and fed by public waters from rivers, brooks and springs. But, what is the bed of Laguna de Bay? The evidence shows that during the dry season, that is, during the months of December to August, the water of the lake at its highest depth reaches no farther that the line forming the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land, and that it is only during the wet season, that is, during the months of September to November, that said water rises to the highway, completely covering said parcels of land. Therefore, the waters of Laguna de Bay have two different levels during the year: Which of these two heights marks the land limit of the waters of Laguna de Bay, that is, which of them forms its natural bed or basin? The law says, the highest ordinary depth. Now then, which of the two aforesaid depths of the waters of Laguna de Bay is the ordinary one? The word "ordinary" and extraordinary are defined: ORDINARY. Not exceeding the average; common, natural, occurring always or most of the time; not going beyond what happens or takes place. EXTRAORDINARY.Uncommon, transcending the general rule, order or measure; exceeding, surpassing, or going beyond that which is ordinary, commonly met with, current, settled, or admitted by the majority. Thus, "ordinary" and "extraordinary," the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during the rainy season is the extraordinary one. If, according to the definition given by article 74 of the Law of Waters, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season, that is, up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question. Inasmuch as, according to article 407 of the Civil Code, lakes and their beds belong to the public domain, and inasmuch as, according to article 74 of the Law of Waters, the bed of lake is the ground covered by its waters at their highest ordinary depth; whereas the waters of Laguna de Bay at their highest depth reach no farther than the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question, said parcels are outside said bed and, consequently, do not belong to the public domain. The Government of the Philippine Islands also contends that as the waters of Laguna de Bay have receded very much, as a result of which the two parcels of land, which had been under water before, were left uncovered, the claimant Colegio de San Jose which owned the estate bordering upon said Laguna de Bay, did not acquire said two parcels of land, in accordance with the provisions of article 367 of the Civil Code, as follows: ART. 367. The owners of estates bordering on ponds or lagoons, do not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, nor lose those inundated by them in extraordinary floods. As may be seen, the legal provision, cited by the appellant in support of its contention, refers to ponds and lagoons, and has therefore no application to the case at bar, which refers to a lake, a lagoon being legally distinct in character from a lake. If, as we have seen, the two parcels of land in litigation form no part of the bed of Laguna de Bay, and consequently, do not belong to the public domain, they must belong to the claimant Colegio de San Jose as a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, owned by it, the northeastern part of which borders on said lake, and in accordance with the legal provision just quoted, the fact that they are inundated by its waters during extraordinary risings, which take place during the months of Septemberto November, does not deprive said claimant of the ownership thereof. Article 84 of the said Law of Waters further provides that accessions or sediments from the waters of Laguna de Bay, belong to the claimant Colegio de San Jose as owner of the lands bordering on said Laguna de Bay. The appellant also contends that it forms a part of the shores of Laguna de Bay and are therefore of public ownership. As the court below correctly held, this legal provision refers to the waters of the sea, being included under Title I, which treats of the ownership and use of said waters of the sea. Lake waters, being terrestrial waters, their ownership and use are governed by Title II of said Law of Waters. In the same manner as the shore of the sea is that space covered and uncovered by the waters during the tides, its interior or terrestrial limit being the line reached by its highest ordinary depth. In the instant case, the interior or terrestrial limit of the Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters in its highest ordinary depth, that is, up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question. In summary: That the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters at their highest ordinary depth during the dry season, that is, during the months of December to August; (2) that the highest depth reached by said waters during the rainy season, or during the months of September, October and November, is extraordinary; (3) that the two parcels of land in litigation form an integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to the claimant Colegio de San Jose; (4) that said two parcels of land, being accidentally inundated by the waters of Laguna de Bay continue to be the property of the claimant Colegio de San Jose (art. 77, Law of Waters of August 3, 1866); (5) that even supposing that the said two parcels of land have been formed by accession or deposits of sediment by the waters of said Laguna de Bay, they still belong to the said claimant Colegio de San Jose, as owner of the land of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, bordering on said Laguna de Bay (art. 84, Law of Waters of August 3, 18660; (6) that the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of the waters of the sea are not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes, which are governed by special provisions. Property SPS. DOMINADOR R. NARVAEZ and LILIA W. NARVAEZ, vs. SPS. ROSE OGAS ALCISO and ANTONIO ALCISO Facts: Larry Ogas owned a parcel of land. A portion of which was subject to a 30year lease agreement with Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. Ogas sold the property to his daughter, Rose Alciso. Alciso entered into a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, selling the property to Jaime Sansano. Alciso later repurchased the property from Sansano and later entered into another Deed of Sale, this time with Celso Bate. Bate entered into a Deed of Sale of Realty selling the property to spouses Dominador Narvaez and Lilia Narvaez. The spouses Narvaez built a commercial building on

the property. In the meantime, Alciso demanded that a stipulation be included in the Deed of Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase the property from the spouses Narvaez. In compliance with Alcisos demand, the Deed stated that The seller (Bate) carries over the manifested intent of the original seller of the property (Alciso) to buy back the same at a price under such conditions as the present buyers (Spouses Narvaez) may impose. The spouses Narvaez furnished Alciso with a copy of the Deed. Alciso alleged that she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the property. The spouses Narvaez denied that Alciso communicated her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui, thus, she could not repurchase the property (*not related to our topic: pour autrui requires communication of acceptance of the favor before it is revoked. RTC stated that Rose Alciso communicated her acceptance of such favorable stipulation when she went to see defendant Lillia [sic] Narvaez in their house, thus, she could repurchase the land)

HELD: NO. Article 447 involves a situation whereby the owner of the property used the materials of another person either in good faith or in bad faith. In the case at bar, there is no mention of any use of materials by any of the parties. The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Article 477 of the New Civil Code as clarified by the Supreme Court in its footnote number twenty- three.

