G.R. No.

L-37995 August 31, 1987 BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents.

PARAS, J.: Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 1 (promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 38163-R, affirming the decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Land Registration Case No. N-506, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-20783 entitled "Filomeno Gallo, Applicant vs. Bureau of Forestry, Bureau of Lands, and Philippine Fisheries Commission, oppositors. " The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the bigger portion of Lot No. 1 after excluding the portion Identified as Lot 1-A together with the improvements thereon in the name of Filomeno Gallo, of legal age, widower, Filipino citizen, and resident of 155 Fuentes Street, Iloilo City, Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the road right-of-way of 15 meters wide which is presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal Montpiller provincial Road and Buenavista-Daraga provincial Road they being properties of the Province of Iloilo and should be registered in the name of said province. The oppositions of the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Philippine Fisheries Commission are dismissed. Lot 1-A with an area of 2.6864 hectares which is enclosed in red pencil and is found inside Lot No. 1 in the plan Exhibit is hereby declared public land. After the decision has become final let the corresponding decree be issued. SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Joint Record on Appeal Annex "A." p. 25, Rollo) This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside respondent court's resolution dated December 14, 1973 denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal is Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court depending upon the evidence adduced before it. (p. 9, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo) The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo described in Plan Psu150727, containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application for registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself occupied said parcels of land having bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The Director of Lands opposed said application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient

title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of the application. The Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition principally on the ground that certain specific portions of the lands subject matter of the application, with an area of approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove swamps and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo. On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title substantially reproducing the allegations in the application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved on August 30, 1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and control of said portion having been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission. On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15 meters width. Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning the following errors in their brief: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND WHICH CONSISTS OF TIMBERLAND, FORESHORELAND AND LAND BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE UNREGISTERABLE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANT-APPELLEE AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN PEACEFUL, OPEN, CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE TO CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER. (p. 6, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo) Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied a motion for reconsideration of the same hence the present petition with two (2) assigned errors, basically the same issues raised with the respondent court: RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC LAND IS AGRICULTURAL OR STILL A FOREST LAND RESTS EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), THE SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES) AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IS PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS NOT CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE REMOTE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST POSSESSED THE LAND IN QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. (pp. 9 & 20, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo) Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System, 11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain. These are more particularly Identified as parcels "B," B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exh. "1-A." The rest,

consisting of 19.4080 hectares and Identified as parcels A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the same plan Exh. "1-A," is now the center of controversy of the present appeal. Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed facts that 1) the controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of February 18, 1956 of the then Director of Forestry to the effect that the area in question is needed for forest purposes. Respondent court in affirming the decision of the Iloilo trial court ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be considered part of the public forest not susceptible of private ownership since petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural lands. Respondent court based its conclusion upon the premise that whether or not a controverted parcel of land is forest land, is a question of fact which should be settled by competent proofs, and if such a question be an issue in a land registration proceeding, it is incumbent upon the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position of respondent that respondent court did "not hesitate to apply this presumption with full force particularly where, as in the case at bar, the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for a long number of years without the government taking any positive step to dislodge the occupants from their holdings which have passed from one to another by inheritance or by purchase." (p. 9, Brief for private respondents) Otherwise stated, it is Our impression that private respondents claim the rule of prescription against the government. Such contentions of private respondents do not hold water. Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question of whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said forest land had been declared and certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the original applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961. In the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49 Phil. 49, cited by private respondents themselves in their brief, We held Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10), it is again held, that whether a particular parcel of land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be established during the trial of the case. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular caseunless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside said land for forestry or mineral resources. (Italics for emphasis) We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. ... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public

forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184). WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, declaring that: 1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting of 11.1863 hectares of coconut land and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain are hereby ordered registered in the name of the applicant Filomeno Gallo and/or his successors-in-interest as provided for by the Public Land Law; and 2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the same plan Exh. "1-A," consisting of 19.4080 hectares, are forest lands or lands of the public domain of the Republic of the Philippines and are therefore inalienable. SO ORDERED.

---------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. L-35778 January 27, 1983 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO MARTINEZ, respondents. G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, l983 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs.

HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioners. Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.: The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan, Branch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in LRC No. N206, respectively, involve a common issue. For convenience, they are hereby decided jointly. G.R. No. L-35778: On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less. On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan. On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation. On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading: Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez during the hearing of August 8, 1972 that this land, subject matter of this application, was a subject of cadastral proceeding and that this land was assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn, August 3, 1972, page 41), this case is ordered re-opened and the Land Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his report and/or comment as to whether this lot is covered by the Mariveles Cadastre within five (5) days from receipt hereof. xxx xxx xxx On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the lower court a report stating. That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097. xxx xxx xxx Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8

hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner. Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or less; that since 1938, applicant has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia are the ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike between applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the other;that eighteen (18) hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables. While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked on the land of the applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or less; that said Luisito Martinez inherited the land from his parents; that he plants palay only on four (4) hectares; that there are 42 mango trees on the land, G.R. No. L-35779: On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and more particularly described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO13431, respectively. On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration. On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report within ten (10) days if the land subject of the application has been issued patents or is the subject of any pending application for the issuance of patents. Likewise, the lower court directed the Commissioner of Land Registration to submit within the same period his report if the land applied for has been issued a title or is the subject of a pending decree. On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in the lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied for registration "do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative Code." Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed in the lower court another report or manifestation stating "that Plans (LRC) SWO13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No. N-41884, when plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the Commission does not appear to overlap with any previously titled property under Act 496; that the plan and records of said Land Registration application will be subjected to further examination as soon as the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court is received in this Commission to determine whether or not a patent or title has in the meantime been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles." At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the lower court issued an Order of General Default against all persons, with the exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, represented by the Office of the provincial fiscal, and the oppositor Eliseo

Martinez represented by Atty. Angelino Banzon, who were directed to file their respective oppositions, On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation. Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein), testified in her behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, and Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, as well as her documentary evidence in support of her application for registration. On the other hand,. Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the government, and submitted documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by the provincial fiscal's office in this case. At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept of owner since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed this land" in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972. Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were the ones working on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his parents, on their request to owner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when the same was sold to applicant; that 16 hectares of these lands were planted to palay while others were devoted to pasture land and planting vegetables. Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood, he had known Elisa Llamas to be the owner of the land applied for; that she was the one managing the planting and improving of the land; that he used to see Leopoldo de Guzman and another one also named Agapito del Rosario worked on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa Llamas informed him that in 1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega. At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of Leonides B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan containing an approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two sheets, as surveyed for Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by the Director of Forestry as such on February 16, 1972." The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to testify on the alleged possession of the land. The applicant also failed to present Guillermo Ramirez, who was hired by her as overseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicant had possessed the land as owners. In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein. In the instant petitions for review the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496. Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings,

for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act. The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order. It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No. 626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that "portion declared Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937." In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of the claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality, township or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no express grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessorsin-interest, the answer need state the length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land. In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive. Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine ofres judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 2 Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period required by law. Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission. The Land Registration Commission has

no authority to approve original survey plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 4 WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are hereby reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III, ROQUETA ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA, EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation is void. Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the Public Land Act does not bar the State from asking for the reversion of property acquired through such means. Statement of the Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 15, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44568. The decretal portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, SET ASIDE and RECALLED."2 The Facts The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA thus: "On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. x x x filed with the District Land Office, Roxas City, Free Patent Application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Mli-06-000020-D, with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City (Exh. "A"; Exh "9"). It appears that on December 27, 1978, when the application was executed under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation and verification of the land to the District Land Office, Bureau of Lands, City

of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the District Land Officer of Roxas City approved the application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to the applicant. On March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and the patent was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration and issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 was issued to [respondent] by defendant Register of Deeds. "On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter-complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the District Land Officer, Roxas City, and the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City, for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of [respondent]. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his Report dated April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of [respondent]. "In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan under the Cottage Industry Guarantee and Loan Fund by the defendant Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu City in the amount of P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. The promissory note of appellant was annotated at the back of the title. "On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City. "On November 17, 1990, while the case is pending hearing, [respondent] died. He was substituted by his wife Roqueta Alejaga and his children, namely: Everette Alejaga, Lynnette Alejaga, Felipe Alejaga, Jr., Maria Dulla Alejaga. Roqueta Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and Felipe Alejaga III. xxx xxx xxx

