Kaprelian 1 Aristotle's Politics centers on the study of different communities of people and their respective constitutions.

To this science of thought he gives the name statesmanship and defines it as determining [1] the ideal constitution, [2] the most appropriate constitution for a city-state, and [3] the best constitution given certain limitations (Aristotle 101). Before examining the particulars in this field of study, one should look to its origins and understand what necessitates its precepts. Since creation, mankind has striven to live en masse for several worthy reasons; whether a farmer who seeks to sell surplus food items to support a family, or a soldier trusting in his comrades to defend him on the battlefield. Aristotle comments by writing "a human being is by nature a political animal" (Aristotle 4), this desire is not only profitable, but also intellectually beneficial in that it brings those involved closer to their most natural state. It is seen that communities emerge nearly immediately after placing even a small quantity of people in the same area. These people may collect into villages in hundreds, then cities in thousands, and so on. As the number increases, not only does their relative productivity increase, but also their transparency in flaws of morality. In terms of productivity, Aristotle places a large emphasis on the self-sufficiency in a city-state as well as the importance of monitoring the population and their efficiency to the point where the city-state might be as independent as possible from other nations. Converging into a common location bears common purpose, not only to engage with one another in strictly the communal sense, but also to maximize the previously stated supply in direct answer to the demands of the people. As the people of the state originally choose to advance as a group under a shared cause, it falls upon these same people to regulate the fundamental issues a newfound society faces, for instance: who gets how much of some product? However, with the introduction of human imperfection, particularly greed, it quickly becomes more difficult for a disorganized mass to pass judgment upon those people who, when examining

Kaprelian 2 the societal structure, maintain the same amount of authority as the accusers themselves. Greed itself cannot be removed unless there were to be a change in underlying human nature, and therefore must be nullified by either embracing it fully, or rejected to the best of the lawmakers' ability. Aristotle himself acknowledges this fact in stating "Besides, human greed is an insatiable thing" (Aristotle 44). As rejecting a base human instinct can never be accomplished by a majority within a large populous, the same lawmakers must be given some level of authority over the other people involved with the community. An imbalance then becomes necessary in regulating the actions of general masses, and giving order to those incapable of creating it themselves. The three responsibilities of statesmanship are then relied on by the people to communicate the type of government which holds to the principles of Truth in an unbiased fashion and which most nearly fits the hearts of its citizens. These are the origins of government and the functions assigned to it by documents the people call constitutions. Of course, humanity has seen many variations of constitutions emerge as a result of this natural and sequential development ranging not only in type (democracy, aristocracy, principality and so on), but also affectivity. On the most basic level, Aristotle makes it clear that government aims toward the Good with a greater level of authority than an individual, and therefore can advance further in its pursuit (Aristotle 1). It is clear then, that government plays an important role in the furthering of personal virtue and so it falls upon the originally stated statesmen to derive the most applicable constitution for a specific city-state and her people. Of course, it would be best to look to that which is most in line with the human state, say kingship under God or perhaps polity amongst humanity, and say that these then are what the authority must uncompromisingly strive for, but as Aristotle states, "For one should not study only what is best, but also what is possible" (Aristotle 102). The legislators must then, to the extent of their

Kaprelian 3 collective reason, interpret a form of organization in concordance with the nature of their people. This factor of interpretation has been grounds for deliberation and, in extreme cases, warfare amongst citizens across the civilized world. However, there are three basic varieties of city-state which are put forth as the most fundamental, those being: Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity (Politeia) (Aristotle 77). As their enforcement cannot be perfect, these constitutions may drift away from their original intent of remaining truthful representations of common benefit and would deviate into counter parts of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, respectively (Aristotle 78). This being Aristotles postulation at the politically feasible forms of government, other authors choose to pursue their statesmanship in a more businesslike manner between the superior and inferior. Niccolo Machiavelli's discussion on forms of government, The Prince, poses two very basic formulations which have proven to generate stability, Principalities and Republics. Republics place their trust in an expansive group of politicians who work closely with or are elected by the common people to have, or at least appear to have the general best interest in mind. These republics will attempt to compromise for the flaws in human nature by widening the spectrum of Reason amongst multiple legislators and therefore increasing a theoretical net sum. Principalities are defined to be led by a single individual or very select group and to rely heavily upon the existence of their ruler. They, principalities, derive their power from a people who ideally feel great fear and love for the presumably effective prince; to help clarify, Machiavelli refers to Alexander VI as an ideal image of what the prince of a country should look like, "he who considers it necessary to secure himself in his new principality [...] to overcome either by force or fraud [...] to make himself beloved and feared by the people [...] to be severe and gracious [...]" (Machiavelli 31). When referring to a principality and the effect of its leader, all in

