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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS B.

. Articles 124-133: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State FELICIANO GALVANTE v. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, et al. G.R. No. 162808, 22 April 2008, THRID DIVISION (Ynares-Santiago, J.) The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. FACTS: Private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic withserial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions. The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999. Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Pending resolution of Criminal Case, petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, and a criminal case, for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman. Petitioner alleged that upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas, He immediately went down of the jeep but before he could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked his way. That the four policemen were (private respondents) PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long firearms ready to fire. He raised his arms and heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing his waistline when he raised his T-shirt. His other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements. While we were raising our arms (private respondent) SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant. That after a while they saw the super .38 pistol under the floor mat of the petitioners jeep and asked for the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to them, He searched his wallet and gave the asked document. He further alleged that he was detained by Police Chief Rocacorba for two days having been released only after posing a bail. Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance with both the IAS and Ombudsman absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining the private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases. The IAS then issued a Decision finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct even if they were merely being enthusiastic in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty. The RTC dismissed the case against the petitioner. On the other hand, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against private respondents for lack of probable cause.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS B. Articles 124-133: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State Thus, the petitioner assailed herein Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices which dismissed the criminal complaint for arbitrary detention, illegal search and grave threats for lack of probable cause the and Ombudsman Order which denied his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman properly dismissed the criminal complaints filed against the private respondents.

HELD: Yes. Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint. Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search, which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order VICENTE P. LADLAD, et al. v. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELACO, et al. G.R. No. 172070-72, 01 June 2007 (Carpio, J.) By its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. Mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.

FACTS: Beltran Petition: On February 24, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a State of National Emergency. Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found probable cause. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The corresponding information was files with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state prosecutors. The inquest was based on two letters from Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) executive officer and deputy director. The letters contained results of CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, et al as leaders and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a tactical alliance. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause. Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such inquest was void. The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati. The Information was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino). Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against him. Before the motion could be resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya). Branch 146 sustained the finding of probable cause against Beltran. Beltran sought reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without resolving Beltrans motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case was re- raffled, issued an Order denying Beltrans motion. In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltrans inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony. 3|Page

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order Ladlad and Maza petitions: Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion. The basisi of the preliminary investigation was tge results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest. During the preliminary invesitigation, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members present during the proceedings. Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, they contend that the preliminary investigation was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? 2. Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? 3. Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity?

HELD: On the Beltran Petition

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.


Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant. The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006. To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or heading a Rebellion. 4|Page

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order

There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion.


Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed [B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltrans contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for rebellion. Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.

On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions

The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted With Irregularities.


The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112. Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall issue a subpoena to the respondents. Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments. During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainants antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the 5|Page

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary investigation.

On Respondent Prosecutors Lack of Impartiality


The SC found merit in petitioners doubt on respondent prosecutors impartiality. Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation, that, We [the DOJ] will just declar eprobable cause, then its up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x. Petitioners raised this issue in their petition, but respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause. SC granted the petition and set aside the rulings of RTC Makati branch 146 and branch 150 as well as the Orders of the respondent prosecutors.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, et. al. V. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006 (SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.) The charge against the petitioners concerns the violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. The charge has a bearing on the professional conduct and behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed by the same, that is, dismissal from the service, imposable only by the military court.

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of Oakwood Apartments in Makati. Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of the Magdalo faction of the Katipunan. They then announced their grievances against the Arroyo Administration, corruption in the Military, illegal sale of arms and ammunitions to the enemies of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military service from the government. They also declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President, as well as her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP. The President issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. After negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. After investigation, they were charged with coup d etat penalized under Article 134-A, RPC. They were likewise charged under the Articles of War, specifically Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. Petitioners filed a motion with RTC Makati where the coup detat case was pending to take over jurisdiction over all the cases pending with the military tribunal following the doctrine of absorption. The lower court ruled that the cases before the military tribunal were not service-connected but rather absorbed in furtherance of the crime of coup detat. When they were charged under Art. 96 of the Articles of War, they filed this petition for prohibition praying that the respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with the said violation. Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination that the offense for violation of Article 96 is not service-connected, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction and thus, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The OSG contended that under RA 7055, violation of Art. 96 is serviceconnected, hence, within the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition. HELD: No. Petition DISMISSED. The delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The 7|Page

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. The offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. Section 1(2) of R.A. No. 7055 bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. The charge has a bearing on the professional conduct and behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed by the same, that is, dismissal from the service, imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. Anent the issue of absorption, Sec. 1 of RA 7055 specifically specifies what are considered as serviceconnected offenses or crimes, and vests upon the military courts jurisdiction. In fact, it mandates that they be tried by court-martial. The doctrine only applies to crimes punished by the same statute, not where the crimes are punishable by different statutes. It applies also if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Sec. 1, RA 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. WALPAN LADJAALAM G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000 (PANGANIBAN, J.) RA No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.

FACTS: In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of appellant Walpan Ladjaalam and his wife to serve the search warrant. When the policemen were about 10 meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase. At the second floor, one policeman saw 3 M14 rifle magazines and 316 rifle magazines with live ammunition in the magazines. On the ground floor, in the presence of Punong Barangay, the other policemen found on top of a table a pencil case with 50 folded aluminum foils inside, each containing shabu. The records show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or been given authority to carry a firearm outside of his residence. With respect to the crystalline substances, the examination yielded positive results for the presence of shabu. The trial court found the appelant guilty of maintaining a drug den, an offense for which was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Appelants guilt was established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness , who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appelant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecutions story. The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that the act of the accused of firing an M14 rifle at the policemen, who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constituted such complex crime. He was also convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms after using said firearm in the commission of another crime.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order HELD: No. The appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon; and (2) maintaining a drug den. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other crime was committed. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order ANGEL CELINO, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007 CARPIO MORALES, J.: "In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat." FACTS: Two separate informations were filed before the RTC charging petitioner with violation of the gunban and illegal possession of firearms. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban violation charge whereas he filed a Motion to Quash to the illgegal possession charge contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms (R.A. 8294) . . . if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts. The trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that "the other offense charged . . . is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 . . . ." The denial was affirmed on appeal. Hence this petition, where petitioner contends that the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. ISSUE: Did the court err in denying the Motion to Quash? HELD: No. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged. Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply. Petitioners reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and Bernal is, therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of their commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime.In the present case, however, petitioner has only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged.Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply. More applicable is Margarejo where, as stated earlier, this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to quash an information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that "the other offense charged [i.e., violation of gun ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x." in consonance with the earlier pronouncement in Valdez that "all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x." 11 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 187229 February 22, 2012 PERALTA, J.:

"The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph."

