Conclusion from coincidence of AR and MR AR must meet with MR As long as AR meet with MR, Repentance no important Liable Liable

e Jakeman Jakeman Import drug cases D had the guilty mind when she booked luggage to London The important point is Ds state of mind at the time the relevant act is done The repentance of D or D deliberate failed to claim in Paris cannot saved her from the criminal liability.

Another example: tabbing someone with intent with cause death are criminal liable !murder or manslaughter" regardless repentance btw act of stabbing and the time of death. ame result if within the seconds he stabbed the victim and does everything to saves the victim #nly victim survive will save him.

AR - a continuing act mens rea for the offence at some time onl needed during its continuance

Liable

!agan " M#C Defendant accidentally drove his car on to a policemans foot but% despite repeated re&uests% refused to remove it. There is no necessary that 'R present during the inception of (R. That the defendant)s act in mounting the policeman)s foot with his car was an unintentional battery which his later conduct in purposel dela ing the remo"al of the car from the foot rendered criminal from the moment the necessary intention to inflict unlawful force was formed. As long as the act can be the continuing act, and the MR superimposed on existing act, then there is enough *e was still +acting at the time he formed the necessary intention for battery% i.e. when he refused to remove the car.

AR - a continuing act Reali,ed and stop the act

$o%Liable !agan " M#C (nother situation Realised car on the leg and removed immediately

#re-arrange plan *it and unconscious .elieved dead and destroy

Liable murder

&habo Meli " &he 'ueen The appellants% in accordance with a pre/arranged plan and intending to kill% struck their victim. 'istakenly believing the victim was dead% they rolled him over a cliff to make it appear as though the death was an accident. It was established that the victim died from e0posure and not from the original blows. (t was impossible to di"ide up what was reall one transaction in that wa % &he appellants set out to do all those acts as part of, and to achie"e, their plan, and it was much too refined a ground of )udgment to sa that, because the were under a misapprehension at one stage and thought that their guilt purpose had been achie"ed before it in fact was, therefore the were not guilt of murder% Church appellant hit and attempted to strangle a woman% who fell unconscious. !1o (R due to the woman not died yet" The appellant panicked and% having given her only a cursory e0amination% thought she was dead so he threw her into a river where she drowned. !1o 'R due to he thought the woman was died" 2ourt e0tended the +series of acts/ principle in &habo Meli to a case of manslaughter where there was no antecedent plan. The 3ury was entitled to regard the whole course of e"ents from the moment the defendant struck the deceased to the moment he put her li"ing bod into the ri"er as all one transaction, so that% if at the beginning of, or indeed at an time during, this course of e"ents he had the intention to cause bodil harm, then the fact that he ma not ha"e the intent when he put the bod in the ri"er owing to a belief that the woman was dead through his assault on her, makes no difference to his guilt in relation to a charge of manslaughter. Church *biter The 3ury should have been told that if they regarded the appellants behaviour from the moment he first struck her to the moment when he threw her into the ri"er as a series of acts designed to cause death or grie"ous bodil harm !'R for murder"% then can be convicted murder

*nl +elie"ed , had died 1o pre/plan

Liable -mansla ughter.

*nl +elie"ed , had died 1o pre/plan Murder0

Liable

Continuing act no pre-arranged plan and no belie"e , had died%

Liable

R " Le +run Le .run had an argument with his wife in the street% during which he knocked her unconscious. *e dragged her from the street 5 either to drag her home or to conceal what he had done. 6hilst being dragged she struck her head on the pavement and died. where the unlawful application of force and the eventual act causing death are parts of the same se1uence of e"ents% the same transaction% the fact that there is an appreciable interval of time between the two does not serve to e0onerate the defendant from liability. That is certainly so where the appellant/s subse1uent actions which caused death, after the initial unlawful blow, are designed to conceal his commission of the original unlawful assault7 And in circumstances such as present2 the act which causes death, and the necessar mental state to constitute manslaughter, need not coincide in point of time2 3mith and 4ogan The way of D might assists his wife if D drop 8 in same manner and at the same time such as9 o 6hen he try to bring her wife to the hospital o 6hen he try to bring her wife home which he thought that is the wifes wish o 6hen he believed the wife to be dead and deliver the corpse to the police o !basically mean D no more acting for himself 3ust like in the fact that he try to conceal what he did"

Continuing act no pre-arranged plan and later act sa"e the wife0

$%liable

2ontinuing act by 4rd party;

Depend

6hether Ds act still operating and substantial; !smith" Reasonable foresee; 6hether 4rd party is voluntary;

If kills another by one or other of two or more different acts each of which% if it caused the death% not necessary to found a conviction to prove which act caused the death D knocked 8 downstairs and then believe he had killed her% cut her throat in order to cause death

Attorne 5eneral/s Reference -$o% 6 of 789:.;7897<

Liable depend

A5 Reference $o%6 of 789: applied the = test which must be satisfied both by 3ury if manslaughter9 intentional act b the accused which was unlawful and dangerous0/ If no they should ac&uit. (f es > then the should ask themsel"es a second 1uestion: ?Are we satisfied be ond reasonable doubt that the act of cutting the girl/s throat was an act of gross criminal negligence0/ -as @ genuinel belie"e , had died. If yes 5 then they should convict of manslaughter. If manslaughter is committed% then it is no important that there is impossible to prove on those death causation If no satisfied both &uestion% then must be ac&uittal

&habo MeliAChurch *owever% if Thabo meli applied to manslaughter% assuming all are one transaction% it should be enough to prove D had mens rea at the first occasion This &uestion is left open !(< Reference 1o.: of $=>?"% but 2hurch suggest it does and seems right in principle.