Morpheus & ALHAT Free-Flight Test Readiness Review

Jon Olansen, Morpheus Project Manager JSC Chirold Epp, ALHAT Project Manager JSC Greg Gaddis, KSC Morpheus/ALHAT Site Manager July 31, 2012
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Mee;ng Objec;ves
Brief KSC Leadership on:
Morpheus/ALHAT project introducJon Morpheus/ALHAT free-ight readiness Test plan at KSC KSC range safety and personnel safety KSC InsJtuJonal Readiness

Get concurrence to proceed with free-ight operaJons at KSC Not a design review

KSC Free-Flight TRR Agenda

IntroducJon Morpheus Overview ALHAT Overview KSC Overview Readiness Poll

Morpheus Overview

Jon Olansen Project Manager NASA Johnson Space Center

Morpheus Team Introduc;ons

Jon Olansen/PM Mike Baine/Chief Engineer Tim Crain/Flight Dynamics Lore Williams/SoRware Rob Morehead/Engine Design Joe Bibby/Media and Comm Greg Gaddis/KSC Test Site Manager

Steve Munday/Dep. PM Lee Wilson/Structures Kevin Dunn/Avionics Jeremy Hart/System T&V DJ Kroeger/Prop GSE Rich Comin/Safety

Jenny Mitchell/SE&I ScoQ Woodard/Power Systems Eric Hurlbert/Propulsion Colin Peterson/Vehicle Mgr Fred Shetz/Ground Data Sys Mark Welch/Ops Lead

Introduc;on
Morpheus is an autonomous, reusable rocket powered terrestrial VerJcal Take-o /VerJcal Landing (VTVL) vehicle for tesJng integrated spacecraZ and planetary lander technologies Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project has advanced the technologies for autonomous precision landing and hazard avoidance. In FY12, AES and TDM Programs are sponsoring the integraJon and demonstraJon of ALHAT technologies on Morpheus, with relevant approach trajectories own at the KSC SLF. The integrated vehicle provides a testbed to develop, mature, rene, and demonstrate advanced technologies promoJng enhanced autonomy, reliability, safety, reusability, ISRU, precision navigaJon and safe landing technologies Successful implementaJon of these capabiliJes will enable access to landing sites that were previously considered to be too hazardous to risk a roboJc lander mission, much less a human mission.

Morpheus Goals and Objec;ves

August 2011
The primary goal of Morpheus is to demonstrate integrated technologies needed for future human space ight missions. Two other important goals are (1) providing educaJon opportuniJes and (2) evolving NASA in-house capabiliJes. These goals and the specic objecJves are dened below:
Mission Goal 1: Advance, demonstrate and integrate technologies needed for future Human Space Flight to other planets or near-earth objects. Mission Goal 2: Educate and Inspire STEM. ObjecJve 1-1: Demonstrate a reusable integrated verJcal test bed capability. ObjecJve 1-2: Demonstrate LOX-Methane propulsion in a terrestrial free ight environment. ObjecJve 1-3: Demonstrate an analogous planetary approach prole with autonomous precision landing using a verJcal test bed vehicle. ObjecJve 2-1: Involve educators and students (K-12 and universiJes) in all phases of Morpheus. ObjecJve 2-2: Involve and communicate to the public. ObjecJve 3-1: Revitalize the human spaceight civil servant workforce. Mission Goal 3: Evolve NASA in-house design, ObjecJve 3-2: Leverage exisJng insJtuJonal capacity. development and tesJng ObjecJve 3-3: Streamline pracJces and processes for eciency. capabiliJes. ObjecJve 3-4: Use unconvenJonal partners for innovaJon. ObjecJve 3-5: Establish infrastructure to perform verJcal test bed free ights at JSC.
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Morpheus JSC Flight Tests