Kaprelian 4 authority must aspire to reach this pinnacle. Pious and devious, honest and deceptive, swift to judge and patient in virtue, deadly at war and beloved at home, are seeming contradictions which a prince must embrace in his acceptance of authority (Machiavelli 31). Upon the necessity of one such person's election, it then becomes his responsibility to prove worth and gain the heightened trust of his people. This last component is most important and is stressed by Machiavelli "but I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity" (Machiavelli 38). Thinking back to the beginnings of developed society, all power derived from legislation is also derived from the peoples' acceptance of their leader. The ruler might openly and offensively defy the peoples wishes and see short term success. However, though comparable events in history, one sees the citizens eventually reach the end of their patience and rebel, particularly (as the quotation states) in the face of adversity when their prince shows signs of weakness. And yet, what is the benefit to having this one leader rather than many entities? Firstly, while it is possible for one or a few to be outstandingly virtuous, it is difficult for a larger number to be accomplished in virtue (Aristotle 77). Secondly, many-headed rule is not good (Aristotle 110), though it should be noted that in this passage, what is meant by many-headed is an independent leadership which may arise within the people and is contrary to the apparent truth the original legislators put in place. In a more authoritarian government like the stated principality, the rulers are placed in an awkward yet necessary balance with the ruled in that "the better the ruled are, the better the rule over them always is" (Aristotle 7). Now the same peoples' recognition (that of the ruled) of this fact can be made inconsequential, but not insignificant, through means which have been perfected for as long as civilization itself has lasted. These means can be accomplished most powerfully through the objective centered thoughts of a great general. Unsurpassed in his

Kaprelian 5 capability to command large quantities of people to his will, Sun Tzu's principles of military ordinance are written so philosophically and artfully, that they can easily be extrapolated to any subject which contrasts one free will against another. On the matter of opinions amongst the people, it is written, "In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and / gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at / sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven" (Sun Tzu 187). Thus, a prince who is able to calculate his actions in a way invisible to the people and clear to himself, also becomes able to change a political situation in such a way as to best accommodate his personal ambition, whether virtuous or not. This, of course, might create potential for the ruler to operate outside of their subjects' wishes and in turn betray the constitution of the country and its people. By nature of the principality and in the interests of stability, the authority of its leaders should not be questioned, but one may see in the previous example that some definition ought to be established to keep the distinction between just and unjust clear. In light of this fact, Aristotle states that it is the virtue of the city-state official which distinguishes him from "Hence a ruler must have virtue of character complete, since his task is unqualifiedly that of a master craftsman, and reason is a master craftsman" (Aristotle 23). So, even amongst democracies and aristocracies, the governing body possesses the qualities of virtue while also attempting to convince the people. With Sun Tzu's experience in the subject matter, one should also realize that the struggle to keep power over what is essentially an excitable mob requires the political prowess of a Caesar in its execution. An Italian proverb perhaps makes the point best in saying "Alexander never did what he said, Cesare never said what he did" and in Machiavelli's own words, "It is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them" (Machiavelli 65). The indefinite shape surrounding this authority grants him as much power as any number of

Kaprelian 6 soldiers would, and if economized well, could be used to make the prince himself unchallengeable. In any prince who wishes to see his command extended so long as his life provides, they must first win the battle in their minds of strategizing and implementing factors without bias, and after, win the battle of its implementation, seeing that it is followed through with the utmost loyalty to its decrees. This is the first step of a prince in maintaining a stable community of people, "In antiquity those that excelled in warfare first made / themselves unconquerable [...] Being unconquerable lies with yourself; being conquerable / lies with the enemy" (Sun Tzu 183). The prince gains something of a favor over his military counterpart in that the prince is, domestically, in direct control over the jurisdiction of his people, whereas in a general "One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will / sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat" (Sun Tzu 179). Therefore the general, and for that matter also the prince employing the general, must be aware of what constitutes victory and defeat, and compensate through such means as past experience, spies, favorable terrain, and the like. The definition of Aristotle in writing that "every community is established for the sake of some Good" (Aristotle 1) is tied to Sun Tzu's warning that "Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and / death" (Sun Tzu 167). These two statements reflect a struggle at the heart of preserving a functioning state, namely the fight to align the people with what they find to contain the most Truth and to shield it from other states which may, inevitably, hold a different estimation of Aristotle's virtue. Even within the nation, a prince as well as other legislators must be very cautious of stirrings in the people, unrest toward the present superior, and even an outright refusal to carry through with obligations. A refusal to complete ones tasks is, of course, detrimental to the infrastructure of the state, and so one should examine what specific devices are preemptively set in place to avoid these complications. The answer does not involve so much