"After hearing, the [trial] court in its dispositive portion decreed as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring that the approval of Free Patent Application No. 3358 and issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of Felipe Alejaga is by means of fraud hence, null and void ab initio and the court orders: a) the cancellation of the approval of the application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering Lot No. 1, Mli-06-000020-D with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less, located at Dumulog, Roxas City; b) the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 in the name of Felipe Alejaga; c) the land covered thereby as above described is reverted to the mass of the public domain;

d) the defendants, Heirs of Felipe Alejaga Sr. or defendant, Philippine National Bank, Roxas City Branch, to surrender the owners duplicate copy of above described Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 to the Register of Deeds (now Registries of Land Titles and Deeds), Roxas City; e) the defendant, Register of Deeds, Roxas City, to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 and the owners duplicate copy of said title surrendered by above stated defendants; f) defendants, Philippine National Bank, cross-claim is dismissed. "Costs against the defendants Heirs of Felipe, Alejaga, Sr."3 Ruling of the Court of Appeals In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove its allegation that respondents had obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through fraud and misrepresentation.4 The appellate court likewise held that, assuming there was misrepresentation or fraud as claimed by petitioner, the action for reversion should have been brought within one (1) year from the registration of the patent with the Registry of Deeds.5 Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.6 The CA added that petitioner had failed to support its claim that the lot covered by respondents free patent and title was foreshore land.7 Hence, this Petition.8 Issues Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration: "I The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the case is already final and executory as against respondent PNB. "II The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that petitioner has proven the allegations to the Complaint. "III The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the action for reversion is unavailing."9 Simply stated, the issues can be summed up into two: (1) the efficacy of the grant of the free patent and (2) the indefeasibility of the Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof. This Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. First Issue: Efficacy of the Grant Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of Respondent Alejagas free patent and Certificate of Title.10 It also avers that Respondent PNB has failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal. On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have acquired a vested right over the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-15 by virtue of their proven open, actual, exclusive and undisputed possession of the land for more than 30 years.11 At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records show receipt by Respondent PNB of a copy of the Decision on October 27, not on October 3, 1993 as alleged by petitioner.12 Further, the bank filed its Notice of Appeal on November 9, 1993, within the 15-day reglementary period. In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised in this Petition -- the presence of fraud - is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters.13 However, the instant case falls under one of the exceptions, because the findings of the CA conflict with those of the RTC and with the evidence on record.14 We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.15 The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case.16 It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways.17 Thus, the law requires that it be established by clear and convincing evidence.18 In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a preponderance of evidence before the trial court, showing manifest fraud in procuring the patent.19 This Court agrees with the RTC that in obtaining a free patent over the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which were20 ignored by the Court of Appeals.21 First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.22 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true.23 Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims.24 Note that this notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau of Lands. In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent25 was dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation & Verification Report26 prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated that he had conducted the "necessary investigation and verification in the presence of the applicant." Even if we accept this statement as gospel truth, the violation of the rule cannot be condoned because, obviously, the required notice to adverse claimants was not served.

Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation allegedly conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale of the Public Land Act.27 As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and verification should have been done only after the filing of the application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent.28 It must also be noted that while the Alejagas insist that an investigation was conducted, they do not dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the application.29 Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted is not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature.30 Their reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty31 is thus misplaced. Since Recios signature does not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land was actually conducted. Strangely, respondents do not proffer any explanation why the Verification & Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as will later on be explained, this alleged presumption of regularity -assuming it ever existed -- is overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner. Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the formers statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule.32 Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the Investigation Report33 he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay.34 On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered as independently relevant.35 The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue36 or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.37 Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.38 Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners contention that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void.39 Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title.40 The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the former.41 Verily, we must uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the Alejagas patent and title was tainted with fraud.42 Second Issue: Indefeasibility of Title Petitioner contends that the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the reversion of a piece of property belonging to the public domain.43 On the other hand, the Alejagas claim that, pursuant to Section 32 of PD 152944 -- otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree -- the one-year

period for reversion has already lapsed.45 Thus, the States Complaint for reversion should be dismissed. We agree with petitioner. True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter.46 However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.47 Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership.48 Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,49 the State -- even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private individuals.50 Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in securing the title.51 In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of fraud.52 Public policy demands that those who have done so should not be allowed to benefit from their misdeed.53 Thus, prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its own property acquired through fraud by private individuals.54 This is settled law.55 Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued, there is another basis for the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 14156 proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from its grant.57The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every application.58 Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title to, or interest in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or any improvements thereon. They are forbidden from enjoying such right, title or interest, if they have not secured the consent of the grantee and the approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than education, charity, or easement of way.59 In the case at bar, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 335860 was approved and issued on March 14, 1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-1561 was issued on the same date. On August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan62 in the amount of P100,000. Despite the statement on the title certificate itself that the land granted under the free patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P15.63 In his testimony, Gabriel D. Aranas Jr., then Cashier III of respondent bank, even admitted that the PNB was aware of such restriction. "COURT You testified Mr. Aranas that you inspected the title also when you credit investigated the loan applicant Felipe Alejaga and you have personally examined this? A Yes, your Honor.