5 Hot Fires, 19 Tether Tests
Morpheus 1.0 (2011): 284 Seconds Engine Burn Time (HD3) Morpheus 1.5 (2012)

Hot Fire 1
April 14

Hot Fire 2
April 19

Tether 1
April 25

Tether 2
April 27

Tether 3
May 3

Tether 4
May 4

Tether 5
June 1

Tether 6
Aug 31

Hot Fire 5
Feb 27

Tether 7
March 5

Tether 8
March 13

Tether 9
March 16

103 sec Igniter tests and hot res

54 sec MulJple engine starts

20 sec Thrust to weight<1 to test GN&C

13 sec Stuck throile failure

20 sec Snagged cable ended ight early

29 sec Stability issue

34 sec Stable hover

11 sec Hard start and engine burn- through aZer 11 s

Morpheus 1.5 (2012): 775 Seconds Engine Burn Time (HD4)

30 sec 40 sec Low pressure First test for Morpheus 1.5 condiJon at with new HD4 liZo Burn-through engine wire false alarm

55 sec Good 40 second hover with prop imbalance and tether eects

47 sec Guidance and control algorithm issue

Hot Fire 6
April 2

Tether 10
April 5

Tether 11
April 11

Tether 12
April 18

5 sec 62 sec Short hold down Guidance and test on concrete control in liZo algorithm environment issue in Foot pads alJtude overheated

56 sec Stable hover with some lateral oscillaJons

67 sec Stable hover with some lateral oscillaJons

Tether 13 Tether 14 May 8 May 2 66 sec 62 sec Stable 45- Stable 45-sec sec hover hover with with good improved lateral stability lateral stability

Tether 15
May 10

Tether 16
June 11

Tether 17
June 18

RCS HF1
July 3

Tether 18
July 6

Tether 19
July 17

60 sec Stable hover at 8 with a planned soZ abort

41 sec Stable 2-level hover at 5 & 8 with ALHAT targeJng & HDS tests

63 sec burn Jme Stable 2-level hover with ALHAT targeJng & HDS tests

31 tests of LOX/ 49 sec methane RCS Stable 2-level engines hover Range of igniJon AZer nominal condiJons tether ight (temperature, compleJon, spark duraJon) tested RCS engine acJve control

72 sec burn Jme Nominal 60- second hover (longest yet) Post-ight methane RCS test

Morpheus Accomplishments
Flight and ground soZware architecture matured; core services and execuJve complete; Jming and avionics data management; incorporaJng design for FDIR Acquired in-ight test data on sensiJvity of components to thermal and vibraJon environments TesJng and demonstraJon of aluminum tanks with cryogenic propellants DemonstraJon of integrated capability using an avionics architecture that has space ight equivalent components Autonomous GN&C during nal approach porJon of lunar descent and landing; precision landing

Autonomous ight manager architecture; core GN&C design

Power distribuJon; power management for propulsion system; baiery management Operator workstaJons, ground soZware and displays Propellant loading and launch operaJons Ground support equipment Landing trajectory operaJonal Jmeline

Demonstrated LOX/Methane propulsion in VTB; propulsion subsystem maturaJon including feed system and startup condiJons; LOX/Methane RCS engines for roll control; propellant management with mulJple tanks

Analysis/simulaJon tools Project processes, systems engineering and infrastructure Core team

Morpheus System Overview

GROUND SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT

Mechanical, Fluid, Electrical

FLIGHT OPERATIONS

TC, OPR, RSO, Prop, GN&C, ALHAT, APS, DFI, FM

MORPHEUS VEHICLE

Like any planetary launch and landing vehicle, Morpheus includes a vehicle, subsystems, opera;ons, and ground systems
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Morpheus 1.5 Ver;cal Testbed (VTB)

(b) (3)
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Test Team Campaign 0

PM/FM1 Olansen, Munday TC1 Baine, Mitchell OPR1 Welch Pad/T&V lead Hart Vehicle Manager/Pad1 backup - Peterson 6. Pad2/GSE McManamen, Banker 7. Pad setup/support Wilson, Rocha 8. Prop Hurlbert, Morehead 9. GNC Crain, Tamblyn, Campbell 10. APS Butcher, Hartnei 11. DFI Sweet 12. Power Woodard 13. Ground Data HW - Shetz 14. Ground Data SE - Hirsh 15. Media1 Bibby, Kehe 16. Safety Comin, Daniel 17. Pad 3 Partridge (KSC Lead) 18. TAM Gaddis (KSC NTD) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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Development and Tes;ng Approach

