Criminal Law Case Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS
ATTY. ROMEO CALLEJO, SR.
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

BAYAN MUNA VS. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS: 1. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court (ICC) with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes (including genocide) of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions." The RP is already a signatory but pending ratification by Senate. 2. The RP entered into a Non-Surrender Agreement with the US which provides that before a person (current or former Government official, employee, or military personnel or national of one party) is surrendered or transferred to any international tribunal, express consent of the other party is required. 3. Petitioner assails the validity of the Agreement because it, among other things, (1) contravenes the Rome Statute; and (2) amends and is repugnant to Sec. 17 of RA 9851 ("Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity"). ISSUE: W/n the Agreement is valid. HELD/RATIO: YES. ROME STATUTE Art. 1 of the Rome Statute pertinently provides that the ICC x x x shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute. Under par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-avis that of the ICC. As far as relevant, the provision states that "no person who has been tried by another court for conduct x x x [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct x x x." The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, show that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute. Given the above consideration, petitioner's suggestion--that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, violated its duty required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its commitment under the Vienna Convention to refrain from performing any act tending to
NOTE: = Callejo Ponente
impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statute--has to be rejected outright. For nothing in the provisions of the Agreement, in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC. Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the process require the requested state to perform an act that would violate some international agreement it has entered into. We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which reads: 2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender. RA 9851 Sec. 17 of RA 9851 provides: In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties. Petitioners view (na mali naman): That the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the State's obligation in relation to grave crimes against the law of nations, i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. That the Philippines is required to surrender to the proper international tribunal those persons accused of the grave crimes defined under RA 9851, if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them. That the Philippines has only two options, to wit: (1) surrender the accused to the proper international tribunal; or (2) surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is "pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties." But the Philippines may exercise these options only in cases where "another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime;" otherwise, the Philippines must prosecute the crime before its own courts pursuant to RA 9851.

That the Agreement prevents the Philippines without the consent of the US from surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.
Circular supported by R.A. No. 7638 since the said law does not pertain to LPG traders. RTC denied MR. Hence this petition for review on certiorari to SC. Issue: W/N the DOE Circular is void on the ground that it introduced new offences not punished under B.P. Blg. 33? Held & Ratio: DOE Circular is valid. For an administrative regulation to have the force of penal law (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants. As for the second requirement: B.P. Blg. 33, provides that the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, the Circular is silent as to any maximum penalty for the refillers, marketers, and dealers. This mere silence, does not amount to violation of the statutory maximum limit. The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. It is B.P. Blg. 33, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures
According to the SC: The Agreement merely reinforces the primacy of the national jurisdiction of the US and the Philippines in prosecuting criminal offenses committed by their respective citizens and military personnel, among others. The jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to the Rome Statute over high crimes indicated thereat is clearly and unmistakably complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction of the signatory states. RA 9851 clearly: (1) defines and establishes the crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes against humanity; (2) provides penal sanctions and criminal liability for their commission; and (3) establishes special courts for the prosecution of these crimes and for the State to exercise primary criminal jurisdiction. Nowhere in RA 9851 is there a proviso that goes against the tenor of the Agreement.
HON. SEC. PEREZ (AS DOE SECRETARY) V. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS. Facts: B.P. Blg. 33 penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled LPG cylinders. The law set the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. To implement the law the DOE issued Circular No. 2000-06-010. Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (LPG Refillers) asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. DOE denied the request. LPG Refillers then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of the Circular with the RTC. RTC nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law (per RTC: the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law). DOE argued: penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are sanctioned by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479. LPG Refillers countered: enabling laws do not expressly penalize the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the

with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders. Note: LPG Refillers filed an MR with the SC on Aug. 28, 2007 (G.R. NO. 159149) contending that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis, is no longer regulatory, but already confiscatory in nature. MR denied. Circular is not confiscatory. The penalties do not exceed the ceiling prescribed in B.P. Blg. 33, which penalizes any person who commits any act [t]herein prohibited. Violation on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase any act. To provide the same penalty for one who violates a prohibited act in B.P. Blg. 33, regardless of the number of cylinders involved would result in an indiscriminate, oppressive and impractical operation of B.P. Blg. 33. The equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.
Issues: 1. Should the Writ for Habeas Corpus be granted? 2. Is the SC Admin. Circular 12-2000 a penal law? What does it really order? 3. What is the positivist theory of criminal law? Held: 1. No! 2. No! 3. See Doctrine Doctrine: 1. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. In this case De Joya was imprisoned by virtue of a court judgment. 2. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the RPC is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. Also, it did not abolish imprisonment. It merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It says that when imposing a fine would better serve the interest of justice, the guilty party may just be fined instead of being imprisoned. 3. In imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist theory of criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law. Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among the important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community.
DE JOYA V. JAIL WARDEN Doctrine: Positivist Theory of Criminal Law Facts: Norma de Joya was charged with two counts of BP 22 or the bouncing checks law in a Batangas MTC. Crim Case 25484 was for issuing a Solid Bank check to Flor catapang de Tenorio worth 150,000 which was dishonoured because the account was closed. Crim Case 25773 was for issuing a Scurity Bank and Trust Company check to Resurreccion Castillo for 225,000 which was also dishonoured because the account was closed. De Joya pleaded not guilty and then jumped bail during trial. She was unable to present evidence and she lost both cases. Both decisions were promulgated without her being there despite due notice. Aside from being ordered to pay the amounts, she was also given the penalty of one year imprisonment. In the meantime SC Admin Circular 12-2000 was passed concerning punishments for BP 22 violations. Two years later, de Joya was apprehended while applying for an NBI clearance. She was jailed in Batangas and then she asked to be released by virtue of the circular. She thought that it could be applied retroactively and that it meant imprisonment was no longer a punishment for bp 22 violations. The RTC denied her motion hence this habeas corpus petition.

LIANG VS. PEOPLE FACTS: Jeffrey Liang is an economist working in the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Because of this, he was arrested, but then, he was able to post bail, and so he was released from custody. The next day, the MTC judge received an office of protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government. Because of this, the MTC judge dismissed the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. It then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The latter set aside the MTC ruling and ordered for an enforcement of a warrant of arrest. Liang filed a MR but it was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review. ISSUE: Whether or not Liang is covered by immunity under the Agreement??? NO. HELD: The immunity mentioned in Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in an official capacity. Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. The commission of a crime is not part of an official duty. CONCURRING OPINION, PUNO, J: The phrase immunity from every form of legal process as used in the UN General Convention has been interpreted to mean absolute immunity from a states jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce its law by legal process, and it is said that states have not sought to restrict that immunity of the United Nations by interpretation or amendment. Similar provisions are contained in the
Special Agencies Convention as well as in the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement. These organizations were accorded privileges and immunities in their charters by language similar to that applicable to the United Nations. It is clear therefore that these organizations were intended to have similar privileges and immunities. From this, it can be easily deduced that international organizations enjoy absolute immunity similar to the diplomatic prerogatives granted to diplomatic envoys. On the other hand, international officials are governed by a different rule. Section 18(a) of the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of the ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity. Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge of his international functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument in doctrine or practice with the principle that an international official is independent of the jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official acts. Those acts are not his, but are imputed to the organization, and without waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no right to waive an officials immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over and individual for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization. Provisions for immunity from jurisdiction for official acts appear, aside from the aforementioned treatises, in the constitution of most modern international organizations. The acceptance of the principle is sufficiently widespread to be regarded as declaratory of international law.
KHOSROW MINUCHER v. CA and ARTHUR SCALZO Facts: Khosrow Minucher is an Iranian national who came to study in the RP in 1974 and was appointed Labor

Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila. When the Shah (monarch title) of Iran was deposed, he became a refugee and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement. Scalzo, on the other hand, was a special agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. He conducts surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs shipped to the US and make the actual arrest. In May 1986, Minucher (and one Abbas Torabian) was charged with for the violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). The criminal charge was followed by a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. They were acquitted. On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed a case before the RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. According to Minucher, he and Scalzo conducted some business. Minucher expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for him and his Abbass wife. Scalzo told him that he could help him for a $2,000 fee per visa. After a series of business transactions between the two, when Scalzo came to deliver the visas to Minuchers house, he told the latter that he would be leaving the Philippines soon and requested him to come out of the house so he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in the cab. To his surprise, 30-40 armed Filipino soldiers came to arrest him. In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that the US Government, pursuant to the Vienna Convention, recognized it on Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government itself thru its Executive Department and DFA.The courts ruled in favor of Scalzo on the ground that as a special agent of the US Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. RTC: decision in favor of plaintiff. CA: Reversed. Scalzo was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. Issue: WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity Yes. Ratio: The Vienna Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include: (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic)
mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Scalzo was an Assistant Attach of the US diplomatic mission. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank. While the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drugactivities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within

Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
SUZETTE NICOLAS v. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs Facts: Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the US Armed Forces. He was charged (along with 3 others) with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette Nicolas, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City (inside a Starex Van). Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the US, the US, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings. During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required. The RTC of Makati found Smith guilty (others were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Pending agreement of the parties as to where Smith shall be detained, he was temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail. However, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the US government due to new agreements between the Philippines and the US, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. Under such agreement, the DFA of the Philippines and the Embassy of the US agreed that, in accordance with the VFA, Smith shall be detained in a room at the U.S. Embassy Compound and guarded by U.S. military personnel. The matter was brought before the CA which dismissed the motion for having become moot. Issue: Does the US have custody over Smith from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings? YES! The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the custody of any US personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with US military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. US military authorities shall make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another States territory. The receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. This is due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to bodies such as visiting foreign armed forces. Who has custody of Smith after conviction? Applying the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained after conviction, the rule that governs is that: the confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of US personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and US authorities. It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between CUSTODY DURING TRIAL and DETENTION AFTER CONVICTION, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states that the detention shall be carried out in facilities AGREED ON by authorities of both parties AND that the detention shall be by Philippine authorities. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the US Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not by Philippine authorities. The petitions were partly granted. Side issue: WON the VFA was constitutional -YES! It is constitutional as ruled by the court in the case of Bayan v. Zamora. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government.
NAVALES V ABAYA Facts: Last July 27, 2003 more than 300 junior officers and enlisted men mostly from the elite units of the AFP quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). The soldiers then made a statement through ABS-CBN News network that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo such as graft and corruption in the military, sale of arms

and ammunition to the enemies of the State, etc. They declared the withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo administration. After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the Government team led by Ambassador Cimatu an agreement was forged between the two groups. Subsequently DOJ charged the 3221 soldiers who took part in the Oakwood incident with violation of Article 134 A coup d etat of the RPC. Thereafter several of the accused filed in the RTC (branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military tribunal. While such motion was pending, DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause for coup d etat against only 31 of the original 321 accused and the charges against them were dismissed. RTC (branch 61) admitted the Amended Information charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup d etat defined under Article 134 -A of the RPC. However, 1Lt. Navales, et. al who were earlier dropped as accused in the crime of coup d etat were charged before the General Court Martial with violations of the Articles of War. At this point the RTC acted on the Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused declaring the petition for the court assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military court and requiring the prosecution to produce evidence to establish probable cause as MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Furthermore, it declared that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused are hereby declared NOT SERVICE CONNECTED BUT IS ABSORBED AND IN FURTHERANCE TO THE ALLEGED CRIME OF COUP D ETAT. March 1, 2004, the General Court-martial has set the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of War. Petitions for the issuance of temporary restraining order were filed and the court directed that parties to observe the status quo prevail before the filing of the petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus. Ruling: No. The Order of the RTC declaring that all the charges before the court-martial against accused were not service-connected but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d etat, cannot be given effect. When RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion to assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal had already been rendered moot and
academic when the RTC accepted the Amended Information under which only 31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290. It has become moot against those charges that were dismissed. However in said order it further declared that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused and former accused are not service-connected, believing that the crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup detat and thus absorbed by the said crime. Thus, insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed, there was nothing left to be resolved after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. This dismissal made the petitioners no longer parties to the case and no further relief could be granted to them. 1Lt Navales, et al. since they are strangers to the proceedings in the criminal case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court, thus they cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC that the charges filed against them before the General Court-Martial were not service connected. In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055 that military courts have jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered service connected crimes. It even mandates that it should be tried by the court martial. The RTC thus has no legal basis to rule that the violation of the following Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d etat and as such absorbed by the latter crime. In making such a declaration the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and is NULL AND VOID. The writs of prohibition and habeas corpus prayed for by the petitioners must fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by a court with jurisdiction and that the writ should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. Thus, the rules apply to petitioners who were detained under Commitment Order issued by the Chief of Staff of the AFP. On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. In this case, the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against 1Lt. Navales, et. al under RA 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.
GONZALES v. ABAYA *READ: concurring opinion of Justice Callejo FACTS: This is about the Oakwood Mutiny (July 26, 2003) where members of the AFP aimed to destabilize the government with use of high-powered weapons and explosive devices. Navy Lt. Trillanes IV & the troops sported red armbands with the emblem Magdalo. They broadcasted their grievances against GMA, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms & ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US government. They declared withdrawal of support from the GMA & demanded her resignation. After several hours of negotiation, they eventually surrendered. DOJ charged them with coup detat (defined under Art. 134-A of the RPC) in RTC. Respondent Gen. Narciso Abaya, then Chief of Staff, filed with the military tribunal for violations of the Articles of War (Art. 63: disrespect toward the Pres., Art. 64: disrespect toward a superior officer, Art. 67: mutiny/sedition, Art. 96: for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman and Art. 97: conduct prejudicial to good order & military discipline). Following the doctrine of absorption, Gen. Abaya recommended that those charged with coup detat with RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violations of Articles of War. The RTC decided that all charges before the court martial against the accusedare hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed & in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup. However, Judge Advocate Generals Office of the AFP (JAGO)s Colonel recommended that 29 of the officers (out of 321 coz DOJ dropped the case against the others) be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Art. 96. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed accused to answer the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with the SC a Petition for Prohibition praying that the respondents (JAGO) be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Art. 96. Gonzales et al maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup detat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners (rebels) are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
HELD: NO. There is no dispute that Gonzales et al, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law according to Commonwealth Act 408 (AKA Articles of War). Section 1 of R.A. 7055 provides that as a general rule, members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. It also provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court. The same provision also identifies "serviceconnected crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these Articles are within the jurisdiction of the court martial. SC held that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. The charge against Gonzales et al concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "serviceconnected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. There is no merit in Gonzales et als argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial because the same has been declared by the RTC as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "serviceconnected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and

in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over serviceconnected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case. Military law is sui generis, applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians. Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. In fine, SC holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.
PEOPLE V. ROGER TULIN MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of 40.4M. The vessel was suddenly boarded by 7 fully armed pirates (accused in the case Emilio Changco, Cecilio Changco, Tulin, Loyola, Infante, etc.). they detained and took control of the vessel. The name MT Tabangao and the PNOC logo were painted over with black. Then it was painted with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore. In Singapore, the ship was awaiting another vessel that did not arrive. Instead, the ship went back to Batangas Philippines and remained at sea. Days later, it went back to Singapore. This time, another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Another accused, Cheong San Hiong, supervised the Navis crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee went back to the Philippines and the original crew members were released by the pirates in batches. The crew was ordered not to tell authorities of what happened. The chief engineer of the crew, however, reported the incident to the coast guard. Afterwards, a series of arrests were effected in different places. An information charging the accused with qualified piracy or violation of the PD 532 Piracy in the Philippine Waters was filed against the accused. As it turns out, Navi Pride captain, Hiong, was employed with Navi Marine Services ( a Singaporean firm, I think). Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker who offered to sell bunker oil to the former. When the transaction pushed through, Hiong was assigned to supervise a ship to ship transfer. He was told that the Galilee would be making the transfer, so Navi Pride ship-sided with Galilee and the transfer was effected. Paul Gan received the payment. Upon arrival in Singapore, Hiong was asked again to transact another transfer of oil. The same procedure was followed. Hiong then went to the Philippines to arrange another transfer with Changco the pirates head. This was how Hiong was arrested by the NBI agents.
PEOPLE VS. LOL-LO While a boat of Dutch possession was in the high seas, Moros surrounded it with small boats. They robbed them of food and cargo, attacked some of the men on board, and brutally violated 2 women. Lo-lo and Saraw were two of the moros responsible. Lo-lo and Saraw later returned to Tawi-tawi where they were arrested and charged with the crime of mutiny. They were claiming that the Philippine courts does not have jurisdiction since the incident happened in the high seas. CFI still found them guilty. Issue: Can a piracy committed outside of the PH triable here? YES. Held: YES. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the