COURT Do you conclude that this Original Certificate of Title is a [free] patent? A Yes, your Honor. COURT And this [free] patent was granted on March 19, 1979. A Yes, your honor. COURT And as such [free] patent it cannot be alienated except [to] the government or within five years from its issuance? A Yes, your honor. COURT Why did you recommend the loan? A Because it is just a mortgage."64 Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.65 A mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of the mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property.66 As early as Pascua v. Talens,67 we have explained the rationale for the prohibition against the encumbrance of a homestead -- its lease and mortgage included -- an encumbrance which, by analogy, applies to a free patent. We ruled as follows: "It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the patent." Further, an encumbrance on a parcel of land acquired through free patent constitutes sufficient ground for the nullification of such grant, as provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, which we quote: "SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State." Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent grant nullifies the award and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the state, as we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals:68 "The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain."69

To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel land granted to him. The mortgage he made over the land violated that condition.70 Hence, the property must necessarily revert to the public domain, pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC of Roxas City (Branch 15) dated October 27, 1993 is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

---------------------------------------------REPUBLIC VS SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS FACTS: Proclamation No 423 which established a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley later renamed Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, was issued by former President Carlos Garcia. Areas specified in the Proclamation were withdrawn from sales and settlements and were reserved for military purposes. Several presidential proclamations would later be issued excluding certain defined areas from the operation of Proclamation 423. What is mainly sought to be declared as a nullity in this petition is the title over the parcels of land that are referred to as JUSMAG housing are in Fort Bonifacio being occupied by active and retired military officers and their families. SHAI , a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers, was able to secure title in its name over the bulk, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. The TCT was issued by the Rizal Registry on the basis of a notarized deed of sale purportedly executed by then Land Management Bureau Director Abelardo Palad Jr. The investigation conducted by the DOJ, however, reported land scams at the FBMR and also finding that the signature of Palad was forged. In 1993, then Pres Ramos ordered the OSG to institute an action towards the cancellation of TCT15084 in SHAIs name as well as the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel of land within the reservation. ISSUE: Whether the land sold was alienable. HELD: NO. As regards the issue of inalienability, the Court upheld the contention of the Republic that the JUSMAG area is inalienable, the same having not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable. Until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable

and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. SHAI had not pointed to any proclamation or legislative act for that matter segregating the property from the reservation and classifying the same as alienable lands of public domain. Furthermore, the Constitution also forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable public land except through lease for a limited period. The whole conveyance process was also suspicious since the whole process was accomplished only in one day. -----------------------G.R. No. 156951 September 22, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASIG, RIZAL,respondents. x-------------------------------------------x BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, intervenor x-------------------------------------------x DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, represented by HON. SECRETARY ANGELO T. REYES, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, GENERAL NARCISO L. ABAYA, intervenors x-------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 173408 September 22, 2006

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, MGEN. MARCIANO ILAGAN (Ret.), MGEN. PONCIANO MILLENA (Ret.), BGEN. JUANITO MALTO (Ret.), BGEN. RAYMUNDO JARQUE (Ret.) and COL. DOMINADOR P. AMADOR (Ret.),petitioners, vs. L/T. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., respondent. x-------------------------------------------x DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court are these two petitions having, as common denominator, the issue of ownership of a large tract of land. In the first, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 156951, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated

January 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59454, affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, of the Republics complaint for declaration of nullity and cancellation of a land title against the herein private respondent, the Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (SHAI). In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 173408, petitioners Rene Saguisag and five (5) retired military officers pray that Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., the present Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), be asked to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for having announced time and again that the military officers and their families in the contempt action would be ousted and evicted from the property subject of the main petition even before the issue of ownership thereof is finally resolved by the Court. After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment2 to the petition in G.R. No. 156951, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), followed by the Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP, joined causes with the petitioner Republic and thus sought leave to intervene. The Court, per its Resolutions dated September 3, 2003,3 and September 29, 2003,4 respectively, allowed the intervention and admitted the corresponding petitions-for-intervention. Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both petitions were ordered consolidated. The Republics recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast against the following backdrop: On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 4235 establishing a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley later renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). The proclamation "withdr[ew] from sale or settlement and reserve[d] for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff of the [AFP] the [certain] parcels of the public domain [indicated in plan Psu-2031]" situated in the several towns and a city of what was once the Province of Rizal. On its face, the proclamation covers three (3) large parcels of land, to wit: Parcel No. 2 (portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A). Parcel No. 3 with an area of 15,912,684 square meters and Parcel No. 4 with an area of 7,660,128 square meters are described in the proclamation as situated inside Fort McKinley, Rizal. Specifically mentioned as excluded from Parcel No. 4 albeit within its boundaries are the American Battle Monument Cemetery (606,985 sq. m.), the Traffic Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and the Diplomatic and Consular area (100,000 sq.m.). Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding certain defined areas from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declaring them open for disposition. These are Proclamation No. 4616 and Proclamation No. 462,7 both series of 1965, excluding portions of the reservation and declaring them the AFP Officers Village and the AFP EMs Village, respectively, to be disposed of under Republic Act (R.A.) 2748 and R.A. 7309 in relation to the Public Land Act (C.A. 141, as amended). Excluded, too, under Proclamation No. 172 dated October 16, 1987 and to be disposed pursuant to the same laws aforementioned, save those used or earmarked for public/quasi-public purposes, are portions of the reservation known as Lower and Upper Bicutan, Western Bicutan and the Signal Village, all in Taguig, Metro Manila. In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and Development Act (R.A. 7227, as amended), investing the BCDA the power to own, hold and administer portions of Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President10 and to dispose, after the lapse of a number of months, portions of Fort Bonifacio.11 At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as or are situated in what is referred to as

the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio. As may be gathered from the pleadings, military officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP on the JUSMAG area. Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1508412 - in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. TCT No. 15084 particularly describes the property covered thereby as follows: A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx. A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as shown on subdivision Plan Psd 76057, being a portion of parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (1,320) SQUARE METERS xxx.. (Underscoring added.) The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991 on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale13purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total purchase price as written in the conveying deed wasP11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter. It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991 deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino are embodied in his Questioned Documents Report (QDR) No. 815-1093.14 Its highlights: QUESTIONED SPECIMENS: 1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) containing the signature of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." designated as "Q-961" . 2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of SHAI containing the signature of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." ... designated as "Q-962. xxx xxx xxx PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION: To determine whether or not the questioned and sample/specimen signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were written by one and the same person. FINDINGS: Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the specimens, submitted, under stereoscopic microscope and magnifying lens, with the aid of photographic enlargement reveals that there exist fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics between

the questioned and the standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." such as in: - The questioned signatures show slow, drawn, painstaking laborious manner in execution of strokes; that of the standard/sample signatures show free, rapid coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the manner of execution of letters/elements. xxx xxx xxx Furthermore, the questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a product of TRACING PROCESS by CARBON-OUTLINE METHOD. CONCLUSION: Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned and the standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were not written by one and the same person. The questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon process. REMARKS: The other questioned Deeds of Sale containing the signatures of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." are still in the process of examination.15 On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 17316 directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63883 and eventually raffled to Branch 71 of the court, the Republic alleged that fraud attended SHAIs procurement of TCT No. 15084. In paragraph No. 5 of the complaint, the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is void owing, inter alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying deed is spurious as the purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.17 In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI denied the material allegations of the complaint and countered that the impugned title as well as the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale are valid documents which the Republic is estopped to deny.18 SHAI also alleged paying in full the purchase price indicated in the deed as evidenced byOfficial Receipt No. 6030203-C dated October 29, 1991. On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence) the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B." Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and "B" as its Exhibits "1" and"2," respectively. As the pre-trial order was written, it would appear that the parties agreed to limit the issue to the due execution and genuineness of Exhs. "A" and "B."19

During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit "A" is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place. The testimony of other witnesses revolved around the absence of bureau records respecting SHAIs application to acquire, payment of the purchase price and Psd-76057, the plan described in TCT No. 15084. 20 For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who brought with him PNP QDR No. 001-96 and testified that Palads signature in Exhibit "A"(same as Exh. "1") is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis,21 followed by the payment in full of the contract price. Atty. Vicente Garcia, the then Register of Deeds of Rizal, also testified about his having endorsed to Palad a letter-inquiry he received from SHAI respecting the authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palads response-letter dated January 23, 1992 (Exh. "10"), according to Atty. Garcia, is to the effect that TCT No. 15084 must be genuine as it emanated from the Registrys office on the basis of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale.22 On rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit "10" and an LMB official would disclaim transmitting the same to Atty. Garcia. Eventually, in a decision23 dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Republics complaint, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint dated November 15, 1991 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are also DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. In not so many words, the trial court considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 59454. In the herein assailed Decision24 dated January 28, 2003, the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court. Hence, this petition of the Republic on the threshold abstract submission that the CA "completely ignored, overlooked and/or grossly misappreciated facts of substance which, if duly considered, will materially affect the outcome of this case." In its COMMENT To Petition, private respondent SHAI parlays the "what-can-be-raised" line. It urges the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the issues raised therein, particularly those bearing on the authenticity ofExhibit "A"/"1," are mainly questions of fact, adding that the matter of the inalienability of the area purportedly sold is outside the issue agreed upon during the pre-trial stage.

