SALONGA VS FARRALES 105 SCRA 359, 369 (1981)

FACTS:

The deIendant Julia B. Farrales is the titled owner oI a residential lot in Sta. Rita Olongapo City.
Within the owned parcel oI land by the deIendant, the plaintiII, spouses Salonga are the lessees oI the
156 sq. meters oI land where the latter erected a house and is paying rentals to the deIendant.
Sometimes beIore 1968, the plaintiII Iailed to pay rental and that as a result, the deIendant Iiled
an ejectment case Ior non-payment oI rentals against the plaintiII. Thus, the deIendant Iorced the
plaintiII. The plaintiII then oIIered that they will just buy their occupied parcel oI land instead oI
vacating the land and the house oI strong materials, however, despite oI the insistence oI the plaintiII,
the titled owner deIendant reIused to accept the oIIer, thus there is no contract oI sale or sell in the
aIoresaid land was realized.
The plaintiII then, aIter a strict reIusal Irom the deIendant-owner to sell her land, Iiled Ior
petition Ior relieI. The case was heard and elevated until the CA, praying Ior ordering to the deIendant
to sell her parcel oI land where the house oI the plaintiII was erected and that the plaintiII invoke their
right to be subjected under Section 6, (9) Article II oI the new constitution, reIerring to the application
oI social justice which they contended that it delimits and regulated property rights and private gains.


ISSUE:

Was the contention oI the plaintiII correct such that by invoking Ior the promotion oI social
justice, provided in article 6 (9) Article II oI the constitution, they could gain their contention Ior relieI
and Iorce the deIendant to sell her land?


RULING:

No, the contention oI social justice cannot be invoked by the plaintiII just gain relieI and Iorce
the deIendant to sell her land where the plaintiII's house was erected.
Social Justice is said to be Ior promotion oI economic development and proper equilibrium
between the relationship oI all units oI the society. However Social Justice cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights oI property owners who under the constitution and laws are also entitled Ior
protection. Social justice is not intended to take away rights Irom a person and give them to another
who is not entitled thereto.
In the case at bar, the plaintiII cannot Iorce the deIendant to sell her title by invoking equity and
justice rather, the plaintiII 's may remove the improvements should the lessor reIuse to reimburse, by
the lessee do not have the right to buy the land. The right oI property oI the deIendant over her owned
land cannot be simply override by invoking social justice, since the right oI property is also protected
by the state. Thus, judgment aIIirmed in Iavor oI the deIendant.









Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47088 JuIy 10, 1981
CONSOLACION DUQUE SALONGA, assisted by her husband WENCESLAO SALONGA,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JULITA B. FARRALES, and THE SHERIFF OF OLONGAPO CITY, defendants-appellees.

FERNANDEZ,
%is is an appeal certified to tis Court by te Court of Appeals
1
from te decision of te
Court of First nstance of Zambales and Olongapo City, %ird Judicial District, Branc ,
Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 1144-0, entitled "Consolacion Duque Salonga, assisted by
er usband, Wenceslao Salonga, Plaintiff, versus Julita B. Farrales, and %e Seriff of
Olongapo City, Defendants," te dispositive part of wic reads:
FOR % RASONS GVN, judgment is ereby rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, as
well as defendants' counterclaim.
Costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDRD.

%e records disclose tat on January 2, 1973; te appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga
assisted by er usband, filed a complaint against Julita B. Farrales and te Seriff of
Olongapo City wit te Court of First nstance of Zambales and Olongapo City, %ird Judicial
District, Branc , Olongapo City, seeking te following relief:
WRFOR, plaintiff most respectfully prays for te following relief:
a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff te parcel of land containing an area of
156 Square Meters, more or less, were te ouse of strong materials of plaintiff exists.
b) Ordering te defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful possession or occupation
of the land by plaintiff, until a final decision is rendered in tis case.
c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay costs; and
d) Granting plaintiff suc oter relief conformable to law, justice and equity.
Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, December 28, 1972.

tat on January 9, 1973, plaintiff-appellant, Salonga filed an urgent petition for te issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction wic was duly amended on January 16, 1973,
4
wit te
following prayer:
WRFOR, plaintiff assisted by counsel most respectfully prays te on. Court te following
relief:
a) %at a restraining order be issued pending resolution of te instant petition for issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary njunction enjoining defendants, particularly te Seriff of Olongapo City to
restrain from enforcing te Writ of xecution issued in connection wit te judgment rendered in
Civil Case 650 for ejectment in te City Court of Olongapo City;
b) %at after due earing of te present amended petition, a Writ of Preliminary njunction
conditioned upon a reasonable bond be issued enjoining te defendants, particularly, te Seriff
of Olongapo City, to restrain from enforcing te Writ of xecution issued in connection wit te
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 650 for ejectment in te City Court of Olongapo City, in
order to maintain te status of te parties; in order to prevent te infliction of irreparable injury to
plaintiff; and in order tat watever judgment may be rendered in tis case, may not become
moot, academic, illusory and ineffectual, and
c) Granting plaintiff suc oter relief conformable to law, justice and equity;
tat on January 22, 1973, te court a quo issued an order temporarily restraining te carrying
out of te writ of execution issued pursuant to te judgment rendered by te City Court of
Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 650, a suit for ejectment filed by defendant-appellee Farrales
against five defendants, among wom te erein appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga;

tat on January 23, 1973, defendant-appellee Farrales filed a motion to deny te motion for
te issuance of a preliminary injunction for being vague and er answer wit counterclaim to
te complaint;

tat an opposition to te amended petition for te issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction was also filed by te defendant-appellee Farrales on January 25, 1973;
7
tat in an order dated January 20, 1973, te court a quo denied te petition for te issuance
of a preliminary injunction and lifted te restraining order issued on January 22, 1973;
8
tat
plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration of te order denying te motion for issuance of a
preliminary injunction on January 5, 1973;
9
wic was also denied by te court a quo on
February 21, 1973;
10
tat after te trial on te merits of Civil Case No. 1144-0, te trial court
rendered te judgment under review, dismissing plaintiff's complaint;
11
tat on August 13,
1973, te plaintiff, Consolacion Duque Salonga, appealed from te said decision to te Court
of Appeals;
1
tat on February 25, 1974, te plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga,
filed wit te Court of Appeals a motion for te issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in
aid of appeal;
1
tat in a resolution dated Marc 6, 1974, te Court of Appeals denied te
said motion on te ground tat "te writ of preliminary injunction prayed for being intended to
restrain te enforcement of te writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 650 for jectment,
wic is not involved in tis appeal, and tere being no justification for te issuance of te writ
... "
14
tat on January 13, 1975, te defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales filed a motion to
dismiss te appeal on te ground tat te appeal as become moot and academic because
"te ouse of te plaintiffs-appellants, subject matter of tis appeal was demolised on
October 21, 1974, Annex "A", Seriff's return and te land were tis ouse was built was
delivered to er and se is now te one in possession ... ;
1
tat te plaintiffs-appellants
aving failed to comment on te said motion to dismiss wen required by te Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated January 16, 1975,
1
te Court of Appeals resolved to submit
te motion for decision in a resolution dated April 17, 1975;
17
and tat, likewise, te plaintiffs-
appellants aving failed to sow cause wy te case sould not be submitted for decision
witout te benefit of appellant's reply brief wen required to do so in a Court of Appeals
resolution dated May 14, 1975,
18
te Court of Appeals resolved on July 8, 1975 to submit te
case for decision witout te benefit of appellants' reply brief.
19

n a resolution promulgated on September 15, 1977 te Court of Appeals certified te case to
te Supreme Court because te issue raised in te appeal is purely legal.
0

%e plaintiffs-appellants assign te following errors:
% COUR% QUO SROUSLY RRD N DSMSSNG APPLLAN%S' COMPLAN%
AND N DNYNG SAD APPLLAN%S' RLF %O PURCAS FROM DFNDAN%-
APPLL JUL%A FARRALS % PC OF LAND N QUS%ON.
% COUR% QUO SROUSLY RRD N NO% APPLYNG %O % SU% A% BAR,
SC%ON 6, UNDR AR%CL 11 OF % NW CONS%%U%ON, WC CON%ROLS,
DLM%S AND RGULA%S PROPR%Y RG%S AND PRVA% GANS.
1