All the accused put up denials and alibis. The trial court, with ROMEO CALLEJO deciding, ruled that the accused were all guilty. ISSUE: w/n the accused are guilty of qualified piracy YES! RULING: [only the important part for crim] Hiong argues that he can not be convicted under PD 534 or Art 122 of the RPC as amended, since both laws punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. Hiong also contends that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters. Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas) provided that piracy must be committed in the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which broadened the law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand, embraces any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in the Philippine waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned laws, they exist harmoniously as separate laws. The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiongs supervision. Although the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not done in Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged with violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it remains to be a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
ordered the Fiscal to file a case against Guevarra for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. Guevarra filed a motion to quash stating that the information contains averments which if true would constitute an excuse or justification. His primary argument was that the term discernment connotes intent under the exempting circumstance found under Art. 12 sec. 3 of the RPC (9<x<15 exempting except if acting with discernment). If this were true, then no minor between the age of 9 to 15 may be convicted of a quasi offense under Art. 365 (Criminal Negligence). Issue: Is discernment the same as intent? NO. Held: Intent is defined as a determination to do certain things. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. They convey two distinct thoughts. It is therefore incorrect to say that since a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. The second element of dolo (deceit) is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist. Thats why we have article 12. In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa (fault), three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. As such, Guevarra was not exempted and the case was remanded to the lower court.
PEOPLE vs OJEDA PONENTE: Corona FACTS: This is a case for estafa and violation of BP 22. Cora Ojeda used to buy fabrics from Ruby Chua. All in all Ojeda 228,306 pesos using 22 postdated checks. When the checks were presented for payment, they were dishonored due to account closed. Criminal charges were lodged against Ojeda. In defense Ojeda claims good faith, absence of deceit, lack of notice of dishonor and full payment of the amount of the checks. Also, Ojeda claims she advised Chua not to cash the checks because they were not yet sufficiently funded. Finally, she claims she made partial
GUEVARRA V. ALMODOVAR Facts: John Philip Guevarra, an 11 year old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard. They were target-shooting a tansan using an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Almine was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death. After the preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated Guevarra due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. Almines parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which
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payments worth 50,000 pesos in the form of finished garments. The trial court convicted her but only for 14 counts out of 22 bouncing checks issued. This was because some checks were not covered by the indictment and others were not signed by her but by her husband. ISSUE: whether or not the defense of Ojeda for absence of deceit is tenable. YES. HELD: Under Art. 315 of the RPC the following are the requisites for estafa: first, a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued; second, lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; third, damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and must be established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. Deceit was not proven by the prosecution. In fact, Ojeda not only made arrangements for the payment of the debts but in fact paid (because during the pendency of the appeal an affidavit of desistance was introduced by Ojeda). This is a sign of good faith and absence of malice an essential element of estafa and crimes under the RPC which are mala in se. Minor ruling: there was also lack of notice of dishonor. Prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter and the registry receipt. However, the registry receipt does not prove itself. It needs to be authenticated and identified. In this case, it was not.
against the door. In the darkness and confusion Ah Chong thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, Ah Chong called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds. The deceased and the accused had an understanding to knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity. Ah Chong alleged that it was because of repeated robberies that he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection. He admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" (burglar) because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite warnings. TC: Ah Chong was guilty of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances. Ah Chong admitted that he killed his roommate but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense. ISSUE: WON one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act RULING: there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. Ah Chong acquiited. There can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG Ah Chong was employed as a cook at Officers' quarters No. 27 at Fort Mc Kinley and at the same place Pascual Gualberto was employed as a house boy or muchacho. No one slept in the house except the two servants, ocuppying a small room toward the rear of the building. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone who was forcing to open the door. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, Ah Chong leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed
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But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge. ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted. Ah Chong struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
TORRES, J., dissenting: the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
PEOPLE V. DELIM FACTS: Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon and Ronald Delim. Modesto Delim, the victim (deceased), was adopted by the father of the brothers. On January 23, 1999, Modesto, Rita (wife), Randy (son) and their 2 grandchildren were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald barged into the house. They were armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto. They then herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Leon and Manuel, also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house at around 7am the following day. On January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance. According to the autopsy, the cause of death was a gunshot wound at the head and the stab wounds sustained by the victim on his left and forearm were defensive wounds. The investigators confirmed that the accused had no licenses for their firearms. Only Marlon, Ronald and Leon were arrested. Manuel and Robert were not found. To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of aggravated murder (The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance
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and of taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime) and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. The amount of P75,000 for moral damages and P25,000 for exemplary damages was awarded. ISSUE: 1) WON the crime charged in the information is murder or kidnapping Murder 2) WON the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that accused are guilty of murder 3) WON the qualifying circumstances should be considered HELD/ RATIO: 1) The crime charged is murder. In determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al., that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. The crime committed would either be homicide or murder. What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with that of murder or kidnapping. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent. Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record. Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which
prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder. The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge. In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof. 2) YES In this case, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: 1) the criminal act and 2) defendant's agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: 1) the objective; 2) the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto
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sustained 5 gunshot wounds. He also sustained 7 stab wounds, defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences flowing therefrom. 3) NO Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors. As to superior strength, what is primordial is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the crime. In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed. The aggravating circumstance of unlicensed firearm and dwelling was not alleged in the information thus, cannot be considered. In sum, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide. Separate Opinion: VITUG The crime charged should be modified to kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The evidence would show that Modesto Delim was forcibly abducted from his residence by appellants, all armed, on the night of 23 January 1999. But to say that the same group was also responsible for his death, days
later, or that his violent end was the consequence of the abduction, and nothing more, would be to unduly put to risk our standard of moral certainty required for all convictions. The evidence would indeed point out that Marlon, Ronald and Robert seized Modesto Delim from his house while Leon and Manuel stood guard and stayed at the door of the victim's house. Randy Manalo Bantas and Rita Manalo Bantas, however, could only testify on the participation of each of the malefactors in the abduction of Modesto Delim but not on what might have happened to him thereafter. In arriving at its verdict convicting appellants for "aggravated murder," the trial court considered the act of the accused of forcibly taking Modesto Delim from his house as being likewise enough to substantiate the killing by them of the victim. The conclusion could rightly be assailed. The accounts of Randy and his mother Rita would indicate that the forcible taking of Modesto was carried out in absolute silence, with not one of the five intruders uttering any word which could give a clue on the reason for the abduction and, more particularly, whether the same was carried out for the purpose of killing Modesto. The two witnesses were unaware of any existing grudge between the malefactors and the victim that could have prompted them to violently snuff out the life of the latter. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case might generally be immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive could be important and consequential when the evidence on the commission of the crime would be short of moral certainty . The facts point to only one established fact, i.e., that the accused forcibly took Modesto Delim from his residence to an unknown destination on the night of 23 January 1999, would be scanty to support a conclusion that the five, aside from abducting the victim, likewise killed him. There was an unexplained gap in what ought to have been a continuous chain of events. The body bore several defensive wounds, which could give rise to the not too unlikely scenario that Modesto might have ultimately been released by his abductors sometime before he was killed.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION
vs.
FACTS: Romeo Dunca, driver of a trailer truck registered under the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp (RRTC), was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property. The private offended parties also instituted a separate civil action against RRTC as employer of Romeo based on quasi delict. From the records, it was shown that Romeo, while driving along the national road in Isabela, approached a damaged portion of the road, where the surface of the road was uneven. However, the left lane parallel to this portion was smooth.
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Thus, they used the parallel lane to avoid taking the damage road. However, at that moment, there was an incoming Nissan vehicle causing the truck to ram with the former. As a result, 2 of the passengers of the Nissan died instantly. The RTC rendered a decision in the criminal case, finding Romeo guilty of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (RA 4136) and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victims. With regard to the civil action filed against RRTC, the RTC ordered the company to pay the offended parties actual damages. Both Romeo and RRTC appealed, while the offended parties moved that the dispositive portion be changed so as to hold RRTC solidarily liable for the damages awarded in the criminal case in case Romeo becomes insolvent. The trial court granted the motion of the offended parties and issued a supplemental decision declaring RRTC as subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded in the criminal case in the event of Romeos insolvency. RRTC appealed the supplemental decision. However, during the pendency of the appeal, Romeo jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. The CA affirmed the trial courts supplemental decision. ISSUE: W/N RRTC may be held subsidiarily liable for damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against Romeo despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against it. NO. HELD/RATIO: In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability." In this case, RRTC, as employer of the accused Romeo, who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused. When private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accuseddriver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. The intention of offended parties to proceed primarily and directly against RRTC as employer of accused truck driver, Romeo, became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on quasi delict. Thus, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.
People v Carmen Facts: A boy named Randy Luntayao was believed by his father (Eddie) to have a nervous breakdown manife sted by him talking and laughing by himself. He thinks that the breakdown was caused by skipping meals whenever he took the boy with him to the farm. Upon the suggestion of one of the accused in this case, Eddie, wife Perlita and their three children went with said accused to Cebu. Upon arriving in Cebu they went to the house of another accused Carmen and diagnosed the boy to be possessed with a bad spirit and that she could exorcise. Warning that in conducting exorcism, the bad spirit might transfer to Eddie it was best to do the healing prayer without him. Eddie, wife and children were locked inside a room in the house. The exorcism conducted by Carmen was witnessed by two children who were playing takyan when they heard a shout asking for help from his mother. They ran to the direction of the house of Carmen and saw that Randy was being immersed in water head first by the 4 accused. They also saw him being tied on a bench while Carmen poured water into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise his head, accused Alexander banged the boys head against the bench. She also witnessed accused Celedonia dropped her weight on the body of the boy. They also took turns in pounding the boys chest with their clenched fist. Then Carmen asked one of the accused to get a knife and after which the knife was slowly plunged into the left side of the boys body. Then the boy was carried into the house.
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Around 5 oclock in the afternoon Randy was already dead. After Eddie and his family returned to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought the assistance from the Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City. As the incident took place in Cebu, NBI in Cebu conducted the investigation and autopsy report of the exhumed body. The family filed a case in court against Carmen et.al of murder. The trial court found them guilty of murder arguing that killing a person with treachery is murder. It cited a court decision stating that even if there is no intent to kill, in inflicting physical injuries with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted of murder. Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. In the case at bar, there is enough evidence that the accused confederated with each other in inflicting physical harm to the victim (illegal act). These acts were intentional and thus they should be liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of murder? NO. Ruling: There was no criminal intent on the part of the accused to kill the boy. It was shown that the accused are members of a cult and the bizarre ritual was consented to by the parents of the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not murder. The RPC states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the person performing such an act. Intentional felonies such as murder or homicide, what takes the place of the element of is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack if skill. The accused lack medical skills in treating the victim of his ailment, resulted in the latters death. Treachery in this case cannot be appreciated in the absence of intent to kill. The acts of the accused therefore considered by the court as treachery are in fact efforts by the accused to restrain the boy so that they can cure him. Thus, the decision of the RTC is affirmed and modified declaring the accused guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina Irene. Get him dead or alive." Defendant corporal Galanta and chief of police Oanis were 2 of the 5 who reported to the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the telegram and a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction in the telegram (dead or alive). The group of defendants Oanis and Galanta went to the house where Irene was supposedly living. There Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare who pointed to them Irenes room and said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour at that time. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Later it was found that the person shot was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but one Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. Oanis and Galanta gave contradicting versions of the incident and it was made apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments corroborated substantially, the testimony of Irene. A careful examination of Irene's testimony showed that it contained all indicia of veracity. In her crossexamination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. LC: homicide through reckless imprudence The LC took into consideration the fact that Oanis and Galanta acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas Issue: WON Oanis and Galanta may be held responsible for the death of Tecson Held: YES. Murder, not homicide through reckless imprudence with qualifying circumstance of alevosia Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep.
PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA Facts: The Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received a telegram: "Information received escaped
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A mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code: a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present PARAS, DISSENTING: In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488). HONTIVEROS, DISSENTING: Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was peacefully lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according to their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed.
kept insisting that he should or could go back to the restaurant while the latter prevented him from doing so. Upon nearing their house, the appellant abruptly stopped the pick-up and the victim alighted. Holding a bottle of beer in his right hand, the victim raised both of his hands, stood in front of the pick-up and said, "sige kung gusto mo sagasaan mo ako, hindi ka makakaalis." The appellant slowly drove the pick-up forward threatening to run over the victim. At this juncture, the victim exclaimed, "papatayin mo ba ako?. The appell ant backed-up almost hitting an owner type jeep parked at the side of the road and on board was prosecution eyewitness, Ma. Cecilia Mariano. Then at high speed, the appellant drove the pickup forward hitting the victim in the process. Not satisfied with what he had done, the appellant put the vehicle in reverse thereby running over the victim a second time. The appellant then alighted from the vehicle and walked towards their house. Witnesses rushed the victim to the Dolorosa Hospital at Norzagaray, Bulacan where the victim expired shortly thereafter. The appellant was not immediately prosecuted for the death of his father which he was able to pass off as an accident. But when his older sister, Leslie C. Padilla, arrived from the United States to attend her father's wake and funeral, she made inquiries about the circumstances surrounding his death and was given different versions of the incident, some of which insinuated that her father did not meet his demise accidentally. Later, a suspicion of foul play moved her to engage the services of the NBI for a formal investigation into the matter. An information for parricide against appellant thereafter. Issue: W/N Castillo Jr. is guilty of parricide. YES. Held: The prosecution has successfully established the elements of parricide: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Issue: W/N the parricide was committed thru reckless imprudence as claimed by the appellant. Held: Appellant claims that there was no intention on his part to kill his father, and that he had accidentally stepped on the gas pedal forcefully, causing the vehicle to travel, at a fast speed. The details of the incident as narrated by Mariano and Agaran bespeak of a crime committed with full intent. And we have held that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. What qualifies an act as one of reckless or simple negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the execution thereof. Otherwise stated,
PEOPLE V. CASTILLO JR. Facts: On Nov. 6, 1993, between 7:30 and 8:30 pm, appellant Castillo, Jr. was in the D&G Restaurant in Bulacan, with his father Castillo, Sr., who is the victim in this case. They were drinking. After 2 hours, a group of noisy customers arrived in the restaurant. Castillo Sr., aware of his sons propensity to get into fights, urged Castillo Jr. to go home with him. The 2 boarded a blue pick-up truck and went. Castillo Jr. drove the vehicle home with Castillo Sr. in the passengers seat. During the trip home, an argument ensued between the appellant and the victim who were both a bit drunk already because the former
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in criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done without malice but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual. Mariano testified that the blue pick-up truck suddenly rushed forward at a high speed then stopped. The victim alighted, went in front of the car and screamed papatayin mo ba ako while the driver was trying to intimidate him with the headlights. Then the truck backed up, almost hitting them and then rushed forward hitting the old man. Then afterwards, it even backed up on the body. The records are bereft of any evidence that the appellant had tried to avoid hitting the victim who positioned himself in front of the pick-up. On the contrary, Mariano's testimony is to the effect that prior to actually hitting the victim, the appellant was "intimidating" him by moving the pick-up forward, thus prompting the victim to exclaim, "papatayin mo ba ako?". Worse, the appellant backed-up to gain momentum, then accelerated at a very fast speed knowing fully well that the vehicle would definitely hit the victim who was still standing in front of the same. The appellant's actuations subsequent thereto also serve to refute his allegation that he did not intend to kill his father. Surely, the appellant must have felt the impact upon hitting the victim. The normal reaction of any person who had accidentally ran over another would be to immediately alight from the vehicle and render aid to the victim. But as if to ensure the victim's death, the appellant instead backed-up, thereby running over the victim again.
at Zurbaran Mart as compared to her expenses. Accusedappellant would force sex on Grace especially when he was drunk. Defense claimed that the accused was initially thinking about ending his life by shooting himself because of the financial woes and his wifes relentless pestering and nagging, but in the process of both spouses struggle to take possession of the gun, it went off and hit Grace. Issue: 1) WON THE KILLING WAS ACCIDENTAL, AND THAT THE DECEASED WAS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY (NO!) 2) MAIN ISSUE AS TO ARTICLE 3: WON THE KILLING WAS DUE TO SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE (NO!) 3) WON ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF PARRICIDE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT (YES!) HELD: 1) No. First, accused-appellant cannot Paragraph 4, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code in order to be exempted from criminal liability. Said provision pertinently states: Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability: 4) Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. Accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here, however, the act of accusedappellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not being in self-defense, is unlawful -- it at least constitutes light threats (Article 285, par. 1). There is thus no room for the invocation of accident as a ground for exemption. The gun was not even licensed or registered hence, he could have been charged with illegal possession of a firearm. Secondly, appellant's claim that the shooting happened when he tried to prevent his wife from killing herself and he and his wife grappled for the possession of the gun is belied by the expert testimony of Dr. Arizala of the who conducted a second post mortem examination. Moreover, the act of accused ordering Eden Ontog to call a taxi in which he brought the wounded Grace to the hospital is "merely an indication or act of repentance or contrition on the part of appellant. Accusedappellant's voluntary surrender is not sufficient ground to exculpate him from criminal liability. The law merely considers such act as a mitigating circumstance. Nonflight is not proof of innocence. 2) No. What qualifies an act of reckless or simple negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the execution thereof. Moreover, if the version of grappling for the gun were to be believed, there should have been nitrates on both hands of Grace, as examined by the NBI doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim. Thus, these
PEOPLE V. NEPOMUCENO, JR. Article 3 of RPC- Felonies are committed either thru dolo (deceit) or culpa (fault) Facts: Accused-appellant Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr. has appealed in regard to the decision finding him guilty of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized under Article 246 of RPC for the death of Grace Nepomuceno. On May 2, 1994 in Manila, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one GRACE NEPOMUCENO Y BENITEZ, his wife, with whom he was married in lawful wedlock, by then and there shooting her with a gun of unknown caliber hitting her on the left hip, thereby inflicting upon the victim a fatal gunshot wound. The prosecution presented Monserrat de Leon, sister of the victim,who declared that Grace would confide to her that accused-appellant was jobless and that Grace had problems with the low income of the store she owned
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physical evidence, the lack of powder burns or nitrates on the hands of Grace and the trajectory of the bullet that entered her left thigh being slightly upwards and from left to right instead of downwards, repudiate accusedappellant's claim of simple negligence. 3) Yes, but with mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The prosecution has sufficiently established the elements of parricide by its evidence. These elements are: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused (Article 246). The first and third elements were stipulated during the pre-trial stage of the case, thus: the victim and the accused are legally married, and that immediately after the shooting, the accused voluntarily and bodily carried the victim into a taxicab and proceeded to the hospital where she died. Further, accusedappellant having admitted that he shot his wife, he has the burden of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility.
incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371). ISSUE: What is the criminal responsibility of Pugay? HELD: Homicide through reckless imprudence. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. ISSUE: What is the criminal responsibility of Samson? HELD: homicide with ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. His conviction of murder because of the presence of treachery is improper. There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it can be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on
PEOPLE vs. PUGAY & SAMSON (may 2 or more persons kill the same victim) FACTS: The deceased victim Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. During a town fiesta, Gabion, the witness, was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book. He then saw Pugay and Samson with several companions making fun of Miranda. Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the Miranda. The victim died due to the incident. Gabion, Pugay, Samson and 5 others were brought to the municipal building for interrogation. Pugay and Samson gave statements to the police. Pugay admitted in his statement that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and Samson set the deceased on fire. Samson alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Pugay and Samson were found guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a conspiracy? HELD: None, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the
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his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning.
Estrada v Sandiganbayan (GR No. 148560. November 19, 2001) Facts: Petitioner Estrada, President of the Phililippines is being prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder as amended by RA 7659. He contends that the, Plunder law is unconstitutional for being vague; second, The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and third Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. Issues: 1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. 2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense. Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
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evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder. We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated
like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger sociopolitical and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit
FAJARDO V PEOPLE Art 3-Mala ProhibitaIllegal possession of part of firearm & plain view doctrine Facts: Fajardo filed a Petition for certiorari on the decision of CA and RTC finding Fajardo guilty of violating PD 1866 (illegal possession of firearms). The case stemmed from a complaint filed by citizens that armed men were drinking liquor and firing guns at Fajardos residence. The police and the PISOG arrived at their residence to find men scampering and then saw Valerio w/ 2 45 caliber pistols, engaging in a shootout w/ the police before running into Fajardos house. Fajardo was also seen tucking a 45 caliber pistol in her shorts before running into her home. The police opted not to enter and just cordoned the area. At around 2 and 4 am, Valerio was seen tossing 2 receivers (part ng pistol) which was recovered and surrendered to SPo1 Tan who used them to apply for a warrant. They found several ammos within the house and filed for illegal possession of firearms against both parties but Fajardo countered that the search warrant was defective in that when it was issued it wasnt based on Tans personal knowledge and they didnt accompany the police while conducting the search. She also disowned the ammos because they allegedly belonged to her brother and also denied having the pistol when the police arrived. RTC: Fajardo and her bodyguard Valerio is guilty of illegal possession of firearm. CA: Affirmed the findings but said that the search warrant is void because it wasnt based on Tans personal
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knowledge and so the ammo recovered was declared inadmissible. But the 2 receivers retrieved before the warrant were valid under the plain view doctrine. Issues: 1. Do the 2 receivers come under plain view doctrine? 2. Is Fajardo guilty of illegal possession of part of firearm? Held: 1. YES, Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular areaNavas presence was justified because they saw armed persons (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent - Nava clearly saw the throwing of suspicious objects (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Considering that the sighting of Valerio holding a pistol he had reasonable ground to believe Valerio had thrown contraband items 2. NO, illegal possession of firearms is committed when the holder (1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof and (2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm. The rule is that ownership is not an essential element. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. The offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Fajardo was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The testimony of Nava shows that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw Fajardo holding the receivers, before or during their disposal. At the very least, Fajardo's possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of her house.
GARCIA V. CA FACTS: Based on the complaint of Aquilino Pimentel who ran in the senatorial elections, he charged elections officer Arsenia Garcia for willfully decreasing the votes received by senatorial candidate Pimentel from 6,988 votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the 159 precincts of the statement of votes by precincts of said municipality to 1921 votes with a difference of 5,077. The RTC convicted accused and gave a prison sentence. On appeal however it was contended that there was no criminal intent and bad faith in his actions. Respondent on the other hand contends that a violation of an election law is a mala prohibita and good faith is not a defense. ISSUE: WON a violation of section 27b of R.A. 6646 is a mala in se or mala prohibita? And could good faith and lack of criminal intent be a valid defense? HELD: mala in se Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. An election offense is defined as: (b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
*Only Valerio was found guilty.
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Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board. Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC, though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC. Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
Senior Inspector Rico Tome (TOME) received a dispatch informing him that 2 trucks did not stop at checkpoint. The trucks were then intercepted and the drivers were interrogated. Tigoy was asked why he didnt stop at the checkpoint and followed up by what was loaded in the truck. Tigoy replied that there is S.O.P (grease money in street parlance), causing suspicion and leading to the police finding piles of sawn lumber beneath cement bags. Since the drivers didnt have a permit, they were turned over to an Investigator and was detained. TIGOY was then charged with qualified theft (possessing lumber without a permit in violation of the Revised Forestry Code). ISSUE: W/N Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without the necessary permit in violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. YES RATIO: In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. It is not even required that the participants have an agreement for an appreciable period to commence it. TIGOYs defense was that he could not have conspired with Bertodazo for he did not know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks as he believed that he was transporting bags of cement and he was not around when the trucks were with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement. But his actions (not stopping at checkpoint, offering S.O.P) adequately show that he intentionally participated in the commission of the offense for which he had been charged. Digest of Digest: FACTS: TIGOY, as truck driver, didnt stop at a check point, got intercepted by police, offered grease money when asked what was loaded on the truck, and was charged with qualified theft for illegal possession of lumber in violation to the Revised Forestry Code when he was found transporting lumber underneath cement bags without a permit. He claimed he couldnt have conspired as he didnt have knowledge of the lumber loaded. ISSUE: same
TIGOY VS. PEOPLE Doctrine: In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously. FACTS: Nestor Ong (ONG), engaged in the trucking business, entered into a Contract to Transport wit h Lolong Bertodazo (BERTODAZO), to transport construction materials from Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City. Ong instructed Rodolfo Tigoy (TIGOY) and SUMAGANG, the formers truck drivers, to bring his trucks to BERTODAZO in Lanao del Norte for loading of materials, leave it there, then go back at dawn to pick it up for the trip to Dipolog City. The following morning, the drivers arrived with the trucks loaded up with cement. After a few checks of the trucks, they left.
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HELD: In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously. The fact that he didnt stop at check point, offered grease money pointed to the obvious fact that he knew lumber was loaded in his truck. Conspirator? Yezzir!
founded on the principle that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows, it does not alter nor diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result.
MELBA QUINTO RANDYVER PACHECO
vs. DANTE
ANDRES
and
PEOPLE v. MOLDES Facts: Inocente Moldes was convicted of homicide by the CFI of Leyte. On the night of April 3 in a barrio, there was a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the master of ceremonies. Moldes insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by the deceased. Moldes went to the porch and began cutting down the decorations with his bolo. He went into the yard and challenged everyone to a fight. Not attracting enough attention, he began chopping bamboo trees. The deceased, unarmed, spoke to him in a friendly manner as he descended into the yard. But Moldes struck him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm (long incised wound on the lower portion directed downwards). As the deceased fell, Moldes inflicted a slight wound on his back and ran away. The wound was treated the next morning. However, it failed to stop the hemorrhage and the deceased died after 12 days. Moldess defense was that he was behaving at the dance, and it was the deceased who struck him on the dance floor with a cane. He attempted to run away but the deceased followed him with a cane and a bolo. He succeeded in wrenching the bolo away and inflicted the wounds in self-defense. The CFI convicted him. The attorney urged that Moldes did not intend to commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in the dark and in selfdefense. It is also contended that had the deceased secured proper surgical treatment, the wound would not have been fatal (but such was not available in that barrio). Issue: W/N he is guilty of homicide YES Ratio: The SC ruled that there was no element of selfdefense. When one resorts to the use of a lethal weapon and strikes another with the force that must have been used in this case, it is presumed that he realizes the natural consequences of his act. The GR is that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, even though the immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful medical treatment. This rule is
FACTS: At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, 11-year old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system. Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene. For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint against the respondents for Wilsons death. Two weeks thereafter, investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto. Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.
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The cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Postmortem findings stated that the CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory. The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for homicide by dolo against the two. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed the order to the CA insofar as the civil aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order saying that the acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. Hence, this petition.
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when: (a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or (b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents are still liable for damages upon extinction of criminal liability. HELD/RATIO: NO. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability [23] may arise does not exist. Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Natural refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while logical means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. The prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the act. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, it must be proved that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. The trial court took into account the following facts: Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were stones inside the culvert. The stones could have caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of water and drown. That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres and
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Pacheco inside. Respondent Andres had no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one. The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased. In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
Issue: 1.) W/N Court erred in convicting Opero for robbery with homicide? [per Opero: he never intended to kill the deceased, his intention being merely to rob her, had he the intention to kill her he could have easily done so with the knife] 2.) W/N Art.49, par.1 of the RPC [which provides that in cases in which a felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit and the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is higher than the offense to which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the offense which accused intended to commit shall be imposed in its maximum period] should apply to Opero? Held & Ratio: 1.) Appellant's theory finds no basis in the law or in jurisprudence. It was been repeatedly held that when direct and intimate connection exists between the robbery and the killing, regardless of which of the two precedes the other, or whether they are committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. If the circumstances would indicate no intention to kill, as in the instant case were evidently, the intention is to prevent the deceased from making an outcry, and so a "pandesal" was stuffed into her mouth, the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated. The stuffing of the "pandesal" in the mouth would not have produced asphyxiation had it not slid into the neckline, "caused by the victim's own movements, " according to Dr. Singian. The movements of the victim that caused the "pandesal" to slide into the neckline were, however, attributable to what appellant and his co-accused did to the victim, for if they did not hogtie her, she could have easily removed the "pandesal" from her mouth and avoided death by asphyxiation. It may not avail appellant to contend that the death was by mere accident for even if it were so, which is not even beyond doubt for the sliding of the pandesal into the neckline to produce asphyxiation could reasonably have been anticipated, it is a settled doctrine that when death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident. What is important and decisive is that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. These Spanish doctrines were cited by this Court in People vs. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil. 992. 2.) Article 49, par. 1 of the RPC applies only to cases when the crime committed befalls a different person from the one intended to be the victim. This was the explicit ruling in the case of People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150153, citing Supreme Court of decisions Spain.
PEOPLE V. DIEGO OPERO Facts: Case is an automatic review of the death sentence imposed on Diego Opero for robbery with homicide. Opero was charged together with Reynaldo Lacsinto and Milagros Villegas who were both convicted with a lesser penalty; while another accused, Asteria Avila, was acquitted. Liew Soon Ping, wife of Dr. Hong, was found dead in Room 314 of the House International Hotel in Ongpin, Manila. Her body was discovered by Salvador Oliver, a GSIS security guard assigned to the hotel when he brought a little girl (found loitering by Barcing, another nd security guard at the 2 flr of the building) to Room 314 where she was said to be residing. Upon reaching the room, Oliver knocked at the door, and when nobody answered, he pushed the door open but he smelled foul odor emanating from the room. Oliver covered his nose with a handkerchief and together with Barcing and the little girl, they entered the room where they saw prostrate on a bed Liew Soon Ping with her face down and both feet and hands tied. A towel was tied around her mouth. The room was ransacked and personal belongings thrown all around. Opero admitted that he robbed the victim, he also stated that he and his co-accused Lacsinto subdued the victim by assaulting her, tying up her hands and feet stabbing her and stuffing her mouth with a piece of pandesal. Dr. Singian, then Chief of the Medico Legal Division of the Western Police District made the following findings (among others) in his necropsy report: superficial stab wound measuring 0.8 c.m. on the right side of the chin caused by a sharp bladed instrument; superficial stab wound on the mid-axilliary line caused by a sharp bladed instrument; stab wound on the left forearm. However he found the cause of death to be due to asphyxiation by suffocation with an impacted bolus (read: pandesal) into the oropharynx and compression of the neck with a broad clothing around the neck.
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In the instant case, the intended victim, not any other person, was the one killed, as a result of an intention to rob. As stated earlier, what may be appreciated in appellant's favor is only the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, an entirely different situation from that contemplated under paragraph 1, Article 49 of the same Code, where as already explained, the different felony from that intended, befalls someone different from the intended victim, i.e. when the person intended to be killed is a stranger to the offender, but the person actually killed is the offender's father, thereby making the intended felony which is homicide different from the crime actually committed which is parricide. Notwithstanding the presence of the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that comitted, there still remains one aggravating circumstance to consider, after either one of the two aggravating circumstances present, that of superior strength and dwelling, is offset by the mitigating circumstance aforesaid. The higher of the imposable penalty for the crime committed, which is reclusion perpetua to death, should therefore be the proper penalty to be imposed on appellant. This is the penalty of death as imposed by the lower court.
survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection. ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of the drainage is the real cause of death of Aribuabo??? NO. HELD: It was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic peritonitis. The infection was caused by the fecal matter from the large intestine which has been perforated. The possibility, admitted by said physician that the patient might have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean that the act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the punishable act of the accused. One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that the other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.) Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily and with the knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the strongest instinct in living beings. It much be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his pathological condition and to his state of nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the contract of the drainage tube with the inflammed peritoneum. The question herein raised by Quianzon has already been finally settled by jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar to the present, the following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act and in this case the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc." INTOD V CA Facts: Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the RTC, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
PEOPLE VS. QUIANZON FACTS: A novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person was being held in the house of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio in Ilocos Norte. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who had the victuals in his care. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied to the neck of Aribuabo. The latter ran to the place where the people were gathered exclaiming that he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as the result of the wound on the tenth day after the incident. There is no conflict between the prosecution and the defense as regards the foregoing facts. However, there is a question as to who wounded Aribuabo. The prosecution claims that it was Quianzon. According to its witnesses, Quianzon confessed that he had wounded Aribuabo with a bamboo spit. On the other hand, it is contended by the defense that granting that it was Quianzon who inflicted the wound which resulted in Aribuabos death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have
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Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandayas house to ask him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangans house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime Art. 4(2). Intod contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent (People of the Phil) argues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that the crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3). Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible. Issue: WON he is liable for attempted murder? NO. Held: Only impossible crime. Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where: . . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. The RPC, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crimean act which, were it not
aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate would constitute a felony against person or family. For this provision to apply, there must be either (1) legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where: (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is no intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor or beyond control prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment and under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . .
GEMMA JACINTO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: Baby Aquino handed petitioner Jacinto with a postdated BDO Check in the amount of P10,000.00 as payment for Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc. (petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam). Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle, the sister of petitioner. Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from Land Bank looking for Generoso Capitle to inform him that the BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia asking her to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the bounced check. Valencia told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and invited Ricablanca to join the
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scheme. Ricablanca, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino had already paid Mega Foam in cash as replacement for the dishonored check. Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the NBI and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. With the help of Ricablanca, petitioner and Valencia were arrested upon receiving the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two. The RTC found the accused guilty of qualified theft. The CA modified the judgment by reducing the sentence of Valencia and Capitle but Jacontos sentence remained. Issue: WON a worthless check can be the object of theft NO!
is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto was found guilty of impossible crime.
PEOPLE VS RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA Ratio: Under Article 308, in relation to Article 310 of RPC, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. Side issue: When is the crime of theft produced? Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Unlawful taking Facts: Balmores is being prosecuted for the crime of estafa through falsification of a security. It is alleged that Balmores tore off the bottom (cross wise) of a genuine 1/8 unit Phil Charity Sweepstakes Ticket. This way, the real number on such ticket was removed and that by substituting and using an ink Balmores allegedly wrote 07400 instead which is actually the winning number. (the removal of the bottom portion and writing in ink the number was pleaded guilty to by Balmores) Balmores presented the ticket as genuine to the PCSO so he could claim the money. However, he was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of estafa through falsification of a security because Bayani Miler, the employee to whom the ticket was presented, immediately discovered the falsification and caused Balmores apprehension. (in short, no exchange of money and ticket took place) Issue: (real issue is actually whether there was estafa)
As to the impossible crime part: since the falsification of the ticket was so obvious, is the consummation of the crime actually impossible? Digesters explanation: the ticket was obviously falsified (as in very patent on its face na spurious siya) hence, it is argued that impossible naman maconsummate yung crime of estafa since nobody will give the money in exchange for the ticket (kasi nga obvious na fake --- as what happened in the case). So question is, do we have an impossible crime here? Held: NO! IMPOSSIBLE CRIME PART: the recklessness and clumsiness of Balmores in falsifying the ticket did not
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make the crime impossible under Art.4 Par.2. Examples of impossible crimes are as follows: trying to kill another by putting an arsenic substance in the latters soup but it turns out the substance was just common salt; or when one tries to murder a corpse. In this case, even if the ticket was patently falsified on its face, it cannot be said that it was impossible to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification. OTHER MATTERS: It is argued that for the June 29, 1947 draw (which is the date when the winning number of 07400 was drawn) there couldve been no genuine 1/8 unit PCSO ticket because the PCSO issued only units for each ticket. Also, it was not shown that the number removed from the ticket is not the same as that written in ink. The court will not take judicial notice of the fact that only units of tickets has been issued because it is not of common knowledge. Besides, if it were true that no 1/8 units were issued, then it only supports the prosecutions theory that balmores ticket was spurious. Note that in this case, Balmores pleaded guilty to removing the true and unidentified number of the ticket and substituting in ink a new figure. There wouldve been no need for such removal and substitution if the original number was the same as that written in ink. (note: in this case, SC said Balmores is merely guilty of an attempt to commit estafa. But since what is involved here is falsification of a government obligation --- sweepstake ticket --- he still has to suffer the fully brunt of the penalty of the law). PARAS DISSENT: There was an impossible crime. The falsification was inherently inadequate and is certainly to be detected. In short, Balmores could not have succeeded in chasing the ticket. In fact, the matter of falsification was immediately detected by Miler. Also the fact that only 1/4units of the ticket was actually issued couldve proved in court (thus taken judicial notice of) if only Balmores had counsel to assist him. (Balmores is actually an illiterate and during the entire proceeding from the lower court, he waived his right to be assisted by counsel)
Lizada, on 4 different occasions (August First Case, November 5 Second Case, October 22 Third Case, and September 15 Fourth Case of 1998), with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with the victim against her will and consent. EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION: o Rose Orillosa had 3 children, Analia, Jepsy, and Rossel. Orillosa after being separated to her husband, met Lizada and lived together as husband and wife. o Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when Lizada entered, laid on top of her, removed her T-shirt and underwear. Lizada then inserted his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger and inserted his penis in her vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from his penis. She also felt pain in her sex organ. Satiated, accused-appellant dismounted but threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. Accused-appellant then returned to his room. The incident lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what happened to her. o Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia, placed himself on top of her and held her legs and arms. He then inserted his finger into her sex organ ("fininger niya ako"). Satiated, accused-appellant left the room. During the period from 1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused private complainant two times a week. o On November 5, 1998, Analia was in the sala of their house studying her assignments. Lizada was also in the sala. Rossel tended the video shop while his mother was away. Analia went into her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door of the room because her brother might enter any time. She wanted to sleep but found it difficult to do so. Lizada went to his room next to the room of Analia. He, however, entered the room of Analia. He was wearing a pair of short pants and was naked from waist up. Analia did not mind Lizada entering her room because she knew that her brother, Rossel was around. However, Lizada sat on the side of her bed, placed himself on top of her, held her hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She struggled to extricate herself. Lizada removed her panty and touched her sex organ. Lizada inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Lizada ejaculated. Analia felt pain in her sex organ. Momentarily, Rossel passed by the room of Analia after drinking water
People vs. Lizada *This is an automatic review of the decision of RTC finding accused-appellant Freddie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 4 counts of qualified rape and meting on him the death penalty for each count. FACTS: THE CHARGES: Lizada was charged with 4 counts of qualified rape under 4 separate Information. That
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from the refrigerator, and peeped through the door. He saw Lizada on top of Analia. Lizada saw Rossel and dismounted. Lizada berated Rossel and ordered him to go to his room and sleep. Rossel did. Lizada then left the room. Analia likewise left the room, went out of the house and stayed outside for one hour. Rose arrived home at 6:00 p.m. However, Analia did not divulge to her mother what Lizada had just done to her. On November 9, 1998, Rose left the house. Lizada was in the sala of the house watching television. Analia tended the video shop. However, Lizada told Analia to go to the sala. She refused, as nobody would tend the video shop. This infuriated Lizada who threatened to slap and kick her. Analia ignored the invectives and threats of Lizada and stayed in the video shop. When Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between Lizada and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour and hit Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. "Ayoko na, ayoko na." Shortly thereafter, Rose and Analia left the house on board the motorcycle driven by her mother to retrieve some tapes which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement, "ayoko na, ayoko na," she told her mother that accusedappellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her body and that he had been on top of her. Rose was shocked and incensed. Analia and her mother went to the Police Station where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint. Analia was also examined by the medico-legal officer. The following is the conclusion made by the officer: 1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination. 2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an averagesized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. 2.
3.
W/N Lizada is guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. (I think sir will focus on this issue) W/N Lizada is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and also W/N Lizada is guilty of qualified rape.
HELD: 1. 2. 3.
NO. Attempted Rape. YES. NO, 2 counts of simple rape.
Summary: First Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape. Second Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape. Third and Fourth Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of simple rape. FIRST CRIMINAL CASE: SIMPLE RAPE Lizada avers that the Information for this Case is defective because the date of the offense "on or about August 1998" alleged therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads: "Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Lizada further asserts that the prosecution failed to proved that he raped Analia in August 1988. The OSG argued that that the date "on or about August 1998" is sufficiently definite. After all, the date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. SECOND CRIMINAL CASE: ATTEMPTED RAPE
DEFENSES AND EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED: Lizada denied any allegations and claimed that Rose actually coached her children to testify against him because Rose wanted to manage their business and take control of all the properties they acquired during their coverture. Also, Rose was so exasperated because he had no job.
ISSUE: 1. First Criminal Case: W/N the information was defective because the date of the offense on or about August 1988 is too indefinite.
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Lizada avers that he is not liable for rape. His contention is correct. The collective testimony of Analia and her younger brother Rossel was that on November 5, 1998, Lizada who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However, Lizada saw Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted. He later left the room of Analia. In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of Lizada into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant. Hence, Lizada is not criminally liable for consummated rape. In light of the evidence on record, we believe that Lizada is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness. Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads: "Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional." For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements: "1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness. 2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances: a. By using force or intimidation; or b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age." "Lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads: "There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: "1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance." The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: "(1) That there be external acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed." Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end. One perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his desistance. In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that Lizada intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of Lizada proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, Lizada had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although Lizada desisted from performing all the acts of execution, his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, Lizada is guilty only of attempted rape. THIRD AND FOURTH CRIMINAL CASES: 2 counts of SIMPLE RAPE Lizada avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The physical evidence belies Analias claim of having been deflowered by Lizada on four different occasions. The contention of Lizada, however, does not persuade the Court. The fact that Analia remained a virgin from 1996 up to 1998 does not preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused by Lizada. Analia being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no substantial bearing on Lizada's commission of the crime. Even, the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. SC agree with Lizada, however, that he is guilty only of 2 counts of simple rape, instead of qualified rape.
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The evidence on record shows that Lizada is the commonlaw husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant, Analia. As of October 1998, Analia was still 13 years old, and under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of the victim's mother, is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty. However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the accused. Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the Lizada being the common-law husband of her mother, Lizada is guilty only of simple rape.
PEOPLE VS LAMAHANG Lamahang was caught by a policeman the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody. The lower court found him guilty of attempted robbery. Issue: Is he guilty of attempted robbery? Held: NO. He is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of the police, did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to
prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes.
PEOPLE V. EDUARDO SAMPIOR No such thing as frustrated rape. Merest touch of the male organ upon the labia of the pudendum, no matter how slight, rape is consummated. Evelyn Sampior (18) is the eldest of Eduardos 9 children. She was left in their house with only 2 little kid sisters and a baby brother, while Eduardo and his other sons went out to harvest palay. Evelyns mom was also out then, selling fruits in a trade center. At 10am that day, Eduardo returned home, told the 2 little girls to go out and play. The only ones left in the house therefore, are Evelyn, her dad Eduardo and the infant baby who was then sleeping. Eduardo suddenly pulled Evelyn towards him and began to take off her shirt and underwear. Evelyn resisted, but Eduardo persisted. He was able to force her to lie down on the floor, then he removed his clothes and mounted her. He held his penis and inserted it into Evelyns vagina. Afterwards, he ordered her to get dressed and to tell no one about it, otherwise, he would kill the entire family. Then he left the house. At 3pm, Eduardo returned home smelling of liquor. He sexually abused Evelyn again. Days later, Evelyn told her mom about the incident and reported the matter to the police. 2 separate complaints for rape were filed against Eduardo (one for
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the 10am session, the other for 3pm). Trial court found Eduardo guilty. In this appeal, Eduardo does not seek an acquittal, but only a reduction of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He argues that no rape was consummated. Evelyn was examined in a general hospital by Dr. Toledo who found that her hymen was still intact. He also alleges that when Evelyn was on the witness stand, she testified that there was no full penile penetration. He wants to be declared guilty only of frustrated rape. ISSUE: w/n Eduardo Sampior is guilty of consummated rape YES! RULING: Eduardos claim that according to Evelyns testimony there was no full penile penetration is contradicted by the records. On the witness stand, Evelyn categorically and convincingly testified that there was complete phallic penetration. A candid narration by a rape victim deserves credence particularly where no ill motive is attributed to her that would make her falsely testify against the accused. No woman in her right mind would admit to having been raped and subject herself and her family to the shame concomitant with a rape prosecution unless the charges are true. A daughter would not accuse her father of incestuous rape unless it were true. On the matter of the intact hymen, a.k.a the VIRGO INTACTA THEORY: a broken hymen or laceration of any part of the female genitalia is not a prerequisite for rape conviction. Medical examination of the victim is only corroborative evidence and is not required. Eduardo points to the 1927 case of People v. Erinia where the court found the accused guilty only of frustrated rape because there was no conclusive evidence of penile penetration. This ruling, however, has been overturned. The crime of frustrated rape is non-existent in our criminal law. The merest touch of the male organ upon the labia of the pudendum, no matter how slight, consummates the rape. Accused guilty of 2 counts of rape. Reclusion perpetua plus 50k civil indemnity, 50k moral damages, exemplary damages for 25k all for both counts of rape.
room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. According to Corazon, Campuhan was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina. Corazon called for help and Campuhan was subdued. The barangay officials were called. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact. Campuhan said he was innocent but the trial court found him guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death. Campuhans defense was that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of Campuhan on Crysthel. He asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthels private parts more than bolsters his innocence. Issue: There is no doubt that Campuhan is guilty of rape. However, is it attempted rape or consummated rape? Held: It was attempted rape. What consummates rape anyway? Statutory rape is consummated by carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years. Jurisprudence has held that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum. It was held that when an accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina, nonetheless rape was consummated if the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into the victims vagina and reaches the labia of her pudendum or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated
PEOPLE V. CAMPUHAN Facts: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo for her children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan, a helper of her brother, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. As she was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayoko, ayoko!" prompting her to rush upstairs. There, she saw Campuhan inside her childrens
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rape because the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, and to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface. Thus, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape. In this case, rape was not consummated because it merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion." There was no bombardment of the drawbridge" according to Justice Bellosillo. Why? The prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that Campuhans penis was able to penetrate Crysthels vagina however slight. Furthermore Corazons testimony could not prove that she saw inter-genital contact. Campuhans kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primos penis supposedly reaching Crysthels external genitalia. Lastly, Crysthel said that Campuhans penis did not penetrate her organ. Under Art. 6 (attempted/frustrated), in relation to Art. 335 (rape), of the RPC, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape - and only of attempted rape are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it. SCIENCE BONUS (Justice Callejo says we should know this): The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. As stated above, the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA vs. People and CA June 21, 2007 Valenzuela and Calderon were charged in an information with the crime of theft. The two were sighted outside the Super Sale Club (a supermarket within SM North EDSA) by security guard Lago. Valenzuela, wearing a Receiving Dispatching Unit ID, was seen hauling a push cart with cases of Tide (twice) and unloading these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela then called a cab and the two loaded the cartoons of Tide and boarded the vehicle. Lago tried to stop them by asking for a receipt, but the two reacted by fleeing on foot, prompting Lago to fire a warning shot. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended and 4 cases of Tide Ultramatic, 1 case of Ultra 25 grams and 3 cases of detergent were recovered. Valenzuela and Calderon pleaded not guilty on arraignment and claimed to be innocent bystanders. According to Calderon, he went to the said supermarket with his neighbor Rosulada to withdraw from his ATM. Due to the long queue, they decided to buy snacks and went outside after hearing a gunshot. Suddenly, they were grabbed by a security guard. As for Valenzuela, he and his cousin Gregorio were walking in the parking lot to ride a tricycle when they saw Lago fire a shot. People started running and he was apprehended by Lago. During Valenzuelas cross-examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a bundler of GMS Marketing, assigned at the supermarket though not at SM. RTC: Valenzuela and Calderon guilty of consummated theft. The RTC found credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime. Only Valenzuela filed a brief with CA, causing the dismissal of Calderons appeal. Valenzuela argued in CA that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. CA: affirmed RTC (consummated theft). Valenzuela filed Petition for Review. ISSUE: WON the theft should consummated or merely frustrated? be deemed as
RULING: Consummated. Theft is already produced upon the taking of personal property of another
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without the latters consent. There is no frustrated theft. Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a subjective phase, or that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective phase begins. It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted. On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, subjectively the crime is complete. Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony was produced after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent. there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the property. As applied to the present case, the moment Valenzuela obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, Valenzuela forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him. the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There are clearly two determinative factors to
consider: that the felony is not produced, and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code as to when a particular felony is not produced, despite the commission of all the acts of execution. So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft produced. Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab. Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which produces the
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felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking. There is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the free disposition of the items stolen is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced.
The authorities continued to appeal to the accused to surrender peacefully but they refused. Finally, the police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to 2 of the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. ISSUE: 1) WON the crime committed was merely attempted 2) WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated HELD/ RATIO: 1) No! The defense contends that the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away or asportation. And without asportation the crime committed is only attempted. There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is known as the element of asportation the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi. In fact, if there is no actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an essential part of the crime of robbery. Salvillo insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is because neither he nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of which is that none of those items were recovered from their persons. However, Rodita testified that Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it to Salvillo. Also, the other accused took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from the Mayor Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her and that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved. It is no defense either that Salvillo and his coaccused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime, From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete. It has been held that the crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it.
PEOPLE V. SALVILLA FACTS: 4 were charged with the crime of robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention but only Salvilla appealed. A robbery was staged by the 4 accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard. They were armed with homemade guns and hand grenade. They entered the establishment and told Rodita (employee) that it was a hold-up. Salvilla pointed his gun at Severino Choco (owner), Mary and Minnie (2 daughters with one minor) and told Severino that all they needed was money. Severino told Mary to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and handed it to Salvilla. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the 4 accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead, one accused took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages. Thereafter, Salvilla told Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released. Severino answered that he could not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed. In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. They negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and appealed to them to surrender with the assurance that no harm would befall them as he would accompany them personally to the police station. The accused refused to surrender or to release the hostages. The OIC Mayor arrived and joined the negotiations. Salvilla demanded P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty of raising more as it was a Saturday. The accused agreed to receive the same and to release Rodita. The P50,000 was given and Rodita released.
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Therefore, robbery is affirmed. 2) No! To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: (a) that the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary. In this case, the "surrender" by the accused hardly meets these requirements. They were asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but they refused until only much later when they could no longer do otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they were completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be mitigating as when he gave up only after he was surrounded by the constabulary and police forces. Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. And while it is claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not despite several opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of. the conviction for consummated
RIVERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: While Ruben went to a store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera, one of the accused, mocked the former for being jobless. A heated exchange of words between the two soon followed. The following day, Ruben, together with his 3-yr old daughter, went to the store, again, to buy food. Then, accused Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo Rivera emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. They mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. While in that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area, while the other two continued mauling him. Although feeling dizzy, Ruben managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When the policemen arrived, the accused fled to their house. The Rivera brothers were then convicted by the trial court of frustrated murder. On appeal, the CA modified the RTC decision and convicted the accused of attempted murder. The accused insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled him with a hollow block. Furthermore, even if they had intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove treachery, thus, they should be guilty only of attempted homicide. ISSUE: W/N the accused should be found guilty only of attempted homicide instead of attempted murder. NO.
HELD/RATIO: An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed. In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions. In addition, even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder. Article 6 of the RPC provides for the essential elements of an attempted felony, namely: 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 1. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; 2. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance The first element of an attempted felony consists of two elements: 1. Presence of external acts; and 2. Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed. In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.
LEONIDAS EPIFANIO Y LAZARO VS PEOPLE
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Facts: Crisaldo and his cousin, Allan were walking to their respective homes. Since the pavement going to Crisaldos house was narrow, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the stab of a bladed weapon on his back. His attacker was their uncle, Lazaro (also known as uncle Iyo). Lazaro stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit the latters left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldos cry of pain, he rushed to help and upon seeing their uncle, asked him why he did such a thing. Lazaro ran away. Crisaldo was first brought to Allans house where the wound was wrapped in a blanket. Then he was transferred to the Penaplata hospital where first aid treatment was administered. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Davao Medical Center where he stayed for 3weeks to recuperate. Lazaro was then charged with Frustrated Murder. He pleaded not guilty to the charge and instead set up an alibi (he was sleeping at home when the incident took place and that when he found out what happened he rushed to help). RTC: Guilty CA: Affirmed Issue: Whether or not the crime of frustrated murder was proved beyond reasonable doubt? Held: NO! Lazaro does not question the conviction but instead seeks that his offense be lowered to attempted murder. It is alleged that there is no evidence to prove that Crisaldos injuries were life-threatening that it wouldve caused his death were it not for the timely medical intervention. He noted that the physicians findings said the wounds would heal within 15-30days barring complications. There was no notation that the injury was life threatening. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines whether a crime is attempted or frustrated. The question is whether the assailant has passed the subjective phase of the commission of the offense. In the leading case of US vs Eduave, an attempted crime is when the offender is thwarted by a foreign force such that he is unable to perform all the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence. The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the acts from the time the commission of the crime is instituted up until the time the last act is performed. After that time, the phase is objective. Note that in attempted crimes, the offender never passes the subjective phase. He is unable to performs all the acts of execution which would produce the crime. On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has passed the subjective phase (meaning, he has performed
all the acts to complete the commission of the crime) but nevertheless, the crime is not consummated because of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, all the acts of execution would have been performed if the wound inflicted is mortal and could cause the victims death barring medical intervention. (if no intent to kill: consummated physical injuries --- if with intent to kill: homicide) Intent to kill may be proved by: 1) motive; 2) nature or number of weapons used; 3) nature and number of wounds inflicted; 4) manner by which the crime was committed and 5) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted. In this case, intent to kill is very evident because of the manner of execution and of the number of wounds that was inflicted. However, Lazaro failed to perform all the acts of execution because Allan came and he was forced to run away. Lazaro did not voluntarily desist from stabbing Crisaldo, he had to stop because Allan recognized him. Hence, the subjective phase has not been completed. Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove that Crisaldo wouldve died from the wounds were it not for the timely medical attendance. Without such proof, the character of the wound is doubtful.
JINGGOY ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (Feb 26, 2002) Facts: As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Estrada, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the Ombudsman. One of the charges was for plunder and among the respondents was petitioner Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. Estrada filed several motions (motion to quash and suspend, very urgent omnibus motion) which were all denied. Estrada claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in: 1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 as applied to him was in denial of his right to the equal protection of the laws; 2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards; 3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results in the denial of substantive due process; ISSUE/RATIO:
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1) WON the Plunder law as applied to Estrada was in denial of his right to equal protection-- NO A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges Erap with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jinggoy, Atong Ang, and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who committed each act. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination or series as they appear in R.A. No. 7080. These two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word series is synonymous with the clause on several instances. 2) WON plunder law provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense?YES Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. 3) WON in sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - resulted in the denial of substantive due process; --NO The allegations in the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information but only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion. There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
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4) WON the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general NO The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.[49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others,[50 for the act of one is the act of all In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. These words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder. 5. WON bail should be granted? Hearings must be conducted first to determine if the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner. During the pendency of the case, Jinggoy prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention. Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail. The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080 with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit: The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.[60]This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan.
Vitug, Dissenting: Allegation of conspiracy is not enough. It is neither right nor just, to cast criminal liability on one for the acts or deeds of plunder that may have been committed by another or others over which he has not consented or acceded to, participated in, or even in fact been aware of. Such vicarious criminal liability is never to be taken lightly but must always be made explicit not merely at the trial but likewise, and no less important, in the complaint or information itself in order to meet the fundamental right of an accused to be fully informed of the charge against him. Kapunan, and Buena, J, Dissenting: The requirement for complete allegations on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charge against him, so that he may adequately prepare for this defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The fact, however, is that it is the prosecution which determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information. It is not for the accused, usually a layman, to speculate upon the purposes and strategy of the prosecution and be thereafter prejudiced through erroneous guesswork. Thus, since the People dictate what he should be charged with, fairness demands that he should not be convicted of a crime with which he is not charged or which is not necessarily included therein. Ynares-Santiago, Dissenting: There is no showing in the records that Mayor Estrada consciously adopted a common plan or joined in concerted action with President Estrada and Governor Singson to commit any two of the four criminal acts in the amended information or conspired to commit more than once the receipt and transmission of jueteng money. If the petitioner was aware that the money entrusted to him for delivery came from illegal gambling, it is established that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate (in the transmission of jueteng funds in this case) is not enough to constitute one as a conspirator of the crime (in this case, plunder) with a view to a furtherance of the common design and purpose. Petitioner states that he is linked to only P2,000,000.00 of jueteng money but the Ombudsman seeks to hold him responsible with his father for the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 of ill-gotten wealth. Petitioners criminal act is alleged to be contributing to the crime of plunder. This construction of the law by the Prosecution is dangerous if not ominous. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Dissenting: My theory is that there are four separate conspiracies with no overall goal or common purpose to commit the crime of
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plunder. For one, there is no allegation in the Amended Information that petitioner agreed with the former President and the other accused to acquire and amass illgotten wealth by misappropriating the tobacco excise tax allocated for Ilocos Sur; by ordering the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commission from such sale; and enriching himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks
PEOPLE V. PAGALASAN Facts: Crime: Two counts of Kidnapping for Ransom (of George Lim and son Christopher Lim-10yo) Spouses George and Desiree Lim had 3 children, one of whom is Christopher. They resided in Villa Consuelo Subdivision in General Santos City. They hired a security guard, Ferdinand Cortez. On Sept. 4, 1994, around 11 pm, 4 armed men barged into their house through the kitchen door. The intruders all wore bonnets and when they entered through the kitchen door, they dragged security guard Ferdinand with them with his hands tied. The men barged into the bedroom of the spouses Lim. They demanded that the spouses cooperate with their demands if they didnt want to get hurt. They ransacked the house, got cash and other valuables. Thereafter, the men gave wife Desiree a handwritten note. The note threatened the spouses not to get the military involved and that they will be getting in touch with the couple soon. The men demanded that George give them the key to the car. He complied. The men dragged George and one of his children, Christopher, to the car. The men drove along the national highway and blindfolded George and Christopher. After some time driving, the car stopped at Sitio Tupi and 2 of the men alighted bringing with them Christopher. Then the driver again started the car to transport George to Maasim. Meanwhile, the police were informed of the kidnapping and policemen were dispatched for investigation and set up a checkpoint. The masked driver with George halted when he saw the checkpoint, switched off the headlights and took off his mask. The driver turned out to be the appellant in this case, Michael Pagalasan. The policemen approached the car, indentified themselves and asked for the passengers names. Although George gave a false name, the policemen saw his hands were shaking and they opened the door of the car. They arrested Pagalasan and inspected the vehicle, finding a handgun and a grenade. At the police station, Pagalasan was placed under custodial investigation. It is said that the police inquired if Pagalasan wanted to execute an affidavit and if he knew a lawyer. Pagalasan said he wanted to and that he didnt knew any lawyer. Thereafter, Atty. Falgui was
called upon to help him execute the affidavit. He gave his confession thereafter with assistance of Atty. Falgui. He admitted that he, together with the others, including Ferdinand (security guard) planned the kidnapping. Thereafter, the men that Pagalasan mentioned in his confession were arrested. The men holding Christopher learned about this and stated that the people named and arrested were innocent and werent involved. They also asked for a 3 million ransom. The following morning however, the policemen were able to rescue Christopher without paying the ransom money. Pagalasan was thereafter charged with kidnapping for ransom. However, after a few days, he substituted his counsel Atty. Falgui with Atty. Fontanilla. Pagalasan retracted his extrajudicial confession, saying that he was tortured and held at gun point when he executed it and that he wasnt assisted by counsel of his choice. As a defense, Pagalan says that at the time of the incident, he was riding a tricycle which stopped near the Lim house. He saw the masked men who saw him as well. He alleges that the men poked their guns at him and forced him to participate in the kidnapping and he was designated as the driver. He further claims that he was tortured to force him to write the confession and that he was mauled. The cases filed against Pagalasan are illegal possession of fire arms and kidnapping for ransom AND serious illegal detention. He was acquitted for possession and was convicted for kidnapping. Issue: W/N Pagalasan should be convicted of kidnapping with ransom. Held: Pagalasan is convicted of only kidnapping, not kidnapping with ransom, the latter being punishable with death. In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows that the appellant and his three cohorts were armed with handguns; two of them had hand grenades, and all of them had masks over their faces. They gained entry into the Lim residence after overpowering the security guard Ferdinand and the housemaid Julita, and tying their hands behind their backs. One of the masked men remained in the sala, while the three others barged into the bedroom of George and Desiree, and kidnapped George and his tenyear-old son Christopher. The appellant and his cohorts forced father and son to board Georges car. The appellant drove the car, dropped off Christopher and his cohorts at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the direction of Maasim. The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his cohorts before, during and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof that the appellant and his three companions conspired with each other to
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attain a common objective: to kidnap George and Christopher and detain them illegally. The appellant was a principal by direct participation in the kidnapping of the two victims. HOWEVER, the prosecution failed to prove that he had knowledge of and concurred with the said demand for ransom so he cannot be convicted of the graver crime of kidnapping for ransom, only kidnapping. To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; (c) motive of the accused, which is extortion of ransom from the victim or any other person. The qualifying circumstance which must be alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution as the crime itself by words and overt acts of the accused before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant conspired with three others to kidnap the victims. However, it failed to prove that they intended to extort ransom from the victims themselves or from some other person, with a view to obtaining the latters release. The kidnapping by itself does not give rise to the presumption that the appellant and his co-conspirators purpose is to extort ransom from the victims or any other person. The only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the element of extorting ransom are the three handwritten letters. There was no demand for ransom in exchange for George and Christophers liberty. While there is a demand for ransom of P3,000,000 in the second letter, and a demand for the release of Ronie Puntuan within three days in the third letter, the said demands are in consideration of Christophers release from custody, and not that of George. There is no evidence that the signatory and sender of the second letter is a co-conspirator of the appellant, the latter is not bound by the said letter, conformably to Section 28, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. Issue: W/N Pagalasan should be convicted of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, for kidnapping George. The prosecution may have failed to prove that the appellant and his co-conspirators intended to extort ransom for Georges release; however, as a matter of substantive law, the appellant may be held guilty of two separate crimes, although he and his coconspirators kidnapped George and Christopher on
the same occasion and from the same situs. As a matter of procedural law, the appellant may be convicted of slight illegal detention under the Information for kidnapping for ransom as the former is necessarily included in the latter crime. The SC held that Pagalasan is guilty of slight illegal detention. Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code which reads: Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated therein. The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the crime. If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three days from the commencement of the detentio, without having attained the purpose intended, and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos. (As amended by Republic Act No. 18). While the epigraph or title of the article mentions only slight illegal detention, kidnapping committed in connection with the lower offense of slight illegal detention is also covered by the article. In this case, the appellant is a private individual. George had been kidnapped and detained illegally by the appellant and his cohorts, but only for less than a day. George regained his freedom after the appellant had been arrested at the intersection of the national highway and Espina Road. There is no evidence that the appellant and his cohorts kidnapped George for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release. There is likewise no evidence that they inflicted any serious physical injuries on George, or simulated public authority, or threatened to kill him. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the appellant and his cohorts intended to detain the victim for more than three days. Although the appellant and his co-conspirators kidnapped George and Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs, the appellant is guilty of two separate crimes: kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant and his co-conspirators were animated by two sets of separate criminal intents and criminal resolutions in kidnapping and illegally detaining the two victims. The criminal intent in kidnapping Christopher was separate from and independent of the criminal intent and resolution in kidnapping and detaining George for less than three days. In the mind and conscience of the appellant, he had committed two
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separate felonies; hence, should be meted two separate penalties for the said crimes: one for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and another for slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the same code. The felony of slight illegal detention is necessarily included in the crime of kidnapping for ransom; thus, the appellant may be convicted of the former crime under an Information for kidnapping for ransom. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. To hold an accused guilty as a coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
SENOJA V. PEOPLE Facts: Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja (they were brothers), Jose Calica and Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal. Leon Lumasac suddenly barged in, holding a bolo and was looking for his brother Miguel whom he suspected of drying up the ricefield he was plowing. However, when Senoja (Exequiel) approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him so he embraced Leon and Jose took Leons bolo. After the confrontation, Leon wanted to get his bolo back because he wanted to go home. After getting it back, Leon walked out of the place followed by Senoja. Suddenly, Senoja stabbled Leon at the back. When Leon turned around, Senoja continued stabbing him until he fell to the ground. Then petitioner ran towards the barangay road and threw away the knife he used to stab Leon. Petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the affirmative defense of self-defense. His version said that after the commotion inside the house, Leon left but with a threat that something will happen to Senoja. Senoja followed Leon as the latter was making his way home. When Leon realized that Senoja was following him, Leon walked back towards him and suddenly hacked Senoja at the left side of his head and right thigh. Unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon, Senoja drew his colonial knife and stabbed Leon in self-defense, inflicting upon him multiple wounds which caused his death. Issue: W/N Senoja merely acted in self-defense Held: No, Senoja is guilty of HOMICIDE.
The affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete or incomplete. It is complete when all the three essential requisites are present; it is incomplete if only unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and any of the two essential requisites were present. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non to self-defense, complete or incomplete. The right of self-defense proceeds from necessity and limited by it. The right begins where necessity does, and ends where it ends. There is however, a perceptible difference between necessity and self-defense. Selfdefense excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity justifies the invasion of a right. Hence, it is essential to self-defense that it should be a defense against a present unlawful attack. Self-defense is an act to save life; hence, it is right and not a crime. x x x It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided in imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. But what then is the standard? We rule that the test should be: does the person invoking the defense believe, in due exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger? Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his adversary to take his life. IN THIS CASE, there were two events concerned: 1) The arrival of Leon who was armed with a bolo and 2) When Leon demanded for his bolo because he wanted to go home already after the commotion inside the house, and then eventually left with a threat. Quoting the appellate court, the SC said that the victim had already left the hut. At that point in time, the victim was simply walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It was Senoja who wanted a confrontation this time. It was Senoja who was now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation.
UNITED STATES V. DOMEN Facts: Domen and the deceased Victoriano Gadlit quarrelled about a carabao of the defendant Domen which Gadlit said had gotten into his corn patch. The deceased attacked the defendant and struck him with a piece of wood called Japanese, about a vara in length and about the size of ones wrist. The deceased struck at the accused four or five times and that the accused did not retreat but struck back wounding the deceased at the forearm. Issue: W/N there was reasonable necessity for the means employed by the defendant to repel the attack?
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Held: Yes, defendant must be ACQUITTED. Quoting US v. Molina, the Court said: 1) During an unlawful attack by another and while a struggle is going on and the danger to his person or to his life continues, the party assaulted has a right to repel the danger by wounding his adversary, and if, necessary, to disable him; 2) the fact that a person when assaulted does not flee from his assailant is not sufficient reason for declining in a proper case to uphold the rational necessity of the means employed in repelling the illegal attack. The retreat to the wall doctrine says that it is the duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can before he is justified in meeting force with force. This principle has now given way in the United States to the stand ground when in the right rule. A true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm. IN THIS CASE, the accused did not provoke the assault. The accused was where he had the right to be. The law did not require him to retreat when his assailant was rapidly advancing upon him in a threatening manner with a deadly weapon. The accused was entitled to do whatever he had reasonable grounds to believe at the time was necessary to save his life or to protect himself from great bodily harm. The element of practicability made it impossible for him to determine during the heat of a sudden attack whether he would increase or diminish the risk to which exposed by standing his ground or stepping aside. His resistance was not disproportionate to the assault. The wound was inflicted, not on what is usually a vital part of the body but on the arm as one would naturally strike to defend himself.
Issue: W/N Beatriz has a legitimate claim for selfdefense? Held: None! There was no unlawful aggression on the part of Marciano. Hence, there is no reason to consider the other elements of self-defense lack of sufficient provocation and reasonable necessity of the means employed because these elements presuppose the existence of unlawful aggression. Beatriz alleges that before she stabbed Marciano, he pushed her head on account of which she felt dizzy and hit her leg against something. The court did not believe this argument on the ground that it was not supported by evidence. Moreover, even if this was to be believed, the court said that a slight push of the head with the hand does not constitute the unlawful aggression contemplated by the law. Unlawful aggression as an element of self-defense is not necessarily implied in any act of aggression against a particular person, when the author of the same does not persist in his purpose or when he desists therefrom to the extent that the person attacked is no longer in peril. The court then gave certain doctrines which illustrated certain acts which do not constitute unlawful aggression, such as: hard blow on the head without specifying whether he used his hand or any instrument, this being the only act preceding the stabbing of the victim; holding the accused by the necktie and giving him a blow on the neck with the back of the hand without injuring him; a shove or an attempt to strike with a bench or chair, all of which took place in a bar. (NB: Names of these cases were not stated, court only cited Gazette dates) Court considered the following mitigating circumstances: (1) obfuscation because she was abandoned by Marciano with whom she had been living with for years; and (2) lack of instruction she was an illiterate.
PEOPLE VS. YUMAN Facts: Marciano Martin and accused Beatriz Yuman without being married, lived as husband and wife for about 3 or 4 years until Marciano decided to leave their common dwelling. Beatriz went to look for Marciano at the cockpit of Mandaluyong. From there, they rode a vehicle wherein they Marciano intimated to Beatriz his determination to end their relations. After Marciano rudely shunned away Beatrizs suggestion that they go home together, Beatriz pulled out a penknife and stabbed Marciano on the right lumbar region which damaged his kidney. Thereafter, Marciano ran away but Beatriz, with penknife in hand, pursued him. Beatriz only stopped when Marciano came across a traffic policeman, Eduardo Dizon. Beatriz was then arrested and eventually charged with homicide because Marciano died the day after. Beatriz claims selfdefense.
PEOPLE VS. DE LA CRUZ Facts: The deceased Leoncio Naos, together with the spouses Cabasan, lived in a house owned by de la Cruz. De la Cruz demanded that the spouses vacate the house. Naos then intervened in behalf of the spouses and told de la Cruz to permit them to stay. De la Cruz disliked this intervention. The following day, de la Cruz, carrying his loaded rifle and accompanied by 2 men, returned to the place of the spouses. At that time, Naos had with him a kris and a small bolo, as was his practice in going to the field, for the purpose of defense against the Moros and the animals. Both the kris and the bolo were sheathed. When de la Cruz saw Naos approaching him he fired causing 9 wounds in the left leg and one in the right. TC found de la
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Cruz guilty of homicide. He argues that he was only acting in self-defense. Issue: W/N De la Cruz has a legitimate claim for selfdefense? Held: None! There was no unlawful aggression! According to the prosecution witnesses, Naos was about 15 yards away from de la Cruz when he fired his rifle. This fact was also supported by the experiments made by the Constabulary which showed that the distance of the wounds in the leg of Naos could only have been made if the latter was about 15 yards away. This means that Naos, who was 15 yards away and had both his bolo and kris sheathed at the time, did not pose any real and imminent danger to the life and limb of de la Cruz. The fact that de la Cruz had gone to the house with his rifle loaded in advance, and the fact that he fired at the deceased without any prior provocation which could properly be considered as such, are indicative not only of de la Cruzs intention to defend himself in case of aggression, but also to provoke and commit the same. Furthermore, de la Cruz, apart from having a loaded rifle in hand, was also accompanied by 2 men. Naos wouldve been dumb had he attacked de la Cruz. The point of the matter is that there was no real or at least imminent aggression on the part of Naos. Court considered 2 mitigating circumstances: (1) lack of intention to cause so grave a wrong; and (2) voluntary surrender.
People v Cajurao Memory aid: NIPPLE STAB Cajurao was charged with murder (qualified by treachery) for stabbing Santiago Betita. On November 29, 1993, the residents of Poblacion, Surallah, South Cotabato were in a festive mood. There was carnival in the municipal plaza. There was also a disco in the town gym. Pacita Pordios put up a stall outside the gym. She used a makeshift lamp (a bottle of Tanduay with kerosene) to light her stall. Cajurao and his friend Danosos tried to enter the gym, but as they didnt have any tickets, they were refused entry. At around 10:30 PM, the victim Betita went to Pordios stall and got her lamp. Pordios got angry with Betita, but the latter just ignored Pordios. Suddenly, someone threw a stone, prompting people to scamper away. And then, out of nowhere, Cajurao sped towards Betita and stabbed him on the right nipple. Cajurao ran away but was soon caught by some volunteers, led by Domingo Tecson.
Cajurao admitted the stabbing, but claimed he was defending himself. He said that at around 9 PM, Betita shouted at him, Putang ina ka, ari pa na, nakit-an na ta! Betita also accused him of being a braggart and a liar. At about 10:00 p.m., Cajurao went out of the gym and seated himself on a concrete bench nearby, beside the trunk of a mango tree. Betita followed and shouted at him saying, When you are in a group you are a braggart. Now, we are here outside. The Cajurao replied, saying, Boy, what is this? Betita retorted, You came here just to look for trouble! The appellant stood up and was about to leave, but Betita slapped him on the face. Betita then fled to the stall of Pordios and took hold of the makeshift lamp. As he was about to throw the lighted lamp at the appellant who was about four meters away, the latter walked slowly to Betita and asked, Why did you slap me, Boy? The appellant pushed Betitas hand aside, the hand that held the lamp, and pulled out a knife from his waist. The appellant then stabbed Betita on his right nipple. He threw his knife in a grassy area and fled from the scene. Cajurao claims he stabbed Betita because the latter took hold of the Tanduay lamp on the stall of Pordios and was about to throw it at him. Cajuraos witness testified that Betita was about to throw the lamp at Cajurao. This impelled the appellant to rush to where Betita was. Before the lamp could be thrown at him, he stabbed Betita. According to Cajurao, the victims act of slapping him and attempting to throw the lighted lamp at him constituted unlawful aggression on the part of the latter. Thus, there was no provocation on his part; the means he used to repel the unlawful aggression of Betita was reasonable. The trial court did not believe Cajuraos claim of self-defense. Issue: Was this valid self-defense? NO. Held: Second (credible witnesses for prosecution), third (prosecution witnesses immediately reported crime a day after, while defense witnesses did not), and fifth reason (defense witness found not credible) are more evidentiary issues, than crim issues. Read original if you want to know in detail. First. Like alibi, self-defense is a weak defense because it is easy to fabricate. When the accused interposes self-defense, he thereby admits having killed the victim. The burden of proof is shifted on him to prove with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of the essential requisites of a complete self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution; because even if the
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prosecutions evidence is weak, the same can no longer be disbelieved. The appellant failed to discharge his burden. Fourth. The flight of the appellant, his throwing away the knife used to stab the victim, his failure to report the stabbing and to surrender himself to the police authorities and to thereafter claim that he killed Betita in self-defense, all these belie his claim that he killed the victim in self-defense. Sixth. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of selfdefense, must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance or posture.he settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance.Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray. In this case, Pordios (the stall owner) testified that the appellant stabbed Betita even as the latter moved over to the next stall, still holding the lamp with the lighted wick which he took from her stall to defend himself from the appellant. Betita had anticipated that the appellant would assault him. Betitas fears proved to be wellfounded, as the appellant rushed to where he was and stabbed him on the right nipple. Pordios did not testify that before the stabbing, Betita was about to throw the bottle at the appellant. On cross-examination by defense counsel, Pordios testified that before the appellant stabbed Betita, the latter was merely holding the bottle in his right hand, on the level of the right shoulder, with his elbow by the side of the body. In fine, Betita was in a defensive position when he was stabbed. If, as claimed by the appellant, Betita was about to throw the bottle at him, surely Betitas right hand would have been raised above his head, his body
and right hand arched backward, ready to throw the bottle at the appellant. This was not the case. Assuming that Betita did slap the appellant on the face, the appellants evidence shows, however, that Betita anticipated that the appellant would retaliate and forthwith ran away to the stall of Pacita and took hold of the knife. From that moment, the inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of Betita had ceased to exist; there was no longer a need for the appellant to still pursue the victim and kill him. In fine, when the appellant stabbed the victim, he did so to retaliate. Court found that there was no treachery either. So he was liable for homicide.
PEOPLE V CATBAGAN (Pretty long case because it involved 3 victims Mickey). Memory aid: 3 victims. Catbagan was charged of homicide, murder and frustrated murder. He claims self-defense and lawful performance of duty. A birthday party was being held for Danilo Lapidante. A guest of his, Air Force and PSG man, Sgt Suico was really excited and started firing shots into the air with his armalite rifle. Policeman Catbagan heard the shots, and since the election ban was at full effect that time, he went to the house of Lapidante to investigate. No one confessed to the shooting so Catbagan went home, embarrassed. Coincidentally, before Catbagan got to Lapidantes house, Sgt. Suico and his friend Lacaden, went back home to exchange the armalite with a pistol. After a while, Catbagan, along with his friend Fababier, returned to the party to investigate again. Suico told him that the shots were just part of the celebration. Suddenly, a piece of stone hurled from the direction of the celebrants house landed on a tree and thence to the body of Catbagan. Irritated and reacting thereto, Catbagan directed Fababier to look for the one who threw the stone. The prosecution claimed that at that moment, Sgt. Suico got out of the pedestrian steel gate and extended his hand towards Catbagan in the street as he introduced himself as being a PSG. Completely ignoring the gesture of the latter, Catbagan drew out his .9mm automatic pistol and with both hands holding the gun, fired successively at Suico, who when hit stretched out his hand, shouting Huwag (Dont) Pare. Despite this Catbagan fired more shots at the victim who fell on the pavement, bloodied and dying from mortal wounds. As the shots were fired, Jun Lacaden who was taking a nap on the front seat of the owner-type jeep parked on the other side of the street was abruptly
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awakened. Not fully aware of what happened, he disembarked therefrom without knowing what to do. Unexpectedly, two shots were also fired at him by Catbagan. One bullet found its mark in the body of Jun Lacaden who then fell down. Almost simultaneously, Catbagan directed his attention to Lapidante who was then inside their compound in the vicinity of their steel main gate. Upon the prompting of his wife Rosita for him to run and evade the assailant, the celebrant turned towards the main door of their house. But before he could reach the safety of their abode, two rapid shots were aimed by Catbagan at him, one of which hit him in the upper part of his body. As a consequence of the injuries they sustained, Sgt. Suico died on the spot; Lapidante later died in the hospital in Lagro, Quezon City; whereas Jun Lacaden had to be treated and confined at the East Avenue Medical Center, Quezon City. Appellant argues that he was justified in shooting the victims, as he was merely defending himself and fulfilling his sworn duties. He claims that upon reaching the house of Lapidante, a rock was thrown at him. He also claimed that two people rushed out to him - Lacaden who had an ice pick and Suico who aimed a gun at him. Threatened of his safety, he drew his own gun while stepping backward and fired at the aggressors. After, he saw Lapidante rushing back to his house, shouti ng akin na yung mahaba! He fired a warning shot, uttering: Tumigil ka, huwag kang kikilos. Lapidante, however, did not heed Catbagans warning and continued rushing towards his house, as if to get something. Fearing that Lapidante might be able to get hold of the long gun, Catbagan fired a shot at him once. Issue 1: Will the defense of fulfilling his lawful duties lie? No. Appellant invokes his lawful performance of duty as one such circumstance, arguing that his presence at the scene of the incident were all in consonance with the legitimate performance of a sworn duty. Citing these specific facts (complaints of neighbors, indiscriminate shots, the gun ban), he argues that he was justified in shooting the victims. In effect, his contention is that he was justified in maintaining public order, as well as in protecting and securing life and property because he was a policeman. Although he is correct in arguing that he had the legal obligation to maintain peace and order, he was not justified in shooting the victims. Two requisites must concur before this defense of lawful performance of duty can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary consequence of such
lawful exercise. These requisites are absent in this case. Appellant was not performing his duties at the time of the shooting, because the men he shot had not been indiscriminately firing guns in his presence, as he alleges. The trial court said that that Catbagan had no personal knowledge that it was Suico who had been firing the Armalite. At most, appellant was in the house of the Lapidantes to determine who had fired the gunshots that were heard by the neighborhood. But the fatal injuries that he inflicted on the victims were not a necessary consequence of the performance of his duty as a police officer. His presence at the scene of the incident should be distinguished from his act of shooting them. His presence was justified, his act of shooting was not. He was dutybound to find out who had fired the gun that day and to maintain peace and order in the neighborhood. But his act of shooting of the victims cannot be justified. There is an important distinction between the present case and People v. Cabrera. In the latter, the disturbance had been created by the victim in the presence of the accused, who therefore had the duty to immediately intervene and subdue the former, who was causing danger. In the present case, appellant had no personal knowledge of who had fired the gunshots. Thus, his duty at the time was simply to determine who was the subject of the complaints of the residents of the village. It was never shown, though, that the shooting was in furtherance of or was a necessary consequence of his performance of such duty. To be sure, the right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. Issue 2: Is the defense of self-defense valid? We should look at the circumstances of the shooting in the case of each victim. As to Suico, no valid self-defense because the means employed were not reasonable, but he is granted a mitigating circumstance because of lack of sufficient provocation and the presence of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong,
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positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury -- as in this case. Thus, Suicos act of aiming a cocked gun at appellant is sufficient unlawful aggression. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense is reasonable if equivalent to the means of attack used by the original aggressor. Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault. The nature and the number of gunshot wounds -debilitating, fatal and multiple -- inflicted by appellant on the deceased shows that the means employed by the former was not reasonable and commensurate to the unlawful aggression of the latter. The unreasonableness becomes even more apparent from the fact, duly admitted by appellant himself, that Suico had obviously been inebriated at the time of the aggression. It would have thus been easier for the former to have subdued the victim without resorting to excessive means. Finally, as to the element of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to selfdefense, appellant has sufficiently established that he went to the house of the Lapidantes to find out who had fired the gunshots earlier that day. There was therefore absolutely no provocation from him, either by unjust conduct or by incitement, that would justify Suicos acts of cocking and aiming a gun at him. Not having proven all the elements of selfdefense, appellant cannot use it to justify sufficiently his fatal shooting of Suico. Having proven a majority of the elements, however, the former may still be credited with a mitigating circumstance in accordance with Article 13 of the RPC. As to Lapidante, he allegedly rushed towards his house to get hold of the mahaba, so appellant had no other recourse but to shoot him. The purpose of the victim in rushing towards his house was supposedly to recover the advantage he had previously enjoyed. Hence, it is argued that unlawful aggression was present. No unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof. Such aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or is at the very least clearly imminent; it cannot consist merely of any oral threat or intimidating stance or posture. Here, the perceived danger was more in the mind of appellant than in reality. His act of running towards his house can hardly be characterized as unlawful aggression. It could not have imperiled Catbagans life. Court ruled that a threat even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person [is] about to be attacked, is not sufficient, but that it is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act
of aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. Catbagan also argued that Lapidante rushed towards his house to take a more advantageous position. Court ruled against him. Referred to here is the rule that if it is clear that the purpose of the aggressor in retreating -or, as in this case, Lapidantes rushing towards his house - is to take a more advantageous position to ensure the success of the attack already begun, the unlawful aggression is considered still continuing; and the one resorting to self-defense has a right to pursue and disable the former. Obviously, this rule does not apply to Lapidante, because 1) there was no clear purpose in his act of retreating to take a more advantageous position; and 2) since he never attacked appellant in the first place, the former could not have begun any unlawful aggression and, hence, would not have had any reason to take a more advantageous position. How could there have been a continuation of something that had never been started? If any aggression was begun in this case, it was by Suico, not by Lapidante. As to Lacaden, Catbagan claims Lacaden rushed towards him with an ice pick. But the evidence does not support his cliam. Moreover, the evidence showed that Lacaden was shot in the BACK. The wound in the back of the victim clearly shows that he was shot while his back was turned to appellant. Hence, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the former. SC: homicide for Suico (no treachery, plus mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender) and Lapidante (no treachery, mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender), less serious physical injuries for Lacaden (no treachery, intent to kill, mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender ).
PEOPLE V. DECENA FACTS: Complainant Renelyn UDE (assisted by her mother, Erlinda AGUIRRE) filed a complaint for RAPE against Edwin DECENA before the RTC of Aklan. The information stated: That on or about the 9th day of March, 1995, in the afternoon, in Barangay Dumga, Municipality of Makato, Province of Aklan, Republic of the
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Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and with intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, RENELYN UDE, a woman, against her will and without her consent thereby inflicting upon the latter, physical injuries, to wit: xxx CONTRARY TO LAW." DECENA pleaded not guilty and testified in his defense that AGUIRRE had a motive against him [AGUIRRE wanted to reconcile with her legal husband] and claimed that he was working in the house of Perseverancia TUBAO on the date and time in question. TUBAO testified to corroborate the defense of alibi. Prosecution presented UDE and Dr. Emma CORTES, who rendered the medico legal report on the examination conducted on UDE. The evidence for the prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows: o UDE is the 12-year old daughter of AGUIRRE by her legal spouse, Ramon Ude, from whom she is separated in fact. DECENA is AGUIRREs commonlaw spouse, and has been living with them since UDE was only in grade 3. o On Mar. 9, 1995, AGUIRRE was asked by DECENA to borrow the fishing net (hudhud) of her uncle whose house was around 1 km from their house. DECENA accompanied her but left ahead. o AGUIRRE was not able to borrow the fishing net so she returned home immediately o She found a naked DECENA on top of her equally naked daughter UDE on the stairs of her small nipa house. DECENA was having sexual intercourse with UDE. On UDEs neck was a scythe held by DECENA; UDEs hands were bound by a towel. o After watching for 5 seconds, AGUIRRE left and went to the back of her house for air. She was so angry she boloed a banana plant. She did not use the bolo on DECENA because she was afraid DECENA might use the scythe he was holding on UDEs neck. o AGUIRRE confronted DECENA why he did that to UDE. DECENA said that he
would not allow UDE to go to another man because UDE is for him. o UDE collaborated AGUIRREs declarations on material points regarding the incident of Mar. 9, 1995. UDE told the Court in the afternoon of the incident she was alone in their house; her mother had gone some place; DECENA took the top part of her clothing and then totally undressed her; DECENA tied her hands with a towel; holding his scythe on her neck, DECENA succeeded in having sexual intercourse w/ her. o According to UDE, DECENA has been using her for around 6 months and for more than 40 times. o In the afternoon of Mar 12, 1995, DECENA wanted to have sexual intercourse w/ UDE but she ran away and hid under the Dumga Bridge until her mother found her. UDE was crying because her vagina was swelling and UDE did not want to go back to their house. They went to the Brgy. Captain of Dumga to report the incident. The Brgy. Captain accompanied them to the Makato Police Station. At about 5PM, DECENA was arrested by the policemen of their town, and UDE (w/ her mother AGUIRRE) was able to return home. On Mar. 12, 1995 at 5:45 PM, UDE was examined by Dr. CORTES. Her internal examinations as stated in the medico-legal report were as follows: admits 1 finger with ease; old laceration 3:00 oclock position (Labia Minora); no signs of external physical injuries In her testimony, she said that DECENAs hymen was quite thick and the old laceration was deep it was not a superficial [laceration]. Old laceration was not connected w/ rape because a new laceration in the hymen would have healed in 2 to 3 days. Old laceration was likely inflicted more than 2 weeks before examination. Vaginal smear revealed no semen. Trial court ruled in favor of UDE claiming that her testimony was credible [gave straightforward, consistent, and intelligent answers even if she was traumatized and accused exercised some kind of moral ascendancy on her]. The defense of alibi was rejected by the trial court because the house of TUBAO was only 150 meters from the house of AGUIRRE, where the rape took place.
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Trial court convicted DECENA for the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the RPC, as amended by (Sec 11) of the Death Penalty Law, aggravated by the fact that said accused is the common-law spouse of the mother of UDE, the victim. DECENA was sentenced to suffer DEATH. And ordered to indemnify UDE w/ 50K for actual damages and 50K for exemplary damages. The case is brought before the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Damages: 50K (civil indemnity) + 50K (moral damages) 50K (exemplary damages is deleted absent aggravating circumstance)
PEOPLE V. ELYBOY SO FACTS:
ISSUE: w/n trial court erred in imposing the death penalty considering that the supposed qualifying circumstances were not alleged in the information? YES. He should be convicted only of simple rape. Penalty of death reduced to reclusion perpetua. DECENA claims that the qualifying circumstances that a girl should be eighteen years of age and that the offender is "the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" were not alleged in the information. In his reply brief, DECENA reiterates his plea for reduction of the penalty for the reason that the information charges only simple rape. This Court has ruled that the circumstances under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, the attendance of any of which mandates the single indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which cannot be proved as such unless alleged with particularity in the information unlike ordinary aggravating circumstances which affect only the period of the penalty and which may be proven even if not alleged in the information. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charge against him and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and will be convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment under which he was arraigned. Procedurally, then, while the minority of UDE and her relationship to the DECENA were established during the trial, DECENA can only be convicted of simple rape because he cannot be punished for a graver offense than that with which he was charged. Accordingly, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
On June 10, 1991, Elyboy SO was charged with murder before the RTC-Manila for the death of Mario TUQUERO. The information reads: That on or about June 3, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Mario Tuquero y Alas by then and there stabbing him several times with a fan knife on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said Mario Tuquero Y Alas mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. Contrary to law. SO pleaded not guilty. The prosecution established the following facts: o On June 2, 1991, at around 9PM, SO met his lady friend, Teresita DOMINGO, in a jeep in Quiapo bound for Pasig. Since SOs house is walking distance to DOMINGOs house, DOMINGO requested SO to bring her home. o While walking on their way to DOMINGOs house, they passed the house of SOs first cousins (Estbean, Edgar, and Emy). SO saw his cousin Edgar with Ronnie Tan and 3 others and noticed that a drinking spree was taking place. o Upon seeing SO, Edgar greeted him by saying that Bingbong Crisologo is coming and then invited SO to drink and requested that SO introduce DOMINGO. SO answered that he cannot introduce DOMINGO because she is his. o SO proceeded to bring DOMINGO directly to her house. After bringing DOMINGO home, SO passed by his cousins house to honor their invitation. o After an exchange of pleasantries, Edgar offered SO a bottle of beer. SO declined because it was already passed
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10PM and he was on his way home. Edgar convinced SO to drink a little and stay awhile so that SO could also meet Edgars future brother-in-law TUQUERO who was arriving with Emy. SO decided to stay. Soon after, Emy and TUQUERO arrived. TUQUERO was a manager of a restaurant in Paris and arrived in the Philippines on March 7, 1991. Emy, a registered nurse, met TUQUERO sometime in March 1991 and they started living in as husband and wife at her parents house. TUQUERO, unknown to Emy, was legally married to a certain Evelyn Tuquero. The group, consisting of Esteben, Edgar, SO, Ronnie, TUQUERO, and Emy resumed their drinking spree. After the group consumed 4 cases of beer and before 3AM, Emy went inside the house to sleep. While Emy was sleeping, she was awakened by noise coming from the group outside. It turned out SO had a misunderstanding and altercation w/ somebody and he was shouting loudly. After pacifying the protagonists, TUQUERO advised SO to go home because SOs voice was disturbing the neighbors. SO ran towards home. At around 4:00AM of June 3, TUQUERO and Emy decided to leave for Fairview, Quezon City to get the papers of a vehicle owned by TUQUERO which is being held by the Bureau of Customs. While TUQUERO and Emy were waiting for a taxi, SO suddenly appeared from behind, and stabbed TUQUERO at the back several times with an 11-in fan knife with a white handle. Emy shouted for help. When TUQUERO was about to run, he slid and fell to the ground lying on his back. SO took advantage of the situation and repeatedly stabbed TUQUERO on the front part of his body. Emy pleaded to SO to stop stabbing TUQUERO but SO ignored her and continued stabbing TUQUERO. SO fled from the crime scene and ran to a dark alley. Emy brought TUQUERO at the UERMM Hospital. o
SO stayed in the alley for 30 minutes until the policemen arrived. SO surrendered. As a result of the stabbing incident, TUQUERO suffered 18 stab wounds on different parts of his body, with at least 4 fatal wounds causing his death.
SO claimed self-defense alleging that it was his cousins who started the fight. The RTC convicted SO for MURDER qualified by treachery and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. SO appeals.
ISSUE/S: w/n RTC erred in disregarding his claim of selfdefense? NO. w/n RTC erred in finding that there was treachery? NO. w/n RTC erred in disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity? NO Self Defense:
SO maintains that he stabbed the victim in legitimate self-defense and invokes in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence claiming that, despite his plea of self-defense, the prosecution retains the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This argument deserves no credit in light of the established and time-honored rule that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. He must prove the essential requisites of selfdefense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The initial and crucial point of inquiry is whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim for absent this essential element, no claim of self-defense can be successfully interposed. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second requisite of self-defense would have no basis.
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SOs claim that TUQUERO attacked him with a knife fails to convince us. The record reveals glaring and serious inconsistencies in SOs testimony that makes it totally unworthy of credence. SO testified that he was able to wrest the knife from TUQUERO because the latter's thrust was slow. However, this contradicts his statement during the same cross-examination, that the incident happened so fast and that TUQUEROs attack was sudden. Even if we allow SOs contention that TUQUERO was the initial unlawful aggressor, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense. After SO successfully wrested the knife from TUQUERO, the unlawful aggression had ceased. After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Appellant's claim of self-defense is, likewise, contradicted and negated by the physical evidence on record. The victim sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds on different parts of his body. Of the eighteen (18), four (4) were fatal stab wounds. The presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim.
The testimony of Dr. Omer Galvez, Chief of the Child & Adolescent Service of the National Center For Mental Health (NCMH) and attending physician of SO when he was confined at the National Center for Mental Health from June 8, 1985 to December 2, 1985, only established the previous confinement of appellant at the NCMH and that appellant showed signs of psychosis or insanity at the time. The rest of his testimony consisted merely of assumptions, possibilities, and generalities. A perusal of SOs testimony further negates his plea of insanity. SOs recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as well as the nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind. His memory conveniently blanks out only as to the number of wounds he inflicted on the victim. This, appellant attributes to insanity but we are far from convinced. A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly felonies. (citing People v. Aquino) In the present case, the defense has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The State, thus, continues its guard against sane murderers who seek to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity. Appeal DISMISSED.
Treachery: Considering the number and nature of the wounds inflicted by appellant on the victim, the testimony of the prosecution witness Emy So that appellant unexpectedly and suddenly attacked the victim from behind, and the fact that appellant suffered not a single injury, we agree with the trial court that the killing was attended by treachery. This clearly illustrates that appellant, in the commission of the crime, employed means, methods and form in its execution which tended directly, and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make. Insanity:
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
Side Issue: Credibility of Witness [Emy So]: We give no credence to appellant's argument. Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. In the instant case, although Emy So readily admitted that her relationship with appellant was not close, she explained that it was SO who had ill-feelings against her family and bore a grudge. The defense has not shown such degree of partiality on the part of prosecution witness Emy So as would cast doubt on her credibility and
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impeach her testimony, especially when said testimony is "not inherently improbable in itself". The fact alone that the victim was Emy So's live-in partner does not impair her testimony. The Court has time and again ruled that mere relationship of the witness to the victim does not automatically impair his credibility and render the testimony less worthy of faith and credit.
JUSTO v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Appellant Justo was found guilty of the crime of assault upon a person in authority. Offended party Nemesio de la Cuesta is a duly appointed district supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools. De la Cuesta was leaving the office in order to take his meal when he saw appellant Justo conversing with Severino Caridad, academic supervisor. Appellant Justo requested De la Cuesta to go with him (Justo) and Caridad to the office of the latter. In Caridads office, appellant Justo asked about the possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a teacher in the district of De la Cuesta. Caridad said that there was no vacancy, except that of the position of shop teacher. Upon hearing Caridads answer, Appellant Justo sharply addressed De la Cuesta:y Shet, you are a double crosser. One who cannot keep his promise. Appellant Justo then grabbed a lead paper weight from the table of Caridad and challenged the offended party De la Cuesta to go out. Hence, upon Justos suggestion, De la Cuesta followed appellant Justo as they went out of Caridads office. Before they could go outside and when they were in front of the table of one Carlos Bueno, a clerk in the division office, De la Cuesta asked Appellant Justo to put down the paper weight but instead Appellant Justo grabbed the neck and collar of the polo shirt of de la Cuesta which was torn. This caused De la Cuesta to box appellant Justo several times. De la Cuesta raised the claim of self-defense which was upheld by the lower courts. Hence, Appellant Justo now claims that the claim of self-defense by De la Cuesta should not have been appreciated by the lower courts because of the lack of unlawful aggression on his (Justos) part. ISSUE: Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on Appellant Justos part despite the alleged fact that there was a mutual agreement to fight. HELD: Yes, there was unlawful aggression. Therefore the lower courts did not err in upholding the self-defense claim of De la Cuesta. (Appellant Justo loses) RATIO: The argument that the offended party, De la Cuesta, cannot claim to have been unlawfully attacked because he had accepted the accuseds challenge to fight,
overlooks the circumstance that as found by the Court of Appeals, the challenge was to go out, i.e., to fight outside the building, it not being logical that the fight should be held inside the office building in the plain view of subordinate employees. Even applying the rules in duelling cases, it is manifest that an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place for the encounter would be unlawful; to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play. In the present case, assuming that De la Cuesta accepted the challenge of the accused, the facts clearly indicate that he was merely on his way out to fight the accused when the latter violently lay hands upon him. The acceptance of the challenge did not place on the offended party the burden of preparing to meet an assault at any time even before reaching the appointed place for the agreed encounter, and any such aggression was patently illegal.
PEOPLE v MARIVIC GENOSA (January 15, 2004) FACTS: Accused Marivic Genosa is charged with parricide. She raises the claim of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) which allegedly constitutes self defense. She suffered battery from her deceased husband Ben Genosa whenever the latter is drunk. She testified that one year after their marriage, her husband would slap her, pin her down the bed and sometimes beat her. The neighbors of the couple have witnessed their frequent quarrels. Accused Marivic has also visited doctors and psychiatrists during her marriage with deceased every time she would be beaten by her husband. On the day of the crime, accused was 8-months pregnant and was looking for her husband as she was afraid that he was gambling and might het drunk again. Eventually that night, deceased came home from gambling and was drunk. Deceased Ben purportedly nagged accused Marivic for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to Marivic, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, Marivic packed Bens clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged Marivic outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and
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told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Marivic testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, Ben got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Marivic then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the (childrens) bedroom. According to Marivic, she thereafter ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben . After the incident, Marivic and the children locked the house and left. The lifeless body of Ben was discovered by the neighbors due to the awful smell which emanated from the couples house. Accused Marivic raised the claim of self-defense for her life and defense of her unborn child. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there was a valid self-defense. NO 2. Whether or not Marivic is entitled to any mitigating circumstance. YES (psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation) HELD: A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman. More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering incident. The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition. At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control. The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person whom she loves. In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS. The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-
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building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage? Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers house; that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode. In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome. The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS. BWS as Self-Defense In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life. Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must beimminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself,
there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated. We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no selfdefense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances. Mitigating Circumstances It should be clarified that these two circumstances -psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part. Epilogue We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and
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an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established. PEOPLE v MARIVIC GENOSA ( GR No. 135981 September 29, 2000) FACTS: This case involved the "battered woman syndrome," which is alleged to be equivalent to selfdefense. RTC found appellant guilty of parricide aggravated by treachery. Appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, which of said acts actually caused the victim's death. ISSUE: Whether the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing. HELD: Yes. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea. RATIO: In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring into evidence the abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse will support the 'battered woman syndrome'," she asks the Court to "re-evaluate the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense and to consider the "battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense. Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence was her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient. Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity
beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings. Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of self-defense in the United States and in Europe. In the US particularly, it is classified as a post-traumatic stress disorder, rather than a form of mental illness. It has been held admissible in order to assess a defendant's perception of the danger posed by the abuser. In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to prove that her relationship with her spouse-victim had afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an expert can explain how her experiences as a battered woman had affected her perception of danger and her honest belief in its imminence, and why she had resorted to force against her batterer. Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused had not performed the act voluntarily, then he could not have been criminally liable. In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot properly evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on her mental and emotional state at the time of the killing and the possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal act.
PEOPLE V. FLORES Y PARAS, G.R. No. 177355, 2010 Facts: Flores was charged with qualified rape. AAA was the name of the 13 year-old victim (under RA 9262 VAWC, the names of women and child victims are withheld.) That the crime of rape was committed with the qualifying circumstances of victim being under 18 years of age, the accused is her stepfather, being the common-law spouse of her mother (BBB in this case), and that the rape was committed in full view of the victims mother. Rape details: fateful evening of July 18, 2001, at around eight oclock, Flores ordered her to ask her daughter AAA to sleep with them. Both AAA and BBB obeyed Flores for fear of his wrath. At around ten oclock in the evening, BBB was awakened by the pinch of her daughter, BBB was then shocked to see that Flores was already on top of her daughter, who was shouting Aray, Aray, Nanay, Aray. She felt angry but could not do anything because Flores not only had a bladed weapon poked at her neck, but he also threatened to kill her if she shouted. BBB endured this horrifying episode for the next thirty minutes. Sweetheart defense of Flores was stricken down by court.
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Issue: Death penalty properly meted? Considering the age of the victim at time of rape incident was not sufficiently established? Held: Yes. But Age not properly proven. In the case at bar, not only did the prosecution fail to present AAAs birth certificate, but BBB, the victims mother herself, gave contradictory statements on the true age of her daughter. At one time she said that AAA was 13 years old, and yet when asked about the year of AAAs birthday, she declared that it was 1982. STILL, Flores cannot escape the penalty of death. Flores forgot the important fact that aside from AAAs minority, the qualifying circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of AAAs mother was also alleged in the Information. BUT (again!) despite this, the 2006 law abolishing the death penalty in effect reduced his sentence to reclusion perpetua.
According to Bautista, the defendant waited on the right side of the path near some guava trees and stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in her right hand when he arrived in front of her; that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while the defendant turned around and returned to the house of Maria Inguit, saying "Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya) Defendant-appelants version: After they reached a narrow part a man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her in her private parts; that she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when she felt weak and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from her pocket, opened it, and stabbed him in defense of her honor. She further testified that the man who attacked her did not say anything; that she asked him who he was but he did not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help, saying "Madre mia; Dios mio"; that when she was seized, she was about two brazas behind her nearest companion; that when she was face to face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize his face in the darkness and could not be sure that it was Francisco Rivera. She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fanknife in question was in a pocket of the overcoat she was wearing that day; that she went off with her friends without having an opportunity of changing her clothes. Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of homicide. Held: No. This case is similar to the case of Ah chong. The court held that a person is not criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith We cannot believe the testimony of Enrique Bautista, because Francisco Ramos, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself said that he could scarcely see anyone in the darkness The appellant is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen years old. We do not believe her story is a fabrication. In this connection it is to be noted that almost immediately after the incident in question took place, the appellant said she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her. It is not improbable that she was reluctant to relate in the presence of all the people in the house of Maria Inguit (where the wake was held) the details of what had occurred.
PP VS GATUA
PEOPLE V DELA Cruz (1935 case) 1 braza is a measure of six feet Francisco Ramos, his wife along with Ramos and Santoyo (4 persons) went to the house of Remedios Dela Cruz (defendant) and asked her to join the wake of Sion. The defendant and her friends started to walk on their way to their respective houses at around 9 P.M. They were later on followed, 5 minutes later, by Francisco Rivera(deceased-victim) and Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook defendants party. When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time the members of the defendant's party were walking in single file and defendant was the hindmost. She was about two brazas from the person immediately ahead of her. Francisco Ramos heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios mio". He went back and found that Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast. The wounded man was taken to the hospital, where he died the next afternoon. Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to go back to the place where Rivera was. He found and that Bautista was with the wounded man, and the defendant had started back towards the house of mourning. He overtook her. She had a knife in her hand. When they reached the house where the wake was being held, Remedios de la Cruz stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her. Prosecutions version:
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The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the knife, and undoubtedly could have inflicted other wounds on him if she had desired. In other words she desisted as soon as he released her Appelant acquitted.
PEOPLE VS JAURIGUE Facts: Defendant Avelina Jarigue(girl) and appellant Amado Capino lived in the same barrio. Prior to the incident at hand, Capino had been courting Jarigue to no avail. A month prior to the incident, Capino stole a hanky belonging to Jarigue bearing her nickname aveling while I was being washed. On another night, Jarigue was feeding a dog under her house, when Capino approached her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her boobs. She thereafter kept a long fan knife to protect herself. A few days later, Capino climbed up the house of Jarigue and entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead with the intention of raping her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Capino then came out from where he was hiding, under the bed, and kissed the hand of Jarigues father to beg for forgiveness. Several days later on the fateful night, her family went to the local church where it was quite bright. When Jarigue was left alone in the bench while her father tended to some business, Capino sat beside Jarigue and placed his hand on top of her thigh. On observing this highly improper conduct, Jaurigue stabbed Capino in the neck, fatally causing a single wound from which he died. Jaurigue surrendered without question. Issue: WON defendant acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and should be completely absolved from all criminal liability. Side issue: WON there were mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Held: She is not absolved from criminal liability. If the defendant had killed Capino when he climbed up her house to rape her, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him. However, when the deceased sat beside defendant on the same bench in a well lit chapel with several people inside, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant where there is no possibility of being raped. She cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability for fatally wounding the deceased since the means employer by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive.
On the side: The fact that she voluntarily surrendered to the lieutenant in the chapel and admitted to stabbing the deceased , and the fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion or temporary loss of reason, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor. The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship cannot be legally sustained as there is no evidence to show that defendant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel. She should therefore be charged with homicide without aggravating circumstances and with mitigating circumstances.
PEOPLE VS. NARVAEZ FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia when the two were constructing a fence (that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill). Narvaez, who was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction, awoke and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Narvaez lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher first, then Rubia, who was running towards the jeep to get his gun. Both died. Narvaez voluntarily surrendered and claimed he killed in defense of his person and of his rights. The CFI convicted him of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premediation and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the Narvaez over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). Narvaez had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, Narvaez received a letter terminating the contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. ISSUE: W/N CFI erred in convicting Narvaez despite the fact that he was acting in defense of his person and of his rights. HELD/RATIO: YES (with respect to rights) Narvaez ordered released immediately coz his penalty was
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reduced and he had already served it as he was imprisoned for 14 years. Defense of his person - NO The courts said that although the fencing of Narvaez house was indeed a form of aggression against him, this aggression was not done against his person but rather on his rights to property. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code, which recognizes the right of owners to close and fence their land. But the Narvaez cant subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that Narvaez Defense of his rights YES (although incomplete) The argument of the justifying circumstance of selfdefense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled, according to Art. 11(1) RPC: 1. Unlawful aggression. 2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Unlawful aggression due to the utterance of Fleischer and the invasion of Narvaezs property was clear. The pending case regarding ownership was decided only over a year after the incident, and even then, Fleischer had given Narvaez until the end of the year to leave the land. Lack of sufficient provocation was clear because Narvaez was asleep in his house, then asked Fleischer to stop so they could talk. Firing a shotgun from a window, however, was a disproportionate means of resistance. Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation. DISSENTS: Abad Santos: Self-defense in the penal code refers to unlawful aggression on persons and not property. Gutierrez, Jr.: Appellant defended from an attack on his property that was not coupled with an attack on his person. There should be no special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense. The sentence should have been modified to prision mayor and the defendant should have been ordered released immediately.
position to defend himself. Voluntary surrender is not appreciated even if the accused submits himself to the members of the barangay tanod who, by their presence in his house, precluded his escape) Facts: The victim, Jessie Lacson and Edwin Velasco were gathering shells by the seashore. Because they were thirsty, they went to the fishpond to get young coconuts. The caretaker of said fishpond was Ignacio, who sometimes stayed in the house located therein. Jessie got a coconut. Ignacio shouted at him to put it down, which he did. Edwin, whom Ignacio did not see, saw Ignacio fire his homemade gun at Jessie who was hit on the left breast (yes, he died). At that time, Iganacio was 40 meters away from Jessie while Edwin was 6 meters away. Then Ignacio cranked his gun and aimed at Edwin but did not fire. Edwin reported the shooting to the Barangay Tanod, who went to Ignacios house (since he wasnt there, they waited for him to arrive). Upon arrival, the latter was asked to and did surrender. When asked why he fired his gun at Jessie, he replied that Jessie stole some young coconut. Ignacios version was that he saw the two boys coming out of his house with a basket. It so happened that there were 28 pieces of crabs stocked in there. Since the 2 did not stop upon his request, he fired his gun at them (50 meters away) without intention to kill. He left and informed the Kagawad about the incident and reported it to the Barangay Tanod. The RTC held that Ignacio failed to prove that he acted in lawful defense of the landowners property. There was no legal reason for him to shoot the victim, and unarmed minor at that time. The court qualified the killing to murder because of the presence of treachery. Ignacio appealed, alleging that the RTC erred in finding the qualifying circumstance of treachery attendant in the case and in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He said he merely acted on impulse to stop them from fleeing and did not intend to kill anyone. Issue: W/N he is guilty of murder YES Ratio: The testimony of Edwin disproves his claim. They did stop after Ignacio shouted at them. In fact, they were already facing him when he fired the shot. This was affirmed by the forensic guy who testified that the entry point of the bullet was at the chest and not at the back. This clearly shows that Ignacio killed the victim and did so without risk to himself. A killing is qualified by treachery when the accused employs means, methods or forms of execution therefore without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party make. In this case, there was no risk to Ignacio because Jessie was only 14 years old and unarmed.
PEOPLE v. IGNACIO (There is treachery when the accused unexpectedly and deliberately shoots an unarmed minor who is not in a
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With respect to voluntary surrender, the SC did not appreciate this. For a mitigating circumstance to be appreciated, 3 requisites must be satisfied: 1) the offender has not actually been arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latters agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary. The defense must show an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, because of an acknowledgment of guilt or because of a wish to spare them the trouble and the expense concomitant to the search and capture of the accused. Ignacions surrender was not voluntary; rather, he was forced to give himself up because the members of the barnagay tanod were already inside his house, thereby precluding his escape.
intention as well as in the act of the person making the defense.
PEOPLE V. CHUA HIONG Doctrine: Self-defense is also available in libel cases Facts: Federico Chua Hiong is the uncle of Cesareo Gacheco. Gacheco and his family were defeated in a civil case in the CFI of Manila, which, if not overturned by the SC, would lead to Gacheco and co. losing 2/3s of the inheritance left by a Paulino Gacheco. Hiong sided with the party that defeated Gacheco. This created tension and Gacheco wrote the Chief Finance Agent of the Department of Finance charging Hiong with tax evasion and using a fake citizenship. He then wrote a letter to Vice-President Fernando Lopez accusing Hiong of illegal transactions with the government. A letter was written by a certain Benito Solipco to Hiong. (The SC says Solipco was undoubtedly if not Gacheco himself, acting under Gachecos inducement.) It said that the members of the Go Family Association, of which Gocheco belonged, told Solipco that they will make every vengeance against Hiong, such as paying some persons to kill him, or reporting him to every Philippine Government Authority that he is a communist and other kinds of vengeance. The letter warned Hiong to be careful as the Go Family wee all his enemies now and that they will make every vengeance against him at all cost. The letter was contained in an envelope along with a rope which contained a note saying this serves for your personal use. Hiong received threats on the phone and was denounced as a communist through anonymous letters. Gocheco then caused to be published articles entitled Doubtful Citizenship in the Feb 11, 1952 issue of the Manila Chronicle. It said that while the Commissioner of Immigration had certain evidences supporting the Filipino citizenship of Hiong, the Commisisoners decision was based on questionable proofs. It then proceeded to enumerate the evidences such as: 1. Mr. Frederico M. Chua Hiong and his amily, as shown, by the Master List of alien registered in 1941 with the Bureau of Immigration, were registered under reg no.s. 199-461 to 199466. The proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry at the Port of Manila, under Chinese Board Report No. 1451, show that Mr. Chua Hiong was admitted into the country as legitimate minor son of Chua Pe on September 23, 1913. A certified Chinese Marriage Certificate secured from the local Civil Registrar shows tha his
US V. AH CHONG Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, Who is there, but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door, & believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife & struck & fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Trial Court convicted him of homicide. Issue: W/n Ah Chong was liable for the death of his roommate. Held: NO. Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact. Ratio: Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intruder under Article 11, par. 1, of the RPC, which requires, to justify the act, that there be: 1. Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no provocation at all. Under A11 of the RPC, there is nothing unlawful in the
3.
4.
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marriage was performed by the Chinese Consul at the Chinese YMCA in 1926. 5. Affidavits sworn to by residents of Aparri, Cagayan, the place where the allaged mother (of Hiong) lives, and submitted by the Chief of Police at the instance of the investigator in this case, show that the alleged mother has never left Aparri, much less the Philippines, and therefore could not give birth to Hiong who was born in China. In response, Hiong caused Seriously Speaking to be published in the Manila Chronicle. It said: This investigation was only one of a series of other investigations conducted by different agencies of our government at the instigation of Mr. Gocheco, who appears to be obsessed with a persecution mania in order to besmirch my name and reputation and harass me and my family. To my eternal shame and misfortune, Mr. Cesario T. Gocheco is my nephew. As such, he is cognizant of all of the facts of my life for he has known me for the past 25 years.Why then this sudden concern over my citizenship? Why this mad desire to bring harm to me and my family? The reason is not hard to find personal revenge is the moving passion in this drama of intrigues and persecution to which I and my family have been subjected. .It is easy to imagine the gloom, despondency and despair, that must have seized the Gocheco family when the above decision was handed down as that would divest them of everything that they now have and thus face stark poverty. ..It is obvious that the name Benito Sulipco is fictitious, as it is the most natural thing that my enemies should cowardly hide behind the cloak of anonymity, but, one need not stretch the imagination too far to be able to guess the mastermind behind these threats. ..For what could be better or more convenient to my enemies than my untimely death, or for that matter, my deportation from this country had they been able to prove their charges filed with the different government agencies. What better or more convenient weapon can my enemies avail of then a this systematic and malicious persecution in order to coerce or cajole me into submitting to their demands that I should desist from proceeding with the civil case I have instituted against the Gocheco family which shall ultimately reduce them to the poverty of the proverbial church-mouse? Because of the article above, Hiong was found guilty of libel by the RTC. He now appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Hiongs libelous publication was a proper act of self-defense in relation to Gochecos earlier Doubtful Citizenship article. Held: Yes. Self-defense applies to the crime of libel. Ratio: Self-defense is a mans inborn right. In a physical assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased, because there would be no further harm to repel. But that is not the case when it is aimed at a persons good name. Once the aspersion is cast its sting clings and the one thus defamed may avail himself of all necessary means to shake it off. He may hit back with another libel which, if adequate, will be justified. Granting that the Seriously Speaking column of the Manila Chronicle caused by Hiong was libelous, is it unnecessarily libelous? It was intended to counteract the impression left in the mind of the public by the article Doubtful Citizenship which Gocheco caused to be published in the Manila Chronicle on Feb. 11, 1952. Hiong was living as a Filipino, his livelihood depended mainly upon enterprises only Filipinos can engage in. It is perfectly conceivable that any attempt to assail his Filipino citizenship should meet the keenest defense from him. To flout in public the genuineness of ones citizenship is slanderous, nobody would dare deny, the more so Hiongs case for obvious reasons. The Doubtful Citizenship column makes it appear that his citizenship was acquired through questionable means and that an investigation is currently being conducted with respect to the legality of his citizenship. Gochecos purpose was to malign Hiong. Because he lost in the civil case, Gocheco decided to air his grievances through the press. Hiongs Seriously Speaking Column is not necessarily libelous because Hiong is entitled to show Gochecos motive behind Doubtful Citizenship and to dispel the bad impression about him of those who had read it.
PEOPLE VS. BATES [penned by J. Austria-Martinez; Justice Callejo has a concurring opinion in this case] FACTS: Version of the Prosecution Edgar Fuentes, Simon Fuentes and Jose Boholst left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green Valley, Ormoc City. After delivering the copra, the three went headed back to Barangay Esperanza. As they were heading back, Carlito Bates suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation, aiming his firegun against Boholst. The latter grabbed Carlitos right hand and elbow and tried to wrest
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possession of the firearm. While the two were grappling for possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates (brother) and his son, Marcelo Bates, Jr. (nephew) emerged from the banana plantation, each brandishing a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose, hacking him several times. Jose fell to the ground but the two kept on hacking him. Version of the Defense Ponciano Sano went to the house of Marcelo Bates to get a chicken. While they were trying to catch a chicken, they noticed Jose, Edgar, and Simon approach the house of Carlito. Thereafter, they saw Jose drag Carlito out of the house while both were arguing and grappling. When Marcelo was about to approach them, Jose shot Carlito with a gun. Marcelo attacked Jose but the latter also fired a shot at him. However, Marcelo was able to duck and avoid being shot. Jose was about to shoot Marcelo for the second time but the latter retaliated by hacking Jose with a bolo hitting him on the neck. The RTC of Ormoc City held Marcelo guilty of the crime of murder. ISSUE: Whether or not Marcelo acted in self-defense??? RULING: NO. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights do not incur any criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur: First, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; second, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and third, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It is a settled rule that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense; and as the burden of the evidence is thus shifted to him, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. After scrutiny of the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court that self-defense was not established by Marcelo. He testified that he initially inflicted only a single hack wound on the neck of Jose causing the latter to fall to the ground. He then went to the aid of his brother Carlito but upon finding that he was already dead, he went back to where Jose fell. Marcelo admitted that at that time, Jose was in a lying position still alive but hardly moving. Under such a situation, Jose could have hardly put up any defense, much less, make an aggressive move against appellant. Despite Joses condition, Marcelo repeatedly hacked Jose. Granting that Jose was the one who first committed unlawful aggression, appellant was no longer justified in further inflicting wounds upon Jose because at that time, the latter
was already lying helpless on the ground. At that moment, unlawful aggression on the part of Jose had ceased. It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not selfdefense is committed. Hence, the fact that unlawful aggression on the part of Jose already ceased when Marcelo repeatedly hacked him rules out the possibility of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. Other Issues: The circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise homicide to murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself. There is nothing to indicate from the testimony of Edgar that Marcelo and his son employed means and methods to insure that they will be able to attack Jose without risk to themselves arising from any defense that Jose might make. There is no evidence to show that they purposely remained hidden in the thick banana plantation awaiting for the opportune time to attack Jose with impunity. Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery or any other circumstance which would qualify the killing of Jose to murder, appellant should only be held liable for the crime of homicide punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant was able to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as shown by the testimony of Barangay Captain Feliseo Sano. Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of Marcelo. To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness 22 or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing his brother, Carlito, shot by Jose. However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if Marcelo refrained from doing anything else after that, he could have validly invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a
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clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge. unjust judgment.
UBARRA V MAPALAD FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint dated 21 November 1991 and addressed to then Court Administrator, Josue N. Bellosillo (Justice), complainant Atty. Manuel T. Ubarra, on behalf of his client Juanito A. Calderon, charges Judge Luzviminda Mapalad (Judge), the Presiding Judge of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, with grave misconduct, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the failure to decide within the mandated ninety-day period Criminal Case entitled Peo v.Cruda which involves the charge of Grave Threats. There is also another action for Grave Threats likewise entitled Peo v Cruda. T Calderon is the offended party in the both criminal cases. He alleges in his affidavit that in the course of the trial of the first criminal case, he noted that accused Roberto Crude worked as a houseboy of the Judge. By that time, he had already observed the Judge's partiality in favor of the said accused. The case was submitted for decision on 27 March 1990. On 9 August 1991, Crude married respondent's youngest sister. It was the respondent herself who solemnized that marriage at her office, as evidenced by the marriage contract. Despite such marriage, respondent did not inhibit herself from hearing the case and instead proceeded to render and promulgate, on 17 October 1991, a judgment acquitting Cruda, her brother-in-law. The answer to the letter-complaint, filed by the respondent was devoted mostly to a narration of her sincere and honest efforts to reform and rehabilitate Roberto Cruda. She denies having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in favor of her brother-in- law because she "was persuaded to dismiss the same not on account that the guilt of Cruda was not proven beyond reasonable doubt but by the very reason that both the private complainant and the accused therein were in pari delicto." She admits, however, that she decided the case beyond ninety (90) days from the date it was submitted for decision, and pleads for this Court's understanding, leniency and compassion considering that a MTC Judge is saddled not only with judicial functions, but quasi-judicial task as well which are enough to drain most of his/her energy. On 10 September 1992 the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan who recommended that proper penalty be imposed upon the respondent Judge. ISSUE: WON the respondent have knowingly rendered an
HELD: Under the pari delicto doctrine, where the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims ex dolo malo non oritur actio' and 'in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.The Court found the application of the pari delicto theory in a criminal case to be strange, to say the least. In the first place, the rule on pari delicto is a rule in civil law. It is principally governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code under the Chapter on Void or Inexistent Contracts, and presupposes a situation where the parties are in culpability similarly situated. That this rule can by no means apply in a criminal ease is evidenced by the aforesaid Article 1411 which provides in part that "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted." Secondly, in view of the broader grounds of public policy, the rule may not be invoked against the State. Thirdly, in the prosecution of public crimes, the complainant is the State while the private offended party is but a complaining witness. Any criminal act perpetrated by the latter on the occasion of the commission of the crime, or which may have given rise to the criminal act imputed to the accused is not the act or conduct of the State and can by no means bind it under the doctrine of pari delicto. To rule otherwise would be to establish a dangerous doctrine which would irreparably weaken the very foundations of the criminal justice system and frustrate the administration of justice. Whatever wrongful act may have been committed by the offended party may only be invoked to justify the accused's own act or mitigate his liability. In spite of all this, however, the respondent may not necessarily be liable for rendering an unjust judgment as there is no convincing evidence on record to show that she knew such judgment to be unjust and that she rendered the same with the conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. She could only be, as she is hereby found, guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The Court noted with grave concern the respondent's revelation in her Answer that "she interceded in the settlement of the cases pending against" Roberto Cruda. By such admission, it is clear that the respondent acted as counsel for the accused. It is therefore evident that she is guilty of improper conduct, which could only serve to diminish public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Her behavior amounted to a violation of Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court decided to dismiss the Judge from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except for the
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monetary value of her accrued leaves, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations for grave misconduct, gross inefficiency and neglect of duty, gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Issue: WON Jesus was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death - No! WON Jesus is liable for murder - No! Homicide only Ruling: The phrase state of necessity is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave peril (un mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical rights (bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and property (la vida, la integridad corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another. It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the same. The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4 of the RPC. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead. The court came to this conclusion based on: 1. Norberta Caons testimony. 2. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea. 3. The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim. There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the abovementioned conditions. The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Retubado Facts: Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellants younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin and his father were having dinner, it exploded. The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel Caon, Jr. The matter was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr. Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o. Emmanuel Caon, Sr., (pedicab driver) was confronted by Jesus when the former was on his way home. Emmanuel Sr. ignored Jesus so the latter pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house. His wife, Norberta Caon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Emmanuel Sr. demanded to know why he was being followed. Jesus told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husbands shoulder to pacify him. Jesus forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Emmanuel was brought to the Tuburan District Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter. Jesus surrendered to the police but failed to surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim. Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He testified that when he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun. Jesus grabbed Emmanuels hand, they struggled for the gun but eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees. Jesus pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuels forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. Jesus then rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table. When he went back to the dining room his sister told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown it into the sea.
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VICKY TY VS PEOPLE Facts: What we have here is 7 cases of violations of BP22. Tys mother, Chua Lao So Un and her sister, Judy Chua were confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital (note: they were not confined at the same time. The mother was confined from 1990 until 1992, while the sister was confined from 1991-1992). Vicky Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment for the admission of the patients. The total hospital bills of the 2patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. Ty then executed a promissory note to assume payment of the obligation in instalments. Several postdated checks against Metrobank and payable to the hospital were drawn. 7checks, each covering an amount of P30K were all deposited on their due dates only to be dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds, with the account closed advice. Demand letters were sent but the obligation remained unpaid. The defense of Ty was that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of greater injury. She was allegedly forced to issue the checks because the hospital would not release her mother unless the bills were paid. She alleges that because of the unsettle bill, the hospital deprived her mother of room facilities (no aircon, refrigerator, tv, telephone line, late delivery of food, refusal to change hospital gown and bedsheets). Also, the hospital allegedly suspended the medical treatment of her mother. This debasing treatment affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical health that her mother contemplated suicide. Thus, fearing this, she was compelled to issue the PN and the checks. TC: Guilty CA: Guilty but deleted the penalty of imprisonment. Issue: Whether Ty is justified because of the uncontrollable fear and state of necessity circumstances? Held: No! Ty is guilty! The only question of law raised is whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant Tys exemption from criminal liability. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully the following must concur: 1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; 2) fear must be real and imminent; and 3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. The threat that caused the uncontrollable fear must be of such gravity that an ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. The threat must not be speculative, fanciful or remote. A person invoking this circumstance must show that the compulsion was so great
that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting without will. In this case, Tys fear was not real and imminent. Her fear that her mothers health might deteriorate due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or that her mother might commit suicide is speculative and not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. Moreover, Ty had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in violation of BP22. Ty also suggests that she may be exempted by the justifying circumstance of state of necessity. For this, the law prescribes the following requisites: 1) evil sought to be avoided actually exists; 2) injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and 3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. In this case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated hence, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have used other options to avoid committing a crime such as giving jewelry or other forms of security. Moreover, for the state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by negligence or imprudence, more so inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys failure to pay the hospital bills. Others: 1) BP22 punishes the mere act of issuing a bounced check whether it was issued to pay an obligation or to guarantee an obligation. The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Deceit is not an essential element of BP22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check. 2) CA is correct in deleting the penalty of imprisonment. Ty was a first-time offender and she did not act in bad faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000 merely establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penalty in BP22 but the discretion on what to impose rests solely on the judge.
CABANLIG VS SANDIGANBAYAN Prosections version: A robbery occurred in Nueva Ecija but 4 days later, 3 suspects were caught. All items were recovered except for a vase and a small radio. Valino, one of those apprehended, knew where the location of the stolen items were so 5 policemen decided to escort Valino to the place where the stolen items were hidden. They rode a jeep. While on their way, Valiano was able to grab one of the polices M16 armalite. Cabanlig, wh o was behind Valino inside the jeep, saw what happened and decided to fire one shot at Valino, and after 3 seconds, fired another 4 consecutive shots. Valino did not fire a shot. The next
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day, somebody heard the police talking to a fellow policeman, saying that they salvaged Valino. Defenses version: It was not a salvage. It was an act of self-defense and performance of duty Sandiganbayan: Cabanlig liable for homicide since he failed to show that the shooting was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty (but the 4 others were acquitted since there was no evidence of conspiracy) Issue: w/n Cabanlig is liable for Valinos death SC: NO. Acquitted. Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is based on the principle of self-preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is premised on the due performance of duty. The difference between the two justifying circumstances is clear, as the requisites of selfdefense and fulfillment of duty are different. While self-defense and performance of duty are two distinct justifying circumstances, self-defense or defense of a stranger may still be relevant even if the proper justifying circumstance in a given case is fulfillment of duty. For example, a policeman's use of what appears to be excessive force could be justified if there was imminent danger to the policeman's life or to that of a stranger. If the policeman used force to protect his life or that of a stranger, then the defense of fulfillment of duty would be complete, the second requisite being present. Undoubtedly, the policemen were in the legitimate performance of their duty when Cabanlig shot Valino. Thus, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance that is applicable to this case. To determine if this defense is complete, we have to examine if Cabanlig used necessary force to prevent Valino from escaping and in protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from imminent danger. In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape. But Valino was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose firearm. By grabbing Mercado's M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger. Had Cabanlig failed to shoot Valino immediately, the policemen would have been sitting ducks. All of the
policemen were still inside the jeep when Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 Armalite. By suddenly grabbing the M16 Armalite from his unsuspecting police guard, Valino certainly did not intend merely to escape and run away as far and fast as possible from the policemen. Valino did not have to grab the M16 Armalite if his sole intention was only to flee from the policemen. If he had no intention to engage the policemen in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the jeep without grabbing the M16 Armalite. The Sandiganbayan had very good reasons in steadfastly adhering to the policy that a law enforcer must first issue a warning before he could use force against an offender. However, the duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there is no other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer's failure to issue a warning is excusable.
PEOPLE VS ULEP Wapili, having a high fever and insensibly talking to himself, was acting strangely in his home (nasisiraan na ng ulo). His brother in law was trying to calm him down but to know avail. Wapili locked himself in his room. Later on, he went out naked and chased his brother in law (Leydan). Leydan and neighbours tried to tie him with rope but to no avail so he got loose in the village. Leydan went to a policewoman to report the incident and while this was happening, Wapili turned up in front of the policewomans house to bang her vehicle so she called for assistance. Later on, SPO1 Ulep and 2 other police officers went to the scene where they saw Wapili armed with a bolo and a rattan stool (sabi naman ng relatives ni Wapili wala siyang dalang bolo). Ulep fired a warning shot but Wapili charged towards them so Ulep shot him. Wapili fell to the ground. Ulep came closer then pumped another bullet to his head, literally blowing his brains out. Ulep: self-defense and fulfilment of a duty. Issue: w/n Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili SC: YES. Liable for homicide Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of RPC may be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
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of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case. During the first stage, the victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly advancing towards them, notwithstanding accused-appellant's previous warning shot and verbal admonition to the victim to lay down his weapon or he would be shot. As a police officer, it is to be expected that accusedappellant would stand his ground. Up to that point, his decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim's further advance was justified under the circumstances. After all, a police officer is not required to afford the victim the opportunity to fight back. Neither is he expected - when hard pressed and in the heat of such an encounter at close quarters - to pause for a long moment and reflect coolly at his peril, or to wait after each blow to determine the effects thereof. However, Ulep cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty during the second stage of the incident when he fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even after the latter slumped to the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the police officers. Sound discretion and restraint dictated that Ulep, a veteran policeman, should have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw the latter fall to the ground. The victim at that point no longer posed a threat and was already incapable of mounting an aggression against the police officers. Shooting him in the head was obviously unnecessary. Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim of self-defense. The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. In the present case, the records show that the victim was lying in a prone position on the ground - bleeding from the bullet wounds he sustained, and possibly unconscious when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to his life. The Court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right. Under Art. 69 of RPC, "a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability
in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The Court likewise credited Ulep with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The police blotter of Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that immediately after killing Wapili, accusedappellant reported to the police headquarters and voluntarily surrendered himself
ORTEGA V. PEOPLE Facts: Joemar Ortega raped AAA (name withheld), the daughter of FFF who was a close friend of Joemars mom. He was around 13 years old then and AAA was around 6 years old. During trial, the RTC and CA were not impressed with the defense of denial and adjudged guilty of rape. The important issue arose during the pendency of the case in the SC. In 2006 (while the case was still pending), RA 9344 (The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act) was passed. One of its provisions found in sec. 64 of the act provides that ...cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Thus, Ortega contends that he should not be made to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as he was 13 years old when the crime was committed. The OSG argued that Ortega is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of RA 9344 since as early as 1999, Ortega was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. RA 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with Ortega now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by RA 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of RA 9344 is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. Issue: Should RA 9344 apply retroactively to Ortegas case? Held: Yes. A retroactive application of RA 9344 should be given to Ortega pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. Furthermore, the deliberations of the Senate with regard to RA 9344 show an intent for it to apply retroactively. As stated by Senator Santiago even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor
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under this law, he should be given the benefit of the law. Senator Pimentel concurred with this statement. Ortega was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by his testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, his age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. As such, Ortega, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability. However, this does not mean that he is exempted from civil liability.
Discernment is the metal capacity to understand the difference of right and wrong. In this case, presence of discernment was deduced from the calculated acts of petitioner i.e. dragging the victim in the vacant house so as not to be discovered and quickly taking off when Teofisto discovered the crime. In fact, upon prodding of petitioners dad, he hid at his grandmothers house to evade arrest. MINOR ISSUE: Whether or not there petitioner, as he contends, was deprived of preliminary investigation No. No need for preliminary investigation. According to the rules on criminal procedure, when there is a valid warrantless arrest, preliminary investigation may not be conducted provided there was an inquest. In this case there was a valid warrantless arrest and inquest
Llave vs People FACTS: Neil Llave, a 12 year old boy, was charged with raping Debbielyn, a 7 year old girl, in Pasay City. After school, Debbielyn proceeded home, changed her clothes and went to her mothers store to bring home unsold quail eggs. On her way, she passed by a vacant house adjacent to Teofistos house (their neighbor). She was suddenly pulled by petitioner to a pile of hollow blocks; forced her to lay down on the cement. Petitioner removed his and the victims clothes. He lay on top of the victim, started kissing her and inserted his penis inside the victims vagina. The victim resisted to no avail. Thereafter Teofisto heard the victims cries and went out to see what has happened. At that point, Llave took off. The parents of the victim, upon knowing the incident, found petitioner in the latters grandparents house. Llave was arrested by the tanod. The victim was brought to the Child Protection Unit of the PGH where Dr. Castillo found that no injury was found on the hymen and perineum, there was a scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora. There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 oclock position near the anus which can only be caused by a blunt object such as erect penis or finger. The findings, according to the Dr., were consistent with the claim that victim was sexually abused. The RTC and the CA both convicted petitioner of the crime of rape. Both courts found that petitioner, by his conducts during the incident, acted with discernment. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner acted with discernment HELD: Yes he did! Article 12, par3 of the RPC exempts from criminal liability persons who are over 9 years and under 15 UNLESS he acted with discernment. The ratio for the exemption is the absence of intelligence which is an essential part of a felony whether by dolo or culpa. Intelligence is the power to determine the morality of human acts and to distinguish licit from illicit acts.
PEOPLE OF VALLEDOR
THE
PHILIPPINES
vs.
ENRICO
A.
3 informations were filed against Valledor: 1. murder (with treachery and evident premeditation) for stabbing Elsa Rodriguez on the chest; 2. Attempted murder (with treachery and evident premeditation) for stabbing Ricardo Maglalang but due to timely medical assistance, he was able to survive; 3. Frustrated murder (with treachery and evident premeditation) for stabbing Roger Cabiguen on his right forearm but due also to timely medical assistance, he was able to survive. Victim Roger Cabiguen was inside his bedroom working on a lettering job together with his first cousin, victim Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua. All of a sudden, Valledor entered the room; uttered Rogers nickname (Jer) and immediately attacked him with a knife, but Roger was able to evade the thrust and was stabbed instead on the right forearm. Valledor then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, I had my revenge, Elsa. Valledor then left. Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a commotion and saw victim Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor, wounded. Antonio learned from the by-standers that Ricardo was likewise stabbed by Valledor. Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the other hand was treated for the 5-centimeter wound sustained by him on his right forearm. Victim Roger Cabiguen testified that Valledor suspected him of killing his dog. Valledor also courted Elsa but she rejected him. Elsa even spat on and slapped Valledor. Valledors defense of insanity: Valledor was employed as provincial jail guard. His mother Pacita noticed that Valledor was behaving abnormally. For
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days he was restless and unable to sleep. He likewise complained that their neighbors were spreading rumors that he was a rapist and a thief, prompting Pacita to bring his son to Dr. de Guzman. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de Guzman that insanity runs in their family. After examination, Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as suffering from psychosis with schizophrenia. He prescribed a depressant (Thoracin), which kept Valledor sane for a period two months. Pacita noticed that Valledor was again acting strangely. She left to buy Thoracin but when she returned he was nowhere to be found. He was seen swimming across the river and uttering that his family will be killed. The brgy. Officials went to get him and on their way to the city, Valledor jumped off the jeep. That afternoon, it was learned that Valledor killed and wounded his neighbors. Defense offered the findings of: Dr. MelendresValledor suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia (deterioration from previous level of functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor judgment and absence of insight), Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder. TC: Valledor guilty of Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder. But since he was confined at the Mental Hospital, the service of his sentence was suspended. Valledor appealed. ISSUE: WON Valledor sufficiently invoked the defense of insanity to exempt him from liability? No. WON Valledor should be held liable of frustrated murder for stabbing Roger? No. only Attempted murder because the wound is not fatal. RULING: In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. In the case at bar, Valledor failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that Valledor was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was
positioned nearest to Valledor but the latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Valledor called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Valledor, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, I had my revenge, Elsa, after stabbing her; and 5) Valledor hurriedly left the room after stabbing the victims. Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who was in a state of a complete absence of the power to discern. Valledor was clearly aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, I had my revenge after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof. Valledor acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. Then, too, the medical findings showing that Valledor was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts. For stabbing Roger Cabiguen, Valledor should only be liable of attempted murder (not frustrated) for the wound sustained was not fatal. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death.
PEOPLE vs. JACINTO FACTS: Herein accused Hermie Jacinto was charged with the crime of raping a 5-year old child back in 2003. It must be noted that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, Jacinto was still a minor, being only 17 years of age. From the evidence of the prosecution, it was alleged that the victim, AAA, together with her sister, CCC, were sent by their father to buy cigarettes from the store. CCC came back to the house without AAA in tow, but the father was not alarmed thinking that she was watching TV at the house of her Aunt Rita. At the same time, witness Julito
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testified that he saw Jacinto at the store as he placed AAA on his lap. The three of them, Julito, Jacinto and AAA, left the store at the same time. Julito went to the house of Aunt Rita, while Jacinto, who held AAAs hand, went towards the direction of the lower area or place. They walked towards the rice fields near the house of the Perochos. There he made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest. Already half-naked from waist down, he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. She felt pain and cried. Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos. She, in turn, went straight home crying. Her father heard her crying and calling out his name. She was without slippers. He found her face greasy. There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head. He checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black. She had no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina. AAA told her father what Jacinto did to her. Enraged, her father confronted Jacinto. In 2007, the RTC rendered its decision finding Jacinto guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the decision, but sentenced him with an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum in accordance with RA 9344 or the Juvenile Justice Law, which was enacted on April 28, 2006. ISSUE(s): (1) W/N the CA was correct in applying RA 9344 in computing the sentence of the accused. (2) W/N Jacinto is entitled to the Automatic Suspension of Sentence granted by RA 9344 to children in conflict with the law (CICL). HELD/RATIO: (1) YES. He should have been sentenced with reculusion perpetua because the crime involved is statutory rape which is punishable by death penalty. Sec. 6 of RA 9344 exempts a child above 15 years but below 18 years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, the appropriate proceedings in accordance with the Act shall be observed. Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature
of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness. In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: (1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense are indicative of then 17 year-old Jacintos mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action. Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified considering that the victim is a minor. Since the victim was only 5 years old when appellant defiled her in 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when statutory rape is committed applies. The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accusedappellant is reclusion perpetua.
(2) NO. Nevertheless, a CICL, whose judgment of