The desired dismissal cannot be granted on the bases of the reasons proffered above. While the Court, in a petition for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far from absolute. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,25 citing Floro v. Llenado,26 for one, suggests as much. In Floro, we wrote: xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court to review the finding of facts of the [CA], summarized in and subsequent cases as follows: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the [CA] are based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) ; 7) ; 8) ; 9) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of facts are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Words in bracket, added.) To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least three of the exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9. Private respondent SHAIs stance about the petitioner Republic being barred from raising the issue of inalienability since it failed to plead or assert the same at the pre-trial proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the general rule, as articulated in Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro,27 is that the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of others on appeal. It should be pointed out, however, that the rationale for such preliminary, albeit mandatory, conference is to isolate as far as possible the trial out of the realm of surprises and back-handed maneuverings. And lest it be overlooked, the adverted rule on the procedure to be observed in pretrials is, as Bergano v. Court of Appeals28 teaches, citing Gicano v. Gegato,29 subject to exceptions. And without meaning to diminish the importance of the same rule, the Court is possessed with inherent power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the demands of justice so require.30 Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be generally observed in pre-trial conferences hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to tackling the question of inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue more legal than factual. As it were, the element of surprise is not really present here. For the issue of inalienability, which is central to the Republics cause of action, was raised in its basic complaint, passed upon by the CA and, before it, by the trial court31 and of which at least one witness (Palad) was examined as follows: Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of land in question at the time of the land alleged sale was part of the [FBMR]. Now as part of the [FBRM] do you know whether the said parcel of land can be the subject of disposition? A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be sold and it is already part of those government lands that has been assigned to other government agencies that is no longer within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say I have no more say on that because the proclamation to the effect was reserving this for particular purpose under the DND .32 (Words in bracket added.) At any rate, Palads testimony drew nary an objection from private respondent SHAI. It even crossexamined said witness.33 The rule obtains that the introduction of evidence bearing on an issue not

otherwise included in the pre-trial order amounts to implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the court to try such issue.34 Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we now consider the clashing assertions regarding the JUSMAG area. Was it, during the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance? Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable. The Republics and the intervenors parallel assertions are correct. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes.35 Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable.36 Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable,37 unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land.38 And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains,39 even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. So it must be here. There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that "subject land is within military reservation,"40 and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se,41 its own evidence themselves belie its posture. We start with its Exhibit "2" (petitioners Exh. "B"), a copy of TCT No. 15084, which described the area covered thereby measuring 399,922 square meters as a "portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031 situated in Jusmang (sic) area Fort Bonifacio." Complementing its Exhibit "2" is its Exhibit "1" - the deed of sale - which technically described the property purportedly being conveyed to private respondent SHAI as follows: A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic) area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx (Emphasis added) As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described in private respondents Exhibits "1" and "2,"formed part of that wide expanse under Proclamation No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land of the public domain as falling within its coverage. These include, inter alia, the entire 15,912,684-square meter area constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 located inside the now renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a redundant point, was declared a military reservation. The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation Map of Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu 203142 prepared in September 1995 and certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates in colored ink the outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by Proclamation No. 423. As there also shown, the 399,992-square meter area embraced by SHAIs TCT No. 15084, defined in the legend by red-