Vehicle tests are the primary method for vericaJon of the integrated system performance However, numerous subsystem tests are conducted where appropriate prior to acceptance or in response to integrated performance, e.g.
Engine tesJng at Armadillo Aerospace and Stennis Space Center Tank proof tesJng Propellant line cleaning and proof test at ESTA Vehicle low pressure leak checks outside of b220 (also available at KSC) InstrumentaJon calibraJon
Load cells, Pressures, Temps, etc. ChannelizaJon

Laser (Leica) scans of as-built vehicle Tether/bungee characterizaJon Card-level power and avionics tests End-to-end gimbal poinJng calibraJons CG measurement and balancing

Complete vehicle funcJonal and procedure checkout prior to each test

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Subsystem Tes;ng Examples

Tether characterization Engine test stand CG measurement

Gimbal circle sweeps

Tank proof testing

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Morpheus Tes;ng Calendar

S July 22 23

T 24 Vehicle Prep for Transport 31 Dry-run KSC TRR 7

W 25 Ship to KSC Prep Team Departs 1 AUGUST Wet-run

Th 26 Vehicle Arrival (SLF conict) 2 TT Equipment staging

F 27 Vehicle Prep (SLF conict) 3 KSC TT1

S 28 Vehicle Prep

29 Ops Team departs 5

30 Leak check FuncJonal checkouts 6 VerJcal Free-Flight

KSC Test Campaign 0 (C0)

8 Slant Hop 9 10 Slant Hop 11

KSC Test Campaign 0 (C0)

12 13 200 m Hop 14 15 High pitch Free-Flight 16 17 18

KSC Test Campaign 0 (C0) KSC Test Campaign 1 (C1), 8/27 9/07 KSC Test Campaign 2 (C2), 9/17 9/28 KSC Test Campaign 3 (C3), 10/08 10/19

KSC Ops

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Data Management & Congura;on Control

Opera;ons data
Procedure Jmes are recorded and uploaded to the SharePoint folder aZer the test Discrepancies are added to the Discrepancy List in SharePoint nal closure/waivers to be completed prior to free-ight VericaJon tesJng and analysis tracked in SharePoint 4 free-ight open items are related to KSC ops and will be closed via dry-run and wet-runs, 1 waived

Vehicle data
Vehicle data is downloaded via a serial hardline aZer the test. The data is posted to SharePoint where the team can get to it. Quick-look plots are generated. Low rate data (1 Hz) is also recorded in the control center

Video and photos are stored on a JSC leserver Congura;on Control

The vehicle hardware and soZware have been locked down following TT19 All changes (other than ight-to-ight maintenance) require approval by the Project Manager The Vehicle Manager has the responsibility to ensure no changes are made without approval
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Project Scale of Rigor

May or may not use guidelines Learn as you go May only implement processes aZer failure

Research & Development

Low cost project Low consequence of failure Easily replaceable hardware LiQle schedule pressure Under the radar

Human Space Flight

NASA guidelines: NPR 7120.5d, 7123.1, 7120.2, etc.

Rigor CM, Requirements, Data Management, Formal Documenta;on, etc.