conviction has become final and executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with RA 9344. RA 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time
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of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.) On 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia, saying: The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime. The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads: If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.) On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which reflected the same position. These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old. Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD. Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellants confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
PEOPLE V. VALENTIN DOQUENA Nature: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (convicting Valentin Doquena, 13 yrs, 9 months, and 5 days old, of homicide; having acted with discernment in committing the said act.) Facts: Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to resume playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousins (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojos denied Doquenas request for a fight and resumed playing.
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Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter. The court held that in committing the act, the accused acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable (given that the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT program), and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that to determine whether or not there was discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken into consideration: a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed. b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed c) The time he had at his disposal d) The degree of reasoning of the minor Issue: WON the accused acted with discernment Held: Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.
The Aguilars demanded upon Jarco Marketing the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred but Jarco refused to pay. Jarcos argument was that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees. Also, that the mom was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her. They also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support. TC: Not liable. The proximate cause of the accident was was Zhieneths act of clinging to it CA: Liable. Jarco was negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter (defective, unstable); the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Issues: (1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence -- NEGLIGENCE (2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to the mother and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises NEGLIGENCE OF JARCO MARKETING Ratio: (1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. I is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." Test: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The tragedy was no accident and ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence. Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were then already personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to
JARCO MARKETING, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO, V. CA CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR Facts: Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's managers. Private respondents are parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH). Criselda and Zhieneth (6 years old) were at the department store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter structure. She was crying and shouting for help. She was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days.
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remedy the situation. They have miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. (2) Conclusive presumption that favors children below 9 years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. If that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The mother was also not negligent. She just momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for her to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us.
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989 JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, Respondent. FACTS: Petitioner Guevarra was 11 years old when the incident happened. He was playing with 4 other children, including his best friend Almine, in their backyard one morning. They were taget shooting tansan(s) with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor, around 15-20 meters away. In the course of the game, Almine was hit by the pellet on his left collar bone, causing his death. The Fiscal exculpated Guevarra taking into consideration his age and the fact that the occurrence appeared to be an accident. As a result, the victims parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, and the latter ordered the Fiscal to file a case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence. It was stated in the information that Guevarra was over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment fired the air rifle and due to his carelessness and negligence, caused the death of Almine. Guevarras parents filed a motion to quash, contending that the Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification. ISSUE: W/N Guevarra is guilty of the crime charged despite his age (11) and lack of discernment. HELD/RATIO: We learned earlier that intent and discernment are different the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to the moral
significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him. The basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC: the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The element of intelligence is necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. If absent, this would mean that the accused-child would have no intelligence in doing the crime and so the law exempts him from criminal liability. lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. Intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense. In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. Case remanded to trial court for trial.
PEOPLE V. SARCIA (GR. No. 169641, 2009) Facts: Sarcia was charged with rape. AAA was the five year-old victim. Some rape details: In 1996, appellant
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removed AAAs shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an upand-down movement("Nagdapadapa tabi"), AAA felt severe pain and exclaimed Aray. Saricas conviction was then affirmed upon appeal, crediting AAAs testimony and her cousins as well, despite certain inconsistencies. Relevant Fact: Meanwhile, when accusedappellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court, (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and YouthWelfare Code, etc. He is now 31 years of age. Thus, the retroactivity of RA 9344 is at issue which affords the accused , so long as he was under 18 at the time of the criminal incident. Automatic suspension of sentence is also available even if the child reached 18 at the time of the promulgation of judgment(Sec. 38). Relevant Issue: WON RA 9344 still applies in favor of accused? Held: NO. But death penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua. Case remanded to court a quo for appropriate disposition under Sec.51. Firstly, Section 38 does not distinguish WON child is guilty of capital offense or a lesser one, and so automatic suspension of sentence can be afforded even in a heinous crime. Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21. Since he is now already 31 years old, the question on the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, he is still entitled to the disposition measure in Section 51 which reads:. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by theBUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
ROWENO POMOY v. PEOPLE The Case: A petition for Review by Appellant Pomoy, against the ruling of RTC Iloilo and the CA, that found him guilty of homicide The TC and CA found that the death of Tomas Balboa, who was shot with a .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault the deceased Balboa. Hence this petition. The Facts according to the Prosecution: Balboa was a teacher in Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo. About 7:30 am of 4 January 1990, some policemen arrived to arrest Balboa, allegedly due to a robbery back in December 1989. Balboa complied and was detained in Camp Jalandoni, Iloilo with Edgar Samudio, another suspect of the robbery case. About 2 pm, petitioner Pomoy, the police sergeant, came for Balboa for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that time, Pomoy had a service gun (a .45 caliber pistol) When Pomoy and Balboa were in the building near the investigation room, and two (2) gunshots were heard. When they came to the source of the gunshot sounds, Pomoy was seen still holding the .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer arrived, he disarmed Pomoy, and had Balboa brought to the hospital but was stopped by a doctor in the premises, saying it was unnecessary as Balboa is already dead. Upon the request of Mrs. Balboa, an autopsy was conducted in NBI Iloilo with findings by the medicolegal officer, as follows: Cause of Death: Hemorrhage, massive secondary gunshot wounds on chest and abdomen. The Facts according to the Defense: Petitioner Pomoy generally adopts the narration of facts in the trail court and CA decisions, Defense had the following witnesses: Erna Basa (the lone eyewitness to the incident) who says, while she was working about 2pm, heard some noise and exchange of words that were unclear but seemed like trouble. She opens the door, and seeing one meter away, finds Pomoy and Balboa grappling for possession of the gun from Pomoys holster. It all happened so fast that the gun was pulled out of the holster, a shot was fired, but she wasnt sure who pulled the trigger.
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Eden Legaspi, she also hears the commotion from the outside, but remained seated where she was. She witnesses Erna Basa go and open the door. Eden Legaspi only stood up after shots were fired and hears on of the two men fall down. Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr., the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy. He finds two (2) entrance wounds on Balboa, ones trajectory going upward, and the other downward. Pomoy the petitioner, he notes that once he opened the door to meet Balboa, the latter suddenly approached him to take hold of the gun in the holster. Pomoy also notes he loaded and cocked his gun before going to Camp Jalandoni that day. Though Balboa is shorter, Pomoy notes Balboa was bigger in build. Pomoy however, prevented Balboa from taking his gun. After a few seconds of grappling, the gun was forced out of the holster, it fired to the right side of the victim.
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances proven. Issues: 3. W/N the prosecution failed to overturn the defense? YES, the prosecution failed. a) Did Pomoy had full control of the gun, as the CA ruled? NO. b) Did the safety lock feature, requirement of pressure and two gunshots necessarily conclude a determined effort to kill instead of an accident, as the CA held? NO. c) Did the number and location of the gunshot wounds necessarily conclude deliberate intent? NO. b) W/N there was a exempting circumstance of accident, as in Art 12, par. 4.. YES. c) W/N there was Self Defense. NO. Held: 1. The CA failed to see the prosecutions failure to overturn the allegations of the accident, as an exempting circumstance in Article 12, which exculpates the actor when the harm was done without his fault or negligence but rather on circumstances unforeseen or out of his control. Thus, in determining whether an accident attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of (1) lack of intent to kill and (2) absence of fault or negligence. (See below) a. POMOY HAD NO FULL CONTROL. According to the facts, the Petitioner was NOT in control of the gun when it fired, mainly through the testimonial evidence of Erna Basa. According to the cross, when she began to see the incident, the gun was still in the holster, at the side of the petitioner. She also mentioned both the petitioner and the deceased had their hands on the gun, while it was INSIDE the holster, at that point they were both already grappling for possession. She mentions that both gunshots happened during the grappling, but because of the wrestling of the two, she could not see where the gun was pointed towards. This was because as Pomoys right hand and Balboas left hand were scuffling for possession, Pomoy continued to use his left hand to subdue Balboa. The foregoing account clearly demonstrates that the petitioner did NOT have control of the gun to consider any willful intent to kill the deceased. According to the witness, the deceased persistently tried to wrest the weapon from the petitioner, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts. The CA therefore, had no firm basis to conclude that Pomoy had full possession of the gun.
Trial Court and CA Decisions: Pomoy was held guilty based on the following: 1) Petitioner had substantial control of the gun, 2) the gun was locked prior to the grabbing incident, hence unlocked by the petitioner, 3) location of the wounds do not support the assertion of the grabbing of the gun, 4) as the OSG said, an accident was unlikely since there were two gunshot wounds, on two different angles and distant parts of the body, instead of merely one. The OSG said that it is an oft-repeated principle that the location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened during the incident. The appellate court cited People v. Reyes saying that revolvers are not prone to accidental firing since it need to be cocked and pressure is needed to be exerted on the trigger. Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this justifying circumstance. Also, the CA altered the trial courts ruling in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position. The CA said that for the aggravating circumstance to apply, he must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of publ ic position. (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). The CA ruled that in this case there was no showing of a premeditated plan, nor did the petitioner take advantage of his public position. Hence there were
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b. NO CLEAR SHOWING OF DETERMINED EFFORT. Since it is now undisputed that both petitioner and victim struggled aggressively for possession of the gun, the eyewitness account of Basa clearly illustrated the fact that in the fierce and vicious frenzied grappling, it supports the conclusion that the safety lock was accidentally released, and the force of either man was strong enough to fire the gun, putting the necessary pressure. Not to mention that it was admitted that Pomoy cocked the gun earlier that day. Also, the fact that two gunshots were fired were attributed to the nature of the gun and not a conclusion of deliberate intent. As the petitioner himself testified, he said that a caliber .45 semiautomatic pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns immediately carrying again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going downward from left to right thus pushing Balboas upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa was still clutching petitioners hand over the gun; the second shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboas body as he was falling down and releasing his hold on petitioners hand. Thus the reliance of the CA in People v. Reyes was misplaced. This case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used in Reyes. Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle. c. THE LOCATION OF THE WOUNDA ARE IRRELEVANT, though ordinarily it would be. In this case though, they are inconsequential where both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular target. 1. The ELEMENTS of ACCIDENT WERE ALL PRESENT in this case.
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury. From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was an investigator for the PNP. Thus, he was in the lawful performance of his duties that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a routine interrogation. Also, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself. Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area. At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him. The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latters culpability. 3. There was NO SELF DEFENSE. Pomoy put forth self defense as an alternative defense, that granting arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger. The SC said that Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from imminent danger. Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous
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and accidental result of both parties attempts to possess the firearm. Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner -- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary. RULING: Though timeless is the legal adage that facts found by the trial court and appellate court are conclusive, the Supreme Court however may overturn the same when certain crucial facts or details are overlooked and when upon a petition, a reexamination is imperative. Due to the appreciation of facts of the accident, credibility of the witnesses creating a reasonable doubt, and upholding the presumption of innocence, the appellant was therefore ACQUITTED.
stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who stabbed him and Ricky replied that it was appellant who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez arrived at the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital. He was sent to the Romblon provincial hospital but died while being operated on. Petitioners story: Same story as the prosecution. . . . until. . .. he then went to his house, locked the door with a nail, and went to sleep. However, he was awakened at around 9:30 p.m. by loud noises coming from Ricky and his three companions. He peeped through the window grills of his house and admonished them not to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was then already inebriated, was incensed; he pulled out a balisong, pushed the door, and threatened to stab the petitioner. The petitioner pushed their sala set against the door to block the entry of Ricky, but the latter continued to push the door open with his hands and body. The petitioner ran to the upper portion of their house and got his bolo. He returned to the door and pushed it with all his might using his left hand. He then pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand, towards Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and the latter lost his balance and fell to the floor. The petitioner, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain at 11:00 a.m. He claimed accidental death (Article 12 par 4) in the trial court and CA then changed his theory to Self-defense (Article 11 par 1) Issue: Whether or not accidental death (article 12) or even Self-defense (article 11) applies. Held: No Accidental Death nor Self Defense. He is still liable for the crime of homicide. Rule on change of theory: It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. The case will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not approached and resolved from a different point of view. To permit a party to change his theory on appeal will be unfair to the adverse party. It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical.(quoting People v Javier 377 SCRA 300 (2002). There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law. Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is
Toledo v People (by Justice Callejo) Prosecutions version: On September 16, 1995, appellant (Noe Toledo y Tamboong) went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo. When he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the afternoon, appellant saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte (deceased) drinking gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Rickys parents. Appellants house is about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte. Appellant requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise. Thereupon, appellant proceeded inside his house and went to sleep. Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guartes brother arrived at the Guarte house and asked for any left-over food. Eliza prepared dinner for him and after Gerardo finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky. Gerardos home is about twelve (12) meters away from the Guarte home. Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex and Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had not laid down for long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times. Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw appellant stoning their house. Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to appellants house. Ricky asked appellant, his uncle, why he was stoning their house. Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his (appellants) house and, without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo. Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was stabbed, shouted for help. Lani heard Elizas cry for help and immediately rushed outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his body with his hands. Lani helped Ricky
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based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of selfdefense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial and appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident without fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted.
Evidence of petitioner incredible and of barren weight. Reasons: A. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle between him and the victim would have caused the door to fall on the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to adduce real evidence that the door of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any physical injuries, considering that he was only five inches away from the door. B. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the victim must have fallen on top of the door. It is incredible that the bolo of the petitioner could have hit the stomach of the victim. The claim of the petitioner that he managed to step aside and avoid being crushed by the door belies his claim that the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
C. To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete: The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While it was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellants house which would give a semblance of verity to appellants version of the incident, such view, however, is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellants house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he threw stones at his (Rickys) house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Rickys arrival at appellants doorstep.Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any aggressive act that may have imperiled appellants well-being. Rickys want of any weapon when he arrived at appellants doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky.Thus, appellants version of the events does not support a finding of unlawful aggression Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky.There was no imminent threat to appellants life necessitating his assault on Ricky.Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.In the absence of such element, appellants claim of self-defense must fail. D. With the failure of the petitioner to prove selfdefense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is guilty of homicide as found by the trial court and the CA.He cannot even invoke Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
TAMBOONG V. PEOPLE Facts: After picking up his bolo from the blacksmith, appellant went home late in the afternoon where he saw a group of people including deceased drinking gin near his house. He then requested the group to refrain from making any noise, he then proceeded to his house and
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slept. At around 9pm he was awakened by loud noises coming from the drinking group, he peeped through the window grills of his house and admonished them not to make any load noises. The deceased, already drunk, was incensed, he pulled out his balisong and pushed the door, and threatened to stab the petitioner. Petitioner then pushed the sala set against the door to block the entry of the deceased, but the latter continued to push the door open. It was then that petitioner ran up his house and got his bolo. He returned to the door and pushied with all his might , he then pointed his bolo towards the deceased. The bolo accidentally hit the deceased on the stomach and died. Petitioner thereafter surrendered to the tanod at around 11a.m. The trial court found him guilty of homicide with mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The TC did not give credence to the testimony of petitioner that his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach. CA affirmed the judgment. Petitioner contends that he acted in complete self-defense when the victim was hit accidentally by his bolo. Issue: WON petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Held: He is Guilty of homicide. Petitioner claims Art 12 par 4 any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it is exempted from criminal liability. However petitioner also claims Art 11 par 1 anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights against unlawful aggression cannot be criminally liable (justified). The courts did not look kindly on this, it is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in criminal law. Self-D necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedo of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. Although the accused in fact kills the victim, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other hand, basis of exempting circumstances is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis therefore is lack of negligence and intent. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, an event happening partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. The petitioner however failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident without fault or intention on his part. His
attempt to prove his defense is based solely on his testimony, but the courts did not think much of it. The evidence on record reveal that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, while it was established that the deceased was stabbed at the doorstop of the accused. The presence of the balisong on the person of the deceased was also not fully established, hence the deceased was approaching without any weapon and no clear sign of hostility. For aggression to be appreciated there must be an actual , sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof. Not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. Appelant was not justified in stabbing the victim. There was no imminent threat to appelants life necessitating his assault on the victim. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
PEOPLE VS. MORALES Note: En Banc case (Callejo was part of this). Automatic review coz they were charged with death penalty kidnapping with ransom FACTS: On Nov 9, 1994 MORALES and MALIT et al. (Morales and Malit lang ang na-charge coz the others were at large), abducted 5 people while they were on board a L-300 van at San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga, for the purpose of extorting ransom money from the parents of the said victims with threat to kill the said victims if their parents failed to deliver the ransom money. The victims were brought and detained in Bataan until the father of victims, Feliciano Tan, paid and delivered to Morales et. al the amount of P92,000.00. Morales was caught and pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After a series of testimonies from the victims, the police and the prosecutor (recounting the kidnapping), MORALES and MALIT testified for their own defense. They denied under oath that they willingly participated in the kidnapping, interposing the defense of having acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. They stated that they met the other co-accused because they were supposedly invited for a construction job. On their way to the construction site (via commute), one of them flagged down an L300 (the one the victims were riding) and poked a gun at the driver. Morales and Malit, who got scared, started walking away but they were forced into the van at gunpoint. They pleaded to be released because they did not want any involvement with the crime but, the other co-accused responded with more threats, including threats to their families. Morales and Malit did a number of acts (was involved in the initial abduction, feeding/guarding the children while they are w/ them,
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instructing the Feliciano to go to Gumi for the ransom) before they were released. Notwithstanding their defenses, both of them were charged by the RTC and sentenced to death. ISSUES: 1. W/N Morales can be granted the exempting circumstances of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. NO Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In the case of People vs. Del Rosario, however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. By not availing of the chance to escape (since the other accused were waiting for them at the distance of 1 kilometer) their allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable. For it to apply: it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. The fear (threats against family members), were not real as they were not supported by evidence. And even if they were real, they were not of imminence as to prevent any chance of escape, and that this fear they allegedly suffered does not suffice to grant them the exempting circumstance. 2. W/N conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt YES The acts done by the appellants (was involved in the initial abduction, feeding/guarding the children while they are w/ them, instructing the father to go to Gumi for the ransom) clearly shows that there was close coordination, indicating a common purpose or design. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
Facts: Paderna, his girlfriend Amelita, and other teenagers went to downtown General Santos City to witness the commemoration of the landing of General Paulino Santos and the first batch of National Land Settlement Administration settlers in Dadiangas before WWII. They stayed until 1am and boarded a tricycle on the way home, which dropped them off in the Silway Bridge because the driver refused to go further out of fear of hold-uppers. When they reached the middle, another tricycle arrived. On board were Tami and Bagatao, who ordered them to stop. Bagatao was armed with a gun. Some of the teenagers fled while four remained. Tami ordered them to leave one girl, Amelita behind while the rest were ordered to leave. Tami and Bagatao took Amelita to the compound of the beachhouse of the Shellane company where Bagatao raped her. She was brought to the Veres Ice Plant where he raped her again. She was raped a third time when they took her to Bagataos uncles house. All the while, Tami served as a look out and assisted Bagatao by removing Amelitas pants, underwear, and by spreading her legs when she refused to do so, all on Bagataos orders. After, Amelitas hands were tied up while Bagatao slept. Tami told Amelita he would release her out of pity and brought her to the Saavedra Saway Elementary School. However, Tami raped Amelita twice, in two separate rooms. After, she was brought to Silway Bridge and was told to go home with the threat that if she told the police, she and her family would be killed. Naturally, Amelita told her family and her boyfriend and they went to the police. The RTC found Bagatao and Tami guilty for the crime of abduction with rape on 3 counts committed with the use of a deadly weapon and were sentenced to 3 reclusion pereptuas each. Tami was additionally found guilty of rape on 2 counts and was sentenced an additional 2 reclusion perpetuas (total of 5). Tami appealed and denied participation in the crimes charged. He maintained that he did not conspire with Bagatao to abduct Amelita and that it was not proven that he agreed to commit the crime. He claimed that he was just following the orders of his cousin when he acted as a lookout. Issue: W/N he is guilty of conspiring with Bagatao YES Ratio: It is a well-settled rule that for collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission, all the accused acted in concert showing that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution. In this case, the simultaneous and participatory acts of Tami and Bagatao
PEOPLE v. TAMI
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reveal a community of design. To hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act pursuant to it. This may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime, or may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the time of commission or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy. Tami was not only present; he actually took part in the sexual assault. To be free of culpability, a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without his will but against his will as well. Compulsion must be of such character as to leave him no opportunity for self-defense in equal combat or for escape. Tami failed to proved this, not taking advantage of the numerous opportunities he had to leave the scene. Other stuff: 1. Tami said it was impossible for both of them to have had multiple sexual intercourse with Amelita in such short a time (around 2 hours) Court said there is nothing incredible about this, given their physical built and age 2. Tami claims the court erred in imposing the penalty of 5 reclusion pereptuas, at most it should only have been 2 counts of forcible abduction with rape. The SC said that he was guilty of 1 forcible abduction with rape and 4 counts of rape pursuant to People v. Jose: Where the four accused forcibly abducted Maggie de la Riva and each of them raped her, the SC held that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature cannot legally be considered as still connected with the abduction. In other words, they should be detached and considered independently of the of forcible abduction and therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter. VINDICATION 1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JESUS G. RUIZ and ALFREDO GUNO, accused appellants. FACTS: Morning: Accused Ruiz [VISLU (a labor union) president] fought with policemen because of the latter allowed civilians to use the Honda the former donated. He called the policemen stupid so medyo nagkainitan. Ruiz left. -
Night: Theres a party at the house of Ruizs niece. The policemen were invited. They parked in front of the VISLU office. Ruiz arrived then started shouting WRONG PARKING! WRONG PARKING! He sent a companion to call the policemen. The policemen obliged to talk to Ruiz. Pero nagkainitan na naman. Ruiz left. Later that night: Riding a pickup, Ruiz and his companions went back to the VISLU office and started firing at the policemen who were about to leave. One died. Others were injured. Ayun, they got convicted of murder and 2 counts of frustrated homicide. Hence, this appeal. The defense claims that the lower court failed to appreciate in favor of Ruiz the mitigating circumstances of (1) voluntary surrender, (2) drunkenness which is not habitual and (3) having acted in vindication of a grave offense.
ISSUE: W/N the erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances. HELD/RATIO: NO to 1 and 2. YES to 3. This Court finds that the first two alleged mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated in favor of said accused. There is nothing in the affidavit and testimony of Jesus G. Ruiz that he intended to surrender when he went to the PC headquarters. The Idea of surrender must have been far from his mind because according to him he just reported the shooting incident to prevent further bloodshed. The defense claims that the accused Jesus G. Ruiz was intoxicated at the time of the shooting incident because he was allegedly drinking Tanduay liquor. He even offered a prosecution witness to join him. This conclusion is without any basis. Not all persons who drink Tanduay liquor get drunk. In fact, the prosecution witness did not testify that Jesus G. Ruiz was drunk or intoxicated. The record has no evidence that shows that the liquor taken by Jesus G. Ruiz was of such quantity as to have blurred his reason and deprived him of self control. Said circumstance must first be established before drunkenness may be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Although the last paragraph of Art. 15, Revised Penal Code fails to provide for the degree of intoxication needed to mitigate the penalty for an offense, it should be such an intoxication that would diminish the agent's capacity to know the injustice of his acts, and his will to act accordingly. However, this Court finds that the mitigating circumstance of having acted in vindication of a grave offense should be appreciated in favor of the accused Ruiz in so far as the killing of Sgt. Bito is concerned. The evidence shows beyond moral certainty that accused Jesus G. Ruiz deeply offended as he was then
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called (abusador) and challenged by the policeman who died to a draw. The question of whether or not a certain personal offense is grave is dependent upon such factors as the social standing of the person, the place, and the time when the insult was made. In the case at bar, the accused Ruiz was the President of VISLU. Considering that he was called an (abusador) and challenged to a draw by the deceased in the presence of other policemen and right in front of his own office building where his laborers were then supposed to be reporting preparatory to a loading job, the act of the accused Ruiz in subsequently killing the policeman is attended by the mitigating circumstance of having acted in vindication of a grave offense.
Melchor escaped. Quidato, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. Quidato was pronounced dead on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later. Two informations were filed. One for the murder of Quidato and the other for Eduardos. The RTC found them (Bacabac, Jose, Jesus, Edzel and Jonathan) all guilty. They all appealed but only Bacabac filed a brief and only his was given due course. Issue: Whether or not Bacabac should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. NO. Ratio: Bacabac is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree." The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head." That act would certainly not be classified as "grave offense." And Edzel is Bacabacs nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. Note: There was a long discussion about conspiracy and the SC said there was conspiracy. There was also treachery. Bacabac is guilty of murder.
BACABAC V. PEOPLE Facts: Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance with Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel). Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Quidatos group also left. They encountered Jonathan and Edzel. The two groups had a misunderstanding. On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), noticed a commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his hands." He then saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick." He thus told the victim and his companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardo told Jesus to go away for they might shoot him. Jesus left and went to Edzel's house to report to his father what he had witnessed. Meanwhile, Edzel and Jonathan escaped. The victim and his companions then headed for home. They met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac (Bacabac), with Edzel and Jonathan who are Bacabacs nephews; Also there were Edzel's father, Jose, Edzels mother, and his two sisters. Bacabac and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel had a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively. Jesus then pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out, however, "You are just bragging that you are brave. You are only bullying small children. Bacabac, at that instant, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at the victim and Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on the move to strike Quidato with a piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And so did Quidato who was in a kneeling position, and as he was raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot him again.
PEOPLE VS. IGNAS June Ignas Y Sanggino and Wilma Grace Ignas are husband and wife. However, Wilma was having an affair with Nemesio Lopate. Later on, Wilma left for Taiwan. She sent 4 letters, 2 of which are meant for Romenda Fogayao and the other 2 for Nemesio. In her letter for Romenda, Wilma instructed the latter to reveal to June her affair with Nemesio. Romenda informed June that Wilma was having an affair with Nemesio. She added that the two had spent a day and a night together in a room at Dangwa Inn in Manila. June got furious. He uttered There will be a day for that Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio. Two gunshots were heard by the witnesses in the evening at the Trading Post (some kind of a vegetable market) in La Trinidad, Benguet. The fallen victim was
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Nemesio. He was brought to the hospital but then he died upon arrival. The RTC found June guilty of murder aggravated by treachery, nighttime, and specially aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm, with no mitigating circumstance and sentenced to the penalty of death by lethal injection. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred when it ruled that the killing of the deceased was attended by evident premeditation, treachery and nighttime??? -- YES Whether or not the RTC erred in appreciating the alleged use of an unlicensed .38 caliber firearm as an aggravating circumstance??? -- NO
RULING: The amended information does not definitely and categorically state that the unlawful killing was attended by the aggravating or qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect only on December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio, as a procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should be given retrospective application. Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity in the amended information, it was error for the trial court to consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty of murder. As worded, we find that the amended information under which June was charged and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall under the scope and coverage of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 8, 1997, where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer be imposed since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. This Court has held in a number of cases that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearm where another crime, as indicated by R.A. No. 8294, is committed. Although R.A. No. 8294 took effect over a year after the alleged offense was committed, it is advantageous to June insofar as it spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms and thus should be given retroactive application.
November 12, 1934 FACTS: Between 11 and 12 o'clock on the night of May 13, 1934, Marciano Retubado, the deceased, and Vicente Matbagon, the defendant, had a fight at the cockpit in Cebu Province. The fight resulted from a remark made by the Matbagon respecting the tuba sold by the niece of Retubado. Shortly after they bit each other, Retubado called his son and they started home. When they came opposite a colo tree, about fifty meters from the cockpit, Matbagon approached Retubado and stabbed him in the breast. Emiliano Retubado cried for help. Rufino Surigao was the first to arrive. Retubado struck the Matbagon on the head with the bottle that he was carrying. The bottle was broken and the light went out. A struggle between the accused and the deceased followed. Retubado received in all four wounds. He died in a few minutes from the wounds that he had received on the breast and on the left side of the chest. The accused then ran away. Lower Court: Guilty of murder because the crime was committed with treachery; aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was offset by the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, crime committed a few minutes after he was bitten by the deceased. Issue: Whether the court erred in the appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. YES SC: Evidence does not justify the finding of the trial judge as to the classification of the crime or the appreciation of the modifying circumstances. There could not be, under the circumstances of this case, both treachery and the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, because the nocturnity would be included in the treachery as an inseparable incident, and should not be considered separately (U. S. vs. Salgado). With respect to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, it was improperly appreciated in this case. At least half an hour intervened between the fight at the cockpit and the stabbing. The accused in waiting for the deceased near the colo tree and in attacking him was actuated by a desire for revenge. The attack was not the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury (People vs. Hernandez). As to the question of whether or not the crime was committed with alevosia or treachery, if the accused had been hiding behind the tree and had stabbed the deceased without warning, the crime would undoubtedly have been committed with treachery, but that is not what took place in this case. The accused was waiting near the colo tree, and when a braza away he was seen by the son of the deceased, and presumably by the deceased. The accused with a knife in his hand walked up to the deceased and stabbed him in the breast. Under these circumstances we think it is clear that there was no
PEOPLE v VICENTE MATBAGON
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treachery or alevosia as that term is used in the Revised Penal Code. As to whether or not nocturnity should be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance in this case, tt was said in the case of People vs. Trumata and Baligasa, that nocturnity should not be estimated as an aggravating circumstance, since the time for the commission of the crime was not deliberately chosen by the accused; that if it appears from the record that the accused took advantage of the darkness for the more successful consummation of his plans, to prevent his being recognized, and that the crime might be perpetrated unmolested, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity should be applied (U.S. vs. Billedo). In the present case none of the foregoing reasons exists for appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. Separate Opinions MALCOLM and GODDARD, JJ., dissenting: We are of the opinion that the crime committed was murder qualified as such because of the presence of treachery and that consequently the judgment should be affirmed. HULL, J., dissenting: The RPC provides that nocturnity is an aggravating circumstance when the circumstance "may facilitate the commission of the offense." This language is clear and contemplates that each case will be considered on its merits. There is no need of an elaborate argument to expound the meaning of the section if the plain words therein used are given their every-day current use. The test fixed by the statute is an objective one. If I read the majority opinion right, before nocturnity can be considered, it must meet the objective test fixed by the statute and a subjective test fixed by the majority opinion. To hold that a sudden, murderous assault committed on a dark night has no greater chance of success than if committed in broad day-light, does violence to the experience of mankind.
deceased returned with a slingshot (Indian pana) which he used, hitting accused-appellants father in the mouth. Palabrica reported the matter to the police. The next day, he was told by his sister that the deceased and some companions were looking for him. He, therefore, looked for the deceased and found him on Ylagan Extension Street, playing billiards with some companions. When the deceased saw him, he said, so you are here, while drawing the knife tucked in his waist. Accused-appellant claimed that he then stabbed the deceased in the stomach with the knife he was carrying and ran away. (When asked why the deceased had two stab wounds, accusedappellant said that after the deceased had been stabbed, he fell down near a pedicab and that he may have sustained injuries as a result). Prosecutions version: The prosecution presented an eyewitness, Domingo Lombreno, Jr., the caretaker of the billiard hall where the incident happened. He testified that that night, Silvano played a billiard game with Andrew Limpio. While the game was in progress, Lombreno, Jr. said he noticed accused-appellant shoving people out of his way as he walked towards the deceased, who was then waiting for his turn at the billiard table. He said that when accused-appellant arrived, he said to Silvano, So you are here! Then accused-appellant stabbed the deceased and quickly made his exit. According to Lombreno, Jr., the deceased was unarmed. Trial Court rendered a decision finding accusedappellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (penalty: death). Accused-appellants claims that he acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against his father (mitigating circumstance). Issues: 1. WON the crime commited was murder qualified with treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation -YES! 2. WON court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against his father. -NO! There was treachery in the commission of the crime as shown by the following: (1) the employment of means of execution which gave the deceased no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption by accused-appellant of the means of execution. The deceased Silvano was unsuspecting when attacked as he was waiting for his turn at the billiard table when accused-appellant stabbed him. Moreover, the weapon used and the nature of the injuries inflicted, showing that accused-appellant aimed at a vital spot of the deceaseds body, establish that accused-appellant
PEOPLE VS. ROBERTO PALABRICA Facts: An information for murder was filed against Roberto Palabrica alleging that he stabbed Vic Jun Silvano using a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, causing his death. Accusedappellant Palabrica testified solely in his defense. Palabricas version: Palabricas family owned a store along the national highway leading to San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. One evening, the deceased, Silvano, was in his store for some beer. Silvano had a quarrel with another customer which Palabrica tried to pacify. Silvano resented this and pulled out a knife. Palabrica broke a bottle and, upon seeing this, the deceased ran away. The
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deliberately adopted the particular mode of attack to ensure the commission of the offense with impunity. The killing of Silvano was premeditated. Contrary to his claim, accused-appellant had a reason for attacking Silvano (Silvano hit his dads mouth using an Indian pana). Although he denied it, accused-appellant could not have helped harboring ill will towards the deceased. He even admitted that on he went around looking for the deceased. He went to many places and did not stop until he found him at the billiard hall. In addition, it is to be noted that accused-appellant armed himself throughout the search with a long knife. All these convince us that the killing of the deceased had been premeditated. The accused-appellant had practically an entire day to reflect on the consequences of his act. Thus, the following elements of evident premeditation: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act were established in this case. Accused-appellant claims that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense should have been appreciated in his favor. The circumstance cannot be appreciated where, as here, the accused had sufficient time to recover equanimity. For in this case, the incident at the store, from which reason accused-appellant claims he stabbed the deceased, happened the night before. Thus, he had sufficient time to regain his composure. In fact, he sought the assistance of the police. This cannot be reconciled with his present claim that he acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against his father. The killing is murder, qualified by treachery. As the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged and proven and as there is no mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly sentenced accused-appellant to death
Caber admitted killing Ramirez but interposed that he did so in self defense. Caber declared that he was 63yrs old, and that he worked at Caltex gasoline station. One morning, on his way to work as he was alighting from the pedicab, he heard someone shout Manong Caber, someone is going to kill you! and turned to see Ramirez who was about to stab him. He was able to parry the blow and turn the knife towards his attacker and in the process stabbing him. (back story to why Ramirez wanted to kill Caber: Allegedly, Cabers wife filed a rape case against Ramirez as a result of which Ramirez was detained. So in short, Caber is arguing that after being released, Ramirez wanted to kill him because of revenge. Also, Caber insists that he holds no grudge against Ramirez for what the latter did to his wife) TC: Caber is guilty with mitigating circumstance of passion/obfuscation and qualifying circumstance of premeditation and treachery. Issue: 1) Whether there was self defense? 2) Whether there was premeditation and treachery? 3) Whether there was passion/obfuscation?43 Held: 1) No self defense! The defense that Caber killed Ramirez in self defense has no merit. Upon invoking self defense, it was the burden of Caber to prove that: 1) the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression; 2) there was reasonable necessity for the means employed; and 3) that there was no sufficient provocation on part of the person making defense. Proof of unlawful aggression by the victim is an indispensable element of self defense. But note that even if there was unlawful aggression in the beginning, once it has ceased, hostility on the part of the person making defense should also cease. The circumstance of running after Ramirez and then stabbing him twice belies the argument of self defense. Assuming that indeed, Ramirez initially attacked Caber, the fact that the former ran away after doing so means the unlawful aggression has ceased. Cabers act of pursuing Ramire when there was no more threat towards him belies self defense. 2) No premeditation and treachery! For evident premeditation, prosecution failed to prove: 1) the time when Caber determined that he will commit the crime; 2) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and 3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him the opportunity to reflect on his actions. Prosecution only presented the circumstance that Caber wanted revenge because Ramirez raped his wife. Theres also no treachery. To prove treachery it must be shown that: 1) at the time of the attack, the victim
PEOPLE VS FRANCISCO CABER Facts: Julian Rama saw Francisco Caber chasing Teodolfo Ramirez with a bladed weapon which was locally known as pisao. Rama was able to identify them because Caber was his fellow tanod while Ramirez was his kumpadre. Ramirez ran towards Rama asking for help. Rama raised his hands telling Caber to stop. Although Ramirez used Rama as shield Caber was still able to stab Ramirez on the chest, twice. Caber surrendered to Rama whereas Ramirez was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
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was not in a position to defend himself; and 2) the accused consciously adopted the particular means, methods or form of attack employed by him. In this case, Ramirez sought cover behind Rama hence, he knew the danger facing him and tried to escape it albeit unsuccessfully. There can be no treachery under those circumstances. 3) No mitigating circumstance of passion/obfuscation! In order that passion/obfuscation might be appreciated it must be shown that: 1) an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind [of passion/obfuscation]; and 2) said act which produced the obfuscation must not be so far removed from the time of the commission of the crime. This is because after a considerable length of time, the perpetrator might have already calmed down. Moreover, the act must be shown to have arisen from lawful sentiments and not that of lawlessness revenge In this case, Caber admitted himself that he harboured no ill feelings and that he didnt even know that Ramirez had already been released. This in itself belies the claim that he acted out of passion/obfuscation. Furthermore, the stabbing incident took place 3days after the rape took place. Thus, the act which supposedly caused the passion/obfuscation was so far removed from the stabbing. In United States v. Sarikala the Court ruled that the lapse of more than 24 hours, reckoned from the commission of the act which produced the passion or obfuscation up to the time of the commission of the felony, constituted a considerable period of time after which such circumstance would no longer be deemed present. NOTE: mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is appreciated. Caber has not yet been arrested when voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority.
neighbors mauled him. He ran home to get a knife tapos nagwala na siya, wanted to pick a fight to whoever he sees. He claims that in the process, Alfredo tried to stab him then the latter ran away pero nadapa daw so nasaksak niya sarili niya LC, CA: guilty of homicide but with a mitigating circumstance: passion or obfuscation Issue: tama ba na may passion or obfuscation? SC: meron Passion and obfuscation exist when (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of the mind, and (2) the said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. There is passion and obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In this case it was established that petitioner and his wife had a violent altercation and that petitioner was mauled by his neighbors after he kicked some of them for laughing at him. These events and circumstances prior to the killing of Alfredo Gonzales could have caused unusual outbursts of passion and emotion on petitioners part. These resulted in the tragic stabbing of the victim thus entitling petitioner to the mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation. PASSION AND OBFUSCATION PEOPLE V. VENTURA Spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were sleeping in their room. At around 2am, Jaime was roused from his sleep by accused Felix Ventura (armed with firearm) and Arante Flores (with a bladed weapon) who were able to stealthily enter the house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door. Ventura pointed the gun at Jaimes face, announce a hold up and hit Jaime on the head. The 2 then struggled for the gun, and since Jaime was winning, Ventura called on Flores to stab Jaime. Flores did stab him 3 times. When wife Aileen saw her husband in danger, she cried for help and Flores stabbed her 4 times (she died eventually). The spouses niece who was sleeping upstairs, ran downstairs and recognized Flores as a former employee of the spouses butcher shop. She called on their neighbors for help. Ventura and Flores then fled. The police intercepted the accused and from them recovered a .38 caliber revolver with bullets and a
DANAFRATA VS PEOPLE Accused Danafrata and his wife were having an argument in the streets when the latter hit the former with a plastic chair while Danafrata hit her back (slugging match). Accused ran home then came back again, kicking the neighbours he encountered. Because of his behaviour, he was mauled by 3 neighbors so he had no choice but to go home again to get a knife. He went back to retaliate. He saw the father of one of those who mauled him so accused challenged him to a fight. However, he spotted one of the 3 and so he stabbed Alfredo in the chest. Accuseds version: inaway nga siya ng asawa niya so napahiya siya sa mga tao sa paligid niya. He was so humiliated he kicked a table but because of this, 3
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blood-stained knife. Bombo radio covered their arrest and when asked why, Ventura answered that he suspects that his wife was carrying on an affair with Jaime. It turned out that Venturas wife was a maid for the Bocateja spouses. Ventura saw his wife wearing a new ring, and the wife said it was from Jaime who was courting her. She was dismissed as a maid when Aileen found out their illicit relations. After Ventura and his wife split, the former tried to confirm the truth from Flores who worked for Bocatejas meat shop. He confirmed the affair and helped Ventura with the crime. Trial court: guilty of attempted murder (Jaime), with aggravating circumstance of evident premediation, dwelling, nighttime and breaking of door to gain entrance. Reclusion temporal max. Also, guilty of murder (Aileen), aggravated by abuse of superior strength, dwelling, nighttime, breaking of door. Death. Issue: w/n not guilty of murder (accused argue homicide lang) MURDER! Ruling: [for passion and obfuscation] Court ruled out the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as mitigating circumstance. While it is true that jealousy may give rise to P&O, it is necessary that the act which produces the obfuscation was NOT far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. This is the same with immediate vindication of a grave offense it cannot be considered where sufficient time elapsed for the accused to regain his composure. Here, Venturas suspicions were aroused a week before the stabbing incident, when he first confronted his wife about the ring. Also, on the day when they planned to commit the crime, 10 hours lapsed from the time they left their home, armed with weapons already, until they entered the Bocateja residence. Within that time, Ventura even had time to change his clothes at a relatives house, accused even had dinner at the market. At the victims residence, they waited 3 hours (because they didnt want to be caught) before they actually carried out their plan. Certainly, there was enough time that passed for Venturas emotions to cool. Other crim-related things: There was evident premeditation. The execution of the act was preceded by cool thought. It requires: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. Also, the fact that they were armed only
showed their careful and deliberate plan of carrying out a killing. There was clear conspiracy between the accused. Theyre both principals There was taking advantage of superior strength in killing Ailleen. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. It depends on the age, size and strength of the parties, and is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, which is taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on her and her husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does not automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of his superior strength.
PEOPLE V. SALAZAR FACTS: The accused is a moro native of Zamboanga. One morning, he invited his common-law wife to go with him to gather nipa for the repair of their house. Romana then arrived and invited Maxima to accompany her to her house to get palay. Because of the invitation of Romana, Maxima refused to go with her husband, which aroused his anger. At that time, the accused already entertained the suspicion that his wife was having illicit relation with Fortunato, the husband of Romana, to the extent that he believed that the child his wife was bearing was the result of such illicit relation. This incident started the accused on a killing rampage leaving in its wake sixteen dead and some wounded. ISSUE: W/N the accused may avail of mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from jealousy? NO. HELD: Such cannot be invoked in favour of the accused considering that his relationship with his common-law wife was illegitimate. In addition, many days had already passed from the discovery of the alleged infidelity of his common-law wife before he
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committed the crime allegedly in vindication of his honor. As a matter of fact he admitted having planned his vengeance long before the opportune moment came to carry it out.
PEOPLE V. RUBEN TAKBOBO Facts: Accused Ruben Takbobo, a middle-aged fisherman from Cebu, is charged with killing his wife, Lucia, using a knife AND bolo, which instantaneously killed her. Though pleading guilty, the court still orders prosecution and defense to submit evidence as to motive. Lucia was killed on March 25, 1991, at night time. This was all witnessed by their youngest daughter Madilyn, who woke up in the middle of the night due to the noise of the quarreling. She testifies as a child witness that she saw her father grab the bolo and hunting knife towards her mom, before hacking Lucia at the feet, then the neck, then the hands, then the armpit, then on the breast. Shortly after the incident, accused Ruben went to the authorities voluntarily, explaining the story, without any mention of his motive for killing her, nor the fact that he came home from fishing shortly before the killing. However, it was mentioned that the accused has a short temper, and on two separate occasions, wielded the bolo to his other daughters, but only with minor cuts. Accused though, told the court that he killed Lucia because he caught her sleeping with another man. The testimony of the accused states that coming home at 3:00 am from fishing, he finds his neighbor, Cadiz Catulong, sleeping with his wife and that his wife isnt wearing underwear. Accused tried to kill Cadiz, but Lucia pushed him away, causing Cadiz to escape through the window. In the process, he struck his wife, then ran outside to look for Cadiz but to no avail In this appeal, Accused Ruben is claiming for mitigating circumstances of (a) passion and obfuscation, (b) voluntary surrender, and (c) voluntary plea of guilty. Issue: Can those mitigating circumstances be claimed by Ruben? Ruling: Not for Passion and Obfuscation, only for Voluntary Surrender and Voluntary Plea of Guilty The reason why passion and obfuscation would not apply is that, after the High Courts thorough and
careful study, there is no evidence that supports Rubens testimony. Though the exceptional circumstance provided for in Art 247 of the RPC couldve been applied, but the accused failed to present any evidence in his favor. The Court ruled that for this to apply, there must be at least clear and convincing evidence, to apply such exemption. The burden of evidence now, has been shifted to accused, which he failed to give credence to. He needs strength of his own evidence and not the weakness of the prosecution Note also that the Court finds no reason to doubt the testimony of the child. Also, the Court held that his statement that he killed his wife by accident AND that he was really aiming for Cadiz for sleeping with her is NEGATED by the number of stab wounds certified in the medico-legal report, and affirmed by the testimony of the child. Also the report shows that the deceased was wearing panties. Police Inspector Singco, who took accused s affidavit and statement also testified that accused did not mention the act of infidelity at that time. The normal human reaction to such incident is to include such fact in the first step of the investigation. THEREFORE, there being no passion or obfuscation attending, the same cannot be appreciated. The dual requisites therefor: (1) there be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. HOWEVER, the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty (which was made prior to the prosecutions presentation of evidence) must be appreciated. SIDE NOTE: Though there are two mitigating and not aggravating circumstances, the penalty for parricide being reclusion perpetua, the same is indivisible. Therefore, the penalty cannot be lowered to the next lower degree. This doctrine is applicable to indivisible penalties, thus no matter how many mitigating circumstances you have in an indivisible penalty like reclusion perpetua, you cannot lower it.
PEOPLE V. LOPEZ Doctrine: The exercise of a lawful right cannot be the proper source of obfuscation that may be considered a mitigating circumstance Facts: The Lopez family (Placido, Luding, and their children) lived in a shanty on a patch of land owned by
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one Perla Castro in Baguio City. Castro had been seeking the ouster of the Lopezes from her land since 1993. In fact, the Lopez spouses even signed an Acknowledgment Receipt that they received the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as an assistance from Perla Castro to transfer voluntarily their shanty which they have illegally constructed on Castros land. The Lopezes never left anyway. Castro sold her land to Liwayway Maramat. One day, Maramat and Castro decided to inspect the excavations done over the land. When they arrived there, Perla immediately confronted the Lopezes about their digging and told them to stop. She told them to dig instead on the fifty-square meter lot supposedly waived in their favor by a certain Josie Ramos. Perla then asked Maramat to see for herself the new lot where the Lopezes were to transfer. As an afterthought, Perla called on Joselito (the son of Lopez) to show him the new site. While the 3 were talking, Joselito suddenly grabbed the hair of Perla at the back and started hacking her with a bolo. Perla died from the wounds. Joselito was prosecuted for the crime of murder. Joselito contends that the trial court should have appreciated the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. Issue: Was there a mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation? NO. Ruling: For passion and obfuscation to be properly appreciated, it must arise from lawful sentiments. In this case, the trial court was correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance when it ruled that the act of Castro in demanding that the Lopez family vacate her land and transfer elsewhere and discontinue their excavation on the land was not unlawful and unjust as she was exercising her right to her land. The exercise of a lawful right cannot be the proper source of obfuscation that may be considered a mitigating circumstance. Since 1993, Castro had been seeking the ouster of the Lopezes who were unjustly occupying her land. This was further bolstered by a written promise manifested by the Lopezes in their Acknowledgment Receipt to vacate the subject land and after receiving P5,000.00 supposedly for their new house. Despite the fact that was an exchange of harsh words between Perla Castro and Luding Lopez, this cannot overturn the fact that the Castro had long been unjustly deprived of the possession of her own land.
until Sola decided to leave Hicks. Sola found another afroamerican lover in Wallace Current. When Hicks learned about this he went to Currents house to confront the two. While conversing, Hicks said God damn, Ive made up my mind as he was about to grab his revolver. Current got hold of Hicks hand but the latter slapped it away. Current ran inside a room just as Hicks drew his revolver and shot Sola, who was close by in the sala of the house, on the left side of the breast. Sola died. Hicks was charged and found guilty of murder, sentenced to death. Issue: W/N there is the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation? Held: None! Generic aggravating circumstance of premeditation SC held that the crime was attended with the aggravating circumstance of premeditation because it found, according to one of the witnesses, that before the crime, the witness and Hicks were drinking and the latter, while cleaning a revolver said that Solas time had come. SC found that Hicks deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper manner, disguising his intention and claiming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand. Absence of mitigating circumstance As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
PEOPLE VS GUILLERMO BELLO KEYWORD: White Slave Trade FACTS: Bello is a 54 year old widower who was having a common law relationship with Alicia Cervantes who was then only 24 years old. Because of financial strain, Bello induced Alicia to work as a public hostess in Marings Bar; to which she agreed. Bello was very infatuated with Alicia that he watched her dance all the time in the bar. One
UNITED STATES VS. HICKS (once you go black) Facts: Agustina Sola was the mistress of Augustus Hicks, an afro-american. They lived together for about 5 years
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night, Bello saw Alicia enter a movie house with another guy. Bello took her out of the movie house and reminded her to be discreet about her personal conduct. One night, he approached Alicia while the latter was working in the bar to ask for some money. He was sent away by Maring, the bar owner, telling him to stop bothering Alicia as he was already an old man. On his way home, Bello encountered Justo and Luis Marasigan who said so this is the man whose wife is being used by Maring for white slave trade. Infuriated, Bello went to the bar, got hold of Alicia from behind with his left hand and stabbed her several times with a balisong his right hand. He surrendered immediately by going to the municipal building. The trial court made a finding of treachery, evident premeditation, and in cold blood and without provocation. In the dispositive portion however, the trial court considered the aggravating circumstances of (1) nighttime (2) abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness and (3) superior strength offset only by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Bello was convicted to die through electrocution. ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, superior strength, nighttime and abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness may be appreciated. NO Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation may be appreciated YES HELD: TREACHERY there was no treachery. True, Alicia may have been stabbed at the back yet this is but a continuation of earlier stabbing which Bello inflicted in the breast, hypogastric region and left wrist. The back stab was inflicted when Alicia was about to run. EVIDENT PREMEDITATION there was no evident premeditation. Bello carried the Balisong not because he planned on killing Alicia but because he always brings it for protection. The killing was a spur of the moment. SUPERIOR STRENGTH there was no superior strength. Bello was an old man and invalid [baldado] while Alicia was in the prime of her youth, and not infirm. The facts are not sufficient to draw a comparison of their relative strength. NIGHTIME although the killing was done at night, it was not purposely sought or taken advantage of by Bello. In fact, Marings bar was well lit.
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE AND OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS - There is nothing to show that the assailant and his common-law wife reposed in one another any special confidence that could be abused, or any gratitude owed by one to the other that ought to be respected, and which would bear any relation, or connection, with the crime committed. None is inferable from the fact that the accused was much older than his victim, or that he was penniless while she was able to earn a living and occasionally gave him money, since both lived together as husband and wife. Neither is it shown that the accused took advantage of any such special confidence in order to carry out the crime. PASSION AND OBFUSCATION the remarks of the Marasigan brothers hurt the feelings of Bello prompting him to indulge in heavy drinking and thereafter, plead to Alicia to leave her work. This constitutes passion and obfuscation.
Pelonia v People Pelonia was charged with murder. There was a fiesta. Deceased Ignacio Nacilla and his friends went with his friends to the house of Pelonia for dinner. After preparing dinner (with a bolo!), Pelonia told the group into the dining room. However, Nacilla refused and said that he was not there to eat, but to kill. Apparently, Nacilla had a grudge against Pelonia, because Pelonia ratted him out to the Marines for being abusive, and the Marines manhandled him for it. The deceased was a head taller than Pelonia. His friends tried to calm Nacilla down, but he was really mad and told Pelonia that Pelonia was depending so much on his garrand rifle, his issued firearm as member of the CHDF. Incensed at the comment and the fact that it was spoken in his own home and in front of his visitors, and the fact that Nacilla was not even invited, Pelonia went upstairs to his room to get his rifle. He fired a warning shot, but Nacilla did not budge. The accused wife even pleaded with Nacilla to leave, but he refused. So, Pelonia shot him. Pelonia claimed self-defense. He claimed that Nacilla got Pelonias cooking bolo and was about to thrust it, so he shot him. The CA gave Pelonia 3 mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender, immediate vindication of a grave offense, and sufficient provocation. Was there self-defense? SC: No self-defense because no unlawful aggression. Court did not believe that Nacilla was able to get the bolo
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during the time that Pelonia went to his room to get the rifle. Can immediate vindication and sufficient provocation be appreciated together in this case? SC: No. The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was properly appreciated. Pelonia was humiliated in front of his guests and kin in his own house. It is settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance. Guilty of homicide.
People vs. EPIFANIO DIOKNO and ROMAN DIOKNO Yu Hiong was a vendor of sundry goods in Lucena. Salome Diokno, engaged to Yu Hiong, invited the latter to go with her. Yu Hiong and Salome Diokno went to the house of Vicente, Salome's cousin. As they found nobody in the house, they went on their way up to San Pablo, Laguna. Roman Diokno telegraphed his father Epifanio Diokno, who was in Manila, informing him that Salome had eloped with the Chinese Yu Hiong. Epifanio and Roman went to San Pablo, Laguna. They saw Yu Hiong coming down the stairs. When Yu Hiong saw them, he ran upstairs and they pursued him. As the Chinese found the door of the house locked, he shouted that it be opened for him. At that moment, he was overtaken by the Epifanio who carried balisong. Yu Hiong fell on his knees and implored pardon. In that situation Roman Diokno stabbed him with the knife in the back and later in the left side. Epifanio Diokno also stabbed him once. Yu Hiong fell on the landing of the stairs in the balcony, and there he was again stabbed repeatedly. Then Roman Diokno said: "Enough, father." Yu Hiong lost consciousness. ISSUE: WON Ramon should be acquitted? No. WON abuse of superior strength was present so as to qualify the crime of murder? No. Guilty only of homicide. RULING:The testimony of the eyewitnesses leave no room for doubt that Roman Diokno cooperated with his father and stabbed the deceased Yu Hiong with a knife in different parts of the body. Furthermore, the deceased stated in his ante mortem declaration that it was Roman Diokno who inflicted the necessarily mortal wound in his back, which caused his death. AGGRAVATING
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength, qualifying the crime of murder, which the trial court found to have been proven, has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of United States vs. Devela, this court said that "the mere fact that the number of the assailants is superior to that of those attacked by them is not sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority." In this case we have the photographs of the body of the Yu Hiong showing that he had a strong constitution: but there is no evidence of the physical constitution of the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno. Therefore, we cannot determine whether or not said accused were physically stronger than the deceased and whether or not they abused such superiority. Neither does this court find the existence of the other circumstance qualifying murder, that is, evident premeditation, proven beyond a reasonable doubt because, even assuming that both the accused went to San Pablo, Laguna, each carrying the knife used by him in attacking Yu Hiong, it being customary for the people of said province to carry it, it cannot be inferred with certainty from the mere fact that they carried knives that their intention in going to San Pablo was to look for the deceased in order to kill him. In order that premeditation may be considered either as an aggravating circumstance or as a qualifying circumstance, it must be evident, that is, the intention to kill must be manifest and it must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated. It is not enough that it arose at the moment of the aggression.\ Therefore, there having been neither abuse of superior strength nor evident premeditation, the crime committed by the accused is simple homicide. MITIGATING- *read Reyes book. As a general rule, you cannot have both vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation in 1 case. This case is an exception. The presence of the immediate vindication of a grave offense to said accused, may be taken into consideration in favor of the two accused, because although the elopement took place on January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th of said month and year, the offense did not cease while Salome's whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication thereof. Our opinion on this point is based on the fact that the herein accused belong to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home and at the same time spreads
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uneasiness and anxiety in the minds of the members thereof. The presence of the having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or ofuscation, may also be taken into consideration in favor of the accused. The fact that the accused saw the deceased run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit the crime with which they are charged. The fact of surrendering himself immediately to the agents of persons in authority, should also be taken into consideration in favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno. crime of homicide defined and punished in article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Three mitigating circumstances must be taken into consideration in favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno and two in favor of the accused Roman Diokno, with no aggravating circumstance, thus authorizing the imposition of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law (reclusion temporal in its full extent), or prision mayor in its full extent, in the period that this court deems applicable, which is the medium period in this case, in accordance with the provisions of article 64, rule 5, that is eight years and one day of prision mayor. LAUREL, J., Agree as to others, except: the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. It should be observed that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the elopement of Salome, the daughter of Epifanio and the sister of Roman. Salome and the deceased had been engaged for about a year and the evidence shows that the elopement took place at the instance of Salome herself. Under existing legislation, a woman eighteen years of age or over, can contract marriage without the consent of her parents. If she leaves the parental home for this purpose, neither she nor her lover commits any offense. The act of the deceased in eloping with Salome, at the invitation of the latter was not a "grave offense" which called for or justified immediate vindication. DIAZ, J., Crime should be murder. lIt is so qualified by the proven fact that abuse of superior strength. said court, resolving the question whether or not the circumstance of abuse of superior strength should be taken into consideration in a case where two persons attack another, there being no disparity in physical strength between the attackers and the attacked, and the former committed the aggression with arms, the latter having only a small rod to defend himself, sustained the affirmative.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFELINO ZAPATA and FERNANDICO TUBADEZA FACTS: 1. Feb 15, 1951; nighttime (around 8pm): Fausta Tubadeza (Fausta), a 60 year old woman, was cutting firewood when she was approached by the two accused, Zapata and Tubadeza. Zapata confronted her, saying You are the woman who bewitched my wife.Using a piece of wood, he then beat her while Tubadeza dragged her towards the house Councilor Simeon Tubadeza. Her husband Mariano heard what was happening and rushed towards the commotion, but Zapata threatened him. Being old himself, he was helpless. 2. The Councilor told the two accused to go back to Faustas house, and when they returned, they brought back a bottle of wine & a bottle of oil, saying Here are the ingredients for witchcraft which we took from her house. The councilo r then wrote on a statement that Fausta practiced witchcraft on Zapata's wife and had the same thumbmarked by Fausta. Her husband was also forced to sign it. Fausta died that same evening due to her injuries. 3. Tubadezas defense: alibi; Zapatas defense: Fausta admitted being a witch and it was her husband himself who kicked her to death. This was held by the SC to be unworthy of belief. 4. Tubadeza was also held as co-principal: while there existed no previous understanding between the tw, yet it may be implied from the acts of Tubadeza (helping, dragging, accompanying), that they had the same unity of purpose in the execution of the act. ISSUE: What are the aggravating and circumstances to be appreciated in this case? mitigating
HELD: Aggravating Evident premeditation not applicable Nocturnity not applicable; Evidence fails to show that nighttime was purposely sought by appellants to commit the crime Abuse of superior strength APPLICABLE. Evidence positively demonstrates that they disregarded the age and sex of the deceased, it appearing that she was a frail woman of 65, weighing only around 100 pounds and only 4 feet and 8 inches in height, while Zapata and Tubadeza were 32 and 27 years of age, when the crime was committed.
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Mitigating: Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong APPLICABLE. It was evident that they merely wanted to denounce her as a witch before councilor Tubadeza when she was beaten and dragged to the councilor's house, but that she received a beating more than she could take. Obfuscation: APPLICABLE. It clearly appears that appellants committed the crime in the belief that the deceased had cast a spell of witchcraft upon the wife of Zapata which caused her serious illness. SENTENCE: 2 mitigating & 1 aggravating = penalty in its minimum period.
PEOPLE V. PANSENSOY Facts: Accused-Pansensoys legally-married wife-Analie had an affair with the victim-Reyes, a jeepney driver. The victim-Reyes and wife-Analie were renting a house in Rizal and this was the place where the accusedPansensoy caught the cheaters and is also where victimReyes was shot in the head at close range by the Accused-Pansensoy. Accused-Pansensoy learned of the house the cheaters were hiding because of his friend Bisaya who told him that he saw the cheaters together with accusedpansensoys son board a jeepney on their way to the house. Bisaya accompanied accused to the house. Accused knocked on the door of the house but he was not able to enter because wife-analie prevented him. Instead he sat on a bench outside the house. Victim-Reyes went out and confronted the accused. Accused asked victim-reyes whether he loved Analie. Reyes answered Yes. Accused asked victim reyes whether he was single. Reyes answered Yes. At this point, although not stated in the case, AccusedPansensoy must have pointed a .38 caliber to the head of victim-reyes. [BTW, accused is a security guard] AccusedPansensoy counted one to three. ONE TWO BANG! Victim-Reyes sprawled on the ground and died. Issue: 1. Murder or Homicide? 2. Is the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation present? Held: CRIME - SC said HOMICIDE because there was no treachery or evident premeditation. Further, the crime is mitigated by passion and obfuscation. 1. Before discussing why there is no treachery or premeditation. The mitigating of passion and obfuscation must first be discussed. In order to be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements should concur: (1) There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; (2) The act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. Accused-claims that he saw the cheaters in their underwear. Wife-Analie claims that they were merely lying down beside eachother. Nonetheless, in either case it is easy to see how accused-Pansensoy acted with obfuscation because of jealousy upon discovering his legitimate wife in the company of another man and the brazen admission by this man that he loved his wife. Moreover, this is aggravated by the fact that the cheaters brought with them the child of Pansensoy. Extreme emotional pain could result from such a situation and produce such passion and anguish in the mind of a betrayed husband as to deprive him of self-control. To be blinded by passion and obfuscation is to lose self-control. In this case, there is a clear showing that there were causes naturally tending to produce such powerful passion as to deprive the accused of reason and self-control. Further, the killing was not far removed from the act producing the passion. Only a few minutes have elapsed. 2.A. Treachery cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation. The reason for this is that in passion, the offender loses his control while in treachery the means employed are consciously adopted. One who loses reason and self-control cannot deliberately employ a particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. 2.B. Similarly, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot co-exist with the circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by calm thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a composed judgment.
PEOPLE vs. PAGAL (NO USEFUL FACTS) FACTS: Accused-appellants Pagal and Torcellino were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, with the generic aggravating circumstances of nightime purposely sought to better accomplish their criminal design; evident premeditation; in disregard of the respect due the offended
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party; and with abuse of confidence, the accused being then employees of the offended party. When the case was called for arraignment, the accused entered a plea of guilty but they were allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act, and that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. The RTC, after considering the 4 aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstance of only plea of guilt, found them guilty of the crime charged, sentencing them with the penalty of death. The case was elevated to the SC by virtue of the mandatory review on account of the penalty of death imposed on the accused. ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in not appreciating in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstances of (1) sufficient provocation and (2) passion or obfuscation. HELD/RATIO: NO, the RTC is correct. As a rule, two or more mitigating circumstances arising from the same act cannot be considered as separate and distinct circumstances but should be treated as one. Thus, in this case, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered because the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation arose from the same incident, which is the alleged maltreatment and/or ill-treatment caused by the victims towards the accused-appellants. As to the circumstance of passion and obfuscation, it cannot be treated as mitigating if the crime involved was planned and calmly meditated before its execution, such as in this case of robbery where the appellants are expected to have carefully planned its execution. Thus, in People vs. Daos, a case of robbery with homicide, this Court rejected the claim of the appellants therein that passion and obfuscation should have been estimated in their favor, because the death of the victim therein took place on the occasion of a robbery, which, before its execution, had been planned and calmly meditated by the appellants. Finally, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately proceeding the act. We hold that the trial court did not commit any error in not appreciating the said mitigating circumstances in favor of the appellants.
their way to the house of Didoy Elican. As they were walking along the road at they met petitioner who collared the victim, saying, Get it if you will not get it tonight, I will kill you. Thereafter, petitioner immediately stabbed the victim on the chest with a Batangueo knife. The place was illuminated by a street light 3 to 4 arms length away from the petitioner, enabling Dante Reginio to easily recognize the latter who happened to be his barangay mate. Dante Reginio and Nelson Magbanua executed a sworn statement identifying the petitioner as the culprit. On cross-examination, Dante Reginio was confronted with an affidavit of desistance allegedly executed by him and Nelson Magbanua stating, among others, that they both realize that it might be another person who stabbed Clemente Del Gracia since it was dark that night of the incident. Dante Reginio, however, denied knowledge of the aforequoted affidavit and claimed that his signature appearing thereon was a forgery. On the other hand, the defense evidence consisted of denial and alibi. Petitioner declared that at 6:00 pm. of the night of the incident, he was in San Jose, Antique, waiting for the arrival of his wife from Iloilo City. The following day, his friend told him that he was the suspect in the killing of Clemente Dela Gracia. For fear that he might be incarcerated, he went into hiding, but his mother convinced him to surrender to the police station. Nelson Magbanua admitted that he signed an affidavit of desistance. He stressed, however, that he knew it was the petitioner who stabbed the victim but he yielded to the pleas of petitioners wife and signed the affidavit because he pitied her as she was then pregnant. The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. On appeal, petitioners conviction for the crime of homicide was affirmed but the penalty was modified appreciating the mitigating circumstance of VOLUNTARY SURRENDER. Issue: 1.
On the veracity of the affidavit of desistance allegedly executed by Dante Reginio and Nelson Magbanua shows that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the culprit.
Held: The contention is without merit. Dante Reginio declared that the signature appearing above his typewritten name on the affidavit of desistance was not his, while Nelson Magbanua stated that he merely signed the affidavit out of pity for the petitioners wife. 2. The mitigating circumstance surrender appreciated by the CA. of voluntary
LUCES V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES Facts: At 6:30 in the evening Dante Reginio, Nelson Magbanua, and the victim, Clemente Dela Gracia, were on
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Held: The Court of Appeals erred in appreciating the same in favor of the petitioner. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance. In the case at bar, petitioner surrendered to the authorities in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This hardly shows any repentance or acknowledgment of the crime on the part of the petitioner. Moreover, at the time petitioner surrendered, there was already a pending warrant of arrest against him. His arrest by that time was imminent. Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
offered to accompany her home. On their way they met four men, one of whom turned out to be a brother of the accused who identified Eddie Basite as the person described by Sonia. They asked her to look for him but she refused. Sonia proceeded instead to Monsoyohoy to wait for her uncle Nazario Habungan who, she learned earlier, was going home and would pass by Monsoyohoy. When she was already with his uncle and on their way to the police station, they saw the accused. Her uncle asked him to go with them to the police station but Basite fled. They pursued him and eventually caught him. Went to the police station, underwent medical examination then filed an Information for Rape against the accused. TC found him guilty of rape. Basite contends the TC should have considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He explains that he voluntarily surrendered to then Barangay Captain Gilbert Sacla, and willingly went with him and complainants relatives to the police station. ISSUE: WON voluntary surrender should be appreciated NO HELD: A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. If none of these two reasons impelled the accused to surrender, because his surrender was obviously motivated more by an intention to insure his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous. The conduct of accused-appellant after the commission of the offense, of running away after having been stabbed by Sonia and of fleeing from her relatives when they tried to bring him to the authorities, do not show voluntary surrender as contemplated under the law. It appears that basite willingly went to the police authorities only to escape the wrath of Sonias relatives who were pursuing him and who appeared to be thirsting for his blood.
PEOPLE V. BASITE Voluntary Surrender | Justice Bellosillo FACTS: Sonia Pa-ay, (19 yo student of midwifery, polio victim) was in Natuel, Buguias, Benguet, on her way to her parents home in Tinoc, Ifugao, to get her allowance. As she was walking, she met Eddie Basite who was headed towards the opposite direction. A few seconds later, Sonia heard footsteps behind her. When she looked back she saw Eddie Basite following her. He reached her, held her by both hands and told her to go down with him. Sonia resisted. But the accused Eddie Basite pulled out a knife from his waistband, thrust it at her neck and threatened to stab her if she continued to resist. He ordered her to lie down on the ground and out of fear she obeyed. The accused committed the act. When he was through with the sexual assault, he warned her not to relate the incident to anyone or else he would stab her. Upon seeing that the accused had laid down his knife beside her head while he was putting on his clothes, Sonia grabbed the knife and stabbed him on the left shoulder. Wounded, the accused ran away. Sonia tried to put on her clothes, but losing her balance she rolled down the cliff and lost consciousness. When she recovered, she felt pain all over her body and could not find her bearings in her weakened state. She fell asleep and woke up at around midnight. She made her way up the mountain by the light of the moon. She decided to continue on her way to her parents house in Tinoc, Ifugao. Along the way she passed by a house where she was offered camote to eat. Some soldiers arrived and
21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO ABELLA, DIOSDADO GRANADA, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN, and EDGARDO VALENCIA, accused-appellants. FACTS: It all started with an altercation during a basketball game. 3 days later, the 5 victims bodies were found in the Pasig River. Victims were Marlon and Joseph Ronquillo, Erwin and Andres Lojero and Felix Tamayo.
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Marlons hands were tied at the back with an electric cord, he had wounds and died from a gunshot to the head. Andres hands were also bound at the back with a rope, his genitals were cut off and had wounds in his body as well, cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation. Josephs hands were tied at the back with a basketball t-shirt, had wounds and died of strangulation as well. Erwins and Felixs body had abrasions and burns, there were cord impressions on his wrists, a fracture in his skull and died by drowning. The accused are Abella, Granada, De Guzman, Valencia (all surnames), for MURDER, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation. There were other accused but their names were dropped from the information later on. March 1992, the victims Ronquillo brothers were played 3 rounds of basketball in Sta. Mesa Manila against the team of Joey de los Santos. The Ronquillos brothers rd won the first 2 rounds but the 3 one ended in a brawl. Later that afternoon, Joey went back to the place carrying 2 pillboxes but were apprehended. So, Joey and his brother just threw stones at the Ronquillos house. The neighbors saw this and ran after them and mauled them. That night, the victims were in front of the Ronquillos house. Suddenly, a white Ford Fiera without a plate number stopped in front of the group. There were 1013 people on board, including Joey and his brother. The passengers in the Fiera alighted, faces covered with handkerchiefs and they were armed. The victims tried to run but a shot was fired and Felix (victim) was shot. They were boxed, kicked and hit and dragged into the van. They were brought to a basement in a compound where witness Elena saw them being mauled, whipped with a gun, beaten with steel tubes and lead pipes. They also had a blowtorch and the victims hands were tied. The victims begged for mercy. Afterwards, they were herded back to the car, seeming almost dead. 2 days later, their bodies were found in the Pasig river. Accused defense was an alibi, that they are INC members and were attending a panata that night. According to them, when they read their names in the newspapers as the perpetrators of the crime, they consulted the INC Central Office and were then accompanied by a lawyer to go to the police station to clear their names, They were later on identified in a police line-up. The RTC convicted all of them for MURDER, with a penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: W/N the accused are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. HELD/RATIO: No. First of all, the witnesses were able to fully establish and prove and connect the appellants-accused to the
crime. The SC is sufficiently satisfied that their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The killing was characterized by treachery. Though treachery should normally attend at the inception of the aggression, the facts show that the victims were first seized and bound and then slain, hence treachery is present. In this case, it is enough to point out that the victims hands were tied at the back when their bodies were found floating in Pasig River. This fact clearly shows that the victims were rendered defenseless and helpless, thereby allowing the appellants to commit the crime without risk at all to their persons. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery. The appellants move to clear their names cannot be accepted as voluntary surrender. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because (1) he acknowledges his guilt or (2) he wishes to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search and capture. When the accused goes to a police station merely to clear his name and not to give himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated.
People v. Diva FACTS: Maximo and Cesaria Diva (DIVA Spouses) were charged with the murder of Ananias Bano (BANO) at the junction of the provincial road and of a trail leading to the house of the Diva Spouses in Barrio Santiago, San Francisco, Cebu, on the afternoon of June 3, 1961. The information alleged that on June 3, 1962, DIVA Spouses w/ intent to kill, conspired and mutually helped each other w/ evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, attacked BANO w/ bolo weapons inflicting 8 wounds, 2 of which were fatal. Based on the evidence of the prosecution: o Prior to the incident, BANO was a resident of Barrio Himinsolan, 4 km. away from Barrio Santiago, both of the municipality of San Francisco, Cebu. BANO married Alejandra Diva Aclon (daughter of Teodora Diva de Aclon and niece of Maximo Diva (ergo, Teodora is the sister of Maximos father, Raymundo Diva). BANO resided in Barrio Himinsolan until Alejandra died in 1958. o In 1961, BANO took Justa Senor as his common law wife. He used to visit the
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land of his deceased wife w/c adjoins the land of Raymundo Diva, about 150 meters to the house of the DIVA Spouses. During this year, as adjoining landowners, a boundary dispute arose between BANO and Maximo, who was then the caretaker of his fathers land. The dispute was eventually brought to court, and was still pending in the CFICebu at the time the incident in question happened. In September 1961, after the boundary dispute case was filed in court, BANO went to Barrio Santiago to attend the wedding of a relative. On his return (at the junction of the provincial road and the road leading to the house of the BANO Spouses [junction]), BANO was ambushed by Maximo Diva and his younger brother, who were both armed with bolos. Nothing serious happened because by-standers intervened. Until his eventual death, no other unusual event happened. Maximo didnt show any belligerence towards BANO whenever they saw each other. On March 1962, BANO got ill of El Tor and became well due to timely medical assistance. On April, Justa Senor fell seriously ill while giving birth but also got well due to proper medical assistance at the Southern Islands Hospital where she was confined for 16 days. To offer thanksgiving to the Lord and the patron saint of Barrio Santiago, BANO and Justa made a pilgrimage on June 3, 1962 to the chapel of Santiago, passing by a road which was 150 meters from the house of the BANO Spouses, without any untoward incident. On their return, BANO and Justa took the same route, but at the junction, BANO was suddenly rushed upon by the DIVA Spouses. Maximo was armed with a bolo while Cesaria with a bolo and a sangalab, a sort of scythe used for cutting grass. The deceased retreated to avoid the hacking blows of Maximo, but while he was defending himself against Maximo, Cesaria sneaked behind BANO and delivered a bolo-blow on his back. BANO continued to retreat while Maximo continued to inflict blows on
him. Already weak, BANO picked up a piece of wood and with it, hit the bolo held by Cesaria causing her to drop the bolo on the ground. o While picking the bolo, Maximo delivered another blow on the right face of BANO. BANO stopped retreating and exchanged blow for blow w/ Maximo (who received wounds on the face, hand, and arms). Meanwhile, Cesaria chickened out and ran away. o Weak and bleeding, BANO was left on the roadside by Maximo. Two persons, together with Justa, approached the scene of the fight. BANO turned over the bolo to Justa w/ instructions to deliver it to the authorities. The other 2 persons helped BANO and led him towards to the Barrio. BANO died at the steps of the stairs of the house of Andres Icoy, a school teacher of Santiago. From the medical certificate issued by Dr. Olitres who autopsied the cadaver, BANO suffered: (1) wound at the right lower jaw; (2) wound near the side of the mouth; (3) wound about the right clavicle; (4) wound at the right side of the chest; (5) wound at the side of the upper part of right forearm; (6) wound at the left arm; (7) wound at the medial side of the left scapular region; (8) wound on his thigh. (3) & (4) were fatal and BANO ultimately died of of hemorrhage and the destruction of internal organs like the lung and big blood vessels. Based on the evidence, DIVA Spouses after the incident nor did they surrender to the barrio lieutenant Rosalio Diva, Maximos uncle, and a resident of their immediate neighborhood. The following day, the chief of police of San Francisco was informed that Maximo Diva had surrendered to the police authorities of the next town of Poro. Defense: Maximo Diva admits killing BANO but claims he acted in self-defense. Cesaria Diva claims that she did not participate in the fight between her husband and BANO. The theory of the defense is: DIVA Spouses were working in the coconut plantation of their father in the afternoon of June 3, 1962, when BANO introduced himself surreptitiously in the coconut plantation and attacked Maximo Diva from behind. So Maximo Diva had to defend himself. The fight started in the coconut plantation about five meters to the provincial road and lasted for about fifteen minutes. Maximo Diva received nine wounds in the different parts of his body,
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although only six were listed by Dr. Olitres in his medical certificate. On the other hand, Cesaria Diva claims that while the fight between her husband and the deceased was going on she was all the time shouting for help but succor did not come TRIAL COURT found the SPOUSES guilty of murder and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The accused appealed from the decision.
ISSUE/S: (1) w/n DIVA Spouses are entitled to mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender? No. (2) w/n there was conspiracy between DIVA Spouses? No. (1) MITIGATING CIRCUSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER After the incident. Maximo Diva left the scene thereof, went to the municipality of Poro, a neighboring town, where Dr. Olitres lived to have his wounds treated by the said doctor, and after the treatment of his wounds, he surrendered to the chief of police of the said town. The trial court considered this act of Maximo Diva as flight, and, therefore, indicative of guilt. To be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the law does not require that the perpetrator must give himself up to the authorities in the municipality where the offense was committed. All that the law requires is for the offender to surrender to the authorities to save the government the trouble and expense of looking for him in order to arrest him. Appellant Maximo Diva surrendered to the authorities the day following the incident. He did not wait for the authorities to arrest him. Thus, an accused who presented himself in the municipal building five days after the commission of the crime to post the bond for his temporary liberty was credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The fact that a warrant of arrest had already been issued is not a bar to the consideration of this mitigating circumstance because the law does not require that the surrender be prior to the order of arrest. By parity of reasoning, therefore, appellant Maximo Diva's voluntary surrender to the chief of police of the municipality of Poro should be considered to mitigate his criminal liability because the law does not require him to surrender to the authorities of the municipality of San Francisco where the offense was committed. (2) PARTICIPATION OF CESARIA DIVA Cesaria Diva was on her six or seven months pregnancy at the time of the incident, and in her condition then obtaining, it is rather doubtful that she would take such active part, as narrated by the witnesses for the
prosecution, in the struggle between two giants who fought for no less than fifteen minutes armed with mortal weapons, without exposing herself to being hit by the blows of one of them, nay, of the deceased, had she approached them and mingled in the fight. We are persuaded, that upon the evidence, the participation of Cesaria Diva in the aggression of the victim is of doubtful veracity. It is more reasonable to believe her testimony that she has been crying and calling for help during all the time the struggle was going on but that no help came. Cesaria Diva did not take part in the commission of the crime, and, therefore, conspiracy did not exist. DISPOSITION: Decision modified - Cesaria Diva is acquitted of the offense charged on reasonable doubt and Maximo Diva is found guilty of homicide, with the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Side Issues: 1. There is lack of premeditation on the part of the accused. The evidence reveals that until the incident occurred (June 3, 1962) nor did Maximo Diva show any belligerence towards BANO whenever they saw each other in Himinsolan and Santiago. To properly appreciate the circumstance of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish with proof, as clear as the proof of the crime itself, that (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect. None of the foregoing requisites are present in the case at bar. 2. There is no treachery. The allegation of treachery is not conclusively proven by the prosecution. Although the deceased was suddenly attacked, but the deceased was able to retreat to avoid being hit by the hacking blows. So that he was only hit when he was already in the act of defending himself against the attack of the accused. 3. Defense of self-defense is untenable. Evidence showed Maximo laid in waiting behind a clamp of iring-iring shrurbs beside the provincial road armed w/ a bolo, w/o perhaps the knowledge of his wife of his purpose and suddenly attacked BANO.Having admitted the killing, it was incumbent upon him to prove by positive evidence or with convincing credibility his claim of self-defense. A primordial requisite for selfdefense is unlawful aggression. This appellant Maximo Diva failed to prove.
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4. Prosecution is not guilty of willful suppression of evidence.
PEOPLE v. QUIMPO FACTS: Accused-appellant Jimmy Dela Cruz y Quimpo was charged with and found guilty of the crime of murder and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The Information alleged that on or about the 1st day of September, 1998 in the evening, in Barangay Tigayon, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a knife, with treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Arnulfo Inocencio, inflicting upon the latter physical injuries. Two eyewitnesses, Jovelyn Felizario, cousin of Arnulfo, and Glen Cipriano testified that in the evening of September 1, 1998, several visitors were in her house at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan since it was the birthday of her brother, Jonel. At around 11:00 that evening, Arnulfo Inocencio, appellant Jimmy dela Cruz, and brothers Glenn, Gilbert and Greg Cipriano were having a drinking session. Arnulfo played a guitar while appellant sang along. Afterwards, appellant requested Arnulfo to give the guitar to Gilbert. Arnulfo obliged and rose to hand the guitar to Gilbert. When Arnulfo returned to his seat, appellant suddenly drew his knife from his waist and stabbed Arnulfo. According to the witness, appellant then pointed at Arnulfo and said, "There, he is already dead." The witness added she was just two meters away from the victim and the appellant when the stabbing incident happened. Appellant admits that he killed the victim, Arnulfo Inocencio. However, he avers he did it in self-defense. He claims that it was Arnulfo who attacked him first and that he had no recourse but to stab Arnulfo. ISSUE: W/N Quimpo acted in self-defense NO. HELD: By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed upon appellant to prove clearly and convincingly the elements thereof: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. In this case, appellant's testimony miserably failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression. He claims that it was the victim who, without provocation on his part, suddenly attacked him. To defend himself, he was constrained to
pull out the knife from his waist and stab the victim on the chest. The one-inch long wound in appellant's left hand was too superficial to support his claim that it was inflicted while he was parrying the thrust of the victim. The mere fact that he was wounded does not prove indubitably his claim that he acted in self-defense. Nor that the victim and not he was the aggressor. Note that appellant did not present a knife during the trial to bolster his case. The witnesses for the prosecution denied that the victim was armed with a knife and, indeed, none was recovered from the scene of the crime. * The issue on voluntary surrender was not fully discussed in the case. It was only mentioned at the end of the case, as follows: The trial court was correct when it considered the mitigating circumstance of Quimpos voluntary surrender to the barangay captain. Appellant spontaneously and unconditionally placed himself in the hands of the authorities, and saved them the time and effort attendant to a search. The testimony of barangay captain Isberto and the police officer on this point was not contradicted by the prosecution. Thus, we find that the trial court correctly imposed the minimum of the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of murder which isreclusion perpetua. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER NOTE: Know crimpro provisions PEOPLE VS CALPITO FACTS: Calpito was charged with Robbery with Homicide. Initially, Calpito entered a plea of not guilty, but after reinvestigation and re-arraignment, changed his plea to guilty. Court then charged Calpito of Murder instead of robbery with Homicide due to prosecutions failure to sufficiently prove robbery. (Side facts for side issue) Calpito argued that since he was a minor (16 years old) when he committed the crime, although his birth certificate could not be verified, he should be credited with mitigating circumstance of minority. RTC didnt consider this and no mitigating circumstance was applied. ISSUE: (related to topic hinde expressly sinabi but I just assumed given the topic) W/N Calpito should be credited with mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty even though he pleaded not guilty on the first arraignment. YES. RATIO: The requisites of this circumstance are: (1) that the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
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(2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. In this case, upon re-arraignment, appellant, in the presence of his counsel, and in open court, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime charged before the prosecution presented its evidence. This mitigating circumstance should therefore be considered in computing the proper penalty. SIDE ISSUE: W/N minority can be credited to Calpito notwithstanding unverified birth certificate. YES. SIDE RATIO: It is established that during the crime, Calpito is indeed below eighteen. Though his real age cannot be ascertained and that the birth certificate that he presented is not satisfactory, throughout the trial, however, he has consistently stated his age as being below 18 at the time of the commission of the crime. His conviction is affirmed but his penalty is reduced.
Ratio: Takbobo admitted his guilt in open court prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, which is a requisite for this mitigating circumstance . But despite the presence of two mitigating circumstances (other is voluntary surrender) without any aggravating circumstance, the court did not agree with the recommendation of the SG to reduce the penalty to reclusion temporal. This would patently run counter to the rules for the application of indivisible penalties under Art. 63. Art. 246 defines the crime of parricide and imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63, when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the penalty cannot be lowered by one degree, no matter how many mitigating circumstances are present. Par. 5 of Art 64 (Rules for application of penalties with three periods) applies only to divisible penalties.
PEOPLE OF THE MAGALLANES [Doctrine: plea of Guilt]
PHILIPPINES vs.
GREGORIO