colored stripes, is within the violet-colored borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No. 423. Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084 was and is still part of the FBMR, more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter Parcel No. 3 of the reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors BCDA, DND and AFP in this appellate proceedings, has maintained all along this thesis. Towards discharging its burden of proving that the disputed property is part of the reservation, the petitioner Republic need only to demonstrate that all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 have been reserved for military purposes. The evidence, however, of the fact of reservation is the law or, to be more precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself, the contents and issuance of which courts can and should take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.43 The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the appellate court seemed to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind eye on, certain admissions made by the private respondent, the most basic being those made in its answer to the Republics allegations in paragraph 5 (e) and (g) of its complaint. To the Republics allegations that the property covered by TCT No. 15084 was and remains part the FBMR, SHAIs answer thereto reads: 2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs 5 of the complaint, the truth of the matter being that in the Deed of Sale , the Director of Lands Certificate (sic) that he is "authorized under the law to sell" the subject property and that the "lots were duly awarded by the [LBM] to the vendee.44 ( Emphasis and word in bracket added.) In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the petitioner Republic alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the formers denial to such allegations on the inalienable nature of the property covered by TCT No. 15084 being in the nature of a general denial. Under the rules on pleadings, a specific, not a general, denial is required; a denial is not specific because it is so qualified or termed "specific" by the pleader.45 The defendant must specify each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely denies and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he will rely to support his denial.46 Else, the denial will be regarded as general and will, therefore, be regarded as an admission of a given material fact/s stated in the complaint. What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to enter what, under the Rules, is tantamount to a general denial of the Republics averments that what SHAIs TCT No. 15084 covers is part of the military reservation. In the process, private respondent SHAI is deemed to admit the reality of such averment. To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had more than sufficiently established its claim on the inalienability of the parcels of land covered by TCT No. 15084. In fine, it had discharged the burden of proof on the issue of inalienability. Be that as it may, the burden of evidence to disprove inalienability or, to be precise, that said parcels of land had, for settlement purposes, effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423, devolves upon the private respondent. This is as it should be for the cogency of SHAIs claim respecting the validity of both the underlying deed of sale (Exh. "A"/"1") and its TCT No. 15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") rests on the postulate that what it purportedly bought from the LMB had ceased to be part of the reserved lands of the public domain. Elsewise put, SHAI must prove that the JUSMAG area had been withdrawn from the reservation and declared open for disposition, failing which it has no enforceable right over the area as against the State.

Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden by reason of lack of evidence. To be sure, it has not, because it cannot even if it wanted to, pointed to any presidential act specifically withdrawing the disputed parcels from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423. Worse still, its own Exhibit "5,"47 a letter dated March 19, 1991 of then PA Commanding General, M/Gen Lisandro Abadia, to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the SHAI, cannot but be viewed as a partys judicial admission that the disputed land has yet to be excluded from the military reservation. The Abadia letter, with its feature dis-serving to private respondent SHAI, reads in part as follows: Dear Mrs. Gabon: This is in connection with your move to make a petition to President Aquino regarding the possible exclusion of Southside Housing Area from the military reservation and for its eventual allotment to the military officers presently residing thereat. Allow me to state that I interpose no objection . I find it helpful to our officers to be provided a portion of the Fort Bonifacio military reservation . (Underscoring added.) Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard put to understand how the CA could still have found for SHAI.. The appellate court, apparently swayed by what SHAI said in its Brief for the Appellees48 that: Appellant [petitioner Republic] is probably unaware that , then President Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation 461 when he excluded from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 an area of 2,455,810 square meters more or less. Likewise on October 16, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 also located at Fort Bonifacio containing an area of 4,436, 478 . So if we deduct the 6,892,288 [2,455,810 + 4,436,478 = 6,892,288] square meters covered by Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 of the areas reserved for military purposes of 7,053,143 square meters, what is only left is 160,857 square meters or more or less 16 hectares .49 justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land with the following disquisition: The foregoing admission aside, appellants [now petitioners] reliance on Proclamation No. 493 [should be 423] in insisting that the land in litigation is inalienable because it is part of the [FBMR] is too general to merit serous consideration. While it is true that, under the said July 12, 1957 Proclamation, then President Carlos P. Garcia reserved the area now known as Fort Bonifacio for military purposes, appellee [now respondent] correctly calls our attention to the fact, among other matters, that numerous exceptions thereto had already been declared through the years. The excluded areas under Proclamation No. 461, dated September 29, 1965 and Proclamation No. 172, dated October 16, 1987 alone already total 6,892,338 square meters. (Figures in bracket added.) The CAs justifying line does not commend itself for concurrence. For one, it utilizes SHAIs misleading assertion as a springboard to justify speculative inferences. Per our count, Proclamation 423 reserved for military purposes roughly a total area of 25,875,000 square meters, not 7,053,143. On the other hand, Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 excluded a combined area of 6,892,338 square meters. Now then, the jump from an acknowledgment of the disputed parcels of land having been reserved for military purposes to a rationalization that they must have been excluded from the reservation because 6,892,338 square meters had already been withdrawn from Proclamation 423 is simply speculative. Needless to stress, factual speculations do not make for proof.

Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent SHAI - and quite understandably, the appellate court - had not pointed to any proclamation, or legislative act for that matter, segregating the property covered by TCT No. 15084 from the reservation and classifying the same as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To reiterate what we earlier said, lands of the public domain classified as a military reservation remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from such classification and declared open to disposition.50 The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.51 Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio. The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of the JUSMAG area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its reclassification as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Still, such hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI. The reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 352 of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas had stated the observation that the reason for the ban is not very clear under existing jurisprudence,53 the fact remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are prohibited from purchasing or otherwise acquiring alienable public lands. Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this disposition. An appropriate closure to this case could not be had, however, without delving to an extent on the issue of the validity of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale which necessarily involves the question of the authenticity of what appears to be Palads signature thereon. With the view we take of the case, the interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious. Consider: 1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The Court perceives no reason why he should lie, albeit respondent states, without elaboration, that Palads declaration is aimed at avoiding "criminal prosecution".54 The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads allegation on forgery.55Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out. 2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped "Received" by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words, the whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed notarized.

3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act.56 There is also no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court57attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.58 4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the "deed of sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203C dated 29 October 1991, (sic) as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price.." An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment,59 it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. A Certification under date September 15, 1993 of the OIC Cash Division, LMB, states that "OR # 6030203 in the amount of P11,977,000.00 supposedly paid by [SHAI] is not among the series of [ORs] issued at any time by the National Printing Office to the Cashier, LMB, Central Office."60 A copy of the OR receipt is not appended to any of the pleadings filed before the Court. We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI. A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.61 5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit. A final consideration in G.R. No. 156951. This case could not have come to pass without the participation of a cabal of cheats out to make a dishonest buck at the expense of the government and most likely the members of SHAI. No less than its former president (Ms. Virginia Santos) testified that a "facilitator" did, for a fee, the necessary paper and leg work before the LMB and the Registry of Deeds that led to the execution of the Deed of Sale and issuance of the certificate of title in question.62 Ms. Santos identified Eugenia Balis, a geodetic engineer, as the "facilitator"63 who "facilitated all these presentation" of documents,64 and most of the time, "directly transacted" with the LMB and the Register of Deeds leading to acquisition of title.65 Engr. Balis was, in the course of Ms. Santos testimony, directly mentioned by name for at least fifteen (15) times. Not surprisingly, Engr. Balis did not appear in court, despite SHAIs stated intention to present her as witness.66 The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio land involved in this and the NOVA area litigations is, as described in the Report of the FactFinding Commission,67 "so epic in scale as to make the overpricing of land complained of in the two hundred AFP [Retirement and Separation Benefits System] RSBS cases (P703 million) seem like petty shoplifting in comparison."68 The members of private respondent SHAI may very well have paid for what they might have been led to believe as the purchase price of the JUSMAG housing area. The sad reality, however, is that the over P11 Million they paid, if that be the case, for a piece of real estate contextually outside the commerce of man apparently fell into the wrong hands and did not enter the government coffers. Else, there must be some memorials of such payment. At bottom, this disposition is nothing more than restoring the petitioner Republic, and eventually the BCDA, to what rightfully belongs to it in law and in fact. There is nothing unjust to this approach.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 173408 need not detain us long. As it were, the question raised by the petitioners therein respecting the ownership of the JUSMAG area and, accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain in the housing units each may be occupying is now moot and academic. However, contempt petitioners expressed revulsion over the efforts of the military establishment, particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from their respective dwellings, if that really be the case, even before G.R. No. 156951 could be resolved, is understandable as it is justified. We thus end thisponencia with a reminder to all and sundry that might is not always right; that ours is still a government of laws and not of men, be they in the civilian or military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not treat lightly any attempt to trifle, intended or otherwise, with its processes and proceedings. A becoming respect to the majesty of the law and the prerogatives of the Court is a must for the orderly administration of justice to triumph. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is GRANTED and the appealed CA Decision is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 (Exh. "A"/"1") purportedly executed in favor of private respondent SHAI and TCT No. 15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such deed are declared VOID. The Register of Deeds of Pasig or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby ordered to CANCEL TCT No. 15084 in the name of SHAI and the area covered thereby is DECLARED part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the same has, in the interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation from such reservation. Private respondent SHAI, its members, representatives and/or their assigns shall vacate the subject parcels of land immediately upon the finality of this decision, subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act. Cost against the private respondent SHAI. Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further thereon other than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same. SO ORDERED.

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