Ignacio vs Hilario Facts:Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres filed a complaint Damian, Francisco and Luis Ignacio concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential. After the trial of the case, the lower court (Judge Alfonso Felix), rendered judgment holding Hilario and Dres as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to the Ignacios the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code; without pronouncement is made as to damages and Issue: Whether Alciso, after repurchasing the land, has the rights given under Article costs. 448 Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same CFI (Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad), Hilario and Dres prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to Held: No. Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of pay the Ignacios for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, the Ignacios repurchase it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore Hilario planter. and Dres in the possession of said lot. After hearing, the motion was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence, the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ignacios praying for In Pecson v. Court of Appeals,the Court held that: (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b) Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, an order to compel Hilario and Dres to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the buildings, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. or sell to them the residential lot for P45; or (c) a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement. This Court said so in Coleongco v. Regalado: The Supreme Court set aside the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad and Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for ordered the lower court to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must Regalado constructed the house on his own land before he sold said land to determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot where they are erected, Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person constructs a as well as the period of time within which Hilario and Dres may exercise their option building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land, and, in the last instance, the period does not apply to a case where a person constructs a building on his own land, of time within which the Ignacios may pay for the land, all these periods to be counted for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on the part of the from the date the judgment becomes executory or unappealable. After such hearing, builder. the court shall render a final judgment according to the evidence presented by the parties; with costs against Hilarion and Dres. Elsewise stated,where the true owner himself is the builder of the works on his Issue: Whether or not the owner of the land can refuse to exercise their option and own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. instead require the builder in good faith to remove the improvements. Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses Narvaez built the Held: commercial building on the land that they own. Besides, to compel them to buy the The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either land, which they own, would be absurd. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. Article 361 the terms of the Deed of Sale of Realty show that Bate and the Spouses Narvaez provides that The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in entered into a sale with right of repurchase, where Bate transferred his right of good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, repurchase to Alciso. The Deed states that, "The SELLER (Bate) carries over the after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one manifested intent of the original SELLER of the property (Alciso) to buy back the who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper same at a price under such conditions as the present BUYERS (Spouses Narvaez) rent. He cannot however refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and may impose." compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other Philippine Fisheries Development GR. No. 150301 Oct. 2, 2007 party fails to pay for the same. Authority v CA For all the foregoing, the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad is hereby set Facts:Municipality of Navotas assessed the real estate taxes allegedly due from aside and the lower court ordered to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it plaintiff Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) for the period 1981 must determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot where they are 1990 on properties under its jurisdiction, management and operation located inside erected, as well as the period of time within which the plaintiffs-respondents may the Navotas Fishing Port Complex (NFPC). The assessed taxes remained unpaid exercise their option either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land, and, in the last despite the demands made by the municipality which prompted it to give notice to instance, the period of time within which the defendants-petitioners may pay for the plaintiff that the NFPC will be sold at public auction in order that the municipality will land, all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory be able to collect on InterWoods delinquent realty taxes. Plaintiff sought the or unappealable. After such hearing, the court shall render a final judgment according deferment of the auction sale claiming that the NFPC is owned by the Republic of the to the evidence presented by the parties. Philippines, and pursuant to PD No. 977, it (PFDA) is not a taxable entity. 50.) Ignao v IAC-Art 448 with respect to Immovable property FACTS: Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao and Isidro Held: PFDA is a public dominion. As held in a cited case, PFDA was named as Ignao were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 534 square meters among the instrumentalities of the national government. Article 420 of the Civil Code situated in Barrio Tabon, Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. Pursuant to an action for provides: partition filed by petitioner, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite in a decision dated February 6, 1975 directed the partition of the aforesaid land, alloting 133.5 ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion: square meters or 2/8 thereof to private respondents Juan and Isidro, and giving the (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports remaining portion with a total area of 266.5 square meters to petitioner Florencio. and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of However, no actual partition was ever effected. 1 similar character; On July 17, 1978, petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended property against private respondents Juan and Isidro before the Court of First for some public service or for the development of national wealth. Instance of Cavite. In his complaint petitioner alleged that the area occupied by the The NFPC which was constructed by the State for public use and/or public service two (2) houses built by private respondents exceeded the 133.5 square meters falls within the term port in the aforecited provision. Being a property of public previously alloted to them by the trial court in Civil Case No. N-1681. dominion the same cannot be subject to execution or foreclosure sale. Considering Consequently, the lower court conducted an ocular inspection. It was found that the that the Authority is a national government instrumentality, any doubt on whether the houses of Juan and Isidro actually encroached upon a portion of the land belonging entire NFPC may be levied upon to satisfy the tax delinquency should be resolved to Florencio. Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered a licensed against the City of Navotas. Additionally, the land on which the NFPC property sits is geodetic engineer to conduct a survey to determine the exact area occupied by the a reclaimed land, which belongs to the State. Reclaimed lands are lands of the public houses of private respondents. The survey subsequently disclosed that the house of domain and cannot, without Congressional fiat, be subject of a sale, public or private. Juan occupied 42 square meters while that of Isidro occupied 59 square meters of Florencio's land or a total of 101 square meters. HEIRS OF OROSA VS MIGRINO The RTC stated that pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code, the owner of the land FACTS: In the case of Maria Mayug Vda de Cailles vs. Dominador Mayuga, the (Florencio) should have the choice to either appropriate that part of the house Supreme Court affirmed the ownership over a 53 hectare parcel of land in favor of standing on his land after payment of indemnity or oblige the builders in good faith Dominador Mayuga and to his successor-in-interest, the late Nicolas Orosa. (Juan and Isidro) to pay the price of the land. However, the trial court observed that Because of this the heirs of Nicolas Orosa moved for execution of judgment. based on the facts of the case, it would be useless and unsuitable for Florencio to Meanwhile Goldenrod filed a motion for leave to intervene in the execution exercise the first option since this would render the entire houses of Juan and Isidro proceeding, alleging an interest over the property. On its defense, Goldenrod alleged worthless. The trial court then applied the ruling in the similar case of Grana vs. Court that Delta Motors has acquired the contingent rights of Nicoloas over the property as of Appeals, 4 where the Supreme Court had advanced a more "workable solution". well as those claims of Jose. Eventually, Delta Motors sold the property to Goldenrod Thus, it ordered Florencio to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions of his land who subsequently sold the property to the Consortium. According to Goldenrod, the respectively occupied by the latter. Thus this petition. contract between the former and the consortium contained an undertaking whereby, ISSUE: WON Art 448 of CC is applicable in this case. Goldenrod shall protect the interest of the Consortium against claims of any third RULING: YES! It should be noted that prior to partition, all the co-owners hold the person. Hence, on the basis of that stipulation, Goldenrod claimed interest on the property in common dominion but at the same time each is an owner of a share which said proceeding. is abstract and undetermined until partition is effected. As cited in Eusebio ISSUE: WON Article 447 is applicable in the case at bar. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 8 "an undivided estate is co-ownership by the heirs." Issue: Whether PFDA is a public dominion