PEOPLE v. TAKBOBO Facts: Ruben Takbobo, a middle aged fisherman, was charged with killing his wife, Lucia, by hacking and stabbing the latter with a knife and bolo. Takbobo went to the authorities and told them what happened. Their daughter testified in court that Takbobo had the propensity for inexplicable resort to violence against members of his family (one of her fingers was cut and the third finger of her older sister was split by a bolo wielded by their father). Takbobo said that the reason he killed his wife was because he caught her sleeping with another man. He arrived home at 3am from his fishing activity when he his wife sleeping with their neighbor. He tried to kill him by stabbing him but his wife pushed the man who immediately jumped out the window. As a result, his wife was hit by his thrust. He then found out that his wife had no panty. He tried searching but failed to find the other man. He immediately reported the incident to the police though he was not able to execute his affidavit as he was very confused. Takbobo entered a plea of guilty. The RTC found him guilty of parricide but did not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty. Thus, this appeal. Issue: Did the court err in not considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty - YES
FACTS: Accused-appellant Magallanes was a "mananari" or gaffer of fighting cocks. He and his friends were walking towards the cockpit. Along their way, they met deceased Virgilio Tapales who was drinking in a store. Tapales called one of Magallanes friends (Cempron) who were walking with him. For some unknown reason, Tapales then directed his attention to the appellant who was walking a few steps behind Cempron. Tapales held the appellant by his shirt slapped him and strangled his neck. But seeing a knife tucked in Tapales' waist, the appellant pulled out the knife and slashed at Tapales to loosen his grip. The appellant succeeded in wounding the face and neck of Tapales who let go of the appellant and fled for his life. Insatiated, the appellant pursued Tapales and when the latter fell, the appellant stabbed him several more times. Later, the appellant surrendered to the police authorities. Accused-appellant Magallanes was charged by the prosecution for Murder. During arraignment, accused-appellant Magallanes expressed his willingness to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. The prosecution refused to lower the charge from murder to homicide, hence, trial ensued after which, a decision was rendered finding the appellant guilty of the crime of murder. ISSUE: Whether or not accused Magallanes should be convicted of Murder or homicide. HELD: Homicide.
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The appellant asseverates that the killing of Tapales was not attended by treachery which would qualify it to murder, hence, he should have been convicted of the crime of homicide only. On the other hand, the prosecution insists that the killing was treacherous because it was perpetrated while the defenseless Tapales was running away from the appellant, thereby giving the latter opportunity to stab Tapales at the back without warning. On this issue we find for the accused-appellant. Absent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we therefore find the appellant guilty only of the crime of homicide. Moreover, a careful scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the trial court had erroneously failed to appreciate in mitigation of the appellant's penalty the circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. On record is the appellant's willingness to enter a plea of guilty but to the lesser crime of homicide. It only remains to consider briefly whether the appellant's plea of guilty in the form it was entered constitutes a voluntary confession of guilt before the court as defined in paragraph 7 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. In People v. Yturriaga where the accused who was charged with murder entered a qualified plea of guilty by claiming that the alleged qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation did not exist, we said that: Although the confession was qualified and introduction of evidence became necessary, the qualification did not deny the defendant's guilt and, what is more, was subsequently fully justified. It was not the defendant's fault that aggravating circumstances were erroneously alleged in the information and mitigating circumstances omitted therefrom. If such qualification could deprive the accused of the benefit of plea of guilty, then the prosecution could nullify this mitigating circumstance by counteracting it with unfounded allegations of aggravating circumstances. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by convicting the appellant Gregorio Magallanes of the crime of homicide only with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty in his favor. [Note: In simple terms, a plea of guilt is a mitigating circumstance. But the question is, how about if the accused pleaded guilty of a lesser crime than that charged against him? Will it be considered a mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt? Yes! For example, in this case, the Court is saying that accused-appellants confession is qualified. It is qualified because although he admitted the commission of a crime (homicide only), he did not admit to the crime that was charged against him (murder). However, this qualified confession, according to the court, did not deny the defendants [accused
Magallanes] guilt. Hence, even though it was a qualified confession, he still admitted his guilt anyway. Otherwise, if we do not interpret the law this way, then the effect would be that the prosecution would simply counteract this plea of guilt with unfounded allegations of aggravating circumstances.]
ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner was the town treasurer and used public funds of a town in Bohol admitting that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine. Filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner was recommended by the Auditor. An administrative case was filed against petitioner to which he filed an answer reiterating his earlier verbal admission before the audit team. He eventually was able to remit amounts equivalent to that which he used. Later, petitioner was charged and conviction before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds. ISSUE: W/N the penalty may be mitigated. HELD/RATIO: YES. In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. (Underscoring supplied) The amount malversed totalled P72,784.57. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, which has a range of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years. However, the commission of the crime was attended by the mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner restituted the full amount even before the prosecution could present its evidence. That is borne by the records. It bears stressing that the full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate an accused, as payment is not one of the elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of
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the sum misappropriated, even before the commencement of the criminal prosecution, does not exempt the guilty person from liability for the crime. At most, then, payment of the amount malversed will only serve as a mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 1387 in relation to paragraph 1088 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code. But the Court also holds that aside from voluntary surrender, petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong, again in relation to paragraph 10 of Article 13. The records bear out that petitioner misappropriated the missing funds under his custody and control because he was impelled by the genuine love for his brother and his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the funds to pay off a debt owed by his brother. Another portion of the misappropriated funds went to his medications for his debilitating diabetes. Further, as shown earlier, petitioner restituted all but Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) of the funds in less than one month and a half and said small balance in three (3) months from receipt of demand of COA on January 5, 1999. Evidently, there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
store approximately two arms length from him. Then he saw Rodrigo handing a bolo to his brother Rodolfo and an ice-pick one foot long to their cumpadre, saying at the same time, The one in white shirt. In a swift, sudden motion, the cumpadre bluntly stabbed Carlos Reyes on the chest, asking his companions, Ito ba? By this time, Rodrigo was six arms length away watching the whole incident. Meanwhile, Rodolfo, still holding the bolo, served as a back-up, standing near his cumpadre. He also shouted Walang makiki-alam! Carlos, wounded and bleeding, fell on his back. After which, the three ran away in the same direction. Danilo was able to clearly see what transpired because the place was well-lighted by electric lights emanating from the store and the lamp post. Danilo helped the parents of Carlos Reyes institute the case. Rodrigo Hilario said the event never took place and that Danilo implicated him because Danilo had a grudge against him. He said he was roving with his fellow barangay tanods that night. The RTC found Rodrigo Hilario guilty of murder, qualified by evident premeditation, and with the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery without any mitigating circumstance, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not the accused is liable despite the error in personae. Held: Yes! Sc affirms the conviction. Ratio: The fact that the accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment. According to Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado, or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. [10 The accused performed voluntary acts. Their purpose was to kill. Hence, notwithstanding the mistake in the identity of the victim, the accused are still criminally liable. It is to be noted that the lower court, in finding the appellant guilty of murder, qualified the killing by evident premeditation. Evident premeditation, however, may not properly be taken into account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim. When the person decided to kill a different person and premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when he carried out his plan he actually killed another person, it cannot properly be said that he premeditated on the killing of the actual victim. Thus premeditation was not aggravating in the case of People vs. Guillen, where the accused had deliberately intended
PP v. HILARIO Facts: One afternoon, accused Rodrigo Hilario, together with his brother Rodolfo, and someone who appears to be their cumpadre (whose name is uknown) went to the house of Danilo Manzanares. Manzanares was a watch repairman and the Hilarios, (Manzanares uncles because they were the siblings of Danilos mom) visited him to have the bracelet of Rodolfos watch restored. While Danilo was busy fixing the bracelet, the three were conversing nearby. He inadvertently heard Rodrigo saying, Pare, nandyan na ang taong titirahin natin, si Berong. In response, Rodolfo remarked, Padilim tayo. After 30 minutes, the three left and proceeded to the Barangay Hall which is only two houses away. At about 8:30 in the evening, Danilo went to Mang Jacks store. There, he saw Berong and the victim Carlos Reyes in front of the store squatting and talking to each other. Both were wearing white shirts. A little later, Berong removed his white shirt. Fate must be smiling on him that night because uncannily, this innocent act would later save his skin at the expense of Carlos. At this juncture, Danilo saw Rodrigo, Rodolfo and their cumpadre approaching from the other side of the
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to assassinate former President Manuel Roxas but he killed instead Simeon Varela and wounded others. This doctrinal rule applies here.
PEOPLE VS. GEMOYA The neighborhood of Barrio Malagamot, Panacan, Davao City were awakened by a commotion. Armando Gemoya and Candelario Aliazar, together with their relatives, Ronilo and Rolly Tionko, went towards the house of Irene Lantapon. They were armed with pipe, wood, and an improvised bow and arrow locally called Indian Pana. Addressing a group of people who were huddled together, Ronilo stopped and demanded an explanation for what happened to his brother-in-law. They replied that nothing happened to him and advised them to go home. Ronilo ignored them and the four went to the house of the Alferezes. They saw Wilfredo Alferez standing by the road waiting for a taxi. The four rushed at him. Ronilo beat him with a cylindrical wood, Rolly with a pipe, while Candelario held his arms behind him. Armando aimed his Indian pana at Wilfredo and the latter was hit on his left chest. Edgardo and his daughter, Rosalie Jimenez rushed to his aid. But Rosalie was hit on the left ear by Armando. Then the four ran away. Wilfredo was brought to the hospital but he died upon arrival. Rosalie, on the other hand, was declared out of danger. The RTC found Armando and Ronilo guilty of murder and frustrated homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting Armando and Ronilo of the crime of frustrated homicide for the wounding of Jimenez??? -- YES RULING: The hitting of Rosalie was accidental as the second Indian pana was meant for Wilfredo. The intent to kill Rosalie is absent. However, they are still liable for the consequences of their felonious act. Mistake in the identity of the victim, which may either be error in personae (mistake of the person), or aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow), is neither exempting nor mitigating. They cannot therefore escape the criminal liability resulting from the injury suffered by Rosalie. NOTE: Gemoya is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The song evokes the bitterest passions. This is not the first time the song "My Way" has triggered violent behavior resulting in people coming to blows. In the case at bar, the few lines of the song depicted what came to pass when the victims and the aggressors tried to outdo each other in their rendition of the song. FACTS: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas (nephew) and Virgilio Bautista. When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him as the latter was familiar with the song (My Way). Jaime Palaganas got irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being mocked by Melton Ferrer, that caused him to went to the Ferrers table and uttered statements which began the fight. Ferdinand sought help to Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the Bar and upon seeing the Ferrers outside, Ferdinand pointing at the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder. ISSUE: Whether or not the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance which should be appreciated by the court at the case at bar? YES. HELD: Both TC and the appellate court were correct that the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed must be applied against petitioner since the same was alleged in the informations filed against him before the RTC and proven during the trial. However, such must be considered as a special aggravating circumstance, and not a generic aggravating circumstance. Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the RPC. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasirecidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be
PALAGANAS VS. PEOPLE (My Way) CHICO-NAZARIO, J. (Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.):
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proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. We already held in several cases that with the passage of RA8294 on 6 June 1997 , the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance. RA 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance. As was previously established, a special aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case is merely an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, it cannot offset the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm. In accordance with Article 64, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum period.
proceeded to the market place, which was just about 5 meters away. Thereat, he saw at a butchers shop a knife which he took and he right away returned to the barangay hall. When appellant returned, Segundina was sitting on a low rattan stool. In front of her were Nancy and Julie. They did not notice appellants return, especially Segundina who had her back to appellant. Appellant suddenly stabbed Segundina on the left portion of her back. He then ran away leaving the knife at the victims back with the jacket he had covered it with, hanging by the knifes handle. Appellant surrendered right away to the police. Segundina died in the morning of the following day. The appellant does not deny stabbing Segundina Cay-no. However, he maintains that neither treachery nor evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. Appellant testified that he was teasing Segundina that he be her baggage boy of the clothes that she was vending. Segundina got mad and humiliated him in front of many people. Trial court found the appellant guilty of the crime of murder. Issues: 1. WON the information for murder was sufficient -YES! 2. WON there was treachery -YES! 3. WON there is a mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation and sufficient provocation -NO! 1. The Information, as written, consists of two paragraphs. The first paragraph contains the allegations of the date, time, place, the acts constituting the offense, and the name of the victim. Written in a separate paragraph are the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and craft, alleged as attending the commission of the crime.The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited in the second paragraph and not in the first paragraph of the Information, as commonly done, is a matter of form or style for which the prosecution should not be faulted. The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or form adopted in the Information. The New Rules on Criminal Procedure now require that both the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information to be appreciated as such. Under the old Rules, only the qualifying circumstances were required to be alleged in the Information, and aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged, could still be appreciated, except in cases where an aggravating circumstance would result in the imposition of the death penalty.
PEOPLE VS. WILSON LAB-EO Facts: Segundina Cayno was engaged in the business of selling rummage goods. One day, she displayed the goods in front of the public market. Nancy Gaoan and Julie Dangla went to see Segundina to be massaged by the latter. Before noontime, while Nancy and Julie were plucking the white hair strands of Segundina, appellant Wilson Lab-eo arrived and approached his aunt, Segundina. Appellant sat down in front of his aunt and uttered something to her in a very soft voice. Nancy and Julie did not hear what he said because of her distance from them. What they only heard was Segundinas answer which was uttered in a loud angry voice saying you get out because I might suffer high blood. Appellant then
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2. Treachery attended the stabbing of the victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if he deliberately adopted such mode of attack with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution which tend directly and specially to insure the accomplishment of the crime without risk to the assailant arising from the defense the victim might make; and (2) a deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. When a victim is unexpectedly attacked from behind, depriving him of any opportunity to defend himself, undeniably there is alevosia. Craft was likwise absorbed in treachery as shown by the fact that the appellant hid the knife under his jacket to prevent the victim from seeing it and from being alerted of an impending assault. 3. In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. In asking the appellant to leave, the victim did not do anything unlawful. There is an absolute lack of proof that the appellant was utterly humiliated by the victims utterance. Nor was it shown that the victim made that remark in an insulting and repugnant manner. Neither was the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation by the victim proven. From the testimonies of witnesses, it was shown that it was in fact the appellant who provoked the victim. Moreover, this Court has held that the provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of the retaliatory act. Treachery attended the stabbing of Segundina Cay-no, thereby qualifying the killing to murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. However, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death. RA 8294 or RA 8353 PEOPLE V JOHN PETER HIPOL Dunno why this is under firearms. Should be under aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office. Facts: Hipol was employed as Cash Clerk II at the City Treasurers office in Baguio. His duty included assisting the cashier in the preparation of payments of vouchers, correspondences, daily cash reports...etc., and other communications and documents necessary in connection with the handling of cash and other duties which may be
assigned to him. He was also tasked to make almost daily deposits to the collections of the City Treasurer to the PNB. Whenever Hipol was absent, it was Lerma Roque who was ordered to deposit money. Thus, one day, Roque was instructed to gather all deposit slips covering all deposits of funds of the City Treasurers Office with PNB. Roque then opened the unlocked desk drawer of Hipol as was her practice. She inadvertently stumbled upon 3PNB deposit slips inside Hipols drawer which did not appear to have been actually deposited. It was later on verified that indeed they were not verified. Upon further inspection, more slips that were not deposited were found. The COA conducted an audit it was found that around P2M++ collections were made but not deposited. Hipol denies the accusation of malversation of public funds. TC: Guilty. Reclusion perpetua as penalty among others. Issue: Whether Hipol is guilty? And whether aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office should be appreciated? Held: Hipol is guilty! But no aggravating circumstance. (Constitutional and criminal procedure arguments were made --- I wont discuss this anymore). But the gist is: Constitutional argument --- Hipol argues that there was unreasonable search and seizure. But note that this Constitutional proscription does not concern itself with the relation between private individuals. Criminal Procedure --amendment of the information. But the Court said the amendment only referred to the amount involved and not to the crime charged. Conviction for malversation of public funds or property require proof that: 1) the offender is a public officer; 2) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; 3) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and 3) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or property. In this case, the facts are clear that Hipol is a public officer and that he is tasked to regularly handle public funds. Even if the duty of depositing them is not his official task, the fact remains that he had custody of the money. Hipol points the blame to the missing money to the City Treasurer and the Cashier against whom the COA also filed charges against for the shortage of city funds. Nevertheless, under Article 217, the failure of the public officer to present such public funds or property upon demand by a duly authorized officer is prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
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personal use. Being an accountable officer, Hipol may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he cannot explain. Nevertheless, the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office cannot be appreciated in this case. The element of taking advantage of public office is inherent in the crime of malversation of public funds or property. Said crime cannot be committed without the abuse of public office. Also, Sol Gen said that the crime was already economic sabotage. SC: No such thing as economic sabotage as aggravating. (note: Mickey, from Glenn notes)
PEOPLE V. VILLAMOR Around dusk, brothers Jerry and Jelord Velez were on their way home on board a motorcycle after having dinner at a friends house. From behind them appeared a speeding motorcycle, which they ignored. Suddenly, gunshots rang out from behind them and they abruptly turned towards the direction of the gunfire. The lights of their motorbike fell on the attackers, and they clearly identified the latter to be PO3 Renato Villamor and Brgy. Capt. Jessie Maghilom (both accused). The assailants fired at them a second time and then fled. Jerry the driver sustained wounds in the abdomen and elbow, Jelord died from the first gunshot (didnt say which part). Villamor and Maghilom were indicted for murder (Jelord) with treachery and frustrated murder (Jerry) but Maghilom remained at large. Villamor posted an alibi (he was then acting as a security escort for Mayor Yap). Not so important: the Velezes and the Yaps are political rivals. Trial court: guilty of murder with aggravating circ of taking advantage of his public position. Death. For frustrated murder also with the aggravating circ of taking advantage of public position as a policeman, guilty. Reclusion temp, max. Ruling: SC agrees with trial court ruling that there was treachery BUT NO ABUSE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The two conditions for the same are present (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift, sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor
on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. The treacherous manner in which the crime was committed is shown by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting and apparently unarmed victims and also by the deliberate manner in which the assault was perpetrated. In this case, a totally unsuspecting Jelord Velez held onto his brother Jerry on board their motorcycle on their way home blissfully unaware of the onrushing peril behind them. The attendance of treachery qualifies the killing to Murder. The trial court improperly applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position. To appreciate this aggravating circumstance, the public officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. Test: Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime? In this case, there was no showing that Villamor took advantage of his being a policeman to shoot Jelord or that he used his influence, prestige or ascendancy in killing the victim. Villamor could have shot Jelord even without being a policeman. In other words, if the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. The mere fact that accused-appellant is a policeman and used his gun to kill is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crime.
PEOPLE V. TABION Where the information charging accused with rape failed to allege minority and relationship (of victim to accused), he cannot be convicted of qualified rape. Simple rape only, as proved in trial. Regin Tabion (16) was at home weaving baskets when her dad, Dominador Tabion called her to wash plates. The latter was her only companion. Tabion then told her to go into their room, lie on the bed and remove her panty. Tabion had with him a large hunting knife which he used to threaten his daughter. He successfully raped his daughter and warned the latter to not tell anyone about the incident, otherwise, hed kill her and the whole family. This went on 10 times, until she couldnt bear the pain anymore. She confessed to her mom and a case was filed. Tabion denied having raped his daughter and said that his wife merely had a grudge on him because he was an NPA. Trial court ruling: guilty of qualified rape. Penalty of death.
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Ruling: Tabion may only be convicted of simple, not qualified rape. The court is convinced that Tabion raped his own daughter Regin. The testimony of the victim is replete with details; she was categorical, straightforward, unshaken and unwavering even during the grueling crossexamination. Victims testimony was also fully corroborated with the testimony of the examining physician. Accuseds defense of alibi cannot prevail over victims testimony. Indeed, no young girl of decent repute would allow an examination of her private parts or subject herself to the shame, embarrassment and humiliation of a public trial, if she has not in fact been raped. However, it must be noted that the constitution grants the accused the inviolable right to be inform ed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This means that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The accused "is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense" charged. RA 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, imposes the death penalty in the event rape is attended by any one of the seven new special circumstances enumerated in the said statute. Pursuant to the above-mentioned constitutional right of the accused, the death penalty may be imposed only if the information has alleged and the evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to the offender. In the instant case, the age of the victim was not alleged in the Information filed against appellant. Because not all the elements of qualified rape were alleged in the Information, the death sentence cannot be meted out to him. In the crime of rape, the relationship between the offender and the victim is aggravating. Accused guilty of simple rape only, the punishment was lowered (as to period of imprisonment) but moral and exemplary damages were awarded.
policeman. Diosdada instinctively followed suit and sat beside Mario. They cruised towards Roxas Boulevard. The driver then asked Mario why he was carrying a "deadly weapon," to which Mario answered, "for self-defense since he was a polio victim." The driver and another policeman who were both seated in front grilled Mario. They frightened him by telling him that for carrying a deadly weapon outside his residence he would be brought to the Bicutan police station where he would be interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and heckled by the press. As they approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile car pulled over and the 2 policemen in front told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a "deadly weapon" was P12,000.00. At this point, the driver asked how much money they had. Without answering, Mario gave his P1,000.00 to Diosdada who placed the money inside her wallet. Diosdada was then made to alight from the car. She was followed by the driver and was told to go behind the vehicle. There, the driver forced her to take out her wallet and rummaged through its contents. He counted her money. She had P5,000.00 in her wallet. The driver took P1,500.00 and left her P3,500.00. He instructed her to tell his companions that all she had wasP3,500.00. While going back to the car the driver demanded from her any piece of jewelry that could be pawned. Ruefully, she removed her wristwatch and offered it to him. The driver declined saying, "Never mind," and proceeded to board the car. Diosdada, still fearing for the safety of her brother, followed and sat beside him in the car. Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the front passenger seat to place all her money on the console box near the gearshift. The car then proceeded to Harrison Plaza where the Montecillos were told to disembark. From there, their dreadful experience over, they went home to Imus, Cavite. The three policemen were charged and convicted with robbery. Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: W/N the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position should be appreciated against the policemen? YES. HELD: To our mind, the success of the accused in taking their victims' money was premised on threats of prosecution and arrest. This intense infusion of fear was intimidation, plain and simple. As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all means the commission of an offense. As such, he should not have kept his silence but, instead, should have protected the Montecillos from his mulcting colleagues. This accused-appellant failed to do. His silence then could only be viewed as a form of moral support which he zealously lent to his co-conspirators.
FORTUNA V. PEOPLE GR 135784, December 15, 2000 (Was given the wrong citation, so I just googled for this case instead.) FACTS: While Diosdada Montecillo and her brother Mario were standing at the corner of Mabini and Harrison Streets waiting for a ride home, a mobile patrol car of the Western Police District with 3 policemen on board stopped in front of them. The policeman seated on the right at the front seat alighted and without a word frisked Mario. He took Marios belt, pointed to a supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word "evidence." Then he motioned to Mario to board the car. The terrified Mario obeyed and seated himself at the back together with another
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We however observe that the courts below failed to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of "abuse of public position." The mere fact that the 3 accused were all police officers at the time of the robbery placed them in a position to perpetrate the offense. If they were not police officers they could not have terrified the Montecillos into boarding the mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over their money. Precisely it was on account of their authority that the Montecillos believed that Mario had in fact committed a crime and would be brought to the police station for investigation unless they gave them what they demanded. Accordingly, the penalty imposed should be modified. Under Art. 294, par. (5), of The Revised Penal Code, the penalty for simple robbery is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. In view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium in any of its periods the range of which is four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. @ PP v. PEDRO
aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime, and contempt of or with assault to public authorities. De Mesa questions the inclusion of aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime, and assault to public authorities. Issue: Was there an aggravating circumstance of contempt of or with assault to public authorities? Ruling: No. The requisites of such circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not the person against whom the crime is committed. In this case, the aggravating circumstance does not exist as the crime was committed against the barangay chairman himself and at the time that he was killed, he was not engaged in the discharge of his duties as he was in fact playing a card game (tong its) with his neighbors. The case also mentioned that the other aggravating circumstances of nighttime and treachery were not present. Since the aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime, and contempt of or with assault to public authorities were not proved, De Mesa should be held guilty of homicide and not of murder.
PEOPLE V. DE MESA Doctrine: The requisites of aggravating circumstance of contempt of or with assault to public authorities are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not the person against whom the crime is committed. Facts: Patricio Motas was a Barangay Chairman of Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City. One night, was shot dead while playing tong-its with some townmates at a neighborhood store. Hernando De Mesa was accused of committing the crime. It was said that De Mesa harboured ill feelings towards Motas. In one instance, he threatened Motas saying "May araw ka rin Chairman. Papatayin kita." After the crime was committed, one of the witnesses overheard De Mesa conversing with other men after the crime saying "Sigurado akong patay iyong putang inang si Chairman." De Mesa put up the defense of alibi saying that he was not at the scene of the crime but was instead watching tv at home. This was corroborated by his wife. The trial court charged him guilty of murder because of the circumstantial evidence of testimony of the witnesses, flight of the accused, and motive to kill, presented by the prosecution. It also appreciated the
PEOPLE VS. TAC-AN (the BRONX Gang) Facts: In two criminal cases, the trial court found Renato Tac-An guilty of qualified illegal possession of firearm and murder, imposing upon him the penalty of death in both cases. Tac-An was a good friend and fellow Bronx Gang member of Francis Escano III. They were both attending rd 3 year high school in Divine World College in Tagbilaran City. Tac-An was 18 years old while Escano was 15. Escano left the gang after his mom told him to stop hanging out with Tac-An upon learning that the latter had been carrying a gun around with him. From that point on, their relationship soured. They got into a fist fight and derogatory graffitis against the Bronx gang and Tac-An were written on the walls of the school saying. Tac-An blamed Escano for this. During an English class Tac-An got up from his chair and approached the teacher to ask a question, leaving on his seat his scrapbook. When he returned to his chair he found Escano sitting on his scrapbook. They got into a fist fight. After they were seaparated, Tac-An sneaked out of the school, went home and got his gun. He returned 15mins later during math class, under Mr. Pasilbas. Upon entering the room he fired his gun and demanded for Escano. The students ran towards the teacher for protection. As Escano was running towards the door, Tac-An shot him on the head. The trial court found
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that the crime was aggravated with the circumstance of contempt or insult to public authority. Issue: W/N the crime was committed in contempt or with insult to public authority? Held: Nope! A teacher or professor is not a public authority Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows: Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall be deemed as such. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance,shall be deemed persons in authority. Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such
statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the provision the trial court applied in the case at bar. In addition, the SC also found no aggravating circumstance of evidence premeditation for the simple reason that no sufficient evidence was presented to prove that Tac-An had formed the intention and determination to take Escanos life. Similarly, the special aggravating circumstance of acting while under the influence of Dangerous Drugs was also deleted because there was no medical proof presented to show that Tac-An was high when he committed the crime. So in the end, SC found no aggravating as well as mitigating circumstances.
PEOPLE VS SAMUDIO FACTS: Herein accused appellant Antonio Samudio was with three friends having a drinking spree in his place when they decided to transfer to Ely Samudios house. While they were drinking there, the victim, Baldomero San Juan, Barangay Captain, passed by and was offered some drinks by Antonios group. Thereafter, Benjamin Samudio, uncle of Antonio, whose house was located approximately 20 meters from Elys house, heard a commotion. When he went there, Benjamin saw Antonio stab Baldomero twice with a knife locally known as palas. While Antonio was stabbing Baldomero, two of his companions held the victim by his shoulder. Benjamin tried to intervene but to no avail. Antonios group went out of the house and when he passed by the house of a barangay councilman, Antonio told the latter that he had killed Baldomero. Meanwhile, Ruben San Juan, the victims son, rushed to Elys house upon knowing the incident. Suddenly, Antonio came and threatened Ruben. Antonio left Elys house again and proceeded to the house of another barriomate where he asked that the members of the CAFGU be called so he can surrender. In his defense, Antonio admitted sole responsibility but interposed self-defense. According to him, Baldomero confronted him about a work which he (Antonio) was contracted for by Baldomero; that Antonio claimed he was not paid for such work and that Baldomero suddenly hit him prompting him to get hold of the knife and stab Baldomero. Trial Court convicted Samudio of the crime of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpatua. It is alleged in the Information that the killing was qualified by treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
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superior strength and disregard of respect due to the offended party on account of his rank. ISSUE: Whether the aggravating circumstances may be appreciated and mitigating
Memory aid: Nawasi, pumatay! Mangsant was charged with murder (qualified by treachery) for killing a 14-year old girl by stabbing her in the back multiple times. Charged with aggravating: evident premeditation, disregard of sex and taking advantage of superior strength. Upon arraignment he pleaded "not guilty" but during the trial and before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, said plea was changed to that of "guilty". He testified that the 14-year old girl and he, were lovers, having agreed to marry in the following May; that on the afternoon of April 7, 1937, the date alleged in the information, he visited his fiancee, and as in the course of the conversation, she revealed that she loved another man, he became so obfuscated that he wounded her with a knife until she was lifeless. Nasawi, pumatay! SC: As to aggravating: No premeditation according to the description or account of the crime given in the information. Disregard of sex [or age] cannot be considered because it has never been proved nor admitted by the defendant that in committing the crime he had intended to offend or insult the sex [or age] of the victim. Neither may the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength be taken into account just because of the fact that the defendant is a man and the deceased a woman, inasmuch as this circumstance is inherent in the crime committed and is moreover absorbed by the treachery which, in this case, qualifies the crime as murder. As to mitigating circumstances: Not proper to consider lack of instruction, inasmuch as he admitted that he had studied in the first grade in a public elementary school. Lack of instruction [alternative circumstance] cannot apply to one who has studied in the first grade in a public school, but only to him who really has not received any instruction. Acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced obfuscation NO. It cant be considered in his favor because the revelation by the deceased that she loved another man, under the circumstances in which it was made, was not sufficient to produce that mental blindness which the RPC recognizes as mitigating. ( tama pa ba to? mickey)
HELD: TREACHERY there was no treachery. When treachery is alleged, the manner of the attack must be proven (to show that the manner of attack was done to ensure the victims defenselessness). In this case, the only eyewitness to the stabbing, Benjamin, did not see the initial stage and particulars of the attack EVIDENT PRE-MEDITATION the court simply said that the 3 requisites of evident premeditation was not present (bahala na kayo sa 3 elements nay un, hahaba lang digest) SUPERIOR STRENGTH although the accusedappellants were many, number alone does not determine superior strength especially when the aggressors took no advantage of their combined strength such as in this case. DISREGARD OF THE OFFENDED PARTY DUE TO HIS RANK this cannot be appreciated. Although Baldomero was a barangay captain, there is no showing that Antonio deliberately intended to disregard or insult the respect due to Baldomero. It is essential that the deliberate intent to offend or insult the rank of the victim must be shown. The aggravating circumstance of with insult or in disregard due to rank is appreciated against an accused only when there is proof of fact of disregard and deliberate intent to insult the rank of the victim. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER all the requisites were satisfied. Antonio was not yet arrested; he surrendered before persons in authority (CAFGU) and his surrender was voluntary OTHER ISSUES: SELF DEFENSE there was no indication that there was an unlawful aggression on the part of Baldomero. CONSPIRACY conspiracy was not proved. Benjamin, the only witness of the prosecution, did not witness the initial stage of the killing from which community of design among the accused can be deduced. At most, the friends of Antonio can only be convicted as accomplices. AGE PEOPLE V. MANGSANT
PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO REYES Dr. Aurora Lagrada, a spinster of about70 years old, lived alone in her 2-storey house. Reyes house was about 4-5
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meters away from the doctor's house. Reyes was able to gain entry into the house of Lagrada without the latter knowing. Armed with a bolo, Reyes stole one Rolex wristwatch, 1 gold bracelet, 1 gold ring with birthstone of Jade, 1 pass book from Lagrada (amounting to P80,000). On the occasion of the said robbery, Reyes stabbed Lagrada several times in the different parts of her body directly causing her death. The trial court convicted Reyes of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in convicting Reyes? YES. HELD: To sustain a conviction of the accused for robbery with homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the essential elements of the crime. The accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery, the homicide being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. The homicide may precede robbery or may occur thereafter. What is essential is that there is a nexus, an intrinsic connection between the robbery and the killing. The latter may be done prior to or subsequent to the former. However, the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of the victim's life. Furthermore, the constituted crimes of robbery and homicide must be consummated. A homicide is considered as having been committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery when the motive of the offender in killing the victim is to deprive the latter of his property, to eliminate an obstacle to the crime, to protect his possession of the loot, to eliminate witnesses, to prevent his being apprehended or to insure his escape from the scene of the crime. Appellant stated that he barged into the house of the victim to rob her, and that he stabbed the victim when she was about to shout and because he was drunk. The appellant then took the victim's money and personal belongings and fled from the scene of the crime. The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of robbery with homicide. ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer: (a)the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. FACTS:
1.
Complainant, Vilma M. Concel (Vilma) is a 70 y.o. retired schoolteacher. She had 11 children by her late husband, and was the recipient of an award as one of the outstanding mothers of the province of Negros Occidental. Accused Nerio is a 28 y.o. field coordinator for ABS-CBN Radio. Vilma, the victim, was his teacher in Grade 1. Vilma was lying asleep in her bedroom insider her sari-sari store when she was awakened by someone groping her breasts. The man undressed her, lay on top of her, took off his clothes, while poking a knife at her. She tried to grapple for possession of the knife, suffering cuts on her palm, but Nerio succeeded in ravishing her. Before he left, he told her he would be back the next day. Together with her daughter, Vilma went to the police station a total of 3 times in connection with the incident. At first she only complained of Trespass to Dwelling, Physical Injuries and Grave Threats. On the third time, she finally told them about the rape and she was examined. Upon filing of the complaint, Nerio fled to Capiz. He stayed there until he was arrested by the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission. DEFENSE: Sweetheart theory and the sex was consensual. Nerio told the Court that they were lovers and had three trysts prior to the incident. On the first, Vilma asked him to help her transfer a potted plant. While he was washing her hands, she groped his groin and pulled him into the bedroom. She performed oral sex on him and he complained about the pain. She removed her false teeth (!!!) and they proceeded to have intercourse. For the second incident, Vilma allegedly gave him P300 after they had sex. The third time he had trouble getting an erection so she performed oral sex on him again, she mounted him, they had sex, and she handed him P100 this time. Trial Court found him guilty, hence this appeal.
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ISSUES a) Whether or not guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt; YES b) Whether the court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her rank and age YES HELD: a) Nerio: unbelievable that Vilma can identify him due to her faulty eyesight and that even if he used to be her
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HILGEM NERIO Y GIGANTO
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pupil, his physical appearance has changed considerably since then. Plus there was delay in reporting the incident. SC: Complainant recognized accused-appellant not because he was once her former pupil but because she had seen his face on the date in question. This is the reason she was able to identify accused-appellant when his photograph was shown to her. As for the delay, complainant, an old lady, was ashamed to tell the police that she had been raped. The defense has utterly failed to show why complainant, a septuagenarian in the twilight of her life, a widow, and a mother of eleven children, who testified not knowing accused-appellant except when she was his Grade 1 teacher, would file such a malicious charge against him. Vilma was, and is, respected not only in the community, having once been a candidate of their barangay, but in the entire province of Negros Occidental, being one of the recipients of an awards as Outstanding Mother of the said province. Why would she take interest in prurient matters and even want to engage in a sexual liaison when ladies of her age and station in life are turning their thoughts to virtues? Accused-appellant would want this Court to believe that complainant was a sex-starved old woman who found accused-appellant, then 28 years of age, so virile and irresistible that she showed sexual aggressiveness even in their first encounter. Indeed, the picture painted of her by accusedappellant is that of the equivalent of the dirty old man. The Court cannot believe this fantasy. b) Accused claims that, other than the bare allegation that she is 70 years old and a retired public school teacher, there is no proof that he deliberately intended to offend or insult complainants rank or age. The trial court properly appreciated the existence of the aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her rank and age. Nerio knew that complainant was his Grade 1 public school teacher and was already quite old. These facts were admitted by accusedappellant in the stipulation of facts embodied in the pre-trial order which he signed. As the Solicitor General observes, accused was fully aware that he was raping his old teacher. That complainant had already retired from the service as a teacher did not diminish the respect due her rank as a former Grade 1 teacher of accused-appellant. DWELLING
PEOPLE V. JOSEPH MARQUITA AND ALEJANDRO MARQUITA Facts: Joseph, Alejandro and their friend the victimdeceased Sergio Pampilo were drinking in the house of victim-Pampilo. A small altercation ensued among them because Pampilo didnt want Joseph and Alejandro to pass through his dike [whatever this was, the case did not explain]. But as the altercation was growing, victimPampilo grabbed a bottle of Tanduay Kulafu and struck Joseph Marquita in the face. Joseph felt the blood on his face and went on a rampage and stabbed the victimPampilo in the stomach with a bolo. Alejandro tried to prevent what was happening but he couldnt so he just ran away. After stabbing Pampilo, Joseph went on a rampage and also stabbed the sleeping family of Pampilo, his wife and 3 daughters. Two other children of Pampilo survived and were able to escape. Issue: Is the aggravating circumstance appreciable against Joseph Marquita? NO dwelling
Held: Joseph is guilty of Homicide for killing Pampilo and Murder as to family of Pampilo because of the qualifying circumstance of treachery since the wife was sleeping at the time of the attack and was in no position to defend herself and as to the children since they were mere children of tender years who were killed while they were sleeping. [Note that Treachery absorbs generic aggravating of abuse of superior strength] Note that Alejandro Marquita was charged and convicted in the lower courts but the SC acquitted him because there was no evidence to establish conspiracy as it was shown that it was solely Josephs Hand which killed the victims. Dwelling Issue: First as to the Homicide of Pampilo - The generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling did not attend the killing of Pampilo because he gave sufficient and immediate provocation for the attack when he hit accusedJoseph with the tanduay bottle. Dwelling is aggravating only if the offended party has not given provocation. Second as to the murder of Pampilos Fam ily The SC said that considering that the killings were committed in the domicile of the four victims, without provocation on their part, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance by reason of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode, for "he who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere."
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PEOPLE vs. RIOS FACTS: Appellant Rios was charged with the crime of murder for the fatal stabbing of deceased Ambrocio Benedicto. The spouses were owners of a sari-sari store in their subdivision. According Anacita (wife of the victim), Rios, their neighbor, was hurling stones at their house the night of the incident. A few minutes later Rios bought cigarettes from their store and Ambrocio confronted him about the stoning incident and an altercation between them ensued. While the two were engaged in a verbal scuffle, barangay tanods, who were then roaming the vicinity, intervened and requested both parties to part ways. A few minutes later, Rios returned to the store. Just then, Anacita saw her husband go to the terrace of their house. Rios suddenly approached Ambrocio and stabbed his right stomach. Anacita was only a meter away from the antagonist; she was facing her husband's back while Rios was standing in front of Ambrocio. As Anacita started shouting, Rios fled. The tanods saw Anacita weeping while Ambrocio was lying lifeless in the terrace of their house. One of the tanods assisted Ambrocio but the latter succumbed to death even before they could reach the hospital. The postmortem certificate of death shows that Ambrocio died of "shock due to a stab wound at the chest around 3 cm. penetrating the right auricle (heart)." RTC found Rios guilty. Furthermore, it found that the killing of Ambrocio was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery but that abuse of superior strength is "comprehended" by said circumstance. It ruled out the presence of evident premeditation. However, it considered dwelling as aggravating to the effect that even if the accused did not enter the victim's house, such as when he shot the victim from under the house or when he fired the shot that fell the victim who was inside his house, said circumstance is aggravating. ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in considering dwelling as a generic aggravating circumstance. HELD/RATIO: NO. The trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada in this case. The word dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof and therefore it includes the staircase of the house and much more, its terrace. When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime. Considering these, the altercation between Rios and Ambrocio that immediately preceded the latter's fatal
stabbing is not within the purview of the concept of provocation under Article 14 (3) of the RPC. The unrebutted facts established by the prosecution show that it was Rios who started the events that led to his unfortunate killing of Ambrocio, by stoning the latter's house. In an apparent show of unmitigated braggadocio, Rios even went to the victim's house on the pretext of buying cigarettes after the stone-throwing incident. The victim naturally confronted appellant about that incident. As the two engaged in heated argument, the roving tanods interved and two parted ways. However, a few minutes later, appellant returned to the victim's house and right at the latter's terrace, dealt him the fatal stab wound. Under these circumstances, to cater to Rios' claim that the victim provoked him would amount to erasing the duly established fact that by stoning the victim's house, appellant himself instigated the heated argument that resulted in his physical assault upon the victim.
PEOPLE V DANIEL Facts: 13 year old Margarita Paleng filed a complaint against Amado Daniel alias Amado Ato for the crime of rape. On September 20, 1965, Margarita, a native of Mt. Province, arrived in Baguio City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus. She was then en route to her boarding house in Guisad as she was a highschool student at the Baguio Eastern Highschool. While she was waiting inside the bus, the accused Daniel came and started molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag. She did not allow the latter and instead called the attention of the bus driver and the conductor but was merely shrugged off by them. It seemed that they were also afraid of the accused. Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters away. The accused followed her and rode and sat beside her. When Margarita alighted in Guisad, she was again followed by the accused. Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him. He pulled a dagger 8 inches long and threatened her saying, If you talk, I will kill you. Because of her fear, Margarita fell silent. She was then forced to lie down with the accused placing a handkerchief in her mouth and holding the dagger to her neck. Her attempts to flee were to no avail as she was only 4 ft and 8 inches tall and 95 lbs while Daniel was 5 ft, 7 inches tall and weighed 126 lbs. The accused was successful in having carnal knowledge of Margarita. Thereafter she lost consciousness. When she recovered, Daniel had already gone. For his defense, Daniel asserts that he and Margarita have known each other since 1963 and this was in fact the second time he had carnal knowledge of her. Also, he alleges that he promised to marry Margarita and
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was actually surprised that she filed the complaint against him. Medico-Legal report indicated that Margarita was a virgin before the incident complained of. The Court found Daniel guilty of the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Issue: Whether or not a boarding house falls within the definition of dwelling in the RPC? Held: Yes. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a dwelling as the term is used in Art. 14 (3) RPC. It is not necessary under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. But he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold. The correct penalty is death pursuant to Art. 335 of the RPC. However, for lack of necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied. Daniel is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages of P12 K.
PERTINENT ISSUE: WON dwelling can be a aggravating circumstance considering it was the house of Yolandas employer YES RATIO: Although Yolanda was raped in a house belonging to her employer, the same served as her residence, she being a stay-in laundress of Castillo. For all intents and purposes, the same constituted a dwelling as the term is used in Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code, it not being necessary, under the law, that the victim own the place. Be she a lessee, a boarder, a bedspacer, or a maid, the place is her home, the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. One's dwelling place is a sanctuary worthy of respect and that one who slanders another in the latter's house is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. Cuello Calon says the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm (People v. Monsayac, G.R. No.126787, May 24, 1999). With the presence of one aggravating circumstance, i.e. dwelling, the law has made it inevitable that the greater penalty of death shall be applied. Other crim related stuff: Three well-known principles that guide the Court: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense . Likewise, when the complainant in a rape case, more so if she is a minor, testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show rape has been committed , the offended party most often being the only one available to prove directly the commission of rape.
PEOPLE V SAPINOSO FACTS: Yolanda Partida, a 15-year old barrio lass was hired by Diosdado Castillo to work as a stay-in laundress at his residence in Tagig. Castillo's residence, parenthetically, also housed a shop for his stained glass business. At around 6 P.M. while Yolanda was lying on a folding bed located near the door of the shop, three men, later identified as Domingo Quila and accused-appellants Noel Sapinoso and David Recreo, suddenly barged in. Yolanda stood up at the intrusion, only to be boxed by Sapinoso, causing her to lose consciousness. When Yolanda came to, she found Sapinoso on top of her. He was then inserting his penis inside her vagina, all the while poking a knife at her. Meanwhile, the two others stood by the side of the bed and watched. Yolanda felt pain at Sapinoso's insertion of his penis. After a while, she sensed Sapinoso ejaculate, which she described as "pinutok po niya yung kanya." Recreo and Quila took their turns. The three then departed. Yolanda immediately reported the incident to her employer, Castillo, when the latter arrived later that night. They went to the Tagig police station to report the incident. The three accused were arrested after Yolanda identified them as her rapists
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FRANCISCO M. SANTIAGO alias "FRANCIS," appellant. FACTS: Spouses Francisco and Tess Santiago rented a room in the house under the care of Purita Sotero, in Baler, Aurora. They had a baby. Purita occupied another room in the house. The neighboring house belonged to spouses Jaime and Marissa Nisperos, who sold liquor and lambanog. When Francis (accused) failed to pay rent, Purita got had the matter placed in a police blotter, which infuriated the accused Francis. One night, Santiago went to the Nisperos house, eyes all red and he was angry with
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Purita. He said Pare, I will kill her. Nisperos counseled against killing her. On Oct 11, 1995, around 5am, while Jaime went to the store, Marissa hear Purita moaning in pain and shouting for help. She rushed to the house of Purita but couldnt open the door. Jaime arrived thereafter and they both tried to force open the door to no avail. Purita was still moaning and shouting for help so the Nisparos spouses went to the side of the house where Puritas room was. They peeped through the wall and saw Francis Santiago stabbing Purita, who was lying on the floor. The room was lighted by a lamp on the table. The Nisparos went back to the store/house and later on Francis passed by and told Marissa that he left his baby in his room. Marissa replied: "Francis, lintek ka, bakit mo sinaksak si Purita?" Santiago ignored Marissa and rushed to the bus terminal and boarded a bus. Meanwhile Purita managed to open her door and asked for help. They rushed her to the hospital but she was dead on arrival. She had 11 stab wounds. Francis was later on found by policemen, hiding in a jeepney after alighting from the bus, and he admit to killing Purita. He was charged with MURDER, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation. It was stated in the Information that he entered Puritas room, inside her house, stabbing her thereafter. The RTC convicted him of MURDER qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, AGGRAVATED by dwelling. He was sentenced to DEATH. ISSUE: W/N prosecution was able to prove the circumstances of treachery, evident premediation and dwelling. HELD/RATIO: Treachery not proven. No evident premeditation. There is the circumstance of dwelling BUT it was not alleged so it was not considered. Guilty of HOMICIDE only. The prosecution contends that appellant killed Purita with treachery and evident premeditation beacuse Purita was asleep and defenseless when the appellant stabbed her. And there was evident premeditation because the appellant told the Spouses Nisperos of his intention to kill Purita. SC held that treachery was NOT PROVEN. Treachery is a qualifying circumstance that changes the nature of the crime of homicide to murder. It must be proven by the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. There is no evidence that the victim was asleep when she was stabbed by the appellant. Marissa testified that she heard Purita shouting for help. When she peeped through the hole, she saw the appellant stabbing the victim. Marissa did not know how the stabbing commenced. For treachery to be qualifying, the prosecution must prove the confluence of the following requisites: (a)
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked NO opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted the means of execution. The prosecution failed to prove that the appellant deliberately or consciously adopted a mode of attack to ensure the killing. There is even no evidence of the particulars as to how the aggression commenced or the events that led to the stabbing. As to evident premeditation, it was NOT PROVEN as well. The prosecution failed to prove the following: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient period of time, as to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The appellant may have intended to kill the victim even before however, there is no evidence on record that from that time on, until the victim was stabbed and killed, the appellant performed overt acts indicating his determination to commit the crime. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present. Although the appellant and the victim lived in the same house, the appellant and his family rented a room, while Purita lived in another. However, dwelling was NOT alleged in the Information as mandated by Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule is that when it is not alleged in the Information, it will not be considered. Hence, the accused is convicted only of HOMICIDE. Reclusion temporal.
PEOPLE V. JOYA (1993) AID: Rape- Store not Dwelling Facts: accused Romeo Joya and Joselito Arbolante were charged for rape. The aforesaid accused, together with one Ismael Cervania who was then at large, conspired and mutually assisted each other to have unconsented carnal knowledge of 14-year old Maria Tolentino by means of force and intimidation such felonious sexual assault being attended by the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. The rape was done in the store of the victims mother after a drinking spree of the accused (Joya boxed Maria and proceeded to rape her). Joyas defenses (he was not at the store, etc.) were denied by the court and credited Marias testimony despite some inconsistencies. Issue: WON the store of victims mom can be considered a dwelling to justify aggravating circumstance? (NO.) Held: the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can not be considered in the case at bar. A dwelling must be a building or structure, exclusively used for rest and comfort.
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The crime was committed in a store which was about fifteen meters away from the complainant's house. It is obvious that the store cannot be considered a dwelling, or even a dependency of complainant's home.
THE PEOPLE OF THE MASILUNGAN
PHILIPPINES v. PEDRO
Between seven and eight o'clock on the night of the 16th day of Mendoza's detention, there was a commotion in the house due to the barkings and howlings of dogs. Soon Mendoza observed that his guards were getting farther from him. Seizing the opportunity, he sprinted and was able to escape. He reached at around midnight, where the Pasion was being chanted. He was sent by the chief of police to the house of the town mayor who told Mendoza to stay in the house. Issue: WON the crime charged falls under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, and carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death? YES. Held: The concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of motor vehicle having been shown and proved, the Solicitor General recommends the imposition of capital punishment, contending that the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the lower court is not in accordance with law. We find this recommendations to be well taken, for besides the two aggravating circumstances mentioned above there also concurred those of nocturnity and band, it having been proven that the victim was kidnapped at about nine o'clock in the evening and by four armed men. Ratio: We have time and again held that alibi is the weakness defense that an accused can avail of, and oral proof thereof must be clearly and satisfactorily established because it is so easily manufactured and usually so unreliable that it cannot be given credit. In the present case, the defense tried to established by the testimony of appellant himself and his witness Daniel Laroza that appellant was in the barrio in Mindoro, which involves an 11-hour trip from the province of Laguna by land and sea, and that said appellant did not leave the place except when he was arrested by Constabulary soldiers and taken to Calapan. But analyzing their testimony, we are with the lower court in not giving it any credence because of its uncertainty and contradictory character. Oral proof to establish and support an alibi must not be loose, vague and doubtful as in this case, but firm, consistent, and trustworthy that when hurled against the evidence for the prosecution the impact must perforce over helm the latter. In other words, such proof must not leave any room for doubting its accuracy, plausibility and verity. Certainly we cannot give any credit to the testimony of the appellant and his witness as to the date of appellant's arrival in Mindoro, for the fixing thereof is merely the result of guesswork. The incident between appellant and Jose Mendoza which allegedly occurred on the day prior to appellant's departure for Mindoro regarding collection of debt and which appellant attributes as the motive for
Facts: On March 7, 1953, between eight and nine o'clock in the evening while Jose Mendoza, then a barrio lieutenant, was on the stairs of his house adjoining his, someone called out saying that he wanted to buy some cigarettes. Mendoza told the prospective customer to get them himself because he was then resting, but the latter insisted that Mendoza himself hand the cigarettes to him outside. Mendoza entered his store and got the cigarettes, but upon coming out to hand them over to his customer, he was grabbed by four armed men who poked their guns at him, warning him not to make any outcry if he wanted to live. He was blindfolded and taken to a waiting pick-up truck nearby. Once in the truck, Mendoza's pockets were searched and the amount of P817.00 was taken from him. His blindfold was taken off, and it was then when he saw and recognized appellant Pedro Masilungan and Arcadio Mercado, whom he had known for a long time, they being residents of the neighboring barrio and who used to ask from him petty loans of money. The pick-up truck then made a quite long trip, and along the way appellant and Arcadio Mercado told Mendoza that he should not resent the taking of his money and that which may thereafter be taken from him because they would use it in buying firearms. The ride ended in a house situated between a rice field and a coconut grove where Mendoza was taken upstairs. There he saw an elderly man, said to be chief of the kidnappers. They told Mendoza and made him swear that he should not make any move without their consent, else he would be shot. They also demanded that he give them P5,000, but he pleaded that he could not raise such a big amount, but that, if released, he was willing to give P700.00. Appellant said that this could not be; likewise the elderly man told Mendoza that he would be killed if he did not come across with the amount. The bargaining by Mendoza was kept up for some days, and in the meantime he was being continuously guarded in shifts by armed men. On the tenth day of his detention, Mendoza was made to sign, at gunpoint poked at the opening of his ear by the elderly man, a prepared note reading more or less as follows "My dear wife, send me P5,000; if you fail, it means my life." This note eventually got into the hands of Mrs. Mendoza, who found it at her doorstep.
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Mendoza's prosecuting him, cannot be believed, as it was shown that Mendoza never bothered collecting the petty debts of appellant during the course of years, and as matter of fact, payment of such debts was left to appellant's convenience. Appellant himself, on the other hand, admitted that when he last borrowed P20 from Mendoza three days prior to his departure, Mendoza did not try to collect nor even mention the loan of P20 which appellant had obtained earlier that month. Were we to again assume that the collection incident were true, the same is so trifling that certainly would not cause the offended party to charge the appellant with the serious crime of kidnapping.
The RTC found Tao guilty of robbery with rape and imposed upon him the penalty of death. The RTC judge appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance because the incident took place supposedly at the residence of private complainant's employer, "which doubles as a video rental shop." ISSUES: 1. W/N Tao is guilty of robbery with rape GUILTY OF TWO SEPARATE CRIMES OF RAPE AND ROBBERY 2. W/N dwelling can be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance NO HELD: 1. Appellant is NOT guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. This felony contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another; and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. Such factual circumstance was not present in this case. As related by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman, accused-appellant suddenly jumped over the counter, strangled her, poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled her towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and gained carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent. Thereafter, he ordered her to proceed upstairs to get some clothes, so he could bring her out, saying he was not leaving her alive. At this point, appellant conceived the idea of robbery because, before they could reach the upper floor, he suddenly pulled Amy down and started mauling her until she lost consciousness; then he freely ransacked the place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly banging her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl, he took her bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then proceeded upstairs where he took as well the jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's employer. Under these circumstances, appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. However, since it was clearly proven beyond reasonable doubt that he raped Amy de Guzman and thereafter robbed her and Ana Marinay of valuables totalingP16,000, he committed two separate offenses -rape with the use of a deadly weapon and simple robbery with force and intimidation against persons. 2. Dwelling aggravates a felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the offended party and the latter has not given any provocation. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode. Ones dwelling place is a sanctuary worthy of respect; thus, one who slanders another in the latters house is more severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere.
PEOPLE v. TAO FACTS: Amy de Guzman was tending a video rental shop owned by her employer and cousin Ana Marinay. Accused Alexander Tao, a relative of Anas husband Gerry Marina, arrived at the shop and asked Amy what time Gerry and Ana would be coming home to which Amy replied that she did not know. Tao kept going in and out of the shop and on the last time that he went inside the shop, he jumped over the counter of the shop to where Amy was and seized the latter by placing one of his arms around Amys neck, while his other hand held a knife which he poked at her neck. Amy started shouting for help the volume of the karaoke drowned her cries of help. Tao then dragged Amy to the kitchen of the shop where, at knife point, he ordered the latter to undress and he thereafter started raping her. However, while Tao was raping Amy, somebody knocked at the door of the shop prompting the former to stop what he was doing and ordered Amy to put on her clothes. He told her to go upstairs to the second floor to change clothes as he will be taking her with him. Amy then pleaded with Tao to just take anything inside the shop and to spare her life, to which Tao replied no, I will not leave you here alive. After a while and upon Amys pleading, Tao put down his knife and while he was kissing Amy, the latter got hold of the knife which she surreptitiously concealed under the stairs. Suddenly, Tao became violent and banged Amys head on the wall causing the latter to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness she found herself and Tao inside the toilet of the shop and the latter again banged her head, this time on the toilet bowl, several times causing Amy to again lose consciousness. Thereafter, Tao went upstairs and looted the place of valuables belonging to Amys emp loyer, Ana. Amy, herself lost her ring, bracelet and wristwatch during the incident in question. Tao, while admitting to robbing the shop, denied raping Amy.
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In the case at bar, the building where the two offenses were committed was not entirely for dwelling purposes. The evidence shows that it consisted of two floors: the ground floor, which was being operated as a video rental shop, and the upper floor, which was used as a residence. It was in the video rental shop where the rape was committed. True, the victim was dragged to the kitchen and toilet but these two sections were adjacent to and formed parts of the store. Being a commercial shop that caters to the public, the video rental outlet was open to the public. As such, it is not attributed the sanctity of privacy that jurisprudence accords to residential abodes. Hence, dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of rape.
stepped back, revealing Sespene et al (3 total) armed with a firearm. They fired four shots at Enerio. Enerio stood up and tried to escape but was shot. After that, he was knifed at the nape. Just like in pinoy action movies, Enerio was still alive and tried to escape. But Sespene et al. caught up to him and killed him eventually. A complaint for murder (initially dismissed due to the absence of witnesses but subsequently revived) was filed against Sespene et al by the witnesses (Enerios wife and sister who witnessed the whole thing). Sespene et al were found guilty of murder. Sespene et al then argued against convicton, claiming they were the real victims. (topic) SolGen contends that crime was attended with aggravating circumstance of dwelling, among other circumstances. ISSUE: W/N aggravating attended the crime. - NO. circumstance of dwelling
PEOPLE VS DACIBAR Facts: Welda was sitting behind their bed near her husband, Josue(soon to die), who was sitting at the end of the bed. Suddenly, there was an explosion followed by sounds of footsteps. When Welda looked through their window she saw appellant coming out from under their house, stooping and carrying a long fire arm. Seeing as her husband was shot she shouted for help. Josue soon died thereafter. It appears that her husband was shot from under the house. Issue: WON the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is to be considered in imputing liability Held: yes Ratio: Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense, it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although he assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from outside the house. Thus, in case at bar, although the attack was made from outside the house, below the floor of the house, nevertheless, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling may be considered as attending the shooting. As in fact the victim was hit inside his own house.
RATIO: Dwelling not applicable as enerio was only about to step on the first rung of the ladder of the house when he was assaukted by Sespene et al.
US v. IBANEZ (Dwelling as aggravating circumstance in adultery) Facts and Ruling Carmen Ibanez and Felix Alviola are lawfully married. Alviola filed a case of adultery against Ibanez and her paramour, Pacifico Manalili. It was proven that the two had intimate relations: 1. They were alone together on a dry river bed in the shade of bamboo trees 2. Paramour was accustomed to frequent the home of the spouses when husbandwas absent. During these visits, the doors and windows of the house were closed 3. Wife often absented herself from her home 4. On one occasion, husband followed her and saw her with paramour. The two separated ways upon perceiving his presence. When he asked where his wife had been, she said she had been to the dressmakers 5. On another occasion, husband surprised paramour going down the stairs of the conjugal home and that paramour immediately mounted his bike and rode away. It was proven that wife and paramour had sexual intercourse in the conjugal home twice. Husband was notified and went to his house with a policeman and surprised paramour hiding behind the kitchen door. Wife denied the presence of paramour despite being asked who the bicycle outside the door belonged to. The trial court found the defendants guilty of adultery as principals by direct participation. SC affirmed but considered the aggravating circumstance of the crime
PEOPLE VS SESPENE FACTS: Enerio was went to the field to tend his carabao. When he got home and just as he was about to step on the first rung of the ladder, Manglilog suddenly appeared and attacked Enerio from the rear with a bolo, striking both his shoulders. Enerio faced Mangilog, who
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having been committed in the house of the aggrieved person in spite of the fact that the conjugal home was their common domicile. Wife failed with her duty to be faithful to her husband and paramour failed to respect the sacredness of this conjugal home. The aggravating circumstance of committing it in his dwelling cannot be excused by the fact that the dwelling was also the home of the adultress; aside from the consideration that the stranger to the marriage who violates the law in that domicile is not a member of the community residing there, the adultresss liability is morally and legally accentuated by her lack of respect for the domicile of the offended party.
quarter may be assimilated to the victim's house, the former being an appendage of, or attachment to, the latter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO LAGARIO, ANECITO SAYONG, RODRIGO ENCISO and THREE JOHN DOES accused. RODOLFO LAGARIO, ANECITO SAYONG, and RODRIGO ENCISO, accused-appellants. FACTS: The Lagarios (pero hindi kasama si accused) were having supper. Their dogs were barking loudly so they checked what was wrong outside. They saw 6 men. 3 of the 6 men rushed to the door of the house and demanded that it be opened. When the residents refused, one proceeded to the kitchen door while another and an unidentified companion rammed the main door. They eventually gained entry through a hole on the door. They were armed with bolos. Hacking ensued. Matinding hacking (sa forehead, sa kamay, etc.). Arms and fingers flew. The men were after the money hidden in the trunk. (Alam na may pera dun kasi anak nung bikitima yung isang akusado.) They left after. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and investigated the incident. The named accused above were convicted of robbery with homicide. ISSUE (this case is under the heading DWELLING ha): W/N dwelling needs to be alleged to be appreciated. HELD/RATIO: NO. The generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling, although not specifically alleged in the information, was duly proved without objection on the part of the accused. In robbery with homicide, dwelling may be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Dwelling is not inherent in the crime of robbery with violence or intimidation against persons because such crime can be committed without violating or scaling the domicile of the victim. (Ito lang yung dwelling part.) Taking into account the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty imposable would have been death pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. In view, however, of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty which must be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment. ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
PEOPLE v ROEL PUNZALAN et.al. FACTS: There are four accused-appellants in this case, namely: Roel Punzalan, Jose Besida, Marieta Mendoza and Domingo Mendoza (husband of Marieta). Except for Domingo, the rest of the accused are the domestic house helpers of the deceased-victim Mrs. Fule. They have been charged of the crime of robbery with homicide. [note: this is how I imagine the house or compound of the victim. The main house is where the victim Mrs. Fule lives. Since she is old already, accused Marieta, one of the domestic helpers, sleep near her bedroom to attend to her (Mrs. Fules) medications. The helpers though have their own servants quarters, immediately beside the main house of Mrs. Fule] One night, after supper, domestic helpers Punzalan and Besida went out of the house for their servants' quarters while the victim, Mrs. Fule and accused Marieta locked up all the doors to the house. Towards midnight, Domingo parked his jeep outside Mrs. Fules house and stayed there. Upon the signal of Marieta, the two other accused-appellants Punzalan and Besida forcibly entered the bedroom of Mrs. Lourdes Fule where the latter was sleeping and once inside therein, jointly attacked or assaulted and stabbed Mrs. Fule which caused her instantaneous death and on the same occasion and by reason thereof, with intent to gain, ransacked the bedroom of the victim, Mrs. Fule and did then take, steal and carry away cash money and pieces of jewelry. Accused-appellant Marieta did nothing to prevent the stabbing and the robbery. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime charged should be aggravated with the circumstance of dwelling. HELD: No. Dwelling should be disregarded because the accused (except Domingo Mendoza) all resided in the servants' quarter of Mrs. Fule's residence. The servants'
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PEOPLE V. OSTI Facts: Spouses Ponciano Onato and Edita Onato lived with their 4-year old daughter Beverly in Sto. Nio, Samar. Ponciano was a fisherman and a farmer but was employed by Tito Soria in his buy-and-sell of fish business. Roberto Ostia, a co-worker of Ponciano, resided in the poblacion of Sto. Nio. Rufo Legaspi, a carpenter and a Barangay Tanod, was a neighbor of Ponciano. On May 13, 1995, at about 7:00 p.m., Rufo was seated near his house and resting before retiring for the evening. Then, Rufo saw Roberto, with Beverly on his right shoulder, walking towards the poblacion. Robertos left hand was holding the right hand of Mary Donoso, a 9year old playmate of Beverly. The trio was in animated conversation on their way towards the poblacion. After an hour or so, Edita noticed that Beverly had not returned to their house. She looked for her. Rufo told Edita that he saw Beverly perched on the shoulder of Roberto on their way towards the poblacion. Then, Roberto passed by. However, Beverly was no longer with him. Puzzled, Edita asked Roberto where Beverly was. Instead of responding, Roberto fled. Rufo, who witnessed the incident, advised Edita to report the incident to the police authorities. Edita rushed back home and woke up Ponciano. She told her husband that Beverly had been taken by Roberto and that Beverly had not yet returned home. The couple rushed from their house and reported the incident to the police authorities. With the help of their neighbors and police officers Toribio and Espino, the couple looked for Beverly but failed to locate her. They resumed their search the next day. They found Beverly sprawled in a grassy portion below a copra kiln about 120 meters away from the house of the Onato couple and about 15 meters from the nearest house. Beverly was already dead. Pictures of Beverly were taken where her body was found. Since the municipal health officer was not there, the Municipal Santiary Inspector Lorenzo Bernabe st conducted the autopsy. He had 4 findings: 1 , a lacerated nd wound from Beverlys vaginal wall to the anus; 2 a rd lacerated wound from the vagina to the mons pubis; 3 a th contusion in the lumbar area and 4 , blood clots in the left ear. Ponciano filed a crim complaint for rape with homicide. An information for rape with homicide was then filed. On his arraignment, Ostia had no counsel so a counsel de officio was assigned to him. During trial, Ostia through counsel moved that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty to rape with homicide and to enter a plea of guilty to murder. Ponciano and the public prosecutor agreed.
In his testimony, Ostia admitted that he killed Beverly by smashing a piece of rock bigger than the size of his fist, about seven inches in diameter, on her head and chest and on the other parts of her body because, in the meantime, he lost control of himself. The RTC found Ostia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and with the generic aggravating circumstances of (a) abuse of confidence considering that Roberto and Ponciano were co-workers, (b) nighttime considering that Beverly was killed in the evening and (c) despoblado considering that the nearest house to the situs criminis was fourteen meters. The death penalty was imposed so the case was automatically appealed. Note: The first ground for the appeal was Ostias conviction despite his alleged improvident plea of guilty. SC sided with Ostia on this issue and said the RTC judge failed to adhere to the procedure accdg. to Rule 116 Sec. 3 with respect to plea of guilty. The second ground was the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. The SC said it was not alleged in the information and it was also not proven by the prosecution. Hence, it could not be used. The third ground was about the generic aggravating circumstances. Issue: Whether or not there was abuse of confidence. Held: None! Ratio: The trial court likewise erred in appreciating nighttime, despoblado and abuse of confidence as generic aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. The prosecution failed to prove that Ostia purposely sought or took advantage of nighttime in killing Beverly. There is no evidence that he sought or took advantage of the solitude of the situs criminis in committing the crime. Abuse of confidence could not be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstance because the prosecution failed to prove that (a) Ostia enjoyed the trust and confidence of Beverly or her parents; (b) and that even if Ostia enjoyed said confidence, he took advantage of said trust or confidence to kill Beverly. The barefaced fact that Ostia and Ponciano were co-workers does not constitute evidence that the latter reposed trust and confidence in Ostia. In the absence of any generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the Ostia is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE VS. ARROJADO
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Salvador Arrojado and Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins (their fathers are brothers). Alberto Arrojado, Mary Anns father, suffered a stroke for which reason he decided to come home to Roxas City and spend the remainder of his days there. Mary Ann and Alberto settled in a house in Barangay Tanque, Roxas City where they lived on the financial support o f Asuncion and Buenaventura (sister and brother of Mary Ann). Later on, Salvador started living with Alberto and Mary Ann. He helped care for Alberto for which he was paid 1K salary. One day, Salvador went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that Mary Ann had committed suicide. He told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be suspected as the one responsible for the death of Mary Ann. The matter was reported to the police. The RTC found Salvador guilty of the crime of murder with no aggravating circumstance. ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence is present??? YES. RULING: For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended partys belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. In this case, while Mary Ann may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda, her fears were subsequently allayed as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects from Erlinda. Thinking that Salvador would not do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, Mary Ann allowed Salvador to sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked. The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death on accusedappellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellants sentence to death.
PEOPLE OF VILLANUEVA
THE
PHILIPPINES
v. CAMILO
On December 5,1997, Reynaldo Gabuya received word that a kissmark was on the neck of his younger sister, 11 year old Nia Gabuya, who was in her fourth grade. She only knew her father by name for she had been living with her mother and her stepfather, Camilo, since she came to the age of reason. Reynaldo confronted and asked Nia who planted said kissmark. He was told that it was their stepfather. He immediately brought his sister to the Pardo Police Station and had the incident blottered. Upon the advice of the police officer, Nia was brought to the hospital. He further testified that Nia told her that she was allegedly raped for the first time by Camilo Villanueva in May 1997 and the last time was on December 4, 1997 at around 12:00 midnight (but no penetration because according to them it was big for her). From May 1997 up to December 4, 1997 she has been sexually abused by the appellant for seven times already. For the defense, accused Camilo Villanueva denied having raped his step-daughter, Nia Gabuya. He claimed that at about 7:00 P.M. of December 4, 1997, he went to the mahjong place in order to sell the eggs which he cooked earlier in the afternoon. At 10:00 in the evening, he and Felipa Gabuya, his live-in partner and mother of the victim went home and they arrived in the house in ten minutes. Also, Camilo insisted that he did not rape Nia and claimed that the spermatozoa found in the victims organ was not his since he could not produc e any after he underwent vasectomy in 1976. TC: CAMILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized by Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610 and R.A. 8353 ISSUE: 1. Whether the TC did not abuse its discretion in considering the fact of common law relationship between the accused and the mother of the complainant when the information that was read to the accused only accused him of rape of one NIA who was a step daughter of the accused. YES 2. Whether there is a generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence. YES.
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SC: The trial court imposed the penalty of death after taking into consideration the age of NIA who was then eleven years old at the time of the incident and the fact that CAMILO is the common-law spouse of NIAs mother. To justify the imposition of the death penalty these two qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the Information. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information reveals that NIA is not the stepdaughter of CAMILO because her mother is not married to CAMILO. A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former marriage. The relationship of stepfather stepdaughter presupposes a legitimate relationship. A stepfather is the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. This Court has consistently ruled that the circumstances under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, the attendance of which mandates the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information, and even if proved, the death penalty cannot be imposed. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged, a qualifying aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information although it may be proved as a generic aggravating circumstance if so included among those enumerated in the Code. Since one of the twin qualifying circumstances aforementioned, namely, relationship, specifically that NIA is the daughter of CAMILOs common-law wife, was not alleged in the information, CAMILO cannot be convicted of qualified rape and the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him, for to do so would be to deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This notwithstanding, the fact that CAMILO is the common-law spouse of NIAs mother and live with NIA may constitute the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence there being a relation of trust and confidence between her and CAMILO, whom she grew up with and whom she even called papa. However, this aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated in determining the appropriate penalty in view of the fact that the penalty prescribed for the offense of simple rape is reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, that penalty shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. Nevertheless, this aggravating circumstance could provide legal basis for the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal
offenses as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
PEOPLE VS. RAELITO LIBRANDO, SURDILLAS AND EDDIE PURISIMA
LARRY
Facts: Edwin Labandero brought his 8 y.o. daughter Aileen to market in Barangay Bunga, Don Salvador Benedicto, Negros Occidental. On their way home, Edwin, Aileen and a relative, Fernando de los Santos, traversed a hilly portion of the trail leading when they met accusedappellants Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima. Raelito inquired from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando and without any warning hit Edwin with a piece of wood. Edwin ran but he was chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns hitting Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. Although it was already dark at that time, Aileen had no trouble identifying the accused-appellants since Edwin was carrying a lighted torch. While the men took turns in mauling the deceased, Edwin, Fernando took Aileen with him and ran to report the incident to the Barangay Captain. The following day, the police proceeded to the scene of the crime and saw the remains of Edwin Labandero lying prostrate on the ground with a wooden pole on his neck. Raelito voluntarily surrendered himself to the police while Eddie and Larry were invited for questioning at the police headquarters. The three men were asked to participate in a police line up during which Aileen positively identified them as her fathers assailants. Raelito Librando claims that he merely acted in self-defense and that it was Edwin who gave the first blow. Raelito claims that his co-accused did not have a hand in the killing of the deceased. The trial court convicted them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place, considered only as one, and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of all the accused. Issue: 1. WON the three accused-appellants are guilty of murder -YES! 2. WON an 8 yr. old child is a competent witness -YES! 3. WON the court erred in not appreciating in Raelitos his favor the mitigating circumstances of a) incomplete self defense and b) voluntary surrender -NO! Ratio: 1. While it is true that only Raelito Librando was shown to have any motive to assault the deceased, nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that crimes have been attributed to persons who appear to have no reason for committing them as long as they have been clearly identified as the offenders. 8 yr. old Aileen has categorically stated that accused-appellants Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima had a hand in the gruesome
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killing of the deceased. Prosecution witness PO2 Dencing also stated that Aileen positively identified the accusedappellants as her fathers assailants. It is basic that in the absence of any controverting evidence, the testimonies of police officers are given full faith and credence as they are presumed to be in the regular performance of their official duties. The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration unless such corroboration is expressly required by law. While it is true that only Raelito was identified by name in the police blotter entry, nevertheless, it was stated in the same police blotter that three persons had a hand in the killing of the deceased. Although Eddie and Larry were not mentioned by name in the police blotter as perpetrators of the crime, they were positively identified by the child, Aileen, during trial. 2. Any child regardless of age can be a competent witness if he can perceive and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. The childs competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. As noted by the trial court, Aileen during the trial was not only a picture of innocence and honesty but was possessed with a strong power of observation and recall. 3. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was already appreciated for the accused appellants. To avail of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self defense, there must be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In the case at bar, prosecution witness Aileen testified that it was in fact the said accused-appellant who delivered the first blow without any warning to the deceased. The severity of the injuries inflicted on the deceased as well as the fact that Raelito who admitted that he was of bigger built than the deceased, could hardly present any evidence of injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the deceased belie his claim of self defense. Extra: In the case of People vs. Santos, it has been held that if the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance only as a general rule although they can be considered separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity. NIGHT TIME PEOPLE V ERNESTO DELA CRUZ
Facts: Aurelio Goze (the victim) and his wife Zenaida with their children lived in a 3x5house with an extension called pataguab. The extension had a door apart from the door at the main house. At 11pm, while the main house was lighted, someone kicked open the door. 2persons forcibly took nd Aurelio while Ernesto Dela Cruz (2 cousin of the deceased and with whom he had a land dispute) whom Zenaida recognized waited downstairs. Zenaida lighted another lamp. By the moonlight, Zenaida saw these persons take Aurelio to a place 30meters to the east of their house. Ernesto Dela Cruz shot Aurelio with a long firearm. The others then followed in the shooting. The next morning, the body of Aurelio with multiple gunshot wounds was discovered around 30meters away from their house. It was observed that there were no trees or other structures which would obstruct the view of the body if you were looking from the house. The baranggay captain reported this to the SPO4 Franklin Tagupa. Zenaida identified Dela Cruz and his companions as the ones who killed her husband. During the investigation, Dela Cruz told Tagupa that he knew who killed Aurelio. However, Tagupa testified in court that he forgot the name Dela Cruz told him. The next day, Tagupa then said that the person Dela Cruz named was actually a military person and that he was afraid of retaliation. DEFENSE STORY: At the time the killing took place, Dela Cruz was sleeping the camp of the military. He was told to stay there because threats from the NPA. They heard gunshots. Sgts. Evoco and Cavila arrived with Lt. Lleto and they were told to keep quiet about what happened otherwise they will become the next victims. As already stated, he told Tagupa that he knew who killed Aurelio. (for more details, pls refer to the original of the case. I dont think its that important naman) TC: Dela Cruz alibi was not believed. Zenaidas identification of the perpetrators were believed by the court. Guilty of Murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation attended by aggravating circumstance of nighttime. Issue: Whether the crime is murder or just homicide? Held: Just homicide! No treachery and evident premeditation but there was abuse of superior strength. Dela cruz assails the credibility of Zenaida as witness. This isnt a crim issue so I wont discuss anymore. Nevertheless, the Court believes Zenaida because of her straightforward answers. As to the identification of the witness, it was established that there was sufficient light for Zenaida to identify the perpetrators. Just because she lighted another
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lamp after her husband was taken away does not mean that there was no light inside the house. The Court has held that a gasera or lampara has sufficient illumination for identification. Moreover, Dela Cruz was known to Zenaida as her husbands cousin. In this case, the defense belaboured the argument that the killing took place under a moonless night and that it was impossible for Zenaida to have seen what happened. The defense even submitted a certification from PAGASA as to the effect that at around the time of the commission of the crime, there was no moon in the sky in their area. Nevertheless, moon or no moon, the fact remains that Zenaida was able to identify Dela Cruz. Here, Zenaidas testimony that none of the perpetrators even stopped the other from killing Aurelio showed that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. For there to be conspiracy, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, all the accused has the same purpose and were united in its execution. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Dela Cruz that the crime committed is merely homicide aggravated by the circumstance of abuse of superior strength but which was not alleged in the information. Treachery was not established. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party migiht make. It must be proved that: 1) there was employment of means that gives the victim no opportunity to present a defense; and 2) that means and mode of attack must be consciously adopted. This the prosecution failed to prove. It appears that the decision to kill Aurelio was a spur of the moment thing because the perpetrators were only initially looking for rice. Abuse of superior strength was sufficiently proven. What should be considered is not there are 3, 4 or more assailants but whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength to consummate the offense. In this case, the number of attackers, the number and extend of gunshot wounds sustained and the manner of killing confirm the presence of this aggravating circumstance. Evident premeditation was not also sufficiently proven. NIGHT TIME PART: (super short lang sa case) For there to be night time as an aggravating circumstance, the accused must intentionally see the cover of the darkness for the purpose of committing the crime. If the place is lighted well enough for the offenders to be recognized, night time cannot be said to be an aggravating circumstance.
61. P v Goquila 428 Phil 716 UNINHABITED PLACE PEOPLE V. CABILES Cabiles (uncle), Rudy Esparraguerra and his brother Rogelio are the accused in this case. Cabiles however remains at large. Violeta was a fish vendorand is barriomates with the accused. One night, she visited her daughter to borrow 1k. the daughter accompanied Violeta back to her house seeing that she was tipsy and weak. On their way to Violetas house, Cabiles and the Esparraguerra bros appeared from nowhere and blocked their trail. The daughter recognized the 3 men, knowing them since childhood. Rogelio demanded money from Violeta, who refused. This infuriated Rogelio, so he forcibly took the money from her and boxed her shoulders. Cabiles then approached and twisted Violetas hands behind her. While in that defenseless position, Rudy drew a bolo and hacked her neck. The daughter, Salvacion was shocked and ran away to go to her house. She immediately told her husband of the incident. The next day, Violetas death spread in the barangay. Reynaldo, a resident thereof, apparently encountered the accused the night before. He had with him a bolo which he used for farming. For no reason, Rogelio grabbed his bolo and attempted to hack him, but he got away. It turned out, that same bolo was the one used to kill Violeta. All the accused put up alibis. But the trial court found them guilty of robbery with homicide, with the circumstances of disregard of sex and uninhabited place. Reclusion perpetua. Ruling: ruling affirmed, BUT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES WERE HELD NOT PRESENT. As regards the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place (despoblado), the term uninhabited place refers not to the distance of the nearest house to the locus criminis. The more important consideration is whether the place of commission affords a reasonable possibility for the victim to receive some help. (note that it was a sitio, so im assuming maraming bahay) Further, before it could be appreciated against the accused, it must be established that solitude was purposely sought or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. This circumstance was not satisfactorily proven in this case Re: disregard of sex: That the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with insult or
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in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex, may be taken into account only in crimes against persons or honor, when in the commission of the crime, there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age or sex. It is not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property. Robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal. It is thus erroneous to take this aggravating circumstance into account in robbery with homicide.
P v Lubu 390 Phil 543
Uninhabited Place Note: Lifted from Charm Calderinis digest under Abuse of confidence, but this digest will disc uss more on Uninhabited Place PEOPLE VS. RAELITO LIBRANDO, SURDILLAS AND EDDIE PURISIMA LARRY
PEOPLE V. LUNETA FACTS: While Leon Gonzales and his wife Segunda Fuentes were walking along an uninhabited place in the municipality of Ivisan in Capiz, they were stopped by the appellant and one Dominador who is still at large. The appellant and his companion were both armed with revolvers and represented themselves as MP soldiers. Leon was asked whether he was an army man to which he answered in the negative, whereupon appellants companion gave him a fist blow on the stomach and another blow with his revolver. In the meantime the appellant was an onlooker with his revolver pointed at the spouses. Dominador ordered Leon and his wife to take off their clothes, a command which was obeyed. Dominador asked appellant to take away and kill Leon. Dominador then raped Segunda. Leon was able to escape though. When Dominador found out that Leon escaped, he went out to look for him. When appellant was left with Segunda, the former also raped the latter. Dominador and appellant left the scene and brought with them the clothes and other stuff of the victims. After the victims reported the incident to the police, the perpetrators were found in the house of a lady doctor and were arrested. ISSUE: W/N there was the aggravating circumstance of commission of the crime in an uninhabited place? NO. HELD: It has not been proven that the appellant and his companion purposely chose said place as an aid either to an easy and uninterrupted accomplishment of their criminal designs or to a surer concealment of the offense. On the contrary, it is not improbable that the offended parties were casually encountered, there being no evidence that the accused had previously sought the former for any purpose whatsoever, or that said offended parties were known by the accused to be habitual travellers in the vicinity. The offense committed is robbery with rape.
Facts: Edwin Labandero brought his 8 y.o. daughter Aileen to the market in Negros Occidental. On their way home, Edwin, Aileen and a relative, Fernando de los Santos, traversed a hilly portion of the trail leading when they met accused-appellants Raelito Librando, Surdillas and Purisima. Librando inquired from Edwin the whereabouts his relative Fernando and then WITHOUT any warning, hit Edwin with a piece of wood. Edwin ran but he was chased by Raelito Librando. Thereafter, the three men took turns hitting Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. Although it was already dark at that time, young Aileen had no trouble identifying the accusedappellants since Edwin was carrying a lighted torch on their way home. While the men took turns in mauling the deceased, Fernando took Aileen with him and ran to report the incident to the Barangay Captain. The following day, the police proceeded to the scene of the crime and saw the remains of Edwin Labandero lying prostrate on the ground with a wooden pole on his neck. Librando voluntarily surrendered himself to the police while Eddie and Larry were invited for questioning at the police HQ. The three accused were asked to participate in a police line up during which Aileen positively identified them as her fathers assailants. Librando claims that he merely acted in self-defense and that it was Edwin who gave the first blow. Librando further claims that his co-accused did not have a hand in the killing of the deceased. RTC convicted all of them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place (the two considered as one), and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of all the accused. Issues:
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1. WON all the three accused-appellants are guilty of murder -YES! 2. WON an 8 yr. old child is a competent witness -YES! 4. WON the court should apply the following: a) (mitigating) voluntary surrender - Yes b) (mitigating) incomplete self defense - No c) (aggravating) uninhabited place - Yes (considered as one with nighttime) Held: 2. While it is true that only Raelito Librando was shown to have any motive to assault the deceased, nevertheless, crimes WILL BE attributed to persons who, though appearing to have no reason or motive, as long as they have been clearly identified as the offenders. Witness, 8 yr. old Aileen, categorically states that all three had a hand in the gruesome killing of the deceased. The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration (unless such corroboration is expressly required by law.) 2. Any child regardless of age can be a competent witness if he/she satisfies the minimum requirement of the law. The he can perceive and he can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined . The childs competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. As noted by the RTC, Aileen during the trial was not only a picture of innocence and honesty but was possessed with a strong power of observation and recall. 3.a) The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was validly appreciated by the RTC. b) To avail of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self defense, there must be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Here, Aileen testified that it was in fact the Librando who delivered the first blow without any warning to the deceased. The number and severity of the injuries inflicted, the fact that Raelito Librando who admits that he was of bigger built than Edwin, could hardly present any evidence of injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the deceased BELIE any claim of self defense. Therefore, there it cannot apply. c)The fact that the attack was at nighttime, and occurred at a hilly portion of the trail leading to the three accused was clearly in an uninhabited place. The Court however deemed the two as one aggravating circumstance. This is in consonance with People vs. Santos, ruling that if the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance AS A
GENERAL RULE. However, as an exception, they can be considered separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity.
PEOPLE V. OCO Facts: Hermigildo Damuag was driving his motorcycle while Alden Abiabi was seated behind. A white tamaraw FX blocked their path and thus they slowed down. Another motorcycle appeared and started shooting. Abiabi was killed as a result of the gunshots while Damuag was wounded. There was also another motorcycle that passed Damuag, with the driver firing shots at Damuag. Damuag was thrown off his bike and fell to the gutter. He saw that the driver of this motorcycle is Oco. He was able to identify him because he was only wearing a towel around his head, unlike the other riders who were wearing helmets. Damuag ran towards safety while being chased by Oco, who was on his bike. He was brought to the hospital and he had his wounds treated. He survived because of the prompt medical assistance. Oco was charged of the crime of murder (Abiabi) and frustrated murder (Damuag). The aggravating circumstances of treachery, superior strength, motor vehicle, nighttime, by a band, aid of armed men, evident premeditation, and unlicensed firearm. Oco raised the defense of alibi saying that he was not there at the crime scene. Issue: Oco is surely guilty of murder and frustrated murder. However, what are the aggravating circumstances present in the case? Which ones are absent? Ruling: Aggravating circumstances present: 1. Treachery In this case, The unexpected and sudden attack on the victims, rendering them unable and unprepared to defend themselves, such suddenness having been meant to ensure the safety of the gunman as well as the success of the attack clearly constitutes treachery. The gunshots fired against Abiabi and Damuag were so sudden that they were not given an opportunity to defend. Abuse of superior strength This was absorbed in treachery. Not only did they outnumber the victims, they were also armed. The circumstances clearly show that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the crime. Use of motor vehicle The motorcycles were used in going to the place of the crime, in
2.
3.
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carrying away the effects thereof, and in facilitating the escape of the accused. Aggravating circumstances absent: 1. Nighttime - This circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. In this case, a lamp post illuminated the scene of the crime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted, and thus could no longer insure the offenders immunity from identification or capture. By a band - A crime is deemed to have been committed by a band when more than three armed malefactors take part in its commission. In this case, the evidence on record shows that only two of accused carried firearms. Aid of armed men - Aid of armed men or persons affording immunity requires that the armed men are accomplices who take part in minor capacity, directly or indirectly. In this case, the so-called armed men were never identified nor charged. There was also no proof as to the participation of these other men. Evident premeditation There was no direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim. Unlicensed firearms - no evidence was adduced to prove that the firearms used in the shooting incident were unlicensed. ARMED MEN PEOPLE VS. OCO September 29, 2003 Facts: Herminigildo Damuag and Alden Abiabi were travelling on a motorcycle when a white Tamaraw FX overtook and blocked their path. Another motorcycle with 2 riders on it appeared behind Damuag and Abiabi. The nd 2 motorcycle suddenly fired 2 shots in close succession. Abiabi fell on the pavement. The Tamaraw sped away. Another motorcycle (a 3rd one) appeared from behind Damuag. Damuag tried to control his motorcycle but it zigzagged towards the gutter, throwing him off on the ground. Damuag then saw Oco, who was riding on the rd back of the 3 motorcycle, firing away at him. He realized then that he was shot on the right side of his body. Nonetheless, Damuag was still able to run, being chased rd by the 3 motorcycle, until he reached Five Brothers