FACTS: Private complainant [AAA] were on her way to her work, boarded the Mitsubishi Adventure with plate no. CSV- 606, driven by the accused who was then plying his route at Bocaue Toll Gate going to Cubao, Quezon City, and upon reaching EDSA corner New York Street, Cubao, this City, accused suddenly poked his gun at her, kidnap and detain her and forcibly brought her at the Town and Country, Sta. Mesa, Manila, where accused had carnal knowledge of her by force and intimidation against her will and without her consent. Moreover, two charged were filed against the accused, one for the crime of kidnapping with rape and the other was illegal possession of firearms to which the Trial Court found the accused as guilty to both charged. On appeal, CA affirmed with modification By pointing out that the crime committed was not kidnapping with rape, but only rape qualified with the use of a deadly weapon. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Wether or not the accused maybe prosecuted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms as a separate offense. HELD: No. The petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of firearms, such judgment must be set aside. We find that he can no longer be held liable for such offense since another crime was committed, i.e., rape. In People v. Ladjaalam, we laid down the correct interpretation of the law and ruled: x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with 13 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. All told, we affirm petitioner's conviction for the crime of rape. However, petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of firearms is set aside.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order RAUL B. ESCALANTE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THEHONORABLECOURTOF APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION and EIGHTEENTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY, Respondents. G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013, FIRST DIVISION (REYES, J.) "Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land." Facts: The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations that were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City, Samar against the petitioner, charging him for violation of Section 261 (q) of BP 881 (Election Gun Ban) and Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.1866, as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). The two cases were consolidated and jointly tried by the RTC as the crimes charged against the petitioner arose from the same incident. Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges. In the trial of the case, the prosecutions versions of the facts are as follows: The petitioner, then the Municipal Mayor of Almagro, Samar, was the guest of honor during the fiesta celebration in Barangay Biasong that was held on April 3, 1995. Towards the end of the program, the emcee called on the petitioner and Ina Rebuya to crown the fiesta queen. Thereupon, the petitioner went to fetch Ina Rebuya who was seated together with Atty. Felipe Maglana, Jr. (Atty. Maglana) and the other members of the rival political party. It was then that Atty. Maglana noticed that the petitioner had a firearm tucked on his waist. After the crowning ceremony, the petitioner delivered a speech, stating that he had never won at Barangay Biasong in any election. This caught the ire of a group of supporters of the rival political party who then shouted invectives at the petitioner. Shamed by the insults hurled at him, the petitioner cut short his speech and, thereafter, went back to his table. However, the mocking continued. Thereupon, the petitioner, with the loaded firearm in hand, went to the table occupied by his political rivals. He then stared at Atty. Maglana and thereafter fired a shot upwards, causing the crowd to scamper for safety. The petitioners bodyguards immediately took hold of his hand to prevent him from firing another shot. Consequently, Ali Prudenciado, a former policeman and then, a kagawad, disarmed the petitioner. The following morning, the Chief of Police of Almagro, Samar entered the incident into the police blotter as an "accidental firing". On the other hand, the defenses versions of the facts are as follows: The petitioner denied that he was in possession of a firearm during the April 3, 1995 fiesta celebration in Barangay Biasong. He claimed that, while he was delivering his speech therein, a group of people were shouting insults at him. Not wanting to aggravate the situation, the petitioner abruptly ended his speech and went to the group to ask them not to disturb the festivities. The group, however, continued to mock the petitioner, prompting PO3 Conrado Unajan (PO3 Unajan) to draw his firearm from his holster to pacify the unruly crowd. When the petitioner saw this, he tried to take the firearm away from PO3 Unajan and, in the process, a shot was accidentally fired. Thereafter, the petitioner was able to take hold of the firearm and, together with PO3 Unajan, went back to his table. He then returned the firearm to PO3 Unajan. On May 23, 2003, the RTC rendered a judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of violation of election gun ban and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. The 15 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order petitioner appealed to the CA, asserting that the RTC erred in convicting him for the crimes charged since the prosecution failed to establish the following: (1) the existence of the firearm which is the corpus delicti; and (2) the absence of a license or permit for the firearm. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the June 24, 2008 Decision of the CA, maintaining that the prosecution failed to substantiate the elements of the crimes charged against him. Additionally, the petitioner averred that the case for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions should be dismissed pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Agote v. Judge Lorenzo which declared that an accused is not liable for illegal possession of firearm if the firearm was used in the commission of an offense such as a violation of the election gun ban. On March 4, 2009, the CA issued a resolution which partly granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The CA ruled that under prevailing jurisprudence there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearm if the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime. Considering that the petitioner was convicted of violation of election gun ban, the CA held that he can no longer be convicted for illegal possession of firearm. Nevertheless, the CA found no reason to reverse the conviction of the petitioner for violation of election gun ban. Issue: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF COMELEC GUN BAN IS ABSENT. Held: Petition is DENIED. Despite the fact that one of the essential elements of the offense of violation of COMELEC gun ban is absent, The petitioner committed a serious procedural faux pas by filing before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy should have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review under Rule 45, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. The period to file a petition for review on certiorari is 15 days from notice of the decision appealed from or of the denial of the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Here, the petitioner received a copy of the CAs May 5, 2010 Resolution, which denied his second motion for reconsideration, on May 20, 2010, thus, he only had until June 4, 2010 to file a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. This he failed to do. "The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable."Thus, the petitioners failure to file a petition for review under Rule 45 within the reglementary

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order period rendered the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision, as modified by its March 4, 2009 Resolution, final and executory. In any case, assuming arguendo that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy, the petition would still be dismissed. Basically, the petitioner asks this Court to overturn the factual findings of the RTC and the CA for alleged misapprehension of evidence. However, "it is settled that questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari."Only established or admitted facts can be considered. The Court notes, however, that the lower courts erred in imposing the applicable penalty against the petitioner. Finding the petitioner guilty of the offense of violation of election gun ban, the RTC imposed upon him the straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty for violation of the election gun ban should have a maximum period, which shall not exceed six (6) years, and a minimum period which shall not be less than one (1) year. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA erred in imposing a straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment against the petitioner. Nevertheless, considering that the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision and March 4, 2009 Resolution had already attained finality on account of the petitioners failure to timely file a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the Court may no longer modify the penalty imposed by the lower courts no matter how obvious the error may be. "Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land."

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest RICARDO S. SANTOS, JR., v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 167671, September 3, 2008, FIRST DIVISION (CORONA, J.) The power of supervision or control over another does not preclude inducement. A person may be induced to commit a crime in two ways: (1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise and (2) by using words of command. Facts: On October 8, 1969, four separate informations for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents were filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI), Branch V, Quezon City against petitioner and nine others. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-9783, Q-9784, Q-9787 and Q-9788. After trial, the CFI found petitioner and his co-accused Pedro Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of malversation thru falsification of public documents under Articles 217 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All of the accused who were convicted appealed the consolidated decision of the CFI to the CA. However, all of them except petitioner died during the pendency of the appeal. CA held that petitioner was a principal by inducement, based on the testimony of state witness Henry Cruz that petitioner induced him to sign the travel expense voucher (Exhibit AA-1), subject of Criminal Case No. Q-9787 in exchange for receiving a share of the proceeds of the claim even if he was not entitled thereto. Petitioner finds it incredulous that the CA believed the testimony of Cruz with respect to Exhibit AA-1 but not Cruzs testimony with respect to Exhibits G, H, I, W, X, X1 and X2.(Treasury warrants which were issued pursuant to travel expense vouchers subjects of Criminal Case Nos. Q-9783, Q-9784 and Q-9788.) Hence, petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding him guilty, as a principal by inducement, of falsification of a public document.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY, AS A PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT, OF FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT. Held: Petition is DENIED. The credibility of a witness is left primarily to the judgment of the trial judge. He is in a vantage position to assess the witness demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination because he has the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand. The factual findings of the appellate court are also given great weight especially if in complete accord with the findings of the lower court. In holding that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses must be left to the trial court as the agency in the best position to observe the witnesses demeanor on the witness stand, the CA merely applied a well-settled rule. We find no reason to rule otherwise. The CA acquitted petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. Q-9783, Q-9784 and Q-9788 after it found That the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses, Henry Cruz and Tolentino C. Mendoza [did] not establish with moral certainty the culpability of the accused-appellant for the falsification of the subject travel expense vouchers 18 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest This pronouncement did not state that Cruz lied. The CA merely stated that Cruzs testimony was insufficient or inadequate to sustain petitioners conviction for falsification in Criminal Case Nos. Q -9783, Q9784 and Q-9788. In Criminal Case No. Q-9787 however, the CA found Cruzs testimony in relation to Exhibit AA-1 sufficient to prove that petitioner committed the crime of falsification of public documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to paragraph 2, Article 171 of the RPC. Falsification of documents under paragraph 1 of Article 172 refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial documents. Its elements are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document. Petitioner was a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Lands. He was a public official. While the CFI did not state in its decision that petitioner took advantage of his position in the government in committing the crime, the CA made a more definite pronouncement to this effect. Petitioners functions as disbursing officer did not include the duty to make, prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the falsified travel expense voucher. His function was only to pay payees of treasury warrants and other cash vouchers or payrolls. Nonetheless, he took the liberty of intervening in the preparation of the travel expense voucher in question. The first element for the crime under paragraph 1 of Article 172 of the RPC was present. The second element was likewise there. Petitioner allegedly committed the crime by causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. Its requisites are: (1) that the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or proceedings; and (2) that such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. Both the CFI and the CA found that petitioner asked Cruz to sign the falsified voucher on the promise of a share of the proceeds, even if Cruz was not entitled it. Petitioner claims that he could not have induced Cruz to falsify the travel expense voucher because he did not have the power of supervision or control over Cruz. The Court disagreed. The power of supervision or control over another does not preclude inducement. A person may be induced to commit a crime in two ways: (1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise and (2) by using words of command. In this case, petitioner was found by both the CFI and the CA to have offered Cruz a share of the proceeds in exchange for his act of falsification. That promise was the inducement for the falsification. Finally, the parties never disputed the finding that the travel voucher was a public document. We see no reason to depart from the findings of the CFI and CA.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest OLGA M. SAMSON vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO CABALLERO A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138 August 5, 2009 The making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits. FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. In her complaint, complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case. According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003. However, respondent insisted that those cases were already dismissed before the interview. The Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his Personal Data Sheet. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Caballero is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of official document. HELD: YES We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC, as both he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete evidence. Thus, no probative value can be given either to the charges or to the defenses. However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating No to the question Have you ever been formally charged? in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel. 20 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered No to that very simple question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology of the question Have you ever been formally charged?, meaning, charged at anytime in the past or present. To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent on March 21, 2006 in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division. According to her, respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction. On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties, the OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended respondents dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service. In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,[15] we held that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest CESARIO URSUA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996, FIRST DIVISION (BELLOSILLO, J.) The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. FACTS: Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. An investigation was conducted on a complaint for bribert, dishonesty, abuse of authority by the petitioner. Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name Oscar Perez after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. Upon learning that the person who introduced himself as Oscar Perez was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, such matter was reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. The trial court convicted Ursua for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases. On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not Ursua should be held liable violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases. HELD: NO An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought 22 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 164368-69, 2 April 2009, EN BANC (Brion, J)

On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads: That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. CONTRARY TO LAW. Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565. Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued. A Special Division in the Sandiganbayan was then created to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada.

