Potomac Papers

Net Assessment
for
SecDef
Future Implications
from
Early Formulations
Dr. Phillip A. Karber
Vol. XIII No. 2
Wesley Cross, Editor
Editors Introduction
The Pentagons Ofce of Net Assessment was founded 40 years ago with the intent to
directly serve the Secretary of Defense in strategic areas where the Military Services and
lntelligence Community had dimculty in pulling together and integrating comparisons of
US and foreign military developments as well as identifying important long-term trends.
Under the leadership of Andrew W. Marshall, the only Director of the Omce over those
four decades, OSD/NA has been associated with a wide variety of research, long-range
planning and innovative strategic initiatives such as the Comparative Measurement of
Military Balances, the Competitive Strategy concept and the Revolution in Military Afairs
(RMAj.
Several times over the course of its life, the Ofce of Net Assessment has been
associated with controversy over its independence and organizational reporting. Recently
these issues have again been raised in a debate that refects more heat than light.
1
But,
in the words of former Defense omcial, Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
M0c| of t|e c0||ent d|sc0ss|on of t|e ofce |anges f|om t|e |moo|tant
o0t not c|0c|a| (oe|sona||ty and |nh0ence of |ts d||ecto|I to t|e oetty and
ootent|a||y m|s|ead|ng (w|at o|gan|zat|ons |ave |ece|ved cont|acts f|om
t|e ofceI. U|t|mate|y, |oweve|, t|e case fo| an Ofce of Net Assessment
|ests on t|e answe| to two q0est|ons:
Does t|e Sec|eta|y of Defense need an ofce to "|dent|fy o|oo|ems and
oooo|t0n|t|es t|at dese|ve t|e attent|on of sen|o| defense ofc|a|s"?
/f so, w|e|e s|o0|d |t oe |ocated?
2
1 Craig Whitlock, The Pentagon Master vs. the Budget Sequester," Washington Post, (17 Oct. 2013j: pp. A1, A16; and Craig
Whitlock, Pentagon Weighs Future of its lnscrutable Nonagenarian Futurist, Andrew W. Marshall," Washington Post, (27 Oct.
2013j, at < http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-weighs-future-of-its-inscrutable-nonagenarian-
futurist-andrew-marshall/2013/10/27/f9bda426-3cac-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html > [accessed 30 Oct. 2013|.
For a variety of views following the initial disclosure, see: Daniel Goure, OSD Errs ln Plan To Shutter Omce Of Net
Assessment," Lexington lnstitute, (14 Oct. 2013j at <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/osd-errs-in-plan-to-shutter-omce-of-
net-assessment?a=1&c=1171 > [accessed 18 Nov. 2013|; Marcus Weisgerber and John T. Bennett, Pentagon Determining
Fate of Revered Net Assessment Omce," Defense News, (15 Oct. 2013j, at < http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131015/
DEFREG02/310150031/ > [accessed 30 Oct. 2013|; Steven Metz, Strategic Horizons: With Small Cuts, U.S. Undermining lts
Ability to Think Big," World Politics Review, (23 Oct. 2013j, at < http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13323/strategic-
horizons-with-small-cuts-u-s-undermining-its-ability-to-think-big > [accessed 4 Nov. 2013|; Protect Net Assessment," [editorial
Commentary| Defense News, (28 Oct. 2013j: P. 66; Robert Bateman, The Omce We Really Need," Esquire, (1 Nov. 2013j, at <
http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/omce-of-net-assessment-cuts-110113 > [accessed 4 Nov. 2013|; Thomas M. Skypek,
ln Defense of Net Assessment," National lnterest, (16 Nov. 2013j, at < http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/defense-net-
assessment-9411 > [accessed 18 Nov. 2013|; James Jay Carafano, Obama Defunding the Pentagon's Net Assessment Brains,"
Washington Examiner, (17 Nov. 2013j at < http://washingtonexaminer.com/obama-defunding-the-pentagons-net-assessment-
brains/article/2539285 >, [accessed 18 Nov. 2013|; and Rueben F. Johnson, Hear No Evil: The Administration's Move to Silence
a Pentagon Strategist," Weekly Standard, vol. 19, No. 10, (18 Nov. 2013j at < http://www.weeklystandard.com/keyword/Omce-
of-Net-Assessment > [accessed 18 Nov. 2013|.
2 Tom Mahnken, ln Search of Strategic Foresight," Foreign Policy, (1 Nov. 2013j, at < http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/5630>
[accessed 5 Nov. 2013|.
The experience of the last forty years is certainly important in addressing those
questions, but the etiology of the concept of Net Assessment, the motives behind the
Omce's creation and persistence across many Administrations, as well as the original
structural argument that it should directly serve and report to the Secretary of Defense
are also relevant. To date, there is only one serious academic work that has addressed
the story behind the story - a paper prepared by Dr. Phillip Karber, then an Adjunct
Professor at Georgetown's lnstitute of lnternational Law & Politics and originally entitled
Net Assessment, Long-Range Planning & Strategy Development for the Secretary of
Defense: Early Formulations and Future lmplications." He presented it on the Early
Formations of Net Assessment" panel at the conference on Net Assessment: Past,
Present and Future?" held 28-29 March 2008 in Washington, DC.
Dr. Karber's background is directly relevant to this topic. ln 1974 he was recruited to
lead the National Security Council's mandated inter-agency Nat|ona| Sec0||ty St0dy
Memo|and0m 186 project comparing US and Soviet, NATO and Warsaw Pact General
Purpose Forces. Over the next ffteen years he authored a number of major net assessment
studies. ln 1981 he was asked by Caspar Weinberger to setup and lead the Strategic
Concepts Development Center and, in that position, directly report to the Secretary of
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as Strategy Advisor." Later, in conjunction
with US Ambassador to NATO, David Abshire, Karber organized and produced the frst
NATO Net Assessment" for the Alliance. He subsequently served as Corporate vice
President of the BDM Corporation and headed its Cente| fo| 7ec|no|ogy and P0o||c
Po||cy; was Chairman of the lnternational Terminal at Kennedy Airport in New York; and
currently is President of 7|e Potomac Fo0ndat|on.
Hopefully the publication of this Potomac Paper will encourage informed discussion
and constructive thought with respect to the need for and reporting chain of military
assessments, long-range planning, and strategy development.
Wesley Cross - Editor, Potomac Papers
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Why? and For Whom? i
1. Need for a National Net Assessment 1
2. Net Evaluation Subcommittee 13
3. Systems Analysis as Surrogate 31
4. Demise of Net Evaluation 41
5. Te 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel 57
6. Lairds Search for a Strategy Dialectic 67
7. Te Pentagon versus the NSC 75
8. Net Assessment Method and Process at NSC 81
9. National Net Assessments 91
10. Lessons Learned 97
WHY? AND FOR WHOM?
Strategy is the great Work of the Organization.
In Situations of life or death, it is the Way of survival or extinction.
Its study cannot be neglected.
Sun Tzu
1
Te conduct of Net Assessments for the Secretary of Defense originated in the early 1970s. During
this period the national security consensus had eroded in an expensive and frustrating military
intervention, a climate of economic pressure where military budgets were headed toward fscal
constraint prevailed, and new threats appeared on the horizon. Net Assessment was viewed then
by far-sighted leaders as a method of helping the US remain competitive in a changing security
environment. It is the thesis of this paper that Net Assessment for the Secretary of Defense is a
lesson from that earlier era, which remains relevant to today and should not be forgotten.
Te performance of Net Assessment is an explicitly defned job rquirement of the Secretary of
Defense and a statutory responsibility of the ofce. It is not discretionary, and the US Code is very
specifc in requiring that:
Te Secretary of Defense shall transmit to Congress each year a report that
contains a comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs
of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of
their potential adversaries.
2
1 These are the opening lines of Sun Tzu's classic, The Art of Strategy: A New Translation of Sun Tzu's Classic The Art of War,
(translated by R. L. Wing; New York, NY: Doubleday, 1988j, chpt. l, sec. 1. The Wing translation, which the author prefers -
including re-naming the work as the art of strategy" rather than the art of war" - is used throughout this paper.
2 US Secretary of Defense," US Code, (Title 31, Subtitle ll, Chapter 11, Section 113, (ij, 1; Washington, DC: US House of
Representatives, 2008j, at < http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode31/usc_sec_31_00001105--000-.html > at < http://
www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00000113--000-.html > [accessed 30 March 2008|. The constituting legal
authority for the Department of Defense specifes that the Comprehensive Net Assessment
A. lnclude a comparison of the defense capabilities and programs of the armed forces of the United States and its
allies with the armed forces of potential adversaries of the United States and allies of the United States;
B. lnclude an examination of the trends experienced in those capabilities and programs during the fve years
immediately preceding the year in which the report is transmitted and an examination of the expected trends in
those capabilities and programs during the period covered by the future-years defense program submitted to
Congress during that year pursuant to section 221 of this title;
C. lnclude a description of the means by which the Department of Defense will maintain the capability to
reconstitute or expand the defense capabilities and programs of the armed forces of the United States on short
notice to meet a resurgent or increased threat to the national security of the United States;
D. Refect, in the overall assessment and in the strategic and regional assessments, the defense capabilities and
programs of the armed forces of the United States specifed in the budget submitted to Congress under section
1105 of the title 31 in the year in which the report is submitted and in the fve-year defense program submitted in
such year; and,
E. ldentify the defciencies in the defense capabilities of the armed forces of the United States in such budget and
such fve-year defense program." Bold in text added.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
II
Tus, according to US law, Net Assessment is both a product of and agent for the Secretary of
Defense.
As the Clausewitzian personifcation of the one chosen to address strategic questions,
3
the
Secretary of Defense is the bridge
4
between the Presidential policy vision and the direction of
the Armed Forces in the their readiness to defend the nation against a variety of contingencies.
5

Tis dialectical
6
interface is normally called strategy development and, if asked, most Americans
would likely believe that having a dedicated organization assist the Secretary of Defense in pulling
together a comprehensive assessment of the US and its potential adversaries is not just common
sense,
7
but essential to getting an important task done, and building public confdence that it
is being done right.
8
Certainly the US Congress does; and they have repeatedly asked for net
assessments and even mandated them in Department of Defense legislation.
9
For nearly four decades the concept of net assessments applied to issues of international security
have been based on an intellectual approach that, at the highest level, is for the use of the
3 By strategic questions we mean those surrounding the Clausewitzian conception of strategy, which is the use of military
campaigns to obtain the political goals of the nation, but also those questions involving the peacetime problem of obtaining
nations goals by military competition short of war." Stephen Peter Rosen, Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept," in On Not
Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, edited by Andrew W.
Marshall, J. J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991j, p. 284.
4 Richard K. Betts, The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations," Joint Forces Quarterly, (Autumn/Winter 2001-02j,
pp. 23-30.
5 lt is commonplace to cite the Clausewitzian dictim of war as continuation of political activity by other [violent| means;" but too
little attention has been given to how political guidance interacts with, in fact links to, military contingency planning through the
use of long range planning and/or balance assessments as anticipatory feedback in adjusting both political ends and military
means, in a recursive and refective way. Clausewitz himself, makes a point of this, immediately before his classic defnition: lf
we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the
supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is tyrant. lt must adapt itself to the
chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the frst consideration. Policy, then, will
permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous infuence on them." Carl
von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976j, p. 87.
6 The dialectic in strategy is emphasized in: Andre Beufre, An lntroduction to Strategy, with Particular Reference to Problems of
Defense, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, (New York, NY: Praeger, 1965j, p. 22, defnes strategy as the
art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute." The dominance of the dialectic as a mode thought
and argument in Clausewitz is from Part ll, The Dialectic," in Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosophy of War, (Englewood
Clifs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985j, pp. 89-94. Also on this theme: Peter R. Moody, Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War,"
World Politics, vol. 31, (April 1979j; and Hew Strachan, Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War," in Clausewitz in the Twenty-
First Century, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herber-Rothe, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007j, pp. 14-44; and
Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, English edition
2007j, pp. 120-122.
7 For an interesting take on how everyday citizens think and reason about . strategy.." see: James DeNardo, The Amateur
Strategist: lntuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Arms Race, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1995j, pp. 1-17. The point is not that amateur intuitive common sense" is correct, but that when expert strategic intellectualizing
becomes widely disconnected from it, the danger of losing national consensus and thus support for sustaining the national
military strategy becomes problematic.
8 James Madison said that a 'popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue
to a Farce or a Tragedy, or perhaps both'. As a principal guarantor of US national security, the Department of Defense has a
special obligation to keep the nation informed." Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Foreword," to The Department of Defense:
Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, (Washington, DC: Historical Omce, Omce of the Secretary of
Defense, 1978j, p. iii.
9 Within the frst four years of Net Assessment at the Pentagon, Congressional interest was high and growing. Congressional
demand for net assessment will probably grow and become more oriented to balance assessments. At present there is
strong demand, but for presentational comparisons at the individual weapon level. DoD will have to organize itself to respond
efectively." A.W. Marshall, Future Directions for Net Assessment," (memo to Eugene Fubini; Washington, DC: OSD/NA, 28
February 1977j. The frst Net Assessment balance presentation to Congress was: Phillip A. Karber, Evolution of the Central
European Military Balance," in Western Europe in 1977: Security, Economic and Political lssues, (testimony of 14 June 1977 in
Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st Session; Washington, DC: Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on
lnternational Relations, House of Representatives, 1977j, pp. 2-16.
WHY? AND FOR WHOM?
III
Secretary of Defense.
10
But it has also taken on attributes that transcend an ofce in the Pentagon.
Te term intellectual movement fts any idea that procreates a dedicated following, is taught as
a serious cognitive enterprise in leading educational institutions, and broadens its appeal to other
applications. By this defnition, Net Assessment has become an intellectual movement, what
some might call a rhetoric of inquiry,
11
one that is noted for, and takes pride in, speaking truth
to power.
12
Te concept of Net Assessment has spread from the halls of the Pentagon to be used by
multinational alliances,
13
to the interest of potential competitors,
14
and, post 9/11, as a model for
other types of security related agencies.
15
It is now taught as policy methodology in some of the
nations (at least the Capitols) leading Security Study programs
16
with syllabi aiming to increase
10 Rosen, Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept," op cit., p. 290.
11 The phrase is from: H.W. Simons, Rhetoric of lnquiry as an lntellectual Movement." The Rhetorical Turn: lnvention and
Persuasion in the Conduct of lnquiry (Chicago, lL: University of Chicago Press, 1990j, 1- 33. ln situations of high uncertainty
or entropy, the rhetoric of inquiry" - contrary to a scientifc method - recognizes facts" as the beginning of analysis but not
necessarily dispositive in the judgments drawn.
12 We have tried to tell the truth to those in power." A.W. Marshall, Dinner Remarks," (conference on Net Assessment: Past,
Present and Future," (Washington, DC: CSBA, 28 March 2008j. The phrase originated with the pamphlet of Milton Mayer, Speak
Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to violence: A Study of lnternational Conflict, (Philadelphia, PA: American
Friends Service Committee, 1955j, where they proposed an alternative approach to the Cold War. Despite its counter-culture
association with views opposite those of the Pentagon, the phrase nonetheless captures and refects an important attribute of
Net Assessment - that it is NOT just a policy shop producing one more implementing rationale, but has a refective, even critical
role, to call the shots as they are seen, not as those in charge would necessarily wish them to be. Standing on that ground of
skeptical professionalism, with a fundamental commitment to strategic curiosity and intellectual honesty, is not an attribute
typically associated with military bureaucracies.
13 Amb. David M. Abshire and Phillip A. Karber, NATO Net Assessment," (testimony before full Committee, Hearings, 100th
Congress Daily Digest; Washington, DC: Committee on Armed Services, Senate, US Congress, 27 January, 1988j, pp. D23-D28.
14 Hai-Tung Lee, The Study of Net Assessment on National Defense Strategic Planning," (Thesis; Peking, CHl: EMBA, 2006j, at
< http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0713107-150521 > [accessed 4 March 2008|, gives the
following as an abstract: the objective of this research is to fnd out how to utilize Net Assessment to efectively develop the
national defense strategy and to sumciently elevate the integrated military capability for the demands in future wars."
15 For example: The Secretary should establish an Omce of Net Assessment (ONAj within the Department to provide the Secretary
with comprehensive analysis of future threats and US capabilities to meet those threats.." Homeland Security Advisory
Council, Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2007j:
Rather than focusing on current threats and responses, the primary role of the ONA would be to provide the Secretary with
comprehensive analysis of future threats and US capabilities to meet those threats. The ONA would fll the much-needed role of
producing long-term assessments and strategy, acting as a brain trust of creativity and imagination. ln order to accomplish this
tall order, the duties of ONA would include:
Studying existing threats in order to project their evolution into the future;
Studying trends in the weapons, technologies, modalities, and targets utilized by our adversaries (i.e., the events that
can transform the security landscapej;
Reviewing existing US. capabilities in order to identify gaps between current capabilities and the requirements of
tomorrow's threats;
Conducting war games and red team scenarios to introduce innovative thinking on possible future threats;
Assessing how terrorist groups/cells could operate around, and/or marginalize the efectiveness of, policies and
protective measures.
The ever-shifting and unpredictable security environment facing the US requires the constant questioning of assumptions, the
asking of what-ifs, and the thinking of the unthinkable. The ONA, on which this task falls, must take a comprehensive, multi-
disciplinary approach to its analysis, looking at the full range of factors which will alter and shape the security environment
of the future, including social, political, technological, economic, and other trends." See also: James Jay Carafano, Frank J.
Cillufo, Richard Weitz, and Jan Lane, Net Assessment 101" in Stopping Surprise Attacks: Thinking Smarter about Homeland
Security," (Backgrounder #2026; Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 23 April 2007j, who, learning from the Pentagon's
Pioneering work," recommend that the DHS Omce of Net Assessment be an independent omce that reports directly to both the
DHS Secretary and Deputy Secretary. The ONA's fundamental purpose is to pro vide strategic analysis to the department's most
senior leaders to keep them informed of global and domestic trends and evolving issues. This cannot happen unless the ONA
has direct access to senior leaders and can provide unfltered anal ysis and feedback."
16 Tom Ehrhard, Net Assessment," (syllabus; Washington, DC: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced lnternational Studies,
Johns Hopkins University, Spring 2008j, at < http://saisauth.nts.jhu.edu/academic_afairs/course_syllabi/spring2008/
strategicstudies/660.756_Ehrhard_Net%20Assessment.pdf > [accessed 1 March 2008|; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Net
PHILLIP A. KARBER
lv
your infuence in the real world through the development of superior strategic analytical thinking
with Net Assessment methods that you will be able to use immediately and upon graduation.
17

Not to mention acolytes who go by the name Jedi
18
and call the Pentagon Strategist
19
and their
mentor, Yoda.
20
All great intellectual movements worthy of the name have founding stories or creation myths.
Net Assessments parentage seems to have come from opposite directions. On the one side, the
canonical telling of net assessment origins has focused on the vision of Andy Marshall, his
RAND colleagues, and the internecine politics of the NSC.
21
On the other side, it can be argued
that the term net assessment was used before Marshall came into the government in the early
1970s.
22
Some types of net assessment were already being performed in the Pentagon
23
and, as he
himself has pointed out, the White House hosted a similar sounding role, during the Eisenhower
Administration, the NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NSEC) performed what was considered
to be the net assessment function at the national level.
24

Assessment and Planning for National Security," (PlBP 710-008; Arlington, vA: George Mason University, no datej, < policy.
gmu.edu/syllabi/2007_1/fles/PUBP710-008.pdf > [accessed 1 March 2008|; Thomas G. Mahnken, Net Assessment," (syllabus
660.756; Washington, DC: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced lnternational Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Spring 2006j; and
Barry D. Watts, Net Assessment and Strategic Planning," (SEST-515; Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2008j.
17 Ehrhard, Net Assessment," op cit., p. 1.
18 The Wizzard of Oz," article on blog SubRealism: Liminal Perspectives on Consensus Reality," 3 January 2008, at < http://
subrealism.blogspot.com/2008/01/wizard-of-oz.html > [accessed 10 January 2008|, claims that Marshall as the man
sometimes called Yoda or the Wizard of Oz, has lots of Jedi disciples and wizard apprentices whose publications are available in
the public domain."
19 George Lewis, Pentagon Defense Strategist Previews Future Warfare," (campus news; Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 11
June 2002j, at < http://www.uky.edu/PR/News/Archives/2002/July2002/AndyMarshall.htm > [accessed 20 Feb. 2008|.
20 Douglas McGray, The Marshall Plan," Wired, (February 2003j, at < www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.02/marshall.html >
[accessed 20 Feb. 2008|; from a critical perspective, Ken Silverstein, The Man from ONA," The Nation, (October 1999j, at <
http://www.thenation.com/doc/19991025/19991025silversteinside > [accessed 30 March 2008|; and, on the positive side: Jay
Winik, Secret Weapon," Washingtonian, vol. 34 (April 1999j, pp. 48f, describes him in reverential tones: the most infuential
man you've never heard of," a legend among the national security elite" and a key fgure, even the central fgure, in reshaping
America's military for the next century."
21 ln the 1960s Andrew Marshall, Herbert Goldhamer, James Schlesinger, and others at RAND Corporation began to develop the
conceptual framework and analytic tools needed to deal with these sorts of issues. ln the early 1970s such eforts led to the
creation of the discipline of net assessment that has been used in the Department of Defense ever since." George E. Pickett,
James G. Roche, and Barry D. Watts, Net Assessment: A Historical Review," in On Not Confusing Ourselves, op cit., p. 160.
22 Ehrhard, Net Assessment," op cit., p. 1. Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-look National Security Policy, 1953-61, (New York, NY:
Macmillan, 1996j, p. 130, notes that following the Killian report on the vulnerability of the US to a Soviet surprise attack, NSC
Directive 5511 of February 1955, established a net evaluation of the damage that would be anticipated in the initial stages of
nuclear war" produced by a sub-committee of the net evaluation sub-committee and chaired by Harold George, a retired US
Air Force General." And, William Burr, Nuclear History at the National Security Archive," (Washington, DC: National Security
Archive, 2008j, at < http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nuchis.html > [accessed 15 December 2007|, adds: Every year, from
the mid-1950s until 1964, the NESC presented the President and the National Security Council with a highly classifed report
assessing the net outcome of a US-Soviet strategic nuclear war."
23 ln the omce of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&Ej, the Net Technical Assessment staf that had
been established in the mid-1960s increased its analyses of the technologies and weapon systems of both the United States
and other nations. A Net Threat Assessment function was established in the Omce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
lntelligence in 1972." Pickett, Roche, and Watts, Net Assessment: A Historical Review," op cit., p. 167.
24 A.W. Marshall, Defnition of the National Net Assessment Process - The Nature and Scope of National Net Assessment,"
(Memorandum for the Record with cover letter to Col. Harold L. Hitch" Hitchens, HQ USAF; Washington, DC: National
Security Council memorandum, 26 March 1972j, notes with approval that the NESG reports were very comprehensive. For
an example of the quality of a Net Evaluation Subcommittee product such as Marshall described in his 1972 memo, see:
The Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union," (National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State
Records, Records of Policy Planning Council, 1963-64, box 280, fle War Aims;" Washington, DC: NSEC, 15 November 1963j
at < http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB31/index.html > [accessed 15 December 2007|. Earlier, however, he had
not been so complimentary: A.W. Marshall, Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture, Summary, Conclusions and
Recommendations," (submitted to Henry Kissinger and K. Wayne Smith; Washington, DC: National Security Council, 1970j,
pp. 2-3, where he had noted that: ln the past, there existed a subcommittee of the NSC that prepared net assessments. lt was
WHY? AND FOR WHOM?
v
Marshall has averred paternity for naming Net Assessment. I did not pick the name of the
ofce or the phrase to designate this particular form of analysis.
25
For serious students of national
security, the bragging rights as to who is the father? of an intellectual movement is not as
important as grounding the idea of Net Assessment as a serious analytical concept whose meaning
is neither uncertain nor institutionally illegitimate.
26
But as we look to the future, there is also a downside to this origins story that the
institutionalization of Net Assessment, which was originally intended to be a direct extension of
the Secretary of Defense, has not been formalized it remains fragilely and tenuously linked to
the longevity of one person. In part that is to the credit of the intellectual power of an individual
that did not need form to follow function in order to be infuential with no less than ten successive
Secretaries of Defense. But the fact that the original mandate remains unfulflled in part also
refects institutional friction where bureaucratic jealousies and the sheer pressure of day-to-day
events conspire to prevent the Secretary of Defense from exercising his role at chief strategist for
the nations defense.
Te kind of input needed for strategy development when facing a long-term rivalry with a hostile
major power is diferent than that for traditional multi-polar military contingency planning or
normal foreign relations. For a quarter of a century, the American National Security establishment
struggled to fnd a mechanism by which the senior leadership of the country could receive the
information necessary to formulate a national strategy that was not only viable in the short term,
but competitively sustainable over an enduring rivalry with another superpower.
27
Te term Net
Assessment as a process and method of thinking has evolved to represent the kind of foundational
material necessary for the implementation of a successful national military strategy in a long-
range competition.
28
However, it neither came quick nor easy and if not appreciated, the fames of
intellectual honesty and substantive depth can all to quickly be snufed out with party line and
political correctness.
While the term net assessment has been used to describe a variety of functions by a variety of
interpreters, to be of help in developing competitive national strategy it necessarily involved: not
merely intelligence gathering but the comparative evaluation of forces and military establishments;
not only the critical appraisal of fghting assets but the systems that produced, trained maintained
and sustained them; not just as a snapshot in time but a developmental stream combining past
trends with future projections; not as a single point bottom line but a process that involved
innovative approaches, heuristic thinking
29
and a willingness to provoke the kind of constructive
composed almost entirely of military omcers. An attempt was made to provide unbiased estimates, by assigning as its head a
three-star general on his last tour before retirement. Something better needs to be done in the future."
25 A.W. Marshall, The Character of Future Net Assessment," (memo; Washington, DC: OSD/NA, 10 July 1996j.
26 Nowhere in the relevant literature can one fnd a clear defnition of net assessment as that term might be applied to military
afairs." Rosen, Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept," op cit., p. 284.
27 The concept of an enduring rivalry" is one that has drawn increased interest from the disciplines of history, strategic studies,
and international relations, see for example: The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, edited by Paul F. Diehl, (Urbana, lL: University
of lllinois Press, 1998j.
28 By strategic questions we mean those surrounding the Clausewitzian conception of strategy, which is the use of military
campaigns to obtain the political goals of the nation, but also those questions involving the peacetime problem of obtaining
nations goals by military competition short of war." Stephen Peter Rosen, Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept," in On Not
Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, edited by Andrew W.
Marshall, J. J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991j: p. 284.
29 Strategizing is the application of heuristic frames to analyze the world and to generate normative evaluations of potential
avenues of implementation.. A good heuristic has four qualities: it is easy use, easy to communicate, provides a better direction
than ones currently employed, and motivates people who have to implement the strategy." Bruce Kogut and Nalin Kulatilaka,
PHILLIP A. KARBER
vl
debate that comes with challenging status quo assumptions.
30

Te many achievements of the Pentagons Ofce of Net Assessment over the last 40 years and
the contributions of its founder, Andrew Marshall, have been documented elsewhere,
31
but what
has not been addressed is what motivated it and why it was thought important to report directly to
the Secretary of Defense. It is the questions of WHY? and FOR WHOM? rather than WHAT?
or HOW? that are the focal points of this paper.
Strategy, Heuristics, and Real Options," in The Oxford Handbook of Strategy, edited by David O. Faulkner and Andrew
Campbell, (Oxford Handbooks; Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003j: pp. 908, 910.
30 Anthony D. Konecny, Net Assessment: An Examination of the Process," (MA Thesis; Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School,
December 1988j, provides a good descriptive summary: Net Assessment is a systematic method of analysis that fulflls the
need for an indirect decision support system and provides a major input to the strategic planning/management system in the
Department of Defense. Through an established process of appraising two or more competitors as objectively as humanly
possible, an analyst is guided to examine factors normally overlooked. Asymmetries that exist among competitors and the ability
of a competitor to achieve its objectives in various conficts are examples of some of these factors."
31 The most authoritative work, has been by those associated with the Omce of Net Assessment in the Pentagon, as staf and/
or contract researchers: Stephen Peter Rosen, Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept," in On Not Confusing Ourselves,
op cit; George E. Pickett, James G. Roche, and Barry D. Watts, Net Assessment: A Historical Review," in ibid; Paul Bracken,
Net Assessment: A Practical Guide," Parameters, (Spring 2006j; and Jefrey S. Mckitrick, Adding to a 'Net Assessment,"
Parameters, (Summer 2006j; Barry Watts, Scientifc Methods and Net Assessment," (conference paper; Washington, DC:
Conference on Net Assessment, 28 March 2008j; and Barry D. Watts, Against Method: Diagnostic Net Assessment (Uj,"
(Paper No. 6, Omce of Net Assessment lntellectual History Series; Washington, DC: OSD/NA, 22 July 2005j. The following
courses on Net Assessment are taught in Washington area Universities by former omce alumni: Andrew F. Krepinevich, Net
Assessment and Planning for National Security," (PlBP 710-008; Arlington, vA: George Mason University, no datej; Thomas G.
Mahnken, Net Assessment," (syllabus 660.756; Washington, DC: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced lnternational Studies, Johns
Hopkins University, Spring 2006j; and Barry D. Watts, Net Assessment and Strategic Planning," (SEST-515; Washington, DC:
Georgetown University, 2008j.
1
NEED FOR A
NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT
For senior statesmen and their advisers, the task of evaluating external security
threats and identifying strategic opportunities is a perennial challenge. Tis
process is an exercise familiar to all states and is the antecedent of efective national
strategy and policy. It requires signifcant intellectual efort, curiosity, creativity,
and a tolerance for uncertainty in the exploration of alternative futures. But this
task has vexed statesmen throughout history, who have frequently misperceived
the threats and behavior of their competitors.
1
From the founding of the Republic up to the late 1880s, the assessment of foreign threats,
2

anticipation of long-terms trends impacting on American security, and/or the development of
national strategy tended to be on an ad-hoc spur-of-the-moment basis. Te approach for addressing
potential US military operations against foreign opponents was neither institutionalized nor based
on any high-level, long-range, strategic planning, but just happened.
3
Te Spanish-American War
not only introduced the US to global force deployments but raised the need to consider confict
with other great powers outside the North American hemisphere; thus the frst Service ofces
dealing with problems of national strategy were formed.
4
1 Thomas M. Skypek, Evaluating Military Balances Through the Lens of Net Assessment: History and Application," Journal of
Military and Strategic Studies, vol.12, no. 2, (Winter 2010j: p. 1.
2 During the Civil War, the Union strategy was based on the Anaconda Plan" developed by Commanding General of the US Army,
Winfeld Scott. See: Timothy D. Johnson, Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
1998j: p. 226; also see Chapter on The anaconda Plan and Bull Run," in: John S. D. Eisenhower, Agent of Destiny: The Life and
Times of General Winfield Scott, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997j: p. 402, notes that Scott's plan came to be
known as the 'Anaconda' because it visualized squeezing the Confederacy like a giant snake." John F. Marszalek, Where Did
Winfeld Scott Find His Anaconda?" Lincoln Hearld, (Summer 1987j: pp. 77-81. Scott believed his strategy was abandoned after
the Battle of Bull Run and his resignation, but others have argued that Grant resurrected and enlarged it on a scale far beyond
what anyone at the beginning of the war would have dreamed." See: Charles P. Roland, An American lliad: The Story of the Civil
War, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 2nd edition 2004jj: p. 170.
3 Curtis H. O'Sullivan, Review: The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940," Air Power History, vol. 50, no. 4,
(2003j: p. 58.
4 Three institutions came into existence during this period that contributed to the prior-planning process: the Omce of Naval
lntelligence, the Naval War College, and the Army's Military lntelligence Division. lt is uncertain how McKinley used his cabinet
and senior military omcers in deciding on the global strategy of three corps-sized expeditions in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines. Following that war, four more institutions were created that strengthened the planning system: the Navy General
Board (1900j, Army War College (1901j, Army General Staf (1903j, and Joint Army and Navy Board (1903j. But the US had little
PHILLIP A. KARBER
2
For the frst half of the twentieth century, the United States had neither a strong tradition of
strategic assessment nor a coherent method of integrating it with long-range planning or strategy
development.
5
Te Army had borrowed the Prussian
6
applicatory system
7
which had been
developed for tactical training of feld grade ofcers.
8
Subsequently adopted by the US Navy
9
under
the better known rubric of Estimate of the Situation (EoS), it became the driving methodology
for War Plan Orange the dominant American theater strategy of the interwar period
10
and
was based on four reasoned elements:
Step 1: Statement of the Mission;
Step 2: Assessment of Enemy forces and intentions;
Step 3: Assessment of Own forces; and
Step 4: Evaluation of possible Courses of Action.
11
Tese elements were addressed in sequential steps from top to bottom that, despite the appearance
of inductively bringing external information into the process, nonetheless refected a linear
deductive reasoning process.
Tis deductive method was imbedded in US Army and Navy contingency and war planning
in the early twentieth century,
12
and the strategic estimate process became endemic to the
chance to infuence the grand strategy of World War l. Our Army ft into what the Allies were doing. Previously, the Navy had
started signifcant work on Plan Orange (especially after Japan's rise in 1904-1905j, but our sailors were generally relegated to
the unplanned and unsought missions of convoy escort, anti-submarine warfare, mine laying, Grand Fleet reinforcement, and
several operations ashore. After the Armistice, the Navy gladly returned to massaging and updating Orange, while the Army
centered its training on preparing for a rerun of the World War l American Expeditionary Force Plan Black (though l remember in
1932 an Army-wide rehearsal of Plan Crimson-another invasion of Canada!j." lbid.
5 For two very insightful and thoroughly researched works on this topic, see: Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning
for Global War: 1939-1940, (Annapolis MD: Naval lnstitute Press, 2003j; and Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The US Strategy
to Defeat Japan: 1897-1945, (Annapolis MD: Naval lnstitute Press, 2007j.
6 Jay Luvaas, lnfuence of German Wars on the United States," in On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and The
German Wars of Unification: 1861-1871, edited by Stig Forster and Jorg Nagler, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1997j, p. 605, citing: Capt. Eben Swift, The Lyceum at Fort Agawam," JMSlUS, issue 20, (1887j, pp. 236-277, he notes Swift
was responsible for introducing the applicatory system at Leavenworth." And Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War
- The European lnheritance, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1988j; and T. R. Brereton, Educating the US Army:
Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000j, pp. 59-64.
7 Col. William Balck, Tactics, vol. l, (translated by Walter Kruger; Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Cavalry Association, 1911j, pp.
10, considered General Julius von verdy du vernois, one of the demigods of Moltke's General Staf as the creator" of the
applicatory methods" which not only involved an appreciation of the situation but a critical appraisal of the successive
decisions involved. von verdy du vernois was also the inventor of the free style" type of wargaming known as Kriegspiele. See:
Julius von verdy du vernois, Studies in Troop-Leading, (London, UK: H. S. King & Co., 1972j.
8 The solution of practical problems in tactics, either on the map or on the terrain, constitutes what is known as the applicatory
method of instruction." P. S. Bond and M. J. McDonough, Technique of Modern Tactics: A Study of Troop Leading Methods in
the Operations of Detachments of All Arms, (for the US Cavalry Association; Menasha, Wl: George Banta Pub., 3rd edition 1914j,
p. 19.
9 Charles W. Cullen, From the Kreigsacademie to the Naval War College: The Military Planning Process," Naval War College
Review, vol. 23, (Janauary 1970j: pp. 6-18.
10 The last of which was: BG Sherman Miles, Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31,
1942," (memorandum for the Chief of Staf; Washington, DC: G-2, US Army, 5 December 1941j, at < http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/
timeline/411205amie.html > [accessed 1 April 2008|.
11 Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit., p. 16.
12 Col. Adolf Carlson, Joint US Army-Navy War Planning on the Eve of the First World War: lts Origins and lts Legacy,"
(monograph; Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies lnstitute, US Army War College, 16 February 1998j, p. 13, at < http://www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdmles/PUB351.pdf > [accessed 4 April 2008|: ln Aril 1904, in response to a recommendation
made by Army Chief of Staf Lieutenant General Adna R. Chafe, Secretary of War William Howard Taft directed the Joint Army
Navy Planning Board to 'agree upon a series of practical problems (Taking them in the order of their assumed importancej which
involve cooperation of the services, and for the execution of which in time of emergency the two stafs will be responsible'.
The Joint Board's solutions to these 'practical problems' would become war plans signed by the two service secretaries. This
was the frst joint deliberate planning system in American history." See also: Henry G. Gole, War Planning at the US Army War
NEED FOR A NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT
3
American Way of War.
13
As a method it demonstrated three positive aspects. First, it showed
sensitivity to the Clausewitzian primacy of the political with the national policy (mission) as
the starting point of strategic logic
14
and as defned by the Commander in Chief
15
or his Cabinet
level representatives the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.
16
Second, the emphasis
upon comparative assessments of relative force generation in a context that required national
mobilization
17
and trans-oceanic deployment became a staple of the planning.
18
Tird, the system
legitimized the brainstorming of innovative and relevant strategic concepts, including utilization
of the intellectual resources of the national War Colleges of the Army
19
and Navy,
20
as well as
debating alternative courses of action based on the comparative assessment.
21
On the other hand, the strategic estimate process as institutionalized in the American military
Services evidenced at least seven serious sins. Preeminent among them: political guidance was
generally a fction.
22
Few politicians were able to articulate the kind of clear guidance that mission-
driven planning required.
23
Moreover, once confronted with the derivative plans attempting to
College," (dissertation; Philadelphia, PA: Temple University, 1991j.
13 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, (Bloomington, lN: lndiana University Press, 1977, p. 172.
14 Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States," (Washington, DC: Army War College, Government Printing Omce,
1915j; and Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Omce, 1917j.
15 Howard White, Executive lnfluence in Determining Military Policy in the United States, (Urbana, lL: University of lllinois, 1925j.
16 The secretaries of war and the navy and their assistant secretaries rarely injected themselves into the planning work of
their uniformed subordinates. Their correspondence on the subject was sparse (although they may have communicated
verballyj. Between the world wars the service secretaries signed about half a dozen Orange Plans or major amendments. They
regarded war plans as national policy instruments available for the president's orders in a crisis. Occasionally they reorganized
procedures or nudged the planners to make revisions because of treaties or changes in the balance of power. Usually, however,
the planners presented themselves innovations for their endorsement." Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit., p. 12.
17 Harry B. Yoshpe, Bernard M. Baruch: Civilian Godfather of the Military M-Day Plan," Military Affairs, vol. 29, no. 1, (1965j: pp.
1-15; Albert A. Blum, Roosevelt, the M-Day Plans, and the Military-lndustrial Complex," Military Affairs, vol. 36, no. 2, (1972j:
pp. 44-46; and Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit., p. 13: For the Pacifc, Army Orange Plans consisted primarily of timetables
for mobilization and embarkation in support of navy-designed ofensives. The army also prepared narrow tactical plans for
defendeing the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal that were complete and workmanlike, but as to wide-angle strategy it
was reactive, not innovative."
18 For an early example, see Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States," op cit., p. 5.
19 ln 1920, the Army General Staf added a ffth (though unnumberedj division to G-1 through G-4-the War Plans Division. The
[Army| War College became an auxiliary think tank for that division." O'Sullivan, Review: The Road to Rainbow," op cit. p. 58.
20 Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit., p. 16, gives an interesting background to the development of war planning at the US Naval War
College in the beginning of the century: Many of them found war planning a congenial exercise of comparative analysis and
scholarly deduction. About 1910 the college's president Raymond P. Rodgers adopted the 'applicatory system', better know as
the 'Estimate of the Situation'. lt was thinking process recommended by his kinsman Captain William Ledyard Rodgers, who
learned it at the Army War College. 'A great white light broke on the service' when through this system plans were presented as
four reasoned elements.. The system was used by other naval entities long after the college left the planning scene in 1912."
21 Charles A. Beard, America Debates War Plans," Current History, vol. 42, (June 1935j: pp. 290-294.
22 During the 1930s the US had a range of color coded War Plans that were only replaced in 1939 by the Rainbow Plans." These
included 23 diferent colored plans for military activities against as many diferent countries. The major ones included: Britain -
Red; Germany - Black; France - White; Spain - Yellow; Japan - Orange; ltaly - Grey; Russia - Purple and/or Green; and China
- Safron and violet. Others were either part of a campaign with a major power or intervention, ln conjunction with Red: lreland
- Emerald; Canada - Crimson; lndia - Ruby; Australia - Scarlet and New Zealand - Garnet. As an adjunct to Orange: Defense
of China vs. Japan - Yellow. lnterventions: Central American Republic - Purple (note same color for Russiaj; French Caribbean
- Gold; lceland - lndigo; Portugal - Lemon; Spain - Olive; Tan - Cuba; Green - Mexico - Green (note confict same color for
Russiaj; Brazil - Citron; and China - violet.
Steven T. Ross, American War Plans: 1890-1939, (London, UK: Frank Cass, 2002j, p. 38.
23 Almost until the outbreak of World War ll the civil government paid scant attention to war planning. Strategy was the domain
of uniformed omcers who neither got nor expected guidance from their civilian masters. Such lack of coordination between the
military and the civil persisted even during the war. Other great powers had integrated their foreign and domestic policies with
military strategy, sensible behavior because a major war in Europe could threaten the very survival of nations. For the United
States the security of ocean moats, distrust of militarism, and a foreign policy based on assuring the sanctity of the Western
Hemisphere and the shunning of alliances all fostered civilian disinterest. Although planning was formalized as a US military
PHILLIP A. KARBER
4
implement his long-range strategy, the Commander in Chief:
Not infrequently ignored them;
24