Some areas we have more rigor than others; it also has changed over the course of the project

High dollar project High reliability required Crew safety Mission cri;cal Expensive payloads High visibility Schedule constraints Costly replacement Paying customer Morpheus ShuQle, ISS, Orion

Technology Development / R&D

The scale of project rigor should always be adapted to the needs and scope of the project. Some aiributes will drive rigor but not equally for all processes.
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Next Phase of Tes;ng Free-Flight at KSC

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KSC Test Range Congura;on

Free-Flight Launch and Landing Pads

Camera and antenna loca;ons

MMCC Opera;ons Center

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Hazard Field and Free-Flight Pad

Free-Flight Launch Pad Free-Flight Landing Pad

Note: 40 meters between pads

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Planned Flight Proles

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Tether single and double alJtude hover to demonstrate conguraJon readiness. Ver;cal single and double alJtude hover, variable ascent/descent rates, descent Slant Hop ascent, hover, translate with HDP guidance, (hover), descent Traverse Hop ascent, hover, translate with rapid pitchover transiJon, hover, descent HDP analog max ascent, slant translaJon, descent supported by HD4 HDP max ascent, slant translaJon, descent supported by HD5

Tether Test

Ver;cal, Slant Hops, Traverse Hops

Flight Envelope Expansion: Expand Veloci;es and Al;tudes

Full Hazard Detec;on Phase (HDP) Trajectory: 0.5 km x 1 km

Autonomous Hazard Avoidance Iden;fy and land at safe site in landing eld with hazards (rocks, craters, slopes)

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KSC Test Campaign Objec;ves

KSC Campaign 0 (C0) KSC Campaign 1 (C1) KSC Campaign 2 (C2) KSC Campaign 3 (C3)

ALHAT Opportunity ALHAT Sensors

KSC C0

IniJal Capability

KSC C1

Envelope Expansion

KSC C2

HDP Flights with Open-loop ALHAT (may require HD5)

KSC C3

HDP Flights with Closed-loop ALHAT

1.Demonstrate KSC TesJng Capability via Tether test 2.VerJcal Free-Flight (10-20m alt) 3.Free-Flight Slant Hop (50m alJtude, 40 m range) 4.Demonstrate repeatability of slant hop ight 5.High-AlJtude Hop (~100 m alJtude, 40 m range) 6.Hop with higher pitch-over rate (50m alJtude, 40 m range) 7.Demonstrate higher alJtude hover (above expected wind shear) 8.Demonstrate porJon of powered ascent 9.Characterize performance below aerodynamic instability condiJons 10.High alJtude hop with ALHAT data gathering 11.Demonstrate full HDP trajectory (or nearest HD4 analog) 12.Landing site re-designaJon (redes) during full HDP trajectory 13.Landing site redes during full HDP trajectory, with ALHAT sensors (open-loop) 14.Repeat previous ALHAT free ight to collect more open-loop data 15.Performance during HDP with ALHAT sensors closed-loop 16.Landing site redes performance during HDP with ALHAT sensors closed-loop
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Morpheus Con Ops (SLF)

Ship to KSC

Cmnd & Tlm FTS Cameras Network Equip CommunicaJons

LN2 Dewar LOX Dewars LNG Dewars Helium Tube Trailer Flex Hose & QDs Pressure Control Panel Etc.

Control Room (MMCC VAN)

Ground Data Systems Setup & Test

Servicing GSE to Pad

Prop Load & Press Xport to Runway

Flight Ops

Processing/Storage & Office Space (LSC) J6-2465

Launch/Landing Area North end of SLF Post Landing Ops (Landing Area) Xport to LSC
VenJng Unloading Sang

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Range Safety

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KSC Range Impact Assessment

Morpheus will not be operated under containment and as such an assessment of the risk to the public, employees, and to criJcal infrastructure had to be performed. Since Morpheus will be operated at KSC, the USAF 45th Space Wing was charged with performing the assessment based on data provided by the Morpheus project. The input data provided by the Morpheus project included following parameters:
Vehicle Reliability = 0 (Failure Probability = 1) - It was recognized during the assessment that if you assume a failure probability = 1 then you will get the worst case condiJons. This was seen as a much easier path to take rather than trying to demonstrate the actual reliability of this vehicle. Proposed Trajectories = unlimited This worst case condiJon was also used in the analysis. Morpheus was modeled as a point mass with a given ISP and propellant load and the analysis was performed. Maximum travel distance = 5 miles. Credible Failure Modes were not assessed since the assumpJon was made that the probability of failure = 1. The one excepJon was that the vehicle will not perform an aerodynamic breakup and so the debris eld or debris catalog would have only a single component. Reliability of Range Safety System = 0 Again, this assumpJon provides a worst case condiJon.