rd
restaurant where he could not pass anymore. The 3 motorcycle again fired at Damuag and then sped off. Damuag was able to survive because of prompt medical treatment. Abiabi on the other hand, died. Damuag was only able to identify Oco because the dumb bastard was only wearing a towel tied behind his forehead while the other malefactors were wearing helmets. Oco was charged and found guilty of murder and frustrated murder, imposing upon him the penalty of death. Issue: What are the aggravating circumstances? (NB: In Glenn Reviewer emphasis was given on commission of a crime by a band.)
2.
3.
Held: Treachery First of all, the SC found that there was treachery as the evidence showed that at the time the crime was committed, the victims were in no position to defend themselves and the malefactors consciously adopted particular means to ensure the execution of the crime with no risk to themselves. Abuse of superior strength present but absorbed by treachery The trial court also found that the offenses were committed with abuse of superior strength. The malefactors not only outnumbered the victims; at least two of them were armed. The assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the crime. Nevertheless, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery. Use of motor vehicle present We also agree with the trial court that the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle is present. The appellant and his companions used motor bicycles in going to the place of the crime, in carrying away the effects thereof, and in facilitating their escape. Nighttime absent We do not agree with the trial court, however, in its appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. This circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted, and thus could no longer insure the offenders immunity from identification or
4.
5.
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capture. In this case at bar, a lamp post illuminated the scene of the crime. By a band absent Likewise, we find that the offenses were not committed by a band. A crime is deemed to have been committed by a band or en cuadrilla when more than three armed malefactors take part in its commission. The four armed persons contemplated in this circumstance must all be principals by direct participation who acted together in the execution of the acts constituting the crime. The Code does not define or require any particular arms or weapons; any weapon which by reason of its intrinsic nature or the purpose for which it was made or used by the accused, is capable of inflicting serious or fatal injuries upon the victim of the crime may be considered as arms for purposes of the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution alleged that the accused and his three other co-conspirators used unlicensed firearms in the perpetration of the offenses. However, the evidence on record shows that only two of them carried firearms. En cuadrilla, as an aggravating circumstance, cannot therefore be appreciated. In aid of armed men absent There was also no evidence presented to show that the offenses were committed with the aid of armed men. Aid of armed men or persons affording immunity requires that the armed men are accomplices who take part in minor capacity, directly or indirectly. We note that all four accused were charged as principals. The remaining suspects were never identified and charged. Neither was proof adduced as to the nature of their participation. Evident premeditation absent There was also a paucity of proof to show that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes. For this circumstance to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as that of the killing, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Evident premeditation must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, which indicate deliberate planning. There must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim. No such evidence was presented to prove the presence of this circumstance. Unlicensed firearm absent In the same vein, no evidence was adduced to prove that the firearms used in the shooting incident were
unlicensed, hence, this circumstance cannot be appreciated. In the end, the SC found that the only aggravating circumstance present use of motor vehicle should be offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. So ultimately, the penalty of death for the crime of murder was reduced to reclusion perpetua. And for frustrated murder, the indeterminate penalty of prision mayor to reclusion temporal was imposed.
67. P v Viraya 400 Phil 202 FIRE ETC PEOPLE V MALNGAN Malngan was a yaya in Tondo. She burned down the house of her employer because she wasnt allowed to go home to her province. Her employer told her, Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na! Incensed, she admitted that Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay! Her employers family died because of the fire (6 of them!). and other houses in the neighborhood burned down as well. She was charged with arson with multiple homicide. The RTC convicted her of such offense. Issue: Is there such a thing as arson with multiple homicide? SC: No. THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH (MULTIPLE) HOMICIDE. The Information in this case erroneously charged accused-appellant with a complex crime, i.e., Arson with Multiple Homicide. Art. 320 of the RPC1, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD No. 16132 respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom.
1 ART. 320. Destructive Arson. x x x x If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.] 2 Presidential Decree No. 1613: SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
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The raison d'etre is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the consequence. When fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson. If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would not be a qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the separate offenses of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson. Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson. Where then does this case fall under? Arson, the information against her stated with intent to cause damage and that the deaths of her empl oyers were only on the occasion of the fire. Hence, she is being charged with the crime of arson. It is clear from the foregoing that her intent was merely to destroy her employers house through the use of fire.
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano (appellants) walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly throw a hand grenade, ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Drinking group were hit by shrapnel (fragments of the grenade) and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the Hospital. However, Robert died before reaching the hospital. TC: appellants guilty of complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder. ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellants? RULING: It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of the house and the moon was bright. No conspiracy. Only Antonio is liable for the crime. When Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime. Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime. Antonios liability. Treachery is present. Coming now to Antonios liability, we find that the trial court correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime. For treachery to be appreciated two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method and form of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) such means, methods and form of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. Its essence lies in the adoption of
PEOPLE vs.ANTONIO COMADRE, GEORGE COMADRE and DANILO LOZANO (critique this decision by Tinga) Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio (drinking grioup) were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Roberts father (Jaime).
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ways to minimize or neutralize any resistance, which may be put up by the offended party. Antonio threw a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace where the unsuspecting victims were having a drinking spree. The suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous combustion and the tremendous impact of the explosion did not afford the victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less defend themselves; thus insuring the execution of the crime without risk of reprisal or resistance on their part. Treachery therefore attended the commission of the crime. When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. RA 8294 not applicable in this case RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing "any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code." The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Even if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made applicable in this case. Before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING CALLEJO, SR., J.: I concur with the majority that the appellant Antonio Comadre is guilty of murder for the death of Robert Agbanlog, and multiple attempted murder for the injuries sustained by the other victims. I dissent, however, from the ruling of the majority that the killing of Agbanlog is qualified by the use of explosives and not by treachery. Under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 which took effect on June 29, 1983, any person who commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code with the use of explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices which results in the death of a person shall be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. However, the imposition of the death penalty was suspended. Under paragraph 3, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the use of explosives in killing a person is a circumstance which qualifies the killing to murder, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death. When the crimes were committed by the appellants on August 6, 1995, Rep.
Act No. 7659 was already in effect. But while the case was pending, Rep. act No. 8294 was approved on June 6, 1997.Section 2 of the latter law provides that when a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code with the use of explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, etc. shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Paragraph 3 of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep Act No. 7659, was, thus, amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8294. Under the latter law, the use of a hand grenade in killing the victim was downgraded from being a qualifying circumstance to a mere generic aggravating circumstance. Considering that Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8294 is favorable to the appellant, the same should be applied retroactively. Considering the factual milieu in this case, the generic aggravating circumstance of the use of explosives is absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. PREMEDITATION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNIBONG y INGGAO vs. GABRIEL
FACTS: 1. Annibong, the accused, was a kitchen aide assigned to the Army Camp Detachment in Apayao. He was in the kitchen with Gabriel Tallong (witness), a CAFGU member. Corporal Obngayan, the victim, arrived perspiring and thirsty. He went to get a drink and was irritated to find all the water containers empty. He went to Annibong, and boxed him three times in the stomach and uttered: "Vulva of your mother, it is better that I will kill you." 2. According to Annibong, he shot at Obngayan in self defense. Obngayan allegedly took an M-16 and aimed it at the accused, who then shot him in self-defense. 3. This was contradicted by Tallong. According to the sole witness, the victim after boxing the accused, was walking towards the bunkers when Annibong suddenly attacked him from the back with an M-16, then later on, a garrand gun. Obngayan died instantaneously with his brain splattered and an eye fallen on the ground. 4. The RTC found Annibong guilty of murder with the special aggravating circumstance of with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank. ISSUE: a) Is the self-defense theory of Annibong credible?NO
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b) What are the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered in this case?
HELD: a)
b)
There was no unlawful aggression. Granting that the initial act of aggression came from the victim when he cursed and then punched appellant three times in the stomach, such aggression did not amount to actual or imminent threat to appellant's life as the victim already ceased and desisted thereafter. As Tallong testified, the victim was already walking slowly away towards 18 his bunker at the time appellant shot him incessantly. At that point, it was no longer necessary for appellant to shoot Obngayan in order to protect himself. In legitimate self-defense the aggression must still be existing or continuing when the person making the defense attacks or injures the aggressor. Thus when the unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making the defense has no more right to kill the former aggressor." Aggravating: Treachery: YES. (1) the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or 24 consciously adopted. In this case, the victim was totally unprepared and unarmed, while appellant was carrying a weapon. When shot, the victim was already slowly turning away towards his bunker. He was clueless of appellant's sudden attack. Annibong consciously and purposely adopted the means of attack to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Such unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances that render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself constitutes alevosia. Thus, the trial court did not err when it ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder. Premeditation: NO. To prove this attendant circumstance, evidence must show: (1) the time the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. There is no
clear proof as to when the accused hatched the murderous plan, and the interval of time therefrom to its commission. Disregard of rank as well as respect due to the offended party: NO. Cannot be appreciated as this was not alleged in the information.
Mitigating: Voluntary Surrender: YES. It is immaterial that appellant did not immediately surrender to the authorities, but did so only after the lapse of two days. There is voluntary surrender if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the offender has not been arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. There is no dispute that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the governor a person in authority, then to the police, before he was arrested.
PEOPLE V. JOSE RODAS, SR. AND ARMANDO RODAS Facts: The two accused-appellants here were charged together with 2 others who pleaded guilty to homicide before the prosecution could rest its case. Jose Rodas, Sr. with his 3 children, co-appellant Armando Rodas, Charlito Rodas and Jose Rodas, Jr., were charged for murdering victim Titing Asenda. Titing Asenda was at a dance near the presence of Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot, the two eyewitnesses to the crime. The two eyewitnesses testified that they saw the Rodas family suddenly surround Titing Asenda. Charlito stabbed Titing in the back. Then Armando clubbed Titing with a chako [nunchucks] causing him to fall. Then Jose Sr. handed Jose Jr. with a bolo which Jr. used to hack Titing in the elbow. The eyewitnesses tried to help Titing but Armando pointed a gun at them. The Rodas Family left and when the eyewitnesses approached Titing he was already dead. The defense of Appellants Jose Sr. and Armando was alibi. That they were not present in the dance and it was only Charlito and Jose Jr. who killed Titing, the two who pleaded guilty. Despite the alibi, the RTC convicted appellant Jose Sr. and Armando of murder qualified by Treachery.
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Issue: Appellants guilty of killing Titing? Aggravating Circumstances? Held: SC finds Jose Sr. and Armando guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery. Denial or Alibi cannot override the positive and credible testimony of two eyewitness. NOTE Justice Callejo assigned this case under Evident Premeditation but because the SC had a short discussion on this, I think we should discuss other circumstances considered by the Court. A. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. All the SC said was that the prosecution failed to establish this circumstance. B. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Here, Titing was completely unaware that he was going to be attacked. He was not forewarned of any danger to himself as there was no altercation or disagreement between the accused and the victim. The suddenness of the attack, the number of the accused and their use of weapons against the unarmed victim prevent the possibility of any defense or retaliation by the victim. The fact that the victim was already sprawled on the ground and still Jose Jr. hacked him with a bolo clearly constitutes treachery. C. Nocturnity cannot also be considered against the appellants. Nocturnity is aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offenders
immunity from identification or capture. Here, the dance was adequately lighted which led to the positive identification of the Rodas family. D. Abuse of Superior attended the killing since there was glaring disparity of strength between the victim and the four accused. The victim was unarmed while the accused were armed with a hunting knife, chako and bolo. However, this is absorbed in Treachery.
PEOPLE vs. BALDOGO FACTS: Baldogo and Bermas were inmates who were serving sentence in the Penal Colony of Palawan. They were assigned as helpers of the Camacho family, who resides within the Penal Colony. In the evening of Feb. 22, 1996, only siblings Jorge (14 y.o) and Julie (12 y.o.) were left in their house together with the Baldogo and Bermas. While Julie was studying in her room, she heard Bermas calling from the kitchen ("Jul, tawag ka ng kuya mo"), but she ignored him. A few moments later, Bermas called her again, but Julie again ignored him. However, when Julie heard a loud sound, akin to a yell (Ahh, ahh!), she got out of the room and went to the kitchen, where she found Jorge sprawled on the floor, lying face down and bloodied. The vicinity was well lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Julie saw Baldogo and Bermas standing over Jorge, each of them armed with a bolo. She ran back to the sala but the two pursued her. Baldogo tied her hands at her back with a torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors. Baldogo dragged Julie outside the house and towards the mountain. During their trek Baldogo and Bermas were able to retrieve their clothing and belongings from a trunk which was located under a Tamarind tree. The following day, Bermas separated from Baldogo and Julie, who continued their ascent to the mountain. The two stayed in the mountains for a few days until Feb. 28, 1996, when Baldogo left Julie in the mountains to fend for herself. Julie went to the lowlands & there she asked for help from Nicodemus. Nicodemus brought Julie to Balsaham where they met some personnel of the penal colony and police officers, and Nicodemus turned Julie over for custody to them. Two informations were filed accused-appellant Baldogo and Bermas, one for crime of murder and the second for kidnapping. Even before the arraignment, Bermas died. Baldogo denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. He contends that while he was preparing for sleep he was approached by Bermas, who was armed with a bloodied bolo. Bermas warned him not to shout, otherwise he will also be killed. Baldogo maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire period that he and Julie
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were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from Bermas. Baldogo asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but Baldogo was afraid that Julio Sr., the father, might kill him. The RTC found Baldogo guilty of the two crimes charged, appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation among many others. ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation despite the failure of the prosecution to prove it? HELD/RATIO: YES. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, based on the following findings and ratiocination: "The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 22, 1996. It was carried out after the accused have been through tidying-up the kitchen, the dining room and the kitchen wares the family of the Camachos used in their early dinner before 7:00 o'clock that evening. But even before dinner, the accused have already made preparations for their flight, shown by the fact that they already had their clothes, other personal belongings and food provisions stacked in their respective travelling bags then placed in a spot where they can just pick them up as they take to flight." Although the SC agrees that Baldogo is guilty of murder, it does not agree with the ruling of RTC that the crime was qualified by evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation must be proved with certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that Baldogo and Bermas hid the bag containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the colony. There is no evidence
establishing when Baldogo and Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed to adduce any evidence of overt acts on the part of Baldogo, nor did it present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas planned and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two felons since then clung to their determination to commit the said crimes. Although Baldogo and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence that they took advantage of their numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge.
PEOPLE V UBIA Facts: Early in the evening of September 14, 1952, Aureliano Carag, Mayor of Solana, Cagayan arrived on horseback at the house of the spouses Esteban Tambiao and Teodora Quilang in the barrio of Bagag, Solana, Cagayan. Upon arriving he tied his horse beside the house, went up, and delivered a dead rooster which he had brought along, to Teodora Quilang to be cooked. Carag, Dionisia and Esteban had conversation with Flora. Not long after this conversation, Teodora Quilang called the three to go up for supper. Carag thought of removing the saddle off his horse, so he directed his steps towards the place where he had tied his horse. It was then that the first gunshot was heard. Carag was hit at the buttock and immediately called upon Teodora for help. Teodora immediately went down, accompanied by Dionisia and Esteban. Flora also heard the call, so she also started to go down. It was then that further shots were heard. At that time, Proceso Ledesma, a policeman of Carag, who had heard the shots and the call of Carag for help, went down, stealthily approaching the besieged house of the Tambiaos. Carag called upon Proceso to help him, telling him to fire at his attackers and that Tomas Ubia and his companions were on the road. It was then that a voice was heard in answer, "You call for all your policemen, although they are many, we are not afraid. The following morning, the police were called, and upon examining the premises around the house, they found the dead bodies of Aureliano Carag, Dionisia Tambiao and Esteban Tambiao. Eight witnesses testified to the facts which they saw during that night. Circumstances not denied by the defendants also indicate that all the other defendants must have participated in the commission of the crime, as pointed out by the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. Appellant Tomas Ubia lost in the election for Mayor to the deceased Aureliano Carag. Tomas Ubia filed a protest against him and utilized his two codefendant, Marcelo de Guzman and Loreto Mercado, as witnesses in his favor. These two individuals together with Ruben Francisco were living at his house evidently at
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Ubia's own expense. He gave them work by which to earn a living. The other defendants, namely, Romero Pagulayan, Pascual Escote and Pablo Binayug, did not live in Tuguegarao, but were tenants of or connected with Tomas Ubia in his business and in politics, and when the party headed by Tomas Ubia arrived at his other house in barrio Andarayan together with his co-defendants, these three were already there waiting for him. These are circumstances which justify the conclusion that they helped and joined Tomas Ubia in his evil design. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that the commission of the crime was attended with an aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Held: There is no question that evident premeditation was present. It has been held that if a crime was planned at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and carried out at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, or planned at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon and executed at 7:30 o'clock in the evening, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present because sufficient time has intervened between the conception of the idea and the resolution to carry it out and the fulfillment thereof This is what exactly took place in the case at bar. The court correctly found that the aggravating circumstance of alevosia attended the commission of the crime, with nighttime as having been included therein. The scene of the crime was in a remote barrio where Carag must have felt secure. This, together with the suddenness of the attack and the darkness of the night, certainly insured the success of the attack and shielded the conspirators from risk or danger. There was, furthermore, the additional circumstance of abuse of superior strength because there were no less than eight of the attackers, all acting in concert around the besieged house, three of whom were armed with carbines, which are certainly superior in deadliness and accuracy to the only pistol with which the victim was armed. We, therefore, find that three murders have been committed, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength. In the commission of these crimes, we hold that Tomas Ubia, Jose Ubia, Loreto Mercado, and Marcelo de Guzman participated as principals, whereas Romero Pagulayan, Pascual Escote and Pablo Binayug took part as accomplices. But as to Tomas Ubia, who conceived the plan and utilized his influence to carry out the offense, the show marked determination, cruelty and depravity. He did not wreak vengeance on his personal enemy alone, but gave vent to his anger unnecessarily murdering two other innocent and defenseless victims. For him justice cannot be tempered with mercy; the law must be applied in its full force and to its full extent.
CRAFT PEOPLE V. EMPACIS FACTS: At about 9pm, as vicitms Fidel Saromines and his wife Camila were about to close their small store in Cebu, 2 men, Romualdo Langomez and Crisologo Empacis, came and asked to buy some sardines and rice. After they finished eating, Langomez announced a hold-up and ordered Fidel to give up his money. The latter started to hand him PhP12K but suddenly decided to fight to keep it. A struggle followed in the course of w/c Langomez stabbed Fidel about 3 times. Empacis joined in and w/ his own knife also stabbed Fidel. At this time, gunshots were heard outside the house (im guessing the gun shots were signals by the 3 other conspirators). It was only when Peter, Fidels 13-yr old son, saw his father fighting for his life and rushed to his fathers defense w/ a pinuti (a long bolo) striking Empacis and inflicting 2 wounds on him did the 2 men flee. Fidel died from the fatal injuries, w/c penetrated his lungs and heart. Empacis went to the clinic of Dr Eustaquio for the treatment of his wounds inflicted by Peter. He told the doctor that he was assaulted w/o warning by a young man near the Papan Market. The next day, police officers went looking for a man who might have been treated for wounds from a bladed weapon. They came to Dr Eustaquios clinic who told them about Empacis. He was found at the public market where they arrested him. He admitted going to the store of Fidel but denied having joined Langomez in his attack. He asserts that he tried to stop him but the latter succeeded in stabbing Fidel. He further alleges that he was brought by his neighbors to the clinic. The other 2 men, who were accused of firing the gun from outside, denied any participation in the crime. They were both absolved by the court. Langomez disappeared & could not be found. Several aggravating circumstances: 1. Dwelling of the offended party 2. Nighttime 3. Employment of craft and fraud. 4. Advantage being taken of superior strength HELD: 1. CRAFT AND FRAUD was properly appreciated against Empacis. Both men pretended to be bona fide customers of the victims store and on this pretext gained entry into the latters store and later, into another part of his dwelling. In previous cases, the Court held the presence of fraud or craft when one pretended to be constabulary soldiers to gain entry into a residence to rob and kill the residents, pretended to be needful of medical treatment only killing the owner of the house, and pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way to enter into a house.
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2. NIGHTTIME was also properly appreciated as nocturnity was deliberately and purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime. Nighttime is not per se aggravating unless shown that it was deliberately and purposely sought to facilate or actually facilitated the commission of the crime. The lateness of the hour prevented other customers from being there to defer the act or coming to the aid of the victims. 3. SUPERIOR STRENGTH properly appreciated. To be deemed present, it doesnt suffice to prove superiority in number on the part of the malefactors but that they purposely employed excessive force, force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked w/c was present in this case. Empacis & his companion took advantage of their combined strength & their bladed weapons to overcome their unarmed victim & assure the success of their felonious design to take the money. 4. DWELLING also. The victim not having given provocation.
near the National Highway. Conductor Eduardo Valle, went down the minibus and allowed appellant to get inside the bus. He observed that his clothes, particularly the right side of his jacket and the right side of his pants, was soaked with blood. When asked where he was going, he didnt answer, he just paid the fare. Conductor observed a wad of cash in his breast pockets. Body of Bonifacio later found with gunshot wounds and stab founds. ISSUE: W/N he is guilty of robbery with homicide, aggravated by fraud and craft. HELD/RATIO: The testimonies of the prosecution witness was able to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence was able to establish the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The time element of the circumstances thus proven link each chain of circumstances to another pointing to a reasonable conclusion and no other but the guilt of appellant. From the early morning of October 27, 1994 to 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, the prosecution has sufficiently shown that the appellant was the last person seen with the victim before the latter was killed. About thirty minutes later, appellant was seen speeding away. Appellant's intention to rob the victim can be gleaned unerringly from the attendant circumstances. Obviously, robbery was the motive that impelled appellant to convince the victim to go with him. Under the pretext of selling cows to him, appellant cajoled the victim to bring a large sum of money and thereafter, lured him to a route where appellant could divest him of his money with the least danger of being caught. As aptly surmised by the trial court, the two inches thick of one hundred peso bills in appellant's pocket and the blood smeared on his clothes are two vital chains of circumstances that undoubtedly bespeak of the robbery with homicide appellant committed. Though not alleged in the Information, the generic aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft were properly appreciated by the trial court. Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious 16 words or machinations, fraud is present. By saying that he would accompany the victim to see the cows which the latter intended to buy, appellant was able to lure the victim to go with him. SUPERIOR STRENGTH PEOPLE V. LORETO (1993) AID: 3 VICTIMS- ONE of which is MURDER-ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, v. VIVENCIO DENCIO, accused-appellant.
PHILIPPINES,PlaintiffLABUGUEN @
FACTS: Appellant Labuguen is accused of the crime of Robber with Homicide, with the aggravating circumstance of fraud and craft, hence the trial court sentencing him to death. The victim is Bonifacio Angeles, who was engaged in the business of buying cows and selling them at the public market. On Oct 27, 1994, a certain Tomas Pagbigayan went to Bonifacios house, offering him 2 cows to sell. Bonifacio said that he would see the cows when he has the time and offered to accompany him to the crossing/terminal. They rode Bonifacios bike to go there and when the latter came back to the house, the appellant Labuguen was riding in the back of the motorcycle with victim. While in the house, Labuguen offered 3 cows for sale to Bonifacio. The latter wanted to inspect the cows because they were nearby so he got P40,000 cash and went with Labuguen to where the cows supposedly were. They rode Bonifacios motorcycle. Several witnesses saw Bonifacio and Labuguen riding together off to the country side. Between 11:00 to 12:00 o'clock noon on the same day, Geronimo Rivera was driving a Challenger, a passenger mini-bus in Isabela. His conductor was Eduardo Valle. At Nappaccu, Geromino Rivera (Rivera) saw at a distance of 200 meters, a person behind some talahibs
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Facts: Samuel Loreto of murder, homicide and of slight physical injuries and meting on him the penalty of death for murder. Leah Rondena (12) died, Lettymar Rondena (9) died as well, while third victim Princess Rondena (3 month old baby) survived. Facts are simple-- Witness Romeo (neighbor/trike driver) witnessed the killing spree when he saw Leah Rondena emerged from the house of Rolando (Leahs half -brother) and into the house of Dan (brother of accused) and thereafter the whole incident occurred, leading sadly to Leah (who was chased around) and Lettymars (already found dead) death. NOTE: This killing spree of the two young girls occurred while their half-brother Rolando was away as a tricycle driver as well, with the latter entrusting the babysitting of Princess to the two young ladies. NOTE also: accused Loreto was previously charged with murder before he came to the victims town in Puerto Princesa. Issue: Aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and treachery applicable in the death of Leah Rondena? (YES only to superior strength. No to treachery.) Held: Aside from the court affirming by circumstantial evidence of the killing of Lettymar and physical injuries on Princess, and more IMPORTANTLY in this case, The victim, Leah, is a girl only (12) years of age unarmed when brutally slain. On the contrary, the accused is a man of legal age and armed with an eight inches knife. Considering the gender, age, height, built, size, and agility of the accused, he is much superior in strength and disposition than the hapless and innocent victim. The use of a bladed weapon even if already superior in physical strength in killing the victim is indicative of the accuseds unmistakable intent of taking advantage of his superior strength. However, the trial court further declared that treachery was attendant but can no longer be appreciated against accused-appellant because treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength. However, the Court does not agree with the ruling of the trial court that although treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength, it is abuse of superior strength and not treachery which qualified the crime. What should qualify the crime is treachery as proved and not abuse of superior strength. If treachery is not proved but abuse of superior strength was proved by the prosecution, the crime is qualified by abuse of superior strength. (IN SHORT, treachery was not proven) Moreover, superiority does not always mean numerical superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-a-vis the victim. There is abuse of superior strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors natural
strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense, although not annulling it. Note: the minority of the Leah and Lettymar was not sufficiently proven. IF It was proven, then such act of Loreto would have automatically been qualified to murder.
PEOPLE V. ALARCON, TOMPONG, AND GUMAWA Per Curiam Decision (EN BANC) FACTS: Three different informations were filed against the accused (co-conspirators) WILFREDO ALARCON, EDDIE TOMPONG, and EDUARDO GUMAWA. o Criminal Case No. 5630 for RAPE WITH HOMICIDE o Criminal Case No. 5631 for RAPE (resulting to the death of Aisha Dava), committed by more than 2 persons, aggravated by superior strength o Criminal Case No. 5632 for RAPE resulting to the death of Aisha Dava), committed by more than 2 persons, aggravated by superior strength ALARCON, TOMPONG, GUMAWA pleaded not guilty. The three cases were heard jointly. The prosecution presented five witnesses: Dr. Irma J. Adayon, Lucia Dava, Melita Cancer, Ostimiano Untalan and Amador Martinesio and rebuttal witness Pedro Enque. The evidence of the prosecution shows: o At 7AM of May 26, 1995, accused ALARCON (17 years old) was on his way to Sitio Casoy, Bugasong, Antique to gather firewood. On his way, he met Lola Magang, the grandmother of the11-year old victim, Aisha Dava (AISHA), carrying goods to be sold at the market in Valderrama. o Upon reaching Sitio Casoy, ALARCON saw TOMPONG (42 years old with his wife Gloria) and GUMAWA gathering firewood and tying them in bundles. AISHA was watching the group bundle firewood while TOMPONG and GUMAWA were teasing her (by telling her that they will court her). AISHA reacted by throwing pebbles at TOMPONG and GUMAWA, and left the place saying that she would just look for the carabao she was tending.
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o After finishing her task, Gloria left TOMPONG, GUMAWA, and ALARCON behind. TOMPONG approached ALARCON and said that they will follow AISHA. TOMPONG, GUMAWA, and ALARCON went to the place where AISHA was grazing her carabao. AISHA saw the 3 of them approaching and stood up and looked at them. Upon reaching AISHA, TOMPONG pushed ALARCON towards AISHA causing them both to fall on the ground and roll together. As they rolled, AISHA scratched the face of ALARCON to defend herself but while AISHA was lying flat on her back, TOMPONG ran towards her and got the knife tucked on her waist. AISHA shouted and cried as the 3 ganged upon her. A t that instant, prosecution eyewitness Melita Cancer, who was on her way home after coming from AISHAs house (w/c was situated around 80m from the crime scene), head the cry of the victim. Cancer was supposed to collect money from AISHAs mother but left after discovering that no one was home. After hearing AISHAs cry, she looked around and saw TOMPONG, GUMAWA, and ALARCON, holding and undressing AISHA. Cancer immediately fled the area started and afraid of what she saw. Another person, Ostimiano Untalan (68 years old and a retired PC officer) saw the incident as he was on his way to the bamboo plantation of Salvador Dava to inquire into the availability of bamboo poled he intended to buy. Untalan heard the shouts of AISHA but felt afraid and took cover and concealed himself inside a thick bush around 4 ft. tall. He saw 3 malefactors sexually molesting AISHA, who was lying flat on her back with both hands being held by ALARCON. TOMPONG laid on top of the victim while GUMAWA covered her mouth. Untalan saw TOMPONG, GUMAWA, and ALARCON take turns sexually abusing AISHA for about half an hour. Thereafter, ALARCON struck the neck of AISHA w/ a piece of wood and slashed further the throat and left check of the victim using a knife. GUMAWA dragged the body of AISHA towards the canal. TOMPONG and ALARCON
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followed and covered it w/ twigs of bungargar. GUMAWA told the other 2 that they will separate and nobody will tell what happened. Untalan left his hiding place and went home 5 minutes after the 3 fled. Three days thereafter, the cadaver of AISHA, in a state of decomposition, was found by the police in Sitio Sio. The findings in the Autopsy Report were: General Appearance: Dead; lying with his head and trunk slightly elevated from the rest of the body; supine position; both arms slightly flexed and perpendicular to the body; both thighs and knees flexed; knees separated from each other 40 cms. apart; wearing T-shirt stained with blood and rolled upward to the level just below the nipples; wearing panty and short pants stained with blood; short pants rolled upwards to the inguinal area. Wound, 6 cms. long, gaping, neck, right, involving right sternocleidomastoid muscle, right common carotid artery and vein. Wound, stabbed, 2.5 cms. long, gaping, left buccinator area, running mediolaterally, involving buccinator muscle thru and thru. Labia majora and labia minora; Medical borders not prominent because it is markedly covered by a swollen clittoris; gaping. Clittoris: Swollen and elevated by 2.5 cms.; 6.5 cms. long; 3 cms. wide; oblong in shape; presence of somewhat fresh blood in the superior third; wound in the inferior half. Vaginal canal: Presence of old mucus like material in the opening, left, lower quadrant; edges irregular; rugosities not discint; admits one finger. Fourchette: Rounded base. Hymen: Not clearly identified because of the extremely swollen clittoris. Version of defense: o ALARCON (19 years old), (testifying on his own behalf) said that after AISHA left to look for her carabao, TOMPONG and GUMAWA approached ALARCON and told him to go with them to follow AISHA. He refused but TOMPONG pushed him. He fell on the root of a santol tree and he was leaning on it when GUMAWA approached him. GUMAWA
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pointed a bolo at him and threatened him that if he did not go with them, GUMAWA would hack him. Scared, ALARCON went with TOMPONG and GUMAWA to follow AISHA. When they found AISHA, TOMPONG and GUMAWA allegedly instructed him to hold the hands of AISHA while they took turns raping her under the threat of being hacked with their bolos. After TOMPONG and GUMAWA finished raping AISHA, TOMPONG faced ALARCON and told him to take his turn, but ALARCON cried and said that he would not do it. Because he did not, TOMPONG told GUMAWA: "We cannot do otherwise." GUMAWA then took a piece of wood beside him and struck the neck of AISHA, put on her shorts and pulled her towards a hole near some shrubs. GUMAWA warned ALARCON not to tell anybody about what happened. TOMPONG then slashed AISHA's neck with the knife he took from her waist and dropped the knife beside AISHA's body. TOMPONG approached ALARCON and told him not to tell anybody about the incident and, if he was caught, to just admit it. GUMAWA and TOMPONG each promised to pay ALARCON P500 if the latter admitted to the crime. Richard Bernabe, first witness for TOMPONG and GUMAWA, declared that at around noon of 26 May 1995, his neighbor ALARCON went to his house to ask for help as he had raped a child. ALARCON confessed to him that he did it alone. Edna Apolinario, the second witness for TOMPONG and GUMAWA, testified that on 22 May 1995, TOMPONG, GUMAWA and her husband began the construction of her house in Apgahan, Patnongon, Antique. TOMPONG and GUMAWA worked continuously from 22 May up to 27 May 1995. At six o'clock in the morning of 28 May 1995, the two went home. She expected them to
come back the following Monday as the house was not yet finished but then she heard over the radio that the two were arrested by police. As laborers, TOMPONG and GUMAWA worked the whole day, from 7:30 in the morning to about 4:30 or 5:00 in the afternoon, and slept in her old house adjacent to the one being constructed. o TOMPONG and GUMAWA raise the defense of alibi. Accused TOMPONG testified that he was 42 years old, married, a carpenter and resident of Sitio Sio, Bagtason, Bugasong, Antique. On 26 May 1995, when the crimes in question were allegedly committed, he and GUMAWA were working on Edna's house and they never left the site. The prosecution presented Pedro Engue as rebuttal witness. He testified that he had resided in Sitio Sio for the last five years and TOMPONG is his neighbor. TOMPONG's usual work was selling firewood which he gathered from the land owned by the Davas. Engue did not know whether TOMPONG had ever constructed a house in Sitio Sio for other people. He added though that GUMAWA is also a firewood gatherer in Sitio Sio. Trial court convicted TOMPONG, GUMAWA, and ALARCON. TOPONG and GUMAWA were sentenced to death while ALARCON faces reclusion perpetua. The judgment against TOMPONG and GUMAWA is before the Supreme Court on automatic review.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the prosecution witnesses are credible? Yes (2) Whether defense satisfactorily established the defense of alibi? No (1) FINDINGS OF LOWER COURT ARE BINDING After a thorough review of the evidence on record, we affirm the judgment of conviction of accused-appellants TOMPONG and GUMAWA. At the core of this petition is the credibility of eyewitnesses. The trial court found worthy of belief the accounts of Melita Cancer, Ostimiano Untalan
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and co-accused ALARCON. We can do no less. Appellate courts accord the highest respect to the trial court's assessment of the testimonies of eyewitnesses by the trial court because of its unequaled opportunity to observe on the stand their demeanor and manner of testifying and to detect whether they are telling the truth or not. This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. None of the exceptions obtains in these cases. TOMPONG and GUMAWA capitalize on Melita Cancer's running away, not attempting to secure help for AISHA, and not telling anybody what she had witnessed, as attributes of the falsity of her testimony. However, Cancer has clearly explained that she was afraid when she saw what was happening. As for not telling anybody, this was adequately explained in her testimony. There is no accounting for the varied reactions an eyewitness might have relative to what he might be seeing. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. Fear has been known to render some people immobile, if not useless, in some life-and-death situations. As to Ostimiano Untalans failure to report the matter to the police and for inconsistencies in his testimony, it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case, and in fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved is of judicial notice. It is understandable for a witness to fear for his safety especially when townmates are involved in the commission of the crime. Moreso in Untalan's circumstances: he is old and disabled. (2) ALIBI TOMPONG and GUMAW claim that they could not have raped AISHA since they were working that day in Apgahan constructing the house of Edna Apolinario. To establish alibi, an accused must show that he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. The trial court, after noting the distance between Apgahan to Sitio Sio in Barangay Bagtason where the crimes were committed, held that it was not physically impossible for TOMPONG and GUMAWA to be present in Bagtason at the commission of the offenses. The burden of proving alibi lies with TOMPONG and GUMAWA and they have failed to discharge this burden. Justifiably,
courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have received the same with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication. It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime. RULING: We are convinced beyond any doubt that TOMPONG, GUMAWA and ALARCON each raped AISHA. Since the facts adduced prove beyond doubt that they conspired and mutually helped each other in committing the rapes, each should be held criminally liable for these rapes. Since AISHA was killed on the occasion thereof, each should be liable for three complex crimes of rape with homicide. SUPERIOR STRENGTH Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides, inter alia: when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. Fortunately for TOMPONG and GUMAWA it was only in Criminal Case No. 5630 that they were charged with ALARCON with the crime of rape with homicide. They were charged only with rape in Criminal Case Nos. 5631 and 5632. The trial court imposed on them in each of such cases the penalty of death because the crime in each case was "committed by more than two (2) persons, aggravated by superior strength." We do not agree with the trial court on this issue. While it may be true that Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 provides, inter alia, that: whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death and that the presence of an aggravating circumstance would justify the imposition of the graver penalty of death, the fact of commission "by two or more persons," which partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance, was not alleged in the information in Criminal Cases Nos. 5631 and 5632. The mere fact that three were accused therein did not amount to a specification of the qualifying circumstance in question and was insufficient for the purpose of complying with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
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Also, abuse of superior strength as a generic aggravating circumstance, which may be appreciated against the accused even if not alleged, was not proven in this case. Mere superiority in number is not enough, there must be proof of deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength. SENTENCE: There being no evidence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua, the lesser of the penalties prescribed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
HELD: The trial court correctly held that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was present since accused-appellant was taller and stronger than the victim. An attack made by an armed man upon a woman, who died as result thereof, is murder, because his sex and weapon gave him superiority of strength. * The SC also held the attendant circumstance of outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse was not present in this case. As the lower court correctly held, the evidence fails to show this. The word "outrage" means to subject to gross insult. "Scoff" means to show contempt by derisive acts or language. There is no proof showing that, in stabbing the dead body of the victim and stripping off her garments, the purpose of accused-appellant was to insult the victim or to show contempt for the dead.
PEOPLE v. OLIVO 79. P v Rivera(?) 402 Phil 547 FACTS: A body of a young Igorot woman was found in a canal near the Athletic Bowl at Burnham Park in Baguio City. The dead woman was identified by her granduncle, Teodoro Incan, as his grandniece, Jane Lorielinda "Lorie" Tacyo. The woman was naked from the waist down, her bloody face crushed beyond recognition, her mouth open in a silent scream. Her abdomen, partially covered by a pink shirt, had several tiny stab wounds. There were also wounds on her neck. Scattered around the woman were a hairband, black shoes, white panties, and a pair of dark blue pants. The police recovered from the canal what appeared to be her personal effects, together with two rough rocks stained with blood and a screwdriver about 10 inches long, with a black handle made of plastic or rubber. According to the police, she was seen in the morning of June 13, 1996 at the Igorot Garden, Burnham Park. She and two companions had their picture taken in the garden by a street photographer. The colored picture shows the victim smiling behind accused-appellant Jessie Olivo and Maybelle Sacliwen. Lorie wore earrings, a headband, dark blue pants, and the pink shirt which the police found on her dead body the following day. The autopsy showed that the cause of death was neurogenic shock due to massive crushing injuries of the head. Based on the testimonies of several witnesses, the prosecution was able to prove that Olivo owned the screwdriver used to stab Lorie and several other circumstances which pointed to the guilt of Olivo. The RTC found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpretua. ISSUE: W/N Olivo was guilty of murder (with the attendant circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength) YES
PEOPLE VS GALAPIA FACTS: Galapia is married to Agudelo. Marriage became difficult because they lived with Agudelos mom, so Galapia left. One day, Galapia felt horny and went to see Agudelo to have sex. He was denied entry to the house. Galapia waited until everyones asleep then entered the house through window. Galapias advances were met with Agudelos refusal along with her threat to s tab him of the kitchen knife she was carrying. A commotion ensued, which resulted to Galapia getting the knife from Agudelo, killing her (stabbed her heart) along with her mom and a nephew and injuring another nephew. Galapia afterwards surrendered to a policeman (dapat kay brgy captain pero maysakit siya). Galapia was then charged with parricide (Agudelo), 2 Murders (mom-in-law + nephew1) and Frustrated Murder. ISSUE: W/N Galapias act of killing Agudelo can be appreciated by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength (as stated in the information). NO. RATIO: (Agudelo) Abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case for the reason that the said circumstance is inherent in the crime of parricide where the husband kills the wife. It is generally accepted that the husband is physically stronger than the wife. TREACHERY PEOPLE v. ESCOTE
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(robbery wit homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously) Facts: At past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian (regular driver of Five Star passenger bus, hereinafter referred as the driver) drove the bus from Pasay City to Pangasinan. Six additional passengers boarded the bus in Balintawak, including Acuyan and Escote, who held up the bus (they had handguns) as they were passing Bulacan. Both fired their guns upward and accosted the passengers, divesting them of their money and valuables. Apparently, SPO1 Manio was aboard the bus. When the felons went to him and asked for his wallet and ID. When they found out his was a police officer and saw his service gun, they said: Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rinangpapataysayo. The police officer pleaded for mercy: Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilyaako. But the two ignored his plea and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and rights side of the body. Manio sustained six entrance wounds. The bus driver was ordered to maintain the speed of the bus. He heard one of them say Ganyanlangangpumatayngtao. Parangpumapatayngmanok. The other said, Ayosnanamantayo pare. Malaki-lakiito. They alighted from the bus and instructed the driver not to report the incident (all in all, robbery was over in 25 mintues). Naturally, the driver and conductor reported the incident to police. Barely a month after at about midnight, a team of policemen were at a checkpoint along the national highway in Tarlac. A white taxi cab without a plate was stopped and asked the driver, who was Escote, for his ID. Escote said he was a policeman and handed over the ID of SPO1 Manio and the money they had taken from the heist. The police became suspicious because the ID had already expired. He asked Escote if the latter had a new payslip. When Escote could not produce any, he finally confessed he was not policeman and was brought to the station. He was frisked and they found five bullets of a 9mm in his pocket. During investigation, Escote admitted that he and Acuyan staged the robbery on the bus and killed Manio. The RTC found both of them guilty for the crime of robbery with homicide and was sentenced to death. They are now before the SC, appealing among others, the propriety of the both the conviction and the penalty. The highest penalty is meted out if there is an aggravating circumstance. Issues:Is the aggravating circumstance of treachery present? - YES (But how can that be? Treachery is considered in crimes against persons and in this case, robbery with homicide is a crime against property. see discussion below)
(NOTE on the anticlimactic decision: the SC said treachery cannot be considered against the two because it was not alleged in the Information. Nyark.) Ratio: General Discussion on the Crime of Robbery with Homicide To warrant the conviction of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294, the prosecution was able to prove the following elements: 1) taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; 2) property taken belonged to another; 3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and 4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. In robbery with homicide, so long as the intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony. All those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it appears they endeavored to prevent it. The Penalty of the RTC: Death (impliedly taking into account treachery) Under Art. 63, par.1, the felons shall be meted out the supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance absent any mitigating. The RTC did not specify any aggravating circumstance in its decision. However, it is evident from the facts contained in the body of the decision that it imposed the death penalty on its finding that they shot Manio treacherously. Its elements were present: 1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and 2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In this case, the victim was shot when he was defenseless, pleading for his life, and at short range. This killing is a
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grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen. Treachery as an Aggravating Circumstance: Legal Basis The SC has ruled over the years that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex crime and at the same time a single and indivisible offense. However, in two cases, the SC has held that robbery with homicide is a crime against property. Treachery is appreciated only in crimes against persons and hence, should not be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. It held in another case that it is not appreciated in robbery with rape precisely because it is a crime against property. These ruling finds support in case law that in robbery with homicide and rape, the latter are merely incidents of the robbery with robbery being the main purpose and object of the criminal. But the SC ruled otherwise in the later case of People v. Cando when it ruled that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. The SC opted not to apply its earlier rulings that same year (i.e. in People v. Bariquit). Criminal law commentators are not in agreement as well. Aquino and Reyes said it only applies to crimes against persons. But Regalado says that it can be appreciated insofar as the killing is concerned. Turning to Spanish Construction It must be recalled that the 1850 Penal Code of Spain, amended by Penal Reform Code of 1870, was applied in the Philippines. The Penal Code of 1887 in the Philippines was amended by Act 3815 (RPC), which was enacted and published in Spanish. In construing the Old and Revised Penal Code, the SC had accorded respect and persuasive, if not conclusive, effect of the decision of the SC of Spain in construing the 1850 Penal Code. Art. 14, par. 16 on treachery is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code of Spain with a slight difference. In the latter law, the words the persons are used whereas in the RPC, the words the person are used. Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as enumerated in Title Eight (Chapts. 1 and 2), Book II of the RPC. However, the SC of Spain has consistently applied treachery to robbery with homicide, classified as a crime against property. The ratio behind it is when robbery is coupled with crimes against persons, the crime is not only an assault of the property but also of the victims themselves. Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance because the SC of Spain said that the word homicide is used in its broadest and most generic sense. Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither is it a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of
robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty. It is neither inherent in the said crime. Hence, it should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance for the imposition of the proper penalty. In applying this, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is applied. Treachery only increased the penalty in accordance with Art. 63. SCs Ruling on the Penalty Despite the foregoing, treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because it was not alleged in the Information, as mandated by Sec. 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Hence, reclusion perpetua only.
PEOPLE V. WILLIAM ANCHETA3 (ET.AL) G.R. No. 143935 June 4, 2004 (431 SCRA 42) (Doctrine: Treachery) FACTS: There are six accused charged in this case but only accused Felipe Boy Ulep is appealing. The accused were charges with the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused took, robbed and carried away 30 cavans of clean palay belonging to Alfredo Roca, and in order to successfully carry out the robbery, the accused, pursuant to the same conspiracy, with treachery, and with intent to kill, fired their guns at Marjune Roca, which caused his death, shot at Benita Avendao Roca and Febe Roca and hurled a grenade against them and both of them died as consequence of the wounds they sustained; and also fired upon Alfredo Roca with their firearms, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely running for cover by the said Alfredo Roca. In the commission of the crime, the lower courts appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery should be appreciated. 2. Whether treachery may be appreciated in robbery with homicide which is classified as a crime against property.
3 Note: there are 3 cases entitled People v Ancheta. Two of them involve Treachery. But I think this is the right one, because the following website matched the SCRA number that Sir gave: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_167693_2006. html (People v Cabalquinto, [2006])
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HELD: 1. Yes. There was treachery as the events narrated by the eyewitnesses pointed to the fact that the victims could not have possibly been aware that they would be attacked by appellant and his companions. There was no opportunity for the victims to defend themselves as the assailants, suddenly and without provocation, almost simultaneously fired their guns at them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. 2. Yes. Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent crime of robbery of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance. In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim of homicide is killed by treachery. -
Ka Ramil was convicted of the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N accused is guilty of murder. HELD/RATIO: YES. As regards the crime of murder, it is true that there is no direct evidence of the actual killing of the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix whereby the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. It is settled that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence is replete with details to prove that appellant and his at-large co-accused were responsible for the abduction and death of the victim. These are: a) On March 26, 1992, appellant together with six (6) other armed men, introducing themselves to be members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), blocked the convoy of the victim and demanded payment of a campaign fee of P50,000.00; b) When the amount was not produced right away, they hogtied the victim with a nylon rope and brought him to the mountains; c) Despite payment of the ransom money, the victim was not released and was never seen alive again; d) After his arrest, appellant disclosed to the authorities the place where they buried the victim at Brgy. Balao, Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, and thereat they recovered the skeleton of Libertador from a shallow grave; and e) The victims relatives were certain that the remains belonged to Libertador. While the combination of said circumstances is insufficient to establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery, considering the absence of eyewitness to the actual killing of the victim; however, it is enough to sustain the guilt of appellant for the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in the information and proved during trial. This qualifying circumstance is present where there is proof of gross physical disparity between the protagonists or when the force used by the assailant is out of proportion to the means available to the victim. In the case at bar, there was superiority not only in strength but in number as well. The lone victim was unarmed and was hogtied by seven (7) armed men who demonstrably abused their excessive force which was out of proportion to the defenses available to the deceased.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICARDO SOLANGON KA RAMIL, appellant. FACTS: Ka Ramil with 6 other armed men blocked the party of Ador Vidal, a mayoralty candidate in the 1992 elections. Ka Ramil said he was a member of the NPA and asked for campaign fees. Ador failed to give the fees so he was abducted. Adors wife eventually handed ransom money but Ka Ramil failed to give Ador back. They did not know if Ador was still alive. Years later, Ka Ramil was arrested. A cadaver, including a maong jacket and shorts believed to be that of Ador were found and retrieved.
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Evident premeditation cannot be considered in the instant case. The careful selection of an ideal site wherein to block the convoy of vehicles may have been premeditated so that the kidnapping of the victim would be carried out successfully; but the same cannot be said as regards the killing. It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it must be "evident premeditation." So baka yung issue of treachery dito is that dapat may eye witness to prove there was treachery? Baka lang naman.
PEOPLE V. GARCIA Facts: Major Ines Opina and SPO4 Paterno Oria went to Barangay Pugo, Bauang, La Union to serve a Warrant of Arrest against Zaldy Garcia issued by Judge Adolfo Alagar. Garcia lived in a house inside a fenced compound. The compound had two houses. One is a big house, bungalow type while the other which was rented by Zaldy Garcia is small, bungalow type made of concrete hollow blocks. There is a perimeter fence, about 7 to 8 feet high with 2 steel gates. The wider gate is about 6 to 7 feet wide and the other is about 5 ft. wide. Both gates were locked at that time. They stood in front of the gate that was closed, then a woman approached them. They told her that a Warrant of Arrest was issued for the arrest of her husband. While Major Opina and Garcias wife were talking, Garcia came out from their house half naked. The wifes reaction was then normal and she told Major Opina that they should just stay outside for she will get the key from the caretaker and open the gate. When Major Opina saw Zaldy Garcia, he pointed his finger to Zaldy and said Zaldy you better surrender, you have a warrant of arrest.(translated already) Zaldy just waived his hands indicating as if he refuses, who was then more or less 20 meters from the gate. After waiving his hands, he went inside the house. From the gate to the house, there were no obstruction and the ground was clear. At that instance, Oria told Opina to call for a back up. Major Opina then ordered him to do so. As they were waiting for the back-up, they discussed the strategy they would employ in order to arrest Zaldy Garcia. After 15 to 20 minutes, 3 policemen arrived. Upon the arrival of the 3 policemen, Oria and Major Opina scaled the fence near the smaller gate and
the 3 policemen positioned themselves outside the compound. Both the big and small gates were closed. But even if someone is outside the gate, the whole of the house rented by Zaldy Garcia could still be seen. Oria and Major Opina were able to enter the compound by scaling the fence. They proceeded to Garcias house. The pathway leading to the house is plain planted with Bermuda grass and is open. Aside from the main door of the house, there is a screen, its a double opening door. If somebody is outside about one meter from the door, persons inside the house could be seen. The door was open but the screen made of chicken wire was closed. While Oria was walking side by side with Major Opina approaching the door, Major Opina was on his left side, and was ahead of him. Suddenly, they were shot at. He was not hit but Major Opina who was about one meter from the door was hit on the abdomen. After the shot was fired, Oria dived and positioned himself in a safety (sic) place. Major Opina fell down and Oria heard the sound of "ehhh" from him. Oria then traded shots with Garcia. He called for the back-up to enter. Since they did not come, and he had run out of ammo, he had to escape from the compound leaving Opina inside. Major Lunsad then arrived and was able to negotiate for Garcias surrender. Garcia asked the back-up policemen to leave. After this happened, he surrendered to Major Lunsad and they were able to retrieve Opina. The RTC found Garcia guilty of murder qualified by treachery and with the special aggravating circumstance of "the use of unlicensed firearm" and sentenced him to death. Issue: Whether or not the murder was qualified by treachery. Held: Yes! There was treachery! Ratio: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offenders safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offenders deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution. Garcia seeks to negate these elements of treachery by claiming to have acted out of fear and nervousness; he was allegedly under these stresses because persons who were armed, dressed in civilian clothes and who did not identify themselves as members
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of the police, scaled his fence. He simply reacted to the intrusion and had no plan to shoot one of those who so approached his house. Hence, he concludes that there was no treachery and the killing could not have been attended by this qualifying circumstance. First, it is not disputed that the appellant went out of his house to see for himself the two men who came. Second, by his own testimony, he returned to his house to get his gun. Third, no immediate shooting took place. The two policemen still called for backup assistance, waited and conferred on what to do, and only after the backup came did they scale the fence. Twenty minutes must have elapsed from the time the appellant went inside the house up to the time of the actual shooting. Fourth, Major Opina was almost at the door of the appellants house when the shot that killed him rang out. Fifth, the shot came from inside the house through a closed chicken wire screen door that effectively hid a man from inside the house from someone from the outside. Sixth, the first and fatal shot was sudden, immediately hitting Major Opina. We conclude from all these established facts that indeed treachery had attended the killing of Major Opina. While the original initiative originated from the police who sought to arrest the appellant, the latters response was an attack which showed, by its method and manner, that it did not come at the spur of the moment. The appellant was duly forewarned about the identities of Major Opina and SPO4 Oria. Not only was he forewarned, he had ample time to reflect on what to do. His immediate response was to arm himself and to lie in wait in ambush, literally - and to fire from a position of concealment and relative safety at the two policemen who were fully exposed and in the open at the time. The shooting distance of a little more than a meter effectively gave Major Opina no chance. This, in our view, is a classic example of treachery under the definition of the Revised Penal Code of the term.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in holding that treachery attended the commission of the crime of murder??? -- YES RULING: The RTC did not explain the basis for the qualification of treachery except for a terse citation that there was a sudden attack and that Arnulfo had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime. It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment.
PEOPLE vs. PERICELITO VALLESPIN alias BOBOY FACTS: PERICELITO VALLESPIN alias Boboy was accused of the crime of Murder for assaulting, attacking and hacking with treachery RICO QUIANOLA (Quainola) several times with the use of an axe while the latter is sleeping, hitting and wounding him on the head which caused his instantaneous death. Based on the testimony of the Mogote spouses, Salvador and Juditha, on the night prior to the incident, at around 9 pm, the victim Quianola, the Vallespin and a certain Dodong Samson, all employees of the iron workshop owned by the Mogotes, were drinking liquor in the shop. At some point, the victim Quianola stood up to urinate and, while urinating, fell down at the rip-rap portion of the house. He thought that the group ganged up on him and mauled him but his boss, Salvador Mogote, explained that he was not mauled; he just fell. Vallespin suddenly rushed towards the victim and strangled him, which prompted Mogote and Samson to separate the two. The Mogotes intervened and tried to pacify their workers but Vallespin became unruly. For this reason, Samson punched him. Mogote then asked someone to fetch Vallespins mother in order to pacify him. After that, Valespin left and the drinking session apparently continued. At around 1am, witness Mrs. Juditha Mogote went to the kitchen to fix her husband a midnight snack. On her way to the kitchen, she noticed that Quianola was asleep inside the shop. It took her husband less than 20
PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO Alberto Antonio and Arnulfo Tuadles decided to play pusoy-dos. When it came to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. The prosecution alleged that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Alberto pulled his gun behind his back and shot Arnulfo at close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. On the other hand, the defense pointed out that Arnulfo suddenly grabbed Albertos gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Alberto reached for Arnulfos hand and they grappled for the possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared. Arnulfo fell face down to the floor. The RTC found Alberto guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.
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minutes to finish his snack. She had just gone back to sleep when she heard a sound which awakened her. She then went to the bathroom to urinate and, while urinating, heard a rasping sound. From the bathroom, which was approximately five meters from the shop, she peeped into the shop and saw the Vallespin hack Quianola three times with a small axe. For his part, Vallespin interposed the defense of denial and alibi. TC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder ISSUE: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present. YES. SC: The trial court correctly found that treachery attended the killing of victim Quianola. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, tending directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It can exist even if the attack is frontal, if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself against such attack. In essence, it means that the offended party was not given an opportunity to make a defense. To prove treachery, the following must be shown: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense and retaliation, and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. We agree with the trial court that the crime was committed with treachery. Regarding the first element, the prosecution was able to establish through the testimony of the spouses Mogote that the victim was drunk and lying on his back when he was attacked by the accused Vallespin. The testimonies show that the victim Quianola had no opportunity to defend himself. This Court has ruled in a number of cases that treachery attends the killing of a person who is drunk, unarmed, has no opportunity to defend himself and the attack is sudden. The second element of treachery is more difficult to determine as it involves a subjective aspect. However, Justice Reynato Punos dissenting opinion in People vs. Antonio is instructive on this matter. In determining whether the mode of execution was deliberately adopted, three categories of evidence are considered: (1) planning activity or what the accused did prior to the killing; (2) motive or facts which show the accuseds prior
relationship or conduct with the victim, and (3) nature of the killing or facts which show the manner of killing was so particular that defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived design. The following examples were given to illustrate each category: (1) prior possession of the murder weapon or surreptitious approach of the victim; (2) prior threats to do violence to the victim or prior conduct of the victim known to have angered the accused, and (3) evidence showing that the wounds were deliberately placed at vital areas of the body. The evidence of the prosecution proved the deliberateness of the attack made by the accusedappellant Vallespin. The evidence showed the planning activity of the accused-appellant the attack was carried out surreptitiously, at two thirty oclock in the morning, after the accused-appellant had left the shop at least an hour earlier. The evidence also showed motive as it was proven that prior conduct of the victim angered accused-appellant the victim accused his co-workers of mauling him when he fell which angered the accused-appellant. Furthermore, the testimony of the medico-legal officer and the medicolegal report proved that three of the four hack wounds were inflicted on the head of the victim and were fatal. Based on these proven facts, it is obvious that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the accusedappellant Vallespin. According to the accused-appellant, his act of strangling the victim was a prior altercation that negates treachery. We disagree. The strangling incident cannot rule out treachery for the reason that it did not serve to forewarn the victim about the impending danger of death. In a case where this Court ruled out treachery, the prior altercation between victim and accused served as a warning of impending danger and alerted the victim to the possible aggression of the accused. In the case at bar, no altercation transpired. Even assuming that the accused-appellants act of strangling the victim put the latter on guard, treachery may still be appreciated. This Court has ruled that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim is warned of the danger to his person as long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who does not give the slightest provocation, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. As the evidence presented has proven, victim Quianola was drunk and lying on his back when he was attacked and had no real chance to defend himself against the fatal hack wounds inflicted by the accused-appellant. As the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or
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mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed.
PEOPLE VS. NESTOR GO-OD, ALEJANDRO GO-OD (DECEASED), SANCHO GO-OD, RUFO GO-OD AND EMPE GO-OD Facts: Prosecutions version: In the afternoon of the incident, accused Alejandro Go-od, Nestor Go-od, Sancho Go-od, Rufo Go-od and Empe Go-od ganged up on Aladino Ygot while the latter was looking for his goat. All the accused after coming out from the banana plants attacked at once and simultaneously hacked Ygot with their bolos many times hitting him on different parts of the body until he had fallen on the ground. Admittedly, the victim had suspected the accused of having stolen the goat. The victim was able to get hold of a bolo which in the process wounded Nestor Go-od. Very near from the scene of the crime Anecia Monsalud and Gaudioso Suson had seen actually the killing. The victim died on the spot suffering fifteen hack wounds. Accused-appellants version: He interposed denial and non-participation as his defense. He said in the afternoon of the incident, Aladino Ygot (victim) and Anecia Monsalud (witness) were in his house looking for a goat. He told them that he had not seen a goat. They left afterwards but returned immediately and asked to have his cigarette lighted. While giving the piece of lighted wood, Ygot stabbed him hitting his right chest. Whereupon, Nestor Go-od ran away and fell on the ground. Then Ygot pursued him. When he was about to be stabbed again, his father Alejandro Go-od helped and parried Aladino's hand. Nestor Go-od was confined for two weeks. He however admitted that the victim had suspected him of being the one who slaughtered the goat. Only Nestor and Alejandro were arraigned. The other accused, namely, Sancho, Empe and Rufo Go-od all remained at large. Alejandro died before judgment. The trial court relied chiefly on the positive identification of two eyewitnesses Issue: WON the guilt of the accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt. YES! WON The acts of accused-appellant and his companions as narrated by Anecia Monsalod and Gaudioso Suson manifestly disclose their joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. The fact that the victim, in the course of the assault against him, was able to stab accused-appellant and disabled him does not exculpate the latter from criminal responsibility. The qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery which was alleged in the information was
correctly relied upon by the trial court to elevate the killing to murder. However, the trial court erred in appreciating abuse of superior strength in addition to treachery. It is well-settled that where treachery qualifies the crime to murder, it absorbs abuse of superior strength and the latter cannot be appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, manifested by the presence of five armed assailants against an unarmed victim, cannot be appreciated independently because it is considered absorbed in alevosia. Incidentally, evident premeditation can not be considered for lack of evidence that accused-appellant preconceived the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The treacherous manner in which the accused perpetrated the crime was shown by the sudden, deliberate and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting Ygot. Nestor Go-od was found guilty of MURDER and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE VS CHRISTOPHER AVILES Facts: Novelito Contapay was driving his passenger jeepney at less than 10km because it was traffic. Danilo Arenas (deceased) was seated beside him. Arenas then shouted apaya. Contapay turned his head towards Arenas who was then being stabbed by Aviles. Note that Aviles upper body was already inside the jeep and h e had his foot on the running board. Contapay stopped the jeep and tried to help Arenas but Aviles stabbed him on the knee. Aviles ran away and Contapay was not able to chase him because of his wounded knee. Arenas died because of cardio-respiratory arrest because of hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. Aviles denied stabbing Arenas and instead said that it was his half brother Cresencia who did the stabbing (interview of the people in the crime scene showed that Aviles and Cresencia were together on that day of the stabbing). On the other hand, Aviles version is that: he was drinking with Cresencia and some others. He left to accompany someone to the municipal hall. When he went back, he told Cresencia that he was going him. Cresencia asked him to stay and drink a little more. He then left. As he was walking towards the marked, he saw Cresencia running towards him with blood stains on his tshirt. Cresencia told him that he stabbed someone. TC: Aviles guilty of murder and slight physical injuries.
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CA: Affirmed. Issue: Whether Aviles is guilty of murder or just homicide? Was there treachery? Held: Just homicide! No treachery! Aviles was arguing against Contapays identification of him and the prosecutions failure to establish a case against him. Nevertheless, the Court believed Contapay when he positively identified Aviles as the one who stabbed Arenas and him. Trial court is correct that with regard to Contapay, the crime was only slight physical injuries as the prosecution failed to prove intent to kill. Intent to kill is an element of homicide. The facts show that Aviles stabbed Contapay only for the purpose of preventing him from helping Arenas. There is treachery when the following requisites are present: 1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory action on the part of the victim; and 2) the deliberate adoption of such means or methods in the execution. The CA ruled that the fact that Arenas shouted Apaya (perhaps a shortened form of apay aya, which is more accurately translated in Filipino as bakit ba) showed that he was probably surprised to see Aviles trying to get inside the jeepney which was moving slowly because of heavy traffic. The testimony of Contapay that after hearing Arenas shout Apaya, he saw Aviles already stabbing Arenas, showed that the attack was sudden and unexpected. Arenas was confused as to why Aviles was doing what he was doing. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present at the inception of the attack. If the attack is continuous and treachery was present only at a subsequent stage and not at the inception of the attack, it cannot be considered. Qualifying circumstances must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot be considered on the strength of evidence which merely tends to show that the victim was probably surprised to see the assailant try get inside the jeepney. Moreover, the fact that Arenas was in between Contapay and Aviles such that he had nowhere to run does not mean that there was treachery. There was no evidence to prove that this situation was deliberately and consciously adopted by Aviles to protect himself from defensive or retaliatory action.
There was a commotion. Then witnesses said they just saw Florencio fleeing for dear life, chased by the 3 men. Florencio retreated in a vacant lot. Florencio fell to the ground and while in the process of standing up, Tamano stabbed him at the back. Thereafter, Dela Cruz and boy negro took turns in stabbing him. Florencio died. The trial court convicted them of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation (reclusion perpetua) ISSUE: w/n there was treachery SC: NO. They are liable for simple homicide only. Treachery must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. Treachery cannot be presumed; nor can it be based on mere surmises or speculations. In case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the accused. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present at the inception of the attack, and if absent and the attack is continued, even if present at the subsequent stage, treachery is not considered as a qualifying or generic aggravating circumstance. The prosecution must adduce conclusive proof as to the manner in which the altercation started and resulted in the death of the victim, and if the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, the crime committed is homicide and not murder. In this case, the witness saw Dela Cruz, Tamano and Boy Negro, armed with knives, chase and overtake the victim in a vacant lot. The victim slipped and fell to the ground. Dela Cruz, Tamano and Boy Negro forthwith took turns in stabbing the victim as the latter tried to stand up. The prosecution failed to adduce any evidence as to how the aggression started and who started the same. The barefaced fact that the victim was helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. In every fight it is to be presumed that each contending party will take advantage of any purely accidental development that may give him an advantage over his opponent in the course of the contest. It follows that alevosia cannot be predicated of this homicide from the mere fact that the accused overtook and slew the deceased while the latter was endeavoring to rise from the ground. In light of the evidence, abuse of superior strength was attendant in the commission of the crime. However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Information. Evident premeditation was not attendant because the prosecution failed to prove the elements thereof, namely: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow himself to reflect upon the consequence of his act.
People vs Dela Cruz At around 12 midnight, dela cruz, Tamano, and boy negro went to the house of deceased Florencio to confront him.
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PEOPLE V. BASE Treachery even a frontal attack can be treacherous! 3 men arrived in the residence of Brgy. Capt. Julianito Luna. 2 of these men introduced themselves as policemen, and said they were looking for a certain Hernandez. Luna said he didnt know who that person was, and 1 of the men shot him in the head. Then the men ran towards their parked jeep and sped off. Luna was rushed to the hospital but eventually died. Reports reached the police and they immediately tracked down the assasins. The jeep they used was found in the house of a Mrs. Quizon without the men. The police thought the vehicle would eventually be recovered by the men, so they waited out. Base arrived to get the vehicle, then he was collared by a team of PC (?) soldiers and brought to the camp. In a line up, several people positively identified Base as one of the passengers of the jeep. While in the camp, Base executed a written sworn statement with the assistance of a lawyer. In that statement, Base admitted that he knew very well that there was a plan to kill Luna. A week before the incident, he and his other co-accused were surveilling the residence of Luna. He also admitted that after the shooting, he was the one ordered to recover the jeep. [ he alleges that he was forced to make this admission, but he did not substantiate his claims] Trial court: Base guilty of murder, w/ treachery and evident premeditation. Reclusion perpetua. His coaccuseds guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and was acquitted. His other co-accused remained at large. Ruling: Murder!Evidenct premeditation and treachery present. The essence of treachery or alevosia is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. The fact that treachery may be shown if the victim is attacked from behind does not mean it cannot also be appreciated if the attack is frontally launched. Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and the victim is unarmed. In this case, the suddenness of the shooting without the slightest provocation from the victim who was unarmed and had no opportunity to defend himself, clearly qualified by the crime with treachery. There was also evident premeditation. The oneweek interval when accused-appellant and his coconspirators first cased the victim's house up to the actual date of the killing underscores the presence of evident premeditation. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered, there must be proof of the following elements thereof, 1.] the time the offenders determined to commit the crime; 2.] an act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination; and 3.] a sufficient lapse of time
between determination and execution to allow reflection upon the consequences of the act. Other crim related stuff: Base argues he was not assisted by a counsel of his choice when the admission from him was made. This was, however, found untrue as culled from the testimonies of the lawyers and police who interrogated him. Moreover, all the constitution requires is that an accused be assisted by a competent counsel. while the right to counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter There was conspiracy
91. P v Manolo 548 s 567
PEOPLE V. DEL CASTILLO Facts: About 6pm of November 25, 1962, Sedesias del Castillo SED, Castromayor, Palencia and Patanao came from a drinking session in one Badong;s house in Sara, Iloilo. It was slightly raining, so del Castillo, Castromayor and Palencia, (not Patanao though), sought shelter in the house of Nene Emak. There they saw Pedro del Castillo, Sr. who also took refuge from the rain. While waiting for the rain to stop a heated argument ensued between Castromayor and Pedro del Castillo, Sr. PERDO SR which resulted in a fist fight. Castromayor had the upper hand but came out with a torn shirt. Sedesias del Castillo offered Castromayor his Tshirt following when the group went home. While walking, Sedesias del Castillo told them to stay on the side of the road as a jeep (driven by Pedro del Castillo, Jr., JUNIOR (another character), his dad PEDRO SR. was inside was well) was coming fast.
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The jeep came swiftly, suddenly swerving and hit SED, who was thrown about a meter away. PEDRO SR, with a blunt instrument, jumped out and struck SED at the back of the head. Then followed by two more stab blows in the neck. Realizing that the person he had assaulted was not Castromayor, but SED, his first cousin, PEDRO SR ran after Castromayor but failed to overtake him. Meanwhile, JUNIOR (the son) upon realizing that he ran over his Uncle SED, carried the latter in his jeep and brought him to Dr. Javellana, Rural Health Physician who examined the victim and found him to have suffered injuries n the neck and jaw, abrasions and contusions. The cause of death was determined as due to shock. Both PEDRO JR & SR. were charged with murder in the Iloilo CFI, with penalties of reclusion perpetua Their defense is denial and alibi.Though PEDRO SR admitted that he and Castromayor met in the house of Emak where they had heated discussion about inheritance. Castromayor, apparently, was irritated at PEDRO SRs intervention in the discussion and, as a consequence, Castromayor boxed appellant-accused in the head. They grappled and PEDRO SR was able to hit back Castromayor who fell on the floor. Castromayor accused SED of trying to take sides with PEDRO SR, but SED explained that he was only trying to stop the fight. Castromayor warned SED that time will come when he will pay for it. Thereafter, PEDRO SR arrived home at about 7pm when he told his son, JUNIOR, to dress up as they would go to the dance at the Sara Elementary School with Mayor Ricardo Zerrudo. With JUNIOR driving the jeep, they proceeded to the mayors house who boarded the jeep and they all went to Sara Elementary School About 9pm, PEDRO SR noticed a commotion in the street. He immediately notified Mayor Zerrudo about it and together they went to the place of the commotion and learned that something was going on inside the house of Jose del Castillo. They went inside and saw the body of SED lying on top of the table. Mayor Zerrudo inquired from a peace officer which told him that Castromayor and SED had a quarrel which resulted in the death of the latter. Further, appellants argue that the theory of the prosecution is highly incredible in that it was improbable for appellant not to have recognized his own cousin SED and to have stabbed him TWICE on the neck after turning him over on his face.
7. WON there was conspiracy YES 8. WON use of a motor vehicle can be applied? YES Held: d) The Court ruled against the appellants, mainly because of the eyewitness testimony of Virgilio Palencia. He testifies that he saw the jump drive by fast, driven by JUNIOR, the jeep hitting SED. Also, Palencia testifies that he saw PEDRO SR stab SED from behind, and a few moments after, that PEDRO SR ran after Castromayor. Palencia even adds that after seeing this happen, he approached JUNIOR and said, Why do you not pity Toto Decias (SED). To which JUNIOR replied, Is that Toto Decias?. When Palencia said yes, JUNIOR asked for his help to bring him to the poblacion doctor. So clearly there was intent and an actus reus causing the death of SED due to the treachery of PEDRO SR and JUNIOR. It all makes sense that when JUNIOR hit SED, it is because Castromayor is wearing SEDs shirt, thus causing the mistake in identity. It clearly showed the treachery of their act of killing Castromayor supposedly.Considering that appellants employed means which tended directly to especially ensure its commission without risk to themselves, the killing of the victim was qualified by treachery which whenever present in the commission of the crime should be taken into account whether or not the victim was or was not the same person whom they have intended to kill. e) The trial court erred in considering nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance since it is necessarily included or absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery. f) There was conspiracy between appellantsto commit the crime as shown by the circumstance that immediately, after Pedro Jr. had bumped the deceased with the jeep he was driving, PEDRO SR jumped from the jeep and with a blunt instrument stabbed his victim twice on the neck. 4. Under paragraph 20, Article 14 of the RPC, motor vehicle would be an aggravating circumstance if the crime was committed by means thereof. There is no question that in this case this aggravating circumstance should be appreciated since the defendants used a jeep and it facilitated the commission of the crime. Note: Though the proper penalty should be death, due to the lack of necessary votes, the Court decided to have imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: 5. WON there was treachery? YES 6. WON nighttime can be applied? NO
PEOPLE V. ONG
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Doctrine: The elements of treachery are (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery. Nighttime is generally absorbed in the crime of treachery although it was not applied in this case. Facts: Benajmin Ong and Henry Chua used to play mahjong together. In those sessions Ong lost substantially that at one time, it amounted to as much as P150,000.00. He suspected that he lost in unfair games and was completely cheated by Henry Chua and the his (Chuas) companions, who made things worse by pressing him to pay his gambling debt with a threat of bodily harm upon his person and that of his family. Ong was so embarrassed by Chuas pressing that he quit his job. One night, Chua invited Ong at the Amihan Nightclub and told Ong to bring with him the money owed (P50,000.00). Ong, on the other hand, hatched a plan with other men to kill Chua and avenge the embarrassment and humiliation he suffered before the eyes of his subordinates. When Chua and Ong met in the club, they had a few drinks and Ong asked for patience and leniency with regard to his indebtedness and ample time for its settlement. They partied hard that night. Both men (Chua and Ong) left in Chuas car. They were discreetly followed by Ongs men in another car. When they reached a dark and secluded place, Ong urged Chua to stop the car in order to urinate, to which the latter obliged. Ongs men stopped their car, alighted, poked a gun at Chua, and told him to step out of the car. He was made to lie, face up. His hands were tied and his mouth gagged with a flannel cloth. They put him on the trunk of Ongs car. They went to Caloocan and stabbed Chua twice with an icepick. He was buried there with all his belongings. The trial court found Ong and his men guilty of murder. The court found qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. They also found aggravating circumstances of superior strength, nighttime, uninhabited place, abuse of confidence, cruelty, and use of a motor vehicle. Ong questions the courts ruling of finding treachery. Assuming there was treachery, he stated that superior strength and nighttime should be absorbed in treachery. Issues: 1. Was there treachery? 2.
Are the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime absorbed in treachery?
Ruling: As to the first issue, yes, there was treachery. The facts show that Henry Chua's hands were tied and his mouth was gagged with a flannel cloth before he was stabbed twice with an icepick and buried in a shallow grave near a creek. These facts portray well that the tied hands of the victim rendered him defenseless and helpless thereby allowing the accused to commit the crime without risk at all to their person. There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself. Chua was not given opportunity to make a defense in this case, and as such, there is an aggravating circumstance of treachery. As to the abuse of superior strength, it is absorbed in the aggravating circumstance of treachery. The case said that it is sustained in a long line of decisions. Nighttime, however, was not absorbed in the aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case. The court relied on the case of People v. Berdida, wherein there was a special circumstance that showed that nighttime was not absorbed in treachery. That case had similar facts to this case of Ong. In both the Ong and Berdida cases, the accused took advantage of nighttime in committing the felonies charged and had evidently chosen to execute their victims under the cover of darkness, at the dead of night, when the neighborhood was asleep. The Court, in Berdida, stated that Inasmuch as the treachery consisted in the fact that the victims' hands were tied at the time they were beaten, the circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed in treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case therefore is present to which the rule that nighttime is absorbed in treachery does not apply. Aggravating circumstances uninhabited place, motor vehicle, included: nighttime,
Aggravating circumstances excluded: superior strength (absorbed in treachery), abuse of confidence, cruelty Barredo, concurring and dissenting: He states that only evident premeditation and use of motor vehicle should be the aggravating circumstances. IGNOMINY PEOPLE VS. FUERTES
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Facts: For gathering firewood and quenching their thirst with coconuts gathered from a tree inside a hacienda managed by Osmundo Fuertes, Napoleon Aldeguer, aged 14, and Mateo Aldeguer, aged 16, were bound, gagged, brutally hacked to death and thrown at the bottom of a dried creek. Napoleon and Mateo were caught gathering firewood and young coconuts inside the hacienda of Fuertes. During the first instance they were able to escape. Fuertes called upon Salva and Gibone (I think they are employees of Fuertes) to accompany Rolando Tano and Jack (I think these two are hired killers) to the place where the two boys were seen. When the boys returned, they captured them and brought them to Fuertes. Thereafter, the boys were brought to the dead creek, hand-tied. The shirts of the 2 boys were torn and used to cover their mouths. Jack then stabbed Napoleon with a bolo repeatedly even when the boy was already on the ground. Jack gave the bolo to Rolando Tano who then stabbed Mateo repeatedly, after which Tano gave the bolo to Gibone and ordered him, under the threat of death, to stab Mateo. Gibone complied. Jack then ordered Gibone to hand the bolo to Salva who at first refused but again, under the threat of being killed, succumbed to the orders of Jack and eventually hacked the thigh of Napoleon. Thereafter, Jack took the bolo and hacked the neck of Napoleon. Rolando Tano and Jack were handed small envelopes by Fuertes after the crime was committed. They were found guilty of murder. However, Salva was used as state witness. Issue: W/N there was ignominy? Held: None! But first Abuse of superior strength present but absorbed by treachery SC found that there was treachery, so the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength had already been absorbed. Evident premeditation present Evident premeditation can be presumed where, as in this case, conspiracy is directly established. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Its requisites are: (1) the time the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination: (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. All of which are present in this case. Crime committed in consideration of a price
Also, there can be no question that the crimes were committed in consideration of a price promise or reward considering that Jack was hired by Fuertes for 5k to kill the 2 victims and in fact received P200 contained in an airmail envelope as down payment with the assurance that the balance would be paid after the job. However while this circumstance is qualifying in murder, it would merely be generic aggravating if it concurs with other qualifying circumstances like treachery, as in this case. Ignominy absent Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. The clause "Which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act" contemplates a situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame. In this case there is no showing that the offenses were perpetrated in a manner which tended to make its effects more humiliating to the victims. Neither can the act slicing the left leg of Napoleon Aldeguer's lifeless body nor the stabbing of Mateo Aldeguer's corpse in the stomach be considered indications of ignominia because what is required is that the crime be committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his moral suffering. Thus, it was held that the fact that the accused sliced and took the flesh from the thighs, legs and shoulders of the victim with a knife after killing the victim did not add ignominy to the natural effects of the acts. In the end, the SC found that several aggravating circumstances were present, with no mitigating circumstances. Therefore, the penalty in its maximum period which is death would be imposable. However because of the suspension thereof, the imposable penalty is only reclusion perpetua. This penalty is single and indivisible, thus, it shall be imposed regardless of any attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
PEOPLE VS VALLA FACTS: Accused Vincente Valle is 28 years old and married. He is the cousin of the victim, an 8 year old girl named DyesebelDela Cruz. One night, a friend of Dyesebel was walking along the road near the rice fields when she heard and recognized the voice of Dyesebel who was being strangled. The friend ran away out of fright. Subsequently, the mother of Dyesebel approached the barangay captain to report that Dyesebel was missing. The barangay captain immediately ordered a search party. The father of Dyesebel told the barangay captain that Dyesebel was last seen with Vicente Valla. Valla was summoned by the captain but the former did not report.
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On the second day of searching, the search party was trailed by Valla. They found the body of the victim near the river with her dress on but her panties pulled down until mid-thigh. The victims head was blue and her vagina was bleeding. When confronted by the people, Valla admitted to raping and killing the victim. Valla even offered his own daughter as payment. The accused was charged with rape with murder. The trial court convicted the accused of rape with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: whether or not the trial court was correct in convicting the accused of rape with homicide instead of rape with murder - YES HELD: The trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the special complex crime of rape with homicide and not rape with murder as stated in the information. Homicide is, herein, taken in its generic sense. Furthermore, The aggravating circumstance of ignominy under Article 14, No. 17 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated considering that the medicolegal officer testified that the pubic area of the victim bore blisters brought about by a contact with a lighted cigarette. This circumstance added disgrace and obloquy to the material injury inflicted upon the victim of the crime. OTHER ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused is admissible YES a. An extrajudicial confession, to be valid, needs only the corroboration of the corpus delicti (other evidences which tend to show the commission of the crime independent of the confession itself). In this case, the testimonies of the barangay captain, parents of the victim and others establish the corpus delicti 2. Whether or not the statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and offering his daughter as payment is part of res gestae - YES