Revised the objectives without realigning resources;
25

Gave them only cursory attention or endorsement;
26

Made changes that were incompatible with the existing plan;
27
and/or
Inhibited serious contingency planning for real threats.
28

Top down policy guidance for long-range military planning tended to come in sound bites from
the White House
29
and telegrammed reporting from the State Department, with policy and
strategy either so general or timidly narrow as to be useless demonstrating the link between
policy and strategy more in the breach than observance.
30
function a the start of the twentieth century, politicians usually either knew nothing about the war plans or maintained a discreet
pretense.." Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit., pp. 2, 10.
24 Woodrow Wilson was overtly hostile to war planners. He curtailed their work in 1913.." Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit., pp. 10,
22: Angered at plotting of steps for mobilization behind his back, he suspended the Joint Board from all war-planning activity."
25 Jefery A. Engle, Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007j, pp. 18-20, quoting Ed Cray, General of the Army: Soldier and Statesman, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton,
1990j, p. 166, notes that President Roosevelt overrode the national industrial mobilization plan as well as the advice of the
Secretary of War and the Army Chief of Staf in pledging that the US would produce ffty thousand planes a year for rearmament
of the Allies. This was an awesome fgure, demanding that an industry that had strained to produce two thousand planes during
the whole of 1939 now churn out more than four thousand a month. The total amount of aluminum ... exceeded America's entire
annual production.... Army Chief of Staf George Marshall, Roosevelt's most venerable military adviser, thought his commander's
goal a shortsighted folly given what he considered the country's more pressing needs.."
26 No Orange Plan was ever enacted by Congress or signed by a President; even in mid-1941 Franklin Roosevelt gave only o9ral
approval to Plan Rainbow Five, the fundamental policy guideline for World War ll. The secretaries of war and navy had signed
forma Orange Plans from 1924 onward; previously they were endorsed only by the senior military omcers responsible for
planning." Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit., Pp. 2, 10: The three Republican presidents of the 1920s were disinterested in war
plans and preparations. Governing during a time of Japanese passivity, they put their trust in treaties that restricted navies and
bases."
27 ln 1940, at the same time President Roosevelt made the decision for an Atlantic frst" strategy he deployed the Pacifca Fleet
forward to Pearl Harbor and reinforced the US presence in the Philippines even though he knew the former was provocative and
the latter could not be rescued in time. See: Chief of Naval Operations memo to the Secretary of the Navy, Plan Dog, November
12, 1940," in US War Plans: 1938-1945, edited by Steven T. Ross, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002j, pp. 55-66.
28 Even though the US had fought its most recent war against Germany and would fght another within twenty years, intense
domestic pressure emerged for the Army to halt when it became known that the Army was constructing a plan for a war with
Germany.. This may have encouraged the Army to focus on more speculative scenarios for planning purposes." United States
Color-coded War Plans," Wikipedia, 2008, at < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Color-coded_War_Plans > [accessed
11 February 2008|; and Ross, American War Plans: 1890-1939, op cit.
29 From the business strategy community, comes some real insight: A common view today is that the formulation of strategy
is easy, but the real issues and problems are those of implementation, and that the conventionally prescriptive approach to
strategy ignores the degree to which strategy in real businesses is emergent rather than directed.. We accept that this a
justifed critique of standard approaches to strategy, but that these approaches are themselves based on a misconception of
what strategy for a business really involves. Such criticisms are appropriately directed at a wish-driven view of strategy which
emphasizes leadership, visions, and missions. lf this is strategy, then it should be no surprise that formulation is easy and
implementation dimcult, and also unsurprising that such 'strategy' has limited impact on what operating businesses actually
do. Meaningful strategy is not a statement of corporate aspirations, but is rooted in the distinctive capabilities of the individual
frm. When strategy is emergent in this sense, the distinction between formulation and implementation becomes far less.. "
John Kay, Peter Mckiernan and David Faulkner, The History of Strategy and Some Thoughts about the Future," in The Oxford
Handbook of Strategy, edited by David O. Faulkner and Andrew Campbell, (Oxford Handbooks; Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2003j: pp. 27-28.
30 American war plans from 1890 to 1939 demonstrate the vital requirement for a close and continuous linkage of policy and
strategy. When such linage was weak or absent, war plans became divorced from reality and turned into mere exercises - an
annual ritual for staf omcers. When a linkage existed, war plans approached reality. The Joint Board had attempted to obtain
continuing advice from the State Department but it was not interested. The Board, therefore, had to devise war plans in a
political void. The planners were aware of the world around them and tried to make plans conform to reality. The Joint Board and
Joint Planning Committee often produced plans that conformed to the nation's policy, but the military organization frequently
devised plans, especially plans for a large-scale war, that had little to do with national policy or diplomatic reality. ln a negative
sense then, American war plans between 1890 and 1939 demonstrate the importance of continuous interactions between policy
and strategy." Ross, American War Plans: 1890-1939, op cit., p. 183.
NEED FOR A NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT
5
If politics had primacy, there were also secondary but serious problems within the military side
of the strategy development process particularly inconsistent and asymmetrical assumptions
buried in war plans not subject to civilian oversight or critical review. While balance assessment
was a critical link in the deductive chain between guidance and options, the bifurcated process of
G-2 evaluating the threat and G-3 appraising its own relative capabilities produced a dangerous
weakness in the process they were often neither truly comparative in the metrics they used nor
objective in diagnosing strengths and weaknesses of both sides.
31
Tird, where the German training
system had stressed initiative and imagination in developing alternatives, the American system
gravitated to a school solution that reduced rather than expanded the range of creative options
32

for example boiling everything down to a simplistic naval Maritime or army Continental
strategy
33
and cross service coordination was incomplete at best, and not infrequently
inconsistent.
34
Fourth, at the peak of the industrial revolution and at a time of epic technological
innovation, American national planning assumed that technology was something to be addressed
by Service armament bureaus rather than viewing new systems with radically new capabilities as
a form of strategic breakthrough.
35
Fifth, there was little systematic recognition of uncertainties,
36

31 ln his classic work, Balck, Tactics, vol. l, op cit., pp. 10, cautions that: One danger of using nothing but the applicatory method
must be noted. The instructor, as representative of a defnite theory, fnds it comparatively easy to select the conditions
governing a specifc case in such a way that the theory which he represents necessarily appears to be the correct one. This is
especially true when the director of an applicatory problem determines the action of the opposing side." Contrary to popular
perception, at least in the inter-war period, there were as many examples of best case" planning as there were threat hyping
worst case" salesmanship. Ross, American War Plans: 1890-1939, op cit., pp. 182-183, notes that in assessing contingencies
versus Japan, Joint Board planners did not take the imbalance of resources between Japan and the United States into account
and consequently planned a war that the United States could not lose and that Japan could not wage."
32 The weakness of the whole applicatory system of instruction lies in the fact that a textbook based upon it, although written by
a master hand, can portray only isolated examples, and that these, studied again and again, soon lose their value in the same
manner as a maneuver terrain that has become too well known. For, although we ordinarily fnd principles represented in a
connected form, this method of instruction can only convey them in a fragmentary manner in connection with the details of the
events described." Balck, Tactics, vol. l, op cit., pp. 10.
33 The American Navy tended to view future confict as a come as you are party" which put emphasis on their role as a force in
readiness" for Maritime defensive protection; while the small US Army required extended mobilization for Continental ofensive
projection. Frank E. Jordan, lll, A Strategic Approach to the Maritime - Continental Strategy Debate," (research paper;
Washington, DC: Naval War College, February 1987j, views the maritime-continental strategy debate as a confict between two
divergent approaches to national strategy development in terms of the strategic criteria of defnition of the strategic problem,
strategic purpose and approach, escalation control, and the strategic center of gravity. This competing Continental versus
Maritime framework was not untypical of island" countries, with Japan and Great Britain having similar inter-service planning
asymmetries. Michael l. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, (London, UK: Routledge, revised edition 2000j,
pp. 292-294, points out that England's Admiral Percy Corbett had attempted to reconcile them, but in doing so, recognized an
inherent incompatibility in their respective views on limitability."
34 The secretaries as well as the admirals and generals were often lax in informing their opposite numbers about departmental
plans." Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit., pp. 12-13, observes that Army planning was also inconsistent. Sometimes its viewpoint
harmonized with the navy's, sometimes it prodded the navy to adopt more aggressive programs, and sometimes it prescribed
caution. lts schizophrenia arose from the incompatible objectives of supporting the garrison of the Philippines and conserving
power for more vital interest in the Atlantic and eastern Pacifc.
35 Points made in: Stefan T. Possony, Tomorrow's War: lts Planning, Management and Cost, (London, UK: W. Hodge and
Co., 1938j; and Stefan T. Possony, Strategic Air Power: The Pattern of dynamic Security, (Washington, DC: lnfantry Journal
Press, 1949j; l. B. Holley, Jet Lag in the Army Air Corps," pp. 123-153, and Col. Alan L. Gropman, Air Force Planning and
the Technology Development Planning Process in the Post-World War ll Air Force - the First Decade (1945-1955j," in Military
Planning in the Twentieth Century, edited by LtCol. Harry R. Borowski, (Proceedings of the 11th Military History Symposium,
10-12 October 1984; Washington, DC: Omce of Air Force History, USAF, 1986j, p. 154, We found that before the end of World
War 11, the Air Force had acknowledged that advanced technology had become a key to victory, but we also discovered
(through reading omcial historiesj that there were dimculties in establishing the processes for developing technology, and, more
to the point, there was no formal nexus between the Headquarters Directorate of Plans and other Pentagon or feld technology
development organizations. We believe two devices-doctrine and long-range or strategic planning-might have unifed the
headquarters eforts, had they been in existence during the decade under review."
36 Arthur J. Alexander, The Linkage Between Technology, Doctrine, and Weapons lnnovation: Experimentation for Use, (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 1981j, pp 5, 12, notes that military bureaucracies often plan as though the world were certain, although that
is far from reality."
PHILLIP A. KARBER
6
treatment of entropy
37
or appreciation of an opponent that reacts to threat reaction.
38
Sixth, the
assumption that the process was linear and could be addressed in successive steps ignored the
iterative nature of most strategic problem solving where there is a constant interplay between
deduction and induction.
39
Lastly, because the whole planning system essentially involved scaling up to the theater level
what was basically a tactical approach, a number of issues unique to strategy either got left out or
were not addressed coherently. Tactical thinking does not include or tends to ignore disconnects
between ends and means,
40
key asymmetries between major rivals,
41
problems of prioritization
between diferent fronts,
42
the contribution of allies and alliance management,
43
or the manipulation
of strategic postures to induce inefcient resource expenditure by the opponent.
44
Strategy is not
just tactics writ large because the latter, focused on the immediate engagement with the opponent,
provide no coherent foundation for a long-range competitive approach trying to avoid direct
confict.
Strategy has long been recognized as a critical element in national security. Te Commander in
Chief has a prime responsibility in its articulation but this does not take place in a vacuum, and
37 Complicating the planners' mission of infuencing the programmers and budgeters is the enormous uncertainty in which
they must operate. Planners themselves, uncomfortable with attempts to see through the dense fog, fnd it easier to make
assumptions about the future than to live with ambiguity. Programmers and budgeters deal with a threat they see, and they
are uncomfortable with planners' assumptions in the face of uncertainty." Gropman, Air Force Planning and the Technology
Development Planning Process in the Post-World War ll Air Force," op cit., p. 159; and Merton J. Peck and Frederick M. Scherer,
Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis, (Boston, MA: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University, 1962j, pp 17-54, 581-582, note that there are substantial uncertainties permeating the
weapons acquisition process" and the dominant unknowns are internal uncertainties, which originate largely in the strategic
environment."
38 Gropman, Air Force Planning and the Technology Development Planning Process in the Post-World War ll Air Force," op cit.,
p. 159: The American military planner deals with an adversary who operates from a closed society, who is extremely stingy
about providing information, and who, most disconcertingly, reacts to planning initiatives. American military planners rely on
intelligence to tell them about the relevant future . thereafter, actions proposed by the American military planner to achieve
national objectives change the future with which planners thought they were dealing because . [the opponent's| actions are
responsive to American initiatives."
39 The two methods (the applicatory, or inductive, and the deductivej must be so supplemented that the lesson in tactics clearly
illustrates the purpose of and object of a tactical operation and allows of the attainment of a thorough knowledge of the means
necessary to gain that object." Balck, Tactics, vol. l, op cit., pp. 11.
40 Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, op cit., commenting on the US Army planning in the 1930s that there
is something surreal in a third-rate military thinking frst-rate global schemes."
41 A general theme in: Kent Roberts Greenfeld, American Strategy in World War ll: A Reconsideration, (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1963j.
42 On the issues of a two-front war and priorities between the Pacifc and the Atlantic, see: Samuel Eliot Morison, American
Contributions to the Strategy of World War ll, (two lectures; London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1958j.
43 A major point in Part ll Participation with Allies and Two-Front War," of Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global
War, op cit., pp. 39-80. See also: Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US
Strategy in World War ll, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000jj. Starting in 1934, the Army War College
always set its problems as wars fought in participation with Allies," and in most years, against coalitions of foes; but serious
US-Anglo staf talks did not begin until the London meeting of August 1940 and culminated with the ABC-1 Report of late March
1941 - an unrealistic plan that placed primary emphasis on bombing and blockade as a means of sapping Axis strength before a
fnal conventional assault.
44 The Pentagon planning we are dealing with is neither operation nor contingency planning, but it is force structure planning
- a term not defned in military dictionaries (in fact, planning itself as an activity is also not defnedj. For our purposes, force
structure planning means directing the building and putting in place the forces (and their supportj necessary to achieve
national security objectives in the future (which many be relatively near or distant but is never the presentj. Whereas operation
or contingency planning is largely a science *strategically allocating know forces to meet an expected or probable situationj,
force structure planning is an art because it deals with unlimited unknowns. Some operation planning has been done . in the
Pentagon, but the majority of the . planning has always been force structure planning. Given the length of the development
cycle, all force structure planning has long-range implications, but that is certainly not to say that force structure planning in
the era we are addressing was coherent, long-range planning." Gropman, Air Force Planning and the Technology Development
Planning Process in the Post-World War ll Air Force" op cit., p. 155.
NEED FOR A NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT
7
is frequently impacted by broader issues of foreign policy, Congressional funding and popular
support. When new threats arise and are recognized with plentiful resources, the discussion of
strategy tends to take back seat to issues of modernization and execution, but when enemies are
distant, small or multiple, the strategic choices that a country must make and the risks associated
with them take on renewed importance.
Te surprise at Pearl Harbor has tended to mask the abject failure on the eve of World War II of
American strategic assessment: both in substance and process.
45
Strategic change the rise of new
challengers under the pressure of receding resources has not infrequently been associated with a
Strategy Gap where the continuance of an old strategy may be irrelevant to a new environment
but a new plan may also have blind spots or be unrealistic on what is needed to implement it. Te
problem of strategic failure is not just one of embarrassment or expensive remediation; in a multi-
polar nuclear world a failed strategy can endanger the nation and imperil the survival of allies.
Although bad strategy is fairly evident after it fails, there has been little attention given to how
to diagnose it or prevent its consequences pro-actively.
46
Strategicide means death by failed strategy. It describes a situation where a plan of action
is a self-inficted wound on the organization that developed it.
47
Te term is a construction of
the Greek stratgos (commanders intent) and Latin caedere (to kill) and literally means a
leaders plan that is more deadly for its inventor than the opponent. In plain English, Strategicide
describes an institutional defeat where mistakes in systematic planning are endemic to the casual
chain of disaster.
Particularly stark in Americas pre-war misconception was a political strategy that encouraged
the forward deployment of US forces and their symbolic deterrent posture in the Philippines.
Tis indictment applies not only to the political leadership but the gross inadequacies in planning
by the uniformed military. In short, there was a fundamental breakdown in the joint planning
process within and between the institutionalized services, not to mention the upstart Air Corps.
48

For the US, like others hiding behind oceanic barriers, there was a real danger that, as Lord
Tedder once remarked about the tendency of strategists to draw conclusions from the later stages
of wars, when after some years of lavish expenditure; the Commander knows that he can more or
less count on a blank cheque.
49
One of the leading planners of the era, Vannevar Bush admitted:
We have done military planning of actual campaigns in time of war well, and we have done
military planning of a broad nature in time of peace exceedingly badly. Yet both have been done
largely by the same individuals.
Why the striking contrast? First, peacetime planning deals with facilities and techniques of
the future rather than the present. Second, the bond that holds men in unison under stress of war
becomes largely dissolved when peace returns. Tird, peacetime planning is done in a political
45 Steven Ross, American War Plans, 1941-1945: The Test of Battle, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997j.
46 Strategy books routinely look at successes and suggest how readers can emulate them. But no one looks as failures and lays
out methods for how not to emulate them." Paul B. Carroll and Chunka Mui, Billion Dollar Lessons: What You Can Learn from the
Most lnexcusable Business Failures, (New York, NY: Penguin, 2008j, p.2.
47 The phrase self-inficted wound" is from: Michel Robert, The New Strategic Thinking, (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2006j, p. 21.
48 See: James Gason, Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2000j.
49 W. N. Medlicott, Review: Grand Strategy," English Historical Review, vol. 74, no. 292, (1959j: p. 509, quoting General Arthur
Tedder, British Air Marshall.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
8
atmosphere.
50
Te danger of learning from the wrong end of a war is an important point, because, if the old
von Moltke dictim is true that no battle plan survives frst contact with the enemy,
51
then success,
even survival, in the initial period of war puts a premium on getting strategic assessment as right
as possible under conditions of uncertainty in the fog of peace.
52
As with most human phenomenon, the explanations for Americas Strategicide of the inter-war
period are complex and multi-variate, but fve key components particularly relevant to the modern
environment suggest fve hypotheses:
Tat the rise of a National challenger in a region where the stabilizing powers are
overcommitted and understrength puts a premium on depending upon political deterrence
that, because it increasingly looks like a con, not a commitment, was asymmetrically
perceived and actually gave an incentive for prevention rather than precaution.
Tat Depression Economics and the national mood of isolationism eviscerated the best
eforts of planning, and thus produced a charade at home and provocation abroad.
53
Tat multilateral Arms Control the strategic Naval Arms Limitations on Capital Ships
produced an environment where unilateral self-constraint was more pressing, in order
to save resources, than hanging tough to enforce opponent observance.
54
Tat the fog of peace
55
including a State Department led politicized strategy of symbolic
forward deployment for deterrent purposes and the need to appease Alliance politics
56

overrode and papered-over deep concerns in military planning about the disconnect
between capabilities and expectations.
Tat discontinuities in Military Service institutional interests and diferences in
interpretation of how to implement them (where the Army was gearing up for a long
50 This is not planning; it is a grab bag. lt will lead us to waste our substance. lt will lead to strife between services of a nature that
can destroy public confdence. lt will render us vulnerable to a hostile world.." vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men, A
Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1949j, pp 250-261.
51 Helmuth von Moltke the Elder," Wikiquote, 15 December 2007, at < http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Helmuth_von_Moltke_the_Elder
> [accessed 12 April 2008|.
52 For one of the few studies of this topic, see: The Fog of Peace and War Planning, edited by Talbot C. lmlay and Monica Dufy
Toft, (Taylor & Francis, 2005j. ln Toft's and lmlay's chapter on Strategic and Military Planning under the Fog of Peace," p. 1,
they note that prudence alone . dictates that states and their militaries plan for the possibility of interstate war. But if the task
of military planning is indispensable it is also fraught with an uncertainty rooted in three basic problems: that of identifying
friend and foe, that of understanding the nature of future war; and that of determining its timing." lmlay and Toft, conclude with
Seven Lessons Learned About the Fog of Peace," pp. 249-257, which include: 1. Efective war planning requires as many inputs
as possible; 2. Balance short-term and long-term perspectives in planning; 3. Hedge Your Bets in Terms of the development
of weapon systems; 4. The need for fexibility in identifying Friends and Foes; 5. Formal Allied planning requires efective
preparation; 6. Balance of power within an Alliance may undermine planning; and 7. Be fexible for efective military and strategic
planning." These seem obvious and simplistic, until one considers how much they are violated.
53 For example: Jonathon Marshall, To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Materials and the Origins of the Pacific War,
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995j; Haruo Tohmatsu and H.P. Willmott, A Gathering Darkness: The Coming of
War to the Far East and the Pacifc, 1921-1942, (Lanham, MD: SR Books, 2004j; and Edward S. Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy:
The US Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor, (Annapolis, MD: Naval lnstitute Press, 2007j.
54 Richard W. Fanning, Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry & Arms Control, 1922-1933, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky,
1995j; Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control between the Wars, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994j; and Robert Gordon Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval
Limitation between the Two World Wars, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990j.
55 The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic Planning under Uncertainty, edited by Talbot C. lmlay and Monica
Dufy Toft, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006j.
56 John Costello, Days of lnfamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill - the Shocking Truth Revealed, (New York, NY: Pocket Books,
1994j; Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and US Strategy ln World War ll,
(Raleigh, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2000j.
NEED FOR A NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT
9
forward deployed campaign in Europe and the Navy was trying to back out of exposed
forward vulnerability in the Pacifc) made realistic planning a farce.
57
None of this excuses Japanese culpability in starting an aggressive war, but the extent to which
Americans were shocked at the disastrous turn of events during the frst six months has much more
to do with a failure of a planning system that not only did not anticipate the danger, but actually
provoked preemption.
Large institutions do not like blank slate strategic planning, and the military even less its a
lot of efort that frequently goes to naught. In the words of one senior British military ofcer on
receiving request from the Foreign Ofce to participate in post-World War II strategic guidance:
I am afraid that it means more work for the Joint Planners, but I do not see how we can get out
of it.
58
But the military is even more uncomfortable operating in the absence of strategic intent.
Despite recognized defciencies in Services planning prior to World War II, the U.S. military
ended the confict without any clearer peacetime planning structure than it started with. In fact,
as of V-J Day the Joint Chiefs of Staf had received no specifc directive to continue to address
basic military problems jointly in peacetime as they had during the wartime years.
59
In 1945 Life Magazine declared in headlines: We are in a diferent league now. How large
the subject of security has grown, larger than a combined Army and Navy.
60
Despite a broad
recognition of the need for unifed military organization to replace the bi-service divide,
61
and
acceptance of greater peacetime civilian oversight as articulated by the Eberstadt Task Force on
57 This contrast between the Army and Navy is well documented and demonstrated in: Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning
for Global War, op cit. for the former, and Miller, War Plan Orange, op cit. for the latter.
58 Comment of General Sir Hastings lsmay, Chief of Staf Omcer to the Minister of Defense, on receiving request from the Foreign
Omce for post-war strategic guidance; quoted in Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war
Strategic Defence, 1942-1947," (London, UK: Sherwood Press, 1988j, p. 1.
59 This stemmed from a policy approved by the President in late 1943. ln November of that year, President Roosevelt had
instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staf to prepare a study for him indicating the general postwar air base requirements of the United
States around the world. They had assigned this task to the JSSC. During development of their report, the JSSC, in an unusual
action, had drafted what it termed a recommended Policy on Post-War Military Problems," completely unrelated to the air
base study. The JSSC appended this Recommended Policy" to its report and sent it forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staf along
with its recommendations for air bases. At their meeting on 15 November 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staf approved all the JSSC
recommendations and forwarded them, including the policy statement, to President Roosevelt who approved the entire package
on 23 November.
The operative portions of the statement of policy regarding the JCS role in postwar policymaking were contained in the frst
three paragraphs, as follows:
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staf should be represented in important groups concerned with post-war planning, as may be
necessary to insure that military considerations may be integrated with political and economic considerations.
2. The Post-war military problems should be studied as an integrated whole rather than as separate problems for the ground,
naval and air forces.
3. They must be examined from the points of view of national defense, of prospective international military commitments and
related national commercial interests. While in the last analysis national security must dominate, we must be prepared to
make concessions to the international organization.
Presidential approval of these statements, while not a specifc directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staf to engage in postwar
planning, was construed as authorizing them to do so. On this basis, the Joint Chiefs of Staf began the process of developing
military policy and strategy for the postwar period." James F. Schnable, The History of the Joint Chief of Staff: The Joint Chiefs
of Staff and National Policy: vol. l, 1945-1947, (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, lnc., 1979j: pp. 135-136.
60 Cited in David Jablonsky, The State of the National Security State," Parameters, (Winter 2002-2003j: p. 5.
61 Service rivalries for the budget were such that the Chiefs, even with a strong Chairman added, could not really develop a
coherent set of strategic plans.. Admiral Denfeld, who, as Chief of Naval operations, had been a member of the JCS, claimed
that 'on nine-tenths of the matters that come before them, the Joint Chiefs reach agreement among themselves. Normally the
only disputes are on strategic concepts, the size and composition of forces, and budget matters'. That, unfortunately, was the
point. On the critical 10 percent of their business, the Chiefs could not agree." Quoted in: William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara
Strategy, (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1964j, p. 19.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
10
National Security Organization,
62
it was not until passage of the National Security Act of 1947
that there was an attempt to articulate a National Security Strategy
63
and structure a competitive
assessment process to support it.
64
Te purpose of this legislation that created the frst integrated
National Military Establishment
65
was not just for efciency but to insure efective unifed
strategic direction of the combatant forces.
66
And along with strategy came recognition of the
need to assess the potential military power of the United States which was declared the frst
duty of the National Security Council.
for the purpose of more efectively coordinating the policies and functions of
the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security,
it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council
to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United
States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of
national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in
connection therewith.
67
Tus, the frst provision specifed for the Joint Chiefs of Staf in the 1947 National Security Act
was the mandate to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the armed
62 Report to the Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy by Ferdinand Eberstadt," Unification of the War and Navy
Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, (Washington, DC: US Senate, committee on Naval Afairs,
22 October 1945j: pp. 47-54. For an interesting perspective on how trusted friendships can produce both valuable critique
and complimentary impact in strategy development, see: Jefery M. Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security
Partnership, 1909-1949, (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1991j.
63 The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United
States.. and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:
1. The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United
States.
2. The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter
aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
3. The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power
of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1j.
4. The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States,
including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to
support the implementation of the national security strategy.
5. Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy
of the United States."
Annual National Security Strategy Report," National Security Act of 1947," (Washington, DC: US Congress, 26 July 1947j, Sec.
108, at < http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml > [accessed 1 April 2008|.
64 By mid-1947, they had approved a military policy, a strategic estimate, and a supporting strategy. The preparation of
implementing war plans had begun, albeit at a low level, and had continued within the JCS supporting structure. No approved
war plans emerged prior to 1948, but the Joint Chiefs of Staf, while not formally addressing the eforts of their planners, were
aware of their eforts and maintained a close interest in the planning going on." Schnable, The History of the Joint Chief of Staff,
op cit.
65 The breadth of the National Security act was remarkable. it not only created the NSc, it created a National Military
establishment (NMEj, a Central lntelligence Agency (ClAj, a National Security Resources Board (NSRBj, the Departments of
army, Navy, and air Force, a War council, a Joint chiefs of Staf (JCSj, a Munitions Board, and a Research and Development
Board. Many of these institutions, and others, became core components of the modern national security system." Cody M.
Brown, The National Security Council: A Legal History of the President's Most Powerful Advisers, (Washington, DC: Center for
the Study of the Presidency, 2008j: p. 5. See also: James S. Lay, Organizational History of the National Security Council during
the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, (Ann Arbor, Ml: University of Michigan Library, 1988j.
66 . to provide for the unifed strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unifed command, and for their
integration into an emcient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staf over the armed forces
nor an overall armed forces general staf." lbid., Sec. 2.
67 Title l - Coordination for National Security: National Security Council," lbid., Sec. 101(bj1.
NEED FOR A NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT
11
forces.
68

Despite its sweeping nature, the 1947 act did not, however, create a holistic enterprise;
69
civilian
participation in competitive strategy and oversight of contingency planning remained weak.
70

Its roots lay in the British Committee of Imperial Defense, a cabinet agency for coordinating
national security matters, but this arrangement was more suited to Cabinet than to presidential
government.
71
Te raising of the traditional Army staf system of G-2 Intelligence/G-3 Operations
system to a national level and for joint application made the process of strategy development both
rigid and turgid.
72
Tus, as early as 1949, what would be the frst of many reorganizations, argued
for broader civilian participation in the higher realms of strategy development:
Much has been written and said about the incapability of civilians to deal with military matters.
Military science, it is said, can be the province only of the military. Tat may be true on the
battlefeld: it is not true in the realm of grand strategy. Modern war cannot be left solely to the
generals.
73
Tis issue was compounded as the Secretary of Defense took on more and more responsibility
for grand strategy
74
that required understanding of strategic concepts as well as the ability to
critically evaluate them relative to other options in order to make prudent decisions on budgets,
force structure tradeofs, and major weapons system procurements, let alone issues of overseas
campaigns, alliance war planning, nuclear deterrence or considerations of negotiated arms control.
75
68 Major Changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staf: 1942-1969," Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs
of Staf, (23 January 1970j in Appendix A, Mechanisms for Change - Organizational History, to Report to the President and the
Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of
Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, (Washington, DC: Assistant Secretary of Defense, Administration, 9 February 1970j,
p. 196.
69 Brown, The National Security Council, op cit: p. 5.
70 Much of this is covered in the classic: Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics,
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1961j.
71 Stanley L. Falk, The National Security Council under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 79, no.
3, (September 1964j: pp. 403-434.
72 For a useful description and history of this planning approach, see: Walter S. Poole, The Evolution of the Joint Strategic Planning
System, 1947-1989, (Special Historical Study; Washington, DC: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staf, 1989j.
73 National Security Organization: A Report with Recommendations, (prepared for the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Brand of the Government by the Committee on the National Security Organization; Washington, DC: GPO, January
1949j, p. 57.
74 Defned as concerned both with purely military strategy and with politics and diplomacy; also, it should be added, with a wide
range of civilian and economic activities from food supply and manpower to shipping and blockade."
75 For a useful summary of this overload, see: Charles A. Stevenson, SECDEF: The Nearly lmpossible Job of Secretary of Defense,
(Dulles, vA: Potomac Books, 2006j. For detailed institutional histories, see: Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, vol. 1, The Formative Years, 1947-1950, (Washington, DC: Historical Omce, Omce of the Secretary of
Defense, GPO, 1984j; Doris M. Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 1, The Test of War, 1950-1953,
(Washington, DC: Historical Omce, Omce of the Secretary of Defense, GPO, 1988j; Richard M. Leighton, History of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, vol. 3, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956, (Washington, DC: Historical Omce, Omce of
the Secretary of Defense, GPO, 2002j; Robert J. Watson, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 4, lnto the Missile
Age, 1956-1960, (Washington, DC: Historical Omce, Omce of the Secretary of Defense, GPO, 1997j; Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald
D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 5, The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965,
(Washington, DC: Historical Omce, Omce of the Secretary of Defense, GPO, 2006j; and Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg,
The Department of Defense, 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders, (Washington, DC: Historical Omce, Omce of the Secretary of
Defense, 1997j.
2
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
Te group involved was called the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council.
And it was a quite interesting group, because it had been established during Eisenhowers time to
do reviews of the results of a thermonuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Te net assessment, in other words, was what happens to each country in the event of that kind of
a war.
1
Te creation of the absolute weapon changed both the nature of war and the role of civilians.
2