Based on this data the 45th Space Wing determined the following risks levels:
EsJmated CasualJes (Ec)= 14.9 per million (worst case - weekday, dayJme) Must be less than 100 per million Maximum Probability of Impact (PImax) = 0.37 per thousand Eastern Range approved Must be less than 1 per thousand

Morpheus ights at KSC

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Flight Termina;on Cascading Modes

SoR Abort Commanded by Vehicle SoR Abort Commanded by Control Room Hard Abort Commanded by Vehicle Hard Abort Commanded by Control Room Range Safety Remote Flight Termina;on
If Vehicle Violates On-Board Limits (Velocity, Distance, Etc) Vehicle Detects ViolaJon Vehicle Aiempts to SoZ Abort and Land Immediately Vehicle Lands

Control Room IdenJes Limit ViolaJon If Vehicle Violates On-Board Limits (Velocity)

Control Room Commands SoZ Abort to Land Immediately Vehicle Detects ViolaJon

Vehicle Lands

Throile Valve Closes

Control Room IdenJes Limit ViolaJon

Control Room Issues Throile Valve Close Command

Throile Valve Closes

Test Safety Ocers IdenJfy Boundary ViolaJons During Flight

TSO IniJates Remote Flight TerminaJon

Independent Thrust TerminaJon Valves Close on Vehicle

Range Safety Remote Flight TerminaJon is a Last Resort aZer all other means of containment have failed

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On-Board Abort Condi;ons

Tether
Category Loss of IMU Prime Loss of IMU Backup SoZ Range Safety Condi;on Fail Flag Strikes Fail Flag Strikes Downrange [<Min,>Max] Crossrange [<Min,>Max] AlJtude [<Min,>Max] SoZ Vel-Mag SoZ Max Ai Rates Velocity Magnitude [>Max] Body Roll Rate [|x|>Max] Body Pitch Rate [|x|>Max] Body Yaw Rate [|x|>Max] SoZ Max Ai Angle Low Prop Margin Hard Range Safety Angle from VerJcal [>Max] Mass FracJon [< Min] Downrange [<Min,>Max] Crossrange [<Min,>Max] AlJtude [<Min,>Max] Hard Vel-Mag Propulsion Health Redlines (Main Engine) Velocity Magnitude [>Max] Burn-Through Flag Low Chamber Pressure Flag Hight Chamber Pressure Flag RCS-Methane Health Prop Thrust EsJmate HDS LS Table Failure Land/Eng Shutdown Fail-On/O detected, any jet Data Invalid (failed P/T) Timeout, Bad Metrics, or LS unveried Touchdown Strikes Abort Type SoZ None/C&W SoZ SoZ SoZ SoZ SoZ SoZ SoZ SoZ SoZ None/C&W None/C&W None/C&W Hard SoZ* SoZ* SoZ* none** SoZ** Designated none # Strikes 9999 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a 2 Limit 9999 3 [-4, +4] m [-4, +4] m [-10, +6] m 5 m/s 45 deg/s 23 deg/s 20 deg/s 15 deg 0.1 [-7, +7] m [-7, +7] m [-20, +10] m 7 m/s 1 1 1 [1,2] 0 n/a 2 # Strikes 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a 2

Slant Hop
Limit 3 3 [-20, +50] m [-20, +20] m [-10, +120] m 15 m/s 45 deg/s 23 deg/s 20 deg/s 20 deg 0.1 [-30, +120] m [-35, +35] m [-1000, +150] m 20 m/s 1 1 1 [1,2] 0 n/a 2 # Strikes 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a 1

HDP
Limit 3 3 [-35, +1116] m [-50, +50] m [-35, +1000] m 27 m/s 45 deg/s 35 deg/s 35 deg/s 20 deg -10.0 [-70, +1166] m [-70, +70] m [-70, +1100] m 32 m/s 1 1 1 [1,2] 0 n/a 1

* Up to igniJon (inclusive), these condiJons will result directly in EngineShutodwn.