st
He had intercourse with her five times. 1 , nd rd th missionary position. 2 , standing up. 3 , missionary. 4 , doggy-style (he bent her body downwards with her hands and knees resting on the ground When the latter was already in this position, appellant then placed himself behind her, inserted his penis into her vagina and executed a push and pull movement in the dog's way of th sexual intercourse.) 5 , missionary. Issue: Is rape via doggy-style circumstance (ignominy)? an aggravating
SC: Yes. The Court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise. Other aggravating circumstances at issue: Uninhabited place yes. The accused dragged the offended party, at the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to better attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection and punishment. Even the junction where the two children were left is already 400 meters from the nearest house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its being an uninhabited place. Superior strength No. Already absorbed in rape. Nocturnity No. no evidence that it was sought to facilitate the crime. Rank No. No deliberate intent to offend the rank.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENE SIAO Joy, Estrella and Reylan worked as house maids and helper of Renes family. Rene ordered Reylan to dragged Estrella to the womens quarters. Once inside, Rene pushed her to the bed and pointed a pistol at Reylan and Estrella. Rene then asked Estrella to choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. He also told Reylan to do something to Ester. Rene lighted the candle and dropped the melting candle on her chest. Estrella chose a bottle of sprite because she was afraid of the pistol. She was made to lie down on her back on the bed with her head hanging over one end. Rene then poured sprite into
PEOPLE V SAYLAN Memory aid: doggy-style rape At 7 PM, accused accosted the victim Eutropia, a teacher, (while she was with her kids) and forced her to have sex with him by poking her with an 8-inch dagger. (dirty mind!) He brought her to a creek and told her to undress. Her kids were left in a junction which was 400 meters from the nearest house.
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her nostrils as she was made to spread her arms and pointed the pistol. Estrella tried to fold her arms to cover her breasts but Rene ordered Reylan to hold her hands. Rene ordered Estrella to remove her pants and T-shirt and commanded her to take the initiative (ikaw ang mauna sa lalaki.) She did not understand what Rene meant and Rene poked the pistol at her temple. Reylan was ordered to remove his shorts. Reylan refused but let his penis out. Rene then ordered Reylan to rape Estrella. Reylan refused and Rene warned to kill them both if they did not obey. Estrella was made to suck the penis of Reylan at gunpoint. Reylan then did the sexual act to Estrella for 10 minutes. Rene ordered to repeat the act. They were made to lay side by side while Rene kept on pointing the pistol at them. After the side by side position, they were made to assume the dog position. Reylan shouted for help. Teresita, sister of Rene, knocked at the door but Rene ignored. Thereafter, Rene ordered them to go to the boys quarter and warned them: If you will tell the police, I will kill your mothers." Estrella and Joy sought permission to go home. On their way home, they met an old man who saw Estrella crying. The old man took them to his house. After the incident was reported to the police, Reylan was arrested. Rene Siao and Reylan Gimena were charged with rape. Both pleaded not guilty. TC: Siao convicted of rape as principal by induction. Gimena acquitted because he acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal, if not greater injury. ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct? YES. RULING: As to fact that Rene Siao forced and intimidated at gunpoint Ester Raymundo and Reylan Gimena to have carnal knowledge of each other, we are convinced that the same has been adequately proved by the prosecutions evidence. Even as under settled jurisprudence, the evidence for conviction must be clear and convincing to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, we find the straightforward, consistent and candid manner in which Ester Raymundo related her harrowing experience in the hands of accused-appellant as bearing all the earmarks of verity. Not only that, the corroborative testimony of Reylan Gimena was consistent in material respects with that of Ester Raymundo. The testimony of Ester and Reylan were assessed by the trial court to be credible. The points raised by Rene are trite and of no consequence. First of all, the important consideration in rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Well-settled is the rule that penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape. Thus, this factor could not affect
the case for the prosecution. Second, accused-appellants argument that it is impossible to commit a rape in house where there are many occupants is untenable. We have held in a number of cases that lust is no respecter of time and place. It is not impossible to perpetrate a rape even in a small room. Rape can be committed in a house where there are many other occupants. Third, Ester and Reylan could not be expected to flee or even to attempt to flee under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, considering that Ester was only fourteen-years old and a newly employed housemaid, while Reylan Gimena a seventeen-year old houseboy, they were easily intimidated and cowed into submission by accused-appellant, who aside from being their "amo" or employer, was menacingly threatening to kill them or their family with a gun if they did not do as he commanded them to do. Thus, it was not improbable for them not to attempt to escape when as accused-appellant perceived they had an opportunity to do so. Moreover, while most victims will immediately flee from their aggressors, others become virtually catatatonic because of the mental shock they experience. It was also not improbable for them to report the incident to an old man they met on the road as there was no on else to turn to. The rape was committed on May 27, 1994 or after the effectivity of R.A. 7659 on December 31, 1993. The governing law, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No 7659 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. But the trial court overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accusedappellant to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in the instant case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof. However, the use of a weapon serves to increase the penalty. Since the use of a deadly weapon increases the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, said fact should be alleged in the information, because of the accuseds right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Considering that the complaint (which was later converted into the Information) failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon, specifically, that herein accused-appellant was armed with a gun, the penalty to be reckoned with in determining the penalty for rape would be reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed for simple rape under Article 335, as amended by R.A. No.
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7659. Simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, which must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the deed. Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is correct.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DOMINADOR CACHOLA y SALAZAR, et al. FACTS: 1. 12 y.o. Jessie Barnachea was just about to leave his house to watch cartoons in the house next door when two armed men barged in his front door. They ordered him to drop to the floor, then hit him in the back with the butt of a long gun. The intruders then shot his uncle, so Jessie crawled and hid under a bed, whereupon the shooting continued. When the men left, Jessie went into the kitchen where he saw his mother, his brother and his cousin all slaughtered. 2. There was a neighbor who saw men with bonnets on outside the house, and neighbors also testified seeing an owner-type jeep with El Shaddai on the front and a Fruits & Vegetable Dealer at the side going toward the house and leaving hurriedly after. A few hours after the incident, the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint. The eight accused riding the vehicle were brought to the police station. 3. Jessie positively identified two of the accused, Cachola and Amay, as the armed men who killed his relatives. The OSG recommended the acquittal of the other 6 accused, who were just unfortunate enough to be riding in the same jeep. There was no evidence of previous or simultaneous to hold them responsible as accomplices, hence the SC acquitted them. 4. The death certificate of Victorino Lolarga (uncle) revealed that his penis was excised. Would such circumstance amount to ignominy that can aggravate the offense? ISSUE: What aggravating circumstances should be considered in this case? HELD: Treachery: YES. There is no doubt that the killings were done with treachery, considering that the assailants suddenly barged in and immediately went on a shooting rampage. The Court has ruled time and again ruled that when the attack is sudden and unexpected, there is treachery.The presence of even this single qualifying circumstance is sufficient to qualify the killing to murder.
Evident Premeditation: NO. There is no evidence of planning or preparation to kill, much less of the time when the plot was conceived. Ignominy: NO. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the victims moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused. In this case, the information states that Victorinos sexual organ was severed after he was shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider ignominy as an aggravating circumstance. Dwelling: YES. As regards Carmelita and Felix, Jr. (mother and brother of Jessie), we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, since it was alleged in the information and proved during the trial that they were killed inside their house. Accused Cachola and Amay, therefore, violated the sanctity of the said victims home. CRUELTY
PEOPLE V. SITCHON Facts: Sitchon beat up a little 2 year old boy named Mark Anthony Fernandez to death. Victim mark spread his feces all over the floor and this enraged Sitchon. Sitchon struck him with a belt, 2x2 wood, and a hammer. He even banged the little kids head on the wooden wall. This was witnessed by victim-marks older brother Roberto. The next door neighbor Lilia also witnessed the beating through the open door after she heard the cries of victimmark. Later, Sitchon brought victim-mark to the hospital but he was already dead then. Sitchonis the live-in partner of Marks mom. He is also a drug addict, he was then high from Valium 10. Sitchonpleaded guiltyafter defense rested its case and pleaded the defense of accident. The lower court convicted him of murder, qualified by treachery, aggravated by cruelty and alternative circumstance of intoxication. Sitchon sentenced to death [note: 1998 RTC decision and 2002 SC decision]. Issue: What are the different aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable in this case? Held: Murder, qualified by treachery, mitigated by lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. [Note: Callejo assigned this case under Cruelty, thus this is to be discussed first]
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1. Cruelty is not present here. The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased thevictims suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. The nature of cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for the consummation of the criminal act which he intended to commit.The sheer number of wounds, however, is not a test for determining whether cruelty attended the commission of a crime. The prosecution failed to show that Sitchon enjoyed the beating. The inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic bend but rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity. Treachery is evidently present here. Whenever you beat up a two-year old kid, its treacherous. Impossible for the kid to defend himself. Mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty cannot be appreciated here. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. Here, Sitchon pleaded guilty only after the prosecution rested his case. Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is present since his only intention was to maltreat and not to kill mark. When he realized what he did, he immediately brought mark to the hospital but it was too late. Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated because he failed to prove any of the circumstances The trial court appreciated intoxication as an aggravating circumstance although it was clear that Sitchon isnt alcohol dependent but rather a drug addict. SC said that alternative circumstance of intoxication is clear when it refers to alcohol and thus is not applicable to Sitchons case. Article 14 on aggravating and article 15 on alternative do not contain an Analogous provision unlike Article 13 on mitigating circumstances. Criminalstatutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused. And no person should be brought within its terms who is not clearly covered by it.
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FACTS: One evening, witness Amanda Tabion was in her house when she heard a motorcycle stop in front of her house and loud voices outside. One of the voices sounded as if someone was being tortured, so she went out to investigate. Moonlight illuminated the area and she saw the 4 accused, Allan Valdez, Ludring Valdez, Itong Tabion and Jose Taboac, surrounding Eusebio Ocreto, whom she knew since childhood. Ludring repeatedly hit Eusebio on the head and body with large stones and boulders while the other accused looked on. Eusebio remained lying on the ground, unmoving. When Ludring stopped hitting Eusebio, the 4 accused carried his body on their shoulders and boarded a tricycle and drove off. Amanda returned to her house, frightened by what she saw. The following morning, she learned that Eusebio was missing. That afternoon, the headless body of a man was found. Policemen identified the body as Eusebios. Postmortem examination of the body revealed that the victim sustained 13 stab wounds, which the doctor opined, as being caused by 2 or more assailants. Two days later, the decapitated head of Eusebio was found buried 1 foot deep, more than 100m away from where his body was found. When it was dug up, it was already in the state of decomposition. The 4 accused were charged with the crime of murder, with aggravating circumstances of superior strength, nighttime and cruelty, by decapitating the victim. The RTC found Ludring Valdez and Jose Taboac guilty of the crime of murder. Only Ludring Valdez appealed. ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in appreciating cruelty so as to qualify the crime from homicide to murder? HELD/RATIO: NO. The crime charged should be murder. The SC agrees with the finding of the trial court that the killing was attended with cruelty, because the deceased was stoned, stabbed and beheaded. There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. The test is whether accused-appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. In this case, evidence showed that the deceased was inflicted with numerous wounds before he was killed. Such acts increased the victim's suffering and caused unnecessary physical pain before his death.
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PEOPLE V ABDUL PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ
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Facts: That the five accused including appellant Abdul when they were invited by the victims to a salo-salo without any inkling that the accused have sinister plans against their life and property since they were their friends. One of the accused got hold of the armalite carried by one of the victims asking it from him to test it, suddenly shoot at the victims composed of Abraham Annudin, Annih Tanjing, Abdulbaser Tanjiri, Idil Sahirul and Suri Jannuh with their firearms, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon their bodies which caused the death of Abraham Annudin and Annih Tanjing while the three other companions were mortally wounded. Taking advantage that the two were mortally wounded, the said accused, took, stole and carried away two M-14 rifles valued at P60,000.00; One M-203 grenade launcher valued at P40,000.00; and One wrist watch and jewelries valued at P5,000.00, or the total amount of P105,000.00, all belonging to the victims. The lower court rendered its decision finding the accused, Minya Abdul, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with double homicide and triple frustrated homicide. And since the crime was committed with the attendance of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and by a band without any mitigating to offset any of them, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Hence, this appeal by accused-appellant Abdul. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant participated in the commission of the crime which occurred on August 19, 1988 at Langil Island. Held: Yes. 1) Sahdiya Tanjings testimony is clear and straightforward. At about five oclock in the afternoon of August 19, 1988, she was at Langil Island, Tuburan, with the group of Sahdiya Tanjing, Jubaira Tanjing, Annih Tanjing, Abraham Annudin, Asuri Jannuh, Abdulbaser Tanjiri and Idil Sahirul upon the invitation of Minya Abdul, Isa Abdul, Maldis Abdul, Inggat Doe and Jowen Appang when she witnessed the shooting. 2) we reject accused-appellants claim that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of death of the victims for the reason that no death certificate or testimony of an imam or Muslim priest was presented in court to prove the fact of death of Annih and Abraham. The absence of a death or burial certificate does not negate the fact of the killing since corpus delicti can be proved by testimonial evidence. 3) a conspiracy existed between the accused-appellant, Isa Abdul, Maldis Abdul, Jowen Appang, and Inggat Doe. Evidence shows that the accused-appellant, together with the other accused all acted in concert, one performing one
part and the other performing another part so as to execute the crime of robbery with homicide. Annih Tanjing was deceived into loaning his gun for the purpose of testing and examination. Once he was disarmed, he was immediately shot and killed. Almost simultaneously, they the guns were grabbed from the victims and they were also shot at, killing Abraham and wounding Abdulbaser as a result. When the other members of Annih and Abrahams group ran, the accused-appellant and his co-accused shot at them. Thereafter, they smashed the faces of Annih and Abraham to the point that their faces could no longer be recognized. Then, the accused-appellant and his coaccused left and brought with them the firearms, a watch and a necklace which they took from the dead bodies. The chronology of events coupled with the simultaneous execution of disarming the victims clearly shows that there was a unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful acts to enable them to commit the crime of robbery with homicide. 3) However the lower court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of robbery with double homicide and triple frustrated homicide. There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime is still robbery with homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion of a robbery since the homicides or murders and physical injuries committed on or on occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the composite crime of robbery with homicide. However, when two or more persons are killed on the occasion of the robbery, the additional killings should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance to avoid the anomalous situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be on the same level as robbery with multiple killings. 4) The court appreciated evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance. We are not convinced that evident premeditation was sufficiently proven. The prosecutions evidence did not clearly establish beyond reasonable doubt two of the three requisites of evident premeditation, viz., a.) the time when Abdul and his co-accused determined to commit the crime; and b.) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Although there are badges of premeditation in the present case, we can only speculate as to the time elements required to appreciate evident premeditation. Evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive evidence and cannot be inferred nor presumed no matter how logical and probable such inferences or presumptions might be. 5) The lower court also appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance.
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The accused-appellant and his cohorts, relying on the friendship they had with their victims, deceived them into voluntarily giving their firearms to the accusedappellant for the purpose of testing and examining said firearms. Thereafter, accused-appellant together with Isa Abdul, suddenly, without warning, shot their victims who were not aware of the danger against them and were not in a position to defend themselves. The court therefore correctly found the presence of treachery as an aggravating circumstance. 6) The court also found the aggravating circumstance of band attendant in the present case. We do not agree. An offense is deemed committed by a band when more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission thereof. This presupposes that from the onset four of the malefactors were already armed in order to facilitate the commission of the crime. In the present case, only two of the five malefactors were armed at the start of the commission of the offense. At any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstance of band was attendant in the commission of the crime, it is absorbed by treachery. The crime of robbery with homicide is a special complex crime punishable under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the presence of treachery and the additional killing as aggravating circumstances, the maximum penalty of death would be imposable under Article 63 of the revised Penal Code. However, since the crime was committed on August 19, 1988 which is prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes which reimposed the death penalty, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty which shall be imposed regardless of the attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Ybasco when as there was information that he would deposit $250,000 for his employer. They decided tp waylay Ybasco on the way to the bank. On the day of the heist, the robbers took a Toyota Corolla owned by Nash and went to the Makati area to do surveillance on Ybasco. At around 6:30 p.m., Ybasco emerged from the office of his employer holding a plastic bag. Momentarily, Manansala and the appellant confronted Ybasco and told him, May warrant of arrest ka. They grabbed Ybasco, handcuffed him and dragged him to the car. Manansala and the appellant had a scuffle with Ybasco when they grabbed the plastic bag from him. Roberto Acosta, a roving security guard, saw the incident and pulled out his gun. He sped towards the scene to investigate the incident. Del Rosario confronted Acosta and grappled with him for the possession of the gun. As Del Rosario managed to wrest possession of the gun from Acosta, shot him in the mouth. They boarded the car, and sped towards EDSA. The robbers sped towards Laguna. When Manansala looked inside the bag, he saw that it contained only P5000 instead of $250,000 as he expected. He hit Ybasco on the nape. Then the robbers Manansala, appellant de Jesus and Del Rosario let Ybasco out in a sugar farm in Laguna. They told hom that he would be allowed to go home but he shouldnt follow them because de Jesus was a member of the NPA. But then suddenly, de Jesus shot Ybasco on the head. The robbers were later caught and one of them, del Rosario, confessed guilt. With respect to appellant, the trial court found de Jesus guilty of Robbery with homicide, sentencing him to death. ISSUE: W/N the appellant de Jesus is guilty of robbery with homicide, despite the qualifying circumstances present that would normally qualify murder. HELD/RATIO: Yes, robbery with homicide. The evidence on record shows that when the appellant and Manansala abducted Ybasco in Makati, they handcuffed the victim and transported him to a sugar field in Cabuyao, Laguna. The appellant and Manansala brought Ybasco out of the car. Still handcuffed, Ybasco was shot by the appellant on the right cheek. In People v. Escote, Jr., the trial court ruled that treachery is aggravating in robbery with homicide. The aggravating circumstance of the use of a vehicle in committing robbery with homicide is also attendant in this case. The appellant and his cohorts used a vehicle when they abducted Ybasco and transported him to Cabuyao, Laguna. However, the Information does not allege that the appellant and his cohorts used a vehicle in committing the crime charged as mandated by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Also, the additional killing is not an aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide.
102. P v Regala April 5, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDUARDO DE JESUS y ENRILE, appellant. FACTS: SPO3 Ybasco was a policeman at the Makati Police Station. He had a part time job as a money changer. Every afternoon he would deliver money for his employer, carrying it in a plastic bag. On February 1994, appellant De Jesus, together with a guy named Manansala and another named Del Rosario planned to stage a robbery. They had a financier, British national Christopher Nash. They were planning to rob
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In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.
occurred. The court later found out that Lorelyn was deflowered by Belgar long before the current case. Issue: was is the proper offense to be charged ? (considering that she was already 12 at that time) and MORE IMPORTANT: was there any aggravating circumstance involved? Held: Article 335, paragraph 3, which states rape committed against a woman under 12 years of age. In this case, the appellant was charged with rape through force and intimidation of the complainant who is a 12-year-old minor, and a retardate. And although the complainant was already 12 years old at the time, she was undeniably a retardate with the mentality of a 6-year old child, so that she also falls under the fourth category, for being under 12 years of age. MORE IMPORTANTLY, Under Section 17 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, "when a crime is committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of a crime and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code." This should serve as a sufficient deterrent if not a warning to those who are inclined to if not actually habitually addicted to drugs. Their addiction will be no excuse but will aggravate any offense they commit.
PEOPLE V. SITCHON FACTS: Emelito Sitchon (SITCHON) was charged for murder after beating to death the 2-year old son (MARK ANTHONY Fernandez) of his commonlaw wife. He was convicted and sentenced to death. The case is before the Supreme Cout on automatic review. Initially, SITCHON pleaded not guilty. However, before testifying in his own defense, he admitted killing the victim and changed his plea to guilty. Prosecution presented 5 witnesses: Lilia Garcia, a neighbor; the victim's eight-year old brother Roberto; the investigating officer, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier; Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medicolegal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Felicisima Francisco, a forensic chemist of the same agency. nd o SITCHON lived in the 2 floor of a 3square meter house in Tondo. His st neighbor, Lilia, resided in the 1 floor. o At about 10 AM of June 12, 1996, Lilia was in front of her house attending to her children when she heard the sound
PEOPLE V. BELGAR (1991) AID: Rape of 12 year-old retardate- Qualifying Aggravating Circumstance of Drug Addiction Facts: This is a case of rape of a 12-year old girl, a mental retardate with the mentality of a 6-year old. The assailant is a young man who is a habitual drug addict. Belgar committed rape when he approached Lorelyn, the victim, while watching television. Meanwhile, Edu, a nephew of accused, four years of age, approached the mother of Lorelyn and informed her "Lorelyn is pinapatungan by Kuya Boy." Belgar claims that Lorelyn herself testified that she was not rape but only was kissed and fingered, and that he came from a pot session just before the incident
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of a boy crying. Lilia went up the stairway and through the open door, Lilia saw SITCHON beating MARK ANTHONY. Lilia saw SITCHON hit various parts of MARK ANTHONGYs body w/ a piece of wood and banging the head of the boy against the wooden wall. The beating went on for about an hour. After, Lilia saw SITCHON carry MARK ANTHONYs body down the house to bring him to the hospital. MARK ANTHONY was already black and no longer moving. o Eight-year old Roberto Fernandez is the elder brother of the victim, also known as Macky. According to Roberto, Macky had scattered his feces all over the house. Because of this, SITCHON beat Macky with a belt, a hammer, and a 2x2 piece of wood. Roberto could not do anything to help his brother because he was afraid SITCHON might also beat him up. When SITCHON brought Macky to the hospital, his little brother, who could barely talk, was not crying anymore. o A certain Alice Valerio from the Galang Medical Hospital informed PO3 Paul Dennis Javier that a boy had been admitted there. When PO3 Javier went to the hospital where he found the boy already dead. He observed that the child had wounds on the left middle finger, the right index finger, and both feet, including lacerations in the upper lip and contusions all over his head and body. PO3 Javier proceeded to SITCHONs house and found human feces and fresh blood splattered on the floor. PO3 Javier recovered the broken wooden sticks and the steel hammer, which were allegedly used to beat up the boy, as well as a bloodstained white T-shirt. SITCHON surrendered to Station 3 of their district that afternoon. The following day, a staff member of the television program Magandang Gabi Bayan turned over to PO3 Javier a brown belt which SITCHON allegedly also used in beating the victim. Roberto Fernandez had given the belt to the staff member. Dr. Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the postmortem examination of the victims body. He found that the boy had suffered many injuries, including three wounds at the head
and the anterior chest, which could have been inflicted with the use of blunt objects such as a piece of wood or a fist. The child could have been dead three to four hours, or not more than eight hours, prior to the postmortem examination. Dr. Lagonera concluded that the victim died of bilateral pneumonia secondary to multiple blunt traversal injuries or complication of the lungs due to said injuries. Defense: o SITCHON, 40, a sidewalk vendor, admitted killing MARK ANTHONY, the son of his live-in partner. He claimed he enjoyed a harmonious relationship with his partner and that he killed MARK ANTHONY (Macky) because he was under the influence of shabu, marijuana, and Valium 10 at that time. SITCHON professed that he began using drugs in 1974 and that he had also taken drugs two weeks before the incident. o On June 12, 1996, SITCHON saw Macky playing with his feces, scattering them all over the pillow, the bed sheets and the curtains. SITCHON scolded the boy, Putang-ina ka Macky! Bakit mo ikinalat ng ganyan ang tae mo? Halika, dadalhin kita sa baba para hugasan! SITCHON got hold of Macky, but the boy struggled to free himself from SITCHONsgrasp. SITCHONt still reeling from the Valium 10 he had just taken, became so angry that he picked up a broom with a wooden handle, and hit the boy. SITCHON did not realize that he had hit Macky hard until he saw the boy sprawled on the floor, breathing with difficulty. He dressed Macky and brought him to the Galang Medical Center at the corner of Abad Santos Avenue and Tayabas Street, Manila. He prayed to God that nothing serious would happen to the boy. o A lady doctor immediately attended to Macky. SITCHON pleaded to the lady doctor to do all she can to save the child; otherwise, he would be in serious trouble. After examining the child, the doctor told SITCHON that she could not do anything more Macky was dead. The same day, SITCHON surrendered to the police. He was brought to the Homicide Section at 3:00 p.m.
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Explaining his change of plea, SITCHON that the killing of the boy was "accidental." He reiterated that he was under the influence of drugs, which he had taken one after the other. He was a drug dependent and, in fact, had been confined at the Tagaytay Rehabilitation Center. Nevertheles s, the trial court sentenced SITCHON to suffer the death penalty.
prove: (a) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the [20] accused to reflect upon the consequence of his act. The prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites. AGGARAVATING: CRUELTY The trial court incorrectly appreciated cruelty against the accused. The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victims suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corps. The nature of cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for the consummation of the criminal act which he intended to commit. The sheer number of wounds, however, is not a test for determining whether cruelty attended the commission of a crime The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed inflicting injuries upon the victim. The inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic bend but rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity. AGGRAVATING: INTOXICATION The trial court also considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance.This Court does not agree. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of mitigating circumstances, which work to reduce the accuseds penalty. Article 13(10) allows courts to consider any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those mentioned therein. Neither Article 14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances nor Article 15 on alternative circumstances, however, contain a provision similar to Article 13(10). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider appellants drug addiction as an aggravating circumstance. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and no person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them. MITIGATING: PLEA OF GUILT Appellant maintains that his plea of guilt mitigates his criminal liability. To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilt must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. In determining the timeliness of a plea of guilty, nothing could be more explicit than the provisions of the Revised Penal Code requiring that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea
ISSUE: Whether or not SITCHON is guilty of murder? Yes. GUILT The Court entertains little doubt that appellant is guilty of the killing of MARK ANTHONY. SITCHONs guilt was adequately established by the testimonies of Lilia Garcia and Roberto Fernandez, who both saw appellant beat Macky. These testimonies were further corroborated by those of PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr. Manuel Lagonera and Felicisima Francisco, as well as the various pieces of object evidence. Indeed, appellant in open court admitted beating the poor child, which beating resulted in the latters death. That appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler would not exculpate him from liability. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine that el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado (he who is the cause of the caus e is the cause of the evil caused). Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts of the latters body, the accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries. Assuming, therefore, that appellant merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is nevertheless liable for the death of the victim caused by such injuries. AGGRAVATING: TREACHERY The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It is beyond dispute that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense, is treacherous. AGGRAVATING: EVIDENT PREMEDITATION Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the prosecution must
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considered as a mitigating circumstance. As appellant changed his plea only after the prosecution had rested its case and just when he was just about to testify, said mitigating circumstance is unavailing. MITIGATING: VOLUNTARY SURRENDER The trial court credited appellant with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, these elements must be established: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that the surrender be spontaneous and made in a manner clear ly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him. Appellant has failed to adequately prove voluntary surrender. While he claimed that he surrendered to the police on the same day that the victim was killed, he did not detail the circumstances like the time and place of such surrender. Neither did appellant state to whom he surrendered. He did not indicate if the person was a person in authority or an agent of the latter. PO3 Javiers testimony that he learned of appellants alleged surrender is hearsay and does not serve to corroborate appellants claim. MITIGATING: NO INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG The Court, however, discerns no intention on the part of appellant to commit so grave a wrong against his victim. Appellants intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him. When appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately brought the victim to the hospital. Sadly, his efforts were for naught. SENTENCE: In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the killing of the victim is qualified to murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion perpetua to death. The murder was attended by the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong and there is no aggravating circumstance. Hence, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed upon appellant. RA 9165, SEC 25 PEOPLE v. DENIIS TORPIO FACTS: Dennis Torpio and Anthony Rapas had some round of drinks at a nearby store together with another
companion. Not contented, they left and proceeded to the seashore where in a cottage there were people also drinking. Joining the group, Anthony and Dennis again drank. Later, the two and their companion transferred to another cottage and there they again drank now with gin liquor except Dennis who did not anymore drink. For one reason or another, because Dennis did not drink, Anthony got angry and he then bathed Dennis with gin, and boxed or mauled him and tried to stab him with a batangas knife but failed to hit Dennis as the latter was crawling under the table. He got up and ran towards home. His family was awakened, his mother shouted as Dennis was taking a knife and appeared bloodied. Manuel Torpio woke up and tried to take the knife from Dennis but failed and, in the process, wounded or cut himself in his left hand. Dennis left with the knife, passed by another route towards the seashore and upon reaching the cottage where Anthony and their companion Porboy Perez were, looked for Anthony. Anthony upon seeing Dennis sensed danger and he fled by taking the seashore. But Dennis, being accustomed to the place and having known the terrain despite the darkness knew that there is only one exit Anthony could make and, thus, he went the other way through the nipa plantation and he was able to meet and block Anthony. Upon seeing Dennis with a knife, Anthony tried to evade by turning to his left and Dennis thus hit the back portion of Anthony. Anthony ran farther but he was caught in a fishing net across the small creek and he fell on his back. Dennis mounted Anthony and continued stabbing the latter. He left the place went to the grassy meadow near the camp and there slept until morning. He then went to a certain police officer to whom he voluntarily surrendered and together they went to the police headquarters. The RTC convicted Torpio of murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation and appreciating in his favor the following mitigating circumstances: (a) sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party (the deceased Anthony) preceded the act; (b) the accused acted to vindicate immediately a grave offense committed by the victim; and, (c) voluntary surrender. Torpio alleged that the RTC erred in finding that treachery and evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. ISSUE: W/N treachery and evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime NO. Only guilty of homicide (Mitigating circumstances were properly appreciated. But sufficient provocation and immediate vindication of a grave offense were considered as only one mitigating circumstance since they arose from the same incident attach on Torpio by Anthony) HELD: Treachery
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There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime which tends directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. There must be evidence showing that the mode of attack was consciously or deliberately adopted by the culprit to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. Further, the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation by the victim. In this case, the record is barren of evidence showing any method or means employed by the appellant in order to ensure his safety from any retaliation that could be put up by the victim. The appellant acted to avenge Anthonys felonious acts of mauling and stabbing him. Although the appellant bled from his stab wound, he ran home, armed himself with a knife and confronted Anthony intentionally. When the latter fled, the appellant ran after him and managed to stab and kill the victim. Evident Premeditation To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation requires that the execution of the criminal act by the accused be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Evident premeditation needs proof of the time when the intent to commit the crime is engendered in the mind of the accused, the motive which gives rise to it, and the means which are beforehand selected to carry out that intent. The prosecution failed to prove the same. According to Manuel, the father of the appellant, the latter told him, I have to kill somebody, Tay, because I was boxed. This utterance is not sufficient to show that the crime was a product of serious and determined reflection. The interval between the time when the appellant made this statement and when he actually stabbed Anthony was not sufficient or considerable enough as to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. There was no sufficient interregnum from the time the appellant was stabbed by the victim, when the appellant fled to their house and his arming himself with a knife, and when he stabbed the victim. In a case of fairly recent vintage, we ruled that there is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a
deliberate plan but of rising tempers, or when the attack was made in the heat of anger.
107. P v Navarre Nov. 18, 1998
(second paragraph of Section 1)The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. (third paragraph) "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. PEOPLE VS LADJAALAM FACTS: Ladjaalam was charged with 4 informations, one of them was for illegal possession of firearms and another was for multiple attempted murder with direct assault (for firing an M14 rifle to police men who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant). RTC found Ladjaalam guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide (not murder since no policeman was hit and injured) and sentenced a separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294. OSGs contentions: [Ladjaalam shouldnt be convicted of separate offense of illegal possession] RTC shouldnt have applied the new law (RA 8294) but PD 1866 (penalized simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time) because provision does not cover specific facts of the case since another crime - direct assault with multiple unlawful homicides -- was committed. Since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. RTCs contentions:[Should be convicted of a separate offense] Second paragraphs (see top) proviso (no other crime), refers only to homicide or murder, in both
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of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should the SC. NOTE: SC knows that this ruling exonerates Ladjaalam from illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. It even contemplated a situation where the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries. But the Courts do not have discretion to question the wisdom behind the language of RA 8294. The matter should be addressed to Congress. ENDING: (in relation to topic) Ladjaalam charged with direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon lang (no separate offense nor aggravating circumstance) J. Panganibans opening statement: Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault. Personal Opinion: Kalokohan yung law. (Thesis topicable?) Crime charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm Murder homicide In connection with: Rebellion, Sedition, Iinsurrection or Attempted coup de'etat Effect Aggravating Circumstance
ISSUE (topic): Whose contentions are correct [W/N illegal possession of firearms is a separate offense when coupled with direct assault with multiple attempted homicide] OR more specifically [W/N the proviso in the second paragraph RATIO: BOTH WRONG (eyng?) A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused and the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to Lamjaalam. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance. OSGs contentions: Crime was committed on September 24, 1997, while RA 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. Therefore, when crime was committed, PD 1866s provision, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime, was amended by RA 8294 which contained the specific proviso that no other crime was committed. The criminal case for homicide [was] not before the SC for consideration (not those appealed) RTCs contentions: Limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to only murder and homicide is not justified. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third
Absorbed
Any other crime
Accused will be prosecuted only for the committed crime without any effect for the unlicensed firearm
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PEOPLE v. SABADAO Facts: Defendants Sabadao, Valdez, Mayo, and Abangon were accused of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearm. Armed with loaded guns, they entered RCBC in Ilocos Norte and ordered that the vault be opened. Peace officers arrived (due to the burglar alarm) and a shoot-out ensued. One police officer and one security guard were shot and died as a result. Aside from the 4, there was a fifth robber (but he was shot and died after). The accused were able to escape with P4,200. Valdez said he was in RCBC to solicit funds for a seminar workshop while Sabadaoput up the defense of alibi. The RTC found them guilty of robbery with homicide. It found that conspiracy took place because of their previously designed scheme of entry and plan of operation. The crime was also attended by the aggravating circumstance of band, having been perpetrated by 4 armed malefactors who acted together in the commission of the crime. Before the SC, they argue that they were not adequately identified s the perpetrators, claiming that there was no clear and convincing proof that either of them caused the death of the victims, and prosecution was not able to establish who actually shot who. Plus, it should have been attempted robbery only because they were not able to perform all the acts of execution, i.e. that the prosecution were not able to concretely establish that they were able to take the money away. Issue: Guilty? YES Ratio: The rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. Further, conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. In this case, their cooperative acts toward their criminal objective render them equally liable as conspirators: Valdez gained foothold by holding the manager and one of the two security guards captive. Further deployment of reinforcement is shown by the concerted th entry of 2 or more of the conspirators follow by the 4 to complete the strength of force that constituted conspiracy. With this in place, the implementation of the plan of action then started with the taking of valuables first, divesting the
2 security guards of their firearms to weaken the capability of the captives and then thereafter, effecting their final mission, which was the grabbing of bundles of cash and the opening of the vault. This taking of the cash by the th dead robber and then thereafter by the 4 robber and the taking of the firearms completed the act of robbery.
PEOPLE v. ESTEBAN DOMACYONG (et.al) [Doctrine: Unlicensed firearm] (Note: this is one of the cases which Sir would like us to criticize or compare with the other decisions ) FACTS: (Penned by Justice Puno). The accused in this case were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The information alleged that the accused were conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, with intent to gain and being then armed with guns, and by means of violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away cash money from the Victoria Supermart,; that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery(,) and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal, rob and carry away the said amount of money(,) the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill, engaged responding policemen and law enforcing agents in a shootout, resulting to death and grave injuries to some people in the vicinity. Accused Domacyong and Paleyan were also separately charged with the crime of Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition). ISSUE: Whether or not accused should be charged separately for the crime of illegal possession of firearms? HELD: No. We now come to appellants guilt for the crime of illegal possession of firearms. The trial court separately convicted appellants of the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 82944 amending Presidential Decree No. 1866. The violation was also appreciated by the trial court to aggravate their penalty in the crime of robbery with homicide. Republic Act No. 8294 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. We have
4 AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED "CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES."
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consistently ruled that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any other crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Thus, a simple reading thereof (R.A. No. 8294) shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. . . . Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. In the cases at bar, the crime of robbery with homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms was committed by appellants. In line with law and jurisprudence, the use of unlicensed firearms merely aggravates the crime of robbery with homicide. It does not constitute a separate crime. Necessarily, the conviction of appellants for illegal possession of firearms has to be set aside.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO, Appellant. FACTS: Accused was found guilty of robbery with homicide of only one count for robbing 4 gas stations and killing one security guard. Modus nila ang magpa-gas then say that their engine wont start so theyll ask the gas boys or the employees to help them push. After which, theyll alight and announce a hold-up. ISSUE: W/N the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm should be appreciated. HELD/RATIO: NO. Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the
penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasirecidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged.64 It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.65 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is "silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying." Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor of the accused." Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance. This interpretation is erroneous, since we already held in several cases that with the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance. Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance. After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that the use of unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm can be established by mere testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be established. The prosecution failed to present written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license to
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carry or own a firearm, hence, the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime. Held: Yes. Guilty! Ratio: Elements of the Crime The following elements must be established for a conviction in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide: 1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2. The property taken belongs to another; 3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and 4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are committed at the same time. The prosecution was able to establish that accused-appellants committed robbery with homicide through the totality of their evidence. The first three elements were established when Oliva testified that he saw, and positively identified, accused-appellants taking Gabuyas property by force and both shooting Gabuya. Gabuyas death resulting from their attack proves the last element of the complex crime as duly confirmed by the post-mortem report. Defense of Alibi Unavailing Accused-appellants cannot avoid liability by way of their defenses. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. To establish alibi, an accused must prove (1) that he was present at another place at the time the crime was perpetrated; and (2) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places." The fact that Aminolas witness, i.e., SPO2 Lukman, corroborated Aminolas testimony about not being at the situs of the crime when Gabuya was robbed and killed does not, without more, serve to strengthen Aminolas alibi. As the appellate court aptly observed, SPO2 Lukmans testimony did not prove the physical impossibility for Aminola to be at the scene of the crime. SPO2 Lukman did not categorically specify the time he was with Aminola on the date of the incident. His testimony did not preclude the possibility of Aminola perpetrating the crime after their meeting. As the trial court perceptively observed: The time interval from Rogan Street to Bonifacio Street is just five (5) or ten (10) minutes. Such distance
PEOPLE V. ABDUL Facts: In the afternoon of Aug. 31, 1999, after Nestor Gabuya, after closing his motorcycle and bicycle spare parts shop, headed home on his bike. Unknown to him, Abdul Aminola (defendant) and Alimudin Laminda were observing him. Aminola followed Gabuya. Upon catching up with Gabuya, Aminola put his arms around Gabuya and wrestled for the bag Gabuya was carrying. Gabuya refused to let go of his bag, whereupon Aminola pulled out a gun and shot him. Gabuya fell to the ground but still resisted, prompting Aminola to take another shot. Mike Maitimbang (the other defendant in this case) then approached and took something from Gabuya. Maitimbang shot Gabuya behind and fled towards the direction of eyewitness Oliva. Joel, Gabuyas caretaker, gave chase but was fired upon by Maitimbang.Oliva testified seeing the incident. Regina, Gabuyas wife, reported the incident that same afternoon. Based on her information, Major Migano formed a team to investigate the crime. Later that evening, an informant known as "Abdul" (different from the defendant) told the police that he witnessed what had happened to Gabuya and could tell them where the suspects could be found. True enough, Abdul led Major Migano and his men. A blocking force was organized while Col. Bernido formed a team to make the arrests on the suspects. The following night, Major Miganos team once again went to the hideout, where Abdul identified four of Gabuyas assailants. One of them, Aminola, was found in possession of an unlicensed .45 caliber gun with one (1) magazine and two (2) ammunitions. The following night Matimbang was also arrested. Two informations were filed. One was against all of them for robbing and killing Gabuya, The other one was against Abdul Aminola only for unlicensed possession of the gun and the ammo. The defendants all denied any knowledge of the crime. They said that they were arrested without warrants and that they only found out about the charge after the inquest proceedings. The RTC found Abdul Aminola and Mike Matimbiang guilty of robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, applying Section 1 of Republic Act 8294. They were sentenced to death. The other were acquitted. The CA affirmed but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty.
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does not preclude the accused from being at the place of the crime at the time of its commission. Hence SPO2 Lukmans testimony could not be given more weight than prosecution witness Olivas testimony. The defense of Maitimbang, likewise, cannot overcome the positive identification by Oliva. Under oath, Oliva testified seeing Maitimbang take Gabuyas property and shot Gabuya at the back while already prone on the ground. Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the witness identifying a person as the perpetrator of the crime absent proof of ill motive. No reason or motive was given for Oliva to falsely testify against accused-appellants on such a serious crime. As often noted, the trial court is in a better position to observe the demeanor and candor of the witnesses and to decide who is telling the truth.
BURGOS-VILLAVERT, JUDGE EDGARDO SUDIAM of the RTC, Manila; RCBC and THE PEOPLE A corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present and efficient actor - Chief Justice Earl Warren Chingwas the Senior VP of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (PBMI). Sometime in September to October 1980, PBMI, through Ching, applied with RCBC for the issuance of commercial letters of credit to finance its importation of assorted goods. RCBC approved the application, and irrevocable letters of credit were issued in favor of Ching. The goods were purchased and delivered in trust to PBMI. Petitioner signed 13 trust receipts as surety, acknowledging delivery of various goods Under the receipts, Chingagreed to hold the goods in trust for the said bank, with authority to sell but not by way of conditional sale, pledge or otherwise; and in case such goods were sold, to turn over the proceeds thereof as soon as received, to apply against the relative acceptances and payment of other indebtedness to respondent bank. In case the goods remained unsold within the specified period, the goods were to be returned to respondent bank without any need of demand. Thus, said "goods, manufactured products or proceeds thereof, whether in the form of money or bills, receivables, or accounts separate and capable of identification" were respondent banks property. When the trust receipts matured, Chingfailed to return the goods to RCBC, or to return their value amounting toP6,940,280.66 despite demands. Thus, the bank filed a criminal complaint for estafaagainst Ching. Petitioner posits that, except for his being the Senior Vice-President of the PBMI, there is no iota of evidence that he was a participescrimines in violating the trust receipts sued upon; and that his liability, if at all, is purely civil because he signed the said trust receipts merely as a xxx surety and not as the entrustee. The RTC granted the Motion to Quash the Informations. On February 27, 1995, respondent bank refiled the criminal complaint for estafa against petitioner. The City Prosecutor ruled that there was no probable cause. RCBC appealed the resolution. On July 13, 1999, the Secretary of Justice issued Resolution granting the petition and reversing the assailed resolution of the City Prosecutor. According to the Justice Secretary, the petitioner, as Senior Vice-President of PBMI, executed the 13 trust receipts and as such, was the one responsible for the offense. Thus, the execution of said receipts is enough to indict the petitioner as the official responsible for violation of P.D. No. 115. Also, respondent bound himself not only as a corporate official of PBMI but also as its surety.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA Cecilia Mendoza and her 10 year old daughter, Charmaine Mendoza, attended a birthday party of a relative of Octavio Mendoza at Mcdo. Later on, Octavio left and went to KFC and had some beer. When it was time to go home, Cecilia and Charmaine could not find the accused and so they decided to leave. When they arrived home, Cecilia and Octavio proceeded to the masters bedroom. Charmaine heard them quarreling regarding Octavio having left the party. Suddenly, she heard 3 gunshots. Running out of her room, Charmaine saw her mother lying on the floor bleeding. Cecilia bled to death. The RTC found Octavio guilty of the crime of parricide and the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of illegal possession of firearm must be considered as an aggravating circumstance instead of a separate crime??? YES RULING: Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was committed, fortunately for Octavio, Republic Act No 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended the said decree and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense. PRINCIPALS ALFREDO CHING, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR ECILYN
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CA: Ching, being the Senior Vice-President of PBMI and the signatory to the trust receipts, is criminally liable for violation of P.D. No. 115 ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient babsis to continue prosecution against Ching. SC: "x xx it is apropos to quote section 13 of PD 115 which states in part, viz: xxx If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other judicial entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense. There is no dispute that it was the respondent, who as senior vice-president of PBM, executed the thirteen (13) trust receipts. As such, the law points to him as the official responsible for the offense. Since a corporation cannot be proceeded against criminally because it cannot commit crime in which personal violence or malicious intent is required, criminal action is limited to the corporate agents guilty of an act amounting to a crime and never against the corporation itself (West Coast Life Ins. Co. vs. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401; Times, [I]nc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303). Thus, the execution by respondent of said receipts is enough to indict him as the official responsible for violation of PD 115. Though the entrustee is a corporation, nevertheless, the law specifically makes the officers, employees or other officers or persons responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities of such corporation and/or board of directors, officers, or other officials or employees responsible for the offense. The rationale is that such officers or employees are vested with the authority and responsibility to devise means necessary to ensure compliance with the law and, if they fail to do so, are held criminally accountable; thus, they have a responsible share in the violations of the law. If the crime is committed by a corporation or other juridical entity, the directors, officers, employees or other officers thereof responsible for the offense shall be charged and penalized for the crime, precisely because of the nature of the crime and the penalty therefor. A corporation cannot be arrested and imprisoned; hence, cannot be penalized for a crime punishable by imprisonment.However, a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a crime if the imposable penalty is fine. Even if the statute prescribes both fine and imprisonment as penalty, a corporation may be prosecuted and, if found guilty, may be fined. A necessary part of the definition of every crime is the designation of the author of the crime upon whom the penalty is to be inflicted. When a criminal statute
designates an act of a corporation or a crime and prescribes punishment therefor, it creates a criminal offense which, otherwise, would not exist and such can be committed only by the corporation. But when a penal statute does not expressly apply to corporations, it does not create an offense for which a corporation may be punished. On the other hand, if the State, by statute, defines a crime that may be committed by a corporation but prescribes the penalty therefor to be suffered by the officers, directors, or employees of such corporation or other persons responsible for the offense, only such individuals will suffer such penalty. Corporate officers or employees, through whose act, default or omission the corporation commits a crime, are themselves individually guilty of the crime. The principle applies whether or not the crime requires the consciousness of wrongdoing. It applies to those corporate agents who themselves commit the crime and to those, who, by virtue of their managerial positions or other similar relation to the corporation, could be deemed responsible for its commission, if by virtue of their relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent the act.Moreover, all parties active in promoting a crime, whether agents or not, are principals. Whether such officers or employees are benefited by their delictual acts is not a touchstone of their criminal liability. Benefit is not an operative fact. In this case, petitioner signed the trust receipts in question. He cannot, thus, hide behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of PBMI. In the words of
PEOPLE VS. BULU CHOWDURY Facts: Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. The prosecution presented four witnesses: private complainants Aser Sasis, Estrella Calleja and Melvin Miranda, and Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla. Sasis testified that he first met Chowdury when he applied with Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade) for employment as factory worker in South Korea. Chowdury, a consultant of Craftrade, conducted the interview. During the interview, Chowdury informed him about the requirements and required him to undergo a seminar. He advised him that placement would be on a first-come-first-serve basis and charged a processing fee of P25k. Sasis completed all the requirements and paid a total amount of P16k. Sasis further said that he went to the office of Craftrade three times to follow up his application but he was informed that he would no longer be deployed for employment abroad. This prompted him to withdraw his payment but he could no longer find Chowdury. After two unsuccessful attempts to contact him, he decided to file with the POEA a case for illegal recruitment against
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Chowdury. Upon verification with the POEA, he learned that Craftrade's license had already expired and has not been renewed and that Chowdury, in his personal capacity, was not a licensed recruiter. Similar facts were given by the other witnesses, Calleja and Miranda. Labor Employment Officer Caguitla of the Licensing Branch of the POEA testified that Chowdury and his co-accused, Ong, were not licensed recruiters nor were they connected with any licensed agency. For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors. He never received money from the applicants and that he already resigned from Craftrade. Citing the second sentence of the last paragraph of Section 6 of RA 8042, accused-appellant argues that the ones who should be held liable for the offense are the officers having control, management and direction of the agency. The trial court found Chowdury guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Issue: WON accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged. -NO! The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 8042 states who shall be held liable for the offense, thus: "The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable." he Revised Penal Code which supplements the law on illegal recruitment defines who are the principals, accomplices and accessories (Art. 17, 18,19). An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. It has been held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer. At the time of the interview, appellant was employed as interviewer of Craftrade which was then operating under a temporary authority given by the POEA pending renewal of its license. The evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized
by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant's conscious and active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction, therefore, is without basis. This is not to say that private complainants are left with no remedy for the wrong committed against them. The DOJ may still file a complaint against the officers having control, management or direction of the business of Craftrade so long as the offense has not yet prescribed.
PEOPLE V. ROGER TULIN MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of 40.4M. The vessel was suddenly boarded by 7 fully armed pirates (accused in the case Emilio Changco, Cecilio Changco, Tulin, Loyola, Infante, etc.). they detained and took control of the vessel. The name MT Tabangao and the PNOC logo were painted over with black. Then it was painted with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore. In Singapore, the ship was awaiting another vessel that did not arrive. Instead, the ship went back to Batangas Philippines and remained at sea. Days later, it went back to Singapore. This time, another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Another accused, Cheong San Hiong, supervised the Navis crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee went back to the Philippines and the original crew members were released by the pirates in batches. The crew was ordered not to tell authorities of what happened. The chief engineer of the crew, however, reported the incident to the coast guard. Afterwards, a series of arrests were effected in different places. An information charging the accused with qualified piracy or violation of the PD 532 Piracy in the Philippine Waters was filed against the accused. As it turns out, Navi Pride captain, Hiong, was employed with Navi Marine Services ( a Singaporean firm, I think). Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker who offered to sell bunker oil to the former. When the transaction pushed through, Hiong was assigned to supervise a ship to ship transfer. He was told that the Galilee would be making the transfer, so Navi Pride ship-sided with Galilee and the transfer was effected. Paul Gan received the payment. Upon arrival in Singapore, Hiong was asked again to transact another
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transfer of oil. The same procedure was followed. Hiong then went to the Philippines to arrange another transfer with Changco the pirates head. This was how Hiong was arrested by the NBI agents. All the accused put up denials and alibis. The trial court, with ROMEO CALLEJO deciding, ruled that the accused were all guilty. ISSUE: w/n the accused are guilty of qualified piracy YES! RULING: [only the important part for crim] Hiong argues that he cannot be convicted under PD 534 or Art 122 of the RPC as amended, since both laws punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. Hiong also contends that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters. Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas) provided that piracy must be committed in the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which broadened the law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand, embraces any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in the Philippine waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned laws, they exist harmoniously as separate laws. As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters. Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and
prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiongs supervision. Although the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not done in Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged with violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it remains to be a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
PEOPLE VS ISABELO PUNO Y GUEVARRA Facts: Isabelo Puno is the driver of Mr. Socorro. While Mr. Socorro was allegedly in Davao for a local election, Isabelo arrived at Mrs. Socorros bakeshop to tell her that her own driver had to go to Pampanga for an emergency. Hence, Isabelo will take his place. Isabelo was driving the Mercedes Benz to bring Mrs. Socorro home Suddenly, accused Enrique Amurao (nephew of Isabelo) boarded the car beside Isabelo and poked a gun at Mrs. Socorro. An initial P7K was taken from her which was in her bag. They demanded P100K more. The whole time, the gun was pointed at Mrs. Socorros neck. They then asked her to issue a check. After drafting 3 checks (2 checks for P30K and 1 check for P40K). Isabelo kept on driving the car until Mrs. Socorro jumped out and then ran. Both Isabelo and Enrique were caught the next day when they were trying to encash the checks they took. An information of kidnapping for ransom was filed. Defense argues that it should be simple robbery under Art294 of the RPC. TC: guilty of violation of PD532 (Anti Pirac and Anti Highway Robbery Law of 1974). SolGen agrees with this based on the observation that PD532 modified art267 of the RPB. Issue: What crime was committed? Robbery under Art.294! Held: The rule in crim law is that the motive and specific intent of the accused in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids at arriving at a correct determination of the crime for which said accused should be held liable. Thus, if murder was committed in furtherance of rebellion then rebellion absorbs murder. Whereas, if murder was
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committed because the accused has his own personal motive, rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. In this case, there is no showing that the accused had any motive other than to extort money under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This was admitted when Isabelo admitted to Mrs. Socorro that he needed money because he had an ulcer and that he tried getting advances from the office to no avail. For the crime of kidnapping to exist, the rule is that there must be an actual intent to deprive the offended party of her liberty. This is different from the situation wherein the restraint of freedom was only incidental to the commission of another offense which was primarily intended by the offenders. Thus, as early as US vs Ancheta, it was held that, even if the victims were detained or forcibly taken but the primary and ultimate purpose was to kill them, the incidental deprivation of liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention. In this case, the testimonies of the accused show that they had no intention to deprive Mrs. Socorro of her liberty. There was no ransom either. Ransom is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or payment for release from captivity. Here, the complainant readily gave the case and checks when demanded from her at gun point. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by Mrs. Socorro on the occasion of the robbery. Thus, while the crime committed was indeed robbery, it is not the highway robbery under PD532. Contrary to what the SolGen postulates, PD532 does not modify Art267 (Kidnapping and serious illegal detention). Instead, what it modifies is Art306 and 307 on Brigandage. This is clear form the fact that under the PD, highway robbery is synonymously used with brigandage. This is in fact consistent with the SCs earlier rulings that highway robbers and brigands are synonymous. Brigandage is indiscriminate highway robbery (formation of a band by more than 3armed persons for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or kidnapping persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom or for any other purpose to be attained by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed highway robbers or brigands --- art.306.) whereas, if the purpose is only a particular robbery, then the crime is only robbery. Note also that PD532 punishes an act as brigandage or highway robbery only when it is perpetrated against any person/s indiscriminately (meaning: they dont choose who they will rob. Anyone will do. Whereas clause of PD532 says, committed upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenceless inhabitants who travel from one place to another) as compared to acts of robbery wherein the victim is predetermined --- as in this case.
It is true that PD532 introduced some changes to Art306 and 307 of the RPC: increase of penalties; PD does not require that there be at least 4armed persons forming a band of robbers; the presumption that accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms has been removed in the decree. BUT, one thing has remained unchanged and that is the definition of brigandage in the code and in the PD --- acts are committed not against a specific victim but against any and potential victim on the highway. Further, it is an absurd argument of the TC that just because the robbery was committed on the highway it is already covered by the PD. Thus, the crime committed here is simple robbery. Accused have acted in conspiracy as shown by their acts. Abuse of confidence also applied with no mitigating circumstance. No procedural obstacle to convict even if information was kidnapping for ransom because simple robbery is necessarily included in kidnapping with ransom.
FILOTEO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN One morning, while the delivery mail van was traversing McArthur Highway to deliver several mails in the Bulacan area, an old blue Mercedes Benz overtook their van and cut across its path. Eventually, armed men took over the van after they introduced themselves as police officers. The victims were ordered to stay at the back of the van while it was driven in circles until the van stopped in Caloocan. Eventually, petitioner and 10 others were apprehended and were charged with robbery-in-band (hijacking). CA: they are guilty of brigandage and not robbery Accused herein are charged with the violation of PD 532. Under said decree, with respect to the highway robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a Philippine Highway which under Section 2 (c) thereof has been defined as any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or any part thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines, used by persons or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles or property or both, while under Section 2 (e) thereof Highway Robbery/Brigandage has been defined as the the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes or the taking away of property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway. The offense described in the information and established by the evidence presented by the prosecution properly falls within the ambit of the aforesaid special law. Therein, it was conclusively proven that a postal van
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containing mail matters, including checks and warrants, was hi-jacked along the national highway in Bulacan by the accused, with the attendant use of force, violence and intimidation against the three (3) postal employees who were occupants thereof, resulting in the unlawful taking and asportation of the entire van and its contents consisting of mail matters. Also the evidence further showed that the crime was committed by the accused who were PC soldiers, policeman (sic) and private individuals in conspiracy with their co-accused Castro and Escalada who were postal employees and who participated in the planning of the crime. Accordingly, all the essential requisites to constitute a consummated offense under the law in point are present. Issue: are they guilty of brigandage or robbery? SC: they are guilty of ROBBERY and not brigandage. The CA labored under the belief that because the taking or robbery was perpetrated on a national highway (McArthur Highway), ergo, PD 532, otherwise known as the AntiPiracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute violated. Such reasoning has already been debunked by this Court in the case of People vs. Isabelo Puno, where it was ruled in unmistakable language that it takes more than the situs of the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity: The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery . Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar. In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. ASTORGA V. PEOPLE
From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or the fact that more than three persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another. What was duly proven in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the indiscriminate commission thereof.
The Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the DENR of Tacloban sent a team to the island Daram to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations regarding illegal logging. The team was composed of 5 EEs of DENR and escorted by 2 policemen. They chanced upon the several yacht-like boats being constructed in barangays in Daram. Astorga was present at one. When one of the team members (Elpidio Simon) approached Astorga to explain their purpose, he was twice slapped hard on the shoulder and the Mayor said in their dialect: I can make you swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can box? I can box. Dont you know that I can declare this a misencounter? Mayor Astorga then ordered for reinforcements and minutes later, a banca with 10 men, dressed in fatigue uniforms and armed with guns, arrived. They surrounded the DENR team and pointed their guns at the team members. Simon again tried to explain their purpose and took out a handheld radio to contact DENR Catbalogan. Mayor Astorga then forcibly grabbed the radio, and said Its better if you have no radio so that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help. He again slapped Simon hard and said If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not tolerate it here. If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa I will surrender mine. (Figueroa is also an owner of several boats) When the team asked to leave, he said, you cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many things to discuss there. The team was brought to a house where they were fed dinner. They were allowed to go around, but not leave the barangay. They were only allowed to leave at 2am the next day.
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The team filed a complaint, and the Ombudsman filed an information against Astorga (Mayor of Daram, Samar) and his men for arbitrary detention. During trial, the complainants executed an affidavit of desistance. The Sandiganbayan still found Astorga guilty of the crime. Issue: Is astorga guilty? YES! Elements of arbitrary detention were all met. 1. Offender is a public officer or EE 2. He detains a person 3. The detention is without legal grounds Clearly there was no legal ground for the detention. In fact Astorga admitted that he was only motivated by instinct of self-preservation. Was there actual detention? Yes. The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will. Here, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. In spite of their pleas, complainants were not allowed to go home. This refusal was followed by the call for reinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the 38 complainants and the witnesses. Given such circumstances, it was not safe to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in the barangay. The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear. Re: the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complainants, it is merely an additional ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, but not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances.
FACTS: On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. The information reads as follows: ... accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captai n, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash. Tuvera contends that the elements are lacking. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors. He essentially says that he is not a public officer. It was asserted that if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Tuvera has nothing to do with it because he is not in any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. ISSUE: W/N Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention? YES, THUS HE CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR ARBITRARY DETENTION. HELD: Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of this crime are the following: That the offender is a public officer or employee, That he detains a person, That the detention is without legal grounds. Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed
MILO V. SALANGA
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them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
PARULAN V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS Doctrine: Evasion of service of sentence is a continuing crime. As long as the crime subsists, the offender may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. He may also be tried by the courts of that place. Facts: Ricardo Parulan was serving a sentence of life imprisonment, which was then commuted to 20 years, in Muntinlupa. He was transferred to a military barracks in Fort Bonifacio (situated in Makati). He escaped and was recaptured in Manila. As a result, he was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence. The CFI of Manila adjudged him guilty. As a defense, Parulan argued that the court had no jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged since he escaped from prison in Makati, but was tried in Manila. He thus filed a petition for habeas corpus. Issue: Did the CFI of Manila have jurisdiction to try Parulans case? NO.
UMIL VS. RAMOS (Digest Online) Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twentytwo (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested. Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
Ruling: The Rule of Court generally provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place. This, however, does not apply to continuing crimes. There are two classes of continuing crimes, namely: (1) acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, and; (2) crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. An example of the first class would include estafa and abduction, while the second class would include kidnapping and illegal detention. In this case, evasion of service of sentence belongs to the second class. Such act of the escaped prisoner is continuous (or a series of acts), set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Since he was arrested in Manila, he may be tried by the CFI of Manila.
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Soria and Bista vs. Desierto (OMB) January 31, 2005 Facts: Soria and Bista were arrested for violating the Omnibus Election Code (election gun ban). Soria was found in possession of a .38 caliber revolver, while Bista was found in possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition. Here are the pertinent dates: May 13, 2001 (8:30pm) Soria and Bista were arrested. Take note that this was a Sunday and that the day following, May 14, was election day. May 14, 2001 (4:30pm) They were brought to the residence of the Provincial Prosecutor where a joint-affidavit was executed by the arresting officers. May 14, 2001 (6:30pm) Soria was released. He was detained for 22 hours. Bista was brought back to the police station because there was a pending case for violation of BP6 (illegal possession of bladed weapons ata to) against him. May 15, 2001 (2:00pm) Bista was brough before the court where the BP6 case was pending. He posted bail. May 15, 2001 (4:30pm) An Information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition was filed against Bista. June 8, 2001 Bista was finally released upon posting bail. He was detained for a total of 26 days. The petitioners filed a complaint with the OMB against the arresting officers for violating Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities). The respondents argued that Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded from the computation of the periods provided in Article 125. The OMB agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. Take note that for purposes of Article 125, the penalty imposed by law on Soria was correccional, while the penalty imposed by law on Bista was afflictive or capital. According to Article 125, detained persons must be delivered to judicial authorities within 18 hours for correccional penalties, and 36 hours for afflictive or capital penalties. Issue: W/N Article 125 was violated?
Held/Ratio: Nope! An election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (SC citing Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313) Here, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with only on May 15, 2001 at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents. Hence, there was no violation of Article 125 insofar as Soria was concerned. In relation to Bista, there was likewise no violation of Article 125 because the running of the 36 hours was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention. The Information against Bista was filed with on May 15, 2001 but he was released from detention only on June 8, 2001. Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The complaint against him was seasonably filed in the court of justice within the 36 hour period prescribed by law. Remember that he was detained in May 13 and the information was filed on May 15. Furthermore, 13 was a Sunday and 14 was election day. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Citing the case of Agbay, the SC said that upon the filing of the complaint with the proper court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail.
ALBIOR v AUGUIS FACTS: Edilberto Albior is the son of the complainant/petitioner in this case> is the Clerk of Court of the MCTC of Talibon Bohol. 2 informations for rape was filed against Edilberto before the sala of Judge Avelino Puracan of which Auguis was the clerk of court who received the complaints. Auguis immediately issued an order for the detention of Edilberto. This order was directed to the BJMP. Edilberto was detained. Claiming that his son was illegally detained because no warrant was issued for his arrest and neither was there a preliminary investigation, complainant filed a
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motion for the release of Edilberto but was ignored by Auguis. This forced the complainant to sue for Habeas Corpus. During the Habeas Corpus trial, Auguis testified that this was not the first time he ordered the commitment of persons but said he did so in the best interest of those persons and upon request of the Chief of Police. He justified his actions by saying that since PNP jails didnt have meal provisions for detainees, he ordered their commitment to BJMP facilities. The court, in the Habeas Corpus proceedings, found the detention illegal and ordered the release of Edilberto. On the same day, a preliminary investigation was conducted and in an Omnibus Motion, confirmed the arrest of the accused. Complainant then filed an administrative case against Auguis for usurpation of judicial functions before the Office of the Court Administrator. The OCA found Auguis administratively liable and imposed a fine of 3,000 with a warning not to repeat the violations anymore. ISSUE: What crime is Auguii liable for? Delay in the delivery of detained persons to proper judicial authorities HELD: The functions of the clerk of court are clearly defined in Section 5 Rule 136 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere in that provision does it provide that, absent a judge, the clerk of court has the power to issue detention orders which is clearly judicial in nature. The good faith defense of Auguis does not excuse his behavior. If a judge is not available, the detaining officer must release the accused upon the expiration of the maximum period of detention allowed in Art. 125 of the RPC. In this case, Edilberto was detained for a period of 56 days from the time he was unlawfully arrested.
did not have envelopes available. CA ruled that their rights were violated. Issue: 1. 2.
Was their right to counsel being violated by the regulated visiting hours? Was their right to privacy being violated by the opening of their letters?
Held: 1. No. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable: such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees safety and prevent his escape. In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees. While petitioner-lawyers may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours. The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. 2. No. (original went through a litany of US cases, just read the original if you want to know) The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner-lawyer who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA
ALEJANO, ET AL V CABUAY (actually a habeas corpus case, but Justice talked about the limitation on lawyers visits) FACTS: Alejano, Trillanes, etc are all AFP men detained for their participation in the 2003 Oakwood Mutiny. They were charged with coup detat and detained in the ISAFP Detention Center under the command of General Cabuay. The detainess claim that their right to counsel was infringed upon because their counsels were only allowed to meet with them from 8 am 5 pm every day. They wanted their counsels to visit them at any time of day or night. They also claim that their right to privacy was infringed upon because Trillanes and Maestrecampos private letters were being opened and read by the ISAFP officials. The letters were not sealed in envelopes (they were merely folded) because the ISAFP Detention Center
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7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. Side note: detainees also complained of the living conditions of their detention cells because they were boarded up and had iron bars. Their cells were dark and had poor ventilation. They also complained that the iron bars restricted their visits to non-contact ones. Court said it was reasonable to put these iron bars to prevent the escape of the detainees. The the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, nonverbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
US vs. VALERIANO DE LOS REYES and GABRIELA ESGUERRA FACTS: Gabriella Esguerra visited the family of Valeriano de los Reyes when certain revenue officials came to search for opium. Valeriano refused entry due to the absence of a search warrant. However, due to their assertion that they were officers of the law, while not consenting, Valeriano offered no physical resistance to their entry and the search for the drug began. Later on, one of the officers saw Gabriella threw a package (with morphine) from the kitchen window into the grass behind the house. There is no direct evidence of any kind showing that the accused Valeriano had any knowledge whatever of the fact that the accused Gabriela had possession of the drug. TC: by refusing entry, Valeriano had knowledge of the drugs in his house. Otherwise, he would have offered no objection to the search. ISSUE: WON Valeriano can be held liable for the morphine? RULING: Valeriano acquitted. Gabriella convicted. TCs ruling not sufficient. The accused Gabriela was only a visitor in the house of Valeriano. She had been there but a short time. At the time of the search the morphine was found exclusively in her possession and under her control. It nowhere appears that any member of the family of Valeriano had the slightest knowledge of its existence. It was only when the accused herself was about to be
searched that she relinquished possession and control of the drug in an effort to protect herself against the consequences of the search. Rather than indicate that anyone else had knowledge of her possession of the drug, the proofs seem to suggest that it was her effort to keep knowledge of such possession from every other person, including Valeriano and his family. The fact that Valeriano refused the officers permission to search his house for opium can not be taken against him. No public official or other person in any country has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search or seizure without first being provided with the proper search warrant for the purpose, obtained in the manner provided by law. The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence of an offense actually committed. Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him, except in a few special cases where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest in it for in its destruction. Those special cases are familiar, and well understood in the law. Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public safety. The home, therefore, can not be guaranteed as a shelter of crime and bad faith, and, for that reason, with the formalities hereinafter enumerated, the public authorities may enter the house of any citizen in the following cases: 1. To arrest any person against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued. 2. To capture the person of any known criminal, either because of his having been caught in flagrante delicto, or because there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty, although no warrant for his arrest has been actually issued. 3. To prevent the consummation of a crime the commission of which is being planned of the same or has already commenced. 4. To search for and seize the effects of the crime or the evidence of the commission of the same and of the identity of the guilty parties. 5. To detect and seize all contraband articles which are the subject of state monopolies. 6. For the purpose of attaching property. As a general rule, it may be stated that, in order to enter a house for any purpose whatever, whether to
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inspect the same, to arrest a person, or to attach property, it is necessary to first obtain the consent of the occupant of the same, as provided in article 6 of the constitution, and, in his absence, an order of the court will be required for the preliminary inquiry in each case, upon notice to the person affected thereby, either immediately or at the most within the twenty-four hours after the issuance of said order.
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. From: http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/marcos-vsmanglapus-177-scra-668-gr-no.html
U.S. V. DORR Facts: Dorr and others were convicted of publishing a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Govt of the Philippine Islands. Scurrilous libels are punished under Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission: Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished [Note: According to my Dictionary scurrilous means, making or spreading claims about someone with the intention of damaging their reputation. Thus perhaps its the same as saying its malicious libels.]
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Anyway, the alleged libel was an editorial in the issue of the Manila Freedom newspaper. The editorial basically complains about the public officers then in position describing them as notoriously corrupt, rascals, and men of no personal character. The editorial continued to go on complaining about the rotten system by which the government was being run. [Note: As I gathered from the decision, perhaps the reason why this libelous editorial was made was because Filipinos were then being appointed to government positions and these foreigners, that includes Dorr who most likely is an American since in another case he asked for a trial by jury, didnt want a government being run by Filipinos.] Dorr and other defendants werent able to prove any of their allegations in the Trial Court. They were convicted and now appeal. Issue: Does the publication constitute a scurrilous libel against the Government? Held: NO. SC acquits. Ruling: First of all, there are many ways in which libel may be committed such as when the libel obstructs an officer in the performance of his functions but these were not present. The Court here focused on the issue above presented. What does the term Government mean? Does it mean in a general sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the aggregate of the individuals by whom the government of the Islands is, for the time being, administered? Government is the institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities that rule a society it is the whole political system. On the other hand, administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being. Thus, when the attack is made only on the individuals holding positions this is not a scurrilous libel against the Government but rather this is adequately covered by the general libel law. This is what the editorial merely did. On the other hand, when libel attacks the established system or form of government and its authority then this constitutes a scurrilous libel. [Note: I think the modern scurrilous libel is the crime of sedition; thus when you attack the government its
sedition but when you merely attack officers of the government its under the normal crime of libel.]
U.S. vs. ARCEO, et al. FACTS: Alejo Tiongson, the victim, lived in his house together with his wife (Alejandra) and sister-in-law (Marcela). On the night of the commission of the crime, the accused, one of whom was armed with a gun and the other two each with a bolo, entered the victims house without first getting permission. At that time, the spouses were already sleeping while Marcela was still awake, sewing. As soon as she discovered the presence of the accused, Marcela woke the spouses. Immediately after, one of the accused wounded Alejo by means of a bolo. Then they took a certain amount of money that belonged to Alejo and fled the scene. After trial, the court found the accused guilty of the crime of entering the residence of another against his will and with violence or intimidation. ISSUE: (1) W/N the trial court was correct in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged? (NOTE: The violence was committed by the accused immediately after their entry without the consent of Alejo.) (2) W/N express prohibition to enter the dwelling is necessary in order to be guilty of the crime charged? HELD/RATIO: (1) YES. Art. 491 of the (Spanish) Penal Code states that: He who shall enter the residence (dwelling house) of another against the will of the tenant thereof shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,259 pesetas. x x x If the act shall be executed with violence or intimidation the penalty shall be prision correccional in the medium and maximum grade, and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. The SC is of the belief that said provision does not only relate to the method by which one may enter the residence of another without his consent, but also pertains to ones conduct immediately af ter his entry. Thus, a person armed with deadly weapons who enters the residence of another in the nighttime, without consent, and immediately commits acts of violence and intimidation, is guilty of entering the house of another with violence and intimidation and is punishable under Art. 491 of the Penal Code. (2) NO. As a rule, the inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the house of another without the consent of its owners or
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occupants. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection to the privacy of his home. However, under the police power of the state the authorities may compel entrance to dwelling houses against the will of the owners for sanitary purposes. The government has this right upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect the health and lives of all of its people. A man can not insist upon the privacy of his home when a question of the health and life of himself, his family, and that of the community is involved. This private right must be subject to the public welfare. It may be argued that one who enters the dwelling house of another is not liable unless he has been forbidden i.e., the phrase "against the will of the owner" means that there must have been an express prohibition to enter. In other words, if one enters the dwelling house of another without the knowledge of the owner he has not entered against his will. This construction is certainly not tenable, because entrance is forbidden generally under the spirit of the law unless permission to enter is expressly given. To allow this construction would destroy the very spirit of the law. Under the law no one has the right to enter the home of another without the other's express consent. Therefore, to say that one's home is open for the entrance of all who are not expressly forbidden. This is not the rule. The statute must not be given that construction. No one can enter the dwelling house of another, without rendering himself liable under the law, unless he has the express consent of the owner and unless the one seeking entrance comes within some of the exceptions dictated by the law or by a sound public policy. (N.B. Under the present RPC, if a public officer enters any dwelling against the will of the owner, they will be liable under Art. 128 for Violation of Domicile. However, if said act was committed by a private individual, like in this case, the crime committed by the offender will be Trespass to Dwelling under Art. 280.)
UNITED LABORATORIES PHILIPPINES/ ERNESTO ISIP
V.
SHALIMAR
FACTS: NBI Special Investigator III Rolando Besarra filed an application in the RTC of Manila for the issusance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines,
owned/operated by Ernesto Isip for the seizure of the following items in violation of RA No. 8203 (IPCode): a. Finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins; b. Other items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia used for the sale and distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins; c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official ledgers and other books of accounts used in the recording of the manufacture and importation, sale of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins. The application was supported by an affidavit by Charlie Rabe, security guard of UNILAB who alalegedly saw the manufacture and sale of fake drugs such as Revicon by Shalimar Philippines. (He was renting a room in the Shalimar Building). The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 pm on January 27, 2004 by NBI agents Besarra and Divinagracia in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fakfe Revicon multivitamins were found; instead there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building which when opened by the NBI agents contained bottles of Disudrin and Inoflox. Respondents herein filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence. They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI st nd rd th conducted their search at the 1 , 2 , 3 floors and 4 floors of the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in open display were allegedly found. These premises were different from the address st nd described in the search warrant which is the 1 and 2 floors of the Shalimar Bldg. located at No. 1571, Aragon St., Stsa. Cruz, Manila. The seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized in the search warrant were likewise asserted by the respondents. The RTC issued an Order sustaining that the seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of finished or unfinished products of UNILAB particularly Revicon multivitamins and documents evidencing counterfeit products. No evidence was shown nor any was given during the proceedings on the application for search warrant relative to the seized products. THE SEARCH WARRANT THUS SUFFERED A FATAL INFIRMITY AND CANNOT BE SUSTAINED. UNILAB filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party to file the petition at bench;
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2. Whether or not it was proper for the petitioner to file the present petition under Rule 45 of the RoC? Whether or not the seized bottles of Disudrin and boxes of Inoflox are INADMISSIBLE as evidence against the respondents because they constitute the fruit of a poisonous tree or if it is justified under the PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE and thus legally inadmissible as evidence against respondents.
3.
RULING: 1. We agree with the petitioners contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action. A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines. A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution. However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash. In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents motion to quash the search warrant. The respondents served copies of their reply and
opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro, Jr. The court a quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it and its counsel. The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General. 2. The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties. The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether there is a legal basis to quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence. On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox, the Court, likewise, rejects the contention of the petitioner. A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. 3. Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an 2.
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initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is recognition of the fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain another warrant. Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution. The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the objects incriminating evidence. In other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officers instantaneous sensory perception of the object. The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure. The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have known in advance of the location of the evidence and intend to seize it. Discovery is not anticipated. The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity. Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a person. Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a
man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-traditional probability In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins. The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin. It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.
PEOPLE V. HUA and LEE FACTS: Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged
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in illegal drug trafficking. Surveillance operations verified that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife. PARAC secured 2 search warrants: 1. for violation of P.D. No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and explosives) 2. for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 (dangerous drugs act) First warrant (Medyo unimportant) While no persons were found inside, the policemen found two kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, paraphernalia, and machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake credit cards. Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu at the Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant. They rushed to the area and 2 of them approached Chan and Lao, introduced themselves, but Chan and Lao fired shots. A shoot-out ensued where Chan and Lao were shot to death Second warrant (ito yung important) The policemen then proceeded to Pacific Grand Villa to nd enforce 2 warrant. The policemen, Pangan and two security guards of the Pacific Grand Villa proceeded to the condominium unit. They knocked on the door until finally appellant Lee peeped through the window. They introduced themselves as policemen, but the appellant could not understand them as she could not speak English. The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they were policemen. The appellant then opened the door and allowed the policemen, Pangan and the security guards into the condominium unit. They searched the masters bedroom plus another bedroom where appellant Hua was sleeping. The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC headquarters. The following articles were found and confiscated by the policemen in the condominium unit: 2 Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one Kilo each of white crystalline granules later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug; Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing an undetermined quantity of suspected Shabu; 1 Small Plastic Cannister also containing undetermined amount of suspected Shabu; Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for sniffing shabu, Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc. Lab test yielded positive result to the test for Methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the two were charged for violation of DDA. Trial court: both guilty RULING: AS TO HUA (not important, for DDA lang): Not guilty. Failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt kasi shes a foreigner na nag-visit lang in the Phils for 4 days pa lang and it wasnt established na in those 4 days connected siya sa shabu-related activities. No regulated drug was found in his person or inside his room or in his other belongings such as suitcases, etc. Thus, he had no actual or constructive possession of the confiscated "shabu." Moreover, it is not disputed that Huang Zhen Hua had only been in the country for barely four (4) days at the time when he was arrested. The prosecution was unable to show that in these four (4) days Huang Zhen Hua committed acts which showed that he was in cahoots with the drug syndicate Henry Lau and Peter Chan. It was not even shown that he was together with Henry Lau and Peter Chan on any occasion. There is no direct nor circumstantial evidence, of any culpability. (He was only staying in the condo of Lee as a guest). Essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exits when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant, at any time, had actual or constructive possession of the regulated drug found in the masters bedroom where appellant Lee was sleeping AS TO LEE (important! Implementation of search warrant): Guilty. His contention that the search warrant was not implemented in accordance with the law was baseless. Appellant Lee avers that certain irregularities were attendant in the issuance and implementation of Search Warrant: (a) the policemen who implemented the search warrant failed in their duty to show to her the said warrant, inform her of their authority and explain their presence in the condominium unit; (b) the policemen gained entry into the condominium unit by force while she was sleeping; and (c) articles and personal effects owned by her and Lao were taken and confiscated by the policemen, although not specified in the search warrant.
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She also contends that she was a victim of a frame-up because the policemen planted the regulated drug on her bed even before they searched the bedroom. She went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua to find out if he was already awake, and when she returned to the bedroom, she noticed shabu on her bed. The rule against unreasonable search and seizure forbids every search that is unreasonable Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is known as the "knock and announce" principle. The method of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as important considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to 63 search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable. In Gouled v. The United States, it was held that a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate the Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force, by illegal threat or mere show of force. Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and understood by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of the substantial provision which safeguards individual liberty. No precise form of words is required. It is sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of the search and the object to be seized. It must be emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only for the protection of the liberty of the person to be searched or of his property but also the safety and well-being of the officers serving and implementing the search warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed and whose property is to be searched is notified of the search warrant and apprised of the authority of the person serving the warrant, he may consider the unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful aggression on his property which he will be
justified in resisting, and in the process, may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for which he would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility that the police serving and implementing the search warrant may be misinformed as to the name or address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations. Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced intrusion. Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence. However, the exceptions above are not exclusive or conclusive. At times, without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must decide whether or not to make an unannounced intrusion into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective, if the police officers entry was without prior announcement, law enforcement interest may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. In determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only with what the officers had reason to believe and the time of the entry. Richards v. Wisconsin: In order to justify a "noknock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. Benefield v. State of Florida: what constitutes breaking includes the lifting of a latch, turning a door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to or pushing open a closed door of entrance to the house, even a closed screen door. However, entry obtained through the use of deception, accomplished without force is not a "breaking" requiring officers to first announce their authority and purpose because the reasons behind the rule are satisfied there was no real likelihood of violence, no unwarranted intrusion or privacy and no damage to the residence of the accused
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In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant Lee admitted, when she testified, that the police officers were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his companions were police officers and had a search warrant for the premises, and also explained to her that the officers were going to search the condominium unit. The appellant was sufficiently aware of the authority of the policemen, who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their purpose.
ISSUE: W/N Calera is guilty of dissolving interrupting a meeting under Art 113. NO!
or
PEOPLE V. CALERA AND CANTELA FACTS: Juan CALINDONG was the municipal mayor of Catarman, Samar. He issued a call to all the municipal officials and employees of the municipality for a conference/meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to readjust the assignment of official duties of the employees to assist or harmonize with the newly established Commonwealth government at that time. So the meeting was held at the municipal hall around 4pm on November 17, 1945. Among those who attended the meeting were municipal councilors, the mayor, vice mayor, treasurer the chief of police of the town and his assistants. The meeting was called to order by Mayor Calindong who explained the purpose of the conference and the importance of maintaining the law and public order. He then called on municipal councilor CAMPOSANO to speak before the audience. Councilor Camposano asked the mayor whether he would take responsibility for what he was about to say to the audience. Then, the chief of police (and accused appellant) CALERA stood up, quite agitated, telling Camposano that the mayor cannot be responsible for whatever he was going to say. Basically, Councilor Camposano was supposed to speak about a certain municipal ordinance and Calera was disrupting him from speaking because he wont sit down even if ordered to by the mayor. Calera was agitated because he feels that Camposano was going to criticize and speak against the police force. As a result, there were exchange of words, shouting between the mayor, the councilor and the chief of police. Due to the confusion, there was disorder in the municipal hall and the audience rushed out of the hall and the meeting was DISSOLVED. The justice of peace present in the meeting tried to break up the fight between the 3 but failed. SO the meeting was never finished. Now, the Calera faces charges of violation of Art 131 of the RPC (prohibition interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings).
HELD/RATIO: The provision in Art 131 of the RPC is intended to penalize the act of a public official who shall prohibit, stop or otherwise interrupt the holding and/or dissolve a peaceful meeting. But in order to be liable under this provision, it is necessary that the accused be a STRANGER, not a participant, of the meeting that has been interrupted and eventually dissolved. In this case, the said conference was called by the mayor and one of the officials invited to attend the same was the appellant Calera (chief of police). So he is not a stranger to the meeting. He was not only present in the meeting but he also took direct part in the said proceeding. Art 131 is found under the title Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of the State. Its specific purpose is to penalize the prohibition, interruption and dissolution of peaceful meetings by a stranger. This is NOT that kind of situation. Side issues: SC held that Calera cannot he held criminally liable under Art 144 (disturbance of proceedings) either. This is because the conference in question is not a meeting of the municipal council. It was in fact convened by the mayor. (the proceedings contemplated in this article ata are legislative and quasi-legislative meetings). However, the SC found Calera guilty of LIGHT COERCIONS (art 287) instead. Evidence shows that he was guilty of unjust vexation in causing the commotion.
ENRILE V. JUDGE AMIN Facts: Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder with the Rtc of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of P.d. No. 1829, for obstructing and impeding the Apprehension of ex. Lt. Col. Gringo honasan by concealing him in his house. Enrile assails this, stating that: The alleged harboring or concealing of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged coconspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989. (it was alleged that Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in that evening) .
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Issue: whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.(considering that such presidential decree is a special law) Held: petition granted. Judge enjoined from holding further proceedings against Enrile. Offense mentioned in PD 1829 abZZZorbed in rebellion! Ratio: as the Hernandez case states: The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion. The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.
BAYAN v. ERMITA FACTS: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was
scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. ISSUES: (1) Is BP 880 constitutional YES.
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(2) Is the CPR policy valid? NO. HELD: (1) B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. (2) The Court ruled that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. The policy of "calibrated preemptive response" is in consonance with the legal definition of "maximum tolerance" under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the "highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same." It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit, and which recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. This could only mean that "maximum tolerance" is not in conflict with a "no permit, no rally policy" or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to preempting the outbreak of violence. Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in