Kaprelian 7 deception but is directly in line with the constitution of the state, in that the actions of people are mediated as a result of the law itself. Even then, many people may feel no pressing need to obey the laws and a second means of submission must take place For the law has no power to secure obedience except habit; but habits can only be developed over a long period of time (Aristotle 49). The productivity and more importantly, the self-sufficiency of a state then relies upon a habitual virtue attained by respect for the law due to the original assumption that their constitution is in following with the Truth of their political needs. Before any measure of a state's resistance to the stated distractions can be tested, those in power should verify on what basis they attempt to advance their country, "The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws" (Machiavelli 45). In following this way of thinking after a government is founded, the duty of the prince is expanded to require knowledge of legal matters and keeping the ever important love of the masses, as well as remaining in tune with the more physical aspects of human nature. Contesting the beliefs of others through force should be considered appropriate to beasts; this however does not out rule it as a feasible means, if those properly pertaining to human reason (and therefore law) should fail. As a result "it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beasts and the man" (Machiavelli 64). This thinking again reflects upon the potency of a principality in providing a prince with the flexibility to favor himself as much as he wish, while providing for the people as much as they are allowed to demand. Another situation which creates potential for discontent is an imbalance in the division of labor which, of itself, as well as the peoples reaction should be closely monitored For if the citizens happen to be unequal rather than equal in the work they do accusations will inevitably be made against those who enjoy but do

Kaprelian 8 little work (Aristotle 32). Again, habitual virtue found through the laws of the state should be the measure taken to guard against these inconstancies in human nature. This way of thinking can then be expanded to make more general statements about the nature of how a state approaches its constituents. In this way, the philosophy behind the actions are akin to that of ancient Athens during their Golden Era, "right [...] is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides 5.89). At their peak, with renowned leaders like Pericles and Alcibiades, Athens had begun to move away from its democratic roots and more toward what was seen in the Roman Empire to come. Once he had gained an incredible amount of trust from the people, Pericles Athens had become more of an empire than the original democracy. Amongst people considered to be equal in their citizenship with others in the city-state, there are those who are distinguished by their capacity for, what Aristotle calls, political virtue. Those with greater political virtue, defined by greater: wealth, property, birth, and virtue (Aristotle 104-105), are identified as notables and have a greater potential to hold higher offices than the common people. In fact, these notables would be held in such high regard to where it would be a disservice to the state, should their superiority be ignored as an unfair advantage, for the other sort there is no law, since they themselves are law (Aristotle 89). The principle then returns to the original Athenian philosophy which prided national supremacy and conquest. For Aristotle, the Truth found in constitutions creates a desire for justice within the people, a natural distaste for being cheated. This, however, is commonly mistaken by some to mean that all humans should be treated exactly equally. This is found to be not true as, Justice seems to be equality, and it is, but not for everyone, only for equals

Kaprelian 9 (Aristotle 79). Nations face their greatest tests of stability when placed in situations which try their proficiency of warfare, honesty, and authority. War, or rather the defense of native people, is not only the greatest affair, but also the most basic necessity which is provided for by a government. Herein lies a fundamental disagreement between Sun Tzus interpretation of war relating more to an end, whereas Aristotle describes it as more of a means in writing, It is clear, therefore, that all military practices are to be regarded as noble, not when they are pursued as the highest end of all, but only when they are pursued for the sake of the highest end (Aristotle 195). The emphasis being placed on the fact that war should be used as a tool, one with which to test the fidelity of the people and their constitution, which if truly founded upon the basis of Truth will not fail them. Though a violent conflict should be avoided under most circumstances, if a nation does engage in battle and loses, this would foster great unrest and mistrust not only in the people being ruled, but also in the soldiers upon which the security of the state depends. Of course in a principality, the trust of the people should be maintained if not on all levels, then at least on this one. Indeed, the physical welfare of his state should be foremost in the mind of a prince while in power; "A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules [...]" (Machiavelli 54). In the midst of hundreds of other affairs, he who carries the nation should be constantly seeking to expand his knowledge of military strategies and the topology of the lands which present themselves as advantageous or hazardous to the state. In gaining the wisdom to use deception to his advantage, a prince has learned that which lies at the heart of every engagement and can use the information to lead an otherwise outmatched people to victory. In the great care taken to win a battle once engaged, perhaps equal attention should be given to the justifications of the