In the conventional era military leaders could treat the initial period of war as indeterminate,
buying time to convert peacetime resources into a mass instrument of an intra-war strategy
designed to meet and defeat the opposing forces. But, in the nuclear age three millennia of
recorded military art was turned upside down the early strikes were likely to be decisive, with
the national mobilization base could be destroyed before most military assets were ever deployed,
and the destruction of opposing forces was secondary to the slaughter of the society that they were
to protect. Strategy came to mean a plan of enforced inaction and indecision what some called
the end of strategy
3
a nuance as strange to traditional military thinking as it was important to
civilian leaders and therefore imperative for their intervention both on the decision to use nuclear
weapons and in the planning process to prevent being confronted with that contingency.
4
It has become accepted wisdom that the nuclear age introduced and legitimized the rise of non-
military strategists and with them a new era of methodological innovation in forecasting and
assessment beyond traditional military planning. But for the frst post-war decade civilian grand
strategists were few, their impact ephemeral, with little evidence of a coherent strategy process.
Te newly formed Department of Defense had trouble grappling with service integration and
its own role in adjudicating resource allocation vice operational requirements. Te Joint Chiefs
1 Charles Stuart Kennedy, lnterview with James E. Goodby," (The Foreign Afairs Oral History Collection; Arlinton, vA: The
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 10 December 1990j at < http://memory.loc.gov/master/mss/mssmisc/
mfdip/2004/2004goo04.sgm > [accessed 1 July 2010|.
2 The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, edited by Bernard Brodie, (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company,
1946j.
3 Bernard Brodie, Strategy Hits a Dead End," Harper's, num. 209, (October 1955j, pp. 33-37: There is a stark simplicity about
an unrestricted nuclear war that almost enables it to be summed up in one short sentence: Be quick on the draw and the trigger
squeeze, and aim for the heart. One then has to add: but even if you shoot frst, you will probably die too.. This brings us a long
way from the subtleties of a Clausewitz, Jomini, or a Mahan.. lt brings us, in short, to the end of strategy as we have known it."
4 Steven Ross, American War Plans, 1945-1950, (New York, NY: Garland, 1988j; and David Kaiser, US Objectives and Plans for
War with the Soviet Union, 1946-54," in The Fog of Peace and War Planning, op cit., pp. 205-223.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
14
created a structure to go through the motions of strategy development
5
but this represented more
of a political forum for internecine battle and budgetary bargaining than a unifed vision of to
how address the Soviet Union as a rising challenger.
6
Various luminary committees addressed
pieces of the nuclear problem, but produced more controversy than consensus. Te one civilian
led efort at integrated assessment, long-range planning, and strategy articulation NSC 68 was
frst sidelined as too ambitious, then in less than six months, with the outbreak of war in Korea,
superseded as insufcient.
7
As the nuclear era evolved into second-generation technology jet bombers, hydrogen bombs,
ballistic missiles, SAMs, and tactical nuclear warheads it brought with it increased appreciation
of the need for netting a much more complex balance: the interaction of very asymmetric ofense
and defense weaponry; the gray area overlap of nuclear and conventional forces represented by
dual capable systems; and the potential of damage limiting counter-force preemption versus
apocalyptic counter-value targeting. Tus, in the late stages of the Truman Administration, with
the Korean War dragging on and with growing concern of Soviet military buildup, including their
development of atomic weapons, the National Security Council sought a comparative analysis of
the emerging ofensive threat relative to American defenses. On 31 August 1951 the NSC directed
that:
the Director of Central Intelligence prepare, in collaboration with the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference (IIC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staf (JCS), a summary
evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the Continental United
States, as of mid-1952.
8
Te title of the NSC Directive clearly indicated its need: A Project to Provide a More Adequate
Basis for Planning for the Security of the United States.
9
Te intelligence side of the studies
were completed in October of 1951 and distributed but the JCS report was not fnished until
1952, and because of the sensitive nature of the JCS study, it was not distributed outside the JCS
organization and members of the working group which drafted the summary evaluation were
5 Poole, The Evolution of the Joint Strategic Planning System, 1947-1989, op cit.
6 Through the Korean War, the JCS stressed emergency war planning, although eforts were made to institutionalize mid- and
long-range planning as well. ln the summer of 1952, the Joint Chiefs authorized creation of a new 'family' of war plans: the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCPj designed to govern the wartime operations of US forces-in-being during the current fscal
year; the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOPj which established force and mobilization requirements for the next three to
fve years or longer as a guide to research and development. These plans were supposed to be completed annually, but the
two were often delayed by interservice debates and appeared somewhat more irregularly. ln the 1950s, the JSOP became
increasingly a 'wish list' rather than a realistic estimate of requirements. Nevertheless these three eforts provided a permanent
structure for organizing strategic planning into the 1970s. The JSCP and the operational plans it guided, including the SAC
Emergency War Plan, were generally prepared on an annual basis. They fostered a process of intensive interservice debate
and analysis which, in the absence of real global confict, served as a kind of a 'surrogate war' for generating and testing forces
concepts. Each new planning efort built on the tradeofs and compromises endorsed by the preceding 'war', thereby creating
a dynamic which tended to discourage radical changes." David Alan Rosenberg, The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and
American Strategy, 1945-1960," lnternational Security, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983j: pp. 25-26.
7 NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment: with Analyses by Paul H. Nitze, edited by S. Nelson Drew, (Washington, DC:
National Defense University, 1994j; American Cold War Strategy: lnterpreting NSC 68, edited by Ernest R. May, (Boston, MA:
Beford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1993j; Samuel F. Wells, Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," (monograph;
Washington, DC: lnternational Security Studies Program, Wilson Center, 1979j.
8 Walter B. Smith, Memorandum From Director of Central lntelligence to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Layj," (14 October 1952j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955 The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document
131, pp. 341-350.
9 lbid, Tab A.
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
15
briefed orally on its contents.
10
While there was recognition that the summary evaluation represents a step forward in planning
for the security of the United States and it was hailed as an an example of the caliber of work
currently to be expected, it was also criticized as a study that falls far short of supplying the
estimates essential to security planning
11
in several important areas.
12
Tere were also identifed
structural problems three primary reasons why the work failed to meet the NSC requirement:
We lack knowledge of Soviet plans and intentions and our knowledge of Soviet
capabilities cannot be considered complete.
Te basic underlying studies required to produce the statement mentioned in
paragraph 3-a do not exist.
Tere is at present no machinery to plan, guide, coordinate and produce an appraisal
or estimate based on the integration of national intelligence with military, political
and economic operational data dealing with our own capabilities.
13
Senior Staf recommendations from the NSC and CIA
14
to correct these defciencies and continue
the efort met serious opposition by the JCS who just submitted to the Secretary of Defense a
lengthy memorandum on the subject arguing that no additional machinery is needed to produce
Commanders Estimates, the JCS being the agency responsible for and capable of producing such
estimates.
15

Tis sparked a serious debate on the very nature of how red and blue information is aggregated,
assessed, and converted into the kind of input necessary for long-term strategy development. In the
subsequent NSC debate on this issue, President Truman pushed General Smith, Director of the
CIA, to address the JCS complaint and make the case for a net approach:
Te Joint Chiefs, said General Smith, do not believe that the production of such
estimates requires the creation of any new machinery. With this view General
Smith said he could not agree, but added that if the present evaluation actually
met all the requirements of the President and the Council there was, of course,
nothing more to be done.
10 The lAC study was published on October 23, 1951 as Special Estimate 14, Soviet Capabilities for a Military Attack on the
United States before July 1952."3 The llC study dated October 10, 1951, and the lClS study of May 15, 1952." lbid.
11 These shortfalls included the following critiques:
An evaluation of the USSR's capability to injure the United States should contain a plain statement of the estimated
percentage of reduction in US capabilities likely to result from Soviet attack; specifcally, percentage reduction in the
felds of: US military strength in being, atomic counterattack capability, industrial production, and ability to produce
new weapons of critical importance.
To provide guidance in current planning for US security, evaluations on this subject should be projected into the
future and contain an estimate of prospective developments in USSR's ofensive capabilities.
A more adequate and realistic evaluation would cover the probable Soviet capabilities to injure US facilities and
strengths in all parts of the world, and not merely the capability of USSR to injure the Continental United States. Such
an evaluation should include some estimate of Soviet intentions in the light of net capabilities.
lbid.
12 lbid.
13 lbid.
14 Enclosure A: Senior Staf Recommendations for NSC Action," to Robert Amory, Jr., Memorandum From the Acting Deputy
Director for lntelligence of the Central lntelligence Agency to Director of Central lntelligence Smith," (25 November 1952j, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 137, pp. 366-368.
15 Amory, Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for lntelligence of the Central lntelligence Agency to Director of Central
lntelligence Smith," ibid.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
16
General Smith then noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staf did not believe that the
Director of Central Intelligence was the appropriate ofcial to prepare Commanders
Estimates. With this view General Smith found himself in agreement, but he
went on to say that he did not think that the Joint Chiefs of Staf were, themselves,
the appropriate body to prepare the kind of estimate which the President and the
Council required. Te data which must be amassed to provide the kind of report
that was required would by no means be purely military data. Tose agencies of the
Government which were concerned with passive defense, civilian defense, sabotage
and the like, were also directly or indirectly involved in the preparation of such
estimates. Plainly, he continued, the problem was too large and too complicated
for any one Government agency to solve by itself. It seemed obvious to General
Smith that the National Security Council alone was the proper agency to guide
and coordinate such studies. Obviously it could not do this directly, but it could
do so by calling on the instrumentalities available to it. With all deference to the
Joint Chiefs of Staf, concluded General Smith, the problem which concerned the
Council transcends the purely military sphere, although General Smith conceded
that it might well be possible, as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staf, to have that
body monitor such a study provided the National Security Council was assured
that the Joint Chiefs of Staf would make use, in its preparation, of the resources
of all the Government agencies which were required.
16
While others chimed in, at the Presidents request, it was General Omar Bradley, JCS Chairman,
who explained the service position:
General Bradley stated that he did not difer fundamentally with the views
expressed by General Smith. On the whole he was inclined to believe that the
NSC Staf was the group best ftted to undertake studies such as these in the
future. No single agency could do such studies and no single agency should try. As
to the furnishing of information on United States capabilities and possible courses
of action in the military feld, General Bradley emphasized that the Joint Chiefs
were wholly in favor of the need to know rule on sensitive material. Within this
reservation, however, the Chiefs were prepared to reveal whatever was necessary
for the preparation of such studies. In point of fact, there were too many people
who were curious about our war plans and had no legitimate interest in them.
General Bradley promised that the Joint Chiefs would do anything in their power
in order to achieve the kind of estimate needed, but would only monitor the efort
as a last resort.
17
With the Presidential election and imminent change of Administrations, it would have been easy
and expected if the issue had been allowed to slide forward to the next watch, but Truman felt
strongly enough about the issue that one of the last acts of his White House tenure was to set
up an ad hoc Special Evaluation Subcommittee
18
to provide the future President and his senior
16 Memorandum for President Truman of Discussion at the 126th Meeting of the National Security Council," (26 November 1952j,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 138, pp. 369-374.
17 lbid.
18 On August 30, 1951, the Council directed that the Director of Central lntelligence, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of
Staf (JCSj, the lnterdepartmental Committee on lnternal Security (lClSj, and the lnterdepartmental lntelligence Conference
(llCj, prepare a summary evaluation, covering Soviet net capability against the continental United States as of mid-1952.4 After
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
17
leadership with a comparative assessment of the relative nuclear balance between the US and the
Soviet Union.
19
It is in this context that the origins of net assessment within the United States government
can be traced to the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
20
As an experienced
practitioner of old-school theater campaigning and the frst Commander-in-Chief facing the
imminent vulnerability of American civilization, Eisenhower realized that nuclear war was too
important to be left to traditional planning.
21
Intercontinental delivery systems and multi-megaton
warheads brought the prospect of decisive surprise attack to the forefront of security demands for
immediate decision-making where there would be no time for consideration of unexplored and
unprepared options:
the problem of the total decision. no executive can undertake the
responsibility for altering the face of our world unless he has strategic and tactical
information of the highest reliability.
22
With little or no time to make new plans, the strategic nuclear era introduced the come as you
are war, and total decision brought with it with it the need for anticipatory crisis management,
the pre-consideration of a wide-range of strike options and laying the groundwork for post-war
recovery ahead of time.
Rather than relying on the joint military planning system that he knew well, Eisenhower
looked to a fne group of fellows from the scientifc and business community to address issue
of revolutionary technologically and long-term competitive posturing.
23
Military aid Andrew
Goodpaster described the Presidents style:
He wanted to get, as we came later to express it, all of the responsible people in the
room, take up the issue, and hear their views. If somebody didnt agree, he was
obliged to speak his mind and get it all out on the table or in the Oval Ofce; and
then in light of all that, the President would come to a line of action, he wanted
everybody to hear it, everybody to participate in it, and then wanted everybody to
be guided by it.
24
considerable delay and dimculty, such an evaluation was submitted to the Council on October 14, 1952, with an accompanying
memorandum by the then Director pointing out shortcomings of the report and recommending that he, DCl, be directed
to examine into the creation of new and better machinery to integrate operational data with intelligence in this feld.5 On
November 25, 1952, the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Council the views of the JCS on the question,6 and there ensued
negotiations in which JCS, ClA, lClS, and llC participated and which eventuated in the directive set forth as NSC 140, approved
by the President on January 19, 1953." Preparation of Coordinated Evaluation of the Net Capabilities of the USSR to lnfict
direct lnjury on the United States," (25 March 1954j, paper prepared in the Central lntelligence Agency, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 173, pp. 481-487.
19 James S. Lay, Jr., Directive for a Special Evaluation Subcommittee," National Security Council Report no. 00312 (19 January
1953j; at (Washington, DC: The Digital National Security Archive, accessed 14 March 2010j.
20 Skypek, Evaluating Military Balances Through the Lens of Net Assessment," op cit: p. 10, ignores the predecessor activity in
the Truman Administration and acts as if it started in the Eisenhower Presidency. l believe this is misleading on two grounds:
frst, it misses the Truman paternity for the Special Evaluation Subcomittee; and second, it does not give credit to Eisenhower for
not aborting it.
21 For an insightful perspective, see: Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, (Lexington, KY: University
of Kentucky Press, 1977j.
22 Technological Capabilities Panel, set up by Eisenhower in July 1954 to study how science and technology might be harnessed to
guard against surprise attack Killian Report" observed:
23 valerie L. Adams, Eisenhower's Fine Group of Fellows: Crafting a National Security Policy to Uphold the Great Equation,
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006j.
24 General Andrew J. Goodpaster, ibid: pp. 1-2. See also: Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, The Eisenhower Administration Project,
PHILLIP A. KARBER
18
As Commander-in-Chief, he ultimately drew on this own net appreciation of the various inputs
for strategy development, but behind these considerations were detailed comparative assessments
that served as the basis for desiderata.
While the new Administration was at pains to diferentiate themselves from their predecessors, on
this issue President Eisenhowers National Security Council adopted continuity rather than change
for change sake.
25
Tus, as approved by Truman, the ad hoc Special Evaluation Subcommittee
(SEC) operated under the aegis of the NSC with an interagency membership that included the Joint
Chiefs of Staf, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
(IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). Using an interagency
staf temporarily assigned for just four months, the SEC was located in the Pentagon and chaired
by a direct Presidential appointee, Lt. General Idwal H. Edwards, USAF (Ret.)who was in fact
nominated by the Joint Chiefs of Staf under a gentlemens agreement with General Smith.
26

Te initial efort was tasked to evaluate Soviet capabilities to infict direct injury on the United
States up to July 1955
27
and was chaired by Lt. General Idwal Edwards,
28
with representatives
from the above agencies and a small but full-time active military staf.
29
Studying the initial phase of war, or when it was assumed the Soviets atomic or
nuclear stockpile was likely to be unleashed, the Committee utilized reports from
each of the agencies represented by its members and had full access to relevant
classifed reports.
30
Te Edwards committee reported its conclusions to the NSC on 18 May 1953 with considerable
emphasis on the danger of surprise attack and warning that deployment of multi-megaton
edited by Dillon Anderson, (oral history collection; New York, NY: Columbia University, 1977j.
25 When General Smith's recommendations were forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staf for comment,
the JCS responded by a sharply critical memorandum, dated November 21, 1952.7 There ensued negotiations, which were
limited to the terms of reference and procedure for a new study, but which also gave an opportunity for General Smith to
clarify his ideas to the Joint Chiefs of Staf on the overall problem. ln the light of the change of administrations then in process
it was fnally decided to let the overall recommendation (subparagraph c. quoted abovej lie over, while proceeding with a new
net evaluation" on the basis of an entirely novel procedure." The 'Net Estimates' Problem," paper prepared by the Central
lntelligence Agency, (25 August 1954j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955,
Document 189, pp. 523-530.
26 When General Smith's recommendations were forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staf for comment,
the JCS responded by a sharply critical memorandum, dated November 21, 1952.7 There ensued negotiations, which were
limited to the terms of reference and procedure for a new study, but which also gave an opportunity for General Smith to clarify
his ideas to the Joint Chiefs of Staf on the overall problem. ln the light of the change of administrations then in process it was
fnally decided to let the overall recommendation (subparagraph c. quoted abovej lie over, while proceeding with a new net
evaluation" on the basis of an entirely novel procedure. This procedure, embodied in NSC 140,8 was approved by President
Truman on January 19, 1953, and accepted by the Eisenhower Administration without change."
27 Memorandum of Discussion at the 148th Meeting of the National Security Council," Foreign Relations of the United States:
1952-1954, vol. 2, (no datej: p. 369.
28 Lt. General ldwal Edwards post-war career had included commanding general of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe from March 1946
to August 1947. He then served Deputy Chief of Staf, Personnel and subsequently Deputy Chief of Staf, Operations, Air Force
headquarters in Washington, D.C., until 1951, when he was appointed Commandant of the Air University at Maxwell Air Force
Base, Ala., where he remained until he retired from active duty Feb. 23, 1953. Lieutenant General ldwal H. Edwards," US Air
Force Biographies, (no datej at < http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?biolD=5329> [accessed 7 May 2010|.
29 ln addition to Edwards, other interagency representatives included: Lt. Gen. Harold Bull (ClAj; W. Barrett McDonnell (lClS;
Maj. Gen. Robert Webster (JCSj; Lish Whiston (llCj. Lt. General ldwal Edwards, Memorandum by the Chairman of the Special
Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC to Lay," Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-1954, vol. 2, (15 May 1953j: pp. 329-
330.
30 Adams, Eisenhower's Fine Group of Fellows, op cit: pp. 89-90.
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
19
thermonuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal would dramatically change the military balance.
31

Although there was a signifcant diference of opinion between them and the President on actual
Soviet bomber pilot ability to navigate intercontinental missions, and the Chairman was called
back again on 4 June to continue to debate the implications of defciencies in US continental
defenses that made the surprise appear more efective.
32

Te Edwards Subcommittee received high praise for the quality and thoughtfulness of its
analysis. It difered from earlier attempts:
in that (1) it was projected for two years into the future, through mid-1955;
(2) in addition to the continental United States, defned key installations overseas
were considered; (3) instead of using maximum estimates of Soviet strength, as
had been substantially done before, the evaluation used a probable estimate level in
this regard, and assumed a Soviet strategy regarded as being consistent with these
estimated capabilities.
33
Te results of the Special Evaluation Subcommittee were shared with other high level study eforts
which added to the usefulness of the Edwards Report.
34
Te results of the ad hoc committee raised issues serious enough for President Eisenhower
to commission a separate Continental Defense Committee headed by Special Evaluation
Subcommittee member and its CIA representative Lt. Gen. Harold Bull. As part of his study, the
general requested the views of various NSC members on the desirability of institutionalizing the
kind of work done by the frst ad hoc Special Evaluation Subcommittee. With the added advantage
of seeing the results of the Edwards Subcommittee, the new CIA Director, Alan W. Dulles,
responded with thoughtful insight, that is worth recording at length:
In response to your request of June 15, for the views of this Agency on organizational
arrangements to provide the best possible continuing production of Net Capability
Estimates, the following thoughts are submitted:
Tere is no need to argue the necessity for reliable estimates of net capabilities as
the basis for national policy formulation. Tese can only be prepared by careful
integration of gross-capability intelligence of the enemy with our capabilities
and plans, so that the net result of the interplay may be forecast as accurately as
possible. Tis need is not confned to the problem of defense of North America
but is equally inescapable for planning US requirements and commitments in any
part of the globe.
Te President and the NSC in practice and pursuant to statutory authority depend
on the Director of Central Intelligence, representing the coordinated views of the
Intelligence Agencies, for foreign intelligence estimates, and on the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staf, speaking as their representative, for military advice.
31 Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956, (lthaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2000j: p. 156.
32 Memorandum of Discussion at the 149
th
Meeting of the National Security Council," Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-
1954, vol. 2, (11 June 1953j: pp. 370-371.
33 Preparation of Coordinated Evaluation of the Net Capabilities of the USSR to lnfict direct lnjury on the United States," (25
March 1954j, op cit.
34 lbid.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
20
Tus what is required to furnish the President and Council with guidance in the
most useful and complete form is the efective amalgamation of the functions of
the two.
Responsibility for such combined analysis cannot rightly be assigned to one of
these advisers to the exclusion of the other, for both are coordinate staf ofcers
serving the same commander. Each must consider the factors developed by the
other in order to eliminate reliance on arbitrary assumptions and produce valid
and realistic forecasts.
It is my view, therefore, that the President and Council should establish a
permanent subcommittee on Net Capability Estimates to be composed of:
Te Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf; Te Director of Central Intelligence
and that this subcommittee be charged with providing, on its initiative or as
requested by the Council, estimates of net capabilities as needed to support the
formulation of national policy.
Te manner in which this subcommittee would discharge its function should be
left fexible and might very well difer substantially according to the nature of the
estimate undertaken. It should have authority to secure support and information
from all executive branches of the government and should be required to consult
with such agencies and interdepartmental committees as may be able to contribute
signifcantly to any estimate. Te subcommittee should take such action as may be
necessary to preserve the security of highly sensitive information such as U.S. war
plans and intelligence sources.
35
Te Bull led Continental Defense Committee issued a prescient 80 page report in July and on 12
August the Soviets detonated their frst hydrogen bomb.
36

As a result of the Edwards Subcommittee work, interagency participants and NSC observers
recorded a number of lessons learned:
Personnel and Facilities. If it is accepted that a tightly-knit operating group is
the appropriate method of operation, questions of personnel and facilities become
important. In the case of the Edwards Subcommittee, these were handled by the
furnishing of facilities in the JCS area of the Department of Defense and by the
furnishing of secretarial and other personnel by the JCS and CIA. It is believed
that these arrangements were satisfactory, and that they could be repeated without
strain on the contributing agencies.
Target Date. Since national policy in the feld of continental defense is now laid
down comprehensively in NSC 5408,13 with programs extended for some years
into the future, it appears unlikely that there will be a major overhauling of this
policy during 1954, barring drastic changes in the intelligence picture of Soviet
capabilities or intentions.
Te Edwards Subcommittee completed its work in four months, but found that
35 Allen W. Dulles, Letter From Director of Central lntelligence Dulles to the Chairman of the Continental Defense Committee
(Bullj," (30 June 1953j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 150,
pp. 428-429.
36 Adams, Eisenhower's Fine Group of Fellows, op cit: pp. 90-107.
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
21
this was too short a period in which to go into all of the important aspects.
37
To
allow six months or more for a new evaluation would throw the completion after
1 October 1954, and would eliminate its usefulness as a supporting element for
work on the FY 1956 budget. However, this disadvantage appears outweighed [by
above argument]
Scope. Te Edwards Report considered not only the continental United States
but also key US installations outside the US, considered in terms of the usefulness
of such installations to US counterofensive action. Tere was some difculty
about the defnition of such overseas installations, leading to a misunderstanding
afecting the JCS submission. Apart from avoiding a repetition of this, the scope
of the Edwards Report appeared workable.
Projection. Te Edwards Report projected its conclusions forward for two years,
and General Edwards recommended that future studies adopt a projection period
not greater than this. For planning purposes it would be desirable to have a longer
projection period, since many policy decisions cannot bear fruit for three or more
years. However, from a working standpoint, it would be extremely difcult to
get a frm enough picture of either Soviet or US capabilities, in order to do the
war-gaming exercise. Te Planning Board should consider whether the policy
considerations should outweigh working difculties and limitations.
38
Te combined weight of these lessons argued for converting the ad hoc nature of the Edwards
Subcommittee example into a more permanent process.
External exigencies and the positive example of the Edwards Subcommittee combined to
demonstrate not only that traditional Commanders estimates were inadequate but that there was
an alternative method.
Importance of the Net Evaluation In view of the usefulness of the Edwards
Report and the subsequent recommendations of the Bull and Jackson Committees,
the importance and desirability of continuing net evaluations of Soviet capability
to injure the United States may be regarded as established. For purposes of Council
consideration of problems relating to continental defense or the defense of US
installations overseas, it is meaningless to have gross estimates of Soviet nuclear
capabilities, air strength, etc., unless these are merged with existing US and Allied
defensive capabilities so as to produce an evaluation of the net Soviet capability,
present and prospective.
Organizational Problem Method of Operation. Experience with the 195152
project demonstrated emphatically that it was not satisfactory to conduct a net
evaluation on the basis of one-shot contributions by several agencies, melded by
37 The Edwards Subcommittee had particular dimculty with the question of Soviet strategy in the event of war, whether the
Soviets would allocate the bulk of their stockpile to the US or a large part of it against non-US targets. A successor group
may fnd it desirable to submit this question to thorough intelligence consideration, based on the material on capabilities and
damage developed by the group. This question was referred to by General Edwards in a personal memorandum to the Executive
Secretary, NSC, dated 19 May 1953.14 General Edwards also referred to the desirability of covering the extent of strategic
warning that might be expected, of a vulnerability study, and of a psychological study of the efects on the people of the US of
assumed levels of atomic attacks. ln view of the complexity of these problems, it appears highly desirable that the new study be
allowed at least six months, and if possible longer, for completion." Dulles, Letter From Director of Central lntelligence Dulles to
the Chairman of the Continental Defense Committee (Bullj," op cit.
38 lbid.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
22
one agency or by a group. Te Edwards Subcommittee operated on the basis of
continuing exchange of material by a tightly-knit operating group producing in
efect successive approximations leading to a fnal refned product. Wherever
the responsibility may be placed, and on whatever basis agencies participate, this
method of operation is essential. Moreover, this method of operation can also be
employedas it was by the Edwards groupto minimize the security problem
involved in the handling of sensitive information that must be supplied particularly
by JCS, CIA, and FBI.
39
Tus, the ad hoc group was not disbanded but continued in limbo while interagency debate shifted
from what and how to whom?
As the JSC and CIA debated organizational structure and prerogatives
40
it became obvious that
the addition of the word net was neither accidental nor unimportant.
Admiral Radford and others infer that all they need is the normal estimate of gross
capabilities which they in the Defense Department can then use in working out
the net capabilities. Tis view is not only an oversimplifcation of the problem but it
puts the Director in the position of abdicating his responsibilities for estimating for
Te Commander the Blocs probable intentions and probable courses of action.
Tis the Director cannot do in a satisfactory and useful manner in a vacuum,
excluded from knowledge of our own deployments and our own capabilities. If the
Directors estimates are done in this manner he is asked to estimate the thinking of
the Kremlin leaders which is based on their intelligence of our capabilities which
they most certainly know in great detail, whereas the Director in his estimate
is permitted to have no such comparable knowledge. Te Directors knowledge
of US and allied capabilities and dispositions must be at least comparable to the
intelligence possessed by the Kremlin leadership. To think, as I believe Admiral
Radford and the military in general do, that the Commanders estimate is made
39 lbid.
40 Memorandum for the Record: Meeting in Omce of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf on Tuesday, 4 May 1954, with Admiral
Radford (Mr. Amory, and General Bull were present with the DCl and Rear Admiral Layton, General Porter, and two other omcers
were also presentj," (4 May 1954j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955,
Document 176, pp. 493-494. Mr. Dulles explained that there was a dual responsibility shared equally by the Director of ClA and
the JCS for advising the NSC on the intelligence and operational features respectively of an appraisal of the net capabilities of
the USSR to infict direct injury on the US. He noted that other agencies would have responsibility also but only in limited areas
requiring only part time participation to the extent necessary to insure that their responsibilities are fully met but not to the
extent requiring a disclosure of war plans, or the extensive use of other highly secret documents. He emphasized also that ClA
participation would be on a very limited high level basis, and that the few ClA representatives involved would be professional
men who could be trusted to protect all information made available to them. He did not expect that revelation of war plans as
such would be found necessary but that operational information would be required. He pointed out that he could not carry out
his full responsibility as DCl without such knowledge of our own capabilities.
Admiral Radford replied that he frankly didn't understand why there was any necessity for this high level organization to make a
commanders estimate. He felt that if ClA made its coordinated intelligence estimate, the JCS and the Defense Department
were, with this estimate available, competent to do the rest of the evaluation for the NSC and the President, based on their own
knowledge of and responsibility for operational matters and war plans. He saw no need for setting up another coordinating
agency. He didn't see this need as recently carried out in the Continental Defense feld.
General Bull pointed out that a single intelligence estimate of gross capabilities was not the fnal word on intelligence-that it was
necessary to work by phases in a process of comparing gross intelligence estimates with our operational capabilities. This
procedure would result in new intelligence estimates based on a knowledge of our own strengths and dispositions such as the
Kremlin is believed to have to guide its decisions. This knowledge is not now available to our own national intelligence agency.
Such a procedure for comparing capabilities on both sides, we believe, is essential and is a shared responsibility of DCl and
Defense..
ln response to Admiral Radford's expressed desire to give it more thought, the Director, in leaving, stated he would be pleased to
discuss the problem further and felt sure they could work it out."
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
23
by G3 after receiving a G2 contribution overlooks the sound procedures which
govern all good staf operations in the G2/G3 feld.
No G2 makes his estimates of enemy capabilities, probable courses of action,
or probable intentions or advises his Commander in an operational vacuum. By
the closest hour by hour contact and joint daily or more frequent briefngs, he is
always able to make his estimate of probable hostile courses of action based on not
only the enemys new capabilities in manpower, weapons, organization, training,
leadership, dispositions, etc. but also from his estimate of what the enemy probably
knows concerning our own strengths, dispositions and intentions.
Te Director as our National G2 should have the same rights and duties as any
G2 in the lower echelons has. Otherwise he cannot fulfll his legal responsibilities.
Although I recognize that a case can be made that the national level presents
diferent problems with a justifed restriction on revelation of war plans, certain
planned courses of action, certain dispositions, weapons development, etc. should
be made available to DCI and IAC on a very strict need-to-know basis, I believe
a clear defnition of intelligence requirements in the operational feld could be
worked out jointly and I doubt that a knowledge of detailed war plans would be
necessary. In general, DCI should get only operational information which it is
reasonable to expect the enemy to have in whole or in part.
We have no present mechanism to meet our minimum needs. We are blocked
by self imposed departmental restrictions or ground rules which severely limit
our intelligence investigation of our own force a handicap not imposed on our
enemies.
41
By 23 June 1954
42
the basis of compromise had been reached the ad hoc approach became
institutionalized with the same remit and structure albeit a new title: Net Capabilities Evaluation
Subcommittee.
43

Te focus remained on direct[ing] the preparation of a report assessing the net capabilities of the
USSR, in the event of general war, to infict direct injury upon the continental United States and
key U.S. installations overseas.
44
Te actual work was still to be done at the Pentagon employing
assigned interagency temporary staf
45
integrating inputs from a broad array of sources under the
41 H.R. Bull, Memorandum From the Chairman of the Continental Defense Committee (Bullj to Director of Central lntelligence
Dulles," (5 May 1954j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 177,
pp. 495-496.
42 NSC 5423: National Security Council Directive for a Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee," (23 June 1954j, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 182, pp. 505-507.
43 S. Everett Gleason, Directive for a A Net Evaluation Subcommittee," National Security Council Report no. 00413 (23 June 1954j;
at (Washington, DC: The Digital National Security Archive, accessed 14 March 2010j.
44 NSC 5423: National Security Council Directive for a Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee," op cit. This net capabilities
report will cover the period through July 1, 1957 and should be submitted to the Council on or before November 1, 1954. lt will
cover all types of attack, direct or clandestine, and will deal primarily with the initial phases of war, i.e., the period during which
all or most of the Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons might be expended. lt will include consideration of the several courses
of action which the USSR is capable of executing and in support of which the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile might be
expended. ln determining the net efect of an attack, the report will take into account the mid-1957 status of presently approved
defense programs."
45 The Subcommittee will have a temporary staf, composed of individuals assigned by the participating agencies.. lt is expected
that members of this staf will be assigned to this project as their primary duty during the period of preparation of the net
capabilities report." lbid.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
24
direction of a retired three-star general ofcer chosen by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf
and the Director of Central Intelligence.
46
Te process was to be supervised by the interagency
Subcommittee consisting of expanded representation from relevant departments
47
but the most
notable innovation was the naming of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the titular head of the
Subcommittee a compromise that allowed the JCS to retain their primus inter paris dignity
while bringing in the external data and expertise necessary to make it a net evaluation.
48
Te CIA had been particular frustrated in producing meaningful reports about the threat
posed by potential enemies without having the data and insight into the strengths and weakness
of friendly forces. In addition to the strategic threat of intercontinental attack, this issue had
been particular problematic in the theater context of NATOs fedgling eforts where US forces
remained in the minority.
experience has subsequently highlighted the vacuity of estimates prepared
without clear knowledge of our own capabilities. With respect to Soviet Bloc
capabilities to attack Western Europe, all estimates through 1950 had been able
to proceed on the assumption of virtually no Western opposition. From 1951
onward, this assumption became increasingly less valid, and in the preparation
of the estimates there were prolonged discussions leading fnally to the use of a
fairly meaningless formula that the Soviet Bloc could launch a lot of campaigns,
including a full-scale ofensive in Western Europe. Whether any meaningful
answer could have been provided in Washington without duplicating the activities
of SHAPE is doubtful, but the fact is that no machinery existed even for getting
and incorporating (with proper credit) the current conclusions of SHAPE. As they
fnally stood the estimates were certainly not helpful to anyone on this point.
49
While the focus of the 1950s evaluations were on intercontinental attack, the challenge of placing
the US-USSR long-term competition in the context of a war in Europe and the need to consider
allied capabilities was a perennial concern that would go on for decades.
Finally, President Eisenhower weighed in on Valentines Day 1955, with a get it done directive
for a retitled Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NES):
Pursuant to the recommendations of the National Security Council in NSC
Action No. 1260b (November 4, 1954) and my subsequent approval thereof, I
hereby establish a permanent procedure to provide integrated evaluations of the
net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to infict direct injury
upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. installations overseas, and to provide a
continual watch for changes which would signifcantly alter those net capabilities.
46 lbid.
47 ln addition to the JCS and ClA, these included: The Chairman of the lnterdepartmental lntelligence Conference and the
Chairman of the lnterdepartmental Committee on lnternal Security for matters relating to internal security; b. The Director,
Omce of Defense Mobilization, for matters relating to continuity of government, sumciency and continuity of industry, and urban
vulnerability; c. The Federal Civil Defense Administrator for matters relating to civil defense; and d. The Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission, for matters relating to Atomic Energy Commission activities."
48 For an extremely interesting appraisal of the net" issues, see: The 'Net Estimates' Problem," op cit. The ClA had been
challenged to address this issue since the fall of 1950 to meet this problem, in three contexts: (1j National lntelligence Estimates
handled through regular machinery; (2j specifc net estimates" or net evaluations" handled by special machinery; (3j the Watch
Committee, handling intelligence from the warning standpoint."
49 lbid.
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
25
Each integrated evaluation should:
a. Cover all types of attack, overt or clandestine;
b. Include consideration of the several courses of action which the USSR is
capable of executing; and
c. Take into account the estimated future status of approved military and non-
military U.S. defense programs.
Each integrated evaluation report should estimate from the practical standpoint
the extent and efect of direct injury, including radioactive fall-out, upon the
continental U.S. and key U.S. installations overseas, resulting from the most
probable types and weights of attacks which the USSR is capable of delivering
during approximately the frst thirty days of general war, taking into account the
efect of U.S. counterattacks during this period.
Integrated evaluations should be submitted to the Council on or before October 1
of each year, and relate to the situation on a critical date normally about three years
in the future. In addition to these annual integrated evaluations, an integrated
evaluation should be submitted to the Council at such times as the Subcommittee
feels that a change has become apparent that would signifcantly alter the net
capabilities of the USSR to infict direct injury upon the continental U.S. and key
U.S. installations overseas.
Subcommittee members are designated to act as individuals, but each shall have
the right to consult, at his discretion and under appropriate security safeguards,
with his agency or committee prior to Subcommittee action on matters normally
within the cognizance of his committee or agency.
Te Subcommittee will have a staf, composed of individuals assigned by member
agencies, as required by the Director, and under the direction of a Director whom
I shall designate. Te Director may be compensated through the National Security
Council from contributions by the member agencies.
Te Net Evaluation Subcommittee hereby established is empowered under the terms
of this Directive to call on any agency of the Government for relevant information,
evaluations, and estimates, subject only to establishment of appropriate security
regulations and procedures for the handling of highly sensitive information as
provided under paragraph 5, above.
Distribution of each completed Subcommittee report will be determined at the
time by me.
50
In a footnote to the Directive, the President explicitly addressed the JCS hot button issue in
stating that access included Information such as that relating to war plans, new weapons and
equipment, techniques and tactics for their employment, the vulnerability of U.S. defenses, and
domestic and foreign intelligence sources and methods.
50 Dwight D. Eisenhower, National Security Council Directive NSC 5511: Directive on a Net Evaluation Subcommittee," (14
February 1955j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955The lntelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 207, pp.
599-601. This Directive was the subject of discussion" at the subsequent NSC meeting on 17 February 1955. Memorandum
of Discussion at the 237th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 17, 1955," Foreign Relations of
the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957volume vl, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico;
Caribbean, Document 2, pp. 2-5.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
26
Te Eisenhower Directive not only institutionalized the process, but created a long-lasting
precedent in terms of how a national net assessment should be organized. Te initial NES
assigned professional staf consisted of two Army Colonels, a Navy Captain, an Air Force Colonel,
a Marine Colonel, a Phd. CIA ofcer, at least one other civilian (probably FBI)
51
and a number of
supporting staf.
52
By 1958 an all new staf had rotated into the NES and the mix was two Army
Colonels, two Navy Captains, two Air Force Colonels, one Marine Colonel and one CIA Phd.
53