which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law. The Court directed the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.
PEOPLE V. ASUNCION (en banc case) FACTS: Respondents (Paterna Ruiz, Noli Narca, Fr. Nick Ruiz, Lydia Narca, Rodolfo Corteza, and Tomas Dominado) were charged with subversion under R.A. 1700. It was alleged that they were conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another by overt acts with the common objective to overthrow the duly constituted government of the Republic of the Philippines. They were also members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/National Democratic Front and/or its successor or of any subversive association in violation of said law. Another information was filed against them for violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms).That they had unlicensed firearms being used in support and furtherance of the crime of subversion or rebellion. Respondents argued that the filing of 2 separate informations for each of the accused violates the rule on double jeopardy, and that there being only a single criminal intent, the other offense of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives should be absorbed in the charge of violation of R.A. 1700, following the doctrine in People v. Hernandez. The lower court agreed with the contention and held that applying by analogy the doctrine laid down in the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515), the possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives to which all the accused are charged is a constitutive ingredient of the crime of subversion and, hence, absorbed by the same and cannot be punished separately. Deadly weapons are needed and necessary to generate the kind of force and violence to accomplish the purpose of subversion. The elements of force, violence and other illegal means mentioned in R.A. 1700 may be done with the use of violence, explosives and ammunition or the possession thereof.
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ISSUE: Whether the crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, punishable under P.D. 1866 is absorbed by the crime of subversion HELD/ RATIO: No. Subversion does not absorb crimes under P.D. 1866 The case of People v. Hernandez and other recent cases on the matter involve the crime of rebellion in which it cannot be complexed with a violation of common crimes, since force and violence are already necessary ingredients of the same. Applying by analogy rebellion to subversion because both are political offenses intended to destabilize and overthrow the government with the use of force, violence or other illegal means is untenable. The Court held that to espouse such theory that force and violence are the very essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. Subversion is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender. Furthermore, subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security, while rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms against the Government is the very element of the crime of rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), other similar associations and its successors because their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national security. The crime of subversion cannot absorb crimes under P.D. 1866. In fact, the legislature provided for 2 distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings and trial.
for bail (previous one denied) for his conviction of rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies. The prosecution said to deny this again because the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense however contends that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The information states that the murders, arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the accused as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof. ISSUE: W/N rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. NO! (deemed abzorbed, este absorbed) Bail granted. RATIO: Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by HERNANDEZ, as means necessary for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion and that the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. Under Article 1346 and 1357, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty. One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by engaging in war against the forces of the government and committing serious violence in the prosecution of said war. These expressions imply everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute only 1 crime, Article 48 doesnt apply since it requires the commission of at least 2 crimes. DISSENT: Montemayor The murders, robberies and arsons are not necessary or indispensable in the commission of rebellion and so are
PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ FACTS: Amado HERNANDEZ5 (member of the CPP and President of the Congress of Labor Organizations) re-filed
5 Future National Artist
6 The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. 7 any person, merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 1. engaging in war against the forces of the government, 2. destroying property, or 3. committing serious violence, 4. exacting contributions or 5. diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated
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not ingredients or elements of the latter. When a crime is a necessary means to commit another, he said, there is a complex crime; but when it is indispensable, there is only one crime. From this premise, one can commit rebellion by rising publicly and taking arms against the government without firing a single shot. NOTE: Doctrine REVERSED. Rebellion can be complexed with common crimes now. Reason: Article 135 was amended by the Republic Act No. 6968 (An Act Punishing the Crime of Coup Detat). Prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 6968, Article 135 punished those who while holding any public office or employment, take part therein by any of these acts: engaging in war against the forces of Government; destroying property; committing serious violence; exacting contributions, diverting funds for the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated. Since a higher penalty is prescribed for the crime of rebellion when any of the specified acts are committed in furtherance thereof, said acts are punished as components of rebellion and, therefore, are not to be treated as distinct crimes. The same acts constitute distinct crimes when committed on a different occasion and not in furtherance of rebellion. In short, it was because Article 135 then punished said acts as components of the crime of rebellion that precludes the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code thereto. In the eyes of the law then, said acts constitute only one crime and that is rebellion. To reiterate, before Article 135 was amended, a higher penalty is imposed when the offender engages in war against the government. "War" connotes anything which may be carried out in pursuance of war. This implies that all acts of war or hostilities like serious violence and destruction of property committed on occasion and in pursuance of rebellion are component crimes of rebellion which is why Article 48 on complex crimes is inapplicable. In amending Article135, the acts which used to be component crimes of rebellion, like serious acts of violence, have been deleted. These are now distinct crimes. The legal obstacle for the application of Article 48, therefore, has been removed.
Ajibun, two men they suspected were responsible for the disappearance of two of Kamlons followers. They chanced upon and abducted the two, who claimed they had no knowledge of such disappearance. They were detained overnight. The next day, they were brought to a store in the market place and were made to sit with their hands tied to the roof. Kamlon fired his automatic carbine at Alling, who died instantly. He ordered one of his followers, Ulluh, to cut off the dead mans head. Ulluh brought the head and body to his vinta and dropped these into the sea. Kamlon spared Ajibun and tried him instead for his alleged participation in the disappearance. Kamlon merely fined him and set him free. Kamlons version, which the courts did not believe, was that Alling was shot to death not by him but by some relatives of a woman who, on that occasion, he and Ajibun were attempting to abduct. In this petition for appeal before the SC, Kamlon alleged, among others, that the CFI erred in convicting him for kidnapping with murder in spite of the fact that the said acts of violence were committed in furtherance of sedition and therefore absorbed in the latter crime. Issues: Was the crime of kidnapping with murder absorbed in the crime of sedition? NO Ratio: The cited cases of Hernandez and Geronimo are inapplicable since these two cases involved the crime of rebellion, not sedition. There is neither law nor jurisprudence that would allow the SC to uphold Kamlons claim. The SC adheres to the rule of stare decisis. It cannot disregard its ruling in the case of Cabrera where it held that sedition is not the same offense as murder, the former being a crime against public order and the latter that against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the authority of the government, and the genera public tranquility. Murder is a crime against the lives of individuals. The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. In the case of Umali, the SC convicted the accused separately of sedition, multiple murder, etc. Conclusion: The common offenses, such as murder, are distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Additional: The SC said that in citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, Kamlon missed a very significant point. In those two cases, murder and other acts of violence were absorbed by rebellion, the common crimes alleged to have been committed in furtherance of rebellion were specifically charged in the information. For this reason, they were necessarily alleged to have been
PEOPLE v. KAMLON Facts: Kamlon was convicted by the CFI of Sulu for being the leader of a sedition (others were also convicted, but not important). In another criminal case, he was sentenced to death for the kidnapping of Alling and Ajibun complexed with the murder of Alling. Heres what happened (version which the CFI believed): Two years prior to the trial, Kamlon together with three armed companions set out to look for Alling and
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committed for political ends. In the case at bar, the information made no allegation of political motivation. The evidence showed that the killing had no political or social color, but was purely motivated by personal vengeance.
PEOPLE v. PEREZ FACTS: Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippines. One time, while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters, including the administration of Governor-General Wood, accused Perez, shouted a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." ISSUE: Is accused Perez liable of any crime? (Yes! He violated Act No. 292, the Treason and Sedition Law) HELD: In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious . But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by Act No. 292.
PEOPLE V. RECTO FACTS: There was a report about rice being stolen from a bodega. The barangay captain and a barangay kagawad went to the bodega to investigate. The chief barangay tanod passed by and asked what they were doing in the bodega. The appellant and his group arrived and was begged by the barangay captain not to start trouble. Despite this, the appellant brought out a balisong which made the barangay captain retreat. The barangay kagawad approached and asked the appellant and his group to surrender their weapons (may parang baril pa silang dala) but the latter shot him instead. At this time, the chief tanod was hiding in an old kubeta, where he saw appellants group kill the kagawad. The chief tanod and the barangay captain jumped out from the window of the kubeta and ran but the former was shot on his thigh while the latter was shot on his elbow. Still, they were able to escape. Several cases were filed against Recto and his group, one of which concerned the injury inflicted upon the chief tanod (which I think is the one important for the class). Based on that, appellant was charged with QUALIFIED DIRECT ASSAULT. ISSUE: W/N appellant should be charged with qualified direct assault for the injury of the chief tanod. HELD/RATIO: NO. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force,
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or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, without the element of public uprising. The second mode, on the other hand, is the more common form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c) when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority. An agent of a person in authority is any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority. In the case at bar, the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not engaged in the performance of his official duties at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked on the occasion of such performance. It must be emphasized that the chief tanod was on his way home when he happened to pass by the bodega. During trial, the chief tanod explained that when appellants group arrived, it was the Barangay Captain and the Kagawad who talked to the group. Melchor did not do anything to avert the tension. He only watched what was transpiring and later hid himself when the first shot was fired. Unquestionably, he was a barangay chief tanod; however, at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault.
are a double crosser. One who cannot keep his promise. Justo then grabbed a lead paper weight from the table of Caridad and challenged De La Cuesta to go out. Justo left Caridads office, followed by De la Cuesta. When they were in front of the table of one Carlos Bueno, a clerk in the division office, De la Cuesta asked Justo to put down the paper weight, but instead Justo grabbed the neck and collar of De La Cuestas polo shirt and it was torn. Carlos Bueno separated them, but not before De La Cuesta had boxed Justo several times. The CF found Justo guilty of the crime of assault upon a person in authority. The CA affirmed. Issue: Whether or not there was still direct assault considering De La Cuesta agreed to fight. Held: Yes! Even if at the time of the assault the officer was not performing his duties, as long as the attack was by reason of his official duties, or past official duties, there is direct assault. (This sentence is from an online Callejo Reviewer made by 4A-2009) Ratio: The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that De La Cuesta was not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. This is apparent from the phraseology of Article 148 of our Revised Penal Code, in penalizing attacks upon person in authority while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance, the words on occasion signifying because or by reason of the past performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being discharged. The evident purpose of the law is that public officials and their agents should be able to discharge their official duties without being haunted by the fear of being assaulted or injured by reason thereof. The argument that De la Cuesta, cannot claim to have been unlawfully attacked because he had accepted the Justos challenge to fight, overlooks the circumstance that as found by the CA, the challenge was to go out, i.e., to fight outside the building, it not being logical that the fight should be held inside the office building in the plain view of subordinate employees. Even applying the rules in duelling cases, it is manifest that an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place for the encounter would be unlawful; to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play. In the present case, assuming that De la Cuesta accepted the challenge of the accused, the facts clearly
JUSTO V. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Nemesio B. de la Cuesta was a district supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools, stationed in Ilocos Norte. On the morning of Oct. 16, 1950, he was in the division office in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. At 11:25 am., as he was leaving to eat, he saw Severino P. Justo talking with Severino Caridad, the academis supervisor. Justo asked De la Cuesta to go with him and Caridad to the office of the latter. They did and in the office of Caridad, Justo asked about the possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a teacher in the district of De la Cuesta. Caridad said that there was no vacancy, except that of the position of shop teacher. Upon hearing Caridads answer, Justo said to De La Cuesta: cShet, you
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indicate that he was merely on his way out to fight the accused when the latter violently lay hands upon him. The acceptance of the challenge did not place on him the burden of preparing to meet an assault at any time even before reaching the appointed place for the agreed encounter, and any such aggression was patently illegal.
PEOPLE VS RELLIN Doctrine: In all forms of assault, resistance or disobedience, it is required that (a) the accused knew the identity of the victim and (b) the victim was then acting in the due and lawful performance of his duties, or the reason for the attack against him was his performance of such official duties
PEOPLE vs. CHAN FOOK. FACTS: Chan Fook (accused/appelant), a Chinese subject, was a passenger of the US Military Transport South Bend, which arrived in Manila on April 6, 1920. Having been allowed by the immigration authorities to land, he left the boat on the same day. At about 3 or 4 pm of the following day, he went to pier no. 1 to get his baggage. After the search of the baggage, postcards of an indecent character were found. Eugenio M. Cruz, a custom agent, attempted to search the accused to which the Chan Fook objected. The agent seized Chan Fook by the arm with intent to search his body, after showing him his police badge. The accused resisted and struck the secret agent on the stomach. The latter in turn struck him on the neck. Here the customs inspector, Anastacio Jacinto, intervened, and explained to the accused that Cruz was a customs secret service agent and had the right to search him. Then the appellant made no further resistance and allowed himself to be searched. Appellant Chan Fook was prosecuted for the crime of resistance and disobedience to the public authority. The prosecution alleges that under section 1338 of the Administrative Code all persons coming into the Philippine from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by the customs authorities under such regulations as may be prescribed relative thereto. The defense, however, contends that once the accused has arrived at the point of his destination by being allowed to leave the boat and to land he was beyond the jurisdiction of the customs authorities, and, therefore, not liable to search without judicial warrant. ISSUE: Whether the accused committed the crime of resistance and disobedience to the public authority.
HELD: No. To decide this question, it is first necessary to determine whether Cruz was authorized to search the person of the accused. We are of the opinion that after the customs authorities have permitted the accused to land in Manila, the terminus of his voyage, he ceased to be a passenger within the meaning of said section 1338 of the Administrative Code. The fact that the accused returned to pier No. 1 to get the baggage that he had left there the day before does not subject him to the operation of said section. The Jones Law provides That the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. That foreigners in the Philippines are entitled to the benefits of the individual rights secured by the Philippine Bill is undeniable. It was too late to look for any contraband. Commenting on the meaning and score of resistance and disobedience, as elements of the crimes against public authority and its agents, Groizard, among other things, says: A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who exceeds his power can not be said to be in the exercise of the functions of his office. The law that defines and establishes his powers does not protect him for anything that has not been provided for. The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents is fixed, If they go beyond, it and they violate any recognized rights of the citizens, then the latter may resist the invasion, specially when it is clear and manifest. The resistance must be coextensive with the excess, and should not be greater than what is necessary to repel the aggression. The invasion of the prerrogatives or rights of another and the excess in the functions of an office, are the sources that make for legitimate resistance, especially, in so far as it is necessary for the defense of the persons or their rights in the manner provided for in article 8 of the Penal Code. (3 Groizard, pp. 456, et seq.) In the case at bar the action of the accused in laying his hands on the agent Cruz is, in our opinion, an adequate defense to repel the aggression of the latter, who had seized him by the arm for the purpose of searching him. In accordance with the repeated decisions of the supreme court of Spain, the gravity of a disobedience to an order of a person in public authority is measured and graded by the circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it, and the real importance of the transgression rather than by the source of the order disobeyed. And, taking into consideration the circumstances of the present case, wherein the agent Cruz had exceeded his functions, and wherein the accused acted in defense of the most highly esteemed of
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individual rights the constitutional right to be secured against unreasonable searches we are of the opinion that there is no ground for finding the accused guilty of the crime defined in article 252 of the Penal Code.
US V. GUMBAN FACTS: Accused is Nicomedes Gumban. He is charged with the crime of assault upon agents of authority. On Aug 13, 1917, Petronilo Gumban is the municipal president of Jaro, Iloilo. He was with municipal councilor Magdaleno Suliano who was reporting about the condition of his animals. Suddenly, Gregorio Ismana, a tenant of councilor Suliano arrived and reported to Mayor P. Gumban an incident. Ismana related that he had surprised a carabao belonging to Policarpio Gumban and as a result, the carabao destroyed the planted area belonging to councilor Suliano. So Ismana seized the said carabao and brought it to the police station in the barrio, which was within the zone affected by the quarantine. Thereafter, Epifanio Gumban and Nocomedes Gumban (accused), who were brothers Policarpio, of the owner of the carabao, arrived to where the municipal president Petronilo Gumban was to protest the taking of their carabaos. After hearing the protests Petronilo (municipal president) said that in his opinion, Ismala had the right to take the carabao to the police station. But he promised that the following day, he was going to intervene in the matter and telephone the man in charge of the quarantine so that the said carabao would not be comingled with the other carabaos in quarantine. Upon hearing this statement of the president, the accused insulted the said president and gave him a slap on the face which struck his left ear. TC convicted him of assault upon an AGENT of authority. ISSUE: W/N Nicomedes Gumban is guilty of direct assault upon an AGENT of authority or did the TC mean PERSON IN AUTHORITY. HELD/RATIO: The facts proved at the trial constitute the crime of assault with the hands upon a person in authority as defined in paragraph 2 of article 249 in connection with paragraph 3 of article 250 of the Penal Code. The offense of assault (atentado) is committed by: 2. Any person who shall attack, employ force against, or seriously resist or intimidate, any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of his official duties, or by reason of such performance.
Article 250 says: The penalty for assaults falling within the next preceding article shall be . . . when the offense is committed under any of the following circumstances: 3. When the offenders lay hands upon any person in authority. According to the above provisions of law, in order that the crime of assault punishable by these articles may exist, it is sufficient that there be an assault upon a person in authority committed by laying hands upon him. The fact of giving a slap to a person in authority should necessarily be qualified in the sense of laying hands upon the same person. The facts proved in this case involve all the necessary elements that constitute the crime of assault, inasmuch as the offended party, being a municipal president, was a person in authority, and was in the performance of his official duties. In the present case, the crime involved is that of assault upon a person in authority, in which the force necessary to constitute this crime is specifically defined by the law and consists in laying hands upon the person. In this case, it is not necessary to ascertain what force the law requires in order to constitute an assault, since the law itself defines concretely this force in providing that it consists in laying hands upon the person. The law simply mentions the laying hands without making any distinction as to the different cases, and it would not be just to make that distinction when the law does not make it. It is to be noted that the same provision of the law with regard to intimidation or resistance is not intended to be applied to the case of laying hands. The information qualifies the crime charged as an assault upon an agent of authority. Inasmuch as the offended party, as municipal president, is a person in authority and not a mere agent of authority, the designation of the crime given by the fiscal is erroneous.
PEOPLE VS LADJAALAM (the case is really long but the relevant part is only 2 paragraphs short) A search warrant was obtained to search the house of Ladjaalam because there was information that the same was being used as a drug den. After the warrant has been issued, 30 police officers went to the house of Ladjaalam but a few meters before reaching the house, Ladjaalam was already informed about the raid so when the police officers got to the front of the house, Ladjaalam started firing his M-14 Armalite at the police officers. Eventually, he was arrested together with other suspects for firing at the police officers. Upon the search, several foils of shabu, M-14 armalites and magazines, among others, were discovered.
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LC: search warrant was void because it was issued for more than one offense BUT since accused open fired at the police officers, the subsequent arrest and search became valid Issue: w/n accused is guilty of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide SC: YES The trial court was correct in convicting appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that the act of the accused of firing an M-14 rifle at the police officers, who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constituted such complex crime. We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision correccional. Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.
Escano was still alive, he fired at the latters chest while he was sprawled face down. Hindi pa nakuntento, he locked the room where Escano was, and entered the faculty room.he found some teachers and students and ordered them to lock doors and close windows, holding them as hostages. Buti na lang the police came with his family who pleaded to give himself up, which he did. He was convicted of qualified illegal possession of firearm and ammunition and murder. Issue: guilty? Yez! Was crime committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities? (There were issues with regard to self-defense, double jeopardy and certain aggravating circumstances here. Im skipping them and discussing only the part related to the HW.) The trial court held that since the crime was committed in front of teachers, then it was done in contempt or with insult to public authorities because RA 1978 provides that a public school teacher is a person in authority. SC: The trial court erred in finding such aggravating circumstance. Art. 152 of the RPC as amended defines who a person in authority is. A careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 31 of the Revised Penal Code, the provision the trial court applied in the case at bar. Tac-An is guilty, but sentence was changed.
PEOPLE V. RENATO TAC-AN Tac-An was 18 years and 7 months, while his victim, rd Escano was 15. They were then classmates in 3 year HS. They were good friends, both being members of the Bronx Gang. Tac-An had been to Escanos house a few times, and the latters mother noticed that Tac -An carried a handgun. Escanos mom told her son to stay away from Tac-An, so Escano withdrew from the Bronx Gang. This caused their relations to turn sour. Tac-An and Escano quarreled with each other, they were sent to the principals office. Their fights worsened after that. One day, when Tac-An left his math project on his chair because he had to ask their teacher something, Escano sat on the project. Angered by what he saw, TacAn kicked Escano out of the chair. A fist fight would have ensued if not for the timely intervention of 2 teachers. Then their class continued, at which point Tac-An went home and got his got. He got back to the classroom 15mins later. When their math class started, Tac-An suddenly burst in the room and fired at Escano. He missed and hit a desk instead. The students rushed towards the teacher for protection. Tac-An fired another shot and hit the th blackboard. Third time hit the concrete wall. The 4 shot hit Escano who was on his way to the only door of the room to escape. He was hit on the head and fell bleeding. Tac-An left the room. Outside, Tac-An was spotted by another teacher, who had no idea that he caused the commotion. That teacher asked Tac-An to help Escano since he was still alive. Tac-An reentered the room and upon confirming that
SENATE V. ERMITA (Note that this is a Consti case, so the Crim Law aspect of this case was not thoroughly discussed, not even a single
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mention of the RPC. Hehe. So please just read in relation to Art. 150 of the RPC which punishes, among others, the refusal to answer any legal inquiry, or to produce books, papers, documents or records in his possession, when required by them to do so in exercise of their functions.) FACTS: On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464] and that said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President and that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005. ISSUE: W/N the Congress had the power to compel their attendance? YES, AS LONG AS IT IS IN AID OF LEGISLATION. (Remember that ultimately, in this case, the SC nullified Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 which provide who are covered by executive privilege and saying that such officials must obtain the consent of the President prior to appearing in either House of Congress. )
HELD: The testimony of the person summoned must be upon matters, into which the National Assembly/Congress has jurisdiction to inquire. (FROM REYES BOOK 2, 2008. THIS IS NOT FROM THE CASE.) The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads: SECTION 21.The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Citing Arnault v. Narazeno, the Court said: That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is coextensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 (of the Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution) find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
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exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.
ADAZA v SANDIGANBAYAN (From 4A Yas Sanchez) Facts: The DPWH awarded to the PTA of Manawan National High School a contract for the construction of a school building consisting of 2 classrooms. Although the project was completed, the PTA failed to receive the last installment payment for such. Later, PTA President Mejorada was informed that the check had been released to petitioner Adaza, who was the municipal mayor at that time of Jose Dalman. Petitioner went to the Office of the Auditor of the DPWH and requested that he be furnished with certified true copies of the relevant documents pertaining to the contract, including the disbursement voucher and the corresponding check representing the last payment made by the DPWH for the project. Confronted with Disbursement Voucher, Mejorada detected that the signature above his printed name acknowledging receipt of the check was not his and that petitioners signature was affixed on the voucher. Mejorada saw that there were 2 signatures at the dorsal portion, his forged signature and another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of petitioner. A case for falsification by taking advantage of public office was filed against Adaza with the Sandiganbayan. Adaza now contends that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. Issues/Held: W/n the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction - No W/n the offender can be prosecuted for the crime of falsification by a public officer- Yes Ratio: For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties be alleged in the information. Although the petitioner was described in the information as a public officer being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte, there was no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither
was there any allegation to show how he made use of his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. The information merely alleges that petitioner falsified the disbursement voucher by counterfeiting therein the signature of Mejorada. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this allegation that is controlling, not the evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial. Under Article 172 of the RPC, the offender must be a private individual or maybe a public officer, employee or notary public who does not take advantage of his official position. Under Article 171, an essential element of the crime is that the act of falsification must be committed by a public officer, employee or notary who takes advantage of his official position. The offender takes advantage of his official position in falsifying a document when (1) he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. It is thus apparent that for purposes of acquisition of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan, the requirement imposed by R.A. 8249 that the offense be committed in relation to the offenders office is entirely distinct from the concept of taking advantage of ones position as provided under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. R.A. 8249 mandates that for as long as the offenders public office is intimately connected with the offense charged or is used to facilitate the commission of said offense and the same is properly alleged in the information, the Sandiganbayan acquires jurisdiction. Indeed, the law specifically states that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of Section 4 in relation to their office. Public office, it bears reiterating, need not be an element of the offense charged. On the other hand, the element of taking advantage of ones position under the RPC becomes relevant only in the present case, not for the purpose of determining whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, but for purposes of determining whether petitioner, if he is held to be liable at all, would be legally responsible under Article 171 or Article 172. While the Sandiganbayan is declared bereft of jurisdiction over the criminal case filed against petitioner, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate charge against him before the proper court.
SIQUIAN V. PEOPLE
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Facts: Jesusa Carreon went to the office of Manuel Siquian, the municipal mayor of Isabela, to apply for a job in the office of the mayor. Siquian then appointed her as a clerk in the office of the municipal secretary and even said that her salary would be included in the budget. Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds through a form issued by Siquian and addressed to the CSC, pursuant to the requirements of the latter. It should be noted that the Municipal council of Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-76. As such, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-75, was deemed re-enacted. No such position existed then. Carreon worked for five months and was supposed to receive her salary of P120. She approached the municipal treasurer to ask for the money but the latter said that there was no money yet. She then sued Siquian for falsification of a public document. The RTC and CA ruled in favour of Carreon. Siquian interposed the defense of a lack of criminal intent. Issue: Was Siquian guilty of falsification of public documents? Ruling: Yes. He was found guilty under par 4 of art 171, making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; the elements of which are: (a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. In this case, all the elements for falsification were met especially when Siquian stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated. It is further bolstered by the fact that when the budget was deemed re-enacted, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Carreon was appointed. And there is also no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-75 for such position, thus rendering Siquian's statement in his certification utterly false. Siquian also had the legal obligation to disclose the truth of such facts. Under the civil service rules and regulations, a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue the certification, Siquian has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up.
He also took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document. In this case, Siquian was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Carreon. Lastly, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public document. The SC relied on the Go Tiok case in stating that wrongful intent on the part of an accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. This is because the principal thing punished in falsifying public documents is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Siquian cannot raise the defense of good faith. He presides at all meetings of the municipal council and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council. He was also aware that there was no budget and no such position (clerk of municipal secretary) existed.
SAMSON V. CA FACTS: Lascano and his wife are entitled to some money because their son was a soldier for the USAFFE during nd the 2 world war. Amado Cruz was with 2 persons purporting to be the Lascano spouses. Cruz asked the help of his friend Rufino Samson, the appellant in this case, in order for the Lascano spouses to get their checks. Samson verified the identity of the purported Lascanos by examining their residence certificates. True enough, Samson had a friend with the Finance Dept of the AFP, Lt. Valencia, and they were able to get their checks that amounted to 12K. The group then went to the Treasury Dept to cash the checks. Samson also knew the teller and represented that the Lascanos were the real Lascanos. Mrs. Lascano placed her thumbprint on the back of the 2 checks while Mr. Lascano signed his name. SAMSON, on the other hand, SIGNED ON THE BOTTOM AS THE LAST INDORSER of the CHECK. The 12K was released. The group went to Aristocrat with about 11 other persons. They had their lunch and Samson was given P310 as gratitude money. Thereafter, the purported Lascanos were never seen again. Days later, Samson was informed that the Lascanos were not the real Lascanos. Samson investigated and found that real Mr. Lascano could barely walk and the real Mrs. Lascano was a teacher who denied receiving any money.
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Samson was charged together with Cruz, a Mr. Vergara and two john does for estafa through falsification of a commercial document. RTC convicted all of them. On appeal to the CA, Samson was only found guilty of Reckless Imprudence. ISSUE: Can falsification Negligence? YES. be committed through
HELD: Samson was definitely grossly negligent in assuring the identity of the impersonators to Lt. Valencia and the Teller as a result of which the govt lost 12K. Samson should not have relied on the mere representations of his friend and the residence certificates of the impersonators. Samson cooperated in the commission of estafa through falsification of a commercial document without which the estafa would not have been accomplished.8 Insofar as the falsification is concerned the act of endorsing the check constituted a written representation that the true payees were the ones who indorsed and cashed the checks, when in truth and fact the true payees had no part in the endorsement.9 Falsification can be committed through negligence since intent to cause damage is not an element of falsification because what the law seeks to ensure that the public has confidence in these documents.10 SC affirmed the conviction for Reckless Imprudence resulting in falsification under Art.365.11 DOCTRINE FALSIFICATION CAN BE COMMITTED BY NEGLIGENCE.
ANDAYA v PEOPLE
FACTS: Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock non-profit corporation rendering savings and loan services to its members. Petitioner Noe Andaya was its president. Noe Andaya proposed to increase the capitalization of the AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity to its members. Pursuant to this, the Board of Trustees passed a resolution creating the Finders Fee Program which provided that any officer, member or employee of AFPSLAI who can solicit at least 100,000 pesos worth of investment is entitled to a Finders Fee equivalent to 1% of the solicitation. Thereafter, the Central Bank notified AFPSLAI that its financial position was precarious because of mismanagement. The Board ordered an investigation which resulted to the filing of criminal information against Andaya for ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS. What happened was Ernesto Hernandez was able to solicit from an outsider an investment worth 2.1M. Since Hernandez did not want his Finders Fee worth 21,000 reflected in his Income Tax Return, he asked Andaya if the latter could find someone who can receive the cash in his behalf. Thus Andaya told Guilas (who was a clerk of AFPSLAI) to receive the Fee and turn it over to him (Andaya) so that the latter may give it to Hernandez. To this end, Andaya allegedly substituted the name of Hernandez for Guilas in the disbursement voucher. The Trial Court convicted Andaya saying that all the elements of the crime are present. First, Andaya caused to it appear in the disbursement voucher that Guilas, instead of Hernandez, was entitled to the Fee and Second, that this was done with criminal intent to cause damage to the government in the form of evading taxes. ISSUES: Whether or not Andaya is guilty of the crime charged - NO HELD: Petitioner must be acquitted on reasonable doubt Petitioner should not have been charged with estafa through falsification of commercial document but only estafa through falsification of private document whose elements are as follows: (1) offender commits any of the acts of falsification mentioned in 171 (2) falsification was committed on a private document and (3) the falsification caused damage or there was intent to cause damage to a third person. st 1 element is satisfied. Prosecution was able to establish the participation of Andaya in causing the voucher to be named after Guilas rather than Hernandez. Although Andaya did not personally cause the substitution, he is nevertheless a principal by induction for having ordered so. In this case, the act of
8 Note: J. Reyes dissented on this point such that, liability as a principal by indispensable co-operation requires knowledge of the criminal act and since Samson was ultimately made responsible for his reckless negligence, its fallacious to argue that he cooperated to the falsification through his negligence. 9 Article 171 Paragraph 2 Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. 10 Please be careful with this statement because I think the SC made a mistake here since in Reckless Imprudence what is punished is the negligence and the result merely determines the penalty imposed. If intent to falsify was not an essential element of falsification then it would be mala prohibita and we all know that falsification is mala in se. Remember the case about tampering of Election Results, court said that its mala in se, I think the same rule applies here. OR is intent to cause damage different from intent to falsify? I dont know. 11 Note: Strong Dissent was made by Justice Reyes that Samson cannot be convicted of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Falsification because this is not necessarily included in the intentional crime of Estafa through Falsification, the crime charged in the information. In the words of Justice Reyes malice or intent cannot co-exist with negligence
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falsification done by Andaya is under 171(2) or causing it to appear that a person has participated in something but in fact has not. nd 2 element is satisfied. However, the prosecution wrongfully classified a disbursement voucher as a commercial document. It is not. it is a private document. A commercial document is an instrument commonly used by merchants to facilitate trade and credit transactions. They are regulated by the Code of Commerce. On the other hand, a private document is an instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary by which some disposition or agreement is proved. Again, a voucher is not a commercial document. rd 3 element was not satisfied. This is because irrespective of who really has the right to claim the Fee Guilas or Hernandez the fact remains that AFPSLAI is indebted to the extent of 21,000. AFPSLAI suffered no damage because in the first place it was under obligation to make such payment. The ration of the Trial Court that it was the Government which stands to suffer because of tax evasion is untenable. Why? Because the information alleged damaged to AFPLSAI and not damage to the Government. If you sustain the finding of the TC you violate Andayas right to be properly informed of the crime he is charged with. Note however that in the book theres no such thing daw as estafa through falsification of private document. Pero the court did not even mention this.
The City Prosecutor of Tacloban resolved that 3 informations of falsification (under Art 172, Par 1 in relation to Art 171, Par 2) be filed against Silvina and Camenforte (a lawyer who conspired with Lastrilla). However, it did not find any probable cause to file against Lastrilla. Granda appealed to the DOJ but the DOJ just affirmed. On appeal to the CA, the CA finally resolved that 3 informations of falsification (under Art 172, Par 1 in relation to Art 171, Par 1, 2 and 5) be filed against Lastrilla. In essence, the CA said that Lastrilla falsified the documents in three ways imitating the signature of the grandparents, causing it to appear that persons have participated when in fact they did not (since the grandparents were dead), and altering true dates. Lastrilla claimed that the CA committed error in finding probable cause against him. Lastrilla also claimed that there was no damage done because he allegedly paid P18m for the land, hence he cant be held liable for falsification. Issue: was there probable cause to engender the belief that petitioner is one of the authors of the falsification? Held: Yes, there was probable cause. Lastrilla attested to the fact that the grandparents signed the deeds in his presence in 1985. However, he also admitted that the negotiations for the sales only started in 1998 (even when the documents said 1985) so how could the negotiations happen only after the deeds were executed? The PNP Crime Lab also reported that the signatures of the grandparents did not match specimen signatures of the spouses. To his claim that no damage was done, the Court said that in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in these cases, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. The case teaches us that there are as many counts of falsification as to documents falsified, regardless of the parcels of land contained in each deed. In this case, there were 3 deeds of sale falsified thats why 3 counts of falsification were charged to Lastrilla and his cohorts. Moreover, it also teaches us that even if there are multiple modes of falsifying a single document, it will still be considered as 1 crime thats why even if Lastrilla falsified each document in three ways (1, 2 and 5), he was still charged of 1 count of falsification per document. With regard to Art 171, Par 2, the case teaches us that the provision applies even if those who were made to appear to participate are already dead.
LASTRILLA V GRANDA FACTS: Granda was the grandson of the lot owners (Rafael and Aurora). The lot owners died in 1989 and 2000, respectively. Granada claims that Lastrila, et al, falsified three deeds of sale covering numerous parcels of land in favor of the latter and the latters relatives. Because of the 3 deeds of sale, the parcels of land were registered to Lastrilla and his relatives. The first deed covered 2 parcels of land. The second deed covered 2 parcels of land. While the third deed covered 3 parcels of land. Granda claims that 1) the signatures on the 3 deeds of sale were falsified and were not of his grandparents, 2) the 3 deeds of sale were antedated (the deeds said that the transactions took place on Dec 1985, but in fact they took place in 1999 or 2000) 3) the witness to the deed (Grandas sister Silvina) could not have possibly signed the 3 deeds in 1985 because she was cloistered in a convent at that time. 4) the subject deeds were only registered with the RD only on 2000, or 15 years after the purported sales
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GOMA VS CA. FACTS: The Ombudsman filed an information for FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT under ARTICLE 171 (2) against Goma and Umale. It was alleged that Brgy. Chairperson Goma and Secretary Umale falsified a brgy. Resolution by allocating the amount of P18,000 as disbursement for a seminar of 2 officials. In the said Resolution, it was indicated that it was passed on motion of Kgwd. Dizon and seconded by Kgwd. Dela Cruz when in truth and in fact no meeting was held as there was no quorum. The said Resolution was even signed by Goma and Umale and with the official seal of the brgy. Goma and Umale denied the allegations, claiming that the said Resolution was a mere draft and it is not sufficient to disburse funds. RTC: GUILTY. The Resolution have all the appearance of a complete and "true and genuine document," sealed and signed by the Sanggunian secretary.CA: affirmed. ISSUE: WON the Resolution is a public document? WON petitioners can be held liable? RULING: 1. Resolution is a Public Document. Revised Rules on Evidence, public documents include "[t]he written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country." There can be no denying that the public money-disbursing and seemingly genuine Resolution, in the preparation of which petitioners, in their official capacity, had a hand, is, in context, a public document in a criminal prosecution for falsification of public document. And it bears to stress that in falsification under Art. 171(2) of the RPC, it is not necessary that there be a genuine document; it is enough that the document fabricated or simulated has the appearance of a true and genuine document or of apparent legal efficacy. GUILTY of Falsification (Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate). The elements of the crime of falsification of public documents, as above defined and penalized, are: 1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public. 2. That he takes advantage of his official position. 3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding. 2.
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding. The first two elements clearly obtain, petitioners, during the period material, being local government elected officials who, by reason of their position, certified, as Umale did, as to the holding of a barangay session and falsely attested, as Goma did, as to the veracity of a resolution supposedly taken up therein. The other two elements are likewise present. As correctly observed by the CA: [Petitioners] made it appear in the Barangay resolution that all members of the Sangguniang Barangay deliberated upon and unanimously approved the questioned resolution, when in fact no such deliberation and approval occurred. The non-participation of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay in the passage of the resolution was established by the 15 October 1995 resolution issued by 7 of the 8 members of the Sangguniang Barangay denying that the challenged resolution was passed upon and approved by the council. Indeed, the contents and appearance of the Resolution argue against the very idea of its being merely a proposal or a draft barangay enactment. Falsification of a public document is consummated upon the execution of the false document. And criminal intent is presumed upon the execution of the criminal act. Erring public officers failure to attain their objectives, if that really be the case, is not determinative of their guilt or innocence. The simulation of a public document, done in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity, constitutes the crime of falsification. In fine, the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a documents integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of public documents. What is punished in falsification of public document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. In this particular crime, therefore, the controlling consideration lies in the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.
MONTEVERDE V. PEOPLE - ?? there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or others) If falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa
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and neither were the two crimes the result of a single act, then there is no complex crime. Since not complexed, acquittal in one does not mean acquittal in other as they are considered separate crimes. Even if it is complexed, acquittal in component crime will not lead to acquittal of other offense/s. Sales Invoice is also a commercial document. If prosecution doesnt prove that second document is falsified, as it didnt present original, no crime as the second document might be an original as well.
Leonilas act falls under par2 of Art. 171 causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. Re: third element PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loans. As mentioned earlier, 3 out of the 4 persons were not members. The remaining one had actually settled the loan but only for the purpose of avoiding legal prosecution, with the understanding however that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected from Leonila. Re: second element The vouchers were indeed private documents because they were not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions, nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial laws. Rather they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other persons legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced, or set forth. No complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document! If the falsification is done as a means to commit estafa, then the crime would be falsification. On the other hand, if estafa could have been committed without the necessity of falsifying the document, the proper crime would be estafa. NB: SC didnt say why but it cited Gregorio, citing Cuello Calon. And according to J. Callejo (feeling ko ancestor niya si Cuello Calon Cuello Calon = Callejo), both crimes share a similar element damage or intent to cause damage. So what crimes were committed? As to the 3 persons falsification of private documents (3 counts) As to Leonilas 3-year-old child estafa! Why estafa??? Because Leonila did not falsify the signature of her son. In fact, it appeared in the voucher that she wrote by: Batulanon, indicating that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of her son. Such act does not fall under any of the instances of falsification enumerated in Art. 171. Nonetheless, such representation caused damage to PCCI which makes her liable for estafa!
LEONILA BATULANON VS. PEOPLE Facts: Leonila was employed as a cashier/manager of Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI). She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the members of the cooperative. During an audit in 1982 certain discrepancies were discovered in relation to the release of loans. 4 informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against Leonila. In summary, these informations stated that Leonila falsified cash/check vouchers in the name of 4 different persons, thereby making it appear that these persons were granted loans when in fact they did not even apply for them, and moreover, they did not sign any of the said vouchers. The witnesses testified that 3 out of the 4 persons were not even members of PCCI and that one of them [the non-members] was the son of Leonila who was, at that time, only 3 years old. Eventually, the TC found her guilty of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. On appeal however, the CA affirmed with modification, finding her guilty instead of falsification of private documents (Art. 172, par2). Issue: What crimes were committed? Held/Ratio: 3 counts of falsification of private documents and one estafa. Elements of the crime: 1) Offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171, except par7; 2) Falsification was committed in any private document; and rd 3) Falsification caused damage to a 3 party OR at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage. Re: first element
R.F. NAVARRO CO. AND HEIRS OF R. NAVARRO VS. VAILOCES AND HEIRS OF E. RODRIGUEZ
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FACTS: Petitioners (Laura Navarro12 and other heirs of R. Navarro) instituted an action for annulment of documents, titles and/or reconveyance against the heirs of E. Rodriguez and Luzon Surety Co. Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of certain lots by virtue of TCT 61619 registered under the name of Raymundo Navarro (deceased) and R.F. Navarro Co13. Raymundo entrusted said property to E. Rodriguez, but it was discovered by petitioners that after Raymundos death, E. Rodriguez was able to transfer the property in his name. Petitioners claim that the transfer of property in E. Rodriguez name was fraudulent as it was done without any consideration and knowledge of the petitioners, and that the signature of Raymundo on the Deeds was forged. Upon discovery of such fraudulent transfers, petitioners demanded that from private respondents to return the properties. On the other hand, private respondents (heirs of E. Rodriguez and Luzon Surety Co.) alleged that the transfer of the property was done through a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage executed by Raymundo in favor of E. Rodriguez. Thus, TCT 61619 was cancelled and a new one (TCT 62411) was issued in the name of E. Rodriguez. The RTC found the transfer as fictitious, thus ruling in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling in favor of private respondents ISSUE: W/N the Deed of Sale is spurious since it was not signed by Raymundo Navarro. NO. HELD/RATIO: Petitioners claim that the aforementioned deed of sale is spurious as the same was not signed by Raymundo F. Navarro. Petitioners' attempts to show that the Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage executed by Navarro and Rodriguez are false do not impress the SC. The bare assertions on the part of Laura Navarro, wife of Raymundo, that the signature appearing on the Deeds of Sale is not that of her husband is not enough. Forgery is not presumed; it must be proven by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not evidence. In the case at bar, where the alleged forged signature was that of a President of a Corporation, petitioners could have easily presented other documents bearing the true signature of R.F. Navarro Sr., to substantiate their claim. Not having done so, Lauras uncorroborated claim cannot be given much weight. This is so especially in light of the fact that Laura was one of the plaintiffs and stood to gain by having the deeds of sale and the transfer certificate of title in the name of Luzon Surety Company declared void.
In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that the Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage were spurious, petitioners are already barred by laches.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PO GIOK TO FACTS: In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the defendant appellee Po Giok To was charged with the crime of falsification. He misrepresented to the City Treasurer of Cebu that his name is Antonio Perez, that his place of birth is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is Filipino. From such misrepresentation of facts the City Treasurer issued him a residence certificate. The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the information does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the crime of falsification. The City Fiscal opposed the motion to quash claiming that the information alleges all the integral elements of the offense charged as defined by the statute. The lower Court, however, found the motion to quash meritorious and ordered the amendment of the information. Hence, this appeal by the Government. ISSUE: Whether or not the information in question should allege the following facts in order to be sufficient to convict the defendant of the crime of falsification: 1) That the accused had the obligation to disclose the truth in the document allegedly falsified; 2) That the accused had the wrongful intent to injure a third HELD: We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first element allegedly lacking in the information, that is, the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the facts that should appear in a residence certificate, is inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document. Section 3 Commonwealth Act 465 provides: "that the residence certificate for persons shall contain the full name, place and date of birth, citizenship, civil status, length of residence in the city or municipality where the certificate is issued, occupation or calling. Needless to say, this provision implies that the person to whom the certificate is issued must state to the officer who issues the same, the true facts, required to appear therein, the latter having merely the ministerial function of recording thereon the facts as supplied by this person. And to guarantee that the facts given correctly and truly identify the holder of the certificate, he is also required by Sec. 3 above to sign the document and affix his right hand thumb mark thereon.
12 Wife of the deceased Raymundo Navarro. 13 Raymundo Navarro was the President of R.F. Navarro Co.
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There is, therefore, no question that the accused had the duty to disclose the true facts about his name, place of birth, and citizenship to the officer or employee who issued his residence certificate and such duty being inherent in the transaction, there was no need for the criminal charge to allege that the accused had such duty. Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the information in question, the law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. Article 172, par. 1, in connection with Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: ART. 171. Falsification by the public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any other kind of commercial document. On the other hand, Art. 172, par 2, defining the crime falsification of private document, provides: 2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such damage , shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceeding article. The distinction made by the law between falsification by private persons of PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND PRIVATE DOCUMENTS IS CLEAR. The first (FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS) is committed by the mere performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171 While the second (FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS) is committed not only by the performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171 but it must likewise be shown that such act of falsification was committed to the damage of a third party or with intent to cause such damage.
The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain in the case of People vs. Pacana that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradiction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Moreover, the acts charged, if true, would result in confusion in the government records, since the fingerprint of the accused would not correspond to that of the person whose personal circumstances are recited in the certificate. Such confusion in its records evidently operates to the Government's prejudice. Being the natural and direct result of the criminal act charged, the accused must be presumed to have intended it. Side issue: It is argued for the defendant that there being a special law with respect to residence certificates expressly punishing their falsification (Commonwealth Act No. 465), this special law, and not the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, should apply in this case. RPC can still apply since under Art. 10 of the RPC has supplementary application to all special laws, unless the latter should provide the contrary, and CA No. 465 makes no provision that it exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence certificates. Thus the information was sufficient, and its dismissal for insufficiency by the Court below was improper and erroneous.
DAVA v. PEOPLE FACTS: Michael Dava bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former and physical injuries to the latter. As a consequence, his driver's license was confiscated and he was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries. One day, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava driving a Volkswagen. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to Dava, they had Dava apprehended for driving without a license. When he was apprehended, he showed the police officers a non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 with official receipt No. 0605870 issued by Agency Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava informed them that his officemate (Manalili) had secured it for him. He was brought to the police station and charged w falsification of a public document. Prosecution witnesses: Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation
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(BLT). He testified that the license was earlier brought to him and he was asked whether it was fake or genuine. He examined it and found that it was "fake or illegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was one of the 50 forms which had been reported missing from their office sometime in November, 1976 and that it was never issued to any applicant for a license. He added that any license that was not included their office index card was considered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency." Although the form used for the license was genuine, the signature of the issuing official was fake. Defense witness: Manalili. He said he obtained the license by paying fixers ISSUE: WON Dava can be convicted of falsification? YES RATIO: Elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172) are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in this case. a. Petitioner himself requested officemate Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license. Through this misrepresentation petitioner was ableto induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. b. A driver's license is a public document. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document. c. When petitioner was apprehended he presented the license to the officer. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is probable that hes been using the license. d. The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. People vs. Sendaydiego, The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the exception that the accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a false document. His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili.
FLORES VS LAYOSA Facts: On Dec 1991, private respondent Benigno Montera, employee of the National Food Authority (NFA), filed a complaint in the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against the petitioners Flores, Elizon and Soloria, and 2 others (Dansal and Vallada). OMB filed an Information charging the petitioners with the offense of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. It was alleged that Dansal and Flores were dept manager and asst manager respectively while Elizon, Soloria and Vallada were security personnel of NFA.That the petitioners conspired in falsifying the DAILY TIME RECORD of Vallada, making it appear that the latter reported for work as a security guard at the NFA when in fact, he never reported for work. And because of this, Vallada was still able to collect his salary. Prosecutors filed a motion to suspend the petitioners pendent lite, which was granted by the court, suspending them for 90 days. Trial court applied Sec 13 of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which mandates that a public officer charged for an offense involving fraud upon govt or public funds or property shall be suspended pending case in court. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. A certiorari to the Sandiganbayan, which only affirmed the TCs issuance of order of suspension pendente lite because it falls under Sec 13 of RA 3019. While petitioners concede that the Information sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense of falsification of public document, they assert that it does not contain an averment of fraud or deceit on their part. Hence, they claim that the Information does not
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charge them with estafa but only falsification of public document. And that they shouldnt be suspended. Also, that it was private res Montera who filed for suspension, not prosecutors. Respondent People argue that the Information sufficiently alleges the elements of estafa through falsification of public document under Article 318 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC. According to the People, this complex crime is an "offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property" under Section 1314, R.A. 3019. Thus, the suspension pendente lite of petitioners is justified. Also, although Montera filed the motion to suspend, it was with conformity of the public prosecutor. Issue: W/N the offense charged is a complex crime of estafa through falsification of public docs. W/N offense charged falls within the coverage of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. YES! W/N suspension of petitioners pendente lite is proper. YES! Held/Ratio: The Information alleges that petitioners took advantage of their positions and conspired and falsified the DTR of Valleda to make it appear as if he reported for work that month but he in fact didnt and in the processes appropriated Valladas salary to the prejudice of NFA. Still, any error in the Information, with regard to the specification of the particular mode of estafa, allegedly committed by petitioners will not result in its invalidation because the allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners that they are being charged with estafa through falsification of public document. Crimpro rules state that the Information should contain the designation of the offense and the criminal acts/omissions complained as constituting the offense. BUT the SC has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense is NOT controlling because what actually determines that nature and characted of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information. Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the mode of commission of the estafa as alleged in
14 Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 provides: Suspension and loss of benefits.Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. (Emphasis supplied)
the Information (which states that petitioners committed estafa under Article 315), or as claimed by the People in their Comment (that petitioners committed estafa under Article 318) and the absence of the words "fraud" or "deceit" in the Information, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan and the RTC that the factual allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa in general committed through the offense of falsification of public document. In the case at bar, although the word "deceit" or "fraud" was not specifically alleged in the information, nonetheless, the same alleges the manner by which deceit or fraud was committed. It was committed by falsifying the daily time record of accused Vallada; and that it was committed by using said falsified daily time record to collect the corresponding salary of Vallada to the damage and prejudice of the National Food Authority. To our mind these allegations are sufficient to maintain the validity of the information. It must be noted that the crime for which the accused are charged is the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document wherein the falsification of the public document is a necessary means to commit the estafa. It bears stressing that the words "fraud" or "deceit" need not be used in an information for the allegations therein to sufficiently allege the offense of estafa. It is enough that acts constituting abuse of confidence or deceit, which are indispensable to estafa, are averred in the information. The court determines whether the information charging a public officer with an offense that falls under Sec 13 of R.A. No. 3019, such as to warrant suspension pendent lite. If it does, the court is bound to issue an order of preventive suspension of the accused public officer as a matter of course. The order of suspension pendente lite, while mandatory in nature, is by no means automatic or self-operative. Before such suspension is imposed, a determination as to the validity of the information must first be made in a pre-suspension hearing. Accused must be given an opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him. In this case, petitioners were afforded the opportunity to challenge the validity of the charges against them, and whether it falls under Sec 13 of RA 3019 when they filed a opposition to Monteras motion.
CAUBANG V. PEOPLE Doctrine: possessor of falsified document is deemed as the forger/ immaterial if falsified document contains no false contents, so long as signature has been forged!
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Facts: Caubang is charged with falsification of public document, as a private individiual, by forging the signature of treasurer Pagaduan contained in the statement of assets and liabilities of the BANGANGA consolidated arrastre stevedoring services (BCASS), making it appear that said PAGADUAN participated in said registration of the newly formed corporation. Petitioner and Pagaduan's stevedoring companies were merged after an agreement by both parties, which was called the aformentioned BCASS. Caubang was designated as the representative to register the merged company with the SEC, although thereafter Pagaduan stated that said merger shall not push through. Pagaduan was then surprised when said BCASS was already registered with the SEC and wondered why his signature was affixed in the STatement of assets and liabilities as treasurer thereof. Petitioner's defense is that he brought to the SEC only the AOI, treasurer's affidavit, and the 2,5oo paid up capital, and denied having presented the statement of assets and liabilities. ISSUE: WON guilty of falsification of document by forging the signature of Pagaduan, even though he denied having brought or made such statement of assets and liabilities. HELD: guilty. RATIO: the arguments of petitioner are mere denials which, if weighed agaonst documentary evidence and testimony of witnesses, do not convince the court to reverse its decision. Moreover, having been the one responsible for the filing of registration papers, the accused must likewise be accountable therefore. As the authorized rep, he is deemed to be the one in custody and possession of the statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the court is convinced that the possessor and user of a falsified document is presumed to be the forger thereof. Also equally important, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth in the forged statement were false, so long as the signature of another was counterfeited. Lastly, in this crime of falsification, the princal thing punished is the PUBLIC FAITH AND DESTRUCTION OF TRUTH as therein proclaimed. The act of forging Pagaduan's signature is the act punishable, and so INTENT TO CAUSE DAMAGE OR GAIN IS IMMATERIAL, moreso actual damage. ( as opposed to private documents, wherein intent to cause damage or gain is necessary).
EUGELIO G. PHILIPPINES,
BARAWID
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
FACTS: Benardino was the former Municipal Mayor and Chairman of the Pre-Qualification Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC); Barawid a Municipal Treasurer was a member of the PBAC; Tomas was the PBACs acting Secretary. The Minutes of the opening of bids show that on December 8, 1997, the PBAC members convened and assessed the qualifications of the four bidders who participated in the bidding for the construction of the extension of the public market which was later awarded to MASCOM. The Minutes was signed by petitioner Tomas in her capacity as the acting Secretary of the PBAC. Bernardino and Barawid and the other PBAC members also signed a Prequalification Bid and Award Committee, Abstract of Bidding and Abstract of Proposal which reflected the names of the four bidders and their respective bids. A new mayor was elected before the commencement of the said project. He thereafter conducted a public bidding for the same project and it was awarded to KYRO Builder as the lowest bidder. In a case filed by MASCOM against the new mayor Dizon, he contended that the award to KYRO is proper because the project could not be validly given to MASCOM as there was in fact no competitive public bidding held on December 8, 1997. Such allegation of Dizon was supported by affidavits of the former members of PSAC which states that no public bidding was held in connection with the construction of the public market extension nor was the local PBAC convened on December 8, 1997. Affiants also declared that the documents in connection with the alleged bidding were delivered to their residence/office; and that they signed the same upon the representation of MASCOMs representative that the documents were necessary for the PNB loan application of the municipality in connection with the construction of the public market. Thus, an Information was filed charging petitioners and the PBAC members of falsification by making it appear in the Minutes of the opening of bids, Prequalification Bid and Award Committee, Abstract of Proposal, and Abstract of Bidding, that they and COA representative conducted a public bidding on December 8, 1997, participated in by four bidders, when no such bidding was in fact conducted. ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are guilty of the crime. HELD: Bernardino and Barawid: NO. Tomas: YES. In the instant case, petitioners were charged with falsification under paragraph 2, Article 171 of the Revised
NESTOR A. BERNARDINO and CELEDONIA N. TOMAS, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
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Penal Code, by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. Its elements are: (1) that the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; (3) that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that no bidding was conducted on December 8, 1997 could not be considered for purposes of determining whether a public bidding was indeed held on that day because of the affiants admission that they do not have personal knowledge whether or not said bidding was indeed conducted. The affiants declared that no public bidding was held on December 8, 1997. However, said declaration is merely an expression of an opinion and not a fact considering that like prosecution witnesses Ronquillo and Mayor Dizon, they also have no personal knowledge as to whether or not a bidding was indeed conducted. Such declaration cannot be admitted as evidence in the court being an opinion of witness which is inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the Rules of Court. And while the Information alleged conspiracy such that the acts of the affiants may be attributed as well to petitioners Bernardino and Tomas, the same cannot be considered against said petitioners inasmuch as no evidence was presented by the prosecution to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be established as a fact. On the part of Tomas, even if we assume that all the PBAC members attended the bidding, including those who executed an affidavit to the contrary, she is still liable for falsification. Note that she was the only one who signed the Minutes of the opening of bids which stated, among others, that COA representative Ronquillo attended the public bidding on December 8, 1997. As acting Secretary of the PBAC she has the duty to prepare or intervene in the preparation of the Minutes of the meetings of the PBAC which should be recorded pursuant to Section 37 of the Local Government Code. In making it appear that COA representative Ronquillo attended the bidding when the latter categorically testified that he never attended a public bidding on December 8, 1997, Tomas took advantage of her official position, rendering her liable for falsification under Article 171 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE V. ANDAYA Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the CA which affirmed the RTC decision convicting
petitioner Noe S. Andaya of falsification of private document. Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI), a non-profit association engaged in savings and loan transactions filed a complaint against Andaya for estafa through falsification of commercial document. Andaya was elected president and general manager of AFPSLAI and during his term. During his term, he sought to increase the capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity to its members. Consequently, the Board of Trustees of AFPSLAI approved a Resolution setting up a Finders Fee Program whereby any officer, member, or employee (except investment counselors) of AFPSLAI who could solicit an investment of not less than P100k would be entitled to a finders fee equivalent to 1% of the amount solicited. On Sept. 1991, the Central Bank wrote Gen. Abadia (Chairman of the Board of Trustees) regarding the financial position of AFPSLAI due to its alleged flawed management. Gen. Abadia requested the NBI to conduct an investigation on alleged irregularities in the operations of AFPSLAI. One of the cases filed pursuant to the investigation is this criminal complaint filed against Andaya based on alleged fraudulent implementation of the Finders Fee Program. On Oct. 1991, an information for estafa through falsification of commercial document was filed against Andaya. Andaya pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented 2 witnesses (1) Diosdado Guillas testified that upon learning of a finders fee of P21,000.00 in his name, Andaya instructed him to collect the money and turn it over to Andaya. According to him, there was no prohibition in placing the finders fee under the name of a person who did not actually solicit the investment. (2) Judy Balangue testified that Andaya instructed him to prepare a Certificate of Capital Contribution in the name of Rosario Mercader for an investment in AFPSLAI in the amount of P2.1M and to inform Guilas that the finders fee will be placed under Guilas name (Note that the P2.1M was actually deposited in AFPSLAI). Defense presented 3 witnesses (1) Arevalo, secretary of AFPSLAI, explained that the finders fee was for P2.1M investment solicited by Hernandez from Mercader but placed under the name of Guilas upon request of Hernandez so
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that the P21k would not be reflected in his income tax return. (2) Hernandez testified that he solicited the P2.1M and that he asked Andaya to place the finders fee in the name of one of his employees so that he would not have to report a higher tax base. (3) Andaya testified. In denying the charge against him, Andaya claimed that the P21k finders fee was in fact payable by AFPSLAI and denied misappropriating the P21k for his personal benefit since it was turned over to Hernandez, who was the true solicitor of the investment. Thus, since AFPSLAI was liable for P21k, then no damage was done to the association. In addition, Andaya alleged that Guilas consented to the entire set-up. In sum, Andaya claimed that he merely approved the substitution of the name of Hernandez w/ that of Guilas in the disbursement voucher upon the request of Hernandez. Andaya brushed aside the imputation of condoning tax evasion by claiming that the issue in the proceeding was whether he defrauded AFPSLAI and not his alleged complicity in tax evasion. Trial court found him guilty and charged him for falsification of private document. Andaya filed a motion for new trial but was denied. Instead, the trial court reopened the case in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Andaya submitted documentary evidence to prove that AFPSLAI did not suffer any damage from the payment of the P21k finders fee. The trial court still convicted Andaya for falsification of private document based on the following facts: o Hernandez solicited from Mercader an investment of P2.1M for AFPSLAI o Hernandez requested Andaya to place the finders fee in the name of another person o Andaya caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Guilas solicited the 2.1M investment o The voucher served as the basis for the issuance of the check for P21k o Guilas encashed check and turned over the money to Andaya who gave it to Hernandez The trial court ruled all the elements of falsification of private document were present: 1. First, petitioner caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher, a private document, that Guilas, instead of Hernandez, was entitled to the P21k finders fee. 2. Second, the falsification of the voucher was done w/ criminal intent to cause damage to
the govt because it was meant to lower the tax base of Hernandez and thus evade payment of taxes on the finders fee. CA affirmed the trial court but stated in certain portions of its decision that Andaya was guilty of estafa through falsification of commercial document.
Issue: Whether the CA contradicted the ruling of the trial court when the CA contradicted the ruling of the trial court when it used estafa through falsification of commercial document whereas in the trial court, Andaya was convicted for the crime of "falsification of private document. Held: Andaya ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt upon a review of the evidence. The alleged points of contradiction were the result of inadvertence in the drafting of the CAs decision. The CA actually affirmed the conviction of Andaya for the crime of falsification of private document and not of estafa through falsification of commercial document. Even if Andaya did not specify the factual and legal aspects of his conviction that should be reversed, the SC deems it proper to review any question including those not raised under the principle that an appeal in criminal cases opens the whole action for review. Elements of falsification of a private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification under Article 171 which, in the case at bar, falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; (2) the falsification was committed on a private document; and (3) the falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage to a third party. Although the public prosecutor designated the offense charged in the information as estafa through falsification of commercial document, petitioner could be convicted of falsification of private document, had it been proper, under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the information. The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to constitute the crime of falsification of private document - (1) petitioner caused it to appear in
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Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that Guillas was entitled to a finders fee from AFPSLAI in the amount of P21k when in truth and in fact no finders fee was due to him; (2) the falsification was committed on Disbursement Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21k. The 1st element of the offense charged in the information was proven by the prosecution. Significantly, petitioner admitted his participation in falsifying the voucher when he testified that he authorized the release of the voucher in the name of Guilas upon the request of Ernesto Hernandez. While petitioner did not personally prepare the voucher, he could be considered a principal by induction, had his conviction been proper, since he was the president and general manager of AFPSLAI at the time so that his employees merely followed his instructions in preparing the falsified voucher. The 2nd element of the offense charged in the information, i.e., the falsification was committed in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380, a private document, is likewise present. The public prosecutor erroneously characterized the disbursement voucher as a commercial document but as correctly ruled by the trial court, the subject voucher is a private document only; it is not a commercial document because it is not a document used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions nor is it defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law. Rather, it is a private document, which has been defined as a deed or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth, because it acted as the authorization for the release of the P21k finders fee to Guilas and as the receipt evidencing the payment of this finders fee. However, as to the 3rd element, the same was not proven. In the information, it was alleged that petitioner caused damage in the amount of P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI because AFPSLAI did not owe P21k to Guilas. However, contrary to these allegations, Andaya was able to prove that AFPSLAI owed a finders fee in the amount of P21k although not to Guilas but to Ernesto Hernandez. Considering that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2.1M investment from Mercader, it follows that he was entitled to receive the finders fee in the amount of P21k. AFPSLAI
suffered no damage because it really owed the P21k finders fee to Hernandez albeit the sum was initially paid to Guilas and only later turned over to Hernandez. Clearly then, the third essential element of the offense as alleged in the information, i.e., the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21k, was not proven by the prosecution. The finding of the trial court that the falsification was done with criminal intent to cause damage to the government by lowering the tax base of Hernandez, the Court does not agree because it violates the constitutional right of Andaya to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Note that the information is valid BUT there is a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during the trial with respect to the third essential element of falsification of private document , i.e., the falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage to a third party. We find this variance material and prejudicial to petitioner which, perforce, is fatal to his conviction in the instant case. If Andaya were to be convicted based on his intent to cause damage to the government, this would be unconstitutional, because Andaya was not forewarned that he was being prosecuted for intent to cause damage to the government. It would be simply unfair and underhanded to convict petitioner on this ground not alleged while he was concentrating his defense against the ground alleged. Thus, Andaya was deprived of his opportunity to object to the evidence presented by the prosecution on the ground that the evidence did not conform to the allegations in the information for the simple reason that no such evidence was presented by the prosecution to begin with.
GALEOS V. PEOPLE & ONG V. PEOPLE / Feb. 9, 2011 FACTS: Galeos and Ong were charged and found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of falsification of public documents under Article 171, Paragraph 415 of the RPC; Galeos with 4 counts and Ong with 8 counts.
15 Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
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Ong was the Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu. Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer. The prosecution alleged that on several occasions, Galeos and Rivera (River later died so the charges were dropped as to him) falsified their individual Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). On 4 occasions, Galeos either answered No or left blank the boxes pertaining to the question of whether th he was related within the 4 degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government. The SALNs were filed by Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before Ong. It was later found out that Galeos and Ong were first degree cousins, as their mothers were sisters. Galeos claimed that he was not being untruthful when he merely left the box blank (unanswered), while Ong argued that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third person at the time of the execution of the documents, and that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely administering the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer administering the oath to certify the truthfulness and/or veracity of the contents of the document. Both accused claimed that they had no knowledge that they were in fact related and there was no intent on their part to make the untruthful statements. ISSUE: Whether both accused were guilty of falsification YES. HELD: All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by the prosecution. The elements of falsification under Article 171, par. 4 are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. It must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document,
what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. The first element was proven. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employees eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power. The second element is likewise present. Legal obligation means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. Permanent employees employed by local government units are required to file the following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and business interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law. A similar requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, The third element was also satisfied. As to Ong: As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the certification recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos appointment. Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on nepotistic appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 79 of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact that the appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Having executed the certification despite his knowledge that he and Rivera were related to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Riveras wife is the sister of Ongs mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He also took advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such certification. As to Galeos As to Galeos contention that leaving the boxes in blank cannot be considered as untruthful, the Court held that
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one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).
CONCERNED EMPLOYEES VS GENEROSO - ??
GARCIA VS CA FACTS: GARCIA was charged with Falsification of a Private Document by being altering a receipt for P5000 to make it appear to be P55k. The receipt was the product of a verbal agreement between QUIJADA and GARCIA for the sale of formers house. A partial payment of P5k was made by GARCIA, and he prepared two handwritten, one for each of them. The deal went sour and GARCIA filed a complaint for estafa against QUIJADA for his failure to execute a deed of sale and deliver the subject property. Among the evidence she submitted was the copy of the receipt she prepared. However, the receipt appeared to have been altered, by inserting fifty before five and the number 5 was inserted before 5,000 (basically made it appear that P5k P55k) plus other changes.16 QUIJADA noticed the alterations and instituted criminal action against GARCIA. GARCIA admitted the alteration, but countered that it was done in the presence and at the request of QUIJADA (no signature of QUIJADA coz he was in a hurry daw). GARCIA added that this was retaliation to the estafa case filed against QUIJADA. RTC: Against GARCIA. If she made changes in the receipt while Alberto was counting the money it would not have taken more than five (5) seconds to affix his signature thereon even if he was in a hurry to leave. Elements of Article 172 (2) in relation to Art 171(6) proven BRD. CA: Affirm conviction ISSUE: W/N GARCIA falsified the receipt (a private document) in violation of Art 172 in relation to Art 171. YES.
16 Inserted additional words 'Now covered by T.C.T. # 3998 R.D. Mandaluyong MM. the parties agree to execute of [sic] valid deed of conveyance covering the same sale, changed the date of the receipt and put P55k on top of the receipt
RATIO: The elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it was made on a genuine document; (3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (4) that the changes made the document speak something false. When these are committed by a private individual on a private document the violation would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. Given the admissions of GARCIA that she altered the receipt, and without convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is readily apparent as it was made to appear that Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he did not. Hence, GARCIA's conviction.
PANUNCIO v. PEOPLE Facts: Operatives of the LTO and the Special Mission Group Task Force Lawin of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) led by PNP Superintendent Panfilo Lascon and Senior Inspector Ouano, Jr. raided the residence of Panuncio, who was a jeepney operator. They were armed with a search warrant and confiscated LTO documents, 17 pieces of private vehicle plates, a copy machine, typewriters, etc. One of the LTO docs confiscated was MVRR No. 63231478 (Official Receipt ata) issued to Manlite Transport Corporation. Panuncio was arrested and brought to the PACC. The LTO filed a complaint against Panuncio and an Information was filed against him for violating Art. 172 (1)17 in relation to Art. 17118 of the RPC. It was alleged
17 Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 shall be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document. 18 Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
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that the accused falsified the vital information as appearing on the LTO Official Receipt. Panuncio denied that she was the source of the falsified documents. She alleged that Manlite, which she used to co-own with her late husband, had already stopped operating and the new business was under her name. She alleged that she was not home when the raid took place and when she did get home, the authorities had already emptied her shelves. She was forced to sign the warrant, inventory receipt and certificate of orderly search. She claimed that she was charged with falsification because she refused the police authorities demand for money. The RTC founder her guilty for the crime of falsification of a public document under Arts. 171 and 172. The CA affirmed with modification as to the sentence. Issue: Whether the elements of falsification of a public document under Art. 172 (1) in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC have been established - YES Ratio: The elements of the crime of falsification of a public document under these provisions are: 1) That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171; and 3) That the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document. In this case, Panuncio is a private individual. The MVRR is an official document issued by the LTO. It is the owners copy of the OR of the payment of the vehicles registration fee. Panuncio falsified the owners copy by making it appear that it was issued to a vehicle of Manlite with a plate number different from the vehicle for which it was issued in the LTOs files. The alteration she made
changed the meaning of the document within the context of Art. 171 (6). Panuncio argues that the MVRR was not found in her possession and that it was not proved that she had participated in the criminal act. The SC disagrees. The falsified copy was found during a valid search conducted in her residence. It was issued in the name of Manlite, which she admitted was owned by her and her late husband. Thus, there is a presumption that she falsified it and she was using it for her benefit. The falsified document could be used for another vehicle operated by Manlite to make it appear that it was validly registered with the LTO. ARTICLE 203 PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Efren Alas was the President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB). The charge against him was due to the alleged anomalous advertising contracts he entered with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government. It is a given fact that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless private persons are charged with them in the commission of the offenses. A public officer has been ruled, as a person whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the function of government. Alas now challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Alas contends that while PPSB is a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (a government owned corporation), PPSB is not created by a special law. It was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code. Since the PPSB was not created by special law, then, its officers did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? (YES, it has jurisdiction!) HELD: Congress enacted RA 8249 (An Act Further Defining The Jurisdiction Of The Sandiganbayan. Amending For The Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, And For Other Purposes) which states: Section 4, Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; 5. Altering true dates; 6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning; 7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy of a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or 8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
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a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense, (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director, and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including: xxx xxx (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics ours)
(respondents) for violation of RA 3019, violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees), and violation of SC Resolution 2-9-2002. Cortes said the proceedings were irregular because (1) he was not cross-examined to rebut the direct testimony of Reyes; (2) the lawyer daw of Reyes negotiated with the justices to reverse their denial of the Demurrer to Evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the justices are liable for the charges against them. NO. HELD/RATIO: It must be stressed that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. It is also worth mentioning that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to rendering knowingly unjust judgment refer to an individual judge who does so in any case submitted to him for decision and has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as the Sandiganbayan or its divisions, who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is unjust cannot prosper. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any showing of wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct on the part of the respondent justices. The complainant failed to substantiate his claim of corruption and bribery, and merely relied on mere conjectures and suppositions. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court Administrator, the respondents cannot be held liable for violation of Supreme Court Resolution No. 2-9-2002, as the same does not define nor punish an offense, but merely defines the extent of the consequence of an administrative complaint if filed against Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, Judges of the Regular and Special Courts and court officials who are lawyers.
xxx
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any distinction with respect to the manner of their creation. The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not. ARTICLE 204 CORTES V. CHICO-NAZARIO FACTS: Leonides Cortes filed a case for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft) against Dolores Reyes who was the municipal treasurer of Samal, Bataan. Cortes alleged that Reyes maliciously caused the sale of the formers property and did not even notify him about the auction sale. This case was submitted to the Sandiganbayan. Cortes now assails the regularity of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan. Hence, he filed a case against th the Sandiganbayan Justices 5 Division
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EDUARDO DIEGO V. JUDGE CASTILLO Facts: In 1965 Lucena Escoto, adopting the name of Crescencia Escoto (Cresencia), married Jorge de Perio, Jr. (Jorge) before Mayor Reyna of Dagupan city. In 1978, Jorge was able to secure a Decree of Divorce with the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas. In 1987, Crescencia married Manuel P. Diego before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy in Dagupan City. The marriage contract showed that Cresencia used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, with a civil status of single. Eduardo Diego, brother of Manuel Diego, filed a criminal case for bigamy against Crescencia. Judge Castillo ruled that Cresencia married Manuel on the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce; this mistake of fact is sufficient to acquit Cresencia of the charges. Eduardo filed an administrative complaint against Respondent Judge for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law. Issue: W/N Judge Castillo knowingly rendered an unjust judgement in the criminal case of bigamy and/or rendered judgement in gross ignorance of the law. Held and Ratio: Judge not guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment but found guilty of rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 of the RPC. For conviction to lie it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. In order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law. Even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and
failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law: The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court. As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives. In this case, a respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case. The SC had previously held in People v. Schneckenburger, that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy. The error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. * Judge Castillo rendered the decision before the effectivityof A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge and penalized the offense with a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000. As such SC ruled that the sanction be a fine in the amount of P10,000.
ANG V. JUDGE ASIS Facts: Gina Ang ran for Mayor in Kawayan, Biliran in the 1998 elections. She lost to Caridad Atok who was the one declared mayor. Ang then filed an election protest which was assigned to Judge Asis. While the case was pending, Judge Asis allegedly told Angs lawyers that hed decide in favour of Ang in exchange for money. Unknown to Ang, her father, on three separate dates (Oct 98, Jan 99, April 99), gave Judge Asis a total of P 140,000. In Dec 98, Angs lawyers told her that Asis had requested assistance in the promotion of his brother, then Examiner II at the Bureau of Customs, through Angs cousin, Atty. Ramon Salazar, Jr., who was the Chief of Staff of the Customs Commissioner. Ang refused. Her family contacted Salazar though and the brother was promoted.
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Ang already wanted to file an administrative complaint against Asis because the protest had not yet been resolved despite the lapse of the 60 day period. She then learned that Asis asked for her help in order for his son to be admitted for training at the Philippine Heart Center. Ang initially refused but ended up following her lawyers request her lawyers request to bring Asis son to Manila and even paid for the latters plane fare and accommodation until his application was granted by the Philippine Heart Center. In Jan. 2000 Asis allegedly called Ang, asking for P 4,000 for his son. Ang didnt have cash at that time. She asked a friend to write a check for Judge Asis. In March of 2000, Judge Asis finally decided the case in favour of Caridad Atok. Ang then charged Judge Asis with Bribery, Extortion and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act with the Office of the Court Administrator. Judge Asis denied asking for help. He said his brother was promoted through the recommendation of his superiors and of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Regarding his son, he alleged that Enrique, Jr. went to Manila to apply for work at the Heart Center upon the advice of a family friend. While in Manila, his son stayed with his uncle, Nestorio Asis, who works at the Bureau of Customs. Asis also said that his son was prepared to pay for training in cash but that he suddenly received a check for P4,000.00 from Angs friend. The case was referred to CA Justice Perlita TriaTirona. She recommended that the bribery and extortion charges be dismissed. She however suggested severe reprimand with respect to Asis delay in deciding the case. Tirona basically said that while Ang learned of Asis request through her lawyers, she never presented these lawyers (Lee, Matriano) to corroborate Angs allegations. It was also never proven whether Salazar, could have really helped in the promotion. Judge Asis on the other hand was able to show Jinggoy really helped. With respect to the check, while it was indeed made by Angs witness, it was never proven that Ang solicited the check. Issue: Whether or not Judge Asis was guilty of bribery and extortion. Held: No! Ratio: For administrative liability to attach it must be established that Asis was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. The record does not show that Asis was moved by ill-will or bad faith in rendering the adverse judgment, or that his ruling was manifestly unjust. Complainant has not,
in fact, adduced any proof to show that impropriety attended the issuance of the subject decision. To reiterate, bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. In view of the fact that Angrelied mainly on second-hand information to prove her charges, her complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. Indeed, the Rules, even in an administrative case, demand that if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, especially since the charge is penal in character. To hold a judge liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment or order is unjust and that it was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In short, this Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. While the bribery and extortion cases were dismissed, Asis was reprimanded for his incompetence in not acting speedily on the election protest. He was also admonished to be more circumspect and to act with more dispatch in the performance of his judicial functions.
IN RE BORROMEO FACTS: Joaquin Borromeo is not a lawyer, but has apparently read some law books and come to possess awareness of some substantive legal principles and procedural rules. For 16 years, he has been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts. (just in case Sir asks who the hell this guy is) NOTE: The significance of this description is that Borromeo was held guilty for contempt for litigating issues already declared to be without merit, rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly
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overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from 3 banks: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), and Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC). He constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him, or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay. When demands were made upon him, he imposed his own terms and conditions which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or those prescribed by law. When the banks refused, Borromeo brought suits right and left. He sued the banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks. He also sued the public prosecutors, the judges of trial courts, CA, and SC who rendered judgments adverse to him, as well as the clerks of court and court employees. ISSUE: WON a party can file an administrative or criminal complaint against the judge for rendition of unjust judgment??? NO. NOTE: Borromeo was alleging that the judges or justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders (not in accord with evidence, with law or jurisprudence, tainted by grave abuse of discretion). RULING: In the case of In Re Wenceslao Laureta, the SC ruled that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. The said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the
judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.
LINDA M. CARPIO
SACMAR vs. JUDGE
AGNES
REYES-
FACTS: In the case filed by complainant Sacmar against Zoren Legaspi in the MTC of Pasig City, the latter was convicted for grave threats and was sentenced to arresto mayorand and to pay complainant moral damages of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Upon appeal by Legaspi, RTC Judge Reyes-Carpio (herein respondent) modified the decision, finding the accused guilty only of Other Light Threats under Article 265 of the RPC, reducing the penalty to arresto menor and to pay moral damages of ten thousand pesos (P10,000). Complainant claims that respondent judge wittingly afforded unwarranted benefits to the accused which caused undue injury to her as private complainant in the case. She likewise avers that respondent judge exhibited manifest partiality towards the accused when she disregarded the evidence on record in modifying the decision of the MTC by downgrading the conviction of Legaspi from Grave Threats to Other Light Threats thereby reducing the criminal and civil liabilities of Legaspi. Respondent vehemently denied all the charges, claiming that she rendered her decision in good faith, without malice, and without any conscious and deliberate intent to favor a movie actor whom she does not even know. In her Reply, complainant pointed out that respondent judge, in her Comment, failed to explain why she unilaterally downgraded the conviction of accused Legaspi. In effect, respondent judge has impliedly admitted the charges against her when she failed to specifically challenge these charges. Complainant assailed the claim of respondent judge that the downgrading of the offense was rendered in good faith and without malice. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge rendered an unjust judgment pursuant to Art. 204, RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. NO. HELD: As a rule, the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
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A perusal of the records, particularly the assailed decision of respondent judge, hardly show that respondent judge has indeed knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment. Complainant failed to satisfactorily show that respondent judge acted in bad faith, with malice or in willful disregard of her right as a litigant. Although the application and interpretation of the law by respondent judge differed from that of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, complainant cannot sweepingly claim that respondent judge knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. For a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment to prosper, it must be shown that the judgment was unjust, and not that the judge merely committed an error of judgment or took the unpopular side of a controversial point of law. He must have known that his judgment was indeed unjust. The failure of a judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable. After several exchanges of pleadings between the parties, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. rendered the opinion that this administrative matter is not a proper subject of an administrative investigation. He pointed out that, pursuant to the rule in Wingarts v. Mejia, complainant failed to show beyond reasonable doubt that the assailed judgment was unjust and that respondent judge consciously and deliberately intended to do injustice to her by rendering such unjust judgment. Accordingly, on October 31, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint against respondent judge.
claims that the judge should have considered the fitness of Rosana first). According to the complainant, the actuations of respondent judge showed abuse of authority and ignorance of the law. In his comment, respondent judge denied the complainants allegations and ma intained that the questioned order finds support in law and jurisprudence. The OCA submitted its report recommending the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be well-taken. Issues: 1. WON the order of respondent judge issuing the writ constitutes abuse of authority -NO! 2. WON the order of respondent judge ordering the provisional custody of the four-year old child to her mother constitutes ignorance of the law -NO! (Side issue)Section 5, Rule 102 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on Habeas Corpus, shows that a court may grant the writ if it appears upon presentation of the petition that the writ ought to be issued. Clearly therefore, respondent judge was well within his authority when he issued the writ as no hearing is required before a writ may be issued.The law grants the mother the custody of a child under 7 years of age. In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that the child subject of the habeas corpus case is only four years old, thus, the custody should be given to the mother. (Main issue)The acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. Otherwise, a judicial office would be untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction, because an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available. The court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the case at bar, the questioned orders were issued after considering the pleadings filed by the parties. There is not a scintilla of evidence that the respondent judge, in issuing the questioned orders, was impelled by ill-will, malice, revenge, personal animosity, impulse to do
CHARLTON TAN V. JUDGE ADRE FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Charlton Tan against Judge Adre. Complainant Charlton Tan was the respondent in a habeas corpus case filed by his wife Rosana ReyesTan. Respondent judge issued the writ prayed for and ordered complainant to bring before the court the body of their daughter, Charlene Reyes Tan. On the scheduled date of hearing, the court provisionally turned over the custody of the child to the mother. A motion for reconsideration praying for the return of the child to complainant or a shared custody be given to the parents was filed. Allegedly sensing the partiality of respondent judge, complainant filed a motion to inhibit him, but the same was denied. Complainant alleged that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of authority when he at once issued the Order granting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus without first conducting a hearing for that purpose and when he hurriedly turned over the custody of their daughter to his wife Rosana on the day of the hearing ( he
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injustice, greed, corrupt consideration or other similar motive. It must be stressed that an administrative complaint against a judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by his erroneous order or judgment. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent judge is administratively liable. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the accusation. ARTICLE 206 LUCIA LAYOLA VS JUDGE BASILIO GABO Facts: Layola filed a complaint charging Gabo of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices act for issuing an unjust interlocutory order and with gross ignorance of the law. Office of the Court Administrator found the judge not liable. It appears that Layola filed a complaint with the Ombudsman charging SPO2 Leopoldo German and PO2 Tomasito Gagui of Sta. Maria, Bulacan with homicide. Allegedly, these police officers killed Layolas son. Information for murder was drafted and the case was indorsed to the prosecutor of Bulacan. The case was docketed in Judge Gabos sala. Chief of Police of Sta. Maria filed a petition to take custody of German. The petition was based on PD971, PD1184 and EO106 wherein it is provided that a police officer charged with any crime may be placed under the custody of the immediate superior officers upon request and these superior officers shall be responsible for the appearance the accused during trial. Also, under the provisions of the PDs and EO, the case is service connected because the offense stemmed from the death of Layolas son, a violator of the law, who was then inside the municipal jail. Judge Gabo granted the petition. MR was filed for that order but was denied. Issue: Whether Judge Gabo knowingly rendered an unjust judgment? NO! Whether there was gross ignorance of the law in ordering release of the accused? YES! Held: Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment --- SC sustained the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator in the case. Knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) that the offender is a judge; 2) that he performs and of the following acts: a) he knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. OCA perceived no evidence that Gabo issued the questioned order knowing it to be unjust; and neither is there proof of conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. SC said that to make the judge liable, proof is beyond reasonable doubt which was not established in this case. Gross ignorance of the law --- Murder is punishable by reclusion to death. Thus, being a capital offense, Judge Gabo should been mindful that bail cannot be allowed as a matter of right. Summary proceeding must have been conducted to determine the strength of the evidence against the accused as to entitle him to post bail. Side note --- As regards the charge of violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the OCA stressed that the important element of the offense, which is damage or injury to the complainant, or manifest partiality shown to any party, lacks evidentiary support. There is no allegation of any injury suffered by the complainant as a result of the conduct or actuation of the respondent judge, nor was there any showing of undue benefit or advantage given to the adverse party under the orders complained of. ARTICLE 208 US V. MENDOZA (one page case) FACTS: Mangunay mounted a carabao with a torch in hand. He went to the house of Mateo to ask for food. However, his carabao went too close to the house that the lighted torch he was carrying touched the roof, catching fire. The house was almost burned down if not for the timely intervention of neighbors. The owner of the house reported the incident to Mendoza, the lieutenant of the said barrio. However, he did not do anything and did not even reported the incident. He instructed Mangunay to go home. Because of this, Mendoza was charged and convicted as an accessory to the crime of arson. SC: acquitted. Had the accused incurred responsibility by his conduct, he should have been charged with the crime of 'prevaricacion' for neglect of the duties of his office by maliciously failing to move the prosecution and punishment of the delinquent.