As co-owners, the parties may have unequal shares in the common property, quantitatively speaking. But in a qualitative sense, each co-owner has the same right as any one of the other co-owners. Every co-owner is therefore the owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract, because until division is effected such portion is not concretely determined. 9 The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the home of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there is a co-ownership if good faith has been established. In other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. Petitioner's second assigned error is however well taken. Both the RTC and CA erred when they peremptorily adopted the "workable solution" in the case of Grana vs. Court of appeals, 12 and ordered the owner of the land, petitioner Florencio, to sell to private respondents, Juan and Isidro, the part of the land they intruded upon, thereby depriving petitioner of his right to choose. Such ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that "(t)he owner of the land . . . shall have the right to appropriate . . .or to oblige the one who built . . . to pay the price of the land . . . ." The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts. INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

addressed to the Provincial Sheriff protesting against the seizure of the properties on the ground that they are not personal properties. Despite the letter of protest, Rocos team then proceeded to dismantle the equipment from the factory, arguing that their function is merely ministerial. Their team, however, noticed that the equipment could not possibly be dismantled without causing damages/injuries to the wooden frames attached therein. In response, IPO filed a case in court for the return of the properties seized. Issue: Whether the machineries and equipment subject of this case is personal or real Ruling: The properties were IMMOVABLE. Machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of the said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated without breaking the material or deterioration of the object (Article 415, NCC). Moreover, the machinery and equipment were intended by the owner of the tenement to be used for the carrying of their industry. Being so, the properties are real within the purview of Article 415, NCC. This being the case, the properties litigated herein cannot be subject of a replevin. Art. 429 PBCOM vs. TRAZO Facts: Elenita Trazo opened a payroll account with China Banking Corporation (CBC) in order to facilitate the payment of her salaries and other monetary benefits from her employer, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM). On or about December 29 1997, Romeo dela Rosa, PBCOM assistant vice-president, instructed CBC to credit all accounts under its payroll with the medical and clothing subsidy for the year 1998. On that date, Trazos current account was credited with the amount of P7,000.00.

2 days after, Trazo resigned from PBCOM. Since she resigned [effective January 1,1998], she was no longer entitled to the medical and clothing subsidy for the year 1998. dela Rosa wrote William Lim, CBC senior assistant vice-president, [5 January 1998] FACTS International Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing and authorizing/directing CBC/Lim to debit the sum of P7,000.00 from Trazos current exportation of plywood and was granted by the Government an exclusive license for a account. Acting upon such authority/directive, CBC/Lim debited the same on the period of 25 years to cut, collect and remove timber from a certain portion of timber same day. land in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna. Meanwhile, Trazo drew checks against her current account in favor of Bliss While the license is still in effect, Executive Proclamation No, 791 and subsequently, Development Corporation (BDC) and the House of Sara Lee Phils., Inc. However, the checks were dishonored by CBC due to insufficiency of funds, which was Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted, ceding and transferring in full ownership to the occasioned by the P7,000.00 debit from her current account. University of the Philippines a certain parcel of land, included therein is the area covered by the license given to International Hardwood. Because of this, Trazo instituted an action for damages against PBCOM, dela Rosa, As a consequence of the passage of the foregoing laws, UP proceeded to collect CBC, and Lim; Claiming that PBCOM [through dela Rosa] had no authority to from International Hardwood all forest charges due and payable by the latter under unilaterally order the debiting of her current account and that CBC [through Lim] the License Agreement. International Hardwood questioned such act as they maintain made such debit without her knowledge and consent resulting in the dishonor of her that the law did not expressly authorize UP to collect said fees. checks.
*On the other hand, CBC and Lim filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Also, PBCOM

ISSUE WON UP has the right and authority to collect all fees and charges due and payable by International Hardwood under the License Agreement. HELD Yes. When the Philippine Government ceded and transferred the property to UP thru the passage of Republic Act 3990, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and removed and segregated it from a public forest. By the wordings of the law, UP was made the absolute owner thereof. Being the absolute owner of the subject property, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those established by law. The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces and jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use. LONGINOS JAVIER, vs. SEGUNDO JAVIER, ET AL FACTS: This case relates to the ownership of the lot, and of the house standing thereon, No. 521 Calle Real, Malate, Manila. The court below found that the land belonged to the Longinos as administrator of the estate of his father, Manuel Javier, and that the defendant Isabel Hernandez and Manuel Ramon Javier, her son, are the owners of the house standing on the lot. Judgment was rendered in favor of the Longinos for the possession of the property, but giving the defendants a reasonable opportunity to remove the house. It is claimed finally by Segundo et al that the case should be decided by an application of the principles of law meant that community of property existed because the house was owned by the Segundo and the land by the Longinos. ISSUE: WON principles of community of property is applicable in this case. RULING: NO. The contention can not be maintained, for such a condition of affairs does not create a community of property within the meaning of that term as it is used in title 3, book 2 of the Civil Code. If, on the other hand, it is itself belonged to the heirs of Manuel Javier, and that two of the defendants were such heirs, it can be said that the decision of the court below was fully as favorable to Segundo et al as it could be. Article 397 of the Civil Code relates to improvements made upon the common property by one of the co-owners. The burden of proof was on Segundo to show that the house was built with the consent of their cotenants. Even if a tacit consent was shown this would not require such cotenants to pay for the house. MACHINERY AND ENGINEERING V. COURT OF APPEALS (October 29, 1954) Facts: Machinery and Engineering Supplies Inc. filed a complaint for replevin to recover the machinery and equipment which they sold and delivered to IPO Limestone Inc. at their factory in Barrio Bigti, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The judge who tried the case ruled in favor of Machinery and ordered the seizure and immediate possession of the properties in question. Days later, two deputy sheriffs headed by one Roco and a group of technical men and laborers went to IPOs factory to carry out the order. However, their group was met by the companys manager, Leonardo Cotreras who handed them a letter