%e main legal question involved in tis appeal is weter or not te court a quo erred in
dismissing te complaint for specific performance or te ground tat tere exists no legally
enforceable compromise agreement upon wic te defendant-appellee Farrales can be
compelled to sell te piece of land in question to plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque
Salonga.
%e facts, as found by te trial court, are:
At te pre-trial conference, te parties stipulated on te following facts -
(1) %A% te personal circumstances of te parties as alleged in te complaint are admitted:
(2) %A% defendant Farrales is te titled owner of a parcel of residential land situated in Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City, dentity of wic is not disputed, formerly acquired by er from one Leoncio
Dytuco wo, in turn, acquired te same from te Corpuz Family of wic only 361 square
meters, more or less, not actually belong to said defendant after portions tereof ad been sold
to Marciala Zarsadias, Catalino Pascual and Rosanna Quiocson*; (*Per Deed of Absolute Sale,
xibit B, te vendee is actually Dionisio Quiocson);
3) %A% even prior to te acquisition by defendant Farrales (if te land aforesaid, plaintiff was
already in possession as lessee of some 156 square meters tereof, on wic se ad erected a
ouse, paying rentals tereon first to te original owners and later to defendant Farrales.
(4) %A%, sometime prior to November, 1968, defendant Farrales filed an ejectment case for
non-payment of rentals against plaintiff and er usband-jointly wit oter lessees of oter
portions of te land, to wit, Jorge Carvajal, Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias, and te
spouses Cesar and Rosalina Quiocson - Civil Case No. 650 of te Olongapo City Court, Branc
1, in wic, on November 20, 1968, and reiterated on February 4, 1970, a decision was
rendered in favor of defendant Farrales and ordering te terein defendants, including plaintiff
erein and er usband, to vacate te portion occupied by tem and to pay rentals in arrears,
attorney's fees and costs;
(5) %A% te decision aforesaid was elevated on appeal to te Court of First nstance of
Zambales and Olongapo City, Civil Case No. 581-0 tereof, and, in a Decision dated November
11, 1971 of Branc tereof, te same was affirmed wit modification only as to te amount of
rentals arrears to be paid;
(6) %A% te affirmatory decision of te Court of First nstance aforesaid is now final and
executory te records of te case ad been remanded to te Court for execution, and te
corresponding writ of execution ad been issued partially satisfied, as far as plaintiff erein is
concerned, by te payment of all rentals in arrears altoug te removal of said plaintiff's ouse
from te land still remains to be carried out by defendant Seriff: and
(7) %A%, even before te rendition of te affirmatory decision of te Court of First nstance, by
common consent amongst temselves defendant sold to Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias
and te spouses Cesar and Rosalina Quiocson te areas respectly occupied by tem; wile,
wit respect to Jorge Carvajal, in a suit tereafter filed between im and defendant Farrales, a
compromise. agreement was entered into wereunder said defendant undertook to pay for
Carvajal's ouse on er land, so tat te decision aforesaid is now being executed, as far as
ejectment is concerned, only against plaintiff erein. (Pre-%rial Order, May 17, 1973, pp. 2-5)