**SoZ Abort condiJon can be disabled via I-load, if desired. Default is shown.

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Flight Termina;on Con;ngency Management

The CMS is a fully redundant, encrypted radio, command, actuator, and valve system that will remove propellant ow to the engine. The CMS consists of two independent strings that shut o ow to both LOX and methane upon command. The CMS uJlizes two unique UHF frequencies to prevent interference. Spoiers in the SLF area provide radio calls to the MMCC Range Safety Ocer if vehicle is approaching range boundaries. The RSO also has a camera view from one perspecJve. The CMS is operated by the Range Safety Ocer located in the Mobile Mission Control Center (MMCC). When acJvated, the CMS also opens tank vent valves to release tank pressure and acJvates a laser kill for the ALHAT ash lidar to ensure approaching personnel do not have laser exposure.

CMS Integra;on with Vehicle

Electronics Battery Status Valve Battery Status Command Decode Counter Status Valve Position Status Command Select System Arm Command Execute

CMS Control Unit (1 of 2)

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Range Boundaries for Flight Termina;on

TBD. We have not dened KSC range boundaries for terminaJng ight or where we will have spoiers located. Spoyng locaJons will be consistent with Hard Abort boundaries

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Morpheus Hazard Overview

Hazard Type
Personnel hazards

Key Concerns
Exposure to vehicle crash, re, high temperatures, cryo temperatures, noise, pinch points, lasers, asphyxiates

Approach
Remove personnel from proximity by enforcing safe distances (range clear) Employ ConJngency Management System (CMS) as well as commanded aborts Use of PPE Team cerJcaJon and training Procedural controls Test rules Enforce safe distances for public Employ ConJngency Management System as well as commanded aborts Employ ConJngency Management System as well as commanded aborts Rigorous re control Pre-declare loss of vehicle is not a mishap. Vehicle and Morpheus equipment hazards are handled as project risks
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Personnel / Public hazards Property hazards

Exposure to vehicle crash, noise

Exposure to vehicle crash, widespread vegetaJon re Loss of vehicle during ight or damage during ground operaJons

Vehicle / Morpheus equipment hazards

SLF Opera;onal Clear Zones

Security Closures

Security Closures

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Safe Cryogenic Fluid Loading and Handling

Tanks are insulated and covered Liquid lines are heavily insulated Personnel will ensure that components are at a safe temperature before handling. Gloves are used wherever frost is evident and always when operaJng cryogenic valves. Operators are cerJed to handle cryogenic uids.
See cerJcaJon and training plan JSC Energy Systems Division (EP) cerJes the operators

PPE is required during cryogenic ows. PPE includes: face shield, goggles, gloves and apron during transfer; safety glasses and gloves for venJng or dump operaJons per procedures Transfer of liquids must include second operator for buddy system Morpheus is leveraging off ESTA experience with cryo handling
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Morpheus Hazard Analysis

Project hazards idenJed for previous test conguraJons
Two personnel / public hazards (vehicle crash, noise) Four property hazards (crash, crane truck collision/re, widespread grass re) Twenty-ve personnel hazards Morpheus Vehicle and Project Equipment hazards are handled as project risks

All hazards will be controlled to a Risk Assessment Code (RAC) of 4 or beier (Acceptable with Controls), requiring Branch Chief- level signature
Branch chief level signature means that Project management can accept controls and residual risk.