and dela Rosa filed their own Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Issue: Won PBCOM and dela Rosa committed a violation of Trazos property rights with respect to her checking account. Ruling: [The court held] YES PBCOM and dela Rosa committed a violation of Trazos property rights with respect to her checking account. They are responsible for the unlawful debiting of Trazos account; wherein such unlawful debiting constituted a violation of Article 429. And Art. 429 provides that The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. [For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.] In the case @ bar, PBCOM and de la Rosa had no cause nor reason to unilaterally order CBC and Lim to debit Trazos checking/current account for it was her personal property and not of PBCOM. Debiting her account without her knowledge, consent and approval was unjust and illegal, and further, was done in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. And even if PBCOM erroneously credited Trazo with monetary benefits [Trazo was to receive] as she did receive separation benefits equivalent to more than P500,000.00 more or less, from PBCOM itself. A reasonable set-off or compensation should and could have been resorted to. However, PBCOM never utilized this option. PBCOM neither informed Trazo of said transaction, much less seek her approval and authority to debit her CHINABANK account when at the time of the debitting (January 5, 1998) , she was no longer an employee of PBCOM. Hence, PBCOM and dela Rosa should pay Trazo damages for violating her property rights. Article 457- Agne vs Director of Lands FACTS: In 1971, sps Presentacion & Joaquin Gascon filed a Case for recovery of possession and damages against Marcelino Agne et al. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of Agne, et.al.; that it was during the Japanese occupation when Agne et.al took possession of said land by means of fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation; that Gascon repeatedly demanded the surrender of the physical possession of said property but Agne et.al refused. Agne, et.al., replied that the land in question was formerly an abandoned bed of the Agno-Chico River. It was formed due to a big flood occurred in 1920; causing the said river to change its course. And by virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code [which was law in force then], Agne, et.al., by operation of law, became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective parts of said river bed bordering their properties.

While the earlier-mentioned case was still pending, Agne, et.al. filed a complaint against Dir. of Lands and sps Agpoon for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to the same property. They maintain that the land in question belongs to them; that the patent granted by the Govt to Herminigildo Agpoon [Presentacions father] and subsequent titles arising therefrom are all null and void. They reasoned that the abandoned river bed is their private property; therefore, it cannot be the subject of a public land grant. Issue: Whether or not Agne et al are the owners of the alluvium or who between Agne et.al [who is the riparian owner presently in possession], and the sps Gascon [the registered owner by virtue of a free patent] has a better right over the abandoned river bed HELD: YES or the Court held that it was Agne et.al that has a better right over the abandoned river bed. Under the old Civil Code, the law then in force, provides that the beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom." Further, riparian owners acquire automatic ownership of the abandoned bed w/o need of any formal act of acquisition. Thus, once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by the article. The law does not require any formal act of acquisition on the part of the riparian owners. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it is a mode of acquisition provided by law. As a result of the right of accretion, the accessory follows the nature of the principal. The landowners right to additions by accretion has been said to rest in the law of nature. It is analogous to the right of the tree owner to its fruits, and the owner of flocks and herds to their natural increase. In the case at bar, Agne, et.al. are the riparian owners of the lands adjoining the river bed and they are also the owners of portions of said abandoned river bed without the necessity of any action or exercise of possession on their part, Their failure to register the accretion in their names and declare it for purposes of taxation did not divest it of its private property character. While it might be true that there is automatic ownership of the alluvium, nevertheless, automatic registration is not included. Therefore, the deposited/added soil is not entitled to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered properties under the Torrens system. However said rule is not applicable in the case at bar, since the title claimed by sps Gascon is not based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the Govt. Such pub. grant presupposes that the property is a public land; which is not true in this case since the subject land is a private property owned by Agne et.al. Hence it is impt. To note that Ownership over the accession is governed by the Civil Code while Imprescriptibility of registered land is a concern of the Land Registration Act. ***Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of Gascon's predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void.

The owner of the land on which building, sowing, or planting is done in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing, or planting after the indemnity mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or, to oblige the person who has built or planted, to pay him the value of the land. . . . (Civil Code, art. 361.) Article 453 and 454 mentioned conceded the right of retention to the possessor in good faith (as the defendant now is) who may have made necessary and useful improvements on another's property. The sale of the lot claimed is thereby declared null and void and of no force and effect, and there is reserved to the defendant his right of action against Jose Mojica to warrant the sale; In lieu thereof, we hold that the plaintiff should recover the lot under consideration, first indemnifying the defendant for the value of the buildings and plantings he has placed thereon, with the right on his part to retain it until she has reimbursed him for said necessary and useful improvements; or in the contrary case, for the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the price of the land, making himself the legitimate owner thereof; without special finding as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.