At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The Peoples evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of: A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account with PCIB and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the account opening documents; B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB under the account name "Jose Velarde"

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest (2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these positions and when deposits were made to the savings account of Jose Velarde Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence. His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the ground that the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name "Jose Velarde". The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estradas case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended,14 and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160. ISSUE: Whether Estrada may be made liable for illegal use of alias based on the evidence the People presented HELD: The petition has no merit. The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read: Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry. 25 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias "a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended."18 Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as follows: The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.19 Following the doctrine of stare decisis,20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142. Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estradas position in the government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based on the Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be. The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua under the following tenor: The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended information adverts to "several transactions" and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused. The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to his real name.22 The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling. We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion to quash23 that cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case.24 The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest.25 It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of Appeals,27 albeit a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez: The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicatacannot be applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted.28 Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua. In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" 27 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estradas use of the alias was public. In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias. What is the coverage of the indictment? We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the Information, as this was how the accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples case, as it deals a fatal blow on the Peoples claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual," as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.

The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405, and R.A. No. 9160. The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua when Estradas signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public" use of an alias that violates CA No. 142. To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis--vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estradas use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAFAEL STA. MARIA y INDON G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, FIRST DIVISION (Garcia, J) Under consideration is this appeal by Rafael Sta. Maria y Indon from the Decision1 dated November 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802, denying his earlier appeal from and affirming the May 5, 2004 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 20, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The indicting Information, docketed in the RTC as Criminal Case No. 3364-M-2002, alleges: That on or about the 29th day of November, 2002, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.041 gram. Contrary to law. Duly arraigned on January 23, 2003, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged. During trial, the prosecution and the defense gave different versions of what transpired. In a decision dated May 5, 2004, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and accordingly sentenced him. On November 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the herein assailed Decision denying the appeal and affirming that of the trial court. In his Brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains that instigation, not entrapment, preceded his arrest. He also faults the appellate court in not finding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165. ISSUE: Whether Sta. Maria is liable under Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 HELD: Petition is without merit. Entrapment vs. Instigation It is appellants submission that what transpired on that fateful evening of November 29, 2002 was instigation and not a valid buy-bust operation. He would make much of the fact that the transaction between him and the police informant occurred on November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust operation took place on November 29, 2002. To appellant, the informant, by pretending that he was in need of shabu, instigated or induced him to violate the anti-dangerous drugs law. He adds that the prosecution was not able to prove that at the time of 30 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs the police surveillance, he was indeed looking for buyers of shabu, and that were it not for the inducement of the informant that the latter would buy shabu, he would not have produced the same on November 29, 2002. In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.8 Here, the mere fact that the agreement between appellant and the police informant for the purchase and sale of illegal drugs was made on November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust operation was conducted on November 29, 2002, is of no moment. Without more, it does not prove that said informant instigated appellant into committing the offense. If at all, the earlier agreement and the subsequent actual sale suggest that appellant was habitually dealing in illegal drugs. It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him. On Whether Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. 9165 Were Complied With Appellant demands absolute compliance with Section 21 and insists that anything short of the adherence to its letter, renders the evidence against him inadmissible. Pertinently, Section 21 of the law provides: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Regrettably, the pertinent implementing rules, Section 21 of the IRR, states: 31 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs

Section 21. a. xxx Provided further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. It is beyond quibbling then that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section 21 was not fatal. It did not render appellants arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible. The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. To recapitulate, the challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellants constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs PEOPLE v. PRINGAS DOLERA v. PEOPLE GR 175928, AUG. 31, 2007 GR 180693, SEPT. 4, 2009

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. NICOLAS GUTIERREZ y LICUANAN Appellant. G.R. No. 179213 September 3, 2009 SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J) . "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plants source of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and destruction. Such record of movements and custody of the seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the dates and times when such transfers of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. FACTS: While on duty at the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Force, SPO3 Matias received information from a concerned citizen that a certain alias "Nick," later identified to be appellant, was peddling shabu in Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On the instructions of SPO3 Matias, PO1 Espares and PO1 Mapula proceeded to, and surveilled, the area and confirmed the information. SPO3 Matias thus formed a buy-bust team, which he headed, with PO1 Espares as poseur-buyer, and PO1 Mapula and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 Familara) as members. The team thereafter went to the target area and met with a confidential asset who was to assist them in the operation. During the operation, the buy-bust team yielded a pair of scissors, an unsealed plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, and five empty plastic sachets from appellant. PO1 Espares then marked all the seized items including the plastic sachet containing the substance subject of the sale. Appellant was brought to the police station wherein the confiscated items were surrendered to an investigator Appellant was then charged with illegal sale of 0.05 gram of shabu and illegal possession of paraphernalia "fit or intended for smoking or introducing any dangerous drug into the body" under Sec(s) 5 and 12, respectively of R.A.9165 Appellant, for his part, advanced the defense of frame-up. He asserted that he was at home having dinner with his wife Josephine, daughter Jennifer and her husband when someone kicked open the door of their house. Four armed men in civilian clothes immediately entered, handcuffed and frisked him, and confiscated his wallet. On asking them what his offense was, he was simply told to explain at the police station.He was thereafter brought to the Pariancillo police precinct where a police officer showed him a plastic sachet and threatened that a case would be filed against him unless he paid P20,000. He failed to pay, however, hence, he was detained and subsequently charged. The trial court convicted appellant of illegal sale of shabu. However, he was exonerated of the charge of illegal possession of paraphernalia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the corpus delicti was duly established under the chain of custody rule.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs HELD: Petition GRANTED. The Court finds that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the allegedly seized shabu. That the defense stipulated on these matters, viz: that the specimen exists, that a request has been made by the arresting officers for examination thereof, that a forensic chemist examined it, and that it tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride has no bearing on the question of chain of custody. These stipulations, which merely affirm the existence of the specimen, and the request for laboratory examination and the results thereof, were entered into during pre-trial only in order to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist and abbreviate the proceedings. That such is the intention of the parties is clear from the additional stipulations that the forensic chemist had no personal knowledge as to the source of the alleged specimen; and that the defense was reserving its right to object to the pieces of evidence marked by the prosecution.21 Clearly, the stipulations do not cover the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the forensic chemist and after it left her possession. The nagging question, therefore, remains whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court is the same object allegedly seized from appellant. While alleged poseur-buyer PO1 Espares testified on the marking and eventual turnover of the allegedly seized sachet of substance to the investigator, no explanation was given regarding its custody in the interim from the time it was turned over to the investigator to its turnover for laboratory examination. Such want of explanation bares a significant gap in the chain of custody of the allegedly seized item. And what happened to the allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the chemist to the investigator and its presentation in court, the records do not show. The Court made it clear in Malillin that the chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The totality of the prosecution evidence does not meet this standard. The Court also notes another lapse of the members of the buy-bust team their failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs. There was no physical inventory and photograph of the shabu allegedly confiscated from appellant. There was likewise no explanation offered for the non-observance of the rule. Coupled with the failure to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted, the buy bust teams disregard of the requirements of Section 21 is fatal.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. ROLANDO LAYLO Y CEPRES, appellant G.R.No.192235, July 6, 2011 Second Division ( Carpio, J.)

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.9 FACTS: PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations in Binangonan, Rizal. While the police officers were in front of a sari-sari store , appellant Laylo and his live-in partner, Ritwal, approached them and asked, Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu? PO1 Reyes replied, Bakit mayroon ka ba? Laylo then brought out two plastic bags containing shabu and told the police officers, Dos (P200.00) ang isa. Upon hearing this, the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor caught up with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying. The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs and used the two plastic sachets containing shabu as basis while Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the third sachet containing 0.02 grams of shabu. Laylo, on his part denied the allegations against him and testified that while he and his common-law wife, Ritwal, were walking on the street, two men grabbed them. The two men, who they later identified as PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, dragged them to their house. Once inside, the police officers placed two plastic sachets in each of their pockets. Afterwards, they were brought to the police station where, despite protests and claims that the drugs were planted on them, they were arrested and charged. This was further corroborated by his three neighbors. The RTC found Laylo and Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA 9165. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Rolando Laylo and Melitona Ritwal guilty of violating Sec 26(b) and Sec 11 of R.A. 9165, respectively. HELD: Petition DENIED The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.9 From the testimonies given, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were 36 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs In addition, the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime charged were sufficiently established by evidence. Further, it was held that allegations of frame-up and extortion by police officers are common and standard defenses in most dangerous drugs cases. They are viewed by the Court with disfavor, for such defenses can easily be concocted and fabricated.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers ACEJAS III v. PEOPLE TORRES v. PEOPLE GR 156643, JUNE 27, 2006 GR 175074, AUG. 31, 2011

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Candao v. People of the Philippines G.R. Nos. 186659-710; October 19, 2011 The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall beprima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. Villarama, Jr., J.: Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria of the Commission on Audit (COA) constituted a team of auditors from the central office to conduct an Expanded Special Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ORG-ARMM). In the Special Audit Office (SAO) Report No. 93-25 as submitted by the audit team, it was found that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioner Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II) without the required disbursement vouchers. Subsequently, Chairman Banaria demanded from petitioner Haron to produce and restitute to the ARMM-Regional Treasurer immediately the full amount of P21,045,570.64 and submit his explanation within seventy-two (72) hours together with the official receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer in acknowledgment of such restitution. On April 17, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, filed in the Sandiganbayan criminal cases for malversation of public funds against the following ORG-ARMM officials/employees: Zacaria A. Candao (Regional Governor), Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II), Abas A. Candao (Executive Secretary) and Pandical M. Santiago (Cashier). They were charged with violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under several informations with identical allegations except for the varying date, number and amount of the check involved in each case. Several witnesses were presented by the defense, all saying that it was SOP to issue checks for the purpose of "peace and order campaign." However, it was clear that the way that the funds totalling over 21 million pesos were disbursed was highly irregular. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Haron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao who were likewise sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to the amount of the check in each case. It is worthy to note that the disbursement vouchers for the amount in question surfaced, but only during the proceedings at the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan found no merit in petitioners claim that the subject checks were covered by existing disbursement vouchers which were belatedly submitted and received by the COA Central Office on October 29, 1993. It said that had those vouchers really existed at the time of the 52 withdrawals petitioners made from December 29, 1992 to March 30, 1993, petitioner Haron could have readily produced them when required to do so by the special audit team on August 24, 1993. The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioners presented no proof that the cash advances intended for peace and order campaign were spent for public purposes, as in fact the alleged disbursement vouchers did not indicate any detail as to the nature of the expense/s such as purchase of equipment, services, meals, travel, etc. and there were no supporting documents such as the Request for Issuance of Voucher, Purchase Request and Inspection Report of the items supposedly purchased. 39 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers

On whether the petitioners are liable under Article 217 of the RPC THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides: Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer: 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos. 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. 3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall beprima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.

The following elements are essential for conviction in malversation cases: 1. That the offender is a public officer; 2. That he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers 3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and 4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. All the foregoing elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution in this case. Petitioners have not rebutted the legal presumption that with the Disbursing Officers (Haron) failure to account for the illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the subject checks when demanded by the COA, they misappropriated and used the said funds for their personal benefit.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Javier v. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 147026-27; September 11, 2009 Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. Peralta, J.: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, or "Book Publishing Industry Development Act", was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the State's goal in promoting the continuing development of the book publishing industry, through the active participation of the private sector, to ensure an adequate supply of affordable, quality-produced books for the domestic and export market. Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector representative for a term of one (1) year. During that time, she was also the President of the Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in the following year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position and for the same period of one (1) year. Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. Based on her itinerary of travel, she was paidP139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair. Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to immediately return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled. Petitioner, however, failed to do so. She was issued a Summary of Disallowances from which the balance for settlement amounted to P220,349.00. Despite said notice, no action was forthcoming from the petitioner. Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive Director of the NBDB, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for malversation of public funds and properties. She averred that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to liquidate or return to the NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival, or in this case from the date of cancellation of the trip, in accordance with government accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio further charged petitioner with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 for failure to file her Statement of Assets and Liabilities. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. It, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the charge for violation of R.A. No. 6713. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25867. Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for being a member of the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board equated to Board Member II with a salary grade 28 and as such, is accountable for not liquidating the cash advance granted to her in connection with her supposed trip to 42 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Spain. During the conduct of the preliminary investigation, petitioner was required to submit her counteraffidavit but she failed to do so. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for the crime charged and recommended the filing of the corresponding information against her. On whether the petitioner is a public officer. PETITION DISMISSED. THE COURT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICER. Petitioner hinges the present petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2) informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy. To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative, stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry. The Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer. Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Ariel Santos vs. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 161877, 23 March 2006, SECOND DIVISION (Garcia, J.) The Petitioners act of issuing the two writs of execution without first resolving the pending motion for reconsideration and despite the existence of a TRO was clearly tainted with or attended by evident partiality causing undue injury to private complainant. FACTS: Labor Arbiter Andres Palumbarit of the Ministry of Labor and Employment of Region 3 rendered a decision in the case entitled Abraham M. Mose vs. Plaza Hotel/Apartments, owned by Conrado L. Tiu. ordering Conrado L. Tiu to pay his former employee, Abraham Mose, backwages and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time of his reinstatement, without however indicating any particular amount. Pursuant to the above Labor Decision, NLRC Corporate Auditing Examiner Maria Lourdes L. Flores issued a Report of Examiner rendering the computation of Abraham Moses backwages and benefits for a period of three (3) years from July 1979 for a total amount of P16,360.50. Plaza Hotel/Apartments filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the MOLE Region 3, seeking for the reversal/reconsideration of the above stated Labor Decision. This appeal was, however, dismissed. Plaza Hotel/Apartments raised their appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court. While the appeal was still pending before the Court, another Report of Examiner was rendered by Examiner Philip A. Manansala increasing the award from P16,360.50 to P63,537.76 which now covered backwages and benefits from July 1979 to May 1987. This sudden increase of judgment award prompted Plaza Hotel/Apartments to file an objection to the Report of Examiner Philip Manansala, citing among others: a) Supreme Court rulings that the maximum backwages to be paid should only cover three (3) years from dismissal; Supreme Court denied the appeal filed by Plaza Hotel/Apartments and with finality. Thereafter, NLRC Region 3 through Norma G. Reyes made a re-computation of the judgment award in favor of Abraham Mose in accordance with the Supreme Court ruling covering a period of only three (3) years from the date of dismissal. This recomputed award amounted to P19,908.46. After the above incidents, the Petitioner took over the above Labor Case. He issued an Order which increased the judgment award from P19,908.46 to a skyrocketing P178,462.56. This computation was contrary to the prevailing jurisprudence in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Encarnacion, where the monetary awards for illegally dismissed employees should only cover a three (3) year-period from the time of dismissal. The Order of the petitioner included the order for the issuance of Writ of Execution. Plaza Hotel/Apartments filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking the reconsideration of the above Order of the Petitioner. During the pendency of the Plaza Hotels Motion for Reconsideration, Abraham Mose through counsel filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of the Order. This was opposed by Plaza Hotel/Apartments. Without however acting on the Plaza Hotel/Apartments Motion for Reconsideration and the Opposition to Motion for Execution, the Petitioner issued a Writ of Execution to implement his Order to collect the amount of P178,462.56. Plaza Hotel/Apartments filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration. The Petitioner however ignored all the abovesaid Motions and pleadings filed by Plaza Hotel/Apartments. 45 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Conrado L. Tiu was then compelled to file a Petition for Injunction before the Department of Labor and Employment with a prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order [TRO]. The NLRC issued the TRO enjoining the Petitioner from enforcing his Writ of Execution. In order to implement the TRO, the NLRC imposed as a condition the posting by Conrado L. Tiu of a cash or surety bond equivalent to the judgment award. Despite the TRO, the Petitioner issued an "Alias Writ of Execution" reiterating the enforcement of his previous Writ of Execution. However, this was not enforced due to the TRO presented by Conrado L. Tiu to the NLRC Sheriffs. Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging the Petitioner with the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Petitioner contended that he deemed not to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Plaza Hotel/Apartments because he felt there is no necessity to resolve it, since the decision of Labor Arbiter Palumbarit has become final and executory, hence, ministerial for his part to implement and enforce the same. The Sandiganbayan adjudged petitioner guilty as charged. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Was the Petitioner guilty of manifest partiality in issuing the writs of execution subject of the Information? 2. Did the Private Complainant suffered undue injury? (since judgment for which he was held liable to pay backwages whether for that limited period of 3 year or continuing backwages until actual reinstatement has never been satisfied) HELD: Petition DENIED. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, under which petitioner was indicted and convicted, reads: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. In Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan,11 the Court en banc enumerated the essential elements of the crime punishable under the aforequoted statutory provision, to wit: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. GUILTY OF MANIFEST PARTIALITY The Court agrees with the findings and disquisitions of the Sandiganbayan that petitioner exhibited manifest partiality towards Abraham Mose in issuing the two Writs of Execution. 46 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers As a Labor Arbiter, and a lawyer at that, it is incumbent upon him to exercise prudence and probity in the exercise of his functions. He knew that there was a pending Motion for Reconsideration filed by Plaza Hotel/Apartments contesting his order ordering, in haste, the issuance of the writ of execution and regarding the hulking increase of the amount of backwages to be paid to Abraham Mose from P19,908.46 to P178,462.56, and despite the pendency of the said Motion, he issued the corresponding writ of execution. His reason that there is no longer a necessity to resolve the motion for reconsideration because the Decision of Labor Arbiter Palumbarit has become final and executory is untenable and a very negligible statement. The issue raised in the motion for reconsideration is not the Decision of Labor Arbiter Palumbarit, but Petitioner's Order and thus, incumbent upon him to resolve first the pending motion for reconsideration before pursuing with the implementation of the said Order and instead of issuing the writ of execution. Furthermore, Petitioner again issued an alias writ of execution, this time, despite issuance of a temporary restraining order by the DOLE-NLRC. By these acts of Ariel Santos, it is clearly evident that he had exercised manifest partiality or bias on Abraham Mose in impetuously issuing the two writs of execution, thus, causing damage and injury, which are not merely negligible to Plaza Hotel/Apartments. PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SUFFERED INJURY Petitioner also maintains that Plaza Hotel did not suffer damage or injury consequent to his having issued the two writs of execution, arguing that neither was ever enforced. Pressing the point, he also states that what Plaza Hotel paid by way of attorney's fees and premium for the supersedeas bond it posted to enjoin the enforcement of the alias writ of execution is not the damage or injury contemplated under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The contention is untenable. Due to the issuance of the Petitioner of the two writs of execution despite the issuance by the NLRC Proper of a TRO, Plaza Hotel was within its right to secure the services of counsel and, to apply for injunctive relief and then pay for the supersedeas bond to stay the implementation of the writ of execution in question. In net effect, Plaza Hotel incurred damages rendered necessary by the illegal or improper acts of petitioner. All told, the Court rules and so holds, as did the Sandiganbayan, that the elements of the offense charged had been duly established beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner, being a labor arbiter of the NLRC, discharges quasi-judicial functions. His act of issuing the two writs of execution without first resolving the pending motion for reconsideration of his Order, and despite the existence of a TRO was clearly tainted with or attended by evident partiality causing undue injury to private complainant Conrado L. Tiu.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Marietta T. Caugma, et al vs. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 167048, 7 April 2006, FIRST DIVISION (CALLEJO, SR., J.) The prosecution is burdened to prove the factual basis and amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. Courts cannot simply rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork in determining the fact and the amount of damages. Conspiracy or collusion by and among public officers, inter se, and via private individuals to commit the crime under Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 must likewise be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. FACTS: Way back, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) had acquired eight vessels from Japan under the RP-Japan Reparation Commission Agreement, one of which is the M/V Malasugui. Due to old age (27 years), the vessel has to be repaired more frequently. The vessel sustained leaks on her forward hull while docked at Pier 4, Fishing Port, Navotas. BFAR engaged the services of V/L Shipyard Corporation (Corporation) for which BFAR was billed a total amount of P103,111.40 for services rendered including repairs and berthing fees evidenced by Invoice Nos. 1529 and 1589. It was recommended to the Bureau Director that the vessel should be disposed of considering that it could no longer serve its purpose due to old age and deteriorating superstructure. Pursuant to E.O. No. 888, BFAR created a Disposal Committee in order to facilitate the disposal of M/V Malasugui. Among the committee members were Marietta T. Caugma, Chief of the Finance Division as chairperson; Amiana M. Abella, vice-chairperson; Rosauro M. Martinez, BFAR Representative as member; Villa J. Bernaldo, COA Auditor/Representative as member; and Meynardo Geralde, Jr., Supply Coordination Office representative, as member. The Disposal Committee submitted its Report on the appraisal of the vessel, recommending that it be sold at public auction at the appraised value of P86,917.60, including the charges of the sale. These were transmitted to Bureau Director Gonzales. Gonzales issued an Invitation to Bid which also contained the conditions of the sale of the vessel. He revised the proposed procedural guidelines of the Committee (Condition No. 8 of the Invitation to Bid) to provide that the bidder agrees to pay, in addition to the award price, taxes, duties and other costs such as berthing fees, cost of publication of the bid, etc. and levies which may be imposed by law. The invitation to bid was published in the Times Journal for three consecutive days. The publisher billed the BFAR P2,400.00 as publication fee. During the publing bidding, the Corporation submitted its sealed bid P13,890.00 or 10% of its bid price as required by the invitation to bid as well as copies of Invoice Nos. 1529 and 1589 showing that the Corporation had billed the Bureau the total amount of P103,111.40 for various services rendered on the vessel. Caugma asked the committee members if the lone bid of the Corporation could already be opened and they all agreed. Nacua did not interpose any objection because she believed in good faith that it was in 48 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers accordance with COA rules and regulations. Caugma opened the bid and receipted the P13,890.00 representing 10% of the bid price of P138,900.00, broken down as follows: publication fee, P2,400.00; berthing fee, P103,111.40; charges on the BFAR, P33,388.60. Believing that the bid price for the vessel was P138,900.00 and that this amount surpassed the appraised value of P86,917.60, the Committee members resolved to recommend to the Bureau Director that the sale of the vessel be awarded to the Corporation for final approval. Gonzales after a thorough investigation was authorized to award and sell the vessel to the Corporation for P138,900.00, pursuant to Section 79 of P.D. No. 1445, and Section 3, paragraph 3 of E.O. No. 888. Antonio B. Baltazar, a former BFAR Chief Technologist filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Ombudsman against Director Felix Gonzales for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for the leaks of the vessel while berthed at Navotas, Metro Manila. Baltazar claimed, among others, that Gonzales had failed to file an insurance claim on the vessel from the Government Service Insurance System. The matter was referred to the COA. Regional Director of the COA directed Villa Bernaldo (then BFAR Auditor) to conduct a discreet inquiry regarding Baltazars complaint. Bernaldo concluded that the vessels appraised value of P86,917.60 was not met xx. Baltazar thereafter filed a Manifestation with the Ombudsman requesting the inclusion of Caugma, Abella, Bernaldo, and Martinez as respondents. Ombudsman filed an Information charging Eddie S. Galler, Jr., Marietta Caugma, Amiana Abella and Rosauro Martinez of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

It was claimed that the second bidding should not have proceeded because the lone bidder offered to purchase the vessel for only P33,388.60 instead of its appraised value as required by Section 6, paragraph 1 of E.O. No. 888. She further declared that to comply with E.O. No. 888, the
minimum acceptable selling price was P190,000.00 broken down as follows: P2,400.00 for publication fee; berthing fee of P103,111.40; and P86,917.60 for the appraised value of the vessel. Considering that this bid price was not reached after the second bid, the Committee should have declared a failure of bid, hence, per COA regulations, the vessel should have been sold through negotiation for a price to be fixed by the Commission. Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the four (4) accused of the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan ruled that, under Condition No. 8 of the invitation to bid, only those bidders who had agreed to pay no less than the appraised value of the vessel, P86,917.60, excluding taxes, duties and other costs (such as berthing fees, publication of the bid and levies which may be imposed by law), should have been considered by the Committee. Caugma was aware of this condition in the invitation to bid. The Sandiganbayan further declared that Caugma had knowledge of the fact that the berthing fee was P103,111.40 since it was clearly indicated in the invitation to bid. Thus, in evident bad faith, the accused conspired 49 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers together and awarded the vessel to the Corporation for P138,900.00, of which only P33,388.60 would be remitted to the BFAR. The Sandiganbayan concluded that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Disposal Committee gave unwarranted advantage and preference to Galler, Jr., causing injury to the government to the extent of P53,529.00; after deducting the publication fee of P2,400.00 and the berthing fee of P103,111.40, the government realized only the net amount of P33,388.60, short by P53,529.00 of the appraisal value of the vessel, P86,917.60. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision, which the graft court denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: Was the prosecution able to prove that the petitioners acted in evident bad faith in awarding the sale of the vessel to the Corporation (NO) Did the Government suffer damage/injury in the amount of P53,529.00. (NO) HELD: Petition GRANTED.

Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 provides:


(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The essential elements of violation of the provision are as follows: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. It must be stressed that mere bad faith is not enough for one to be liable under the law, since the act of bad faith must in the first place be evident. 50 | P a g e

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Undue injury has been interpreted as synonymous to actual damages which is akin to that in civil law. The prosecution is burdened to prove the factual basis and amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. Courts cannot simply rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork in determining the fact and the amount of damages. Conspiracy or collusion by and among public officers, inter se, and via private individuals to commit the crime under Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 must likewise be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. This was the ruling of the Court in Desierto v. Ocampo: Collusion implies a secret understanding whereby one party plays into anothers hands for fraudulent purposes. It may take place between and every contractor resulting in no competition, in which case, the government may declare a failure of bidding. Collusion may also ensue between contractors and the chairman and members of the PBAC to simulate or rig the bidding process, thus insuring the award to a favored bidder, to the prejudice of the government agency and public service. For such acts of the chairman and the members of the PBAC, they may be held administratively liable for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the government service. Collusion by and among the members of the PBAC and/or contractors submitting their bids may be determined from their collective acts or omissions before, during and after the bidding process. The complainants are burdened to prove such collusion by clear and convincing evidence because if so proved, the responsible officials may be dismissed from the government service or meted severe administrative sanctions for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the government service. The SC agrees with petitioners contention that the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 was not committed when the Committee conducted the bidding and resolved to recommend to the Minister, through the BFAR Director, to award the sale of the vessel to the Corporation; neither was it committed when the award was made by the BFAR Director to the Corporation. This is so because there was as yet no evidence that the government sustained a loss of P53,529.60. The crime would have been committed if the Corporation had remitted to the National Treasurer the P138,900.00, and the P103,111.40 was applied by way of set-off against Bureaus account to said Corporation for Bill Nos. 1529 and 1589. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the government lost P53,529.00 in the sale of the vessel. The only evidence presented is the Corporations bid and the Report of Villa Bernaldo. The Prosecution offered no competent and sufficient evidence to prove the actual damages caused to the government. On the other hand, the BFAR Director declared that the vessel was sold to the Corporation for P138,900.00, which accepted and remitted the amount to the national treasury, as full payment of the vessel. The government receipted the amount as proceeds of the sale of the vessel. To reiterate, there is no evidence on record that, after the Corporation had remitted the P138,900.00, P103,111.40 thereof was applied to the Bureaus account under Bill Nos. 1529 and 1589 by way of set off. Thus, the full amount of the bid price, P138,900.00, which the Corporation remitted to the 51 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers national treasury was intact; yet, petitioners were prosecuted and convicted of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. In fine then, the Court holds that the travesty which had been committed must be undone.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers VENANCIO R. NAVA vs. RODOLFO G. PALATTAO et al. G.R. No. 160211, August 28, 2006, PANGANIBAN, CJ To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Lack of public bidding alone does not result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Nevertheless, the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are strictly construed against the government. FACTS: COA conducted an audit of the 9.36 million allotment which was released in 1990 by the DECS, Region XI to its Division Offices. In the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265.00 was shown to have been released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to the newly nationalized high schools located within the region. Through the initiative of accused Venancio Nava, a meeting was called among his seven (7) schools division superintendents whom he persuaded to use the money or allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). In other words, instead of referring the allotment to the one hundred fifty-five (155) heads of the nationalized high schools for the improvement of their facilities, accused Nava succeeded in persuading his seven (7) schools division superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of science education facilities for the calendar year 1990. In the purchase of the school materials, the law provides that the same shall be done through a public bidding pursuant to Circular No. 85-55, series of 1985. But in the instant case, evidence shows that accused Nava persuaded his seven (7) schools division superintendents to ignore the circular as allegedly time was of the essence in making the purchases and if not done before the calendar year 1990, the funds allotted will revert back to the general fund. In the hurried purchase of SLTDs, the provision on the conduct of a public bidding was not followed. Instead the purchase was done through negotiation. As disclosed by the audit report, the prices of the [SLTDs] as purchased exceeded the prevailing market price ranging from 56% to 1,175% based on the mathematical computation done by the COA audit team. The report concluded that the government lost P380,013.60. That the injury to the government as quantified was the result of the non-observance by the accused of the COA rules on public bidding and DECS Order No. 100 suspending the purchases of [SLTDs]. The Commission on Audit (COA) Report recommended the filing of criminal and administrative charges against the persons liable, including petitioner, before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. Petitioner Nava was subsequently charged with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After due trial, only petitioner was convicted, while all the other accused were acquitted.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Nava guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or entering on behalf of the government any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or would profit thereby. The Sandiganbayan (SBN) said that, in the purchase of the Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTDs), petitioner Nava had not conducted a public bidding in accordance with COA Circular No. 8555A. As a result, the prices of the SLTDs, as purchased, exceeded the prevailing market price from 56 percent to 1,175 percent, based on the mathematical computations of the COA team. In his defense, petitioner had argued that the said COA Circular was merely directory, not mandatory. Further, the purchases in question had been done in the interest of public service. In its assailed Resolution, the SBN denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It held that the series of acts culminating in the questioned transactions constituted violations of Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 100; and COA Circular No. 85-55A. Those acts, ruled the SBN, sufficiently established that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors (not grave abuse of discretion) in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019.

HELD: Petition is DENIED. To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the evidence presented warranted a verdict of conviction. Petitioner is a public officer, who approved the transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by the DECS and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established such undue injury. Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. We must emphasize however, that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of an administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the third element of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g); namely, that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, as seems to be stated in the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Lack of public 54 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers bidding alone does not result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Nevertheless, the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are strictly construed against the government. If the accused is to be sent to jail, it must be because there is solid evidence to pin that person down, not because of the omission of a procedural matter alone. Indeed, all the elements of a violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 should be established to prove the culpability of the accused. In this case, there is a clear showing that all the elements of the offense are present. Thus, there can be no other conclusion other than conviction.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers OFELIA C. CAUNAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. / JOEY P. MARQUEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04 / G.R. Nos. 182020-24, September 2, 2009, NACHURA, J. The gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption of innocence. The court, in ascertaining the guilt of an accused, must, after having marshaled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accuseds guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudic ed mind. Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted. FACTS: In March 1999, a Special Audit Team audited selected transactions of Paraaque City for the calendar years 1996 to 1998, including the walis tingting purchases. Based on the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team that there was overpricing in certain purchase transactions of Paraaque City, five (5) informations were filed against Marquez and Caunan, along with four (4) other local government officials of Paraaque City charging them of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Parenthetically, to ascertain the prevailing price of walis tingting for the years 1996 to 1998, the audit team made a canvass of the purchase prices of the different merchandise dealers of Paraaque City. All, however, were reluctant to provide the team with signed quotations of purchase prices for walis tingting. In addition, the audit team attempted to purchase walis tingting from the named suppliers of Paraaque City. Curiously, when the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers, these were occupied by other business establishments. Thereafter, the audit team located, and purchased from, a lone supplier that sold walis tingting. As previously adverted to, the audit team made a report which contained the following findings: 1. The purchase of walis tingting was undertaken without public bidding; 2. The purchase of walis tingting was divided into several purchase orders and requests to evade the requirement of public bidding and instead avail of personal canvass as a mode of procurement; 3. The purchase of walis tingting through personal canvass was attended with irregularities; and 4. There was glaring overpricing in the purchase transactions. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners and the other local government officials of Paraaque City for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. Consequently, the five (5) Informations against petitioners, et al. were filed before the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan and Marquez, along with Silvestre de Leon and Marilou Tanael, guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan ruled as follows: 56 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers 1. The Bids and Awards Committee was not properly constituted; the accused did not abide by the prohibition against splitting of orders; and Paraaque City had not been afforded the best possible advantage for the most objective price in the purchase of walis tingting for failure to observe the required public bidding; 2. The contracts for procurement of walis tingting in Paraaque City for the years 1996-1998 were awarded to pre-selected suppliers; and 3. On the whole, the transactions undertaken were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. Caunan, Marquez and Tanael, moved for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan decision. All the motions filed by Marquez, as well as Caunans motion, were denied by the Sandiganbayan. However, with respect to Tanael, the Sandiganbayan found reason to reconsider her conviction. Hence, these separate appeals by petitioners Marquez and Caunan. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in finding the petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. HELD: Petitioners Joey P. Marquez and Ofelia C. Caunan are ACQUITTED. Both petitioners insist that the fact of overpricing, upon which the charge against them of graft and corruption is based, had not been established by the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioners maintain that the evidence of overpricing, consisting of the report of the Special Audit Team and the testimony thereon of Bermudez, constitutes hearsay and, as such, is inadmissible against them. In addition, petitioner Marquez points out that the finding of overpricing was not shown to a reliable degree of certainty as required by COA Memorandum No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997. In all, petitioners asseverate that, as the overpricing was not sufficiently established, necessarily, the last criminal element of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 a contract or transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government was not proven. Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 provides: Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officersIn addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction, manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 57 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold question we should resolve is whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly injurious or disadvantageous to the government. We agree with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. Thus, we grant the petitions. In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption of innocence. The court, in ascertaining the guilt of an accused, must, after having marshaled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accuseds guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted. In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions. Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. The reasoning of the Sandiganbayan is specious and off tangent. The audit team reached a conclusion of gross overpricing based on documents which, at best, would merely indicate the present market price of walis tingting of a different specification, purchased from a non-supplier of Paraaque City, and the price of walis tingting purchases in Las Pias City. Effectively, the prosecution was unable to demonstrate the requisite burden of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, in order to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers AMBIL JR., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN GR 175457, JULY 6, 2011 Prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. VILLARAMA, JR.,J.: FACTS: The present controversy arose from a letter of Atty. David B. Loste, president of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in a murder case from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.. Sometime around September 1998, Ambil, jr and Alexandro R. Apelado (being then the Provincial warden of Eastern Samar, both having been public officers, committing an offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping x x x each other , with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause the release of Adalim by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the RTC-Branch 2 eastern samar and allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at petitioner Ambils residence for a period of 85 days which act was done without any Court order, thus petitioner in the performance of official functions had given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the government, thus contrary to law. On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail. At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the information. However, they reason that it was justified by imminent threats upon his person by Adalims sister Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held. Sandiganbayan, First Division found petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act. HELD: YES. Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides: Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall 59 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions and he is not such government officer or employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer. However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan[42] where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. With regard to his second contention, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party. WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers ORGANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN GR 133535, SEPT. 9, 1999 Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade 27 or higher PARDO, J.: FACTS: Dominga S. Manalili, Teopisto A. Sapitula, Jose dP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, being then public officers and taking advantage of their official positions as employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Region 7, Quezon City, and Gil R. Erencio, Reynaldo S. Enriquez and Luis S. Se, Jr., conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass and acquire funds belonging to the National Government by opening an unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines for and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposit therein money belonging to the government of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax payments, then withdraw therefrom (P193,565,079.64) without proper authority, through checks made payable to themselves and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the above named private persons, thereby succeeding in misappropriating, converting, misusing and/or malversing said public funds tantamount to a raid on the public treasury, to their own personal gains, advantages and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount. Petitioner filed a motion to quash with the Sandiganbayan for lack of jurisdiction contending that SB no longer had jurisdiction over the case under RA 8249. SB without first resolving petitioners motion issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused. SB then issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to quash for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for the reason that she should first surrender to the Court before she may file any further pleading. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case HELD: NO. The crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "until otherwise provided by law." Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise" than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080. Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused occupied positions with Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated November 20, 1997, and April 28, 1998, in Criminal Case No. 24100. The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to forthwith refer the case to the court of proper jurisdiction.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents. [G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002] FACTS: As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. The respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The Information was amended and the arraignment of the accused was set, no bail for petitioners provisional liberty was fixed. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion. The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his coaccused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law. Petitioner then filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion[2] alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face 2.) Whether or not sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process; 3.) Whether or not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers HELD: 1.) Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners premise is patently false. Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this subparagraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation.