Kaprelian 10 engagement. Where in men "The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common [...] but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame" (Machiavelli 14). The desire on the part of personal profit for the prince and communal glory for the masses is often the driving force behind which a states progression should propagate and vigilantly advance. Again, considering its incomparable influence on the nation, the prince and his generals must not hesitate to use any form of accessible advantage to their favor in warfare, whether it come though the misstep of an enemy, or the mind of a tactician. Every opportunity witnessed in peace or in conflict should be used to better secure one's own nation, "If the enemy opens the door, you must race in" (Sun Tzu 224). In seeking for a justification for such brash actions, a prince needs not inconvenience himself through paralyzing justifications for the conscience, for "that war is just which is necessary" (Machiavelli 96). Through years of perfection, the art has, undeniably, become more a game of chess and less a ruthless waste of human lives for principalities to advance in their political reach. This gives value to those who seek to conquer swiftly and with the least resistance possible, in that a long drawn out war exhausts both the spirit (ch'i) of men and the resources available to them. Due to the top-down structure of a principality, should a campaign fail horribly, the blame falls violently upon the prince himself should he have no other significant nobles, "I say that all men when they are spoken of [...] are remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or praise [...]" (Machiavelli 57). While this may have been the only fault (and indeed it cannot be anything but a fault) in the recently deceased prince's career, the significance of the matter would justify the necessity for a trial of new leadership. The people, whether educated and active in the process or not, would cleanse their nation of the one now considered a plague as "Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more

Kaprelian 11 consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him [...]" (Machiavelli 17). From this it appears that solely by the nature of an exclusive rule free from interfering bureaucrats, the prince gains some newfound amount of political value in his own nation. In addition, were the prince to gain trust enough to rid his authority of state appointed advisors (but not eliminate them entirely), a certain sense of dependency would emerge amongst the common people with regard to their leadership. All this is opposed to a republic, in which the present administration would be ousted in favor of one in line with the instantaneous desires of the mob. The source of error, the people themselves, would then be allowed to go on unknowingly destroying themselves until they were conquered by some better prepared state. In their poor judgment, this might even occur were the country to evolve into something along the lines of the previously mentioned principality or even aristocracy. Integrity in the heart of a prince is second to the command he exercises over his people. There is, in warfare, a great resemblance to the jurisdiction a prince commands. So much so that the laws a general uses to guide his men begin to blur with those used in a legislative sense, and the graceful movement practiced in battle are also applied by noteworthy princes. As an encompassing axiom, "Warfare is the Way (Tao) of deception" (Sun Tzu 168) and all those who wish to succeed under its ways are forced to observe this. Here Sun Tzu creates a direct correlation between the two subjects and implies that the duty of a valuable general and statesman both necessarily gravitate to the use of a more coercive nature. Some may take note of the fact that the ruler may not consistently participate in conflict around his lands or even in heated political debates over his legitimacy to rule. He is however, obliged to maintain the previously stated love and fear of his people if he is to be effective in his reign. In this way, the prince is bound to a conflict which will remain with him and serve as the counter-weight to his

Kaprelian 12 considerable authority over the rest of the state. In relation to the character of a prince, "something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity" (Machiavelli 58). This makes an argument against the strict moral code followed by some with power who afterward lose it and struggle to discern as to why. Machiavellis position here does not rob the prince of all virtue, but rather highlights the importance of an open mind free from traditional constraints which may impede on his sovereignty. For instance, old trade agreements could exist pertaining to open exchange with other countries and may have been very profitable decades ago, but if a ruler were elected who chose to continue rigidly with these laws, their potential inapplicability could be his undoing. Yet in response, Aristotle resolutely trusts in the fact that the one who is more virtuous should rule or be master (Aristotle 10). This more virtuous being, whether manifested under the collective reason of polity, or a prince whose will is aligned with Truth, may use the freedom he finds in Machiavellis words to choose a more idealized faith in virtue itself, or the equally difficult to maintain calculated use of virtue and vice. Ideally, a virtuous people would allow one wiser than they to be master of the state and in doing so, they would allow this superior the required level of authority to act with or against the immediate desires of others. He might advance the country toward more personal ambitions, but in keeping the very important love of his people, would be forced to act within certain bounds which preserve the security of the people, as well as a level of moderation within the prince himself. In reference to the attitude a prince should bear when presiding over his people, "a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty" (Machiavelli 61). In the previous scenario, the prince gained power from the people who trusted him as a part to advance the state