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However, he was charged as an accessory. In the case at bar, since the principal was acquitted since it was proven that the burning was merely incidental, then the accessory must likewise be acquitted. ARTICLE 209 US V. LARANJA (magulong case!) Laranja, with other men, went to the house of Candoy. They began singing and drinking, and later a quarrel ensued which resulted in the death of Candoy and one Ando. Complaints for homicide were filed Laranja killed Candoy, Iyon killed Ando. When Laranjas case was called, an agreement was entered into between his counsel de officio (Mr. Lozano) and the fiscal. This agreement was to the effect that the testimony of Iyon, whose case was tried first, will be admitted in the case of Laranja also. Laranja was later convicted of homicide. Laranja, now with a different counsel insists that the trial court erred in allowing the agreement between the fiscal and the counsel de officio. He also raised the argument that the counsel assigned to him by the court was not of his choice he wants a new trial. The court said that the only way for the case to be remanded for a new trial is if the counsel de officio was disqualified. To know whether he was disqualified, it must be asked, did he change positions/ sides? Iyon killed Ando. Laranja killed Candoy. Candoy is the father of Iyon. Ando is the bro-in-law of Laranja. The counsel de officio assisted the prosecution in Iyons case to show that Iyon was guilty of killing Ando. In defending Laranja, it was his duty to show that Candoy the victim, was the aggressor. (RECAP: the same lawyer was for prosecution in the Iyon case, Defense for Laranja) Issue: is Laranja entitled to a new trial? Yes! Ruling: There was no clear showing when counsel de officio was appointed for Laranja whether before or after the trial of Iyon. Either way, there was opportunity for the lawyer to act in a double capacity and this must be avoided. Courts will give no approval for Lozanos conduct. He should have called the attention of the court to these facts, and the court would definitely relieve him of as counsel de officio. Public policy prohibits him from defending Laranja under the circumstances because the relation between attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. He learns all the facts of his clients case both the strong and the weak points. No opportunity must be given to lawyers to take advantage of the secrets of his clients.
ARTICLE 210 GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (I think the important part here is the identification of those government positions which would be within the scope of the R.A. 1379.) Facts: Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP. Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas from the office of the ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with the Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,19 violation of Art. 183 of the RPC, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law. Based on this complaint, a case for Violations of R.A. No. 1379,20 Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713, was filed against petitioner. Petitioners wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his illgotten wealth. The Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379. It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman, after conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal cases, has determined that a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other respondents therein who hold such properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income, if any. Petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition, raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the civil action for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
19 Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; 20 February 1989. 20 An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor
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properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 2 of the law,21 and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 14and 14-A Essentially, petitioner maintains that Sandiganbayan is just a criminal court with no jurisdiction over civil actions. ISSUE FOR THE PROVISION UNDER WHICH THIS CASE WAS ASSIGNED, the issue is W/N Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over this case? YES. (The main issue was W/N the Ombudsman had the power to investigate, file and prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379? YES.) HELD The Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan. Under R.A. No. 8249,22 the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of
21 Sec. 2. Filing of petition.Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not be declared property of the State: Provided, That no such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election or within three months before any special election. 22 RA 8249, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor. What acts would constitute a violation of such a law? A reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate the imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from
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legitimately acquired property. Section 12 of the law provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the public officer or employee who transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or employee for making the unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or employee. It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the respondent officer or employees incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft courtto address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service. Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies.
As a result, Merencillo was convicted under RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Art. 210 of the RPC (Direct Bribery). Merencillo contends that the convictions placed him under double jeopardy. Issues: Can the accused interpose the defense of double jeopardy when he is convicted under RA 3019 and Direct Bribery? Ruling: No. Sec. 3 of RA 3019 states that [i]n addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following [acts] shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful This means that one may be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the RPC for the same delictual act, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy here. Remember, the test in double jeopardy is (1)whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or (2)whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. In this case, there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses. The provision in sec. 3(b) of RA 3019 punishes unlawful acts such as Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. The elements under such section in RA 3019 are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit; (3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the government and (5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a contract or transaction has the right to intervene. On the other hand, the elements for direct bribery are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; (3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
MAMBA VS JUDGE
MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE Doctrine: Conviction under both RA 3019 and Direct Bribery is NOT double jeopardy Facts: Lucit Estillore went to the BIR office in Tagbilaran City to ask for the computation of taxes due on the sale of real property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc (owned by Ma. Angeles Cesar) and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration (CAR). The revenue examiner assessed the taxes and Estillore paid them. The examiner, however, advised Estillore that the CAR will be released in 7 days pending approval of Merencillo (evil supervisor). Merencillo called Cesar wanting to meet her in his office. Upon their meeting, Merencillo demanded P20, 000 in exchange for the CAR. Cesar said that she will confer with her business partners first. Merencillo soon made several demands for the money and refused to release the CAR. An entrapment scheme was set up after Cesar complained to the PNP. As such, Merencillo was caught red-handed!
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crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do and (4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. The violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. Despite having common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Why? Because of the following reasons: 1. The mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. In direct bribery, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required. 2. RA 3019 is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, involves performance of an act constituting a crime; execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime; and agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.
handed the envelope to Tad-y who opened the same and upon seeing it asked whether it was safe. He then handed it under the table to Velez. When Tad-y and Velez left, they were apprehended by the police. Forensics found ultraviolet powder on Tad-ys shirt and forearm. According to Defense Obviously, Tad-y denied asking for P4k from Encabo. Also, Tad-y said that when they went to inspect the buildings, it had some defects in its construction, which was the reason why he didnt want to sign the final inspection certificate. He also insists that he is not authorized to sign and issue an occupancy certificate under the law because only a building official can do so. Furthermore, Tad-y also argued that after they inspected the building, he was supposed to go bowling but only reluctantly went with Encabo to the bakeshop because he was hungry. He also said that the ultraviolet powder was found on his forearm only because when he was arrested, the arresting officers forced him to touch the money which he parried away with his forearm. Tad-y was convicted! Velez was not because Encabo testified that he [Velez] didnt know shit. Issue: W/N Tad-y is guilty of direct bribery? Held/Ratio: NO! Elements of Direct Bribery 1. Offender is a public officer; Check! SC said that Tad-y was no doubt a public officer. He was working in the OCE. 2. Offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; No check J. Callejo cited the case of Formilleza vs. Sandiganbayan where it was held that, there must be clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift and consider the same as his own property, such as when he puts it away for safekeeping. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other circumstance to show such acceptance is not sufficient to conclude that the crime has been committed (Note that this came from an indirect bribery case but was applied to direct bribery by J. Callejo here). Facts showing that Tad-y had no intention to keep the money or consider it as his own: o If Tad-y really intended to accept the bribe, he would not have brought Velez with him. o After the inspection, Tad-y was on his way to his bowling tournament. He only
TAD-Y VS. PEOPLE (2005) Facts: According to the Prosecution Julio Encabo was employed by for the construction of a building in Bacolod City. After the construction was finished, he went to the Office of the City Engineer (OCE) to secure the final inspection certificate as well as the occupancy certificate. Tad-y was one of the engineers working in the OCE. Tad-y allegedly intervened during the processing of the certificates and told Encabo that his [Encabos] employers still owed him [Tad-y] P4k, and that the certificates would not be signed without paying the said amount. Encabo allegedly complained to the mayor of Bacolod but he did not tell the mayor that Tad-y was trying to extort him because according to him, Tad-y was his kumpadre and he didnt want to tarnish his reputation. So Encabo went to the police and an entrapment was organized. Encabo set up a meeting with Tad-y where brought an envelope with him containing the P4k which was marked with ultraviolet powder. Tad-y, together with Nestor Velez (also an employee in the OCE), met up with Encabo. After they had conducted the final inspection of the building, they went to a bakeshop. There, Tad-y signed the final inspection certificate. After which, Encabo
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joined them in the bakeshop because Encabo had invited him. o When the envelope was handed to Tady, he asked what it was for. When he opened it in full view of Velez and saw its contents, he handed it to Velez instead of keeping it. Acceptance is with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do so; and Not discussed The act which the offender agrees to perform is connected with the performance of his official duties. No check Under the National Building Code, only the building official can issue an occupancy certificate. Tad-y is not a building official. So the issuance of the said certificate was not connected with the performance of his official duties as an engineer in the OCE.
Tad-y was made to incriminate himself when he was forced to touch the marked money.
3.
Some other note-worthy stuff Agreement between the public officer and the bribe-giver may be express or implied. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Proof of such an agreement may rest upon relevant and competent circumstantial evidence. It is not necessary that the money is received before or at the time the agreement was made. It is sufficient that it was received afterwards.
4.
PELIGRINO V PEOPLE To convict the accused in a prosecution for the violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, mere receipt of a gift or any other benefit is enough, even without any express demand for it. The duration of the possession is not controlling. Important are the appellants words, action and reactions showing acceptance thereof. Peligrino was an Examiner for the BIR, hence, a public officer. His co-accused was Atty. Buenafe. Atty. Buenafe delivered a letter to the complainant Dr. Feliciano saying that Peligrino was going to examine his (Feliciano) books. However, Peligrino never came to examine the books. A few weeks later, Peligrino and Atty. Buenafe went to the doctor and told him that his tax deficiencies amounted to P500k. Flabbergasted since his books were never examined, the doctor figured he was being extorted. He negotiated for a smaller amount, and they agreed that 200k would instead be paid P50k going to the BIR, P150 going to the pockets of Peligrino and Buenafe. Feliciano told the NBI and they arranged that marked money would be given to the accused during the pay-off. On the day of the pay-off, only Peligrino appeared. He received the envelope with marked money, looked at it and then placed it on the table. Then the NBI agents arrested him. He was charged under Sec 3 (b) of the Anti-Graft Law23. Sandigan found him guilty, but acquitted Atty. Buenafe. Issue: Is he guilty?
Additional Facts as to why Tad-y was acquitted There was no evidence to prove that Tad-y and Encabo met before the day when Encabo went to the OCE. No evidence that Tad-y had previously asked for P4k. Testimony of Encabo not entitled to full probative weight because it was evasive and chameleonic. o He told the lower courts that Tad-y demanded the P4k before he would sign the final inspection certificate. And this was contrary to what he told the police which was that Tad-y demanded the P4k for the issuance of the occupancy certificate. o He said that Tad-y was his kumpadre which is why he didnt tell the mayor that Tad-y tried to extort him but he went to the police anyway and filed the criminal case. Contradictory! o Encabo claimed that months after the occupancy certificate was issued, Tad-y was still conducting inspections of the building. The thing is, during this time a criminal charge was already filed against Tad-y. SC said it is incredible that Tad-y would continue inspections and demand the money during such time.
23 SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
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Held: Yes. The elements of this offense are (1) the offender is a public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene. 1, 4, and 5 are obviously present. Claim 1: Peligrino contends that he never demanded the money and that he merely informed the doctor of his tax deficiencies, and that it was the latter who requested the reduction of the amount claimed. Peligrino wrong. Section 3(b) penalizes three distinct acts -- (1) demanding or requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene under the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction. The lack of demand is immaterial. After all, Section 3(b) of RA 3019 uses the word or between requesting and receiving. Claim 2: He also denies that he received payoff money from complainant. According to him, receive, as contemplated in the offense charged, connotes a voluntary act coupled with knowledge. Hence, where the giving of the money affords the accused no opportunity either to refuse or to return it to the giver, no punishable offense ensues. He claims that the 40 seconds or less that the boodle money was in his hands was merely a momentary possession that could not prove receipt, which the law requires for the offense charged to be consummated. Hes wrong. The duration of the possession is not the controlling element in determining receipt or acceptance. Here, he opened the envelope containing the boodle money, looked inside, closed it and placed the envelope beside him on the table. Such reaction did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery, especially considering that he was not supposed to accept any cash from the taxpayer. The proximity of the envelope relative to petitioner also belies petitioners contention that he refused the bribe.24
A person found in possession of a thing taken from the recent execution of a wrongful act is presumed to be both the taker and the doer of the whole act
LAURO G. SORIANO, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft. The case was assigned to Petitioner Soriano, who was then an assistant city fiscal. Soriano then demanded 4,000 from the accused Tan for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to NBI, which set up an entrapment. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed in the SB. Soriano was charged of violating Section 3b of RA 3019 for demanding 4,000 from Tan and receiving 2,000. SB: Soriano guilty as Principal. MR filed by Soriano was also denied. ISSUE: WON the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019? RULING: NO, the investigation conducted cannot be considered as a contract or transaction. Soriano is liable NOT of RA 3019 but of Bribery under Article 210. SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the Soriano was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
24 Court also quoted Cabrera v. Pajares where acceptance was established because the accused judge placed the bribe money between the pages of his diary or appointment book, despite his
protestations that the money bills landed on the open pages of his diary, only after he had flung them back to the complainant.
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Soriano also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the RPC because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information clearly makes out a case of bribery so that Soriano cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
Held: Marifosque cannot feign ignorance and profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt and malicious intent. Marifosque did not introduce his asset to Sy at the time of the transaction. Neither did he attempt to present or justify his reciept of the marked money when he was arrested and interrogated. Instead, he accepted his arrest with an air of resignation characteristic of a culprit who is caught red-handed. Capt. Salvo testified that Marifosque even attempted to give back the money to Sy. This was a clear showing that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction. Had he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have courageously faced the arresting officers and indigantly protested, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. Instead, he meekly submitted to the indignity of arrest with the docility of a man at a loss for a satisfactory explanation. Marifosques solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident betrays an intention not altogether altruistic. It denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. Moreover, at the time he got the tip, he was no longer on duty. He was too overzealous to meet with Sy despite that another investigator was already assigned to the case. (Ayan, eager beaver kasi.) His justification that he wanted to encourage the victim to pursue the case rings hollow and untrue. It is clearly an afterthought -the main reason he met them was for no reason other than to demand money. While the asset corroborated he received P1k from Marifosque, it was revealed during cross examination that: it was not the usual practice for Marifosque to give incentives for tips; and that the asset did not complain that the P1k was not enough. The conduct of Marifosque during recovery of the stolen goods is suspicious. He did not arrest or invite Arnaldo for questioning. That he was promised additional information is a flimsy excuse. He did not follow the standard procedure. Curiously, Arnaldo turned out to be the brother of the police asset. This strange coincidence indicates a conspiracy between Marifosque and the thief to steal from the victim and later on cash in on the recovery of the lost items. As Marifosque is a police officer, a public officer, and that his act of receiving the money was connected with his duties, the case falls within the 2nd paragraph of Art. 213 of the RPC: Direct Bribery. He is ordered to pay a fine 3x the amount he extorted, in addition to prison term and special temporary disqualification.
MARIFOSQUE V. PEOPLE Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Sandiganbayan resolution finding Marifosque, a member of the police force of Legaspi City, guilty of the crime of direct bribery. The spouses Sy went to the office of Captain Salvo of the PNP to report the robbery of Shellane tanks at their gasoline station, and the alleged extortion attempt made by Police Sergeant Marifosque, in exchange for the recovery of the lost items. Thus, Capt. Salvo set up a plan to entrap him -Sy would pay off Marifosque, using marked money (P4,800) wrapped in newspaper, at the Golden Grace Dept. Store while the police would position themselves strategically outside. Marifosque arrived via tricycle, went inside, and demanded the money from Sy who then handed him the money. Upon Sys signal, the police operatives swooped down on their comrade and arrested him. Sy later on testified that Marifosque demanded P7,200 but she bargained to lower it down to 4.8k. Marifosques defense (which an assets testimony corroborates): a police asset came to his house to tip him off about a robbery he witnessed at a gasoline station. They went to the police station to report the incident, then the asset asked if he could get P350 per cylinder tank as a reward. So Marifosque relayed that message to Sy, who agreed if that was the only way to recover the tanks and apprehend the robbers. Based on the assets info, the police then went to the house of Arnaldo where they found the stolen gas tanks. Arnaldo arrived but he was not arrested bec he allegedly promised to lead them to the other stolen tanks. The police went back to the station and made a report. He said that: 1) he was not the one who asked for a reward for Sy but his asset; 2) There was no evidence to prove that he intended to appropriate the amount; 3) He merely relayed the assets request for a reward to Sy who was agreeable to the same. Despite this defense, the Sandiganbayan convicted Marifosque of direct bribery. ISSUE: W/N the act of Marifosque in recieving sums of money for delivery to his asset constitutes Direct Bribery YES.
ACEJAS V. PEOPLE; HERNANDEZ V. PEOPLE
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FACTS: Hernandez is an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). He served a mission order to Mr. Takao Aoyagi in his home and informed him that he was wanted in Japan as a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien. Takao Aoyagi promised to appear at an investigation in the BID and as guarantee he gave his passport. The wife of Takao Aoyagi, Bethel PelingonAoyagi, called up Expedito Perlas. Perlas referred them to a lawfirm, of which Atty. Acejas was tasked to take on the case. The wife Bethel Pelingon-Aoyagi informed her brother, Jun, of her husbands problem. Jun Pelingon contacted BID Comissioner Respicio. Commissioner Respicio told Jun to contact him in his office. The Aoyagis and Jun Pelingon met with Atty. Acejas and Perlas at Aristocrat in Roxas Blvd where Acejas told Pelingon that he was preparing a lawsuit against the BID agents who took the passport of Aoyagi. Later, Hernandez with a certain Conanan arrived at the restaurant. The group again met at the Hotel Nikko where Hernandez said that he would give back the passport if Takao Aoyagi paid him 1M, but he said that 300K D/P would do in the meantime. Pelingon said that Takao Aoyagi could pay in full. In this meeting Acejas didnt do anything when the demand was made. Pelingon then contacted BID Commissioner Respicio and informed him of what transpired. BID Comm. Respicio referred the matter to NBI who together with agents of the BID set up an entrapment operation. The group again met, this time in the Diamond Hotel. Aoyagi had the 1M inside an envelope and handed it to Hernandez. Hernandez however waived his hand and pointed to Acejas. Aoyagi thus handed it to Acejas. Acejas handed the money to Perlas. Hernandez returned the passport to Aoyagi. Thereafter, the group was apprehended by the NBI. Acejas, Hernandez, Perlas and Conanan were charged in the Sandiganbayan for Direct Bribery under the second mode. The Sandiganbayan held that the elements as well as the conspiracy was shown by evidence of the prosecution. ISSUE: Guilt of Acejas and Hernandez? YES! Guilty of Direct Bribery. HELD: The second mode of direct bribery acceptance of a gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime has the following elements: 1) offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.
The circumstances here show the guilt of Hernandez, a BID agent. He was the one in possession of the passport. He was present at several meetings. He asked for the 300K downpayment. He directed Aoyagi to give the money to Acejas. Acejas guilt as a conspirator was also shown by the circumstances. At the time when the money was demanded, he kept silent although he knew that his supposed clients were being extorted. He was also the person who received the 1M. Lawyers must report attempts to extort to the authorities and must advise their clients not to perform an illegal act. Moreover, lawyers should not participate in the illegal act. There was also no instigation here since the criminal intent came from the conspirators who demanded for the money and arranged the payoff. Although the Prosecution did not present Takao Aoyagi, the person extorted, it was able to prove all the elements of the crime. The decision on who to present as witness lies with the Prosecution. The prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no question that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport. Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design.
SAZON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Petitioner Zenaida Sazon was a Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR. A travel order was issued by the DENR directing Zenaida to proceed to Karuhatan and Navotas to investigate alleged illegal operations. While looking for the office of Vifel Shipyard, which was the subject of the travel order, they chanced upon R&R Shipyard and asked the guard for a certain Mr. Opena, the operations manager. Since Zenaida knew Mr. Opena, she wanted to ask directions to Vifel. While Zenaida was talking with the guard, her team spotted squared logs (dungon logs) piled at the R& R compound. Since dungon logs were banned species, they asked for documents pertaining to the logs. R&R failed to do so, thus they decided to return 5 days later. Upon their return, R&R still could not produce documents. Zenaida insisted that the logs were banned species and threatened Mr. Opena that he could be arrested and that the logs could
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be confiscated. Mr. Opena however claimed that the logs were yakal and tangile, not dungon. Two days later, Atty, Agbi, lawyer of R&R, met with Zenaida to talk about the logs. Zenaida instructed Atty. Agbi to meet her at a bakeshop near her office. Atty. Agbi told Zenaida that she had the receipts covering the logs, but Zenaida said that they were insufficient. Zenaida initially demanded P300K if no papers would be submitted, P200K if incomplete, and P100K if the papers were complete. Days later, Zenaida made a final demand of P100K in exchange for the favor of fixing the papers of the alleged hot logs. She even offered Atty. Agbi P25K as her share in the amount. Atty. Agbi reported the matter to the police. An entrapment operation against Zenaida was planned. The operation proved to be successful. Zenaida denied the accusations against her and alleged that it was in fact Atty. Agbi who proposed the settlement. She stated that during the entrapment operation, when Atty. Agbi offered her a brown envelope containing money, she stood up to leave, but a man came from nowhere and immediately handcuffed her while another man took pictures. She was charged for Robbery Extortion. After trial, Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding her guilty of the crime. The court found that the elements of robbery with intimidation were established by the prosecution. Zenaida appealed, alleging that the elements of the crime were absent. ISSUE: W/N the SB erred in concluding that the elements of the crime of robbery with intimidation are present. HELD/RATIO: NO! SB decision is affirmed. The crime charged was simple robbery under Art. 293 and 294(5) of the RPC. Its elements are: (1) that there is personal property belonging to another, (2) that there is unlawful taking of the property, (3) that the taking was with intent to gain, and (4) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. The SC found that the prosecution adequately established these elements. (1) that there is personal property belonging to another - it is undisputed that Zenaida demanded and eventually received P100K, a personal property belonging to R&R. (2) that there is unlawful taking of the property It was also proven that the money was unlawfully taken by Zenaida from R&R, with intent to gain and through intimidation. In robbery, there must be unlawful taking, which is defined as the taking of items without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence or intimidation against
persons, or by using force upon things. Taking is considered complete at the time the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of it. When Zenaida took possession of the brown envelope containing the money, it already consisted of taking. As a public officer employed with DENR, Zenaida had the power to make reports on forestry violations which could result to possible confiscation of logs if possession thereof is not justified, and the prosecution of violators of forestry laws. Thus, Zenaida could not demand and eventually receive any amount from private persons as a consideration for the formers non-performance of her lawful task. In this case, Zenaida threatened R&R with possible confiscation of the logs and prosecution if they would not accede to her demand for P100K. This made her eventual receipt of the amount as an unlawful taking. (3) that the taking was with intent to gain - intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, is an internal act; hence, presumed from the lawful taking of things. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. Having established that the money was unlawfully taken by Zenaida for her personal benefit, intent to gain was likewise proven. (4) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things - Intimidation is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. In robbery with intimidation of persons, the intimidation consists in causing or creating fear in the mind of a person or in bringing a sense of mental distress in view of a risk or evil that may be impending, real or imagined. Such fear of injury to person or property must continue to operate in the mind of the victim at the time of the delivery of the money. From these principles, the SC finds that the P100K grease money; was taken by Zenaida through intimidation. By using her position as Senior Management Specialist of the DENR, she succeeded in coercing the complainants to choose either to part with their money or suffer the burden and humiliation of prosecution and confiscation of the logs.
GREGORY JAMES POZAR V. CA FACTS: Gregory James Pozar was convicted of the crime of Less Physical injuries and the crime of Oral Defamation. After his conviction he applied for probation. Pozar and his lawyer Atty. Suarez went to the probation office to inquire for the requirements needed for the application.
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Unfortunately, they did not reach Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo and was asked by Mr. Manalo, clerk of the Probation Office to come back since Mr. Danilo Ocampo was out. Later, Atty. Suarez called the Probation Office and was able to speak with Probation Inspector Mrs. Primitiva Francisco and informed him of all the necessary requirements to be submitted for the application for probation. Subsequently, all these requirements were submitted by Mr. Pozar either to Mrs. Francisco or Mr. Manalo. On December 10, 1979, Pozar was able to speak with Mr. Danilo Ocampo in a meeting where he was asking permission from the Probation Officer to go to Baguio. The Probation Officer required him to submit a photocopy of his visa, I.D. picture. On December 17, Mr. Pozar went to the Probation Office looking for Mr. Ocampo to submit the requirements but since he was not there, handed to Mr. Manalo an envelope addressed to the Probation Officer and requested to give the same to Mr. Ocampo. When Mr. Ocampo opened the envelope in the presence of Mr. Manalo, it contained a photocopy of the applicants passport, copy of his visa and attached to the documents is a P100.00 peso bill. Mr. Ocampo upon the suggestion of the presiding judge of City Court of Angeles who learned about the P100 given to the Probation Officer in an envelope by the applicant (judge who heard Mr. Pozars application for probation), filed an Information Sheet against the accused. RTC found Mr. Pozar guilty of Corruption of Public Officer. ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Pozar is guilty of Corruption of Public Officer HELD: No he is not guilty of Corruption of a Public officer. Decision of the CA reversed. 1) RTC made an error of convicting accused of the crime of Corruption of Public Officer as a consummated offense since the facts show that the public officer did not accept the P100.00 bill. Hence the crime should have been attempted corruption of public officer. However the crucial point is whether the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the P100 bill was meant to bribe and corrupt the City Officer or to defray the photocopying expenses for documents pertinent for the application for probation. In the case at bar, the Information against the petitioner charged the accused for willfully and feloniously giving Mr. Danilo Ocampo the sum of P100.00 under the circumstances that would make the said officer liable for bribery.
It is well to note and distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery. In both crimes, the public officer receives a gift. While in direct bribery, there is an agreement between the public officer and the giver of the gift or present. In indirect bribery, usually no such agreement exists. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an act or refrains from doing something, because of the gift or promise while in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer should do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to him by reason of his office. The record shows that herein accused while applying for probation made more or less 12 visits in the office as he was directed to report every Monday at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. He reported for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks and there were times that he went there unscheduled for conference and clarification of the various requirements he needed. During all the time he went there, he met Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo himself asking for different requirements. From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut And since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was needed further to complete and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent and not criminal. law library The Government's own evidence as indicated in the Post-Sentence Investigation Report that the giving of the P100.00 was done in good faith, is vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent. There being no criminal intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal of the crime charged. We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is no moral certainty required to convict him.
FORMILLEZA V SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Leonor Formilleza was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte. Her duties include the processing of the appointment papers of employees. On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA whose term was coterminous with a project. When her appointment was terminated, she nonetheless continued working for the NIA pursuant to the
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verbal instructions of the regional director of the Administration. Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed appointment; that the regional director advised her to see the petitioner Formilleza who was to determine the employees to be appointed or promoted; and that Formilleza refused to attend to her appointment papers unless the latter were given some money. Mutia reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the province (her husband was in the PC). Entrapment was set. st 1 attempt. The plan did not materialize as the petitioner did not show up at the designated rendezvous at the NIA building canteen. nd 2 attempt, in canteen. Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks, she handed the marked money bills under the table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the same with her left hand. At that moment, one of the PCs approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the money bills. Photographs were taken of Formilleza standing up with her hands held by the PC. At the PC crime laboratory she was found positive for ultra-violet powder dusted on the marked money. She was charged before the Sandiganbayan for direct bribery. In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner maintains her innocence that there was no entrapment; the scenario was but a scheme set up by Mrs. Mutia and her husband's colleagues in the PC. The petitioner denies having accepted the supposed bribe money. Sandiganbayan decision: guilty of indirect bribery, not direct bribery. (case did not say how SB got to this conclusion) Formilleza elevated the case to SC via Petition for Review, alleging that the findings of SB is not supported by evidence ISSUE: WON Formilleza is guilty of indirect bribery? NO RULING: The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public
officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other property. The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the entrapment show that the petitioner was accosted by the PC soldiers after she accepted the marked money. Against the evidence of the defense that it was when Formilleza stood up that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand which she did not know to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away. An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. This corroborates petitioner's story. There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated which should be her position immediately after the money was handed to her under the table, which should be the case according to the version of the prosecution. None of the photographs show the petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her. There were other persons in the canteen like the undercover PC agents and their colleagues. Under the circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable that petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner would not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she did not see the alleged passing of the money. Guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. ACQUITTED. ARTICLE 217 BALUYOT v. HOLGANZA FACTS: Petitioner Francisca Baluyot was the chapter administrator of Philippine National Red Cross BOHOL chapter. On March 21, 1977, the PNRC headquarters sent a team of auditors to conduct a spot audit on the Bohol chapter. It was found that there was a cash shortage of P154,350. Baluyot as the chapter administrator was held accountable for the shortage. Thereafter, respondent Holganza, in his capacity as member of the board of directors of the Bohol chapter, filed an affidavit-complaint for malversation under Art 217 of RPC, with the Office of the Ombudsman. However, upon recommendation of other respondent Militante (Graft Investigation Officer), an administrative case for dishonesty was also filed against Baluyot. The OMB ordered Baluyot to file a counteraffidavit, which she did. She raised as a defense that the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction over the controversy
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because the OMB had authority only over GOCCs, which she claimed the PNRC is NOT. OMB denied Baluyots motion to dismiss and the subsequent MR. OMB maintains that it has jurisdiction over the case of malversation. ISSUE: W/N the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the malversation case, where the office is a chapter of PNRC. HELD/RATIO: Yes, has jurisdiction. Baluyot contends that the OMB has no jurisdiction over the controversy because PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary org. And because it does not receive budgetary support from the government, and the funds actually come from fund campaigns, private contributions, and that it is not audited by the COA, etc. Basically, she contends that PNRC is not a GOCC, hence not under OMBs jurisdiction. SC cited Camporendondo v. NLRC where it was held that PNRC is a GOCC with an original charter under RA 95 as amended. The test to determine whether a corporation is a GOCC, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS. The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to a private corporation" simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases. SC holds that PNRC is clearly a GOCC, hence OMB has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the office jurisdiction over complaints against employees of the government, including GOCCs.
province, loaned out 56M of the 100M for the livelihood projects of Lingkod Tarlac Foundation Inc. (LTFI), being represented by its Exec. Director Andres Flores in the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). How this 56M was utilized is the subject of the 25 criminal cases filed against herein petitioners, with 2 out of the 25 cases being the matter being appealed herein. (Prosecution relied mainly on COAs report of the LTFI disbursement of such funds). SB thus ruled that Ocampo is guilty of malversation of public funds by consenting, thru negligence, that another person misappropriate such funds. Flores was likewise held guilty, having received such funds and deposited in his bank account. Issue: won PETITIONERS guilty of malversation, considering that the public funds alleged to have been malversed were loaned by the Province of Tarlac to LTFI; hence, LTFI acquired ownership of the funds which thus shed their public character and became private funds? Held: Petition meritorious. Both acquitted. Ocampo not found negligent (Art.217) as he made proper safeguards for the handling of funds of LTFI. Ratio: The MOA shows that LTFI is allowed to borrow funds directly from the Provincial Government to fund Lingkod Tarlac Foundation projects provided the projects are livelihood projects. Moreover, the MOA stipulates under the Conditions for Release of Funds that the Province of Tarlac shall release in lump sum the appropriate funds for the approved projects covered by individual loan documents upon signing of the respective loan agreement. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the funds released by the Province of Tarlac, including the money allegedly malversed by petitioners, were in the nature of a loan to LTFI. (Art. 1953 of the Civil Code provides that a person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.)Hence, petitioner Ocampo correctly argued that the funds shed their public character when they were lent to LTFI as it acquired ownership of the funds with an obligation to repay the Province of Tarlac the amount borrowed. (Thus, the relationship between the Province of Tarlac and the LTFI is that of a creditor and debtor). Lastly, Gov. Ocampo cannot be said to be negligent (Art.217) in permitting Flores to misappropriate such funds because he set proper safeguards before releasing them to LTFI, and therefore he was neither accountable nor in custody thereof. Flores cannot be guilty either because these funds became private in character due to the said loan agreement.
OCAMPO III V. PEOPLE Doctrine: One cannot be guilty of malversation of public funds when such funds became private in character due to a loan agreement, which in effect transfers ownership of said funds. Facts: Tarlac Gov. Ocampo and Andres Flores were found guilty of malversation in the Sandiganbayan. During Cory admin, Tarlac was one of four provinces chosen to test the decentralization of LGUs, so the Dept of Budget and Management (DBM) allocated 100M to Tarlac. Ocampo, then the Governor of said
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RENE P. PONDEVIDA V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: The Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting petitioner Pondevida, the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan, Iloilo, of three counts of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of commercial documents, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and perpetual special disqualification for each count. The petitioner questioned the validity of his conviction alleging that he is not criminally liable for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC because (a) the prosecution failed to prove that, before he was charged with malversation complexed with falsification of commercial documents in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Office of the Provincial Auditor had demanded the refund of the amounts of the three checks; and (b) the Sandiganbayan ignored the cash deposit slips issued by the Land Bank (LBP) showing that he deposited an amount which included the total amount of the three checks. The petitioner further avers that the charges against him were barred by the decision of the RTC of Iloilo City in Criminal Case convicting him of malversation of P1,176,580.59 which included the amount of the 3 checks subject of the cases before the Sandiganbayan. He also assert that the prosecution failed to prove that he misappropriated the said amount for his own personal use and benefit. The petitioner posits that had the prosecution proved that he received a demand to account for or refund the said amounts, the burden could have shifted on him to prove that he did not misappropriate or take away the said amounts for his personal use or benefit. ISSUE: Is the petitioner guilty? YES Ratio: Malversation is defined and penalized in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) (b) That the offender be a public officer. That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. (c)
(d)
That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
A public officer may be liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the public officer appropriated, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take public property or public funds under his custody. Absent such evidence, the public officer cannot be held criminally liable for malversation. Mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of conversion; neither is the mere failure of the public officer to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even the prima facie case. In fine, conversion must be proved. However, an accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his account which he is unable to explain . Demand to produce public funds under a public officers custody is not an essential element of the felony. The law creates a prima facie presumption of connivance if the public officer fails to produce public funds under his custody upon demand therefor. However, the presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the public officer had fully accounted for the alleged cash shortage. In the present case, the petitioner does not dispute the fact that, by his overt acts of drawing and issuing the checks to the order of Grande, Celis and Tiu, they were able to encash the checks. Even if the petitioner received P893,860.67 from them a day after the checks were encashed, by then, the felonies of malversation had already been consummated. Case law has it that the individuals taking of funds is completed and is consummated even if the severance of the funds from the possession was only for an instant . Restitution of the said amount after the consummation of the crimes is not a ground for acquittal of the said crimes. On the petitioners claim that he deposited the amount of P893,890.67 with the LBP on June 15, 1995 as evidenced by the deposit slips cannot be considered. The petitioner was burdened to prove that the said amount was
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part of the deposit he made with the LBP on June 15, 1997, but he failed to do so.
MANHIT V. OMBUDSMAN (2007) Facts: Manhit seeks reversal of the CA Decision affirming the Order of the Ombudsman (Order) finding Manhit guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, aggravated by the offense of Simple Misconduct. The Order imposed a penalty of fine equivalent to 6 months of his salary. On Dec. 1998, Andrew Gonzales (then Secretary of DECS) requested financial assistance from the Land Bank of the Phil (LBP), allegedly for the purchase of office equipment. The request was approved and LBP allocated P12M as donation to DECS. In connection to this donation, then DECS Usec Valdes wrote LBP-Pasig Manager, requesting the opening of a DECS special account. LBP opened a Special Account for DECS to which the P12M donation and interest from other DECS accounts were credited. The account is a checking account w/o an account name and it was not reflected in the DECS Book of Accounts. Subsequently, DECS purchased vehicles worth P21.5M, with funding sourced from this special account. Procurement of vehicles was made w/o any public bidding and w/o authority from the Office of the President. On Sept. 2000, the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) filed an Admin Complain against Manhit and some DECS officials for (1) failure to observe guidelines on government accounting in connection w/ the receipt and use of donations from LBP; (2) allowing the use of the proceeds of the donation for a purpose other than that for w/c it was granted; (3) failure to comply w/ rules on procurement of government vehicles; and (4) taking part in the illegal disbursement of donated funds through conspiracy by silence having been the principal beneficiaries of said illegal transactions. OMB found Manhit did not even attempt to cause the submission of a report to the Dept. of Budget and Mgt and to the COA relative to the receipt of the donation and/or disbursement thereof. Further, it concluded that Manhit directly participated in the disbursement of the donation when he signed a check payable to Autohand (supplier of vehicles).
OMB issued Order (described above). Manhit filed petition for review before the CA. CA held Manhit was aware of the P12M donation since he was of the Executive Committee and he knew the existence of the Special Account under the control of Usec Valdes. Further, he knew that the check he was signing was going to be drawn against said Special Account and procurement of vehicles was made w/o public bidding. Manhit appeals to SC.
Issue: w/n Manhit should be charged (particularly he says that he is not specifically obliged by law to report the receipt of the funds, nor of the special account, and that as a non-official signatory to the special account, he cannot be held liable for signing a check from said account which was eventually accepted by the depository bank). Held: Yes he should, CA affirmed. Manhits liability does not really lie on his failure to report the matter but on his his direct participation and complicity in the illegal disbursement of public funds. Donations in cash or in kind to the Government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies become government funds or property. Even the proceeds of donations cannot be disbursed or disposed of except in accordance with law. Some of the governing rules are found in the GAA, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual.25 Manhit admitted knowledge of the existence of the donation but denies knowledge of the special account. His denial cannot overcome the common finding of fact of the OMB and the Court of Appeals that he was aware of the existence of the special account.
25 Receipts from donations shall be accounted for in the books of the government in accordance with pertinent accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Such donations, whether in cash or in kind, shall be deemed automatically appropriated for purposes specified by the donor. The receipts from cash donations and sale of donated commodities shall be remitted to the National Treasury and recorded as a Special Account in the General Fund and shall be available to the concerned implementing agency through a Special Budget pursuant to Section 35, Book VI of E.O. No. 292. The agency concerned shall submit to the Department of Budget and Management, the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Committee on Appropriations, and to the Commission on Audit a quarterly report of all donations whether in cash or in kind, as well as expenditures or disbursements of the amount released. In case of violation of this Section, the erring officials and employees shall be subject to disciplinary action under the provisions of Section 43 and 80 of Book VI, E.O. No. 292 and to appropriate criminal action under existing penal laws
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In any event, the inescapable truth is that petitioner signed a check drawn against the special account. Indeed, he does not deny that he signed Check No. 00003048009. The check was honored by the LBP and its proceeds were used to purchase a vehicle. The signing of the check is an indication of his awareness of the existence of the special account and his recognition that his signature could pave the way for the encashment of the check. Definition of gross and prejudicial in connection with the offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. o Gross connotes something out of measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful o Prejudicial detrimental or derogatory to a party; naturally, probably, or actually bringing about a wrong result Manhits acts have prejudiced public service. Public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. Any act or omission on the part of those involved in the public service which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the public office cannot be countenanced. In sum, petitioners signing the check, with full knowledge that it is to be drawn, as it in fact was, from the special account sourced from the donation, and that the proceeds of the check are to be used, as they in fact were, for the procurement of a vehicle, coupled with the fact that the purchase was effected without public bidding, renders him liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, aggravated by simple misconduct.
witness, who testified that she and her team, in the course of their audit examination, discovered that FRIAS, on behalf of the Municipality of Capas, made cash advances amounting to P50,000 and P950,000. These cash advances were allocated for the maintenance of economic enterprises and the augmentation of the general fund, respectively. However, Abesamis and her team and disallowed them for lack of a specific legal purpose. On Dec. 19, 1997, Abesamis notified FRIAS, municipal treasurer Panganiban and municipal accountant Domingo of the disallowance of the cash advances and directed them to settle the P1M immediately. Panganiban and Domingo failed to return the amount, while FRIAS refused for the reason that he gave the proceeds of the cash advances to Panganiban. Abesamis, mindful of FRIAS's predicament, pointed out that the cash advances were made under his (FRIAS') authority. Moreover, the checks were payable to him (as payee) and he admitted receipt thereof. Thus, even if he gave the proceeds to Panganiban, he was still required to return the P1M. Notwithstanding Abesamis' demand, FRIAS did not account for the cash advance. Thus, Abesamis recommended the filing of this criminal complaint against FRIAS. In his defense, FRIAS argued that he was not liable for the cash advances because he did not derive any benefit from them. Panganiban alone benefited from the cash advances as she used the P1M to settle her existing deficiencies with the COA. FRIAS pointed out that the COA, upon Abesamis' recommendation, also filed a criminal complaint against Panganiban. th The 4 Div. of the Sandiganbayang found FRIAS guilty due to the concurrence of the ff elements: 1) FRIAS was a public officer; 2) he was an officer accountable for public funds or property; 3) he was required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or provincial auditor and 4) he failed to render an account for the period of two months after such accounts should have been rendered. ISSUE: Whether FRIAS was guilty under Article 218 YES! HELD: PETITIONER IS AN ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC OFFICER According to the Local Government Code, municipal mayors are chief executives of their respective municipalities. Section 102 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines provides that The head of any agency of the government is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his agency. In Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that public officers are accountable if they, as part of their
FRIAS v. PEOPLE FACTS: Hermes FRIAS was charged with violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that FRIAS, an accountable officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Capas, Tarlac, after being required by the Commission of Audit to settles his disallowed cash advances amounting to P1M, failed to render accounts for a period of two months after such accounts should have been rendered, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The prosecution presented Tarlac Provincial Auditor Abesamis of the Commission on Audit as its sole
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duties, receive public funds or property which they are bound to account for but fail to do so. FRIAS never denied that he received the checks representing the disallowed cash advances. He in fact admitted that the disallowed cash advances were made under his authority, that he was the payee of the checks and that he received them. Thus, it is clear that he, as municipal mayor, received and had possession of (and consequently was accountable for) the cash advances. FRIAS was undeniably an accountable officer. SECTION 347 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 5 OF COA-CIRCULAR 97-002 REQUIRE ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT Because FRIAS was an accountable officer, he was obliged to liquidate the cash advances. However, considering that the cash advances were disallowed, FRIAS was bound to return the P1,000,000 to the Government. Section 347 of the Local Government Code provides that Local treasurers, accountants and other local accountable officers shall render their accounts within such time, in such form, style, and content and under such regulations as the COA may prescribe. Likewise, Section 5 of COA Circular 97-002 provides that All cash advances shall be fully liquidated at the end of each year. FRIAS had until January 20, 1998 to settle the disallowed cash advances. To escape liability for violating Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, despite his failure to timely return the P1M, FRIAS should have settled the cash advances on or before March 20, 1998. When Abesamis demanded an accounting of the cash advances from FRIAS, he could have compelled Panganiban to render the necessary accounting or he could have simply prepared it himself. FRIAS, however, did neither. When asked why he did not liquidate the P1M, FRIAS nonchalantly gave the excuse that he was too busy preparing for the forthcoming elections and for his defense in a murder case. He never settled the disallowed cash advances. Consequently, he was guilty of violating Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO RETURN P1M TO THE GOVERNMENT Inasmuch as the cash advances were disallowed and FRIAS failed to return the P1M within the allowable period, the funds were deemed illegally or improperly used or applied. Section 342 of the Local Government Code makes him jointly and severally liable with the Panganiban and Domingo, being their department head/superior, for the sum illegally and improperly used. FRIAS was held liable to restitute the P 1M to the Government without prejudice to his right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable with him.
QUERIJERO VS PEOPLE FACTS: Accused was an accountable public officer, a cashier of the Provincial Heal Office, and as such was accountable for public funds. She misappropriated the amount of 165,000. It appears that a COA team went to the office of the accused and opened a safety deposit box assigned to her, she was summoned on the opening but alleged that she has been on sick leave a number of days prior to the inspection. When the COA team found the shortage, accused denied having any unliquidated market and miscellaneous expenses since it has already been paid but not reimbursed. Issue: What would sustain a conviction for malversation of public funds, and was the audit properly made. Held: audit not properly made, cannot sustain conviction Ratio: Under Art 217 of RPC conviction requires proof that 1) offender is public officer 2) has custody or control of funds 3) funds involved are public funds for which he is accountable 4) he has misappropriated by himself or has consented to through negligence or abandonment, the taking by another of such funds. It appears that the accused at the time was the cashier of the health office, she was found guilty on art 217 whic h provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by and duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal use Such presumption was overcome by petitioner because the presumption cannot arise in this case because the audit conducted was irregular, incomplete and inaccurate and hence the shortage was not established. The records showed that there were other accountable officers in the cashiers office who were responsible for the same funds as the accused. However only the cash and accounts of accused were examined by the COA team, this would lead to certain errors and inaccuracies. The prima facie presumption arises only if there is no issue as to the accuracy and regularity of the audit and the fact that the funds are missing is duly established. An accountable officer is defined in the Government Auditing Code of the Phil, he is every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds and who shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law. It is the nature of the duties which he performs and not the nomenclature of the position held. It should be emphasized then at this juncture that the audit team should have examined all
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accountable officers in the same place as there is a possibility that one might be borrowing from another and a simultaneous cash count of all officers in the vicinity should have been conducted to guarantee accuracy. Instead it was only the accused who was subjected to the examination despite the fact that there were at least three other accountable officers in the office. The audit is demmed incomplete and irregular, the shortage of funds which was attributed to the accused was not indubitably established. ACQUITTED.
BARRIGA VS SANDIGANBAYAN WARNING: MAHABA! FACTS: BARRIGA and VILLAMOR, Municipal accountant and mayor respectively of a municipality in Cebu, were charged with malversation and illegal use of public funds (in relation to water projects [ex. construction of pipelines and deep wells] in their municipality). Three informations were filed against them (Note: Info also alleged that BARRIGA conspired with Mayor). BARRIGA filed a motion to quash Info on numerous grounds: Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8294, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged because the Info failed failed to allege and show the intimate relation between the crimes charged and her official duties as municipal accountant, which are conditions sine qua non for the graft court to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense. Her position as municipal accountant is classified as salary grade 24, not an accountable officer. SB has no jurisdiction in felonies of malversation and illegal use of public funds. although SB has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office, the mere allegation in the Info that she committed the offenses charged in relation to her office is not sufficient as the phrase is merely a conclusion of law and controlling are the specific factual allegations that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of her official duties and the commission of the offenses charged. And to support her contentions, she cited jurisprudence26. The conspiracy was not proved as they failed to show her exact participation. The funds were not under her control or administration.
SB denied BARRIGAs contentions, following other jurisprudence27 where it held that an offense is committed in relation to public office when there is a direct, not merely accidental, relation between the crime charged and the office of the accused such that, in a legal sense, the offense would not exist without the office. This means the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. SB said that the offices of a mayor and municipal accountant were constituent elements of the felonies of malversation and illegal use of public funds. What theyre trying to point out is that the jurisprudence relied on by BARRIGA apply only where the office held by the accused is not a constituent element of the crimes charged and in such cases, the Info must contain specific factual allegations showing that the commission of the crimes charged is intimately connected with or related to the performance of the accused public officers public functions. (So GR: is Montilla and EX: lang yung Montejo). ISSUE: W/N SB committed GADALEJ in Denying BARRIGAs contentions. NO! SB has original jurisdiction over the crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds. RATIO: Coverage of SB Original Jurisdiction RA 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories enumerated at the time of the commission of such crimes. There are two classes of public office-related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: 1. those crimes or felonies in which the public office is a constituent element as defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the office; 2. such offenses or felonies which are intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee while in the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct. SB Orig Juris on #1 even if without factual allegations The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and felonies under the first classification. Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent element of the crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that
27 Montilla vs Hilario
26 People vs Montejo and lacson vs Exec Sec
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the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. SB has Orig Juris on #2 only if with factual allegations However, the Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the second classification IF the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular. The requirement is not complied with if the Information merely alleges that the accused committed the crime charged in relation to his office because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law. #1 covers: (1) malversation & (2) illegal use of public funds/ property Two of the felonies that belong to the first classification are malversation defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal use of public funds or property defined and penalized by Article 220 of the same Code. The public office of the accused is a constituent element in both felonies. Elements of Malversation The prosecution must prove the following essential elements: 1. The offender is a public officer; 2. He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; 3. The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and 4. He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property. Elements of Illegal use of public funds or property The prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: 1. The offenders are accountable officers in both crimes. 2. The offender in illegal use of public funds or property does not derive any personal gain or profit; in malversation, the offender in certain cases profits from the proceeds of the crime. 3. In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to another public use; in malversation, the public fund or property is applied to the personal use and benefit of the offender or of another person. Even if position not covered, if in conspiracy with position which is = also guilty of malversation
SC upheld SBs ruling that Mayors office is a constituent element of malversation and illegal use of public funds or property. Mayors position is classified as SG 27. And since Info alleged that BARRIGA conspired with her coaccused, the municipal mayor, in committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her. A public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property. The determinative fact is that the position of her coaccused, the municipal mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the principal accused is classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense. Name of position not controlling factor but nature of duties Even though a municipal accountant is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor is she obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an accountable officer within the context of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal Code . The name or relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.
CASTILLO v. BUENCILLO Facts: Castillo was the complainant in a criminal case for estafa against Zabella before the RTC San Pablo. During trial, Zabella offered P70k as settlement for the civil aspect of the case. Castillo was reluctant to accept the amount for being insufficient, prompting the counsel of Zabella to suggest that the money be left with the court. Presiding judge agreed and ordered OIC Branch Clerk of Court, defendant Buencillo (hereinafter CLERK), to receive the amount. Fearful that the money might be lost if left in the
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office steel cabinet which had no lock, Buencillo deposited the same in her personal bank account. The civil aspect of the case was settled with Zabella giving Castillo postdated checks as payment for his obligation, including the P70k already deposited with the court. Castillo requested for the clerk to give her the money but the latter only remitted P50k, retaining in her possession the amount of P20k. It is this P20k that triggered the instant administrative complaint filed by Castillo against the clerk for alleged serious misconduct and dishonesty. The clerk contends that the P20k was voluntarily left by Castillo along with the postdated checks to answer for the latters monetary obligation in connection with a paluwagan system she participated in. Castillo, however, contends that the clerk refused to give the 20k, which she tried collecting several times. Letters sent by her lawyer were ignored, hence she has no other recourse but to filed an administrative case. In addition, Castillo filed a supplemental complaint alleging that the clerk has been operating a canteen within the premises of the Hall of Justice and succeeding in stealing electricity and water from the city government through illegal connections. These acts violated a SC Admin. Circular prohibiting the use of the Halls of Justice for residential or commercial purposes. The clerk denied that she owned the canteen, since it was registered under the name of her son-in-law. She claimed that the admin complaint was filed to harass and malign her, Castillo hoping to secure leverage in the two criminal complaints filed by clerk against her for violation of BP22. Issue: Whether the clerk is guilty of misconduct and dishonesty YES Ratio: To answer this question, the SC considered 4 sub-issues: 1. Whether clerk can validly deposit the P70k in her personal bank account NO SC said that even if it were done in GF, still not appropriate and without justification. Every public officer is bound to exercise prudence and caution in the discharge of his duties, acting primarily for the benefit of the public. If the steel cabinet had no lock, she should have informed the judge so that proper arrangements could be made. If it were at all necessary to deposit the money, it should have been made in a bank account in the name of the court, the amount being in the nature of a fiduciary fund. The interest should have accrued to the general fund of the government instead of accruing to the personal account of the clerk. However, her act does not constitute misappropriation. Castillo contends that the P70k given to the court turned into property in custodia legis, making the clerk liable for
misappropriatio of funds. There is a distinction between property in custody and property in custodia legis. Custody of things means to have them in charge of safekeeping and implies temporary control; it does not connote domination of supremacy of authority. On the other hand, for property to be in custodia legis, it must have been lawfully seized and taken by legal process and authority, and placed in the possession of a public officer. In the case at bar, the P70k was voluntarily deposited and not pursuant to a seizure order by the court. Although in the custody of the court, it was not in custodial egis and never became public fund. There was no misappropriation. 2. Whether clerk may retain the P20k and apply the same to offset the paluwagan debt - NO Castillo admitted that she owed the clerk for her participation in the paluwagan but contends that she did not want to use the P20k for payment, instead giving the clerk three postdated checks. However, the clerk should be reminded that her private dealings and businesses should not be mixed with her public duties. While private persons may normally offset their obligations upon agreement, public officials hold a different position in society and must always bear in mind that their actions reflect their status as such. Public official should always uphold public interest over and above personal interests. SC ordered the P20k returned. 3. Whether paluwagan is gambling - NO It is not a game of chance and does not involve wagering, gambling, or betting penalizd under the RPC. Hence, the clerk did not violate any law. 4. Whether the operation of the canteen is violative of the SC Circular SC said no evidence it belonged to the clerk However, the SC has enough reason to believe that the clerk should have refrained from pursuing activities which interfered with her official functions. Whether she is owner or merely helping manage the canteen is irrelevant. Her frequent absence from her post during office hours so as to attend to personal matters undermines her efficiency as a court employee. As OIC and legal researcher whose duties are essential to the speedy administration of justice, she is obligated to devote her time and full attention that her position demands. In all these allegations, the clerk does not seem to be directly liable for the violation or irregularities. However, she cannot avoid responsibility for her acts and still needs to be disciplined. Public officer is a public trust. They are servants of the people, not their rulers. Every official or employee connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility, their conduct above suspicion,
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and must be examples of integrity, uprightness & honesty. They must at all time be accountable to the people. The clerk failed to live up to these high ethical standards. She undermined the integrity of the service and jeopardized the publics faith in the courts. But considering that it is her first admin case in her 37 years of service, the SC did not accept the recommendation of the OCA that she be suspended from office without pay for a year. Instead, found guilty of simple misconduct for the following acts: 1) depositing amount entrusted to her by the court in her personal bank account and 2) attending to personal matters during court hours, which prevented her from performing her functions. She was fined P5k.
AQUINO v. OLIVARES FACTS: Judge Aquino reported that he issued a Memorandum to Ricardo Olivares, Clerk of Court of MCTC Davao del Norte, directing Olivares to explain in writing under oath why he should not be administratively charged for violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 50-95 and/or malversation through falsification of public document for keeping in his possession for five (5) months the cash bond in the amount of P12,000.00, posted by an accused. In his written explanation, Clerk of Court Olivares acknowledged that he incurred delay in depositing the bail bond of P12,000.00 to the Municipal Treasurer (now City Treasurer) but raised as a defense that the delay was due to oversight considering that he is old and sometimes forgetful. He noticed the bail bond contained in an envelope only when he was checking his records in preparation for his retirement. Immediately, he deposited the amount with the Municipal Treasurer. He vehemently denied that he misappropriated the same. ISSUES: 1. W/N Olivares may be held liable for malversation through falsification of public document? (No) 2. W/N Olivares may be held administratively liable? (Yes) HELD: Supreme Court Circular No. 50-95 dated October 11, 1995 states that all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within twenty-four (24) hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the land Bank of the Philippines. Clearly, respondent Olivares violated the above Circulars. He should have deposited the cash bond immediately or within twenty-four (24) hours with the Municipal Treasurer. Instead, it took him about five (5) months to do so. The charge of malversation through falsification of public document has no basis. One essential element of
the crime of malversation is that a public officer must take public funds, money or property, and misappropriate it for his own private use or benefit. In this case, there is no proof that respondent appropriated the amount. Clerks of Court are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts. With regard to the collection of legal fees, they perform a delicate function as judicial officers entrusted with the correct and effective implementation of regulations thereon. Hence, as custodians of court funds and revenues, they have always been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody. For those who have fallen short of their accountabilities, we have not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty. Even undue delay in the remittances of amounts collected by them at the very least constitutes misfeasance. This Court has never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. Indeed, as an officer of the court, respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of his officially designated duties. He has fallen short of this standard. Thus, we find him administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.
PEOPLE V. ENFERMO FACTS: Office of the Ombudsman filed 12 informations against Enfermo and Entienza, both former employees of the National Research Council of the Philippines (NRCP). Several of the cases filed were dismissed for repeated failure of the prosecution to present evidence. As a result of the dismissal of those cases, the only ones that survived and were 2 cases for Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and 2 other cases for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents in which only Enfermo was charged. Enfermo, held the position of Disbursing Officer II, Accounting Section, Finance and Administrative Division of the NRCP. His duties and responsibilities are to: o assist the cashier in the preparation and the release of the checks covering the financial transaction of the NRCP; and o assist the cashier in encashing the checks for salaries of the employees of NRCP. It was discovered that the debit and credit records of the checks issued and paid by its depositary bank, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), did not balance. An investigation disclosed that there were double
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issuances of checks, which were covered by only one disbursement voucher each. After investigation, appellant was confronted and was asked to pay debt but he refused. Appellant was convicted by the Regional Trial Court on all four charges. CA affirmed Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N he is guilty of malversation. HELD: YES. The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, under the above penal provision are that: 1. the offender is a public officer 2. he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; 3. the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and 4. he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of, such funds or property. In the case at bar, We find that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved all the elements of the crime of malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant did not give any explanation as to the shortage in the funds which have been traced to the double issuance of checks, the responsibility for which fell on the cashier (Entienza) and the disbursing officer (appellant). Also, one of the contentions of Enfermo na related sa malversation was that the funds taken by him in the cases for malversation were private na, not public. He claims that Avanzado and Manalo signed their names, which signified that they had already received the money and therefore the money had already become private in character. From the testimony of Avanzado and Manalo, it is plain that appellant took the money prior to their signing the payrolls. The SC said this was untenable citing local and foreign jurisprudence which basically states that so long as the money is in the hands of the disbursing officer, it is still the money of the State. Hence, the money was public in nature since it had not yet been received by Avanzado and Manalo when appellant took it.
Forest Ranger Mandia scaled and made notches on most of the lumber before issuing a seizure receipt and turning over its custody to petitioner Brgy. Captain Arriola in the presence of petitioner Chief Tanod Radan. Arriola acknowledged receipt thereof and signed accordingly. Mandia subsequently discovered that the lumber, stockpiled at the backyard of Radan, was missing. Accompanied by several police officers and Foresters, he requested petitioners to turn over custody of the confiscated lumber but the latter claimed it was taken away without their knowledge. Subsequently, petitioners produced lumber and claimed that these were the ones they recovered. Upon closer inspection however, Mandia noted that the lumber produced by petitioners were different from those previously confiscated. A subsequent investigation showed that the missing lumber was actually hauled to and used in the Magdiwang Cockpit where petitioner Arriola is a stockholder. As a result, both petitioners were charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Property thru Negligence or Abandonment. Arriola asserts that none of the powers, duties and functions of a Barangay Captain enumerated in the LGC directly or by inference suggests he is an accountable officer with respect to the custody of illegally sawn lumber. He insists the confiscated lumber was placed in his custody "not by reason of the duties of his office" as Barangay Captain, thus he is not legally accountable to answer for its loss so as to make him liable for Malversation under Art. 217 of the RPC. Petitioners claim that the confiscated lumber were stolen. With respect to the replacement lumber they subsequently produced, petitioners believed in good faith that the various lumber found scattered in a nearby creek were the missing confiscated lumber left by the thieves who failed to transport them across. Issue: W/N petitioners Arriola and Radan are accountable officers in relation to the confiscated items. Held and Ratio: SC held Arriola accountable but acquitted Radan. To find an accused guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: a.] The offender is a public officer; b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property. An accountable officer under Article 217 is a public officer who, by reason of his office is accountable for public funds or property. Sec. 101 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD No.
ARRIOLA V. SANDIGANBAYAN 494 SCRA 44 Facts: DENR Forest Rangers and PNP officers confiscated 44 pieces of illegally sawn lumber totaling 1,174 board feet w/ an estimated value of P17,611.20.
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1455) defines accountable officer to be every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds or property and who shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law. In the determination of who is an accountable officer, it is the nature of the duties which he performs and not the nomenclature or the relative importance the position held which is the controlling factor. In the instant case, Arriola knowingly and willingly signed the seizure receipt for the confiscated articles. By affixing his signature, he undertook to safeguard the lumber on behalf of the Government. Although his usual duties as Barangay Captain do not ordinarily include the receipt of confiscated articles on behalf of the Government, by virtue of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging, which had for its basis Section 68 of PD No. 705, he may be called on to take custody thereof as the need arises. Furthermore, by affixing his signature in the seizure receipt which clearly enumerates his obligations as a custodian therein, he effectively becomes an accountable officer therefore. Records show that prior to its confiscation by the DENR officers, the lumber was previously apprehended by Arriola. Thus, even without the seizure receipt where he signed as custodian for the said lumber, Arriola was accountable therefore because he was the one who originally took possession of it on behalf of the government. Moreover, he admitted that he already knew about the missing lumber long before the DENR officers came back to get it but he did not inform them about its loss because "somebody advised me not to report because the one who got the lumber might panic and tuluyan na ang lumber." As for Radan, SC held the trial court erred in judging him liable as an accessory. The evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove Radans liability as an accessory were neither clear nor convincing. His presence during the time when the DENR officers turned over the custody of the seized items to Arriola is not enough proof of complicity, nor the fact that the confiscated lumber was placed behind his fathers house. The assertion that he was responsible for the alleged transport of the confiscated articles to the cockpit in Dulangan was a mere conjecture. *SC affirmed no subsidiary imprisonment imposed because the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional.
RUEDA VS SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Rueda was the municipal treasurer of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. An audit examination of the accountabilities of Rueda was conducted covering the
period February 8, 1989 to September 20, 1989. As a result of the audit, it was assumed that petitioner had a cash shortage of P107,299.02. A report was prepared. Rueda signed on the certification on the dorsal portion of the report to the effect that his accountability for the funds of the municipal government of Tigaon, Camarines Sur was correctly stated. In his defense, petitioner Rueda disclaimed any criminal liability on the ground that the assumed shortage was the result of unliquidated cash advances made by several municipal officials and employees as evidenced by various chits or vales and expenses of the municipal government of Tigaon as evidenced by several disbursement vouchers. Rueda declared that the municipal officials and employees took the cash advances from the cash collections of the municipal collectors before the cash collections, in the total amount of P41,234.71, were turned over to him as municipal treasurer. What they turned over to him were the chits and vales evidencing such cash advances. Although he never tolerated the practice and had verbally warned the municipal officials and employees from making those cash advances, they continued to do so Petitioner Rueda stressed that the cash advances were made with the consent of the municipal mayor, and had been the practice in the municipality of Tigaon long before he assumed office as municipal treasurer. He would later on deduct the cash advances made from their respective salaries in installment, and after they were paid, he would turn over the amount to the office of the municipal treasurer. With respect to the subject chits and vales, petitioner Rueda declared that after the same were paid, he turned over the amount to the office of the municipal treasurer who then credited those payments as restitution of the shortage on his total cash accountability. Thus, the debtors themselves liquidated the cash advances and petitioners accountabilities had been fully restituted before the start of the preliminary investigation in the office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, petitioner Rueda stated that before the start of the preliminary investigation in the Office of the Ombudsman, all his financial accountabilities had been fully restituted. The cash advances, in the form of chits and vales amounting to P41,234.71, had been wholly paid or redeemed by their respective debtors. The disbursement vouchers of P53,700.00 representing various legitimate expenses of the municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur and the collection deposits in the amount of P12,384.06 were all liquidated. A certification dated July 11, 1990, signed by Mr. Francisco N. Briguera, in-charge-of office of the municipal treasurer of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and verified and found correct by Melanio C. Alarcon, state auditing
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examiner (Exh. 9), showed that petitioner Rueda had fully restituted the cash shortage discovered during the cash examination. As such, petitioner claimed innocence and therefore must be acquitted. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of malversation His MR was denied, hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or not Rueda was guilty of malversation of public funds under Art. 217 par. 4 of the RPC. Held: No. The taking of public funds for personal use was never proved, Ratio: The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner admitted his accountability and failed to have duly forthcoming his cash shortage in the amount of P107,299.02 with which he is chargeable, and that he did not tender the required written explanation as to why the shortage was incurred. His failure to do so, the Sandiganbayan said, instantly created aprima facie evidence pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that he had put such missing funds to personal use. The SC disagrees. Petitioner did not admit any shortage. The mere fact that he signed the dorsal side of the report of cash examination is not an admission of shortage. His signature was only evidence that he received a copy of the report. Thus, it is incorrect to say that petitioner admitted his shortage when he signed the audit report prepared by the audit team. For one thing, he was made to sign it right away; for another, his signature only meant an acknowledgment that a demand from him to produce all his cash, money and paid vouchers had been made. It did not mean that he admitted any shortage. In fact, subsequent events showed that he had fully explained his accountability. Thus, he satisfactorily explained the shortage. In other words, there was no direct evidence or proof that he put public funds to personal use. When absence of funds was not due to personal use, the presumption is completely destroyed. The taking or conversion of public funds for personal use must be affirmatively proved. When there is no shortage, taking, appropriation, conversion or loss, there is no malversation. The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, under the above penal provision are that: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence
permitted, the taking by another person of, such funds or property. Concededly, the first three elements are present in this case. It is the last element,whether or not petitioner really has misappropriated public funds, where the instant petition focuses itself. In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. The presumption is , of course, rebuttable. This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is deemed never to have existed at all. An accountable officer under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code must receive money or property of the government which he is bound to account for. It is the nature of the duties of, not the nomenclature used for, or the relative significance of the title to, the position, which controls in that determination. Based on this definition, to be held accountable the public officer must receive the money or property, and later fails to account for it. When a public officer is asked to account for the cash in his accountability, this necessarily means that he has to produce the cash in bills and coins and other cash items that he received. It does not include collectibles and receivables or even promissory notes. Petitioner Rueda did not receive the money (cash), which he was supposed to produce or account for at the time of the audit. The money did not reach the hands of petitioner. Therefore, it is not part of his cash accountability.
QUIZO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Arturo Quizo works as a Money Order Teller of Cagayan de Oro Post Office. He was found to have incurred a shortage in his cash and other accounts of 17,421.74, after an audit was conducted by the Commission on Audit (shortgage was only 1.74). However, Quizo was able to reimburse the full amount within a reasonable time. Notwithstanding full restitution, an information for malversation of public funds was instituted by the Tanodbayan against Quizo before the Sandiganbayan. On a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that no damage was inflicted on the government since there was full restitution of the malversed funds within a reasonable time. But this was denied by the
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Sandiganbayan, ruling that damage to the government is not an essential element of the crime of malversation of public funds and that restitution is not a defense that would exempt the offender from criminal liability. ISSUE: WON there is sufficient evidence to show a prima facie case against Quizo??? NO. RULING: Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. Hence, an accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. This is because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie evidence of conversion. However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at an end and the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar, Quizo successfully overthrew the presumption of guilt. He satisfactorily proved that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used by him for his own personal interest, a fact conceded by the Tanodbayan. The bulk of the reported shortage actually referred to the items disallowed by the Audit Team representing cash advances extended to co-employees. In fact, evidence disclosed that the itemized list of the cash advances was verified and found to be correct by an Auditing Examiner. Quizo explained that the granting of the cash advances was done in good faith, with no intent to gain and borne out of goodwill considering that it was a practice tolerated in the office. Such being the case, negligence evidentiary of malice or intent to defraud the government cannot be imputed to him. Also to be considered is the circumstance that the actual cash shortage was only P1.74 which, together with the disallowed items, was fully restituted within a reasonable time from date of audit.
27, 1995. On December 27, 1995, the auditor from the COA assigned to the NBI, conducted a routine audit examination of the accountability of Chan. The auditor found that all collections for the period beginning December 7, 1995 up to the date of the audit, December 27, 1995, were accounted for. On January 24, 1996, the same auditor conducted another audit examination. However, the auditor found a shortage of P290,228.00. The auditor thus issued a demand letter to petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the shortage. In a parallel move, she sent a memorandum to the Regional Director requesting that Chan be immediately relieved of her assignment. The Regional Director issued a Special Order replacing Chan with Gloria Alvarez, effective March 1, 1996. As a standard operating procedure, the COA conducted an audit examination and found that Chan had a cumulative shortage of cash accountability in the amount of P333,360.00. The COA Region VII thus filed a complaint against petitioner for Malversation of Public Funds. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsmans Resolution of February 18, 1997 and for Re-investigation of the case against her on the ground that the entire amount subject thereof should not be charged solely to her but also to Delza Bas, the acting collection officer during her absence. The motion was denied. RTC: The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, with the mitigating circumstance that she had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Sandiganbayan: The Sandiganbayan affirmed the conviction of petitioner. It found, however, that the amount totally remitted wasP150,547.82, not P150,000.00 as found by the trial court, hence, it held petitioner to be liable for the unremitted balance of P182,812.18. ISSUE: Whether Pamela Chan is guilty of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 RPC. Yes. HELD: Article 217 of the RPC states: The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. While Chan could have shown that she was not remiss in her supervision of Bas, by way of rebutting the disputable presumption in Article 217, she failed to do so. Not only did she omit to report the shortages of Bas to the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even
PAMELA CHAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: In November 1989, Chan was hired as Accounting Clerk II and assigned at the Regional Office of the NBI in Cebu City. Petitioner went on leave from December 7 to
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practically admitted to having assisted Bas in covering up such shortages. Chan was thus not merely lax in supervising Bas; she actively assisted her in concealing her shortages to the extent of lending her public funds for that purpose. Significantly, petitioner acknowledged the illegality of her own act. To make matters worse, petitioner did not only lend Bas those amounts given on November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She admittedly extended vales to her in the amount of P112,089.18, and to others, also out of public , funds. In Meneses v. Sandiganbayan the granting of vales has been held to be contrary to law, however:The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an accountable officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public funds by other persons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds. There is no law or regulation allowing accountable officers to extend loans to anyone against "vales" or chits given in exchange by the borrowers. The alleged acquiescence of petitioners superior, even if true, is not a valid defense. As Ilogon v. Sandiganbayan teaches: The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements". (Underscoring supplied)
FRANCISCO ENRIQUEZ V. CRUZ (Sorry guys, super long and magulo case) Facts: ENRIQUEZ was Municipal Treasurer, while ESPINOSA was Administrative Officer and acting Municipal Cashier of the Pasig Treasury. By virtue of Local Government Audit Order, an audit team headed by Carmencita Antasuda as team leader conducted an audit examination of the cash and accounts of the Pasig Treasury covering the period from May 4, 1987 to November 30, 1987. The audit disclosed, among other things, accused Enriquezs accounts contained a shortage amounting to P3,178,777.41, which shortage was mainly due to a dishonored China Banking Check in the amount of P3,267,911.10. Said check was deposited with the Quezon City Treasury as part of the collections of the Pasig Treasury. A letter of demand was sent to ENRIQUEZ by the COA to restitute the value of the dishonored check. In a reply, ENRIQUEZ denied responsibility for the shortage and pointed to ESPINOSA as the one to whom the letter of demand should be addressed as the custodian of said check
China Banking Check was payable to the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig and was drawn by one "D. Noble". The check bears ENRIQUEZs indorsement (NBI found this to be forged) at the back and was accompanied by a statement of checks also bearing the initials of ENRIQUEZ. The subject check was transmitted from the Pasig Treasury to the Quezon City Treasury as the official district treasury for municipal deposits. According to Benito Buenviaje, a casual janitor of the Pasig Treasury, on, ENRIQUEZ instructed him to get the bundled checks from his table and to deliver them to the Quezon City Treasury. Benito Buenviaje was issued two official receipts, one of which included the amount of the dishonored check. Several days after, the Quezon City Treasury informed the Pasig Treasury of the dishonor of CBC Check. The then Mayor Mario Raymundo of Pasig sent a letter-request to the NBI to conduct an investigation of the alleged shortage. It appears that less than a month before the dishonor of the subject check, ESPINOSA herself had gone to the Quezon City Treasury to make a deposit of checks and statement of checks. Felisa Cervantes, Computer Operator of the Quezon City Treasury, accepted the checks issued an OR in the amount of P3,583,084.18. ESPINOSA later returned to Felisa Cervantes and requested her to cross-out the first figure "3" on the official receipt to conform with the actual amount of P583,084.18 deposited therein. In an Information, ENRIQUEZ together with ESPINOSA were charged with Malversation of Public Funds. After trial, the Sandiganbayan convicted ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA. The Sandiganbayan found that ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA in conspiracy with each other misappropriated public funds in their custody and sought to cover up the shortages already existing in the municipal treasurys collections by depositing the subject China Banking Corporation check in the amount of P3,178,777.41. Issue: WON ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA are guilty of malversation; WON they had incurred a shortage in their accounts as Municipal Treasurer and Administrative Officer/designated as Acting Cashier, respectively, which they had attempted to conceal through a bad check. NO! Both acquitted. Ratio: The elements of malversation under the above penal provision are: (a) That the offender is a public officer, (b) That he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) That those funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable, (d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
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Verily, the first two elements are present in this case, the last two are not. The prosecution, upon whose burden was laden the task of establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners had committed the offense charged, failed to discharge this obligation. First. There is no evidence to prove that the Pasig Treasury incurred a cash shortage in the amount of P3,178,777.41, which amount, incidentally, is even less than the amount of the dishonored check. It was only the drawn check, based on the audit examination that brought about the shortage. Therefore, it was palpable error for the Sandiganbayan to conclude that the check which the audit team had pinpointed as the shortage due to its dishonor was at the same time, intended and used by ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA to "cover up" shortages in the funds allegedly in their custody. Evidence of shortage is necessary before there could be any taking, appropriation, conversion, or loss of public funds that would amount to malversation. Even the audit team leader, Carmelita Antasuda, who conducted the cash count and cash examination of the Pasig Treasury, testified that based on their audit examination, it was only the subject check that brought about the shortage. They could not even identify whether it was cash or check that was lost. The SB relied on the statutory presumption that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. It must be emphasized that the prima facie presumption arises only if there is no issue as to the accuracy, correctness, and regularity of the audit findings and if the fact that funds are missing is indubitably established. Second. There is no evidence that ENRIQUEZ or ESPINOSA had received such an amount which they could no longer produce or account for at the time of the audit. The Sandiganbayan merely speculated that it was "surreptitiously encashed with the municipal treasury through a revenue collection clerk or someone performing collection tasks" or "it was borrowed from the account holder for the purpose of covering-up missing collections." Third. There is no showing that the subject check was received by the Pasig Treasury in an official capacity; that there was a duty to receive or collect the said amount; and that there was an obligation to account for the same. Indeed, the subject check never formed a portion of the public funds of the municipality for which either ENRIQUEZ or ESPINOSA are accountable for. Fourth. As to the correction of the OR, ESPINOSA has explained, and her testimony remains unrebutted, that she requested that the correction be made because she discovered 15 minutes after she was issued the official receipt that the checks and the accompanying statements of checks had not been
endorsed and signed by ENRIQUEZ. Moreover, the general rule is that the law will not consider evidence that a person has done a certain act at a particular time as probative of a contention that he has done a similar act at another time. (res inter alios acta) Said incident could not even sufficiently establish a plan or scheme between ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA to cover-up a shortage that has never been proven. In view of the foregoing, the presumption is that ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA are innocent, and the presumption continues up to the moment their guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
JUDGE DOMINGO CAMURONGAN
SAN
JOSE
VS
ROBERT
Facts: (en banc) Camurongan is a court aide assigned to the office of the clerk of court (OCC) of the MTC of San Fernando, Pampanga. Judge San Jose charge Camuronogan with gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Allegedly, Judge San Jose received a report from Juanita Flores, Clerk of Court, regarding the theft incident allegedly perpetrated by Camurongan. The theft involved jueteng evidence in different cash denominations which were confiscated from Camurongan. (Total of P11,983) Camurongan admitted taking the monetary exhibits under the custody of the OCC for his personal use. He explained that he took the money only for safekeeping because the OCC was flooded at that time. While the money was with him, a family emergency constrained him to use it for his personal benefit. He asked the court to understand his plight as the sole breadwinner and pleaded for leniency. OCA found Camurongan guilty of gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. His dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits was recommended. Issue: Whether Camurongan should be dismissed? YES Held: (Basically, nag-lecture lang yung court the conduct officers in the judicial service should observe in performing their work) The strictest standards have always been valued in judicial service. Everyone involved in the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is expected to live up to the strictest norm of competence, honesty and integrity in the public service. The consti enshrines this. Further, the Code of Conduct and Ehtical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that every public servant shall uphold public interest over and aboe personal interest at all times.
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Camurongan admitted taking the monetary exhibits for his personal use. The act of taking monetary exhibits without authority from their custodian constitutes theft. Thievery no matter how petty has no place in the judiciary. This unlawful act of taking cannot be justified by an alleged intention to safeguard the money from damage that might be caused by the flood. Neither can this Court sanction the appropriation, even if temporary, of property under custodia legis in order to remedy the financial exigency of ones family. Personal problems cannot justify the misuse by any court employee of judiciary funds in their custody. Integrity in the judicial service is a necessity. Camurongans acts indeed constitute gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
CONSOLIDATED CASE OF ARIAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN AND DATA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Data was the District Engineer of Pasig Engineering District. He was tasked to create a committee that will handle the Mangahan Floodway Project which will ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig. The committee was to conduct surveys and negotiate with the owners for the sale of the properties that will be affected by the project. The six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of the land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the project. The 19,000 sqm Riceland in Rosario, Pasig was purchased for P80/sqm even though it had been assessed at P5/sqm only. The land was acquired through negotiated purchase. The trial court convicted them in connection with causing undue injury to the government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. SC: Data is Acquitted. The assessors tax valuation of P5/sqm is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction. No undue injury was caused to the government The property was acquired through a negotiated purchase. It was, therefore, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left to the discretion of one of the contracting parties. Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other factors as location, potentials, surroundings and capabilities. This being the case, the parties have arrived at the amount of P80/sqm as the fair and reasonable price for the property. The prosecution failed
to adduce evidence to prove that the true and fair market value of the property was indeed P5/sqm as stated in the tax declaration. A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of expropriation proceedings. It is true that the documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified (as determined by the trial court). However, the heads of the departments or projects are not required to painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate motives of every person involved in the transaction before affixing his signature therein. That is asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on good faith of those who prepare the bids, purchase supplies, or those who enter into negotiations. Lastly, the prosecution failed to prove that a conspiracy existed between the accused persons. ARTICLE 218 CAMPOMANES V. PEOPLE Case involves irregularities in the disbursement of the Phil. Sports Commission funds made available to Federation Internationale Des Echecs (FIDE a swiss organization). The PSC submitted a bid offer to FIDE to host a chess Olympiad, which bid was accepted. PSC board then issued a resolution appropriating for the monthly expenditure of FIDE. PSC also remitted to FIDE Php 12.876M also in connection with the world chess olympiad. FIDEs President, Campomanes, received said amount. (it is the 12M that is subject of this case) COA then audited PSCs transactions. COA noticed lack of acknowledgement receipts (proof the FIDE received amounts) and accounting liquidation (used to explain how funds were spent) attached to the disbursement vouchers. Thus, an information was filed against Campomanes and Hechanova (PSC Chair). It alleged that Hechanova and Campomanes conspired to get the 12M and failed to render accounts for its disbursement. Sandiganbayan ruling: Hechanova acquitted, only Campomanes is guilty. Campomanes now appeals, arguing that he cant be made liable under Art 218 (failure to render accounts) in relation to Art 222 (officers included in the preceding provision) because he is not required by law to render an accounting. Issue: guilty? No. Ruling: Elements of Art 218:
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Accused is a public officer He must be an accountable officer for funds/prop The offender is requires by law/regulation to render accounts to COA or provincial auditor 4. He fails to render an account for 2 months after such accounts should be rendered. Campomanes is not a public officer, so the Sandiganbayan applied Art 222 in relation to Art 218. Its elements are: 1. Offender is a private individual 2. He has charge of national, provincial or municipal funds, revenues or property or is an administrator or depository of funds, property attached, seized, or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual 3. He is required by law to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor 4. He fails to do so for 2 months after such accounts should be rendered. The element lacking is #3. Sandiganbayan failed to specify any law or regulation requiring Campomanes to render accounts to the COA. Sandigan tried to justify this by saying that as recipient of PSCs money, FIDE should render accounts. Office of the Special Prosecutor cites PD 1445 and the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances. Both state that persons entrusted with custody of funds under the agency head shall be immediately responsible to him. Also, Art 222 provides that Art 218 shall apply to private individuals who have charge of national, provincial or municipal funds. Finally, COA is vested with power to examine accounts of ALL persons with respect to funds they received. (Consti, Art IX-D) SC said that laws invoked by the Office of the Special Prosecutor dont apply. With regard to the consti provision, it must be read in conjunction with Art 222. COAs power is only over entities required by law or the granting institution (in this case, PSC) to submit to an audit. Doesnt apply to FIDE. PSC entered into a contract with FIDE, and it complied with all its undertakings. There is no claim by the PSC to render an accounting. There being no law or regulation requiring FIDE to render accounts, its President, Campomanes cannot be liable under Art 218. ARTICLE 220 ABDULLA V. PEOPLE FACTS: Abdulla, Aguil and Darkis were charged with crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation. It was alleged in the information that Abdulla and Aguil were both public officers (President and Cashier of the Sulu State College) and by reason of their positions and duties, they were 1. 2. 3.
accountable for public funds under their administration. It was alleged that a 40K allotment for the payment of the salary differentials of the 34 teachers was approved by the Department of Budget and Management. But since the entire amount was not utilized for such purpose because out of the 34 teachers, only 6 of them were entitled to the salary differential, the remainder was used to pay terminal leave benefits of 6 casual employees. In other words, while in the performance of their functions, it was alleged that Abdulla and Aguil conspired with Darkis who was also a public officer (administrative officer of said school) in applying for the payment of wages of casuals, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service. Aguil and Darkis was acquitted but too bad for Abdulla, she was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: W/N presence of criminal intent was proven? NO W/N all the requisites for technical malversation was present? NO HELD: 1. The presumption of criminal intent will not apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence that appellants act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution. The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in discharging its undertaking to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any single witness at all, not even for the purpose of identifying and proving the authenticity of the documentary evidence on which it rested its case. The prosecution definitely failed to prove unlawful intent on the part of appellant. The Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellants conviction.
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2. The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of all the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which are: a. That the offender is a public officer; b. That there is public fund or property under his administration; c. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance; d. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance. Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the second and third elements of the crime charged. She argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part of savings, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose. The Court finds merit in appellants submission. As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) originally intended to cover the salary differentials of thirty four (34) secondary school teachers whose employment status were converted to Instructor I, were sourced from the lump sum appropriation authorized by R.A. 668828 and the current savings under personal services of said school. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed the use thereof for another public purpose will not make the accused guilty of violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688
28 AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTYONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The Court has found President ERAP, with family and associates, GUILTY of plunder amounting to P4B under the account name Jose Velarde. Here, ERAP seeks to petition that (1) RA 7080 (Anti-Plunder Law) is so vague, its unconstitutional. (2) Also, due to the vagueness, he must be acquitted due to reasonable doubt and (c) the law, in effect, abolishes the requirement of mens rea to crimes already punishable under the RPC. Issue: Whether or not RA 7080 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL due to: Vagueness Abolishing the Mens Rea requirement through the conversion of the crime from mala inse to mala prohibitum Held: ALL UNTENABLE. The Court held that RA 7080 is constitutional. Ratio: (1) Law is not vague. Any purported inability of Congress to clearly define the words employed will NOT necessarily void the law for vagueness SO LONG AS the legislative will is clear, or at least can be gathered from the whole act. RA 7080 distinctly expressed its legislative will. Moreover, legal hermeneutics provide that words in a statute shall be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning since Congress are also regular people, unless the law itself indicates a special legal meaning. Here, when the Anti-Plunder Law used the words combination" and "series", it simply means combination and series. For just as the accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof. "The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality . . . To doubt is to sustain.' The "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as ERAP seems to suggest.
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(2) Mens Rea. The majority agreed with Justice Mendoza who stated that Plunder is mala inse. Precisely, his constitutive crimes (series or combinations of acts) must be proven. Here, the information stated that the crime was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally, thus alleging guilty knowledge of the petitioner. Clearly, the stealing of P4B from the people must be treated with the same gravity as arson, murder, etc and not as lightly as BP 22 offenses and jaywalking, which are mala prohibita crimes. Dissents: 9. On vagueness Dissent of Kapunan, J., citing Fr. Bernas The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Fr. Bernas poses the question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise punishable under the RPC which are bailable. This absurdity then, violates due process and equal protection. 10. On Mens Rea Dissent of Kapunan, J., The component acts of plunder, a heinous crime, are patently mala in se being inherently wrongful and immoral, even if punished by SPL. Thus, criminal intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. Here, when RA 7080 eliminated mens rea, it no longer requires the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder, thus imposing a lesser burden of proof, thus paving the way for the imposition of reclusion perpetua or death, violating due process and equal protection clauses. Dissent of Ynares-Santiago, J., In malversation or bribery under the RPC, criminal intent is an important element. Here, it is enough that the acts are committed and does away with the requirement that each and every component of the criminal act of plunder be proved... instead limiting to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In
effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy. In other words, RA 7080 circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because here, the law only requires merely proof of a pattern.
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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS

ATTY. ROMEO CALLEJO, SR.

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

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*Only Valerio was found guilty.

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

MELBA QUINTO RANDYVER PACHECO

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO

NOTE: = Callejo Ponente

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO