BELTRAN VS.

PEOPLE 334 SCRA 106

FACTS: 1. Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. 2. After 24 years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon City, Br. 87, a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. 3. In her Answer to said petition, petitioners wife alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. 4. She then filed a criminal case for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61. 5. Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. 6. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. 7. Judge Alden Cervantes denied the motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration. 8. Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati, on certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge Cervantes. 9. The RTC denied the petition also a Motion for Reconsideration. 10. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage? HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It has two (2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of

such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA 572) , the SC ruled that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable bases for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to petitioners argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS. RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO VS. LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its

nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case of concubinage.

DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 226 SCRA 572 Petitioner: Roberto Domingo Respondents: Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera Ponente: J. Romero FACTS: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petition entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against Roberto Domingo. The petition, which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following: (a) they were married on November 29, 1976; (b) unknown to her (Delia), he had a previous marriage with Emerina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; (c) she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerina sued them for bigamy; (d) since 1979, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay in the Philippines when she would avail of the onemonth annual vacation leave granted by her employer; (e) Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; (f) Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the possession of Roberto, who disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge and consent; (g) while on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their marriage, which is void ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further suggested that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired by their union. RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner's motion for lack of merit. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not a petition for judicial delaration of a void marriage is necessary. (If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.) 2) Whether or not the petition entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

HELD: 1) Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation. On the other hand, the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment delaring such marriage void" in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage. 2) Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA's decision is affirmed.

DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 226 SCRA 572 FACTS: 1. Private Respondent Delia Soledad Domingo filed a Petition of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property against petitioner Roberto Domingo. 2. Petitioner and private respondent were married on November 29, 1976. 3. Unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Erlinda Dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is still valid and existing. 4. She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Dela Paz sued them for bigamy. 5. Petitioner prayed that a Temporary Restraining Order or a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining Roberto Domingo for exercise any act or administration and ownership over their properties. 6. She also sought that she be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of her attorney in fact. 7. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. 8. The Motion to Dismiss was denied for lack of merit so with a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. 9. The CA dismissed the petition finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. ISSUE: Is there a necessity for a void marriage to be judicially declared a nullity? HELD: A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under the Family Code even for purposes other than remarriage. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now

explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 40) Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgement declaring the previous marriage void. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marriages again. With a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

WASSMER v VELEZ (1964) 12 SCRA 648 Two days before the wedding (meaning everything about the wedding was already set, as well as bridal showers and gifts) the groom Francisco Velez suddenly flew to his home in Cagayan de Oro, leaving the bride, Beatriz Wassmer, only this note: will have to postpone wedding my mother opposes it. The next day (day before the wedding) he sent this message through telegram: Nothing changed rest assured returning soon. But he never returned and was never heard from again.

ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable

HELD: This is not the case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 NCC. Defendant is liable for actual damages, as well as to moral and exemplary damages. Judgment affirmed with modifications (on amount of damages).

TANJANCO v CA (1966) 18 SCRA 994 Arceli Santos and Apolinario Tanjanco are sweethearts. Because of the mans promise to marry the woman, they continually had sexual relationship with each other for a span of one year with the womans consent. When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child to give her support plus moral and exemplary damages of P100,000. The CFI dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA set aside the CFI decision.

ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21 HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. The facts stand out that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained

intimate sexual relations with defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. If she had been deceived, she would not have again yield to his embraces, much less for one year. Besides, she is old enough to know better. Hence no case is made under Art 21.