Five years later, the staf had doubled to sixteen: three Army Colonels, four Navy Captains, three
Air Force Colonels, one Marine Colonel, four CIA and one State Department civilian.
Te Director was a three-star retired general ofcer, backed up by a two-star Deputy Director,
a brass heavy pattern that refected Presidential importance and continued throughout the life of
the NES:
Lt. General Harold L. George, (USAF retired): 1955-1956;
54
Lt. General, Gerald C. Tomas, (USMC retired): 1956-1958;
55
Lt. General Tomas F. Hickey, (US Army retired): 1958-1961;
56
and
Lt. General Leon W. Johnson, (USAF retired): 1961-1963.
57
Over the eight years of the Eisenhower Administration, the Subcommittee produced at least one
report a year,
58
and had no less than 37 Presidential level meetings.
59
51 At this time J. Edgar Hoover, FBl Director, was Chairman of the llC and thus had a statutory position on the Subcommittee, had
an interest in the work of the Subcommittee.
52 The make up of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee senior professional is taken from: National Security Council" meeting agenda
and attendance, Eisenhower Archives, (27 October 1955j, at < http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/digital_documents/
Appt_Books_Pres/1955/October%201955.pdf > [accessed 20 July 2010|.
53 Discussion at the 387
th
Meeting of the National Security Council," (20 November 1958j is available at the Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, (Eisenhower Papers, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman flej.
54 Lieutenant General Harold L. George," US Air Force Biographies, (no datej at < http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.
asp?biolD=5516 > [accessed 20 July 2010|. After the war he served for a while as director of information for the Air Force and
as senior Air Force representative of the military staf of the United Nations. He retired from active duty Dec. 31, 1946, with rank
of lieutenant general dating back to March 1945. ln 1955 Harold George was recalled to active duty for eight months as special
consultant to the Air Force Chief of Staf and relieved from active duty Nov. 4."
55 Allan Reed Millett, ln Many a Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the US Marine Corps, 1917-1956, (Annapolis, MD, Naval
lnstitute Press, 1993j: pp. 346, 433.
56 Thomas Francis Hickey (Generalj," Wikipedia, (18 February 2010j, at < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Francis_Hickey_
(generalj > [accessed 27 Feb. 2010|. See also: Norman A. Graebner, The National Security: lts Theory and Practice, 1945-1960,
(1986j: p. 192; and History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, volume 5, (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense
Historical Omce, 1984j: p. 316.
57 General Leon W. Johnson," Arlington National Cemetery Website, (20 October 2008j, at < http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/
lwjohnsn.htm > [accessed 15 Jan. 2010|, retired July 31, 1961."
58 NSC 5423 - Directive for Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee," in Box 11, White House Omce, Omce of the Special
Assistant for National Security Afairs: Records, 1952-61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries," Eisenhower Archives, < http://
www.eisenhower.archives.gov/Research/Finding_Aids /PDFs/WHO,%20OSANSA/NSC_Series_Policy_Papers_Subseries.pdf >
[accessed 11 Nov. 2009|.Examples include:
NSC 5511 - Net Evaluation Subcommittee [study of USSR capabilities|," in Box 15;
NSC 5605 - A Net Evaluation Subcommittee [Soviet nuclear capabilities|," in Box 17;
NSC 5728 - Net Evaluation Subcommittee," in Box 23;
NSC 5816 - Net Evaluations Subcommittee [study of Soviet attack capabilities|," in Box 23.
59 Meeting Date, Agenda Topics" at NSC Meetings - Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961j," (Ann Arbor, Ml: University of
Michigan Library, no datej at < http://www.lib.umich.edu/fles/libraries/govdocs/pdf/nscmeet2.pdf > [accessed 30 Feb. 2010|: 11
Mar. 53 - Nuclear Matters; 6 May 53 - Nuclear Matters; 4 Jun 53 - USSR, Nuclear Matters; 25 Jun 53 - Nuclear Weapons;
7 Oct. 53 - Nuclear Weapons; 3 Dec 53 - USSR, Nuclear Matters; 23 Jun. 54 - Nuclear Matters; 5 Nov. 54 - Nuclear
Weapons; 10 Feb. 55 - Nuclear Weapons; 3 Mar. 55 - Nuclear Weapons; 24 Mar. 55 - Nuclear Weapons; 14 Jul. 55 - Nuclear
Weapons; 27 Oct. 55 - Nuclear Weapons; 5 Apr. 56 - Nuclear Weapons; 20 Dec. 56 - Nuclear Weapons; 11 Jan. 57 -
Nuclear Weapons; 7 Feb. 57 - Nuclear Weapons; 16 May 57 - Nuclear Defense; 13 Jun. 57 - Nuclear Weapons; 20 Jun 57 -
Nuclear Weapons; 1 Aug. 57 - Nuclear Weapons; 31 Oct. 57 - Nuclear Defense; 7 Nov. 57 - Nuclear Defense; 12 Nov. 57 -
Nuclear Weapons; 27 Mar. 58 - Nuclear Defense; 29 May 58 - Nuclear Defense; 26 Jun. 58 - Comparative Evaluation Group;
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
27
In addition to the controversy and creative compromise that created it, several other factors stand
out about the success of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. First, their work was marked by subtle
distinctions, an emphasis on comparative data, and operational context.
60
Second, they not only
informed the Commander-in-Chief, but had a dramatic impact on his own evaluations.
61
Tird,
they were able to address some of the most sensitive and controversial areas of US national security
in the 1950s and did so with high discretion and a complete absence of leaks.
62
Fourth, their work
continually stimulated additional questions, which were then referred to other organizations or
used as the terms of reference for a new committee dedicated to that follow-on topic. One example
of this, was the famous Technological Capabilities Panel that produced the Killian Report, which
itself was a major contribution to the art of competitive strategy.
63
Last but not least, the NEC
established a precedent in justifying the need for a national net assessment, developed a model of
how to do it and set expectations of expected output.
It has been widely observed that as President, Eisenhowers background made him his own
secretary of defense and he left strategic planning to the military and looked to his political
appointee managers to implement budgetary guidance rather than strategize.
64
But by the end
of his Administration, Eisenhower himself noted that the traditional coordinating committee
approach as set up by the Naval and War departments, and carried over into the Department of
Defense, was too slow and too cumbersome for the atomic age. In an address to a special session
of Congress he argued that:
Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unifed, combat forces must be
organized into unifed commands, each equipped with the most efcient weapons
systems that science can develop.
We must strengthen the military staf in the Ofce of the Secretary of Defense
14 Jul. 58 - Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Defense; 6 Nov. 58 - Comparative Evaluation Group; 20 Nov. 58 - Net Evaluation
Subcommittee; 15 Oct. 59 - Comparative Evaluations Group; 16 Dec. 59 - Nuclear Defense; 28 Apr. 60 - Net Evaluation
Subcommittee; 24 Mar. 60 - Nuclear Weapons; 25 Aug. 60 Nuclear Matters; 13 Oct. 60 - Comparative Evaluations Group; and
29 Dec. 1960 - Nuclear Defense.
60 Although most of the NES reports of the 1950s remain classifed, a summary of the Top Secret 1958 study focused on counter-
force versus counter-value targeting tradeofs is available at: Discussion at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council,"
(20 November 1958j op cit. For a critical commentary on the substance, not the analysis, see: Gerald C. Smith, Memorandum
for the Secretary [of State|: Oral Presentation of the Annual Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee," (25 November 1958j,
reacting to 100 megatons targeted on Moscow, observed: We used to be advised that a doctrine of 'restraint' governed the
planning of our strategic bombing operations. lt is dimcult to see any fruits of any such doctrine in this briefng."
61 Writing in his diary on 23 January 1956, Eisenhower reacted to a report on two nuclear war scenarios studied by his Net
Evaluation Sub-Committee that: the United States experienced practically total economic collapse, which could not be restored
to any kind of operative conditions under six months to a year. Members of the federal government were wiped out and a new
government had to be improvised by the states. Casualties were enormous. lt was calculated that something on the order of 65
percent of the population would require some kind of medical care and, in most instances, no opportunity whatsoever to get it."
The Eisenhower Diaries, edited by Robert H. Ferrell, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company 1981j: p. 311.
62 Academic treatment of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, its role and contribution is very slim, but some commentary can be
found in: Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, lnc., 1996j: p. 130;
Norman A. Graebner, The National Security: lts Theory and Practice, 1945-1960, (1986j: p. 192; History of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, volume 5, (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense Historical Omce, 1984j: p. 316; and Chpt 12, in
Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. lmmerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, (Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1997j.
63 For a good description of their use of balance" timelines and how they helped in developing counter-strategies, see: Adams,
Eisenhower's Fine Group of Fellows, op cit: pp. 123-124.
64 "He did not need politico-military advice from his defense secretaries.. He looked ot his defense secretaries to implement
a defense budget unpopular with the armed services, to carry out his decisions, to bear the weight of military objections to
ceilings on defense spending, and to force the services to develop military policy within those ceilings, not to suggest alternative
policies." Geofrey Piller, DoD's Omce of lnternational Security Afairs: The Brief Ascendancy of an Advisory System," Political
Science Quarter, vol. 98, no. 1, (Spring 1983j: p. 61.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
28
in order to provide the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense with
the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational
direction of the unifed commands.
65
Tis meant that a Secretary of Defense could no longer be content to focus merely on force
generation but had to get educated on and involved with force design and application.
In the Defense Reorganization of 1958 the JCS were pushed to drop their traditional coordinating
committees in exchange for an integrated operations division utilizing the traditional line
numbered J-Directorates of a conventional military staf in order to efectively interface with
the unifed and specifed commands.
66
Tus, the coordinating Strategic Plans Committee was
divided to form the nucleus of the new J-3 Operations and J-5 Plans and Policy Directorates.
67

Ironically, the more the JCS moved toward a Command orientation,
68
the more the planning,
forecasting and assessing functions
69
of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP)
70
became caught
up in the narrowly defned linear programming and budgeting rather than thinking out of the box
in terms of alternative options or long-range competition.
71
While President Eisenhower was more than willing to delegate traditional military matters to
the military and let civilian appointees manage budgets, he recognized the centrality of nuclear
weapons to US foreign policy as well as in defense
72
and was not willing to delegate the authority
of the Commander-in-Chief to be mentally prepared in thinking through the unthinkable. Te
65 The date of Eisenhower's speech was 3 April 1958. lbid., pp. 219-220. He added for efect: l think it is important to have it
clearly understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staf act only under the authority and in the name of the Secretary of Defense. l am,
therefore, issuing instructions that their function is to advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in respect to their duties and
not to perform any of their duties independently of the Secretary's direction."
66 Poole, The Evolution of the Joint Strategic Planning System, 1947-1989, op cit.
67 Major Changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1942-1969," op cit., pp. 224-226.
68 For a useful summary, see: Historical Background of the Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staf," in
Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS Pub. 4; Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staf, 15 July 1963j, pp.
3-6.
69 That these three function are intimately related is well argued in: Alan Gropman, Long Range Planning-A New Beginning," Air
University Review, (Nov-Dec, 1979j: p 50. He notes that planning is the systematic process of formulating objectives for the
future and developing strategy and resource allocation alternatives for reaching those goals. lntrinsic to this process is a system
for monitoring the implications, in an uncertain future, of the chosen decision alternative." Gropman, Air Force Planning and the
Technology Development Planning Process in the Post-World War ll Air Force," op cit., p. 156.
70 The JSOP was developed in 1955 and is a document of two volumes that assesses the threat and then prescribes the
military forces that the JCS believe are required to carry out our military strategy and national objectives." Lawrence J. Korb,
The Budget Process in the Department of Defense, 1947-1977: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Three Systems," Public
Administration Review, vol. 37, no. 4, (July/August 1977j: p. 335. See also: Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First
Twenty-five Years, (Bloomington, lN: lndiana University Press, 1976j.
71 As of 1963, the generic planning within J-5 was divided into three unique branches each covering a separate function in the
overall process:
Short-Range Branch - prepare the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCPj; and provide basic planning data and
make recommendations concerning force requirements, assignments and deployments for strategic planning in the
short-range period, based on actual Service capabilities."
Mid-Range Branch - prepare the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOPj" and collaborate, as may be required,
with the Personal Directorate (J-1j and the Logistics Directorate (J-4j in the development of concepts for military
mobilization and the phased expansion of active and Reserve forces to support the strategic concepts and objectives
of JSOP."
Long-Range Branch - prepare the Joint Long-Range Strategic Study;" and provide strategic guidance concerning
world-wide or overall base rights and requirements in support of joint plans, estimates, studies and appraisals for the
long-range period."
The responsibility for reviewing and preparing JCS comments on Basic National Security Policy (BNSPj was in a separate
General Planning Branch. Historical Background of the Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staf," in Organization
and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staf, ibid., pp. 67-76.
72 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-56, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1963j, p. 180.
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
29
vehicle by which the Administration attempted to both develop and propagate its strategy was
a National Security Council document stafed across all relevant agencies known as the Basic
National Security Policy (BNSP).
Issued annually, and purporting to set forth the basic strategic concept for the
United States, BNSP has been described as a detailed outline of the aims of US
national security strategy and a more detailed discussion of the military, political,
economic elements to support the over-all national strategy. In it, the Eisenhower
Administration announced that the United States henceforward would place main
but not sole reliance on nuclear weapons. With this guidance, the Joint Chiefs
of Staf were expected to prepare a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP)which
would project force requirements fve years into the future.
73
However, because there was continued disagreement within the Administration and between
the services over the meaning and comprehensiveness of a Massive Retaliation doctrine, in the
absence of Commander-in-Chief clarity, the military were not getting clear guidance in this
area.
74
Te end product has thus far been a document so broad in nature and so general
in language as to provide limited guidance in practical application. In the course
of its development, the sharp issues in national defense which confront our leaders
have been blurred in conference and in negotiation. Te fnal text thus permits
many diferent interpretations. Te protagonists of Massive Retaliation or of
Flexible Response, the partisans of the importance of air power or of limited war,
as well as the defenses of other shades of military opinion, are able to fnd language
supporting their divergent points of view. Te Basic National Security Policy
document means all things to all people and settles nothing.
75
Te efect of widespread dissatisfaction with the loose generality of the BNSP language, was not
to focus on clarity and specifcity at the National Security Council but rather ridicule and dismiss
the whole idea of top down deductive articulation entirely.
Over at the Pentagon the historic American phobia over a General Staf nonetheless remained,
76

and the results showed. But despite legislative authority and responsibility for both DoD strategy
as well as resource planning, the Secretary of Defense lacked the diagnostic and prognostic talent
necessary to make informed strategic judgments.
Under the postwar organization of the military establishment the Secretary of
Defense presumably had the authority to establish a strategic concept and require
agreement on force size and composition. But he labored under several severe
handicaps. He lacked any independent basis on which to assess what the Services
were demanding. And, in the American tradition, he tended to assume that it was
impossible for him to understand, much less learn, the art of military planning.
73 Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, op cit: pp. 23-24.
74 Former Army Chief of Staf (and later CJCSj, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, testimony, in Organizing for National Security, (Washington,
DC: Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, US Senate, 1961j, vol. l, p. 795.
75 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (New York, NUY: Harper and Brothers, 1960j: p. 82.
76 The Joint Staf shall not operate or be organized as overall Armed Forces General Staf and shall have no executive authority."
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958," (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 August 1958j.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
30
Tat was a mystery that could only be performed by the military stafs themselves.
To argue with veteran commanders in these circumstances seemed presumptuous
and dangerous. Military judgment was sacrosanct.
77
Up until 1961, this was a bi-cameral culture, with the Secretary of Defense having limited ability to
bridge the two worlds of military strategy and civilian resource allocation, and raised a fundamental
question as to whether his role was Umpire or Leader?
78
77 Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, op cit: pp. 19-20.
78 Arthur D. Larson, The Secretary of Defense: Umpire or Leader?" Polity, vol. 4, no. 4, (Summer 1972j: p. 557.
3
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS SURROGATE
His fair for quantitative analysis was exceeded only by his arrogance. Enthoven
held military experience in low regard and considered military men intellectually
inferior. He likened leaving military decision-making to the professional military
to allowing welfare workers to develop national welfare programs.
1
With respect to the coordinative versus command style, President Kennedy addressed this
decisively.
2
He needed and wanted a Secretary of Defense who, unlike Eisenhowers Pentagon
chiefs, would not only implement the administrations decisions but also vigorously initiate
policies regarding weapons selection and strategy.
3

It is probably not too much to say that in less than three years, McNamara brought
about two revolutions within the Department of Defense. He redesigned the
military strategy and forces of the United States. At the same time, he installed an
entirely new method of making decisions within the Pentagon.
4
Kennedys SecDef aggressively pursued what he believed to be a new, but necessarily revolutionized,
5

proper role of the Secretary of Defense to grasp the strategic issues and provide active leadership
in developing a defense program that sensibly relates US foreign policy and military strategy
with defense budgets, and the choice of major weapons and forces.
6
Tere were several reasons behind the management revolution, and they primarily had to do
with the new Administrations negative attitude toward the Joint Staf approach to planning:
Teir advice was perceived at the White House to be the product of consensus among the
1 H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1997j, p. 19.
2 Paul Y. Hammond, The National Security Council as a Device for lnterdepartmental Coordination: an lnterpretation and
Appraisal," American Political Science Review, vol. Llv, (1960j: p. 899.
3 Piller, DoD's Omce of lnternational Security Afairs," op cit., pp. 63, 65, also contrasts Secretary of State Rusk's view of himself
as a judge" versus McNamara's activist initiative.
4 Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, op cit: p. 3.
5 For contemporary evaluation, see: Stewart Alsop, Master of the Pentagon," The Saturday Evening Post, (5 August 1961j; Joseph
Kraft, McNamara and His Enemies," Harper's Magazine, (August 1961j; and Charles J.v. Murphy, The Education of a Defense
Secretary," Fortune, (May 1962j: p. 102.
6 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, (New York, NY: Harper
& Row, 1971j, pp. 32, 106.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
32
services rather than what was best for national security;
7
Another was that the Joint Chiefs also produced analyses and recommendations at a
tortuously slow pace;
8

And, they frequently seemed opposed to major Administration initiatives and contemptuous
of their strategic wisdom.
9
With this attitude at the top, selecting an activist SecDef who was not in awe of military
experience and giving him the mandate to introduce innovative strategy frequently at odds with
Service preferences,
10
combined to structure the SecDef as chief strategist.
11
Te Secretary of Defense and I am talking about any Secretary of Defense
must make certain kinds of decisions, not because he presumes his judgment to
be superior to his advisors, military or civilian, but because his position is the best
place from which to make these decisions.
12
Much to the dismay of critics of defense intellectuals,
13
a corollary of this positional vantage-
point, was the belief that modern-day strategy and force planning has become largely an analytical
process.
14

Secretary McNamara correctly viewed the DoD as a bilineal organizational structure,
15
and,
7 For a contrast in attitudes toward the uniformed military, see: Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to
Kennedy, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1975j.
8 lbid., p. 65, quoting Paul Nitze as saying of the JCS, that it would take them three days to blow their nose."
9 ln interviews with the senior military omcers of the period, one historian quotes Air Force Lieutenant General David Burchinal
(U.S.A.F. Chief of Staf LeMay's Deputy for Operationsj, speaking about the value of strategic superiority and the Cuban Missile
Crisis: 'lt [value of superiority| was totally missed by the Kennedy administration... They did not understand what had been
created and handed to them... Fortunately, there was enough panic in Washington when they saw those missiles going in... they
gave only the broadest indication of what they wanted in terms of support for the President. So we were able at the military
level, from the JCS on down (without involving the politiciansj to put SAC on a one-third airborne alert, to disperse part of the
force to civilian airfelds [and take other alert measures| ... These were things that would be visible to the Soviets... We could
have written our own book at the time, but our politicians did not understand what happens when you have such a degree of
superiority as we had, or they simply didn't know how to use it. They were busily engaged in saving face for the Soviets and
making concessions, giving up the lRBMs, the Thors and Jupiters deployed overseas - when all we had to do was write our
own ticket.' A few moments later in this interview, U.S.A.F. General Leon Johnson (Chairman, Net Evaluation Subcommittee,
National Security Councilj said about the political leadership: 'They were very good at putting out brave words, but they didn't
do a bloody thing to back them up except what, inadvertently, we did'. To which LeMay confrmed: 'That was the mood prevalent
with the top civilian leadership; you are quite correct'." Dan Lindley, What l Learned since l Stopped Worrying and Studied the
Movie: A Teaching Guide to Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove," Political Science & Politics, vol. 34, no. 3, (2001j: pp. 663-667.
10 For a variety of descriptions of McNamara's attitude and approach, see: Deborah Shapley, Power and Promise: The Life and
Times of Robert McNamara, (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1993j; Clark A. Murdock, Defense Policy Formation: A Comparative
Analysis of the McNamara Era, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1974j; Ralph Sanders, The Politics of Defense
Analysis, (New York, NY: Dunellen, 1973j; Henry L. Trewitt, McNamara: His Ordeal in the Pentagon, (New York, NY: Harper &
Row, 1971j; and James Michael Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense,
(Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1970j.
11 One of President Kennedy's most fascinating attributes was his ability to attract able men and women to the service of his
Administration.. At his side, and deeply committed to his service, stood Robert S. McNamara. lf Kennedy was the patron of
new departures in the realm of national security, McNamara has been their architect and engineer." Kaufmann, The McNamara
Strategy, op cit: p. xi.
12 Robert S. McNamara, Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors," (Press Release No.548-63; Washington,
DC: 20 April 1963j, pp. 1-13, in Public Statements by the Secretaries of Defense: Part 3, The Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations, (1961-1969j, Robert S. McNamara, January 21,1961-February 29,1968, edited by Paul Kesaris, (microflm;
Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983j, reel vl, frames 0165-0177.
13 For example: General Thomas D. White, Strategy and the Defense lntellectuals," Saturday Evening Post, vol. 236, (4 May 1963j:
p. 10.
14 Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, op cit: pp. 32, 106.
15 The operational control and direction of the combat forces extend down through one chain of command and the direction and
control of the supporting activities down through another." Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office,
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS SURROGATE
33
impressed with the controlling dual chain management system he had experienced at Ford Motor,
tried to introduce that approach in the Pentagon.
16
During his tenure the Systems Analysis Ofce
operated as analytic policemen
17
keeping military advice honest and as a surrogate means of
both option planning and performance assessment. While it was recognized that the uniformed
military could, in theory, present a range of alternative strategies, nevertheless, inventing creative
options was not a recognized JCS strong suit.
18
Nor was a passive position in the strategy development process practical for the SecDef. Te
following retort is worth revisiting because the argument still fuels a relevant debate:
It would limit the Secretary of Defense to the role of judge rather than leader.
Tough he could select one of the alternatives presented in the JCS list, he would
be unable to challenge the particular objectives and alternatives which the JCS
chose present. He would be unable to get independent evaluation of the JCS
estimate of the amount of military force required to attain a particular objective
with a given degree of confdence. He would be unable to probe for and suggest
an alternative mix of forces which might achieve a given objective at a lower cost.
Challenging, testing, probing, checking, and suggesting alternatives in an
informed and responsible way are more than any one man can do by himself.
He would have to have a staf to help him, and that staf would have to become
deeply involved in the matters in the province of the military professionals. Tis is
the only way the Secretary of Defense can exercise initiative and avoid becoming
a captive of the information generated by the military stafs. In the most direct
sense, it is the only way the country can be assured of achieving a signifcant
degree of civilian control.
19
Tus, the issue was not so much the development of alternative options, although there were
certainly cases where that need was articulated, and few challenged the responsibility of the SecDef
to be the Pentagons Chief Strategist.
Rather, the question raised by McNamara and his team was the due diligence the Secretary
(New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1968j, p. 96.
16 Following BDM's acquisition by Ford Motor in 1988, l spent a signifcant part of my time for the next two years in Dearborn
serving as an international strategic planning adviser to Ford's Chairman and CEO. lt was not until then that l realized what
had conditioned McNamara's approach. Ford had a long culture of strong leaders in the operating and production parts
of the company. ln the 1950s, when they realized that the company had to be brought under modern fscal discipline with
a comprehensive budgeting system similar to PPBS, a parallel line of Finance Omcers was introduced at every level of line
organization. They served as implicit deputies to help" the line managers prepare and stay within corporate budgets, but they
had their own independent reporting chain (and guardianj up the ladder to the Corporate Finance Omcer. We called them the
KBG of Ford, but a closer parallel would probably have been the political omcer" in the Soviet military. lt is my belief, that when
McNamara realized he could not duplicate this level of intrusion into the JCS and Services (although the latter became more
permeable over timej, the Systems Analysis Omce was used as surrogate vehicle to police" the system.
17 An important implication of the increasingly analytical nature of the force planning process is the need for an 'analytic
policeman'.. lt its role as analytic policemen, the Systems Analysis omce tried to make sure that the methods of analysis used
in various studies, and the assumptions that went into them, were both explicit and consistent." Enthoven and Smith, How Much
is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, op cit., pp. 106, 108.
18 lbid., p. 115: lf the Secretary wants a wider range of alternatives - alternatives that include 'less' as well as possible nonmilitary
solutions - he will need civilian analysts possessing the necessary analytical skills and with the charter to cut across Service
institutional lines jurisdictions and integrate forces and mission contributions from all the Services. This does not mean that
alternatives ofered by civilian analysts are necessarily 'better' than those of the military. But they are likely to be more broadly
based, balanced, and concerned with getting the most from available resources. ln any event, some kind of counter-vailing
power is clearly needed if the Secretary of Defense is to sort out the desirable and the undesirable changes."
19 lbid., p. 196.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
34
would give in thinking through the inputs to the strategic choices he would make and his need
to have access to independent and sophisticated analysis that would enable him, not to ignore
institutional factors, but to see them in proper perspective in making operational, management and
policy decisions.
20
As the Clausewitzian personifcation of the one chosen to address strategic
questions,
21
the Secretary of Defense is the bridge
22
between the Presidential policy vision and the
direction of the Armed Forces in their development of contingency planning.
23
Tis dialectical
24

interface is normally called strategy development and, if asked, most Americans would likely
believe that having a dedicated organization assist the Secretary of Defense in pulling together a
comprehensive assessment of US and potential adversaries is not just common sense,
25
but essential
to getting an important task done, and building public confdence that it is being done right.
26
If it is admitted that a Secretary of Defense has the requirement to take on the role of evaluator
rather than just a ladler of resources and, in making those decisions, has a fduciary responsibility
to consider long-range trends, assess US and potential adversary postures, and develop alternative
strategic concepts to cope with change then the need for immediate and confdential staf
support to the SecDef as Chief Strategist was axiomatic in its logic and unchallengeable as common
sense. Te most basic argument for the PPBS approach to strategy rested on six major arguments:
Decision-making on the basis of openly debated National Interest;
Considering needs and costs simultaneously rather than sequentially;
Explicit consideration of alternatives rather than as straw men;
Active use of an analytical versus accounting staf;
A multiyear rolling force and fnancial plan versus fxed budget ceiling; and
20 Larson, The Secretary of Defense: Umpire or Leader?" op cit., p. 561.
21 Rosen, Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept," op cit: p. 284.
22 Richard K. Betts, The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations," Joint Forces Quarterly, (Autumn/Winter 2001-02j,
pp. 23-30.
23 lt is commonplace to cite the Clausewitzian dictim of war as continuation of political activity by other [violent| means;" but too
little attention has been given to how political guidance interacts with, in fact links to, military contingency planning through the
use of long range planning and/or balance assessments as anticipatory feedback in adjusting both political ends and military
means, in a recursive and refective way. Clausewitz himself, makes a point of this, immediately before his classic defnition: lf
we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the
supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is tyrant. lt must adapt itself to the
chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the frst consideration. Policy, then, will
permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous infuence on them." Carl
von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976j, p. 87.
24 The dialectic in strategy is emphasized in: Andre Beufre, An lntroduction to Strategy, with Particular Reference to Problems of
Defense, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, (New York, NY: Praeger, 1965j, p. 22, defnes strategy as the
art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute." The dominance of the dialectic as a mode thought
and argument in Clausewitz is from Part ll, The Dialectic," in Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosophy of War, (Englewood
Clifs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985j, pp. 89-94. Also on this theme: Peter R. Moody, Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War,"
World Politics, vol. 31, (April 1979j; and Hew Strachan, Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War," in Clausewitz in the Twenty-
First Century, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herber-Rothe, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007j, pp. 14-44; and
Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, English edition
2007j, pp. 120-122.
25 For an interesting take on how everyday citizens think and reason about . strategy.." see: James DeNardo, The Amateur
Strategist: lntuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Arms Race, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1995j, pp. 1-17. The point is not that amateur intuitive common sense" is correct, but that when expert strategic intellectualizing
becomes widely disconnected from it, the danger of losing national consensus and thus support for sustaining the military
strategy becomes politically problematic.
26 James Madison said that a 'popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue
to a Farce or a Tragedy, or perhaps both'. As a principal guarantor of US national security, the Department of Defense has a
special obligation to keep the nation informed." Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Foreword," to The Department of Defense:
Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, (Washington, DC: Historical Omce, Omce of the Secretary of
Defense, 1978j, p. iii.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS SURROGATE
35
Open and explicit analysis rather than implicit and intuitive assumptions.
27
Tis was a real improvement and, whatever the complaints, few argued for a return to the old
system, and McNamara pushed it to the extreme: I equate planning and budgeting and consider
the terms almost synonymous, with the budget being simply a quantitative expression of the
operating plans.
28
Practically, however, there were several problems in the McNamara approach. First, unlike at Ford
Motor where the analyst policemen were actually embedded at every level of every organization,
Enthovens Systems Analysts were, like a sophist watching the shadows on Platos cave, outside
the military organization looking in with surrogate measures of efectiveness.
29
Second, and more
subtle, having hooked the Pentagon on the PPBS with its linear programming so helpful to
27 For a good summary description, see: Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, op cit: pp. 32-48.
28 Robert S. McNamara, testimony, in Organizing for National Security, (Washington, DC: Subcommittee on National Policy
Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, US Senate, 1961j, vol. l, p. 1197.
29 James R. Schlesinger, Defense Planning and Budgeting: The lssue of Centralized Control," (RAND paper 3464; Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, June 1967j; James R. Schlesinger, Defense Planning and Budgeting: The lssue of Centralized Control,"
(RAND paper 3813; Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1968j; Wesley W. Posver, Dispersion of the Strategy-Making
Establishment," in American Defense Policy, edited by Mark E. Smith lll and Claude J. John Jr., (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1968j; and William A. Niskanen, Defense Management After McNamara," (lDA N-589; Arlington, vA: lnstitute for Defense
Analysis, 1968j; and William A. Niskanen, Coherent Decentralization of US Defense Force Planning," in lnterorganizational
Decision Making, edited by (Chicago, lL: Aldine, 1972j, pp. 277-286.
Figure 1
PHILLIP A. KARBER
36
careful auditing
30
it reinforced the military predisposition to favor material force structure over
ethereal strategizing.
31
As illustrated in the fgure above,
32
although the PPBS system depended
upon Strategy input to initiate it and incorporated opportunities for Assessment feedback, its
sequential multi-year cumulative linearity made the process rigid and the strategy unrefective.
However, turning planning into an administrative auditing process
33
came at a cost of
imagination and creativity.
34
In the extreme, the approach of PPBS in the late 1960s carried the
danger that strategy would emerge de facto from a stream of acquisition decisions, rather than
independently providing the basis for those decisions.
35
Tird, with analytic policemen tending
to treat the military as planning criminals and all the resultant years of open warfare between OSD
and the Services, animosities were so deep that basic cooperation, let along joint brainstorming,
took more efort than it was worth.
36