Kaprelian 13 as a whole. However, the fact remains that while the prince may act out of more selfish motives, the citizens also had him elected on the same principle. At this point, a virtuous ruler would take a step back and examine his political situation. If he advances without deliberation into a state of indifference toward the opinion of the people, there would quickly emerge factions within the state and plots to overthrow current rule. For the security of his country, a harmony of the citizens must be the foremost in the leaders mind and the means to achieve it may vary with the political disposition of the state. Machiavelli does not hesitate to allow the prince the power he deserves in that his power may extend to calculated cruelty against the nation should their resistance necessitate it. Aristotle comments on the validity of a slightly forceful unification in that a city-state consists of a multitude, as we have said before, and should be unified and made into a community by means of education (Aristotle 34). If a prince is to follow Aristotles advice, he would realize that aside from education of the masses being beneficial to standard of living and general virtue in nearly every aspect, the existence of a strong educational system would allow for a heightened communal capacity to tolerate seeming injustices and pose their concerns toward the state with more civilized mannerisms. Thus, a ruler with the interests of his state in mind may see a preventative measure against the wrath of a future uprising. Nevertheless, despite all his best efforts, the general people are many and the prince and his army are few, in the same way that the poor will inevitably outnumber the wealthy. As a result, education even will find its limits in dealing with the deranged passions of the common people. In response the prince must institute a failsafe to guard against the obviously less preferable alternative of anarchy. In a situation where the prince is faced with a decision to choose between the two possible measures for stability, "it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with" (Machiavelli 62).

Kaprelian 14 Should a misguided people choose that the decisions made in a state of utter confusion are superior to that of a more virtuous head of state, a prince must be prepared to shift the means of maintaining stability not only for his own welfare, but for that of the present population as well. Alternatively, the ruler may even decide for this to be the founding position of his nation and rely on the increased stability of a respectful fear of his people over a more benevolent outlook. Furthermore, great caution must also be given to avoid unrest amongst the people causing violence, "Thus combat between armies is advantageous; combat between masses is dangerous" (Sun Tzu 197). Sun Tzus implication of masses applies well to the present condition as it refers to a sort of undisciplined army. The most unfortunate circumstance in which a prince can find himself is a civil war. Should all previous measures taken have failed and the will of his people becomes immutable, it would become nigh impossible to reclaim former stability. At this point of his reign, the most a fading prince can hope for is that the standard of education he has set for the revolutionaries will save them from the internal bleeding of the state. These occurrences are rare, but examining the nature of a principality in its most dire state will enlighten future leaders with the power of foresight. In order to avoid making hasty decisions to be regretted later, a ruler must be wary For appetite is like a wild beast, and passion perverts rulers even when they are the best men. That is precisely why law is understanding without desire (Aristotle 97). Here, a prince is warned against allowing his human greed to direct the course of the state rather than what he knows to be Truth. A self-seeking nature is natural and even healthy in the earlier stated circumstance, but a prince whose sense of virtue is even slightly lesser will tempt the perversion and degradation of which Aristotle speaks. The laws established by the constitution of the state will help provide guidelines to those in authority which, if observed, will serve their purpose of returning the people to a state of internal

Kaprelian 15 efficiency. So, should the prince be tempted by these powers which lie outside of his rightful authority, he may find security in the observance of state regulations and the wisdom of those who drafted them. To compensate for the loss of popularity these actions could gain him, a prince should also "adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful" (Machiavelli 39). As a method of maintaining loyalty, Machiavellis advice may be successful, but the leader should be careful when creating a sense of dependency amongst the citizens in an effort to avoid the attitude turning into hopelessness. If the ruler has kept the love and fear of his people, in most of his ambitions his people will offer a backbone and legitimacy to his endeavors. In return for their loyalty, the leader follows the example of " [a general] who does not seek fame [...] but seeks only to preserve the people and / gain advantage for the ruler is the state's treasure" (Sun Tzu 115). Once a prince has established himself as an unequivocal power in the land, he solidifies his rule by studying his position in relation to the peoples' thoughts of him. If he does this well and consistently reconsiders the point, a prince may become more powerful through this knowledge than by any raw outward action. In maintaining his power, the people surrounding the prince can become very powerful tools in multiple ways, all the while viewing him as a sort of political celebrity. Despite his being the sole executive within the state, the prince cannot always operate well following only his own knowledge of the nature of Truth and the wellbeing of the people. As even the most virtuous of leaders will inevitably hold even a subconscious bias to sway them from a just way of thinking, a wise leader will appoint the wisest men he can find to be his advisors. These men will not only give him multiple worthwhile stances to consider, but they will also create a general reputation of remaining close to the people. This will benefit him

Kaprelian 16 not only domestically, but also give the state a more cultured and civilized appearance to those surrounding it. Machiavelli highlights the importance of this outward appearance by writing, "the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his undertaking, is by observing the men he has around him" (Machiavelli 86). This implies that one can not only judge the prince by his capacity to hold the love of his people, but also by his willingness to appoint and listen to the greatest of the states men. In doing so, this would also demonstrate a healthy desire to perfect his rule as a statesman. When these factors have been considered, the prince is left to a complete dominion over his people as all his borders are defended by his men in respectful fear, some with the hope of higher standing and profit in return for their loyalty. At this point, the prince has reached maximum efficiency with his given resources, and "Thus one who excels at employing the army leads them by / the hand as if they were only one man, so they cannot avoid it" (Sun Tzu 222). The leader now fully recognizes the nature of his people including their tolerance to his actions and their reaction to any stance he chooses to take. Once all these factors are known to him, the will of the people and of the prince can exist without conflict, allowing he who has greater authority to surpass opposition from external sources. As the sway of the prince begins to near perfection, in which there is an equilibrium in desires of people and government, "Thus the pinnacle of military deployment approaches the / formless. If it is formless, then even the deepest spy cannot discern / it or the wise make plans against it" (Sun Tzu 193). Formless as it applies to the army and state does not allude to leaderless inconstancy, rather Sun Tzus words speak of a delicate condition in which the nation as an entity becomes a unified will toward some end, for example: the will of the ruler. The fully matured state now advances with the highest authority and allows for no breach in synthesis of the people. The state and its constituents may pursue

Kaprelian 17 their interests under the security of knowing their own nature under a principle they identify only by their means of using it. Apart from disconnectedly studying the nature of statesmanship from the three criteria given by Aristotle, it may be even more valuable to observe its development within the state, whether this manifests under a change to the political doctrine of a nation, or the growth of a prince from the point of his election. After the establishment of a strong initial government with foundational laws, the people of the newly formed organization must choose an objective toward which to move, whether a republic or principality. The constitution of the state is built around this original decision and may, of course, be refined and even uprooted as the situation requires. The legislative power will fall upon statesmen to correctly interpret the desires of the people in line with the greater idea of an ideal state which exists only in Truth. Conflict between opposing states will naturally occur, and internal unrest may also be observed in the establishing of authority rule over citizens power and the prince should make these wars the first in all his thoughts concerning the nation. Eventually, the balance of power will begin to equalize under the guidance of virtuous supervision and a standard of equality will emerge, in which those who are equal by nature are not reduced, and those unequal are not raised above their capacity. One then begins to examine the nature of this prince more closely and notes the struggle between his thoughts of glory and the peoples resistance to overly demanding government. Aristotle comments that one cannot rule well without having been ruled (Aristotle 73), so even the ruler should know the state of the people and employ his wisdom in appointing well qualified advisors to allow for a more broad perspective on the numerous political questions he will face. The prince then finds his power in the love and fear of his people and works to come into unison with their spirit. The nation as a whole moves toward a higher, almost indefinable nature of

Kaprelian 18 formlessness, and in doing so makes itself protected from dissent both internally and externally. This becomes the process of the state coming to realize its own nature, and this cognizance is only possible when those tasked with the drafting of a constitution possess the necessary virtue to lead the state toward Truth.

Kaprelian 19 Bibliography 1. Aristotle. Politics. Trans. C.D.C Reeve. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998. Print. 2. Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Trans. W.K. Marriott. Simon & Brown, 2010. Print. 3. Thucydides. The Landmark Thucydides. Ed. Robert B. Strassler. New York: Free Press, 1996. Print. 4. Tzu, Sun. Art of War. Trans. Ralph D. Sawyer. New York: Basic Books, 1994. Print. 5. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Reason in History. Trans. Robert S. Hartman. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. Print.