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Flight System Readiness for Free Flight

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Performance Characteriza;on
ATTRIBUTE Stable, controlled ight from takeo through landing Main engine performance Roll control performance Vehicle robustness in ight environment (EMI, vibe, overpressure, thermal, wind gusts) Robustness to propulsion system coupled interacJons (integrated main engine/RCS, thrust, pressure, imbalance, temperature eects) Demonstrated soZ abort capability Margin for meeJng ALHAT trajectory requirements Margin for meeJng ALHAT poinJng stability and control requirements ALHAT performance TT Hop HDP

n/a n/a

n/a n/a

Healthy Known issues or forward work Cant fully characterize unJl we start ying at KSC

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Reliability
ATTRIBUTE Reliable vehicle communicaJons Reliable ight computer Reliable instrumentaJon Mature soZware Reliable propulsion hardware (feed system, EMAs) Reliable roll control hardware Reliable GN&C hardware Reliable main engine Healthy power margin Healthy propellant margin Healthy structural margin Reliable thrust terminaJon system Reliable control center Reliable remote connecJvity for JSC and ALHAT teams to parJcipate TT Hop HDP

Healthy Known issues or forward work Cant fully characterize unJl we start ying at KSC

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Opera;ons, Safety and Logis;cs

ATTRIBUTE Well-trained operaJons team Manageable logisJcs, ground handling, prop loading at KSC Ready operaJonal procedures (nominal and conJngency) Healthy spares posture Ready transportaJon plan to KSC Team availability to support KSC operaJons Approved range safety approach Rigorous personnel safety approach TT Hop HDP

Healthy Known issues or forward work Cant fully characterize unJl we start ying at KSC

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Morpheus Readiness Statement

The following is complete and veried good; Morpheus hardware and team are ready to support!
Post-Shipping inspecJons
Vehicle leak check FuncJonal checkout

MMCC setup Comm &Telemetry and Flight TerminaJon Radio setup Free-Flight Ops simulaJons including range safety simulaJons Finalize camera posiJoning KSC dry-run and wet-run (scheduled for tomorrow) Methane RCS engine tesJng and control system renement HD5 repair and re-test HD4 trajectory shaping ALHAT/Morpheus Nav Jme lag x and tesJng
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Major work in progress

Autonomous Landing & Hazard Avoidance Technology Overview

Chirold Epp Project Manager NASA Johnson Space Center

ALHAT Team Structure

HEOMD OCT AES (HQ) TDM (MSFC)

ALHAT Management (JSC) Project Manager: Chirold Epp

JSC Systems Engineering G&N Algorithms ALHAT/Morpheus Sim System Avionics HSI

Langley Sensor Development & SelecJon Sensor TesJng 6 DOF SimulaJon

JPL TRN & HDA Algorithms Terrain RecogniJon Analysis

Draper Systems Engineering Autonomy GN&C IntegraJon G&C Algorithms

Goals For KSC Tes;ng

Perform an autonomous closed loop free ight demonstraJon on the Morpheus vehicle uJlizing ALHAT navigaJon and ALHAT sensors ALHAT sensors perform real-Jme hazard detecJon and safe site determinaJon, Based on this navigaJon informaJon, Morpheus iniJates a divert to the ALHAT determined safe landing site on a KSC constructed hazard eld This will demonstrate the ALHAT methods for HDA and HRN to TRL 6 This is the nal major milestone requested of ALHAT in FY12 and was scheduled for compleJon end of September but more likely early in October

ALHAT Vision Statement

Develop and mature to TRL6 an autonomous planetary landing GN&C and sensing system for crewed, cargo, and roboPc planetary descent vehicles. The System will be capable of idenPfying and avoiding surface hazards to enable a safe precision landing to within tens of meters of cerPed and designated landing sites anywhere on the planet under any lighPng condiPons.

ALHAT Hazard Detec;on Phase (HDP) Trajectory

Key ALHAT Techniques

Terrain RelaJve NavigaJon (TRN)
Compares onboard reconnaissance data with real-Jme terrain imaging and accurate poinJng systems to update the onboard navigaJon state

Hazard DetecJon and Avoidance (HDA)

Hazard detecJon provides real-Jme surface hazard informaJon based on sensor measurements and hazard avoidance assumes the landing vehicle has the divert capability to y to the determined safe area

Hazard RelaJve NavigaJon (HRN)

Compares onboard real-Jme determined terrain maps with follow-on real-Jme terrain imaging and accurate poinJng systems to update the onboard navigaJon state as the vehicle descends

Key ALHAT Techniques

100 km Deorbit maneuver Transfer Orbit Phase (coast) ~1 hr

Powered Descent Initiation (PDI)

Powered Descent Phase

Braking Phase (TRN)

Efficiently reduce velocity from orbital speeds

1.5 3 min

Pitch-up Maneuver
Short pitch-up and throttle-down maneuver

Hazard Detection Human Interaction Hazard Avoidance

~15 km

Approach Phase (HDA, HRN)

View landing site while approaching at a low throttle and relatively constant attitude

Vertical descent to surface

NOTE Not to scale

300-600 km (8-10 min)

Touchdown

~50 m

Terminal Descent Phase

Key ALHAT Sensors

Flash Lidar

ALHAT has advanced the state of the art in the use of ash lidar technology for the HDA and HRN funcJons.

Doppler Lidar

ALHAT Doppler lidar provides an order of magnitude higher accuracy than instruments in use for current missions, eecJve for the terminal descent phase of ALHAT operaJon. High-precision, eye-safe laser alJmeter provides three orders of magnitude higher resoluJon than radar alJmetry. Tested successfully for the TRN funcJon.

Laser AlJmeter

Brief ALHAT History

First project plan approved in January 2006
Based on charter which contained no requirements other than to develop and demonstrate technologies to accomplish what is in the ALHAT vision statement Developed level zero requirements which have been the guiding principles for all of our development to date Early eorts focused somewhat on human lunar landings because of the ConstellaJon Program but always remained exible for roboJc missions

Considerable analysis and engineering eort was uJlized to determine sensors, soZware, and techniques required to meet the level 0 requirements

FT4

Brief ALHAT History

2011: Late in FY2010, NASA HQ mandated that tesJng for the ALHAT TRL 6 milestone would occur on a free-ying VTB. 2012:
Completed ALHAT System integraJon and ground tesJng at the Long Distance Test Range (LDTR) at LaRC with the excepJon of Hazard RelaJve NavigaJon Successfully integrated the ALHAT System with Morpheus and performed integrated range and tether tesJng. Only open issue is a Jming delay issue between Morpheus and ALHAT navigaJon AddiJonal open work for ALHAT include upgrades/xes to the ALHAT hardware and soZware plus HRN tesJng at LaRC during the month of August

Sensors On Morpheus

Sensors On Morpheus

Hazard Field Requirements

ALHAT requires the ability to land a spacecraZ safely, essenJally anywhere on a planetary surface under any lighJng condiJons
Requires acJve sensing of vehicle landing hazards (rocks, holes, and slopes) in real-Jme with the ability to divert and land at the determined safe site TesJng these capabiliJes requires a hazard eld for landing which has these kinds of hazards arranged in a landscape similar to what would be encountered on a planetary surface Dening a lunar landscape was the simplest for checking out our sensors and algorithms so KSC was given a layout based on known moon data KSC followed requirements developed by JPL with rocks, craters, slopes, and safe areas of varying sizes laid out similar to a lunar landscape

KSC Hazard Field

Looking towards the SLF

ALHAT Readiness Statement

Current open items
Sensor upgrades and checkout HDS soZware updates and checkout including HDA parallelizaJon and HRN coding and integraJon ResoluJon of Jme delay issue between HDS navigaJon and Morpheus navigaJon

All open items are scheduled for compleJon prior to shipping ALHAT Systems to KSC rst week in September No known show stoppers, however, the major lesson learned so far this scal year is that integraJon and tesJng always seems to throw you a curve and you have to react

KSC Readiness Statement

KSC team and faciliJes are ready to support!
Propellants Command and Control ALHAT Hazard Field External RelaJons and Public Aairs Hangar and work space TransportaJon and BilleJng