%e lower court explained its conclusion tus:
... From te very allegations of te complaint, it is clearly admitted -
5. %hat plaintiff herein, in view of te sale to tree tenants defendants of te portions of land
occupied by eac of said tree tenant-defendants, by defendant Julita B. Farrales, also offered
to purchase from said defendant the area of One Hundred Fifty-Six (156) Square Meters, more
or less, where plaintiff's house of strong materials exists, but, defendant Julita B. Farrales,
despite te fact tat said plaintiff's order to purcase was just, fair and reasonable persistently
refused such offer, and instead insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case,
before the City Court of Olongapo City, tru te erein defendant Seriff of Olongapo City, wit
te sole and only purpose of causing damage and prejudice to te plaintiff (Complaint, p. 3
empasis supplied).
Being a judicial admission, te foregoing binds plaintiff wo cannot subsequently take a position
contradictory tereto or inconsistent terewit (Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court; McDaniel vs.
Apacible, 44 Pil. 248 Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Pil., 227). ence, if plaintiff's offer to purcase
was, as aforesaid persistently refused by defendant, it is obvious tat no meeting of te and,
took place and, accordingly, no contract, eiter to sell or of sale, was ever perfected between
tem. %is is only firmed up even more by plaintiff's admission on te witness stand tat no
agreement respecting te purcase and sale of te disputed land was finalized because, wile
defendant Farrales purportedly wanted payment in cas, plaintiff did not ave any money for tat
purpose and neiter were negotiations ever ad respecting any possible arrangement for
payment in installments. On all fours to te case at bar, terefore, is Velasco et al., vs. Court of
Appeals, et al, G.R. No. L-31018, June 29, 1973, wic was a case for specific performance to
compel te terein respondent Magdalena state, nc. to sell a parcel of land to petitioner per an
alleged contract of sale in wic te Supreme Court ruled:
t is not difficult to glean from te aforequoted averments tat te petitioners
temselves admit tat tey and te respondent still ad to meet and agree on
ow and wen te down payment and te installment payments were to be paid.
Suc being te situation, it cannot, terefore be said tat a definite and firm
sales agreement between te parties ad been perfected over te lot in
question. ndeed tis Court as already ruled before tat a definite agreement
on te manner of payment of te purcase price is an essential element in te
formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.
Since contracts are enforceable only from te moment of perfection (Articles 1315 and 1475,
Civil Code of te Pilippines; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-
21881, Marc 1, 1968; Atkins, Kroll and Co., nc. vs. B. Cua ian %eck G.R. No. L-9817, January
31, 1958), and tere is ere no perfected contract at all, it goes witout saying tat plaintiff as
absolutely noting to enforce against defendant Farrales, and te fact tat defendant Farrales
previously sold portions of te land to oter lessees similarly situated as plaintiff erein, does not
cange te situation because, as to said oter lessees, a perfected contract existed - wic is
not te case wit plaintiff.

%e trial court found as a fact tat no compromise agreement to sell te land in question was
ever perfected between te defendant-appellee as vendor and te plaintiffs-appellants as
vendees.
4

t is elementary tat consent is an essential element for te existence of a contract, and
were it is wanting, te contract is non-existent. %e essence of consent is te conformity of
te parties on te terms of te contract, te acceptance by one of te offer made by te oter.
%e contract to sell is a bilateral contract. Were tere is merely an offer by one party, witout
te acceptance of te oter, tere is no consent.

t appears in tis case tat te offeree, te defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not only did
not accept, but rejected te offer of plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to buy te land in
question. %ere being no consent tere is. terefore, no contract to sell to speak of.
Likewise, it must be borne in mind tat te alleged compromise agreement to sell te land in
question is unenforceable under te Statute of Frauds,

and tus, renders all te more

ineffective te action for specific performance in te court a quo.
oreover, as correctIy found by the triaI court, the pIaintiffs-appeIIants, as Iessees, are
neither buiIders in good faith nor in bad faith. Their rights are governed not by ArticIe
448 but by Art. 178 of the New CiviI Code.
7
As Iessees, they may remove the
improvements shouId the Iessor refuse to reimburse them, but the Iessee does not
have the right to buy the Iand.
8

Anent te appellants' claim tat since te appellee sold to te tree (3) oter defendants in
te ejectment suit te tree (3) portions of te land in question occupied by tem, it follows
tat "se must also sell tat portion of te land were appellants' residential ouse was found
to appellants" is unmeritorious. %e trial court correctly ruled tat te fact tat defendant-
appellee sold portions of te land to te oter lessees similarly situated as plaintiffs-appellants
Salonga does not cange te situation because as to said oter lessees, a perfected contract
of sale existed wic, as previously sown was not te case wit te plaintiff.
9

As to te contention tat Sec. 6, Article of te New Constitution is applicable to te case at
bar, it must be remembered tat social justice cannot be invoked to trample on te rigts of
property owners wo under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. %e
social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rigts from a
person and give tem to anoter wo is not entitled tereto. vidently, te plea for social
justice cannot nullify te law on obligations and contracts, and is, terefore, beyond te power
of te Court to grant.
%ere is no sowing tat te trial court committed any reversible error.
WRFOR, te appeal is DSMSSD for lack of merit and te judgment appealed from is
ereby affirmed, witout pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDRD
%eehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.