PACIFIC FARMS V. ESGUERRA (March 25, 1970) Nature: This was an appeal to the decision made by the Supreme Court in 1969. Facts: Carried Lumber Company sold and delivered lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms, Inc. which the latter used for the construction of 6 buildings in its compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan. The total procurement price was P15, 000.00 but Insular failed to pay the full price and owed Carried Lumber P4, 710.00 Because of this, Carried Lumber filed a case to recover said unpaid balance from Insular Farms. The RTC ruled in favor of Carried Lumber and eventually, the decision became final. The sheriff then went on to levy the 6 buildings. Pacific Farms, however, asserted ownership over the levied buildings later on. It would seem that it acquired the properties from Insular Farms seven months before Carried Lumber instituted the abovementioned case. In short, Carried Lumber was an unpaid furnisher of materials. In the 1969 case, the SC obligated Pacific Farms to pay Carried Lumber the unpaid portion of the procurement price. The Court in that case applied Article 447 by analogy, stating that if indeed Pacific Farms owned the 6 buildings, it must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the said materials especially so that Carried Lumber Co. does not desire to remove the materials and even if it wanted to, it cannot remove them without the necessarily damaging the buildings; hence, the more reason to emphasize the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. Moreover, since Pacific Farms benefited from the accession, it should shoulder the compensation. In this present case, Pacific Farms questions the propriety of the decision earlier made by the Court alleging now that it was a buyer in good faith of the 6 buildings in question. Issue: Whether Pacific Farms should shoulder the unpaid portion of the procurement price Ruling: Yes, within the purview of Article 447.Indeed, because the Court assumed that Pacific Farms was in good faith, it did not pronounce Pacific Farms liable for the reparation of Property - PAULA MARTINEZ vs. VICTORINO BAGANUS damages but only for the payment of the unpaid price of the lumber and construction Article 452 G.R. No. L-9438 November 25, 1914 materials due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher thereof. Based on this same assumption, the Court likewise held that the Carried Lumber has no right to remove Facts: Paula Martinez was the owner of a town lot, description whereof is not the materials but only to recovery the value of the unpaid lumber and construction necessary, as the property has been well identified. She was the owner through materials. Thus, since the Pacific Farms benefited from the accession, i.e., from the purchase from the spouses Martin Magahis and SeverinaDignasan for the price of lumber and materials that went into the construction of the six buildings, it should P70, as is recorded in the instrument executed therefor, which is in every way valid. shoulder the compensation dueto the Carried Lumber as unpaid furnisher of Jose Mojica, son of Paula Martinez, sold said lot to VictorinoBaganus for the same materials, pursuant to the rule cited in our decision that compensation should be price, P70, as is likewise recorded in the instrument executed therefor, also in every borne by the person who has been benefited by the accession. way valid. Subsequently, Paula Martinez sought recovery of ownership and Q: Why was Article 447 applied only by analogy? possession of the lot, previously requesting that the sale thereof made by Jose Mojica A: The fact that it was not Pacific Farms which used the materials used for the to VictorinoBaganus be declared null and void. construction and the fact that the principal property considered in this case was not a The defendant Baganus alleged that he bought the lot from Jose Mojica with parcel of land but buildings. the consent of the latter's mother, Paula Martinez, in the belief that it belonged to Jose; that he had paid to Jose Mojica a deposit of P30 in advance and agreed to pay PADA-KILARIO vs. CA the P40 balance when the instrument of sale had been executed, as was later done; G.R. No. 134329 (January 19, 2000) that, confiding in good faith in the validity and efficacy of his acquisition, he had made necessary and useful improvements on the lot, having a house and a carriage shop Facts: During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his estate included a parcel of land of thereon, graded it, and planted fruit trees, all which had costs him over P1,000. residential and coconut land located at Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. Jose Mojica, confirmed the sale he had made to Baganus for the price of P70, 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. Jacintos half-brother, Feliciano Pada, having received P30 in advance and P40 later when the sale was put on record; but obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern portion. When he says that he made the condition that if his mother did not agree to the sale he Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight might take back the land and would return the money received; and that in fact his children. Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house mother did not agree to it. since 1960. VictorinoBaganus affirms that he arranged the sale with Paula Martinez and paid her in advance P30. He said that the value of the improvements were: For Jacinto died intestate. Subsequently, the six children of Jacinto, as his compulsory construction of the house, P1,000; for the warehouse, P80; and for the fruit trees heirs, entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they planted, P300. although they had not yet borne fruit. The only thing impugned is the executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of planting of the trees; counsel for the plaintiff only acknowledged the grading of the the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by land or lot in question. his daughter, Maria, which Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said Issue: Whether both Martinez and Baganus acted in bad faith partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as coYes. It is evident, that the lot in litigation is the property of the plaintiff; and the owner of said property. defendant acquired it in bad faith, for he himself says that he dealt with the plaintiff, but consented that one who was not the owner of the thing sold should appear as the Thereafter, dispositions of certain properties by the Padas ensued. vendor.Even though the defendant built and planted in bad faith, the plaintiff also acted in bad faith:Concepcion Mojica, plaintiff's daughter, two years after the sale On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, made the proposition, in talking with a lawyer for the purpose, that the land be Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881. repurchased. All were present and were living in the barrio, the mother and her two children when the said transaction between Jose and Victorino took place.Bad faith On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of on the part of the owner is understood whenever the act (of building or planting) has his father, Marciano. Silverio, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer. been executed in his presence with his knowledge and tolerance and without objection. (Civil Code, art. 364 par. 2.) When these has been and faith, not only on In order that Silverios family can utilize the northern portion, he demanded Verona the part of the person who built, sowed, or planted on another's land, but also on the and Roberto to vacate the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the part of the owner thereof, the rights of each shall be the same as if both had acted in barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest good faith. (Civil Code, art. 364, par. 1.) efforts toward that end, failed.

On June 26, 1995, Silverio filed in the MCTC, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against spouses Pada-Kilario. On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation transferring to Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. Issue: Whether or not there was bad faith on the part of both parties- the owner of the land and the builder Held:Under Article 453, it is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. In the instant case, although the possession of Verona of the northern portion was with the knowledge and permission of Jacinto Pada and later his heirs since 1960, it cannot be said that the owner of the land is in bad faith because its owners allowed Verona to occupy the land only by sheer tolerance. From the admission of Verona and Roberto that they have been occupying the northern portion without paying any rental, they knew all along that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time because their possession of the said property was by sheer tolerance only of its owners. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand.