It is easy to dismiss the McNamara era gap between civilians and uniforms by demeaning clichs
like military mindset or efete intellectuals.
37
However, on closer examination the diference is
not whether one side was thinking correctly and the other idiots, but rather that they were thinking
diferently.
38
Te classic Chinese strategist Sun Tzu gave a defnition of the strategic arts that is
relevant here:
the Five Strategic Arts are:
First, measurements;
Second, estimates;
Tird, analysis;
Fourth, balancing;
30 A Modern Design for Defense Decision: A McNamara-Hitch-Enthoven Anthology, edited by Samuel A. Tucker, (Washington, DC:
lndustrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966j.
31 Alluded to in both James R. Schlesinger, The Changing Environment for Systems Analysis," (RAND paper 3287; Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 1965j; and Harold Brown, Planning for Military Forces," Foreign Affairs, vol. 45, (January 1967j.
32 The Joint Staf Omcer's Guide 2000," (JFSC Pub. 1; Norfolk, vA, 2000j, Fig. 2-3.
33 For a critique of this administrative audit mentality, see: lda R. Hoos, Systems Analysis in Public Policy - A Critique, (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1972j; Allen Schick, A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB," Public
Administration Review, vol. 33, (March-April 1973j: pp. 146-156; and Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary
Process, (Glenview, lL: Scott, Foresman, 1987j.
34 The ascendancy of management and the decline of policy, the elaboration of structure and technique, and the faltering of
innovation and bargaining mark the McNamara years. lt is clear that while imagination and fexibility are vital in the determination
of policy and strategy, the thrust of the new management has made for increasing rigidity. lt is clear that while a creative,
reinforcing tension between military and civilian professionalism is indispensable to national security policy, the thrust of the
new management has been to neutralize such pluralism." James M. Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the
Secretary of Defense, (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 1970j, pp. 20-21.
35 Pickett, Roche, and Watts, Net Assessment: A Historical Review," op cit., p. 165; and Gregory Palmer, The McNamara Strategy
and the vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978j.
36 James Schlesinger, Uses and Abuses of Analysis," Hearings, (Washington, DCL US Senate Committee on Government
Operations, Planning Programming Budgeting, Government Printing Omce, 1970j; and Hanson W. Baldwin, Slow-Down in the
Pentagon," in Defense, Science, and Public Policy, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1968j.
37 While Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, op cit: pp. 242-245 was a pains to downplay the downgrading of the military," other
respected commentators made it their point of departure in a critique of both the strategy and the method used to analyze
it; for example, the long-time military editor for the New York Times: Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow, (New York,
NY: Harper & Row, 1970j: p. 15 quoting Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., . where civilian authorities dominate the decision-making
process in matters exclusively military . then national catastrophe may result."
38 This was recognized by Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, op cit: p. xii: .
the diferences we describe between independent civilian analysts and career military omcers, between the Systems Analysis
omce and the Military Services, between concern for the national interest and concern for parochial interests, though real and
important, are diference of degree, not of kind." However, our point here is that, the mental starting points for strategizing were
in fact at opposite ends of abstraction and logic.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS SURROGATE
37
Fifth, triumph.
39
Sun Tzus list of fve key attributes is not random but refects both a hierarchy of abstraction and
difering forms of reasoning.
40
As illustrated in Figure 2, the fve elements are actually sequential
and can be hierarchically placed on an ordinal scale that ranks deductive logic on one end and
inductive empiricism on the other. Traditional military thought treats the lower order empirical
39 These are the opening lines of Sun Tzu's classic, The Art of Strategy: A New Translation of Sun Tzu's Classic The Art of War,
(translated by R. L. Wing; New York, NY: Doubleday, 1988j, chpt. l, sec. 1. The Wing translation, which the author prefers -
including re-naming the work as the art of strategy" rather than the art of war" - is used throughout this paper.
40 This Sun Tzu approach was frst applied experimentally in my 1975 briefng of the TAC Air Net Assessment," then discussed in
the 1979 TRADOC Battlefeld Development Plan, frst presented as a coherent argument in Secretary Weinberger's Counter-
Ofensive" and Competitive Strategy" studies of 1982-1983, and most well known with Ambassador Abshire in our NATO Net
Assessment for the US Congress where this paradigm was used as the organizing principle for the report; see: P.A. Karber,
Battlefeld Leverage: Hierarchy and Transition in Central Battle," (paper presented at symposium on Battlefeld Development
Plan, Ft. Monroe, vA: TRADOC, Spring 1979j; P.A. Karber, The Counter-Ofensive," (briefng for SecDef; Washington,
DC: Strategic Concepts Development Center, December 1982j; P.A. Karber, Competitive Strategy," (briefng for SecDef;
Washington, DC: Strategic Concepts Development Center, January 1983j; and Amb. David M. Abshire and Phillip A. Karber,
NATO Net Assessment," (testimony before full Committee Hearings, 100th Congress Daily Digest; Washington, DC: Committee
on Armed Services, Senate, US Congress, 27 January, 1988j, pp. D23-D28. For useful insight into the depth of Sun Tzu's
meaning, see: Gary Gagliardi, Sun Tzu's 'The Art of War' and lts Amazing Secrets - the Keys to Strategy, (Seattle, WA: Science
of Strategy lnstitute, Clearbridge Publishing, 1999j; and Chow Hou Wee, Sun Zi: Art of War: An lllustrated Translation with Asian
Perspectives and lnsights, (Singapore, Sl: Pearson-Prentice Hall, 2003j.
Figure 2
PHILLIP A. KARBER
38
issues as the common sense part of the appreciation of the situation that comes with experience
based judgment, but the area they tend to emphasize is deduced guidance from political superiors
articulating National Interests, defnition of threats and allocating resource commitments. Te
systems analysis perspective starts at the other end of the spectrum focused on collecting and
measuring as much information as possible in order to inductively derive their comparisons and
conclusions.
41
Te senior military leaders are afraid of uncertainty in national objectives and political
will, while the civilian strategists sought to avoid subjective qualitative judgment. But neither of
these two approaches can cover the range of thought required for sound strategy development. If
intuitive experience is weak without structured empirical verifcation, the danger of quantifed
systems analysis is introuvable data
42
and, even worse, not knowing what is missing. Te more
rigorous and empirically dependent the measurement, the greater the chance of its signifcance
being distorted or overwhelmed by the unknown.
Tis highlights the value of net evaluation or assessment eforts. Because they employ abductive
reasoning inference to the best explanation
43
they can avoid some of the major pitfalls of
linear deduction or entropic induction making conscious estimates to plot trend data, analyze
asymmetries, as well as explore the interactions of strengths and vulnerabilities. Another advantage
41 When asked to give an example of quantitative measurements applied to nuclear strategic forces, McNamara gave this extended
example: A major mission of these forces is to deter war by their capability to destroy the enemy's war-making capabilities
[deleted|. With the kinds of weapons available to us, this task presents a problem of reasonably fnite dimensions, which are
measurable in terms of the number and type of targets or aiming points which must be destroyed and the number and types of
weapon delivery systems required to do the job under various sets of conditions.
The frst step in such a calculation is to determine the number, types and locations of the aiming points in the target
system.
The second step is to determine the numbers and explosive yields of weapons which must be delivered on the aiming
points to insure the destruction or substantial destruction of the target system.
The third step involves a determination of the size and character of the forces best suited to deliver these weapons,
taking into account such factors as -
The number and weight of warheads that each type of vehicle can deliver.
The ability of each type of vehicle to penetrate enemy defenses.
The degree of accuracy that can be expected of each system, i.e., the CEP..
The degree of reliability of each system, i.e., the proportion of the ready operational inventory that we count on
getting of successfully within the prescribe time.
The cost/efectiveness of each system, i.e., the combat efectiveness per dollar of outlay.." Etc.
Robert S. McNamara, Testimony," Hearings on Military Posture, (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee,
1962j: p. 3171.
42 lmportant, balance determinative variables, for which hard, comparative, reliable empirical data is not available.
43 Robert Burch, lnference to the Best Explanation," in A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, edited by W.H. Newton-Smith,
(London, UK: Blackwell, 2000j: pp. 184-193. Abductive reasoning typically begins with an incomplete set of observations and
proceeds to the likeliest possible explanation for the set. Abductive reasoning yields the kind of daily decision-making that does
its best with the information at hand, which often is incomplete. A medical diagnosis is an application of abductive reasoning:
given this set of symptoms, what is the diagnosis that would best explain most of them? Likewise, when jurors hear evidence in
a criminal case, they must consider whether the prosecution or the defense has the best explanation to cover all the points of
evidence. While there may be no certainty about their verdict, since there may exist additional evidence that was not admitted
in the case, they make their best guess based on what they know. While cogent inductive reasoning requires that the evidence
that might shed light on the subject be fairly complete, whether positive or negative, abductive reasoning is characterized by
lack of completeness, either in the evidence, or in the explanation, or both. A patient may be unconscious or fail to report every
symptom, for example, resulting in incomplete evidence, or a doctor may arrive at a diagnosis that fails to explain several of the
symptoms. Still, he must reach the best diagnosis he can. The abductive process can be creative, intuitive, even revolutionary."
Deductive, lnductive, and Abductive Reasoning," Paul Thagard and Cameron Shelley. Abductive Reasoning: Logic, visual
Thinking, and Coherence," (Waterloo, Ontario: Philosophy Department, University of Waterloo, 1997j at. < http://cogsci.
uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/%7FAbductive.html> [accessed 10 February 2010|. The term abduction" was coined by American
philosopher, C.S. Peirce: Now, that the matter of no new truth can come from induction or from deduction, we have seen. lt can
only come from abduction; and abduction is, after all, nothing but guessing. We are therefore bound to hope that, although the
possible explanations of our facts may be strictly innumerable, yet our mind will be able, in some fnite number of guesses, to
guess the sole true explanation of them. That we are bound to assume, independently of any evidence that it is true. Animated
by that hope, we are to proceed to the construction of a hypothesis." C. S. Peirce, On the Logic of drawing History from Ancient
Documents, Especially from Testimonies", MS c. 1901, published 1958 in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 7,
paragraph 164-231.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS SURROGATE
39
of abduction is that it ofers a bridge that spans the spectrum from induction to deduction; and
is thus a useful integrative device in contrast to strategy inferred from either frst principles or
a data dump. Compared to the command presumptions of SAC or the quantifed data of the
Systems Analysts, the work of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee provides an excellent example of
the value of an abductively driven methodology one that uses empirical data where available, but
does not shrink from hypothesizing expectations where it is not.
4
DEMISE OF NET EVALUATION
Secretary McNamara was a very powerful man. He just felt he had enough
trouble in trying to overcome resistance in NATO and he didnt need any more
resistance, especially from within his own building So he arranged with the
President that that was the end of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, which in
a way was too bad, because something like that was needed, and still is needed.
1
Tere were two prime areas during the Kennedy Administration where the method of comparative
force balances had an impact on strategy, and where strategy had an impact on method. Te frst
was strategic forces; and the second was the conventional balance in Central Europe. Both topics
were hotbeds of politico-military controversy, both issues were debated utilizing the leading edge
analytical tools of the day. Te methodology and studies of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, and
the NESC itself, were at the center of both controversies
President Kennedy had campaigned on closing the missile gap, and both the 1961 Berlin Crisis
and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis underscored the importance of strategic balance.
2
Although
there was no shortage of controversy, this was an area where refned Force-on-Force analytical
techniques had been in development for over a decade and one of the leaders in using them to inform
the political leadership was the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. A major initiative of Secretary
McNamara was in developing a robust but not open ended rational for American strategic force
levels particularly the felding of the new generation Minuteman ICBMs to ofset the growing
vulnerability of manned bombers.
3
In his memorandum to the President, the SecDef based much
of his initial targeting priorities and missile allocation derived from studies performed in June
1961 by the Staf of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, under the direction of Lieutenant General
Tomas Hickey.
4
Likewise, when the JCS responded, they also deferred to NESC data and
1 Kennedy, lnterview with James E. Goodby," op cit.
2 Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program in the Kennedy Administration, (Berkley, CA: University
of California Press, 1981j.
3 The frst requirement . is clearly to maintain our nuclear strike power as a realistic, efective deterrent against Soviet initiation
of major wars. We can no longer hop to have such a deterrent merely by maintaining a larger stockpile of nuclear weapons. Our
weapons must be hardened, dispersed, and mobile so that they can survive an enemy attack, and they must be equipped with
the most sophisticated devices necessary to penetrate enemy defenses." Robert S. McNamara, Address before the Fellows of
the American Bar Foundation," (Chicago, lL: 17 February 1962j, quoted in Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, op cit: pp. 74-75.
4 Robert S. McNamara, Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy," (23 September 1961j,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963volume vlll, National Security Policy, Document 46, pp. 138-152. The cited Net
Evaluation Subcommittee work was: A Study of Requirements for U.S. Strategic Systems: Preliminary Report," dated June 1961.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
42
analysis.
5
In theory, the strategic analysis of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee should have continued to
provide common ground between the civilian strategists and military leadership, but all too soon
those in the middle of the road got hit from both directions. First, the JCS used the unfnished
research of the NESC as an excuse to prevaricate;
6
and then OSD responded with a 17 page attack
on Subcommittee methodology in the snide condescension that came to characterize whiz kid
critique.
7
Te underlying issue was fundamentally not one of force structure, resources or NESC
methodology but the philosophy of controlled response strategy.
With a December 22 memorandum to McNamara, Charles J. Hitch, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), enclosed a 17-page evaluation of the Hickey
Report. In the memorandum Hitch stated that his evaluation concluded that the
requirements for a controlled response strategy were exaggerated in the Hickey
study, and its feasibility underestimated. I see no reason why we cannot have a
satisfactory posture for a controlled response strategy by 1964 if not sooner. I reject
the suggestion implicit in the Hickey Study that all of these advanced capabilities
must be achieved before it makes sense to abandon the spasm war concept. Tere
was nothing in the Hickey study necessitating a change in the decisions you have
already made for FY 1963 procurement.
8
Te Kennedy Administration wanted to reduce the spasm efect of a full strategic strike by
introducing various options of numerical restraint and target withhold short of Armageddon while
the JCS believed that the best chance of limiting damage to the US homeland and saving American
lives was to go ugly early.
9
In retrospect this was not an issue that was going to be decided by
sharp pencils and simulations: no matter which way it went, both sides were literally playing with
fre in making assumptions about human nature in a nuclear exchange.
10
For the next three years the issue of controlled response strategy was at the heart of the internal
American strategic debate. In early 1963, President Kennedy issued the following Directive:
(Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3463, 381 Hickey Report 19 Apr 61j.
5 General L.L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staf, Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staf to Secretary of Defense
McNamara," (17 November 1961j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963volume vlll, National Security Policy,
Document 54, pp. 195-197.
6 Since a fnal report of General Hickey's group is expected in December, it is assumed that a more defnitive exposition of target
destruction requirements can thereby be expected." lbid.
7 The fnal Net Evaluation Subcommittee was titled: A Study of Requirements for U.S. Strategic Systems: Final Report," (1
December 1961j which concluded that controlled response strategy could not be implemented until late in the 1960s because
a number of necessary advanced weapons systems such as Advanced Minuteman and a manned reconnaissance strike aircraft
would not be available until then. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 4700 (1 Jun 61j Sec
1Aj. The critique was authored by: Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptrollerj, Memorandum to McNamara,"
(22 December 1961j, (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3463, 381 Hickey Report 19 April 61j,
ibid.
8 Hitch, Memorandum to McNamara," op cit.
9 ln the infamous words of Lt. General Ray Sitton, who had served as Strategic Air Command Deputy Chief for Plans and Deputy
Chief for Operations, and latter J-3 Director for Operations, Joint Staf, JCS. ln context the quote was: Look Karber, civilian
strategists in peacetime ask 'how many Russians can we hold hostage' but in wartime military operators are going to be
asked by the President: 'how many American lives can you save'. The answer to that question is not to play games with limited
strike options, but throw the kitchen sink at them in one mass strike - 'go ugly early'." Gen. Sitton to P.A. Karber during DoD
CPX Proud Prophet," March 1983, where the former played CJCS stand in for JCS Chairman Jack vessey and the latter was
surrogate for SecDef Caspar Weinberger.
10 A point made by Thomas C. Schelling, Assumptions about Enemy Behavior," in Analysis for Military Decisions: The RAND
Lectures on Systems Analysis, edited by Edward S. Quade, (Chicago, lL: Rand McNally, 1966j: pp. 199-216.
DEMISE OF NET EVALUATION
43
Te NESC will develop studies of a series of general wars initiated yearly during
the period 1963 through 1968. Comparative results in each year war will be
determined with emphasis on the degree of damage sustained by the US and an
analysis will be made to identify signifcant trends in national defense capabilities.
11
Based on Presidential tasking, the NESC laid out a careful research program focused on attempts
to limit the mass casualty efects of an initial US/Soviet strategic nuclear exchange.
12
In the words
of the only civilian assigned to the NESC:
there was a feeling, particularly among the top people in the Kennedy
administration, that Eisenhower had let the whole nuclear weapons issue get too
much out of hand, and that there were a lot of nuclear weapons around, and that
the idea of a nuclear war was just kind of a spasm war everything lets fy and
you dont know how to stop it. And there were a lot of people in the Cambridge
group, Harvard and MIT, that thought that should change.
And one of them was a man named Tomas Schelling, quite a prominent fgure
in academic circles, who had done a lot of work on games and modeling of various
diplomatic situations as well. He persuaded Walt Rostow that there ought to be
a study of what was called war management and termination. And the basic idea
was to try to get away from the idea of just sort of a massive, all-out attack on
the Soviet Union and try to think about a more managed kind of confict, and
especially how do you stop that kind of a nuclear war. Walt persuaded Maxwell
Taylor, who was then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that point, to use an
NSC apparatus [the Net Evaluation Subcommittee], over which the Joint Chiefs
had control, to do this study of war management and termination.
According to Goodby, the military staf on the NESC were very skeptical of this idea of war
management and termination.
And I think they had good right to be, at that particular point, because we couldnt
do it; there wasnt the command and control capacity to manage a nuclear war.
And they didnt really feel that nuclear war was something that you ought to treat
as a conventional war. And, on that issue, I shared their point of view one hundred
percent. In other words, the idea that you would consider nuclear weapons the
same as kind of a nuclear artillery and plan to use it in increments did not really
appeal to me, at least at that point. And, at that point, it simply wasnt feasible to
do it anyway, because we just didnt have the tools to do it with.
To me, this whole idea of, well, if we send a message by one explosion here that
takes out a city of 50,000, theyll do this. these things are so terribly destructive
that I cant imagine a military commander, once it started, saying, Well, gee, they
11 Presidential tasking cited in: Oral Report," Net Evaluation Subcommittee, National Security Council, (227 August 1963j,
[Excised copy, FOlA release, formerly TOP SECRET|, NARA, Record Group 218. Joint Chiefs of Staf Records (RG 218j,
Chairman's Files, Records Of Maxwell Taylor, box 25, 381 Net Evaluation, as 8. 'A Period of Nuclear Stalemate'," ln Special
Collection: Some Key Documents on Nuclear Policy lssues, 1945-1990," edited by William Burr, National Security Archive, (15
June 2007j, at <
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/special/index.htm#9 > [accessed 12 March 2010|.
12 Defned as the complete exchange of strategic nuclear ofensive weapons in their initial attacks and does not include restrike,
reserve, or residual capabilities. lbid: p. 6.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
44
sent a better signal than we did, therefore were going to quit.
I think there was a feeling among the military that these were horrendous weapons
that really would come close to destroying civilization. their basic idea was
that if you get into a war, you do not hold back, you do not give the enemy the
initiative. And their worry was that, okay, you send a signal by a nuclear
weapon, and you give the enemy the initiative, and he comes back with everything
he has. And their preference would be, if were going to get into a nuclear war,
then lets go in it with everything we have and hope for the best. And that was the
basic philosophy.
13
On this issue, the uniformed military were generally on one side, the Administrations civilian
strategists on the other, with the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in the middle.
Tus, the net evaluation project for 1963 was directed to study Te Management and Termination
of War with the Soviet Union.
14
Te terms of reference were developed by an interagency panel
headed by Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of
State, and were based on the report of an interdepartmental group under Mr. Tomas C. Schelling
which examined certain long-range aspects.
15
Te NESC did a thorough job of studying the issues
and concluded that full consideration must be given to the problems of war management and
termination in all planning for war and that doing so will increase the likelihood of a successful
application of political actions and military forces to deter the Soviet Union from intensifying a
war should one occur as well as cause Soviet leaders to seek to end the war under conditions
acceptable to the US.
16
Te study was very balanced in its assessment and in diferentiating what was desirable from
what was likely. What the general issue of limited nuclear war raised, and the NESC was
uncovering, was the radical redefnition of the role and responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief
in the nuclear age.
17
It highlighted the uncertainties involved in trying to fght a limited nuclear
13 Kennedy, lnterview with James E. Goodby," op cit.
14 A Study of the Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union," (Washington, DC: The Staf of the Net Evaluation
Subcommittee of the National Security Council, 15 November 1963j.
15 Walt W. Rostow and Thomas C. Schelling, Terms of Reference," (undatedj, Appendix, ibid: pp. 73-76: lt is US policy to develop
a capability so that, in the event of war with the USSR, military force can be used in a discriminating manner, to bring about a
cessation on terms acceptable to the United States, to deter Soviet anti-population attacks on the USA and its allies, and to
avoid unnecessary damage in enemy countries. Terms for cessation could be both political and military. The US war aim would
not be 'unconditional destruction'.. Detailed plans for the coordination of military forces with war objectives and negotiations
appear neither feasible nor desirable. Detailed planning can help to assure that military forces, information and communication,
operational plans, decision procedures, and possibly enemy expectations, are adapted to this concept of war conduct. The
ways in which this concept might be carried out should be expected to vary over time. The following planning tasks are essential
to the concept.
1. The possible stopping points in war with the USSR;
2. The information and communications that would be available, and that can be developed, to support this concept;
3. Criteria for targeting;
4. The forces best suited for the terminal stage of war, for secure policing of a truce, and for post-war security and support of
war aims;
5. Decision and negotiation in war."
16 A Study of the Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union," op cit: pp. 67-72.
17 ln an escalating war situation, there are inherent stopping points which could be exploited to US advantage by deliberate war
management practices. However, the problem of deciding between alternative course of action at these important turning points
would be complex. To be efective, they would have to be supported by an evaluation of military actions relative to political aims.
Since the most critical of these decisions would involve consideration of changing the level or intensity of warfare they would
require Presidential action.. ln all the situations examined it was clear that the President must exercise his role as Commander-
in-Chief in a manner not previously required. The President must be supported by a mechanism which can bring to rapid focus
DEMISE OF NET EVALUATION
45
war, but constructively identifed ways of reducing them. Tese included:
Anticipatory Planning;
18
Creation of a National Command Center;
19
Establishing a Reconnaissance system for pre-war, intra-war and post-war monitoring
and its direct link to the National Command Center.
20

If the United States was going to fght a nuclear war, let alone attempt a controlled response
strategy these would be essential, and their absence reinforced the impression that promotion of
limited options was way ahead of the ability to execute them.
21
Te NESC study ran afoul of the Administration in three areas. First, in asking for clearer
strategy guidance
22
and recommending an expansion of the NSC to provide the Commander-in-
Chief with his own war planning staf in peacetime
23
it clashed with the Secretary of Defense who
responded with intense antagonism.
24
In trying to honestly develop controlled response options, the
NESC brief-out
25
managed to unintentionally convince President Kennedy that whatever window
those political and military factors which relate to the existing situation as well as to provide previously considered judgements
[sic| of the possible consequences of the courses of action being considered. ln particular, he must have available his chief
political and military advisors who can be supported at the command center by staf and a continuing fow of information. Such
an organization should not be assembled on an ad hoc basis, but rather must have existed prior to the need arising and have
been operating in an integrated political-military environment." lbid: p. 70.
18 lncrease sophistication in the control and management of wars involving the threat of nuclear escalation will require an
extraordinary degree of anticipatory planning in order to ensure that the President is provided with the means to make timely,
considered decisions and the assurance that a wide range of possible decisions can be properly carried out." Such anticipatory
planning would encompass specifc actions such as: Adoption of procedure to acquaint the President with examples of the
types of decisions he may be called upon to make under conditions of extreme urgency and adoption of means to ensure that
his principal advisors are continuously able to provide the most accurate and timely joint evaluation of his military, political and
economic consequences of alternative course of action." lbid: pp. 70-71.
19 Adopt the concept of a National Command Center organized, stafed, and equipped wherein the President and his key advisors,
both civilian and military, assemble for managing a war." lbid: p. 72.
20 lbid.
21 A point made repeatedly by Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960j.
22 What is sought is war planning which is more efective because national objectives and war aims are more precisely defned.
What is also sought is a common understanding by political and military planners of the possible efects of alternative courses
of action once war has begun. The latter process could be of most importance since it could be a means whereby the President
and his principal advisors, in review such plans, could be made aware of the nature of decisions which would confront them
should contingency plans be implemented." A Study of the Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union," op cit:
pp. 67-68.
23 Recommendation.. That a subcommittee of the National Security Council be formed which would have the overall
responsibility for the integration of political and military factors in the provision of guidance for war planning at the national level.
This subcommittee, which would be composed of senior members of agencies represented on the NSC, would operate on a
permanent basis to the end that the President is provided with the means to make timely considered decisions on the basis of
a full appreciation of all of the political-military aspects which may result from adoption of alternative courses of action." lbid: p.
72.
24 Walt W. Rostow, Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State to
Secretary of State Rusk," (23 July 1963j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963volume vlll, National Security Policy,
Document 136, pp. 489-490. l should report to you the state of the BNSP [Basic National Security Policy| in the Pentagon. You
will recall that, at Secretary McNamara's request, you referred the draft BNSP back for another round of work which would give
the JCS a chance to thrash out its views with DOD. After that work had gone forward nearly to resolution Secretary McNamara
shifted his earlier favorable view to a judgment that the BNSP was not necessary for the conduct of his business.. Thus, so far
as the Pentagon is now concerned the BNSP is dead.. Whatever the limitations inherent in any such document, l doubt that it
will redound to the credit of our Administration that we failed to thrash out any successor document. A BNSP obviously cannot
substitute for specifc policy judgments; and it should not tie the President's hands. But it can provide an occasion for debating
and defning the bone structure of policy and communicating it to the troops.." For further discussion of the BNSP strategy
guidance" debate, see: Walter S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol.
vlll: 1961-1964 Part l, The Structure of National Defense, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1998j: p. 18.
25 Gen. Leon Johnson, USAF, Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, Oral Report," Net Evaluation Subcommittee, National
Security Council, (27 August 1963j, [Excised copy, FOlA release, formerly TOP SECRET|, NARA, Record Group 218. Joint Chiefs
of Staf Records (RG 218j, Chairman's Files, Records of Maxwell Taylor, Box 25, 381 Net Evaluation, as 8. 'A Period of Nuclear
PHILLIP A. KARBER
46
of opportunity may have made limited nuclear war feasible or desirable, it was rapidly closing.
26

General Taylor presented the Net Evaluation Subcommittee report
2
and
introduced General Leon Johnson, with the suggestion that the President might
wish to question him about the report.
Te President asked whether, even if we attack the USSR frst, the loss to the U.S.
would be unacceptable to political leaders. General Johnson replied that it would
be, i.e. even if we preempt, surviving Soviet capability is sufcient to produce an
unacceptable loss in the US.
Te President asked whether then in fact we are in a period of nuclear stalemate.
General Johnson replied that we are.
Te President said these fatality fgures were much higher than those he had heard
recently in Omaha.
4
As he recalled it, SAC estimated 12 million casualties.
General Taylor said these were higher casualty fgures than the President had ever
seen. Todays fgures include two new factors:
1. Soviet weapons were targeted on U.S. cities.
2. Te use by the Soviets of huge megaton weapons was included in the
computations for the frst time.
General Johnson replied that no matter what we do we cant get below 51 million
casualties in the event of a nuclear exchange.
27
PresidentI have been told that if I ever released a nuclear weapon on the
battlefeld I should start a pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union as the use of
nuclear weapons was bound to escalate and we might as well get the advantage by
going frst.
SpeakerGen. JohnsonStated he did not consider this necessarily true under
the circumstances which exist.
28
A period of nuclear stalemate was in direct contradiction with NATOs declaratory MC-14/2
Deterrent Strategy which depended upon American willingness to initiate early strategic strikes
in the event of a failing conventional defense. Tus, the NESC briefng brought to a head the
nuclear linkage between US intercontinental strategic forces and NATO committed assets at the
theater level particularly the role and vulnerability of forward based strike aircraft at a time the
administration was trying to create a frebreak between Europes conventional defense and nuclear
deterrence.
Of the wide variety of strategic issues addressed during the McNamara tenure, with topics ranging
from intercontinental nuclear exchange to the Vietnam War, none cut to the core of strategy
development like the debates associated with the Administrations push to convert NATO war
Stalemate'," in Special Collection: Some Key Documents on Nuclear Policy lssues, 1945-1990," edited by William Burr, National
Security Archive, (15 June 2007j, at < http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/special/index.htm#9> [accessed 12 Mar. 2010|.
26 The NESC briefng for President Kennedy was one of the most important turning points in his Administration's nuclear strategy.
27 Bromley Smith, Summary Record of the 517th Meeting of the National Security Council: Report of the Net Evaluation
Subcommittee," (12 September 1963j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963volume vlll, National Security Policy,
Document 141, pp. 499-507.
28 Resume of Discussion during the NESC Briefng of 12 September 1963," attached to ibid.
DEMISE OF NET EVALUATION
47
plans to Flexible Response.
One of the frst major policy changes ought by the Kennedy administration in
196` was to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense and
increase the reliance on conventional forces, especially in NATO. Tis change in
strategy was not ofcially adopted by NATO unit May 1967. During the interval,
millions of words were written and spoken, both in this country and in Europe,
regarding the merits and implications of this change.
29
Under Secretary McNamaras direction, the Enthoven Systems Analysis group had been
attempting to measure the Central European convention balance, in part to identify the prospects
for conventional defense, and in part to generate support for the idea.
Tese types of static side-by-side comparisons popularized by Systems Analysis throughout the
1960s had both positive and negative aspects in terms of assessing a major theater military balance.
On the constructive side, they made a contribution by:
Defning diferent categories of weaponry and not relying on the traditional division
counts that had been quite misleading;
Trying to compare apples to apples by diferentiating active versus low ready and reserve
29 Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, op cit: p. 117.
Figure 3
M-Day Land Forces in the European Central Region in Mid-1968
PHILLIP A. KARBER
48
forces;
Carefully delimiting the geographic scope of the comparison; and where military assets
were being counted;
Contrasting the diferent approaches to logistics and support; and
Highlighting anomalies and inconsistencies.
As illustrated in the following fgure, this was the frst time in the Cold War, that an attempt
was made to explicitly compare and contrast NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels and relative
advantages.
On the other hand, there were also serious faws in the approach;
A tendency to downplay or paper over disturbing asymmetries for example, the Warsaw
Pact advantage in ofensive tank and armored formations;
A tendency to tip the scales in counting for example, including quarter ton Jeeps in
NATOs truck count, which made 30% diference for blue, but was not a factor for red;
A tendency to make optimistic assumptions about NATO mobilization and reaction time;
A tendency to highlight diferences between American forces and Soviet, but ignore equal
or even greater anomolies between US and NATO units;
A tendency to pretend that Nuclear Weapons were out of the equation, when in fact both
sides had thousands deployed and dual capable systems were a major feature of the forces
as well as future contingency plans; and,
A tendency to treat side-by-side comparisons as if they refected military face-to-face
combat and with it the utter disregard of military operational planning.
Unfortunately for the credibility of the comparative process, most of the negatives appeared to not
just be issues associated with bean counting but refected a less than honest efort to load the
analytical dice and use weighted scales to sell a the Administrations political message.
Te Net Evaluation Subcommittee study plan for 1964 focused on the NATO-Warsaw Pact
military balance in Central Europe. Tis was the frst time the NESC had focused on a major theater
where the complexity of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces overlapped.
Secretary of State found the study interesting;
Tere are some fndings of the report on which I should like to comment. First, I
agree completely that political and psychological factors will be important, and in
some situations may be determining, in the decisions to release nuclear weapons.
It is for this reason that I have always felt that we need not only a wide range
of options, but also efective means for exercising initial and continuing control
by the President, over the use of all types of nuclear weapons. I believe it would
be helpful, if it has not already been done, to brief the President on what can
and cannot be accomplished with existing systems and procedures in exercising
selective control over the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. We should
then seek means of remedying defciencies in pres-ent control systems.
Second, I was impressed by the description of the restrictions of SACEURs
fexibility in the use of NATO forces in limited aggression situations. I concur in
the judgment that situations may arise in which the risk inherent in degrading
NATOs general war posture in Europe is more than ofset by the advantages of
bringing decisive conventional forces to bear in a limited confict. While we must
exercise considerable care to avoid the impression among our allies that we are
DEMISE OF NET EVALUATION
49
prepared to contemplate a World War II conventional hostility limited to Europe,
or that we would not carry out our nuclear commitments, it is important that we
place our emphasis on the more likely sort of contingencies, with the expectation
that in time our allies will agree with the wisdom of such action. Tis suggests
that SACEUR should prepare, by the way of planning or training, more than
he has in the past for contingencies in which some degrading of his general war
posture is permitted by higher authority in order to cope with a limited confict.
In particular, I would hope additional efort would be directed at the problem of
unpremeditated confict arising from the present unsettled situation in Central
Europe. I understand that this, and other ideas to improve SACEURs capabilities
for situations less than general war are under continuing discussions among
Ambassador Tompson, Mr. McNaughton and General Goodpaster. I hope that
we will be able to reach a considered judgment about this matter at an early date.
Tird, I fully endorse the position that there should be continuing inter-agency work
on improving our crisis management capability, to include a timely development of
contingency plans identifying the politico-military courses of action in anticipation
of a crisis. Pursuant to an exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of
Defense and me, we have established a small senior level coordinating committee
precisely to fll this need.
Fourth, I am entirely in accord with the suggestion that there should be close
State-Defense collaboration in developing the portions of the JSCP and JSOP
having to do with national and military objectives and strategic concepts.
30
Rusk concluded by assuring the JSC that we will make every efort to avoid creating delays in the
JSCP and JSOP timetables as a result of Department of State participation.
Te most recently completed NESC study was an evaluation of a war conducted in 1964
between the US, its Allies, and the Soviet Bloc based on current U.S. war plans with the overall
purpose to evaluate the validity and feasibility of this type of analysis as a basis for providing
guidance for political-military planning.
31
As one of the participants remembers, I stayed with
the Net Evaluation Subcommittee for another study, and the next one was on NATO. But:
there we also ran into a disagreement with the top people in the Kennedy
Administration; not over fundamentals, but over implementation mainly. What
Kennedy wanted to do was to change NATO strategy away from the idea of heavy
reliance on nuclear weapons, which was the Eisenhower notion, and to what was
called Flexible Response, something that Maxwell Taylor had been advocating
for a long time and that Kennedy felt was the right approach. Tat doctrine said
that you do not use nuclear weapons automatically, you try frst to see what you
can do with conventional, in efect. I supported the basic policy and hoped, in a
study that we were asked to do in that Evaluation Subcommittee, that it would
be shown that that was a feasible policy. Well, we traveled to Europe and talked
to a lot of military commanders and concluded that in order to have a successful
30 Dean Rusk, Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf (Wheelerj," (23 November 964j,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968volume X, National Security Policy, Document 62, pp. 180-181.
31 Robert S. McNamara, Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson," (undatedj, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968volume X, National Security Policy, pp. 201-203.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
50
conventional defense, there was a great deal of work that needed to be done. You
just couldnt adopt that kind of a strategy without making some pretty signifcant
changes in the way the military was structured, and basically said that in our
report to the NSC. Briefed Maxwell Taylor on it, who was a little taken aback,
but not nearly as taken aback as Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense.
We briefed him on the fndings of the report one morning, and he was highly
critical and said we hadnt taken various things into account. And of course there
were some things we hadnt taken into account. Our basic stance, though, was not
that we were quarreling with the idea that we ought to have a good conventional
defense in Europe, but that we were moving too fast in trying to persuade the
NATO countries that it should be done basically overnight. Te result of that was
that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was essentially discontinued.
32
Lest the intent be missed, the interviewer asked: What was the motivation behind McNamaras
disagreeing? And: Was it because you were running against what was essentially a political
decision and you were coming up with, say, the hard facts, that this wont [work]? Answer: Yes,
essentially thats what it was.
Tus, in the name of maintaining the Pentagon on message, McNamara fred for efect in a
Memorandum to President Johnson:
Having studied the 1964 Report, I do not feel that a brief survey of this type
qualifes as a basis for planning guidance. As a broad survey of the problem, it
is not without merit; but our strategic planning today is increasingly based upon
more detailed studies of specifc problem areas, such as those included on the
Secretary of Defenses annual Project List and other studies conducted by the
Joint Staf and military departments.
33
Te economy involved in eliminating a major study group is obvious. We can, I
feel, make better use of our limited study skills while simultaneously improving
the product delivered to the consumer. Participation in DoD studies by other
government agencies is, of course, welcomed when warranted by the subject
matter. Similarly, we remain responsive to requests for study reports from other
interested agencies of the government.
In summary, while the annual study program of the NESC had value and
relevance in 1958, its contribution today is marginal when compared to the battery
of specifc studies which have become major functions of the JCS and DoD during
the intervening years. It therefore appears logical to terminate the requirement for
the NESC.
34
Te fnal coup de grace was the last sentence: Attached is a draft implementing directive for
32 Kennedy, lnterview with James E. Goodby," op cit.
33 For example, the Special Studies Group (SSGj of the Joint Chiefs of Staf has developed a broader base of expertise than
that of the NESC staf. Both groups have explored similar issues, used the same sources of input, obtained the same computer
support and have performed the same type of analysis. Because of the close relationship of strategic studies to forces, the
budget, and other on-going Defense Department studies, the usefulness of the SSG studies has been understandably greater
than the annual survey of the NESC." McNamara, Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President
Johnson," op cit.
34 lbid.
DEMISE OF NET EVALUATION
51
signature.
Te response of the JCS was telling and ironic. Originally, in the mid-1950s, they had felt that
a special study group reporting to the Commander-in-Chief infringed on their prerogatives.
However, throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee had done
yeoman service and been a very constructive process of reconciling military strategy with national
policy in a refective and recursive process. Where the JCS had been a major force at the beginning
of the Kennedy Administration and often a source of contention within it, by the mid-1960s:
Te Joint Chiefs of Staf were composed primarily of men little known to the
public me with no real public image. Te were not yes men, but they were
selected by the president and Mr. McNamara because if was felt they would not
kick over the traces. Te were not men who would pound the table. Tey were
not strong Chiefs of Staf in the tradition of Ernie King or George Marshall.
35
In this light, it is interesting to note the reaction of the JCS Chairman to McNamaras ditching of
the NESC:
Te Joint Chiefs of Staf have reviewed the 1964 NESC Report
2
pursuant to our
meeting with you on 6 July 1964. Tis memorandum covers only those questions
relating to national planning. Issues regarding NATO defenses were dealt with in
JCSM865, dated 8 January 1965, subject: Issues Concerning NATO Raised by
the 1964 NESC Report (U).
3
Te 1964 NESC Report raised three major questions regarding planning:
a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staf lack guidance for the preparation of military
plans which could be provided by a Basic National Security Policy or other
compilation of strategic planning guidance having national endorsement?
(Pages 23, 33, NESC Report)
b. Should JSOP and JSCP sections dealing with national and military objectives
and strategic concepts be discussed among planners of the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, and other appropriate agencies? (Pages 4,
3334, NESC Report)
c. Should US military and political departments undertake more extensive
cooperation in identifying specifc potential crisis situations and examining
them in the light of the political-military measures which they might require?
(Page 34, NESC Report)
With respect to the requirement for a Basic National Security Policy, its
compilation into a single document is desirable in principle, but, at the present
time, the Joint Chiefs of Staf do not lack policy guidance for the preparation of
military plans. Necessary guidance is obtained through both face-to-face meetings
and a continuing exchange of written memoranda with the Secretary of Defense.
Guidance also results from meetings with the President, National Security Council
meetings, National Security Action Memoranda, National Country Policy papers,
and National Planning Task papers.
Lack of a Basic National Security Policy has not handicapped the Joint Chiefs of
35 Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow, op cit: p. 13.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
52
Staf in developing basic short-range (JSCP), mid-range (JSOP), and long-range
(JLRSS) plans, as well as specifc contingency plans.
Finally, there are in existence some 200 contingency plans prepared by unifed and
specifed commands as a result of both broad and specifc directives in the JSCP.
Tese plans represent the military planning for crisis situations in a wide variety of
situations and a large number of countries and areas.
Tere is no evident need to provide additional organizations for crisis planning.
36
Tus, on 18 March 1965, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was dissolved by Presidential order
with little fanfare, no eulogy for its long existence and many contributions no one attended the
funeral.
37
Tere was a post-script however. Even though the Administration fnally won its political battle
to have Flexible Response adopted by the Alliance, the adoption of a new strategy did not satiate
the need for net evaluation. In fact, three post-mortem examples underscore that point. First,
the ink was not even dry on the NESC death warrant when the State Department, noting
that similar issues related to conventional-nuclear forces and strategic issues of targeting restraint
were associated with the rise of new nuclear power in Asia, asked for a similar type of project be
established related to China.
38
Second, as the US attempted to revive arms control discussions with
the Soviet Union, various intelligence issues that could impact the strategic balance kept recurring,
and it was not uncommon for observers to note: Tere is no agreed-upon or disagreed-upon net
evaluation within the US Government.
39
Tird, a case could be made that having adopted a new NATO strategy in advance of the material
assets necessary to make it viable, the real work (as opposed to salesmanship) had only just begun.
36 Earle G. Wheeler,ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staf, lssues Regarding National Planning Raised by the 1964 NESC Report (Uj," (4
February 1965j, Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staf to Secretary of Defense McNamara.
37 Bromley Smith, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smithj to All Holders of NSC
5816," (23 March 1965j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968volume X, National Security Policy, Document 82,
pp. 228: The President on March 11, 1965, approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense2 that NSC 5816, A Net
Evaluation Subcommittee," be rescinded. The Subcommittee, having served its purpose with distinction, was discontinued on
March 18 by National Security Action Memorandum No. 327.3 The type of study which the Subcommittee has conducted since
1958 will be accomplished by other means.
Copies of NSC 5816 now in the custody of the member agencies may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of in accordance with
the regulations of the member agency relating to the custody and destruction of classifed materials and with Executive Order
10501,4 as amended by Executive Order 10964.5
38 Dear Bob: The Department of State has no objection to your raising with the President the question of discontinuing the
Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESCj of the National Security Council. The case you present in your draft memorandum
of December 23 to the President2 is a persuasive one and the Department believes the President would be well advised to
consider whether he wishes to retain the Subcommittee, at least in its present form. The participation of representatives of this
Department in the preparation of strategic studies at the working level has been useful to this Department. Therefore, it is hoped
that arrangements can be made to continue such participation. Moreover, although surveys such as the last NESC study may
not qualify as a basis for planning guidance, the Department believes that a similar broad survey of a possible major confict
between the United States and Communist China could serve a useful purpose in clarifying issues and highlighting areas
which could usefully be the object of more detailed consideration. lf you agree, we suggest that Ambassador Thompson meet
soon with Mr. vance and General Wheeler to discuss these matters." George W. Ball, Memorandum From Acting Secretary of
State Ball to Secretary of Defense McNamara," (28 January 1965j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968volume
X, National Security Policy, p. 205. ln fact, a State-Defense working group was set up on China, with at least one overlapping
member of the NESC on it, but the focus remained at the political level and there was no serious military balance analysis of the
conventional-nuclear issues raised by the PRC's new status as an Nth power. Kennedy, lnterview with James E. Goodby," op
cit. . the next thing we did was an interagency study, more or less the same framework, on China."
39 Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staf to the President's Special Assistant (Rostowj,
Subject: ClA lntelligence Report on the Status of the Anti-Missile Defense System for Moscow," (31 May 1966j, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1964-1968volume X, National Security Policy, Document 130, pp. 402-405.
DEMISE OF NET EVALUATION
53
In short, the more serious the desire to reduce NATO dependence upon nuclear deterrence, the
greater the need for:
Detailed balance diagnosis as a refective monitoring mechanism to calibrate progress (or
lack of it);
Prognostic trend analysis, to identify key vectors in both sides rapidly changing conventional
technology;
Prescriptive identifcation of key transformational technological, force structure and arms
control proposal would be needed to frst establish a capable conventional defense and then
convert it into a credible deterrent.
Te fundamental mistake McNamara and President Johnson made was to assume that because
Systems Analysis had done a couple of studies in the mid-1960s, this would be enough to break
Alliance drift and Pentagon institutional inertia: it wasnt.
Indeed, toward the end of the Johnson Administration, when McNamara was gone and NATO
had already adopted Flexible Response, General Maxwell Taylor, now Chairman of the Presidents
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, sent an interesting recommendation to the President:
In the course of the Boards continuing appraisal of the adequacy of our
Governments intelligence coverage of Soviet plans and actions afecting U.S.
national security, we have had discussions of the desirability of reinstituting a
periodic examination of the relative strategic strength of the United States and
the USSR. We have noted that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National
Security Council which had been charged with this work was inactivated in 1963
and that no other agency in the government has been given the responsibility for
continuing an interdepartmental analysis of this matter.
2
Meanwhile, from the
intelligence point of view, we see the increasing need for reliable information on
the status of Soviet advanced strategic military capabilities, and on related Soviet
research and development eforts.
Based on discussions with former members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee,
our conclusion is that the former evaluation procedure would hardly be adequate to
cope with the current problem which is now far more complex than the one which
confronted us in the past. Tese complexities arise from the growing sophistication
of strategic ofensive and defensive weapons systems, the many unknown factors
with regard to the performance of these new weapons and the sensitivity of the
kind of study which we have in mind.
Te kind of analysis we envision would call for an evaluation of the composition,
reliability, efectiveness and vulnerability of the strategic ofensive and defensive
forces of both sides, to include their command and control systems. It would also
call for a close study of the urban-industrial structure of both nations in order
to assess the probable efects of strategic attacks on urban-industrial targets.
Tese analyses should be based upon the best available information and foreign
intelligence. A by-product of the kind of new study we are discussing would be to
focus attention on the gaps in the intelligence data and to accelerate measures to
collect the missing pieces.
After the development of the best possible understanding of the likely performance
of the opposing strategic forces, it should then be possible to construct one or
PHILLIP A. KARBER
54
more scenarios for war game purposes in order to measure the interactions of
these forces in nuclear war. Te results would then permit our best military and
scientifc minds to draw pertinent conclusions as to the relative strength of our
forces and the considerations which should infuence future decisions and actions
in the strategic feld.
Te agencies interested in such a study and with a contribution to make to it
include the White House, State, Defense, JCS, CIA, Justice and AEC. Since the
study would draw heavily upon the scientifc community, the Presidents Science
Advisory Committee should be included as a participant.
Taking into account this breadth of governmental interest, the question arises
as to the best way of organizing it. Te old Net Evaluation Group did not have
adequate scientifc support to carry on a study of the scope which we are proposing.
Furthermore, it reported through a committee chaired by the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staf to the National Security Council. Under present conditions, the
Board believes that the proposed study could best be done under the Secretary of
Defense acting as executive agent for the President.
40
Teir bottom line: It is the recommendation of your Board that the Secretary of Defense be
directed to prepare proposed terms of reference whereby he would undertake the net evaluation
studies in collaboration with the appropriate other government agencies, along the lines suggested
above.
Te new Secretary of Defense Clark Cliford, after consulting with JCS Chairman Wheeler,
formally demurred:
In response to your request that we look into Max Taylors suggestion for a
resumption of the sort of study last conducted by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee
of the NSC in 1963, I have had my staf review existing studies to determine
whether a new NES-type efort would be worthwhile.
Needless to say, the NES studies were initiated in the 1950s at a time when our
strategic capabilities were far less than they are today and more signifcantly for
purposes of a new study, we lacked the analytical capability to assess relative U.S.
and Soviet performance in various scenarios. General Wheeler and I fnd that
existing current material fully covers the ground of the Net Evaluation studies.
Our intelligence in regard to Soviet capabilities has vastly improved, as refected
in periodical NIEs on Soviet strategic ofensive and defensive systems, updated
versions of both of which will be forthcoming shortly (NIEs 118 and 113).
Each year the Joint War Games Agency writes a Soviet objectives plan (RISOP)
which they game against our SIOP. Tese results give us a very detailed evaluation
of our near-term capabilities against the Soviets and their capabilities against
us. When dealing with capabilities over the next ten years, the DOD strategic
force and efectiveness tables, last revised on August 7, 1968, consider relative
strengths in a number of diferent strategic situations, and we have the capability
40 Maxwell D. Taylor, Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign lntelligence Advisory Board (Taylorj to President
Johnson," (9 August 1968j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968volume X, National Security Policy, Document 211,
pp. 732-734.
DEMISE OF NET EVALUATION
55
of readily preparing additional tables for any particular scenario not covered. Te
forthcoming DPM on U.S. strategic and defensive systems also covers much of
the same ground.
In the light of the availability of this material General Wheeler and I are convinced
that it would not be desirable to proceed with a new net evaluation study.
However, in a personal note to Gen. Taylor, the SecDef was not so negative:
Dear Max:
Tank you for sending me a copy of the memorandum you propose to send to the
President in regard to the FIAB proposal for a new Net Evaluation Study.2 In
general you have done justice in presenting my views, although there are many
more evaluations going on than I mentioned in my letter to Walt Rostow3 or than
you mention in your memorandum to the President.
I would like to emphasize, however, that while I believe a new administration
might wish to have a hand in initiating as far-reaching a study as you propose,
my main point is that existing studies and existing coordinating mechanisms for
bringing information to bear on the problem are adequate to do the job.
This is not to say that there are no intelligence gaps, or that we intend to rest on
the merits of studies we have already completed. I am convinced, however, that
our current eforts are able to identifyand take steps to fllany gaps in our
intelligence, our research and development, and our analysis.
I believe that our current eforts have the interdepartmental inputs that you feel
would be the main beneft of your proposed study. What is lacking most in our
current eforts is the relaxed, long-range view that could best be supplied by studies
at IDA, Rand, etc. I have been promoting such studies and would appreciate your
help in focusing such studies on the pertinent issues.
I have enclosed brief descriptions of a few of the more important continuing eforts
that we are making to evaluate the relative strategic strength of the United States
and the USSR. I would be glad to provide briefngs on any of these eforts to you
personally or to the FIAB.
41
Te areas of study underway referenced by the SecDef included:
1. Political-Military War Games;
2. RISOP-SIOP War Games;
3. Post-Nuclear Attack Study;
4. Strategic Forces Draft Presidential Memorandum;
5. DoD Strategic Force and Efectiveness Tables;
6. Study of Sub-SIOP Options;
7. National Intelligence Estimates anu Piojections.
42
41 Letter From Secretary of Defense Cliford to the Chairman of the President's Foreign lntelligence Advisory Board (Taylorj," (20
September 1968j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968volume X, National Security Policy, Document 215, pp. 739-
743.
42 Major DoD Eforts to Evaluate the Relative Strategic Strength of the United States and USSR," enclosure to: Letter From
Secretary of Defense Cliford to the Chairman of the President's Foreign lntelligence Advisory Board (Taylorj," ibid.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
56
What was not on that list, is where the NESC had left of the interrelationship between the
Conventional force balance in Europe, its relationship with dual-capable and theater nuclear
forces, and the continued dependence of NATOs new strategy of Flexible Response upon nuclear
options.
Thus, while Naxwell Tayloi anu the FIAB appieciateu the woik being uone as outlineu by
Cliffoiu,
43
it was not an acciuent, that, following the election, they iepoiteu:
Comparative Evaluations of Military Capabilities. The Board believes that
national security interests would benefit from the establishment of an interagency
mechanism (representing civilian and military departments and agencies)
for making periodic, comparative evaluations of the military offensive and
defensive capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR. It is important that this be an
interdepartmental efort involving as participants all appropriate elements of the
Executive Branch. We envisage that from time to time this body would evaluate
the composition, reliability, effectiveness and vulnerability of the offensive and
defensive forces of both sides, thus providing an informed basis for national policy
decisions. An anticipated by-product of such studies would be the identification
of significant gaps in the intelligence communitys coverage of the USSR.
44
43 Dear Clark: Your letter of 20 September2 will be most helpful to your old colleagues of the FlAB in dealing with the intelligence
aspects of its central theme. Although aware of some of them, l found the tabulation of DOD eforts in the feld most impressive
and would like to take advantage of your ofer of a briefng on some of them. With regard to the use of lDA, Rand, etc. for studies
in this feld, speaking under my lDA hat l can assure you of lDA's readiness to work on any aspect of these problems which are
within its competence. Sincerely." Maxwell D. Taylor, Letter From the Chairman of the President's Foreign lntelligence Advisory
Board (Taylorj to Secretary of Defense Cliford," (24 September 1968j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968volume
X, National Security Policy, Document 216, p. 744.
44 Maxwell D. Taylor, Report Submitted by the Chairman of the President's Foreign lntelligence Advisory Board (Taylorj to
President Johnson," (25 November 1968j, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968volume X, National Security Policy,
Document 222, pp. 758-770.
5
THE 1970 BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE
PANEL
Tere is no mechanism within the Department to provide an integrated
analysis which systematically places existing or proposed programs in the context
of the capabilities and limitations of the United States and its allies versus
possible antagonists.
1
Te conduct of Net Assessments for the Secretary of Defense originated in the early 1970s. Tis
was a period when the national security consensus had eroded during an expensive and frustrating
military intervention, it was a climate of economic pressure where military budgets were headed
toward fscal constraint, and at a time when new threats appeared on the horizon. Net Assessment
was viewed by a few far-sighted leaders as a method of helping the US remain competitive in a
changing security environment.
Tis then was the environment in the frst year of the Nixon Administration when the President
commissioned a number of outside eforts to examine government organization and propose more
efective and efcient structures. In April the Ash committee
2
began its work on Te Presidents
Council on Executive Organization. Only three months later, in the summer of 1969, the Fitzhugh
Commission
3
started studying the organization and management of the Pentagon,
4
and there were
similar, if less known, eforts directed at State and the CIA.
5
Tis one-year efort became know as
1 Fitzhugh, Report to the President, op cit., p. 31.
2 Named after its Chairman Roy Ash, appointed 5 April 1969. A number of scholars have observed that the President's reasons for
creating Government reform commissions are unknown, the motivations behind the Nixon administrative strategy are unclear,
there is no question that the strategy involved some important institution changes within the Executive" branch. David McKay,
Domestic Policy and ldeology: Presidents and the American State, 1964-1987, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1989j, p. 100.
3 Fitzhugh, Report to the President, op cit..
4 They were commissioned 1 July 1969 and submitted their report exactly one year later. Fitzhugh, chairman of the Board of the
Metropolitan Life lnsurance Company, complained about fragmentation of responsibility for decisions, excessive size of stafs,
the constant thrusting of minor issues to the top for decision, and the delays in making decisions through committees and staf
co-ordination.
5 ln November 1971, the Omce of Management and Budget's James Schlesinger, conducted a secret review of the intelligence
community and the Nixon Administration announced a number of management steps to improve the emciency and
efectiveness" of US intelligence. OMB had been signifcantly empowered by the Ash Council recommendations, and
interestingly, Schlesinger would a year later be named Director of the ClA to implement his own recommendations but his four-
month tenure was too short to bring about any large-scale change.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
58
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (BRDP), consisting of sixteen distinguished members, including
a number of CEOs with defense related executive experience, supported by a large staf of 46, a
majority of whom were focused on researching the problems.
Most of the Blue Ribbon Panels focus was on the Pentagons mismanagement of the
unmanageable
6
by an un-managing management.
7

Te Department of Defense presents an unparalleled management challenge.
Many factors contribute to the scope of this challenge, including: the size of
the defense establishment; the variety and diversity of its activities, all of which
are closely interrelated; its technological dependence; the annual authorization-
appropriation cycle; the political sensitivity of its operations; the obscurity of any
quantitative standards for measurement of success or failure; the diverse origin and
broad sweep of its policy guidance; the internal divergences of interests within the
Department; and the variances of its objectives due to changing threats, shifting
potentials for crises and fuctuating national commitments.
8
Four issues were raised by the BRDP of direct relevance to our interest the failure to control
escalating costs as the US depended upon qualitative system performance, the lack of realistic
planning in the budgetary process, the need of the Secretary of Defense to be directly supported by
long-range planning and net assessment, and growing concern that America was being overtaken
by the Soviet Union in several key areas of military balance.
Major issues addressed by the Blue Ribbon Panel were the failure to control waste and cost
overruns as well as the inability of the Defense planning process to forecast accurate budgetary
performance. Although the PPBS is the major planning, programming and budgeting procedure
in the Department, the BRDP concluded that it has more practical use as a budgeting device
than as a planning and programming procedure.
9
While the PPBS had brought consistency and
discipline to the frontside creation of DoD budgets, there was a growing trend where the backside
performance the discipline to match output with the plan was breaking down.
10
6 Fitzhugh declared at a July 1970 press conference that his investigation showed that the Pentagon was an impossible
organization to administer in its present form, just an amorphous lump." Shaping the Amorphous Lump," Time, 10 August 1970,
at < http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,876725,00.html > [accessed 13 October 2005|
7 Fitzhugh was quoted as personally concluding that: There is nobody you can point your fnger at if anything goes wrong,
and there is nobody you can pin a medal on if it goes right, because everything is everybody's business. What is everybody's
business is nobody's business." lbid.; for a contemporary commentary, see also: Timothy H. lngram, The Corporate
Underground," The Nation, vol. 213, issue 7, 13 September 1971, at < http://www.nationarchive.com/Summaries/v213i0007_08.
htm > [accessed 10 November 2005|.
8 Fitzhugh, Report to the President, op cit., p. 111.
9 lbid., p. 114.
10 Franklin C. Spinney, Statement," (testimony in Hearings; Washington, DC: Subcommittee on National Security, veterans Afairs
and lnternational Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 4 June 2002j, at < http://www.d-
n-i.net/fcs/spinney_testimony_060402.htm > [accessed 1 April 2008|, notes that the disconnect begins in the late 1960s with
alternating swings in under/over estimation of budgets. The overages are driven by front-end" downplaying of system lifecycle
costs, which ultimate lead to overruns, drops in production, and subsequent high unit prices. The low-balled" cost projections
made during the pre-production phase of a weapon's life cycle permit too many new programs to get stufed into the out years of
the FYDP. This sets the stage for repeated increments of cost growth and ever rising pressure to grow the entire defense budget.
But the budget cannot grow as fast as the unit costs of front-loaded programs increase and eventually a retrenchment sets in. At
the same time, the efects of political engineering paralyze decision-makers and induce them to absorb the cost growth through
inemcient expediencies, like repeated production stretch-outs in lieu of terminations. The lower rates of production naturally
decrease the rate of inventory turnover, which increases the age of weapons and makes them more expensive to operate,
thereby driving up the operating budget. But the increasing age of the equipment also increases the pressure to transfer money
from the operating budget to the modernization budget, while the rising cost of operating the older weapons makes it more
dimcult to do so. Consequently, cost pressure builds up rapidly over time, and a kind of boom and bust cycle is born: Budget
THE 1970 BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL
59
Subsequent studies over the last thirty years have shown how prescient the Fitzhugh panels
concern was.
11
Figure 4 above illustrates the historic disconnect between the FYDP projected
plans and the actual budgetary performance. Depending on the cycle, the FYDP was wrong when
budgets were increasing, wrong when they were in decline, and in fact, only one out of thirty years
plans corresponded with what actually happened. Tis breakdown in fnancial discipline is not only
inefcient but produces a disconnect where the budget takes on an alternate reality, one divorced
from the external environment and driven instead by internal constituents.
12
retrenchments like those in the 1970s and 1990s make problems worse, which are followed by budget expansions that naturally
overreach when the front loaders and political engineers plant the seeds for anther round of outyear underfunding problems..
Over time, the cycle of decay takes the form of the so-called death spiral of shrinking combat forces, decreasing rates of
modernization, aging weapons inventories, with the rising cost of operations creating continual pressure to reduce readiness.:
11 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, (GAO-08-467SP; Washington, DC: Government
Accountability Omce, March 2008j; and press summary: Dana Hedgpeth, GAO Blasts Weapons Budget," Washington Post, 1
April 2008, p. A-1, reports that GAO auditors found that of 72 major systems GAO examined in detail, none had met all of the
standards for best management practices during their development stages. Auditors said the Defense Department showed few
signs of improvement since the GAO began issuing its annual assessments of selected weapons systems six years ago.. 'lt's
taking longer and costing more'."
12 Without reliable information, there can be no confdence that the required matchup between the Defense organism and
its environment has been or will be achieved. When such a condition of uncertainty persists, the interaction of chance with
necessity guarantees that it is only a matter of time before dangerous mismatches creep insensibly into the relationship between
organism and its environment. When this occurs, the unreliable information in the database creates a kind of virtual reality
Figure 4
PHILLIP A. KARBER
60
In an extended Appendix, Mechanisms for Change Organizational History,
13
the Blue
Ribbon Panel recognized that many traditional aspects of foreign relations had become strategic.
First, the declining distinction between peace and war converted mobilization time from weeks
to minutes and with it brought standing armies, feets in being and, with hair-trigger forces, the
danger of strategic surprise. Second, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction combined
with intercontinental range, not only created an environment of reciprocal fear of surprise, but
held entire nations in delicate balance of terror one in which they could be destroyed. And
third, the increasing communicability and complexity of international relations produced a security
environment involving a much wider range of professional expertise in science as well as a number
of social disciplines. As a result, the image of an expert military profession, unchallengeable in its
feld, began to fade in the strategy of the atomic age military advice had to be tempered with
a wide range of civilian expertise.
14

Te Blue Ribbon Defense Panel picked up on the observation that in a Cold War military advice
was essential but seldom determining,
15
and they focused on the inadequate civilian contribution
to strategy development without mincing words:
Te Secretary of Defense does not presently have the opportunity to consider all viable
options as background for making major policy decisions because important options are
often submerged or compromised at lower levels of the Department of Defense.
A need exists for an independent source of informed and critical review and analysis of
military forces and other problems particularly those involving more than one Service, or
two or more competitive or complementary activities, missions, or weapons.
16
Tere is no organizational element within OSD with the assigned responsibility for
objectively making net assessments of US and foreign military capabilities.
Tere is no organizational element within OSD that is charged with the responsibility
that disorients decision makers, yet keeps them busy, thereby blocking corrective action, while the internal activities shaped
by their decisions become progressively disconnected from and vulnerable to the threats and constraints in the real world.
Moreover, without decisive action to correct the source of the disorientation - i.e., the corrupted information - the disorientation
will grow worse over time, leading inevitably to a growing sense of confusion and disorder that feeds back into and magnifes
the disorientation even further. Eventually the breakdown in the goal seeking process will produce paralysis, and the activities
of the organism will be directed more by inner workings of its constituent factions than by the requirements of the environment.
Naturally, such a self-referencing process would become far more dysfunctional if the external environment changed suddenly
and unexpectedly.." Spinney, Statement," op cit..
13 Appendix A, Mechanisms for Change - Organizational History, to Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
Department of Defense, (Washington, DC: Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1 July 1970j.
14 The argument was not that these disciplines could not be taught in omcer schools or mid-career graduate education, but rather,
that truly developing a professional level of expertise in an analytical area - whether economics or physics, arms control or
the methodology of long-range planning - involved continued participation in the feld through research, publication and peer
exchange. Obviously, a military omcer could be assigned to an area of expertise for more than cumulative decade's worth
of experience, but then as they would become substantive experts in another occupation over time they would be military"
in name only - a pattern evidenced in a number of omcers assigned to the civilian side of Pentagon planning, including Net
Assessment. The author remembers fondly a promotion party for a long-time assigned military omcer to OSD/NA who, having
not donned his uniform in years, not only had trouble buttoning his jacket, but could not remember which direction his Colonel's
eagles mounted.
15 No longer could military professionals plan in isolation and expect to take over after the diplomats failed. The validity of military
plans, policies and requirements depended more and more on the extent to which they were in tune with foreign, economic, and
other policies than on their own merits - although the law still called for purely 'military advice'.. Moreover, military experience
lost much of its value as the efect of nuclear weapons could be measured only in theoretical war games and civilians invented
new and imaginative computer techniques for determining probabilities.. ln the atomic age, a major war was no longer a
continuation of policy but annihilation. Deterrence . was as much a political, diplomatic, and economic problem as a military
one." OSD Historian, R. A. Winnacker, The Historical Framework," Omce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Administration,
(9 Feb. 1970j in lbid. pp. 5-6.
16 Fitzhugh, Report to the President, op cit., p. 29.
THE 1970 BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL
61
for long-range planning for the structuring and equipping of forces for other similar
purposes.
17
Te emphasis was not on replacing uniformed advice on military strategy, or even changing their
primacy, but in providing the national security leadership with options, independent assessments,
and non-canonical planning that did not get inhibited, diluted or suppressed on their way to the
top.
In order to address this perceived vacuum two quite diferent methodologies were proposed
diagnostic comparative analysis and prognostic, diachronic trend projection. Not insignifcantly, as
illustrated in Figure 5, two of the Blue Ribbon panels 113 recommendations called for the creation
of special ofces for these respective foci with both reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.
Ofce of Net Assessment;
Ofce of Long-Range Planning.
Te BRDP argued that each of these functions was so unique that they not only required their
own separate organizations but also so important that they had to be immediately reported to
the top without interference from any of the other subordinate organizations that might try to
infuence the independent analysis and projections of these two functions.
17 lbid., p. 3.
Figure 5
PHILLIP A. KARBER
62
Te report also recommended a third group to serve as a SecDef coordinating function, which
would presumably have been the tasking and agent for these two proposed ofces.
18
Te case for an Ofce of Net Assessment was made with considerable passion in the report:
Major program and policy decisions in the Department of Defense tend to be
based on an assessment of individual factors, such as the apparent threat, the
technological capability of the United States and possible opponents, and cost
efectiveness criteria. Te Defense intelligence community is concerned with
foreign developments, but does not make assessments of US capabilities. Treat
assessments are made for comparison with the projected capability of some proposed
new US development. Tere is, however, no mechanism within the Department
to provide an integrated analysis which systematically places existing or proposed
programs in the context of the capabilities and limitations of the United States
and its allies versus possible antagonists. Te Secretary of Defense should have
available, on a continuing basis, the results of comparative studies and evaluations
of US and foreign military capabilities, to identify existing or potential defciencies
or imbalances in US military capabilities.
19
Tus, there was the perceived need for the comparative evaluation of both US and enemy
capabilities conducted by the same agent reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.
Te BRDP was concerned that no one ever put the strategic picture together and that this
was a vital function now performed by no one.
20
Tey argued that Secretary of Defense needed
someone close to him who would be an unbiased advisor about where the US military balance
stood relative to competitors.
A way was needed to bring enemy and friendly data together with no restrictions
on the information used and no limits on questions as to its accuracy or relevance.
Real diagnosis was needed, not just assessments of the potential impact on the
enemy in order to justify military programs that the services had already decided
to pursue.
21
Tis in turn led to the unusual stafng recommendation, at least for then, that a Net Assessment
Group should consist of individuals from appropriate units in the Department of Defense,
along with consultants and contract personnel appointed from time to time by the Secretary of
Defense, and the OSD/NA ofce should report directly to him.
22

Te Blue Ribbon panel proposed that the trend projection and critical review of strategy
functions would be performed by a parallel Long-Range Planning Group, similarly composed and
18 No formal mechanism exists within OSD to assure adequate coordination among the various elements of the Department.
There is a need for a Coordinating Group in the immediate omce of the Secretary of Defense, to assist in coordinating the
activities of the entire Department and in the scheduling and follow-up of the various activities." The Coordinating Group should
be headed by a civilian Director, who should also serve as executive assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Fitzhugh, Report to
the President, op cit., pp. 31, 59-60. Under then Secretary of Defense Laird, this tasking and integrating role, along with a lot of
other functions, was handled by his special (executivej assistant Bill Baroody Jr. and his E-ring staf. Thus, this recommendation
was merely formalizing and broadening the authority of what was already happening and Laird was comfortable with.
19 Fitzhugh, Report to the President, op cit., p. 31.
20 Shaping the Amorphous Lump," Time, op cit..
21 Pickett, Roche, and Watts, Net Assessment: A Historical Review," op cit., p. 166.
22 Fitzhugh, Report to the President, op cit., p. 59.
THE 1970 BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL
63
likewise reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense with the responsibility for planning which
integrates net assessments, technological projections, fscal planning, etc.
23

Tere is no organizational element within OSD that is charged with the
responsibility for broadly supporting the Secretary of Defense in long-range
planning which integrates net assessments, technological projections, fscal
planning, etc. Force planning is currently initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staf and
the Military Departments within the constraints of fscal guidance to each Service
and for each major mission and support efort. In order to provide an overall
balance of forces, to prevent wasteful duplications, and to develop efective but
more economical alternatives to those conditioned by traditional approaches of the
Military Services, OSD requires an internal long-range planning capability. Te
development of alternative solutions should include consideration of all relevant
political, economic, and technological and military factors. To the extent to which
such a capability exists in the current OSD organization, it is too fragmented
and too limited by the pressure of more immediately urgent assignments to be
efective.
24
Co-equal in design and chain of report with diagnostic Net Assessment, the Long-Range Planning
Group had two quite distinct functions. One was prognostic to identify major factors (domestic
and foreign) potentially infuencing the security of the nation, project alternative vectors, track
changes in these trends and alert the Secretary of Defense to those which (for good or ill) might
change the assumptions that the national military strategy was predicated on. Te other function
was prescriptive to identify new approaches and/or create alternative courses of action, including
diferent military options, in order to both enlighten the deliberations and empower the decisions
of the SecDef.
On the surface, the integrative function of the Long-Range Planning Group would put it higher
on the food chain as a consumer of Net Assessment products. But there was also a reciprocal and
recursive feedback loop, where unexpected or newly emergent trends would be fed back to Net
Assessment in order for them to evaluate the impact of this impending change. Tere was some
dissent as to whether these two functions Net Assessment and Long-Range Planning should
be treated as two separate ofces, each reporting to a third coordinating ofcer in the immediate
SecDef staf or whether the functions should be integrated into an Assistant Secretary of Defense
with an overall mandate encompassing Strategic Assessment.
BRDP member Robert C. Jackson, who as Chairman of Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical had
substantial DoD experience and insight, felt so strongly about the need to integrate the three
functions long range planning, net assessment and strategy development into an ASD level
position that he took the extraordinary step of issuing a Dissenting Statement arguing that the
position required confdentiality and access that could only be achieved with a direct report to
the SecDef.
Te Panel recommends a Long Range Planning Group to provide support to the
Secretary of Defense with responsibility for long range planning which integrates
net assessment, technological projections, fscal planning, etc. Te Panel further
23 lbid., p. 7.
24 lbid., p. 31.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
64
recommends a coordinating group to assist the Secretary in coordinating the
activities of the entire Department. Te Panel also recommends a Net Assessment
Group to conduct and report on net assessment of United States and foreign military
capabilities and potentials. I believe these three groups should be assembled under
an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Long Range Planning, Coordination, and
Net Assessment. Tis Assistant Secretary would report directly to the Secretary/
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
25
Te proposed elevation from the BRDP slot of two Directors to Jacksons integrated Assistant
Secretary had a strong precedent in another SecDef advisory position Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Afairs which had similarly been upgraded from a Directorate
to ASD.
26
What is interesting about BRDP member Jacksons proposal for an Assistant Secretary of a
combined ofce of Net Assessment and Long Range Planning, is that his version of other aspects of
DoD organizational structure was at once not as radical as the BRDP (in terms of having multiple
DepSecDefs, with the Services and the Operational Commands reporting through them) and far
25 Robert C. Jackson, Chairman, Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical and BRDP Member, Dissenting Statement," in Fitzhugh, Report to
the President, op cit., p. 204.
26 Prior to the fall of 1949, the Secretary of Defense, or his predecessor, the Secretary of War, had had no explicitly mandated
civilian politico-military afairs advisor." Under President Truman a Special Assistant to the Secretary was created and outgoing
Defense Secretary Robert Lovett recommended to Eisenhower's frst secretary of defense, Charles E. Wilson, that the Special
Assistant for lSA be upgraded to the assistant secretary level." Piller, DoD's Omce of lnternational Security Afairs," op cit., p.
60. The upgrading from advisory" Special Assistant to ASD occurred in 1953.
Figure 6
THE 1970 BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL
65
more prescient of what actually became implemented over the 1970s.
27
Just as Jackson correctly
forecast the trend toward functional Under Secretaries, he argued that the position of ASD for
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Long Range Planning, Coordination, and Net Assessment had
to be autonomous and report independently to the SecDef .
Tus, despite diferences among the BLDP as to how to organize the unique
functions, among all of the members there was universal belief in and strong
endorsement that the Long-Range Planning Council and a Net Assessment
Group has merit. Likewise there was universal agreement that they should report
directly to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense as special staf groups.
28

Unfortunately, in the succeeding thirty-eight years since the need was articulated,
rarely has Long-Range Planning and/or Strategic Concept Development
29
actually
had the high level position or institutional resources envisioned by the BRDP. Net
Assessment is an exception, but its position has also vacillated widely.
30

27 This was true in particular with the retention of a real deputy in the form of a DepSecDef with Under Secretaries as an intervening
layer of management for the growing number of Assistant Secretaries being created in OSD.
28 Wilfred J. McNeil, Director, Fairchild Hiller Corporation, President of the Tax Foundation and BRDP Member, Dissenting
Statement," in Fitzhugh, Report to the President, op cit., p. 207.
29 ln 1981, SecDef Caspar W. Weinberger set up a Strategic Concepts Development Center with its Director reporting directly
to the Secretary of Defense as Strategy Advisor." A position held by the author, but whose SecDef access did not survive
institutionally a year after my departure.
30 From direct report to the SecDef, to a Deputy SecDef, to an Under Secretary for Policy, to proposals for it to be shipped over the
National Defense University.
6
LAIRDS SEARCH FOR A
STRATEGY DIALECTIC
Net Assessment isa comparative analysis of those factors, military, technological,
political, and economic which impede or have a potential to impede our national
security objectives with those factors available or potentially available to enhance
the accomplishment of those objectives.
1
Te idea of having some type of assessment and planning functions performed in the Pentagon was
neither new nor particularly controversial,
2
but having a split portfolio, with each reporting directly
to the Secretary of Defense was.
3
As the Blue Ribbon Panel recognized, some of the functions
of the proposed Long-Range Planning Group already existed, albeit fragmented and dispersed
in various parts of OSD.
4
However, this was not the case with Net Assessment which had to be
created from scratch, and thus there were at least two precursors to its formal establishment in
Defense. Lairds long time special assistant, Bill Baroody Jr., established a Net Assessment cell
within the Secretariat
5
temporarily assigned to an existing Long-Range Planning unit headed by
Col. Don Marshal.
6
Baroodys fles suggest an interest in the Net Assessment function that arose
1 Melvin R. Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence: Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973, (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Omce, 1972j, p. 26.
2 The JCS had long thought they were doing this through their PPBS process called JLRSA (Joint Long-Range Strategic
Appraisalj.
3 Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate.
(Washington, DC: Committee on Armed Services, Senate, US Congress, GPO, 1985j, p. 114, authored by James Locher,
critiqued the Fitzhugh recommendation that the Net Assessment Group should report directly to the Secretary of Defense on
the grounds too many direct reports and thus too broad a span of control. This report also suggested that the products of Net
Assessment not be integrated with trend projections by a Long-Range Planning Group, but rather by a proposed Coordinating
Under Secretary. This study had a major formative impact upon the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986.
4 Robert W. Welsh, The Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel: A Case for a Staf Management Doctrine for OSD,"
(monograph; Carlisle, PA: Army War College, February 1972j.
5 More than a year after the report was submitted to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird only one recommendation was
acted upon: creation of the 'Director of Net Assessment' in OSD." Major Greg H. Parlier, The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986:
Resurgence ln Defense Reform and the Legacy of Eisenhower," (War in the Modern Era seminar; Quantico, vA: Marine Corps
Command and Staf College, 15 May 1989j, at < http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1989/PGH.htm > [accessed
15 November 2005|.
6 Dr. Donald S. Marshall, had an Anthropology degree from Harvard and had conducted research with Margaret Mead in the
South Pacifc prior to the Second World War. ln late 1972 or early 1973 he left Baroody's omce to set up and manage the new
omce held by Fred Wikner, as Strategic Arms Control Adviser to the Secretary of Defense. The Long-Range Planning role was
PHILLIP A. KARBER
68
in 1969, simultaneously, if not antedating, the creation of the Fitzhugh Commission analysis.
7
Te Blue Ribbon Defense Panel had placed a high stress on the importance of understanding
both technological trends and the increasing evidence that the Soviet Union was closing
Americas qualitative lead in a number of areas. Because Johnny Foster was seen as part of a triad
running the Pentagon consisting of the Secretary, his Deputy David Packard and the DDR&E
therefore some have drawn the conclusion that the net technical assessment function which the
BRDP suggested should lie directly with the Secretary of Defense. Instead lies with Foster
and with his deputy for Research and Advanced Technology.
8

Department of Defense leadership needed a higher level of analysis, recalled
Stephen J. Lukasik, who served as the Deputy Director and then Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) from 1967 1974.40 Te
recognition of this demand within the Department of Defense led the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), John S. Foster, to establish
the Ofce of Net Technical Assessment, which was led by Fred Wikner. Te
ofce focused on technical comparisons of U.S. and Soviet systems but did not
address the grand strategic policy questions of American power in the context
of its ongoing competition with the Soviet Union. Te Ofce of Net Technical
Assessment was eventually eliminated during the Carter administration. Still, in
the early 1970s, the need for a higher level of analysis persisted.
9
Based on my involvement with NTA,
10
the types of projects they were undertaking
11
and
contemporary discussion with the people running it at the time, it is my strong opinion that this
ofce was set up in reaction to the ideas of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, but was never intended
to either implement or substitute for the BRDP recommendation for the SecDef level Ofce of
Net Assessment.
Lairds long personal interest in trying to square the circle of Americas Strategy Gap
12
and
adopted ad hoc by others in the SecDef omce front omce, but with the demise of Col. Marshall the Net Assessment activity
remained an orphan.
7 Net Assessment, 1969-1972 (1j-(2j," Box A82 Department of Defense Papers: Baroody Subject File, (Melvin R. Laird Papers-
Container List - Part 1: Boxes Open to Researchj; Ann Arbor, Ml: Gerald R. Ford Library, no datej, at < http://www.ford.utexas.
edu/library/guides/Finding%20Aids/Laird,_Melvin_-_Papers_ftl1.htm > [accessed 16 November 2005|.
8 James M. Roherty, The Laird and McNamara Styles," in New Civil-Military Relations: The Agonies of Adjustment to Post-
vietnam Realities, edited by John P. Lovell and Philip S. Kronenberg, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974j, pp. 237-
238.
9 Skypek, Evaluating Military Balances Through the Lens of Net Assessment," op cit: p. 12.
10 ln 1973 BDM's Tactical Warfare Department run by John Bode was assigned to my National Security Programs Directorate. John
had several contracts with the NTA omce, and we visited there often.
11 All of the ones l remember were very detailed technical and technologically detailed studies, such as counter-battery radar
evaluation or Bode's development of the P001 model to evaluate hit probability of the ZSU-23/4 air defense gun. Following the
1973 Arab-lsraeli War, NTA was DDR&E's lead in assessing the relative technological state of captured Soviet equipment; as it
became evident that the US had signifcantly underestimated the other side's qualitative level, it could be said that this omce's
work took on competitive" signifcance, but the analytic focus itself was tactical and technical.
12 Melvin Laird, A House Divided: America's Strategy Gap, (Chicago, lL: Henry Regnery, 1962j. The view that his interest in
strategy development was not a passing or shallow interest is shared by Douglas Kinnard, Secretary of Defense, (Lexington,
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1980j, p. 120. Laird's recognition of both the importance of strategy as well as gaps" in its
conceptual development and implementation are still continuing interest of his: Melvin Laird, Purse Strings and Pragmatism,"
Washington Post, 17 January 2007, p. A19: .cutting of funding is not a plan. Holding hearings to excoriate the executive
branch is not a plan. Emotional oratory about casualties is not a plan. Such is the stuf of dinner-party debates and protest
rallies. lt is not what the American people need from their elected representatives, and it is not what they voted for.. America
needs a broad national security strategy."
LAIRDS SEARCH FOR A STRATEGY DIALECTIC
69
create a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence
13
naturally brought the topics of Net Assessment and
Planning together both substantively and organizationally. Te defense Report in which this
combination was introduced was viewed as the best defned and most widely distributed statement
yet of the meshing of foreign policy and national security policy and strategy.
14
In his annual
posture statement, he identifed fve axes on which to assess military strategy.
An identifed spectrum of confict ranging from political agitation to strategic nuclear
warfare with insurgency, guerrilla warfare, sub-theater conventional warfare, theater
conventional, and theater nuclear in between;
Te national security strategy as articulated by the Commander in Chief;
National resources inputs measured in budget levels, active manpower and foreign
assistance;
Military force posture output indices for General Purpose Forces, Teater Nuclear and
Strategic Forces; and
Strategic concepts covering defense and deterrence based on alliance partnership,
military strength, and negotiated restraint.
15
Laird viewed strategy as the great work of the organization, and he was the frst Secretary to go
beyond sound bite comparisons and methodically juxtapose the Pentagons changing military
strategy on an explicit set of relational criteria plotted over time.
Addressing those fve areas into a comprehensive appraisal was a monumental task, but it ft
Lairds defnition of Net Assessment. In his FY 1973 Annual Posture Statement, Secretary Laird
introduced the construct by giving Net Assessment its own section in his report and underscoring
its importance:
I said at the beginning of this Report that the business of peace is a complex one.
Net Assessment in National Security Planning is an indispensable tool for coping
with these complexities. In simple terms, Net Assessment, in conjunction with
Total Force Planning, tells where we are, what we need to do, and how to get
there.
To put it more fully, Net Assessment is a comparative analysis of those military,
technological, political, and economic factors:
which impede or have a potential to impede our national security objectives
with those factors:
available or potentially available to enhance the accomplishment of those
objectives.
16

13 This was the title of his 1971 Defense Posture statement that clearly showed an attempt to bridge the gap between nuclear
massive retaliation and conventional fexible response by adding more options to the former and more deterrence (with less
US manpowerj to the later. The new strategy was designed not to manage crises but to prevent wars" yet operate across
the full spectrum of possible confict and . capabilities.. positive and active" as compared to previous strategy which was
responsive and reactive." Laird argued that realistic deterrence had to be developed to deter not only nuclear war but all levels
of armed confict. But at the same time we had to develop this new strategy in a way that faces up to the realities [strategic
nuclear parity| of the 1970s." Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence,
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Omce, 9 March 1971j, pp. 1-20.
14 Raymond S. Blunt and Thomas O. Cason, Realistic Deterrence," Air University Review, (May-June 1973j, at < http://www.
airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1973/may-jun/blunt.html > [accessed 19 Sep. 2007|; and from the academic side:
Douglas Kinnard, The New Defense Literature," Polity, vol. 5, no. 4, (Summer, 1973j: pp. 517-530.
15 Laird, Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, op cit., pp. 155-162.
16 Melvin R. Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," (Statement of Secretary of Defense on FY 73 Defense
PHILLIP A. KARBER
70
A dialectical process of strategic thought through which we are able to determine how to apply our
resources more efectively to accomplish our national security goals.
17
Where others, then and now, use the term net to refer to the juxtaposition of ones own v.
opposing forces, Lairds defnition went much further than military balancing.
18

Assessment and planning in the nuclear age are intimately related to understanding
of international relations on the one hand and to weapons technology and possible
use on the other hand. Tere is, of course, nothing new in this dependence. What
is new is the enormous complexity that has entered into force planning since World
War II, compounded by dramatic technological advances, major world economic
adjustments, and a fragmenting of the past bi-polar world structure.
Te international environment is dynamic, confusing and in some aspects
disconcerting. Te rate of change political, economic, social and technical is
perhaps the greatest we have ever known. Net assessment ofers a valuable tool for
understanding and responding to these challenges.
It is important to re-emphasize that any realistic assessments and resulting plans
for military forces and new weapons systems must include political, economic and
social considerations.
Net Assessment plays a critical role in our Total Force Planning and in the
development of forces necessary to maintain our national security. In these
assessments we weigh the capabilities of potential enemies against our capabilities
and those of our allies. At the same time, we must give careful consideration not
only to the strengths of potential adversaries, but also to the defciencies in their
capabilities and the various constraints with which they must cope.
19
Although the above was stated in a special section entitled Net Assessment and the Treat, this
was not merely red baiting in the guise of objectivity nor was it narrowly focused on military
comparisons.
Lairds perspective had a much broader and more long-range evaluative ring to it like what
would later be called competitive strategy refectively assessing the environment one is in,
relative to where one wants to be. Looking back, it would not be inaccurate to describe Lairds view
of Net Assessment as a form of strategic sociology systemically integrating cultural, economic,
Budget and FY 1973-77 Program; Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee, US Congress, 15 February 1972j, p. 6.
The term Net Assessment" and the juxtaposed with" were both underscored in the original.
17 lbid..
18 This is not to say that he did not include military aspects, but tended to view them as a piece of the larger assessment." Thus,
Laird noted: the momentum of Soviet weapons development and deployment demands examination in relation to what we
and our allies and friends must do about it." And, in conjunction with my Defense Report, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staf, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, will present to Congress and the American people a comprehensive military assessment of
the threat and of our force capabilities. Our combined presentations this year will represent another step forward in our new
emphasis on Net Assessment." lbid., pp. 6-7. Concerning the military posture statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staf, the frst such formal statement was 'United States Military Posture for FY 1972', issued on 9 March 1971 by Admiral
Thomas H. Moorer, USN. The Secretary of Defense is required by law to present an annual report/posture statement to the
Congress; the Chairman is not. The Chairman has, however, always accompanied the Secretary when he presented these
statements to the Congress. lnitially, the Chairman made no statement at these appearances, but he was usually called upon
by the Secretary of Defense to answer certain questions. Consequently, the Chairman began to prepare an informal statement
of his own, and over the years it evolved into the formal document it is today. The frst one formally bound and issues as 'United
States Military Posture' was the one for FY 1972. Academic lntelligence,: Military Afairs, vol. 43, no. 1, (February 1979j: p. 47.
19 lbid., p. 29.
LAIRDS SEARCH FOR A STRATEGY DIALECTIC
71
technological, and political trends
20
upon which planning would be based and against which new
concepts could be analytically tested.
21
In the SecDef s view, the leader of the Defense Department had the responsibility to be the
synthesizer of military needs and civilian resources; a challenge beftting a statesman, one that
could not be delegated but had to be taken personally:
22
We intend to accomplish this through a more coordinated emphasis on Net
Assessment in my immediate ofce and throughout the Department of Defense.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that Total Force planning must be carried
out both in terms of immediate as well as longer-range phased objectives.
However, this will be a difcult task since the apparent demands of the moment
may sometimes have adverse impact on what we hope to accomplish in the future.
In order to minimize this often troublesome problem, my Director of Net
Assessments will be supported by and work closely with the Office of my Assistant
for Long-Range Planning, whose task it will be to assure efective coordination
of the Net Assessment and Total Force planning functions of the Secretary of
Defense.
As a former member of Congress, I am confident that our new approach, with
its emphasis on Net Assessment and Total Force planning, will permit the
Department of Defense in coming months and years to be even more responsive
to the Congress as we share the responsibility for assuring our national security.
23
Te target audience of this message was clearly the Congress, and Laird was using Net Assessment
to forge a better relationship with them and was willing to make the process an extension of his
immediate ofce and direct staf in order to demonstrate his commitment.
Tus, for a Secretary of Strategy, the tools of Net Assessment and Long Range Planning
were the left and right hands (brains) of strategy development
24
respectively diagnostic and
20 One is reminded here much more of the then contemporary work of Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons than any particular
efort in lR Theory or Strategic Studies. See for example: Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social
Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers, (New York: The Free Press, 1939j; Talcott Parsons,
Edward A. Shils, and James Olds, values, Motives, and Systems of Action," in Toward a General Theory of Action, Talcott
Parsons and Edward A. Shils, ed., (New York: Harper and Row, 1951j; Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society,
(New York: The Free Press, 1956j; Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (New York: The Free Press,
1960j; Talcott Parsons, An Outline of the Social System," in Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory,
ed. by Talcott Parsons, et. al. (New York: The Free Press, 1961j; Talcott Parsons, Some Refections on the Place of Force in
Social Process," in lnternal War: Problems and Approaches, ed. by Harry Eckstein (New York: The Free Press, 1964j; Talcott
Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, (Englewood Clifs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, lnc., 1966j; Talcott
Parsons, Politics and Social Structure, (New York: The Free Press, 1969j; and Talcott Parsons, On Building Social System
Theory: A Personal History," Daedalus, (Fall, 1970j; Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, (Englewood Clifs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1971j; Talcott Parsons, The Evolution of Societies, (Englewood Clifs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977j.
21 Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," (1972j op cit., p. 30: emphasized that there were four major areas
we must take into account in any comprehensive Net Assessment related to national security planning. They are the Strategic
Reality, the Political Reality, the Fiscal Reality and the Manpower Reality."
22 Several months after the announcement of the new strategy, he said that to be perfectly frank . successful implementation of
the strategy of realistic deterrence is the most dimcult and challenging national-security efort we have ever undertaken in this
country." Laird quoted in US News and World Report, 17 May 1971, p. 29.
23 Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," (1972j op cit., p. 26. Bolding emphasis added. The term Net
Assessment" was underscored in the original.
24 Net Assessment and Long Range Planning," 1972, Box A82 (Open to Researchj, op cit.; and Key Points Rationale for
Strategy," Undated, Boxes B1-B3 (Not Yet Reviewed for Opening to Researchj, op cit., Baroody to Secretary Laird, Concerning
Net Assessment and Long Range Planning Efort (1j-(2j," Memo, 1972, Boxes B1-B3 (Not Yet Reviewed for Opening to Researchj,
PHILLIP A. KARBER
72
prognostic that, in combination would provide prescriptive input for strategy development as
well as negative feedback for course correction.
25
It would be through this dialectical process
that the Department of Defense would be able to determine how to apply our resources most
efectively in order to improve our total capability to accomplish our national security goals.
26
It
could be argued that McNamara had also had a dialectical process: JCS and Services proposed; the
Systems Analysis policemen opposed; and the Secretary disposed.
But Lairds model of Net Assessment was diferent. And the following seems to capture his
intent:
Net Assessment is based on an intellectual approach that difers substantially from
the modern examples. At the highest level it is for the use of the Secretary of
Defense, and the questions that it tries to answer are those that arise when the
overall capabilities and future shape of the American military are considered. It
is not intended to provide a day-to-day management tool to review the efciency
with which existing missions are executed nor is it designed to alert the Secretary
of Defense to the danger of an imminent war.
27
In short, Lairds model of Net Assessment was not the beginning of a linear process of programming
and budgeting process, but an of-line device with which to think strategically about theater
balances and long-range competitive challenges.
Trends uncovered in Long-Range Planning or Net Assessment conclusions could serve as a
thesis that something may be amiss in US strategy or that there may be a competitive advantage in
doing something new.
28
As illustrated in Figure 6, the Pentagon with all the inertia of the Queen
Mary military services, Joint Staf and organizations in DoD can respond to the assessment
with a proposed remedy that is then debated; and SecDef, with the advice of the JCS Chairman
and others, has the opportunity to create a new synthesis.
29
Lairds point was that given the totality
of the Pentagons planning activity, a process that takes several years for each cycle and involves
an enormous amount of built up momentum, it makes it difcult for the SecDef to ask questions
he does not know the answers to, to innovate in rapidly changing environments in real time, or
to explore alternative options (in order to remain competitive or exploit an unexpected advantage)
that are outside institutional boxes. In order not to disrupt the massive mainline planning machine
or be held hostage by its inertia, the Secretary thus adopted the BRDP position that it was prudent
to have a strategic assessment unit reporting directly to his ofce. Without this direct access, his
inquires could not be asked or answered in confdence; or without some intervening ofce putting
op cit.,
25 As in steering" - which could be either reinforcing or corrective as opposed to inherently critical. For this distinction drawn from
cybernetic control theory, see: William W. Kaufman, Who is Conning the Alliance?" Brookings Review, vol. 5, no. 4, (Fall 1987j:
pp. 10-17.
26 Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," (1972j, op cit., p. 26. Note, this sentence was in the context of his
paragraph defning net assessment."
27 Rosen, Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept," in On Not Confusion Ourselves, op cit., pp. 290-291.
28 The end product of Net Assessment provides a basis for judging whether, in the case examined, we and our allies will be able to
sustain our national objectives and protect our vital interests, or if not, where there are problem areas." Laird, National Security
Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," (1972j, op cit., p. 26.
29 There was considerable thought that went behind the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel focused on the dialectic" between Net
Assessment diagnosis and Strategic Planning prescription as evidenced in: Net Assessment, 1969-1972 (1j-(2j," Box A82
Department of Defense Papers: Baroody Subject File, (Melvin R. Laird Papers, Ann Arbor, Ml: Gerald R. Ford Libraryj; see
particularly: Net Assessment and Long Range Planning,"1972; and Baroody to Secretary Laird, Concerning Net Assessment
and Long Range Planning Efort (1j-(2j," Memo, 1972j.
LAIRDS SEARCH FOR A STRATEGY DIALECTIC
73
their spin on the question or trying to grade, let alone infuence, the answer.
On the other hand, while this small planning cell or group was clearly expected to engage the
various services, departments, or components in discussion and dialogue on emerging issues,
the intent was NOT to create another bad experience similar to McNamaras Systems Analysis
Ofce, where they were used as front line combatants in the bureaucratic and budgetary wars. As
a dialectic, it was informative and intellectual, providing a perspective outside the formal planning
process for SecDef to be exposed to dissonant views and make his own synthesis; it was NOT an
antithetical battering ram with which to assault Service POM positions.
30
30 Laird did not depart abruptly from the McNamara-Cliford management system, but rather instituted gradual changes. He
pursued what he called participatory management," an approach calculated to gain the cooperation of the military leadership
in reducing the Defense budget and the size of the military establishment. While retaining decision-making functions for himself
and the deputy secretary of defense, Laird somewhat decentralized policymaking and operations. He accorded the service
secretaries and the JCS a more infuential role in the development of budgets and force levels. He revised the PPBS, including
a return to the use of service budget ceilings and service programming of forces within these ceilings. The previously powerful
systems analysis omce could no longer initiate planning, only evaluate and review service proposals." Biography: Melvin R.
Laird, 10th Secretary of Defense," Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipient Melvin R. Laird," Presidential Medal of Freedom,
2007, at < http://www.medalofreedom.com/MelvinLaird.htm > [accessed 31 March 2008|.
Figure 7
7
THE PENTAGON VERSUS THE NSC
National policymakers want to know how the US stands in various types of
international competition. Tey are interested in our relative position and any
trends that may afect it. Further, it is most important to know what causes the
trends.
1
It has become Net Assessment folklore that Secretary Laird had chose not to implement the
Fitzhugh Panels recommendations to create a net assessment function.
2
But that interpretation
not only is contradicted by the evidence above but also ignores the then ongoing policy confict
between the Pentagon and the National Security Council.
3
Inadvertently caught up in the middle
and stimulating a net assessment organizational competition was a supplementary report on the
changing balance between the US and the USSR from the Blue Ribbon Panel efort.
From the perspective of the NSC it was business as usual, with assessment interest stemming
from strategic competition. Here are two diferent versions:
In November 1969, Kissinger had initiated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) with the Soviets. By the following spring he had begun worrying that
the Soviets might begin dragging their feet or otherwise misbehave regarding
the negotiations. He therefore convened a special defense panel under K. Wayne
Smith to explore programmatic steps the United States might take to pressure the
Russians should that prove necessary in order to reach a SALT agreement. During
the deliberations of Kissingers special defense panel, Charles Herzfeld pressed
Marshall and Schlesinger to assess where the United States stood in the principal
areas of military competition between the two Cold War adversaries. In response,
Marshall focused on the Soviets and where they were headed, while Schlesinger
concentrated on the two sides military budgets. Marshall, however, ended up
doing most of the drafting of this frst net assessment because of Schlesingers
1 A.W. Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessments," (memo for the record; Washington, DC: National Security Council,
16 August 1972j, p. 1.
2 Pickett, Roche, and Watts, Net Assessment: A Historical Review," op cit., p. 166.
3 Kissinger was obsessed with undermining the infuence of Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William
Rogers by denigrating them behind their backs and excluding them from major policy matters. Cutting out Mel Laird is what
we did for a living," says former Kissinger Stafer Laurence Lynn." Walter lsaacson, Hay Corey and Peter Stoler, Two of the
President's Men," Time, 26 April 1982.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
76
commitments at the Bureau of the Budget.
4
Or.
By 1970, however, it was beginning to be clear that the US defense budget
would decline after the Vietnam War was over, while the Soviets apparently
were expanding their strategic nuclear forces with an intensity that seemed both
unbounded and directed toward establishing clear superiority over the United
States. Te dominance of US forces was eroding and a long term question was how
well the United States was equipped to compete with the Soviet Union in military
matters. Te National Security Council appointed a study group that worked on
a net assessment in the last half of 1970. Its report not only speculated on long-
term developments in US and Soviet forces, but recommended establishing a more
permanent efort to conduct net assessments in order to develop a picture of how
the competition was going over time.
5
Diferences over positions in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks became intertwined with
varying degrees of alarm over the changing balance with the Soviets as well as a personality turf
war between Laird and Kissinger.
Across the Potomac in September 1970, just three months after the Blue Ribbon Report, seven
of the sixteen panel members, led by Lewis Powell,
6
produced a Supplemental Statement
7
as a 35
page Report on the Shifting Balance of Military Power,
8
derisively called the Red Book around
the NSC for the color of its cover and Russians are Coming! tone.
9
However, the reports call
for public discussion of converging trends and the need to assess the threat to technological
superiority and the contribution of negotiated limitations on the arms race, underscored the
need for some type of assessment that would not only function as the basis for military strategy,
but also be addressed to Congressional and public audiences.
10
Te Red Book highlighted three specifc areas of major concern about the convergence of a
number of trends indicating a signifcant shifting of the strategic military balance against the
United States and in favor of the Soviet Union; with particular concern over:
Te growing Strategic superiority in ICBMs coupled with convincing evidence that the
Soviet Union seeks a preemptive frst-strike capability;
Te rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability; and
Te possibility that present US technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union.

4 Barry Watts, Scientifc Methods and New Assessment," (conference paper; Washington, DC: Conference on Net Assessment,
28 March 2008j, p. 4:
5 Pickett, Roche, and Watts, Net Assessment: A Historical Review," op cit., p. 166.
6 The pivotal role in this balance supplement" played by Lewis Powell, who would be sitting on the Supreme Court within a year is
detailed in: John C. Jefries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994j, pp. 217-220.
7 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel - Supplemental Statement," 9/30/1970, Box D5 Department of Defense Papers: Subject File,
Baroody Planning Files (Melvin R. Laird Papers - Container List - Part 2: Boxes Not Yet Reviewed for Opening to Researchj; (Ann
Arbor, Ml: Gerald R. Ford Library, no datej, at < http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/guides/Finding%20Aids/Laird,_Melvin_-_
Papers_ftl2.htm > [accessed 17 November 2005|.
8 The Shifting Balance of Military Power, (Supplemental Statement to Report of Blue Ribbon Defense Panel submitted to the
President and the Secretary of Defense signed 30 September 1970; Washington, DC: Government Printing Omce, 1971j.
9 Net Assessment - US vs. Soviet Union (Comments/Notes 'Red Book', ca. October 1970 (1j-(2j," Boxes B1-B3 (Not Yet
Reviewed for Opening to Researchj; Ann Arbor, Ml: Gerald R. Ford Library, no datej, op cit..
10 The Shifting Balance of Military Power, op cit., p. x.
THE PENTAGON VERSUS THE NSC
77
11
Johnny Foster, one of the most infuential leaders to hold the position of DDR&E, was held in
high esteem by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and quoted extensively in the Supplemental Te
Shifting Balance of Military Power report. In particular, he stressed concern about the long-range
efects of Soviet R&D investment and concern that the US was losing its competitive advantage in
industrial base long-range competitive themes picked up by the Blue Ribbon report.
12
Te authors of the supplemental Report on the Shifting Balance of Military Power admitted
that it does not purport to be an exhaustive assessment of the comparative military capabilities
and emphasized that it had a public education purpose.
13
But one side efect was to sensitize the
Kissinger NSC that some type of net efort at assessing the US v. Soviet strategic balance was
going to happen whether they liked it or not and that, rather than defensively critiquing the failings
of others, they should get ahead of it, and take the lead.
Although its avowed purpose was to rally public opinion behind a strong defense,
the report was immediately buried. Nothing was heard of it for six months.
Te White House intervened through Henry Kissinger, who asked the Deputy
Secretary of Defense to have his staf review the Report in some detail for
substantive accuracy and for consistency with our other public statements before
further consideration is given to releasing it to the public. In other words, never
was soon enough.
14
Despite a cold shoulder from the National Security Council,
15
this pioneering US-Soviet side-
by-side comparison also popularized, even within the DOD/NSC community, the concept
of a balance that should be periodically watched and weighed via a methodology called net
assessment.
16
Because the Red Book intermixed description and prescription, subsequent NSC
emphasis would separate them with an emphasis upon the diagnostic nature of net assessment.
In the fall 1970, the Nixon Administration began taking the possibility of meaningful conventional
arms control in Europe serious. In an NSC Senior Review Group meeting, chaired by the National
Security Advisor, contrasted the opening position, or more accurately, non-position with the past
attention given to strategic forces:
Tis will be a brief meeting to review where we stand on MBFR and agree where
we go from here. We have identifed a number of approaches: 1) an approach that
11 lbid., pp. vii.
12 US qualitative superiority in weapons, due to its advanced technology, has aforded a decisive advantage over the past years.
This advantage is now being eroded away, as the US falls behind the Soviet Union in the support of R&D and in the training of
scientists and engineers. There is an ever present risk of disastrous technological surprise in major weaponry where an open
society is in competition with a closed Communist society. We are neglecting, by inadequate support and planning, to minimize
this risk." lbid., pp. v and 22: ln addition to talented leadership and the necessary industrial base, the essential ingredients of a
vital and competitive technology are skilled manpower and adequate R&D funding." The US is falling behind the Soviet Union in
both of these respects."
13 lbid., p. v.
14 Jefries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, op cit., p. 218.
15 Finally, on March 12, 1971, the statement was released without fanfare by low-level defense omcials and given almost no
circulation. Even Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's members were not sent copies.. Powell expected President Nixon and Secretary
Laird to applaud his statement. He failed to realize that his alarming attack on strategic preparedness against the Soviet threat
was as unwelcome to the administration as it was to their liberal critics." Jefries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, op cit., p. 218.
16 Net Assessment - US vs. Soviet Union (Comments/Notes 'Red Book', ca. October 1970 (1j-(2j," Boxes B1-B3 [Not Yet Reviewed
for Opening to Research|, op cit..
PHILLIP A. KARBER
78
is basically political; 2) an arms control approach which attempts to preserve or
enhance our military position through asymmetrical cuts. I have the impression
from our work on NSSM 84 and the NSC meeting that there is a general consensus
that symmetrical cuts of any signifcant size are not very desirable from the security
point of view. Te only symmetrical cuts that would not be undesirable would be so
small as to be symbolic, and even these might run counter to attempts to improve
our posture. Tis leaves us with an attempt to develop an asymmetrical approach.
Conceptually an asymmetrical approach represents a tough problem. Contrary
to the SALT exercise, we have developed no criteria for comparison we have
no yard-sticks. Nor have we worked out questions of collateral restraints, either
symmetrical or asymmetrical. Our biggest problem is related to the mobilization
date. Ideally, we should develop constraints designed to give maximum warning
or to impede mobilization and reinforcement. We havent yet worked out what
specifc constraints would be most efective. (to Mr. Helms) We havent had a
systematic analysis of how our intelligence capabilities could be strengthened to
help us monitor an agreement. Tis is a tough problem.
17
After discussion of substantive issues, the topic turned to the question of how to proceed:
Mr. Kissinger: (to Wayne Smith) Lets get a working panel to work on this, chaired
by CIA with DIA representation.
Mr. Packard: Tats a good idea. Also, we have some new capability which we are
looking at as an independent matter.
Mr. Kissinger: We need a compilation of all the sources of our information,
what sort of information we get and what sort we need. For example, I noticed
a reference to the fact that if the Soviet forces were returned to the Moscow and
Kiev Military Districts this wouldnt help us. Why would it not help us somewhat
to have Soviet forces moved 1000 miles back? Why would it be necessary for them
to go beyond the Urals? I can see the relationship of a move 1000 miles back by
the Soviets to a 3000 mile move by the U.S., but it should help some. (to Wayne
Smith) Lets get this compilation.
Mr. Irwin: At least we would get an idea of the time span of our uncoverage.
Mr. Helms: Te idea of a task force is frst class.
Dr. Smith: Has anyone done any work on the recent Warsaw Pact exercises in this
regard? We could learn something from it.
Mr. Packard: We have done some work but nothing very detailed.
Mr. Kissinger: We must try to be as concrete as possible. For example, we speak
of troops being disbanded. Do we mean that these troops would go into reserve
status; would their weapons be destroyed; if not, where would their weapons be
moved? We must know what we are talking about.
Over the next six months, the need for Net Assessments of US and Soviet forces, and the role of
17 Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, Subject: Military [M0t0a|| Balanced Force Reductions, (23 November 1970j, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976volume XXXlX, European Security, Document 39, pp. 99-105.
THE PENTAGON VERSUS THE NSC
79
doing it from the NSC as an interagency process began to take hold.
18
Tere is some evidence that a contemporary paper Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force
Posture, prepared in 1970 by Andrew Marshall, then a NSC consultant, was either viewed as
countering the supplemental Red Book report, or at a minimum recommending further follow-
up to it.
19
In any case it was relevant to a whole new area of interest in the balance of General
Purpose Forces. Tus in a Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations, prepared for National
Security Advisor Kissinger, he highlighted the following:
Tere is considerable importance to having better, more fnely tuned net assessments
of the relative position of US and Soviet force postures. Crude measures were
acceptable in the past, but are no longer so. Moreover, the question of how we
are doing relative to the Soviets will be increasingly raised as a more important
political question than has been in [sic] the case in the past. A case can be made
that in the areas that we cared most about, namely, Naval forces, military R&D,
and strategic ofensive forces, we have been until recently, rather far ahead of the
Soviets. Tey have now caught up in almost all of these and may be on the point
of passing us. All of this suggest that it will be important to fnd some regular way
to get better, more refned assessments.
20
In short Marshall was admitting that in the same areas that the Red Book had highlighted, there
were noticeable and negative changes in American competitive standing. Recognizing that in the
past there had been a subcommittee led by a three star general that prepared net assessments,
Marshall recommended to Kissinger that the NSC:
begin by organizing and conducting a major national study to produce a net
assessment of US and Soviet force postures as of end 1972. Since this will be the
frst net assessment made in some time using the mechanism of a national study
will allow one to bring in whoever seems to be the most suitable and best able
to contribute to such an assessment. Such a study ought to run about a year to
eighteen months. Te time will be needed to get the Intelligence community up
to speed in many areas now lacking adequate data. Te virtue of this efort also
would be that it could bring to bear absolutely frst-rate people who would perform
not only the function of producing the initial estimate, but set standards for
future estimates to come. Moreover, a number of methodological improvements
will need to be developed. Subsequent assessments could be undertaken by an
organization within the government, institutionalized in whatever seemed to be
the most appropriate way. Indeed, one could draw on the experience of having the
national study to come up with recommendations as to how best to organize and
conduct future net assessments within the standard bureaucracy.
21
18 Ray Cline, lnformation Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of lntelligence and Research (Clinej to the Under
Secretary of State (lrwinj: Subject: Factors in Making a Net Assessment of US and Soviet Strategic Forces," (8 March 1971j,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976volume ll, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972,
Document 228, pp. 487-490.
19 various fles refer to the following National Security Council memo: A. W. Marshall, Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force
Posture: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations, (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 1970j.
20 lbid., p. 2.
21 lbid., p. 3.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
80
In conclusion Marshall recommended that Kissinger consider organizing a national study to
produce a net assessment by end 1972. Moreover, he suggested that this group be asked to produce
a plan for the regular supply of such assessments and tasked with the development of appropriate
methodologies and data bases for making such assessments.
22
President Nixon had struggled with the organization of US intelligence, and with the
organizational recommendations on defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel,
23
he directed
James Schlesinger (then Deputy Director of the Ofce of Management and Budget) in December
1970 to recommend options on how the organizational structure of the Intelligence Community
could be changed to bring about greater efciency and efectiveness. Completed in March 1971,
Schlesinger produced A Review of the Intelligence Community,
24
focused on consumer views
25

and found a fragmented efort with unnecessarily competitive and redundant collection activities,
a disorganized and inefective management, costly inefciency, and analytical products that often
sufered in timeliness or quality.
26
Although the report received most attention for its reform of the
management structure with a strong DCI who could bring intelligence costs under control, it also
focused on improving analytic quality
27
and, at the end, recommended:
Periodic review by outsiders of intelligence products, of the main working hypotheses
within the community, and of analytical methods being used.
A net assessment group established at the national level which, along with the NSSM
process, will keep questioning the community and challenging it to refne and support its
hypotheses.
28
After half a year of internal review and debate, the President incorporated much of the Schlesinger
study in a major reorganization of the American intelligence community that also had signifcant
implications for net assessment.
22 lbid..
23 Woodrow J. Kuhns, lntelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology," in Paradoxes of Strategic lntelligence:
Essays in Honor of Michael l. Handel, edited by Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, (London, UK: Frank Cass, 2003j,
p. 99, footnote 19, attributes Nixon's interest to unhappiness with the intelligence community, especially its convoluted
organization" and followed on the heels of a similar review" by the BRDP.
24 James R. Schlesinger, A Review of the lntelligence Community," (report; Washington, DC: Omce of Management and Budget,
10 March 1971j, at < http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/document%204.pdf > [accessed 12 March 2008|.
25 Kuhns, lntelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology," op cit..
26 For background, see: Harold Brown and Warren B. Rudman, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US
Intelligence, (Washington, DC: Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US lntelligence Community, 1 March 1996j,
Appendix A. The Evolution of the US lntelligence Community - An Historical Overview," at < http://www.fas.org/irp/ofdocs/
int022.html > [accessed 15 March 2008|. For a contemporary commentary on the Schlesinger report, see: Comments on
'A A Review of the lntelligence Community'," (Langley, vA: ClA CREST Collection, NARA ll, no datej, at < http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/document%205.pdf > [accessed 13 March 2008|.
27 Schlesinger, A Review of the lntelligence Community," op cit., p. 12: Despite the richness of the data made available by modern
methods of collection and the rising costs of their acquisition, it is not at all clear that our hypotheses about foreign intentions,
capabilities, and activities have improved commensurately in scope and quality." This is also a point stressed by Kuhns,
lntelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology," op cit., pp. 84-85.
28 Schlesinger, A Review of the lntelligence Community," op cit., pp. 45-46.
8
NET ASSESSMENT METHOD &
PROCESS AT THE NSC
How would net assessment studies be diferent in methodology and style of
analysis from other forms of analysis now undertaken to assist top level decision-
makers? Te focus on comparison with rival powers is not entirely new, but new
methods of making such comparisons need to be developed. As improved methods
of comparing the US and our competitors are developed, they will provide
further diferentiation for net assessment as a particular type of analysis.
1
In November 1971, President Nixon issued a Presidential Memorandum on the Organization
and Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community,
2
focused on more efcient use of
resources and improvement in the intelligence product. Te Director of Central Intelligence was
made responsible for planning, reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities
and in the production of national intelligence as well as setting up an interagency Intelligence
Committee, chaired by the National Security Advisor, and consisting of the Attorney General,
the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staf, and the DCI.
3
As part of the intelligence community reorganization the President also directed:
that a Net Assessment Group be created within the National Security Council
Staf. Te group will be headed by a senior staf member and will be responsible
for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products and for producing net
assessments of US capabilities vis--vis those of foreign governments constituting
a threat to US security.
4
Tis represented a virtual mirroring of the above Schlesinger recommendations and equally
1 lbid., p. 7.
2 Richard M. Nixon, Organization and Management of the US Foreign lntelligence Community" (Memorandum; Washington, DC:
The White House, 5 November 1971j, p. 6.
3 Appendix A. The Evolution of the US lntelligence Community - An Historical Overview," op cit..
4 lbid. This Memorandum was superceded by Gerald R. Ford's Executive Order 11905 on United States Foreign lntelligence
Activities," of 18 February 1976, which makes no mention of Net Assessment function or omce anywhere in the six agencies
making up the intelligence community or the NSC.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
82
interesting, combined both functions within one ofce, and Andy Marshall was recruited to lead
the NSCs NAG
5
an acronym that became popular with those who resented having someone
grade their intelligence products.
Following the NSCs lead,
6
in December 1971
7
Laird formally implemented the frst and only
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendation up to that time, and established an Ofce of Net
Assessment reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.
8
However, trying to use the SecDef
ofce as the E-ring strategic coordinator was one thing, but for it to also serve as surrogate lead
for Long-Range Planning as a part-time activity while ground-breaking a new methodology of
Net Assessment, all without a dedicated staf, was neither implementable nor sustainable. Te
very breadth of Col. Marshalls histrionic interest, indeed preoccupation with Vietnam and its
lessons learned, seemed to invert these assessment eforts from a relevant forward looking center-
stage to a retrospective backwater.
9
Moreover, the position remained unfulflled and the function
unaddressed while an intense OSD v. NSC dialogue on the subject of Net Assessment went on
between late 1971-mid 1972.
10

Tis delay in flling a position that Laird wanted and had invested considerable personal political
capital in getting established, was not unique to the Net Assessment function. For example, in
October 1972 Congress passed legislation creating a second deputy secretary of defense position,
which was a proposal Laird strongly supported, even though he never flled the position.
11
Laird
was not the only one side-tracked by the politics. Over at the White House:
bureaucratic tension between the NSC and the Pentagon over who would be
in charge of national net assessments prevented Marshall from getting any started
in 1972.
12
Te departure of Secretary Laird early in 1973
13
and the dispersal of his Long-Range Planning
5 Richard Nixon's reorganization of the national intelligence community established a Net Assessment Group (NAGj on the NSC,
which Marshall was asked to head." Watts, Scientifc Methods and New Assessment," op cit, p. 4.
6 Douglas Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1980j, p. 236, footnote 42: suggests
that the original motivation may have been to counter Kissinger's net assessment activity within the National Security
Council staf." The timing of events would not contradict that, but there is substantial weight that Laird had a commitment to
implementing that part of the BRDP recommendation since the fall of 1970.
7 The date given is from Watts, Scientifc Methods and New Assessment," op cit, p. 4.
8 The position was set up as a Schedule C" appointment - positions in which the incumbent serves at the pleasure of the
agency head. These positions are excepted from the competitive service by law, by Executive order, or by the Omce of
Personnel Management (OPMj based on their responsibility for determining or advocating agency policy or their confdential
character." Transition to a New Presidential Administration: Employment Guidance for Agencies, (Washington, DC: United States
Omce of Personnel Management, August 2000j.
9 Lt. Col. Donald S. Marshall, Summary of Observations and Recommendations Resulting from a visit to vietnam and
the PACOM Area," February 1971, Boxes B1-B3 (Not Yet Reviewed for Opening to Researchj; and Preliminaries to a Net
Assessment of the vietnam Confict," 1972 (1j-(2j, Box A101 (Not Yet Reviewed for Opening to Researchj, lbid..
10 Net Assessment - White House," 1972, Box A82 (Open to Researchj, op cit.
T.H. Moorer (CJCSj, Concerning Capabilities Assessment," Memo, 11/2/71, Boxes B1-B3 (Not Yet Reviewed for Opening to
Researchj, op cit.; Net Assessment - Study Efort," March-April 1972, lbid; and Nature and Scope of Net Assessments,"
4/26/72, lbid. The latter is close to the same title of an Andrew Marshall memo dated 4/26/72, and may in fact have been
a copy or critique of a version of a for comment" draft. See: Andrew W. Marshall, The Nature and Scope of National Net
Assessments," (draft NSC memorandum; Washington, DC: National Security Council, 16 August 1972j, pp. 1-12.
11 Melvin R. Laird, 10th Secretary of Defense," op cit., notes that by 1972 Laird was a lame-duck: Because he had stated
repeatedly that he would serve only four years . it came as no surprise when President Nixon on 28 November 1972 nominated
Elliot L. Richardson to succeed him."
12 Watts, Scientifc Methods and New Assessment," op cit, p. 4.
13 Announced on 28 November 1972 and formally succeeded by Elliot L. Richardson on 29 January 1973. Secretary of Defense -
NET ASSESSMENT METHOD & PROCESS AT THE NSC
83
staf, compounded the departmental disorganization produced by the short tenure of Elliott
Richardson (three Secretaries within six months) left the Net Assessment ofce stillborn, albeit
with a heroic mandate waiting to be flled.
In April 1972 Andrew W. Marshall arrived at the National Security Council as a full time
employee to head up the Net Assessment Group.
14
After getting the ofce organized with both
assigned military assistants and secretarial support he laid out the analytical mission:
In the past the US held a clear edge in nearly every aspect of international
competition; certainly we did so in military forces and military R&D. Where and
when we were challenged we were always able to divert enough resources to the
problem area to restore our superiority. Tat is, we were able to buy solutions to
our problems. Tis is no longer the case. Tere is severe pressure to reduce military
expenditures, and this pressure is likely to continue. Tus there is a high premium
on thoughtful and inventive approaches to the defense problem solution, and on
carefully calculated risk taking. To make this work, we must have a very clear
description of the comparative situation of ourselves and our rivals.
15

It is not clear who this was written for, but the message was clear, it was time to play smart, not
rich.
16
In the memorandum, Marshall explicitly recognized that to make this work, we must have
a very clear description of the comparative situation of ourselves and our rivals.
17
Although at this stage the function was not called competitive strategy,
18
that is the descriptor
that best captures what he intended.
Te long-term competitive position of the US military establishment compared
with its counterpart should be analyzed and evaluated.
Since many of the basic assumptions of US foreign and defense policy are in
question and transition, the scope of even military net assessments should be
broadened to include political and economic aspects.
19
Particularly noteworthy here, was the warning against bipolar simplicity and a rejection of
the deductive policy driven Estimate of the Situation approach so typical of past American
military strategy analysis.
20
Whether intentional or accidental, this was putting meat on the bare
bones of Lairds view of Net Assessment as a form of strategic sociology
21
systemically integrating
cultural, economic, technological, and political trends and the vehicle for doing so would be Net
Assessment at the National Level.
22
Melvin R. Laird," SecDef Histories, DefenseLink, undated, < http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/laird.htm
> [accessed 20 November 2005|.
14 Background on Attached Memorandum," op cit., p. 2.
15 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 1.
16 Play smart, not rich." was my phrase, trying to describe what l believed was the dominant theme of the Marshall competitive
strategy approach. See: Abshire and Karber, NATO Net Assessment," op cit., pp. D23-D28.
17 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 1.
18 This was the theme of his last paper as a RAND employee: A.W. Marshall, Long-Term Competition with the Soviets: A
Framework for Strategic Analysis," (R-862-PR; Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972j, pp. 1-61.
19 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 1.
20 See earlier discussion in section l. Strategy Development and the Need for Assessment.
21 See earlier discussion in section lll. Laird's Search for a Strategy Dialectic.
22 William Baroody to [Henry Kissinger| the Assistant to the President for National Security Afairs, Concerning Net Assessment at
PHILLIP A. KARBER
84
Marshall came uniquely prepared, having spent the previous decade addressing most of the
problematic issues that would drive a comparison of rival strengths and weaknesses. Tis experience
and refectivity covered issues of: long range planning for analytical organizations,
23
treating
uncertainty,
24
problems of estimating military power,
25
addressing cost and delays in procurement,
26

technological forecasting,
27
employing special intelligence to gain insight into opponent decisions
and structures,
28
using organization behavior to improve intelligence,
29
asymmetries in opposed
force design,
30
comparing rival research and development strategies,
31
using bureaucratic behavior
to get a deeper appreciation of various balances,
32
as well as thinking about long-term competitive
frameworks.
33
Te combined breadth and depth of this body of work, led him to be skeptical about
single point comparative methods and facile claims of quick fxes, particularly those pitched by
technological salesmen. If, within a year, Schlesinger would bring the most relevant resume to
the position of Secretary of Defense,
34
Marshall would equal it in breadth and depth of related
analytical experience applicable to strategy development, long-range planning and net assessment.
One of the frst things Marshall did upon arriving at the NSC, was to lay out a foundational
game plan for what he called the Nature and Scope of Net Assessment. Again, he went back to
the same areas of alleged growing imbalance that had been highlighted in the Red Book eighteen
months earlier.
Areas in which the Soviet Union is alleged to have or be moving toward superiority,
such as naval forces, strategic nuclear forces, or R&D require investigation.
35
Te idea was neither to counter nor mirror the Red Book hyperbole, but rather substitute a
diagnostic approach, and Marshall was candid about the challenge.
Net assessment in the sense we propose is not an easy task. Te single most
productive resource that can be brought to bear in making net assessments is
the National Level," (9/1/1972j, Boxes B1-B3 Department of Defense Papers: Baroody Planning Files, Gerald R. Ford Library.
23 Bernard Brodie, Charles J. Hitch, A.W. Marshall, The Next Ten Years," (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., December 1954j.
24 A.W. Marshall, A Treatment of Uncertainty," (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., May 1955j.
25 A.W. Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power," (P-3417; Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1966j.
26 A.W. Marshall and H. W. Meckling, Predictability of the Cost, Time, and Success of Development," (p-1821; Santa Monica, CA:
The RAND Corp., 1959j.
27 A.W. Marshall and J. E. Loftus, Forecasting Soviet Force Structure: The lmportance of Bureaucratic and budgetary
Constraints," (p-1821; Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., July 1963j.
28 Project Sovoy was an efort at RAND led by A.W. Marshall and Joe Loftus, where selected RAND analysts would 'provide
interface with the intelligence community'," acquiring a deeper appreciation on what was known on the Soviet Union, thus giving
them a measure of their own entropy in order to 'provide better forecasts'." Based on interview with Marshall by Stephen Peter
Rosen, Winning the Next War: lnnovation and the Modern Military, (lthaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991j, pp. 217-218.
29 A.W. Marshall, The lmprovement in lntelligence Estimates Through Study of Organizational Behavior," (paper for Board of
Trustees Meeting; Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., April 1968j.
30 Marshall, Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations," op cit..
31 A.W. Marshall, Comparisons, R&D Strategy, and Policy lssues," (RAND Working Note WN-7630-DDRE; Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, October 1971j.
32 A.W. Marshall, Bureaucratic Behavior and the Strategic Arms Competition," (paper presented at the Southern California Arms
Control & Foreign Policy Seminar; Los Angeles, CA: October 1971j.
33 A.W. Marshall, Long-Term Competition with the Soviets: A Framework for Strategic Analysis," (R-862-PR; Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 1972j.
34 Work at RAND as well as head of national security programs at the Bureau of the Budget, Director of the Atomic Energy
Commission, and Director of the ClA.
35 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 2.
NET ASSESSMENT METHOD & PROCESS AT THE NSC
85
sustained hard intellectual efort. Te methodologies for doing net assessments
are virtually non-existent. Data problems abound.
36
Nevertheless, alluding in the same paragraph to the concerns raised in the Red Book, he
concluded that whether difcult or not, the need for net assessments is clear.
Admitting that clearly the term net assessment is not well defned, nonetheless in this memo
that launched the formal NSC Net Assessment activity, Marshall succinctly articulated the basic
principles of a Net Assessment approach, which emphasized seven signifcant themes:
37
1. Multi-disciplinary comparative breadth:
Our notion of a net assessment is that it is a careful comparison of US weapon
systems, forces, and policies in relation to those of other countries.
Net assessments should aim at a broad and comprehensive examination of the area
of interest.
Tey are concerned with national security in its broadest sense, embracing political,
economic, and technological problems as well as purely military ones.
38
2. Focus on interactive action-reaction dynamics and trends:
Tey should look comprehensively at rivalries and the various types of competition
that ensue.
It is comprehensive, including description of the forces, operational doctrines
and practices, training regime, logistics, known or conjectured efectiveness in
various environments, design practices and their efect on equipment costs and
performance, and procurement practices and their infuence on cost and lead times.
Relevant trends in the international rivalries examined will generally be of interest
in net assessments. Tis will mean that more attention to the recent past, in order
to establish a basis for the description and understanding of trends, will be needed
than is usual in the current style of analysis.
39
3. Side-by-side comparisons should be placed in an operational environment, theater of
confict, or contingent scenario:
Tey should evaluate the status of the competition in terms of outcomes of potential
conficts and confrontations.
Net Assessments, in contrast to other analyses, are the most comprehensive,
and in principle concern themselves with actual outcomes of combat or of
competitions.
40
36 lbid: p. 2.
37 lbid.
38 lbid.
39 lbid.
40 As such, they raise severe problems of data and of analysis methodology." Marshall, Letter to Col. Harold L. Hitch" Hitchens,
(HQ USAF; Washington, DC: National Security Council memorandum, 26 March 1972j, p. 1. Recognizing that elaborate
combat simulations and models or warfare scenarios should be avoided" initially because of their dependence upon implicit
assumptions and opaque processing of outcomes, he concluded that generally, at least in the frst instance, the comparison of
interest between forc4es, postures, and programs will by 'side-by-side' rather than 'face-to-face'."
PHILLIP A. KARBER
86
work done in the past, in systems analysis studies and some NSSMs tends
to focus on weapons systems choices in a simplifed context. Te results of
these studies tend to be expressed in terms of outputs of various force levels and
structures, such as submarines sunk, warheads delivered, fatalities caused, etc.
Te assumptions which are made in achieving the needed simplifcation may bias
assessment outcomes in the more likely contingencies.
4. Conclusions about combatant efectiveness needed to be modulated in terms of
production and support efciencies which were key to sustaining a long-term advantage:
Tey should compare the efciency with which the various powers, including the
US, are conducting the competition.
Where there are areas of apparently great efciency, or inefciency net
assessments should explain them.
41
5. Claimed competitive efciencies needed to be deconstructed so they could be better
understood, borrowed, and/or targeted:
Where there are areas of apparently great efciency, or inefciency net
assessments should explain them.
It will highlight efciency and inefciency in the way we and others do things, and
areas of comparative advantage with respect to our rivals.42
6. Include a range of potential competitors, not just the US-Soviet relationship, and include
both allies and enemies of our enemies:
Te implications of multiple rivalries and balances, rather than bipolar simplicity,
should be examined.
It can be focused to deal with real or at least credible adversaries, rather than the
fctitious, highly abstracted and oversimplifed antagonists found in present study
eforts.
43
7. To be of maximum beneft to security policy and defense planning Net Assessment
should be descriptive, not prescriptive:
Aim at providing diagnosis of problems and opportunities, rather than
recommended actions. Te focus on diagnosis rather than solutions is especially
signifcant.
Te use of net assessment is intended to be diagnostic. It is not intended to provide
recommendations as to force levels or force structures as an output.
44
Although these seven themes were never articulated as formal rules, they were refected in
both Marshalls frequent questions and guidance to anyone tasked with running a balance or
competitive assessment who bothered to ask.
41 lbid.
42 lbid.
43 lbid.
44 lbid.
NET ASSESSMENT METHOD & PROCESS AT THE NSC
87
A number of the OSD/NA staf have refected on what they perceived as a lack of methodology
for Net Assessment and Marshalls reticence in trying to inculcate a school solution in the staf
or promulgate a cookie-cutter approach.
45
Too many of them, who served in his ofce as Military
Assistants with overlapping service from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, subscribe to this view to
challenge it, or suggest that there was an early versus late Marshall. Nevertheless, for the two-
decades of near continuous interaction I had with him, I found it not only easy to get Marshalls
methodological guidance but concluded that he seemed to welcome discussing it. Certainly, the
number of times he referenced the need to work on methodologies between 1970 and 1974 while
architecting what would become Net Assessment argues heavily against the thesis that he was
against method.
46
Like most others, Marshall defned Net Assessment as a comparison between the US and some
rival nation in terms of some aspect of our national security activity, but explicitly noted that the
term had two connotations of equal importance. Te second meaning being that Net Assessment
was the most comprehensive form of analysis in the hierarch of analysis. Admitting that at
present, net assessment as a distinctive form of analysis is not clearly defned, nevertheless he
argued that it is possible to indicate the general nature of the analysis desired, and its objectives.
47
Net assessment as a specifc form of analysis will become more fully defned as
various net assessments are produced, and specialized methods of analysis evolve.
New analytical tools are needed to identify problems and trends, and to assist in
shaping changes.
We see a number of ways in which net assessment can achieve major advances in
the art of analysis.
48
Tese are hardly the admonitions of one against method. Rather it is recognition that there are
diferent of levels of analysis, each requiring their own unique methodologies; a candid recognition
that the state-of-the-art needed to be improved, as well as a commitment to help develop relevant
approaches.
As mentioned earlier Sun Tzus Five Strategic Arts
49
measurements, estimates, analysis,
balancing, and triumph provide the components of a comparative evaluation or what is termed,
in todays intelligence jargon, net assessment.
50
As a check list of important things to consider
these items hardly seem innovative. However, they take on more meaning if viewed as a series of
sequential steps, each with its own unique method, successively and cumulatively building on the
steps of their predecessor and adding a diferent set of unique intellectual tasks.
45 Watts, Scientifc Methods and New Assessment," op cit, p. 5, makes a point of later reading the Nature and Scope of Net
Assessment" paper and having been frustrated that it Marshall had not made an efort to show it to him before he did his
balance work: Andrew May and l immediately recognized that this short document contained a conceptual blueprint for
diagnostic net assessment that Marshall was still following three decades later. Somewhat mifed and perplexed, l asked
Marshall why he had never shown this seminal memo to me-or to any of the other military and civilian assistants who had
worked in his omce since the late-1970s. With a slight smile he said that he would have gladly shown it to me or anyone else in
ONA if they had asked to see it."
46 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 2.
47 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 2.
48 lbid., pp. 3-5.
49 We originally used the version translated by Samuel Grimth: Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
1963j; but later moved to the R. L. Wing version: Tzu, The Art of Strategy," op cit., book lv, section 16, pp. 62-63.
50 Handel, Masters of War, op cit., p. 237.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
88
Te situation give rise to measurements. Measurements give rise to estimates.
Estimates give rise to analysis. Analysis give rise to balancing. Balance gives rise to
triumph. Terefore, a winning Strategy is like a pound balanced against an ounce.
While a losing Strategy is like an ounce balanced against a pound.
51
Like Sun Tzu, Marshall defned the ultimate form of triumph as dissuading the opponent to
drop out of a long-term competition
52
rather than fghting a real war to annihilation.
53
In retrospect, Sun Tzus Sun Tzus Five Strategic Arts serve as a virtual index of Marshalls
multi-tiered analytical framework:
Measurements collecting empirical data in a comparable format;
Data is not available in important areas because US Intelligence has not focused
on some aspects of Soviet posture needed to make net assessments. For many
force components, intelligence is skimpy on matters concerning logistics, general
levels of readiness, etc.
54
Data on US allies is incomplete and inaccurate. Data on our own forces and
programs is frequently not available in a form which permits ready comparison
with that available on the Soviets.
55
Estimates discovering, describing and distinguishing those elements that are
important but unmeasurable
56
and not overly depending upon quantitative
data that are incomplete or unknowable when signifcant qualitative
factors need to be considered;
Tere are many difculties in providing a good net assessment of the current
military balance and future likely trends. For one thing the Intelligence evaluation
of the Soviet posture frequently does not focus on some of the key aspects for
making such a comparison. Te emphasis in US Intelligence has tended to be
on order of battle, and upon the technical characteristics of individual weaponry.
Very little efort has been put in to understanding Soviet military organizations,
their operational practices, and the basic military economics of the Soviet military
establishment. If the President is interested in establishing a good net assessment
capabilities [sic], a substantial Intelligence efort will have to be put on a number of
areas that so far have not been studied in depth.
What follow is my best judgment as to what the state of the current balance
is and what trends exist. Hypotheses about what the situation is provide a
51 Tzu, The Art of Strategy," op cit., book lv, section 16, pp. 62-63.
52 Marshall, Long-Term Competition with the Soviets: A Framework for Strategic Analysis," op cit.; and Marshall, The Nature and
Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 2.
53 The ideal Strategy, therefore, is to thwart a Plan. The next best is to thwart a Negotiation. The next best is to thwart a Strategy."
Tzu, The Art of Strategy," op cit., book lll, section 9, pp. 44-45: Those who are skilled in executing a Strategy, Bend the strategy
of others without confict; Uproot the fortifcations of others without attacking; Absorb the organizations of others without
prolonged operations."
54 Marshall, Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations," op cit., p. 1.
55 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 2.
56 For the author's review of qualitative factors in a quantitative context, see the case study: Phillip A. Karber et al., Assessing the
Correlation of Forces: France 1940," (Report No. BDM-W-79-560-TR; McLean, vA: BDM Corporation, 18 June 1979j.
NET ASSESSMENT METHOD & PROCESS AT THE NSC
89
framework within which further work could progress.
57
Hypotheses about what the Soviets might be doing are just as important to the
inference process as the data itself. Tis leads, however, to a biasing problem.
Repeatedly in the history of Intelligence, especially in the technological area, there
has been excessive mirror-imaging.
58
Analysis evaluating competitive strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and
opportunities and their change over time:
there are many cases where the sorts of comparisons that we are able to make now
probably do not give the US forces enough credit. Tey are higher cost, but have
more capability than the Soviet forces. Tere are numerous cases where the Soviets
in the economical operational practices, their lower readiness levels, etc., give us
signifcant advantage in certain circumstances. In most evaluations, the evaluators
are not able to feel sure enough to this kind of assessment because intelligence
on crucial aspects of Soviet forces is missing. Moreover, the US military services
consistently have an incentive not to give themselves credit for superior capabilities
in implicit comparisons made in the course of military planning exercises for
operations or for force posture budgeting and programs.
59
Balancing anticipating opportunities for the application of strength to
vulnerability in juxtaposed postures over time:
Diferences in US and Soviet force postures make any simple blancing by specifc
weapons categories inadequate. We need, but [do] not have, adequate means
of assessing capabilities of ne force to deal with another in specifc contingencies.
War gaming and other techniques would have to be used in any more systematic
efort to make such evaluations.
60
I think, that there is some reason to believe that there is a danger of the US
pricing itself out of the military competition with the Soviets. Are the comparative
economics of military forces running against us if so in what areas?
61
Te objective should be to supply the President and the NSC with answers to such
questions as:
Do we have a problem?
If so, how big is it?
Is it getting worse or better?
What are the underlying causes?
62
Triumph identifying and projecting into the future opportunities for the
57 Marshall, Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Section B. Facts and Trends in the Current Military Forces," op cit.,
p. 2.
58 lbid., p. 3.
59 Marshall, Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations," p. 2.
60 lbid., p. 1.
61 Marshall, Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Section B. Facts and Trends in the Current Military Forces," op cit.,
pp. 20, 22.
62 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., p. 2.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
90
conversion of favorable balances (i.e., imbalances) into political outcomes:
What follows is also defcient in not dealing systematically with Hertzfelds point
that it would be highly important to try to assess peace outcomes. I think that is
absolutely true, and indeed essential. Te net assessment that seems must crucial
to me is how do the US and Soviet look in terms of their capabilities for the long-
term political and military competition they will be waging in the world.
63
Some months ago Dean Acheson. talked about the very late 40s when
in their view current basic US national strategy became fxed in its essentials.
Te essence of the strategy was alleged to be the notion that by building up our
forces and putting some military pressure on the Soviets, and containing them
in the shortrun, that the resource strain would tell on them much before it did
ourselves. Te Soviets would not have the will and the dedication to persist with
their policies. What seems to have happened, at least in Achesons eyes, is that the
opposite has taken place. Tey have persisted, and it is we who now say that we
cannot aford to spend the required resources. Tis highlights the key role an
assessment of the comparative economics and of the comparative efectiveness of
the weapons acquisition process and operation of practices can play in planning
future US strategy and forces.
64
Here was a relatively simple formula for an enormously complex thought process. Sun Tzus
parsimony allowed one to see it sequentially while Marshalls commentary took it out of the realm
of philosophy and grounded it in contemporary strategic issues.
Whether discussing how Net Assessment should be approached thematically, or in comments in
the above Sun Tzu cumulative research paradigm above, there was a defnite thematic underpinning
evidenced in Marshall commentary. Just as Sun Tzu ends his classic work on the importance of
knowing what we do not know, Marshall was brutally honest about the quality of data and the
level of entropy not knowing what we do not know involved at all levels of the assessment
process.
Many aspects of the rivalries in which the US is engaged are frequently neglected
in decision oriented studies, and have also not had high priority in our intelligence
eforts. Tus the identifcation of gaps in our intelligence data is likely to be an
early by-product of the net assessment process.
65
Even more, Marshall viewed Net Assessment as a long-term research program, so highlighting
weakness is actually a means of potentially improving the process. Moreover, he not only exercised
this level of candor with his superiors, but promoted explicit entropy recognition by all who worked
for him.
63 Marshall, Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations," p. 2.
64 lbid., pp. 22-23.
65 Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment," op cit., pp. X-8
9
NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENTS
Te President has directed the preparation of a series of national net assessments
under the guidelines approved in NSDM 242. Te frst national net assessment
will evaluate the comparative costs to the US and the USSR to produce,
maintain, and operate comparable military forces. It will assess the status of the
competition between the US and USSR in maintaining such forces, trends in the
competition, signifcant areas of comparative advantage or disadvantage to the
US and the nature of opportunities and problems implied.
1
Te existence of a National Net Assessment ofce and their interests are only documented four
times at interagency level via the prime policy action vehicles
2
of that day: the National Security
Study Memorandum (NSSM) which commissioned cross-departmental research and response; and
the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) which recorded NSC formal positions.
Te authorizing memorandums were:
NSSM-178 Program for National Net Assessment, (29 March 1973);
3
NSDM 224 National Net Assessment Process, (28 Jun 1973).
4
Te frst and only action memorandum commissioning the frst and only interagency National Net
Assessment was debated for over a year
5
before being signed out by Henry Kissinger:
NSSM-186 National Net Assessment of Comparative Costs and Capabilities of US -
1 Henry A. Kissinger, NSSM 186 - National Net Assessment of Comparative Costs and Capabilities of US - USSR Military
Establishments," (1 September 1973j.
2 For a helpful survey of the evolution of the Kennedy/Johnson Administration's policy action vehicle to the Nixon/Ford
Administrations division of labor between study" (calling for relevant inter-agency inputj and decision" (notifying the inter-
agency community that a Presidential decision had been madej memoranda, see: Harold C. Relyea, Presidential Directives:
Background and Overview," (98-611 GOv; Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, revised 7
January 2005j, at < http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/98-611.pdf > [accessed 24 July 2005|.
3 Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Study Memorandum: NSSM 178 - Program for National Net Assessment," (29 March
1973j.
4 Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Decision Memorandum: NSDM 224 - National Net Assessment Process re NSSM 178,"
(28 Jun 1973j.
5 Alexander Haig to Daniel Murphy, Concerning National Security Study Memorandum on National Net Assessment of the
Comparative Emciency and Efectiveness of the US and Soviet Military Establishments," Memo, 8/17/72, Boxes B1-B3 (Not Yet
Reviewed for Opening to Researchj, op cit.; and the apparent response: Baroody to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Afairs, Concerning Net Assessment at the National Level," Memo, 9/1/72, lbid.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
92
USSR Military Establishments, (1 September 1973).
6
Te transfer of the ofce from the National Security Council to the Department of Defense was
made in memorandum:
NSDM 239 National Net Assessment Process, (27 November 1973).
7
Tese four Memoranda written over seven months and representing in toto only four pages not
only bracket the short happy life of the NSC NAG but more importantly represent the rescue of
the Blue Ribbon Defense Pane and Secretary Lairds vision of Net Assessment at the Pentagon.
Combined with personal changes, they ended the NSC v. OSD feud, they flled the vacuum left
in DoDs Net Assessment Ofce, and brought the function into the immediate proximity of the
Secretary.
Apparently NSSM-178 was personally drafted by Marshall as a remit for creating a Program
for National Net Assessment. Tere were several interesting features about this short NSSM.
First it was explicitly treated as a fulfllment of Nixons 1971 Memorandum on Organization and
Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community.
8
Second, it noted the President had
directed the initiation of a program for the preparation of a series of national net assessments.
Te words series and national took on special signifcance: the former suggested this would be
an extended process not a one time product; the latter meant that it would be interagency and not
limited to one department.
As a frst step in this process, the President has directed that a paper be prepared
which would:
Defne the national net assessment process, and discuss the range and types of
topics that would be addressed.
Discuss methodology appropriate for use in preparing net assessments.
Establish reporting and coordination procedures for the program.
9
NSSM-178 gave Marshall the opportunity to write his own NSC mission statement as well as
lay out a game plan for how to proceed, not just with the coordination but cooperation of an ad
hoc group comprising representatives.
10
Te response to NSSM-178 by the Ad Hoc Group was
submitted on time,
11
commented on by the NSCIC Principals,
12
and reviewed by the President.
13

NSDM 224 implied that there would be multiple National Net Assessments. Likewise, it ratifed
the interagency nature of the process under the direction of a representative of the National
Security Council Staf and specifed that requests for net assessments will be issued as National
Security Study Memoranda.
6 Kissinger, NSSM 186 - National Net Assessment of Comparative Costs and Capabilities of US - USSR Military
Establishments," op cit.
7 Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Decision Memorandum: NSDM 239 - National Net Assessment Process," (27 November
1973j.
8 Henry A. Kissinger, NSSM 178 - Program for National Net Assessment," op cit., p. 1.
9 lbid. Note, the NSSM specifed a deadline, with the report of the Ad Hoc Group completed by May 15, 1973."
10 lbid. Consisting of representatives from State, Defense and ClA, chaired by the Director, Net Assessment Group, of the National
Security Council staf."
11 The actual report has not been found, the following statements, were all referenced in the subsequent document: Kissinger,
NSDM 224 - National Net Assessment Process re NSSM 178," op cit. p. 1.
12 National Security Council lntelligence Committee.
13 This was a lot of action for a period of less than six weeks between 15 May and 28 June. Kissinger, NSDM 224 - National Net
Assessment Process re NSSM 178," op cit. p. 1.
NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENTS
93
Te only national net assessment to be formally undertaken while Marshall was at the NSC
was National Security Study Memorandum 186. For over a year the NSC had discussed the need
for and content of a National Security Study Memorandum on National Net Assessment of the
Comparative Efciency and Efectiveness of the US and Soviet Military Establishments,
14
Where
NSSM-178 and NSDM 224 had dealt with process, NSSM-186 was the vehicle of substance.
Finally, on 1 September 1973, Henry Kissinger signed out NSSM-186 calling for a National Net
Assessment of the Comparative Costs and Capabilities of US and Soviet Military Establishments.
Te President has directed the preparation of a series of national net assessments
under the guidelines approved in NSDM 242. Te frst national net assessment
will evaluate the comparative costs to the US and the USSR to produce, maintain,
and operate comparable military forces. It will assess the status of the competition
between the US and USSR in maintaining such forces, trends in the competition,
signifcant areas of comparative advantage or disadvantage to the US and the
nature of opportunities and problems implied.
Te President has directed that the analyses and comparisons required by this net
assessment be prepared by the Department of Defense, in consultation with the
Net Assessment Group/NSC, and with the assistance of the Department of State
and the Director of Central Intelligence.
Te complete assessment will cover all aspects of US and Soviet military forces,
and will take place over a long period of time. Te initial part of the net assessment
will focus specifcally on the ground forces on each side. Comparisons of interests
will include the costs and performance of comparable military units. Te analysis
should highlight the major determining factors in costs and performance on each
side, and any evident trends.
A frst report on the net assessment of US and Soviet ground forces should be
forwarded to the Chairman, NSCIC, by 1 November 1973.
15
As originally mandated in NSDM 224,
16
NSSM-186 reiterated that the various National Net
Assessments would be managed by the head of the NAG with fnal acceptance contingent upon
review of the NSCIC.
Tere were several interesting aspects about NSSM-186 from the outset. First, as it had become
increasingly evident with NSDM 224 and NSSM-186 that the focus of the initial National Net
Assessments would involve comparisons of military establishments, it was natural that the
primary lead should be taken by the Pentagon. But it was somewhat surprising that while the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf had been copied on the tasking,
17
the JCS were neither
directly invited to participate in the production nor comment on the process.
18
Second, there had
14 For example the Haig memo Concerning National Security Study Memorandum on National Net Assessment of the
Comparative Emciency and Efectiveness of the US and Soviet Military Establishments," went back to 17 August 1972.
15 Kissinger, NSSM 186 - National Net Assessment of Comparative Costs and Capabilities of US - USSR Military
Establishments," op cit.
16 Kissinger, NSDM 224 - National Net Assessment Process re NSSM 178," op cit. p. 1.
17 This was the case with NSDM 224 and NSSM 186, where the Chairman, JCS has been cc," but not with the original NSSM 178.
18 This was surprising in that just the year before, JCS Chairman had initiated a formal assessment presentation to much fan fare.
See: Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, United States Military Posture for FY 1972," (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staf, 9 March
1971j; Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, United States Military Posture for FY 1973," (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staf, 8 February
PHILLIP A. KARBER
94
been a subtle shift in the title from Comparative Efciency and Efectiveness to Comparative
Costs and Capabilities. Te former were very subjective terms: efciency relative to requirement
and resources; efectiveness relative to mission and opposition. Te latter were ostensibly fxed
in terms of objective scale.
A third feature was also out of the norm. As had already been implied in NSDM 224, NSSM-
186 now made it explicit that this comprehensive assessment would involve multiple successive
eforts and take place over a long period of time. As such, it had an implied variance with the
typical NSC standard operating procedure for NSSMs which had focused on producing a timely
and tightly argued response a tasking with a defnite built in sunset clause. But under NSSM-
186, these National Net Assessments would be incremental, iterative and potentially infnite
19

taking successive bites of the apple as opposed to trying to swallow it whole in one culminating
gazumpt fnal report and closure of the Study, as was typical with NSSMs. A last unique feature
at the very start of NSSM-186 was the abrupt change in the reporting channel in the middle of
the efort.
Per NSDM 224 and NSSM-186, the NSC Net Assessment Group would be responsible for both
producing the requirements and tasking for the National Net Assessments as well as monitoring
their progress and evaluating their fnal product.
In the White House the Net Assessment Group was a casualty of several factors:
the overwhelming demands on top-level decision makers to focus on near-term
foreign policy issues; the realization that the Department of Defense had the depth
of resources needed to support a long-term net efort; and a fuller recognition of
how difcult it was and how long it would take to develop a net assessment efort
in the executive branch.
20
Te credibility of James Schlesinger as one of the most prepared Secretaries of Defense, his personal
role in defning the need for Net Assessment two years earlier
21
and strong personal relationship
with Marshall
22
all combined to make this a smooth transition.
Within six weeks of the start of NSSM-186, Marshall moved from the NSC and joined the
OSD staf being assembled by Secretary James Schlesinger.
By the time Schlesinger had succeeded Eliot Richardson as defense secretary
in July 1973 and appointed Marshall to be his Director of Net Assessment on
October 13th, a further concern had arisen that undermined defnitional clarity.
Marshalls brief from Schlesinger was to establish a viable net assessment function
in the Department of Defense (DoD). But aside from Melvin R. Lairds December
1971 directive establishing the position in the Ofce of the Secretary of Defense
1972j; and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, United States Military Posture for FY 1974," (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staf, 28
March 1973j.
19 Up to that point, NSSMs had the general characteristics of being intended to cover the assigned topic comprehensively (rather
than incrementallyj; were a one shot" activity (rather than iterativej; and had a defnitive end date (rather than being temporally
infnitej.
20 Pickett, Roche, and Watts, Net Assessment: A Historical Review," op cit., p. 167.
21 Schlesinger, A Review of the lntelligence Community," op cit..
22 A close working relationship that went back more than a decade when Schlesinger had been assigned to Marshall's
department when he had originally joined RAND and then also became a social relationship in the 1960s. James R. Schlesinger,
Comments,"
NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENTS
95
(OSD), little progress had been made on clarifying the nature of net assessment or
what it might produce, especially within the Pentagon. In fact, neither Laird nor
Richardson had appointed anyone to fll the new position.
23
Scarcely had Marshall arrived at the Pentagon, and within another six weeks, Kissinger signed
out NSDM 239 on the National Net Assessment Process which recorded that the President
had directed that the responsibility for the national net assessment program be assigned to the
Secretary of Defense.
24

Tis was not just the transfer of an individual but the entire Net Assessment Group
25
to a three-
room ofce on the A-ring. Importantly, the intent of the mission that Marshall had written for
himself in NSSM-178 and secured with NSDM 224 was neither given over to someone else in
the NSC to pick up that portfolio nor was the mandate materially changed with his move to the
Pentagon.
26
Marshall was now responsible for conducting the Net Assessment he himself had
commissioned but he would not be reporting to himself to grade his own work. Te structure that
had been established but unflled gave James Schlesinger the opportunity to not only set up the
ofce but create and reinforce the precedent of the Director of Net Assessment reporting directly
to the Secretary of Defense. With its arrival, Net Assessment initiated a new era in Pentagon
thinking, one that would make a signifcant diference over the next thirty-fve years.
23 Watts, Scientifc Methods and New Assessment, op cit, p. 5.
24 With NSDM 139, the previous NSDM 224 and NSSM 186 were rescinded but the study required by NSSM
186 the National Net Assessment of the Comparative Costs and Capabilities of US and Soviet Military
Establishments which was still ongoing should be completed under the supervision of the Secretary of
Defense and it, along with all future completed net assessment studies should be forwarded to the Assistant to
the President for National Security Afairs. Kissinger, National Security Decision Memorandum: NSDM
239 National Net Assessment Process, op cit., p. 1.
25 Which consisted of two military assistants that had been assigned to the NSC: Captain Chip Picket and Lt.
Commander Robin Pirie; and even transferred the NSC secretaries: Joan Hunerwadel and Irene Parkhurst.
26 For example, NSSM 186, the frst interagency tasking under the original organization mantel, had been let
before the move occurred its tasking was not modifed in any way other than the transfer of reporting authority.
10
LESSONS LEARNED
Today, there is no rational system whereby the Executive Branch and the
Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military strategy,
the forces to carry it out, and the funding that should be provided-in light of the
overall economy and competing claims on national resources. Better long-range
planning must be based on military advice of an order not now always available
- fscally constrained, forward looking, and fully integrated. Tis advice must
incorporate the best possible assessment of our overall military posture vis-a-vis
potential opponents, and must candidly evaluate the performance and readiness
of the individual Services and the Unifed and Specifed Commands.
1
Te strongest supporters of an independent and high level Net Assessment function seem to fall into
two groups former Secretaries of Defense and former stafers in OSD/NA. Unfortunately, the
former have said little publicly about the utility and importance of having this kind of confdential
strategic advice; and the over-selling of the latter have made it sound more like a cult than a
critical national security function. However, when we review the early origins of Net Assessment
the years of path breaking work by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, the proposals of the Blue
Ribbon Defense as well as Secretary Laird, the methodological and organizational development by
Andrew Marshall both the problem and the solution are much clearer. So, when contemplating
the future of the enterprise, the evidence and arguments assembled for this paper suggest fve
lessons should be drawn from the early origins of the Net Assessment concept.
LESSON 1: For over a century, there has been a growing recognition by those who have made the
efort to think about how American military strategy is developed, that an indispensible ingredient
is the availability of some type of comparative diagnostic trend analysis of US and rival forces placed
in the context of operational battlespace. Whether one calls this an assessment or evaluation;
whether the term net is used are not is unimportant. What is critical however, is that the efort
include fve primal characteristics:
Comparative deconstruction of the combatant, supporting and force generating
assets;
Examined as they have temporally developed over time with future vectors
1 uavld ackard, lnLerlm 8eporL: resldenL's 8lue 8lbbon Commlsslon on uefense ManagemenL," (wlLh cover
leuer, WashlngLon, uC: resldenL's 8lue 8lbbon Commission on uefense ManagemenL, 28 lebruary 1986), p. 9.
8old emphasls upon assessmenL" ln Lhe orlglnal.
PHILLIP A. KARBER
98
not plotted any further in the out years than historical data traces back;
Operational analysis in a real theater of potential confict against a real, not
hypothetical opponent;
Contrasting not merely like versus like, but juxtaposing strength to weakness,
ofense to defense, and opportunities to vulnerabilities;
Ultimately viewed, not in terms of trying to predict which side will win a
specifc engagement, but rather projecting the factors that will make one side
prevail over the long-run.
A special caveat must also be registered, in the second nuclear age where nuclear assets and
powers are increasingly distributed throughout potential confict regions, the assessments cannot
ignore the interrelationship between conventional and nuclear war.
LESSON 2: Tere is a coherent and reasonably clear methodological approach that can be applied in
the conduct of Net Assessments. It is not mystical, it is not arcane; it evolved over a several year
period in the early 1970s, and taken as a whole, it can be teased from the writings of Andrew
Marshall in that period. Although never formally stated as such, that method can be summarized
in fve sequential steps:
Measurements collecting empirical data in a comparable format;
Estimates discovering, describing and distinguishing those elements that
are unmeasurable but important;
Analysis evaluating competitive strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and
opportunities;
Balancing anticipating opportunities for the application of strength to
vulnerability in juxtaposed postures;
Triumph identifying and projecting into the future opportunities for the
conversion of favorable balances (i.e. imbalances) into political outcomes.
Te successful implementation of these steps can be as complex in application as they are simple
in articulation but this method is as relevant to todays emerging challenges of strategic rivalry as
it was 2,500 years ago when so elegantly laid out by Sun Tzu. Te success of this approach has
been demonstrated in the productive application of that methodology over the last thirty-fve years
by the Net Assessment staf. Its value is not diminished by the fact that many of the those who
successfully applied it, did so as a product of sub-conscious enculturation and the guiding hand of
their mentor in trailblazing new intellectual territory rather than using a cookie cutter formula or
realizing that the approach had high strategic pedigree.
LESSON 3: Te Blue Ribbon Defense Panel had it right, the ofce of Net Assessment has to be
independent and report directly to the Secretary of Defense. Tus, going back to the need for Net
Assessment and the cogent organizational arguments for its structure as an independent advisory
ofce reporting directly to the SecDef:
Te Ofce of the Secretary of Defense and the armed services of the United States
have many agencies that measure current military performance against current
military goals. Tat is not the purpose of net assessments. Each net assessment
concludes, not with a statement about whether we would win or lose a war today
or with recommendations for new programs, but with a discussion of the issues
and problems about which the Secretary of Defense may wish to think, because
they afect the future of American national security. Net Assessment is a tool for
the Secretary of Defense that may better enable him to do strategic planning for
LESSONS LEARNED
99
the American military, if that is desired.
2
Not every Secretary may want or value having Net Assessment as a direct report, but then that is a
pretty good indication that they are not planning on taking their role as chief strategist seriously.
LESSON 4: Te recommendations of Blue Ribbon Defense Panel member Robert C. Jackson need to
be reconsidered specifcally that long-range planning, net assessment and strategy development
should be combined into an Assistant Secretary of Defense level position. Te reason for this
has more to do with the efectiveness of OSD than it does Net Assessment. An independent
and intellectually driven Net Assessment ofce, with sufcient research resources and reporting
directly to the Secretary of Defense can do its own thing. But, as the BRDP suggested, there is
a need, at the Secretary level for a group also to be conducting Long-Range Planning, Likewise,
as Secretary Laird and later Cap Weinberger found out, there is great value in having Strategy
Development also working in close proximity to the Secretary. Tese are three diferent functions.
Net Assessment is diagnostic; Long-Range Planning is prognostic; and Strategy Development is
prescriptive. Nonetheless, they all share some common attributes, need to work closely together,
and could efciently utilize some of the same resources. Tus, as Jackson originally recommended,
creating a combined ofce under an Assistant Secretary addressing these functions could be a very
powerful and efective combination.
LESSON 5: Like all art, the processes and products of Net Assessment, Long-Range Planning and
Competitive Strategy Development, are only of value to the extent that they are appreciated.
Like performance art, where the observer is not a passive voyeur but interacts and creatively
contributes, they take on a dynamic and living quality when the chief strategist participates in the
process one which requires direct report and the highest confdentiality. When the helmsman
of the Pentagons Queen Mary understands that the art of Net Assessment is important and takes
the time to directly engage the results of that research, he both empowers those methods and
acquires the navigational aids of prognostic anticipation and option diagnostics that separate great
leaders from the mediocre. On the other hand, when he remains narrowly focused on the FYDP
budget and Administration talking points in the absence of engaging the refective tools of Net
Assessment a future Secretary of Defense may fnd uncomfortable parallels with captaining the
Titanic.
2 8osen, neL AssessmenL as an Analyucal ConcepL," ln Cn noL Confuslon Curselves, op clL., p. 300.
Celebrating our
25
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