Verily, bad faith was only on the part of the builder because even though they knew that their occupation may be terminated at any time, they built improvements on the land not belonging to them. Neither did the belated donation of the heirs of Amado convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized. More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for the heirs of Amado were not owners thereof. As such, Verona and Roberto cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot. Art 457 Alluvium - Zapata vs CA Facts: Juliana Zapata own a parcel of land adjoining a non-navigable and nonPINGOL VS CA floatable river called the Candalaga creek. In 1915, when the cadastral survey of San FACTS: In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed Fernando was begun, the width of the Candalaga Creek adjoining the two parcels of a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF land owned by Juliana Zapata was about 90 or to 100 meters. At present, the width is [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years. 15 meters because soil had been accumulated by the water current of the river on the banks of Lot No. 25 and of that part of Lot No. 16 owned by Juliana Zapata. The In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, accreted land is delimited in plan Psu-140515 and designated as Lot 1, 2 and 3. leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such Later, In a verified petition filed on 16 June 1956 in the Court of First Instance of lot and offered to settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept Pampanga, Juliana Zapata claims that the aforesaid three lots belong to her by the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action accretion, was provided for in article 457 of the Civil Code, and prays that the same for specific performance (with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol be registered in her name. However this application was opposed by the director of were encroaching upon Donascos lot). Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of lands contending title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of article 457 of the Civil Code cannot apply and does not support the Zapata's claim sale). With Donascos breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was that the accretion or deposit of alluvial soil, belongs to her as riparian owner, because deemed cancelled, and the heirs continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by such accretion "was not due to the natural effect of the current but was artificially Pingol. induced on account of the erection of the fish traps on the creek." ISSUE: WON the action filed by the heirs of Donasco has prescribed. W/N such contention is tenable HELD: NO. Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific No. True, those fish traps might have slowed down the current of the Candalaga performance, it was actually an action to quiet title. Creek and might have brought about or caused the accretion, but as there is no Under the law, there are six requisites to be complied with in an action to quiet title. In evidence to show that the setting up or erection of the fish trap was expressly the case at bar, all the requisites are present. intended or designed to cause or bring about the accretion, Zapata may still invoke First, the heirs of Donasco have an equitable title on the said property because of the the benefit of the provisions of Article 457 of the Civil Code to supper her claim of title transfer of ownership to Francisco, their father, by Vicente. thereto. Moreover, the fishermen who since 1894 used to set up fish traps in the Second, there exists a cloud in the heirs title because the TCT of the property was creek, later on secured permit from the Government that auctioned off the right or still registered in the name of Vicente Pingol. license to set up fish traps in the creek, and the setting up of such fish traps stopped Third, the cloud exists by reason of Vicentes TCT. or was discontinued even before 1926, all go to show that the alluvial accretion was Fourth and fifth, Vicentes TCT is valid in its face however in truth and in fact it is no entirely due to the setting up of such fish traps. ineffective because the portion of Vicentes property was already sold to Francisco. Art 476 Quieting of Title Sixth, it is prejudicial to the heirs because the strength of Vicentes title is stronger than the heirs and the latter may be ejected by Vicente. Tandog vs Macapagal Facts: The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Antipolo where, the Art 420- City Of Manila vs. Garcia et al Tandogs, represented by Efren Tandog claim that they have been in actual, open, Facts: City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area. Later, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land since time immemorial. They squatters (defendants) entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and trace their right from Casimiro Policarpio. He was survived by his nephews and consent. Their presence being discovered, they were given written permits by the nieces, now deceased, except Maria Bautista Catanyag. She and Casimiros grand Mayor labeled lease contracts. Then came the need of Epifanio de los Santos nieces and grand nephews (herein petitioners) have continued possessing and Elementary School for expansion. So, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear cultivating the land. squatters' houses on city property, they were given thirty (30) days to vacate and When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they remove his construction or improvement on the premises. But Garcia et al refused to found that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina vacate on the contention that they were lessees and have been paying rent. Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners, spouses Issue: W/N they can be removed from the premises despite the issuance of the Calderon used falsified documents to justify their possession, and for his part, Renato lease contract Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent No. 045802-1165 which led to Held: YES. SC held that defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the the issuance to him of Original Certificate of Title. Because of these incidents, premises and the excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bracnh 73, Antipolo City a complaint for They insist that they have acquired the legal status of a tenant but SC said They are quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2418. wrong. They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners the knowledge and consent of the city. Squatting is unlawful and no amount of allegations in their complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bought their acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. The Mayor property in 1958 and, since then, have been in possession of the same. They planted of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple trees and crops thereon. Also, they have been paying the corresponding realty taxes. expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing leases. Accordingly, the She does not know petitioners who are all strangers in the place. Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or oral, to defendants, Before the hearing of the case, or on July 20, 1993, petitioners and Macapagal and that the permits herein granted are null and void. entered into a Compromise Agreement.2 Petitioners acknowledged therein his Art. 429 Doctrine of Self-Help ownership of the portions of the land consisting of 18,787 square meters covered by Villafuerte vs CA OCT No. P-665. This agreement was approved by the trial court. Facts: Sps. Villafuerte operated a gasoline station on the premises of three adjoining W/N the action to Quiet title should prosper. lot. One of these land is owned by De Mesa, the other by the Daleon brothers (and

the last is owned by appellee's mother.) Here, the lands of De Mesa and Daleon where subject of a lease by the gasoline station operated by sps Villafuerte. Now, when the lease expired, sps sought a new lease from De Mesa. However, as regards Lot 2948-B of the Daleon brothers, the Villafuertes were not as lucky. That instead of obtaining a lease renewal, they instead received a demand letter from the brother's counsel ordering them to vacate. But this was simply ignored by the Villafuertes. So, a complaint for ejectment was filed against them by Daleon. Later, its lease contract with the Daleon brothers also expired and was not also renewed. But as what they did before, they stayed with in the premises and continued operation. On February 1, 1990, Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon, with the aid of several persons and without the knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the closure of the latter's gasoline station by constructing fences around it and Invoking their status as owners of the withheld premises, the defendants admitted in their respective answers having caused the fencing of the plaintiffs' gasoline station thereat but reasoned out that they did so on account of the plaintiffs' refusal to vacate the same despite demands. W/N the act was justified pursuant to the doctrine of self-help No. The CA ruling was, (which the SC up held later on) states that, Private respondents could not invoke the doctrine of self-help contained in Article 429 of the Civil Code6reasoning that the doctrine finds no application when occupation was effected through lawful means such as in this case where petitioners' possession of the lots owned by private respondents was effected through lease agreements. That Sps Villafuertes continued unauthorized occupation of private respondents' properties may have been illegal, however, it was incumbent upon private respondents to abide by the express provision of Article 536 of the Civil Code requiring recourse to the proper court prior to ousting petitioners from their (private respondents') lots; Art 536 In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing. In the case at bar, when private respondents personally took it upon themselves to evict petitioners from their properties, which act was in clear contravention of the law, they became liable "for all the necessary and natural consequences of [their] illegal act. Having disregarded the plain requirement of the law, private respondents Daleon and De Mesa were held accountable to petitioners for the various damages prayed for.

No. As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.3 While petitioners alleged that respondents claim of adverse possession is a cloud on their (petitioners) interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been proved. The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to justify their possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in evidence by petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents which may have been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.4 Also, it is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.5 Petitioners failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to prove that Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-interest. Republic vs Barandiaran Facts: Ma. Isabel Laurel Barandiaran (respondent) filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Tanauan City, Batangas an Application for Registration[1] over a parcel of land located in Batangas. The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic, herein petitioner), represented by the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the ground that Lot No. 12753-C (the questioned lot) is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic and that neither respondent nor her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession or occupation thereof since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. Barandiaran testified that a certain Isadora Gonzales (Gonzales) was the owner of Lot No. 12753 (the lot) of which the questioned lot forms part. When respondent and her siblings became interested in buying the lot, they inquired from people in the vicinity and from the Assessors Office in Tanauan and came to learn that the lot was registered in Gonzales name in 1930. After negotiating with the heirs of Gonzales, the latter executed on October 3, 2002 a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent and her siblings for a consideration of P100,000. Issue: Whether the property is within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain and henc,e available for public appropriation.

And since the subject properties are shorelands, under Article 420 of the Civil Code, shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not registrable. Long has been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert them into private properties nor confer title upon the registrant. In the case @ bar, the Rep is right in claiming that the lots were not subject to registration for being outside the commerce of men, and the defense of long possession by the Castillos is incorrect, for mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character. *And since the lots in litigation are of public domain, the registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private property. The action filed by the Rep was not barred by the decision of the registration court nor by prescription. Rico vs. Rufon Facts: Atty. Rico was the counsel of Teodoro and Carmelina for a civil suit filed against Rachel. The RTC rendered decision in favor of the former which was affirmed by the CA. Consequently, some of the properties in the name of Claudio as spouse of Rachel which were located in Bacolod City where thereafter levied in execution by the Bacolod City Sheriff who annotated a "Notice of Embargo" dated May 16, 1989 on the TCTs. Claudio filed a petition for Cancellation of Notice of Embargo at the RTC, presided over by Judge Rufon, in an acting capacity, granted the said petition and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Embargo on the ground of prescription. Issue: Whether or not the Petition for Cancellation of Notice of Embargo is an action to quiet title and/or remove clouds Held: The petition for the cancellation of notice of embargo is an action to quiet title and/or remove cloud therefrom under Articles 476 of the Civil Code. When one is disturbed in any form in his rights of property over an immovable by an unfounded claimed of others, he has the right to ask remedy from the competent courtsan action to quite the title or to remove such cloud.

In the instant case, Claudio challenged the notice of embargo issued in this civil suit and prayed that the annotations on the TCTs be cancelled in order to nullify the rights Held: The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of state ownership of lands of of the adverse parties, especially that of Teodoro and Carmelina. the public domain lies on the person applying for registration. The evidence to overcome the presumption must be well-nigh incontrovertible. Claudio claimed that there exists a cloud on his titles; as shown on the face of the To discharge the burden, respondent presented a Certification issued by the titles issued in the name of Claudio, married to Rachel, there is a Notice of Embargo Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of annotated by the Ex-Officio City Sheriff. The cloud on the said title was apparently Environment and Natural Resources. Such certificate does not state, however, that valid because the said annotation was pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the lot of which the questioned lot forms part is alienable and disposable. The Judge Rufon. However, Claudio sought for its removal because it may be prejudicial certification merely states that the lot is not covered by any kind of public land to his titles. application or patent. In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as 9.) Sergs Products v. PCI Leasing-Sec 415, par 5 required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the FACTS: On 13 February 1998, PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. filed a complaint for said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin . required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is On 6 March 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, judge issued a writ of alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a On 24 March 1998, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the one machinery, with word that he would return for the other machineries. Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at On 25 March 1998, Sergs product filed a motion for special protective order, invoking bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever replevin. with the nature and character of the property surveyed On 6 April 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take Respecting the Declaration of Real Property in Gonzales name, the same does not possession of the remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prove ownership of the questioned lot. It is settled that tax receipts and declarations prevented by the workers from taking the rest. of ownership for tax purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership; they On 7 April 1998, they went to the CA via an original action for certiorari. Citing the only become evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by Agreement of the parties, the CA held that the subject machines were personal proof of actual possession of the property.[26] No such proof of actual possession of property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled the property was presented. Besides, the Declaration of Real Property shows that it that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of was effective in 1997, indicating that the declaration is of recent vintage.[27] It cannot the contracting parties." It thus affirmed the 18 February 1998 Order, and the 31 thus prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of March 1998 Resolution of the lower court, and lifted the preliminary injunction issued an owner since time immemorial or since 1945. on 15 June 1998. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 26 February 1999. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Article 420- Republic vs Lat Vda. De Castillo ISSUE: Whether or not the subject machines were personal property. Facts: In 1951, Modesto Castillo, who was married to Amanda Lat, applied for the DECISION: Yes. Machines were personal property in so far as the contracting parties registration of two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Batangas. And in the same are concerned. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property year, he was declared as the true and absolute owner of the land with the be considered as personal as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no improvements thereon. innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby. There is absolutely no reason why a In 1960, the Lots were consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9. Also, in that machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by year, Modesto Castillo died and Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a deed destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. After agreeing to such of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al. As a stipulation as embodied in sec 12.1 of their lease agreement, Sergs product are result, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled, and new transfer certificates of consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. title were issued. Because of this, the Republic of the Philippines filed for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to the Castillos, and further, asked for the Sps. Cruz vs. Leis reversion of the lands to the State. Facts: Gertrudes, while married to Adriano, acquired from the then Department of It was alleged that said lands had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) a parcel of land with an area of one inundated by the waters thereof. And being of public ownership, it could not be the hundred (100) square meters, situated at Bo. Sto. Nio, Marikina, Rizal. However, the subject of registration as private property. Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title described Gertrudes as a The Castillos, on the other hand, answered that the Government's action was already widow. barred by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the government was estopped from questioning their ownership and possession. After the death of Adriano, Gertrudes obtained a loan from Alejandro and Adelaida, in Issue: WON the subject properties are of public dominion. the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before February 5, 1986. The Held: The court held that YES, the subject properties are of public dominion. loan was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. Gertrudes, however, Because, as proven by the Republic, the properties in question were the shorelands failed to pay the loan on the due date. of Taal Lake during the 1923 cadastral survey. Further, other evidences pointed out that the properties were under water at that time and are still under water especially Consequently, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of Alejandro. The first is during rainy season. denominated as "Kasunduan" which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a

"Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property for the price of P39,083.00, the same amount stipulated in the "Kasunduan." For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated and a TCT was issued in favor of Alejandro.

agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Emphases supplied.) According to the aforequoted provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity for the same, as provided for in Articles 546[41] and 548[42] of the Civil Code; or obliging the builder to pay the On June 9, 1987, Gertrudes died. Thereafter, the children of Gertrudes received price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in demands to vacate the premises from Spouses Cruz, the new owners of the property. which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.[43] RTC utterly failed to make an adjudication on the rights of Tuatis and Visminda under Aggrieved the heirs of Spouses Leis filed an action before the Regional Trial Court Article 448 of the Civil Code. It would seem that the decretal part of said RTC (RTC) of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale over a lot executed by judgment was limited to implementing the following paragraph in the Deed of Sale by Gertrudes in favor of Alexander, as well as the title subsequently issued in the name Installment: of the latter. The RTC rendered decision in favor of the former which was also 4. That failure of the BUYER [Tuatis] to pay the remaining balance within the affirmed by the CA. period of three months from the period stipulated above, then the BUYER [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this contract to the SELLER [Visminda] and the Issue: May a co-owner dispose the property owned in common in its entirety SELLER [Visminda] [shall] likewise return all the amount paid by the BUYER [Tuatis].[46] Held: The subject property was acquired by Gertrudes during the subsistence of her marriage with Adriano. Upon the death of Adriano Leis, the conjugal partnership was Taking into consideration the provisions of the Deed of Sale by terminated and a regime of co-ownership arose between Gertrudes and the other Installment and Article 448 of the Civil Code, Visminda has the following options: heirs in relation to the property. Under the first option, Visminda may appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary[50] and useful Accordingly, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the expenses[51]the latter incurred for said building, as provided in Article 546 of the Civil property owned in common as provided in Article 493 of the Civil Code. Code. Unfortunately for the heirs of Spouses Leis, however, the property was registered solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. Tuatis vs Escol FACTS: Sometime in November 1989, Visminda, as seller, and Tuatis, as buyer, entered into a Deed of Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by Installment[7] (Deed of Sale by Installment). The subject matter of said Deed was a piece of real property situated in Poblacion, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. The significant portions of the Deed of Sale by Installment stated: That for and in consideration of the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine currency, the SELLER [Visminda[8]] hereby SELLS to the BUYER [Tuatis], the above-described parcel of land under the following terms and conditions: 1. That the BUYER [Tuatis] shall pay to the SELLER [Visminda] the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00), as downpayment; 2. That the BUYER [Tuatis] shall pay to the SELLER [Visminda] the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), on or before December 31, 1989; 3. That the remaining balance of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) shall be paid by the BUYER [Tuatis] to the SELLER [Visminda] on or before January 31, 1990; 4. That failure of the BUYER [Tuatis] to pay the remaining balance within the period of three months from the period stipulated above, then the BUYER [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this contract to the SELLER [Visminda] and the SELLER [Visminda] [shall] likewise return all the amount paid by the BUYER [Tuatis].[9] In the meantime, Tuatis already took possession of the subject property and constructed a residential building thereon. In 1996, Tuatis requested Visminda to sign a prepared absolute deed of sale covering the subject property, but the latter refused, contending that the purchase price had not yet been fully paid The RTC, in the body of its Decision dated 29 April 1999 in Civil Case No. S-618, found that Tuatis breached the conditions stipulated in the Deed of Sale by Installment between her and Visminda; but since both Tuatis and Visminda were guilty of bad faith, [t]heir rights in such cases are governed by Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.[40] Tuatis thereafter filed before the RTC on 22 April 2002 a Motion to Exercise Right under Article 448 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.[21] Tuatis moved that the RTC issue an order allowing her to buy the subject property from Visminda. While Tuatis indeed had the obligation to pay the price of the subject property, she opined that such should not be imposed if the value of the said property was considerably more than the value of the building constructed thereon by Tuatis. Tuatis alleged that the building she constructed was valued at P502,073.00,[22] but the market value of the entire piece of land measuring 4.0144 hectares, of which the subject property measuring 300 square meters formed a part, was only about P27,000.00.[23] Tuatis maintained that she then had the right to choose between being indemnified for the value of her residential building or buying from Visminda the parcel of land subject of the case. Tuatis stated that she was opting to exercise the second option. ISSUE:Whether or not Art. 448 is applicable in the case. HELD: YES! Article 448 of the Civil Code, referred to by the RTC, provides: ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall Until Visminda appropriately indemnifies Tuatis for the building constructed by the latter, Tuatis may retain possession of the building and the subject property. Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair value of the land.[53] TheP10,000.00 price of the subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment executed in November 1989, shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the exercise of Vismindas rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis obligation will then be statutory, and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under Article 448 of the Civil Code. Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject property herein, turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms. The Court highlights that the options under Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the owner of the subject property. There is no basis for Tuatis demand that, since the value of the building she constructed is considerably higher than the subject property, she may choose between buying the subject property from Visminda and selling the building to Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is for Visminda, not Tuatis, to make. And, depending on Vismindas choice, Tuatis rights as a builder under Article 448 are limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the building and subject property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the second option, a right not to be obliged to pay for the price of the subject property, if it is considerably higher than the value of the building, in which case, she can only be obliged to pay reasonable rent for the same. The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.