2.) Sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process; There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. 3.) Not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality. The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt. 64 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG y CUSTODIO, appellant. [G.R. No. 129895. April 30, 2003] FACTS: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned to the Bacolod City police station, was lawfully married to Leah Nolido Dalag. They had three children: Francis, Princess Joy and Ezra John. At around 8:00 p.m., the children heard their parents quarreling. Leah was admonishing Armando not to drink liquor. The kids sensed that some object was being banged on the wall. Thereafter, they heard their mother cry. Francis and Princess Joy rushed outside the house to see what was happening. They were horrified when from a distance of three meters, they saw Armando pushing and kicking Leah on the left side of her body. She fell to the ground. Even as Leah was already lying posthaste on the ground, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of the body. Francis and Princess Joy pleaded to their father to stop maltreating their mother. Armando angrily told them not to interfere and that he will later beat them up as well. He grabbed Leahs hair and banged her head on the wall. Leahs forehead directly hit the wall. In the process, Armando stepped on a nail. Even as she was being assaulted by her husband, she told him Toy, Toy, I will find some medicine for your wound. Leah then fled to the house of their neighbor, Felisa Horilla or Tia Feli. Armando ran after Leah and pushed her to the house of Felisa. Francis went back to the house. Princess Joy looked for her parents but could not find them. She decided to go back to their house to sleep. In the meantime, Armando herded Leah back to the house. Princess Joy was awakened when she heard her mother crying. When Princess Joy went outside of the house, she saw her mother being pushed by her father. Leah fell to the ground and lost consciousness. Armando placed the head of Leah on a stone and ordered Princess Joy to get some water. She did. She poured water on the face of her mother but the latter did not move. Armando then tried to revive Leah by applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no avail. Armando and Francis carried Leah to the house. Francis noticed that there were lumps on his mothers face as well as bruises on both her arms, between her breasts and on her thighs. There was likewise blood on Leahs right ear. After laying down her head on the bed, Armando told Francis to get some hot water. Armando then washed his wifes face with lukewarm water. When Francis finally went to sleep, his mother was still unconscious. When they woke up the following day, or on August 16, 1996, Francis and Princess Joy noticed that their mother remained unconscious. Despite their mothers condition, they decided to go to school. During lunchtime, Francis went home and saw that Leahs condition had not improved. When the children came home in the afternoon after their classes, Armando told them that their mother was brought to the hospital. Armando instructed Francis to inform his colleagues at the police headquarters that he would be unable to report for duty because his wife accidentally slipped and had to be brought to the hospital.When Francis visited his mother in the hospital, he saw her lying on the bed, her face badly swollen. He saw the lumps and bruises on the different parts of her body. Leah never regained her consciousness. She died on August 22, 1996. The trial court rendered judgment finding Armando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide for killing his wife and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court appreciated the 65 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and one analogous to passion and obfuscation in favor of Armando. ISSUE: Whether or not the credibility of witnesses and their testimony should be given probative weight. HELD: It is axiomatic in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, an appellate court will normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial unless the lower court has reached conclusions that are clearly unsupported by evidence, or unless it has overlooked some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered, would affect the result of the case. The rationale for this rule is that trial courts have superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe at close range the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. In this case, the trial court declared that the children, Francis and Princess Joy, the principal prosecution witnesses, testified in a logical, candid, and straight-forward manner, describing in detail what they saw and heard in a manner characteristic of witnesses who are telling the truth. The Court finds no reason to deviate from these findings as the records fully support the same. The children recalled the sordid events that happened in the evening of August 15, 1996 involving their parents without any trace of bias, impelled by no other motive than to bring justice to their mothers senseless death.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSENDO REBUCAN G.R. No. 182551 July 27, 2011 Leonardo-De Castro, J.: According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246... There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves... FACTS: Rosendo Rebucan worked in Manila. While in Manila, the victim, Felipe Lagera, went to their house and placed himself on top of Rebucan's wife, Marites, who was lying down. The incident was seen by Raymond Rance, Rebucan's step-son and his younger daughter who were sleeping next to Marites. Marites succeeded in driving Felipe out of their house. Thereafter, Marites left for Manila. When Rebucan returned to their house, Raymond told him about the incident. Rebucan went to the house of Felipe with a long bolo (sundang). Felipe was carrying his grandson, Ramil Tagpis, Jr., 1-year old. Carmela, his granddaughter, eyewitness, was also with them playing in the house. Carmela recounted that she saw Rebucan enter the house suddenly, without any word and hacked Felipe on the face, left arm and right arm and Ranil on the forehead. Felipe was still able to walk outside the house but fell on the ground afterwards. Subsequently, Rebucan immediately ran outside the house. On the part of the defense, Rebucan testified that he went to the house of Felipe because he needed to buy kerosene. He saw Felipe feeding chickens and confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his wife. Felipe got angry and threw the cover of a chicken cage at Rebucan but the latter was able to parry it with his hand. Rebucan drew his bolo and hacked Felipe on the left side as the latter was running towards the house. Rebucan followed since he thought that Felipe might get a weapon. As Rebucan was about to deliver the second blow, Felipe held up his grandson, Ramil, as a shield which caused Rebucan to hit Ranil on the forehead. Rabucan became angry as Felipe walked outside of the house. Rebucan followed and delivered another blow to Felipe on his right arm. He ran and voluntarily surrendered to the barangay chariperson. The RTC convicted Rebucan of the complex crime of double murder. It elucidated that the manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victims was a premeditated decision and executed with treachery. he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court in automatic review but the SC ordered to transfer the case to the CA for appropriate disposition. The CA modified the RTC judgment. Rebucan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder for the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a complex crim of double murder. The court subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the killing of the victims were attended by treachery and evident premeditation. Rebucan filed a Notice of Appeal to the SC. 67 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons The contention of the accused is there is no treachery because there was no witness whi stated that he attacked the victims suddenly, thereby depriving them of any means to defend themselves. ISSUE: Whether or not Rebucan was guilty of murder by committing the crime with treachery. RULING: APPEAL DENIED. The SC affirmed the decision of the RTC and CA. The evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder. According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves. The SC respected the resolution of the RTC in giving weight to the testimony of Carmela that she categorically pointed to Reburca as the person who hacked Felipe and Ramil. She also stated in her testimony that the attack was not preceded by any altercation between Reburca and Felipe. Without any provocation, Reburca suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The abruptness rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived of an opportunity to defend himself. As Felipe was carrying Ramil, the child suffered the same fatal blows. Treachery may be properly considered even when the victim of the attack was not the one intended by the defendant to kill if it appears that neither of the two could put up a defense against the attack or become aware of it. Furthermore, the killing of the child is characterized by treachery for the weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the accused.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE VS. CECILIA LAGMAN G.R. No. 197807 April 16, 2012 Velasco, Jr., J.: In order that treachery may be properly appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. FACTS: 2 Informations were filed against Cecilia Lagman (Lagman). The first Information was for the Murder of Jondel Santiago (Santiago), that Lagman killed Santiago with the use of a knife by stabbing him and hitting his neck and trunk thereby inflicting fatal wounds resulting to his immediate death. The second Information was for Attempted Homicide of Violeta Sicor (Sicor) by stabbing her in the middle of her buttocks with a knife. The prosecution presented Donna Maniego (Maniego), daughter of Sicor, PO3 Ricardo Alateit (Alateit) and Sicor as witnesses. Based on Maniego's tetestimony she was with Sicor riding a side car when without any warning Lagman punched Maniego on the face then turned to Sicor and stabbed the latter in the middle of her buttocks with a knife. She asked for help in the barangay hall but the Barangay Chairman was not around. She then went to check on her common-law spouse, Santiago, she saw Lagman stab Santiago. Lagman then flee the scene of the crime while carrying her knife. Maniego rushed to Santiago and saw that he was seriously hurt, they proceeded to a hospital where Santiago died. Maniego also testified that she was a close friend of Lagman but the latter got angry with her when Santiago eloped with Maniego. Sicor corroborated with Maniego's testimony. PO3 Alateit testified that while he was riding his motorcyle on his way home, it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident. He headed toward the area where a crowd was causing a commotion and saw a Lagman running towards him with a bloodied head. He was informed that Lagman stabbed someone. While he was arresting Lagman, a sharp object fell from the woman's waist. He confiscated the sharp object and brought her to the police station. For the part of the defense, they offered the testimonies of Lagman.She claimed that she confronted Maniego if it was true that the latter was spreading rumors that Lagman was insane to which Maniego affirmed. Lagman slapped Maniego and left, Santiago and Sicor ran after her. Santiago hit her with a lead pipe. She denied that she killed Santiago, that the knife was not hers and she only had an argument with Maniego. The RTC convicted Lagman of the crime of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries. The CA found the presence of treachery. In the CA's decision, it stated that the Santiago was caught off guard when the Lagman, without warning, stabbed him 4 times leaving him no chance to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself. Thus, there is no denying that Lagman's act of suddenly stabbing Santiago left the latter with no room for defense is a clear case of treachery. CA ruled that the totality of the prosecution's 69 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused failed to show any ill-motive on the part of the witnesses of the prosecution to falsely testify against her. Hence, Lagman appealed. Accused argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the killing of Santiago was attended by treachery, it was not proved that she deliberately adopted her mode of attack. The encounter was preceded with an argument between the accused and Maniego. The accused was followed by victims, thus, the stabbing incident should have been considered as a spur of the moment occurence. ISSUE: Whether or not the killing was attended with treachery RULING: Appeal Denied. The killing was attended by treachery. The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; (4) that the killing is not parricide nor infanticide. The prosecution clearly established that it was Lagman who killed Santiago as there was an eyewitness to the crime. The killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of Treachery. Treachery is defined as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend to directly insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might take. In order that treachery may be properly appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. These elements were present when Lagman stabbed Santiago to death. Lagman's method of inflicting harm ensured that she would fatally wound Santiagi without any risk to herself. The alleged advantage of Santiago in terms of height was of no use to him as Lagman employed treachery in killing him. He was not given the oppotunity to defend himself due to the accused's sudden asudden stabbing him repeatedly with a knife.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNOLD T. AGCANAS G.R. No. 174476, 11 October 2011, EN BANC (SERENO, J.) For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. FACTS: The provincial prosecutor of Laoag City charged the accused with murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Laoag City. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. The trial court found that on 4 May 2000, at about nine oclock in the evening while the victim Warlito Raguirag was having dinner at home, herein accused Arnold Agcanas entered the former's house through the kitchen door. The accused pointed a gun at the back of the left ear of the victim and shot him point-blank. Under the 50-watt light bulb and with only a meter between them, Beatriz Raguirag (hereinafter Beatriz), the wife, was able to identify the accused, who was the son of her cousin. Around 9:15 in the evening, when the police officers arrived, Beatriz informed them that Arnold Agcanas was the assailant. Thereafter, around ten oclock in the evening, the police found the accused in the house of his brother, Alejandro Agcanas, who was actually residing in Barangay San Miguel, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. The accused then went willingly with the police officers to the police station. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and the use of an illegally possessed firearm. On intermediate appellate review by the Court of Appeals, the conviction was affirmed. However, the award of damages was modified based on prevailing jurisprudence. ISSUES: 1. Whether the crime was committed with treachery, thus, qualifying it as murder. 2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the crime was aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling and illegal possession of firearm. HELD: Decision AFFIRMED. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two 71 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The victim was then eating his dinner, seated with his back to the kitchen door. Suddenly, without provocation or reason, the accused entered through that door and shot the victim in the head, causing the latter's instantaneous death. With the suddenness of the attack, the victim could not do anything, except turn his head towards the accused. The trial court was also correct in ruling that dwelling was an aggravating circumstance. It has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. The aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm was likewise properly appreciated, even though the firearm used was not recovered. As this Court held in People v. Taguba,11 the actual firearm itself need not be presented if its existence can be proved by the testimonies of witnesses or by other evidence presented. In the case at bar, Beatriz Raguirag testified that she saw the accused holding a gun and then heard a gunshot. The post-mortem examination also showed that the accused died of a gunshot wound. Thus, the presentation of the actual firearm was not indispensible to prove its existence and use.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL DION G.R. No. 181035, 4 July 2011, FIRST DIVISION (LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived her of reason. FACTS: Accused-appellant Noel Dion y Duque (Dion) was charged with two counts of statutory rape in two separate criminal complaints filed directly before the RTC. Criminal Case No. 4354-R charges the accused of rape committed on 16 June 2001 by means of force, threats and intimidation against the complainant, a minor, 10 years of age. While Criminal Case No. 4355-R, also charges the accused of rape committed sometime on April of 2001. Upon arraignment, Dion entered a plea of not guilty to the two charges. During trial, AAA alleged that at around three oclock in the afternoon, after she had finished throwing garbage at the "bakir" or garbage pit11 located some 300 meters from the back of their house, Dion came out from behind some trees, beckoning her to approach him. Instead of going to Dion, AAA started to run to their house, but she tripped and fell to the ground. This allowed Dion to catch up to her, and he then pulled her toward an area covered with tall grasses. After threatening AAA that he will cut her tongue and neck if she shouted, Dion forced her on her back and removed her undergarments. Dion then removed his own short pants and briefs then climbed on top of her. AAA described how Dion made the "push and pull movement" after he inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA claimed that when Dion had finished, he stood up and again warned her not to report the incident to anyone, otherwise he will cut her neck or tongue. Regarding the second incident of rape, AAA averred that at around ten oclock in the evening of June 16, 2001, while she was getting water from their kitchen, she heard knocking at the door. AAA inquired who it was but received no response. She testified that all of a sudden, Dion was already inside their house, and he was calling her. Once again, Dion gave the same threats to AAA before raping her as he did previously, in April 2001. Dion had just finished his deed and was about to go home when AAAs uncle, CCC, arrived. Following the sound he had heard, CCC found Dion hiding in a corner in the kitchen. CCC immediately collared Dion and woke up BBB, AAAs grandmother. BBB thereafter called Dions father and their Barangay Chairman. Dr. Romero-Fernandez, who conducted the medico-legal examination, elaborated that a number of factors could cause lacerations to the hymen, but admitted that in AAAs case, she "could not surmise or definitely say that those lacerations could have been caused by sexual abuse." After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Dion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision. ISSUE:

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons Whether or not the accused is guilty of two counts of rape as charged. HELD: Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Dion argues that because the complaint failed to state the exact, or at least the approximate, date the purported rape was committed, he was not able to intelligently prepare for his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against him. We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived her of reason. Furthermore, in refuting AAAs testimony, Dion proffered the defense of alibi and denial. This Court has time and again held that alibi is one of the weakest defenses, not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check out or rebut. Dion has failed to show us that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime in April 2001. In fact, his alibi was discredited by the testimonies of his own witnesses. It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and categorical testimony of the complainant and as between the positive declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence. Lastly, Dion insists that the findings in the medical certificate cast serious doubts on AAAs claim of being raped. The medical examination of the victim or the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape as the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The absence of spermatozoa in the vagina of the victim does not negate the commission of rape for the simple reason that the mere touching of the labia of the female organ by the penis is already considered as consummated rape. The presence of sperm is not a requisite for rape. For in rape, it is not ejaculation but penetration that consummates the sexual act.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons G.R. No.182237 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS TERENCIO FUNESTO y LLOSPARDAS, APPELLANT.

DECISION BRION, J.:


FACTS: On June 9, 1992, the prosecution charged the appellant at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Libertad, Butuan City, with rape committed on January 15, 1992 against AAA, a child below 12 years old. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6] In the trial that followed, AAA, her mother (BBB), and Dr. Teonesto K. Mora (Medical Officer at Cabadbaran District Health Office) testified on the details of the crime. The appellant, BBB, and AAA lived in a house in Barangay Marcos, Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. At around 9:00 p.m. of January 15, 1992, while BBB was at a prayer service, the appellant approached the sleeping AAA, then nine years old, and removed her panty. He then forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina, waking up AAA. Due to the extreme pain and numbness in her legs, AAA could not push him away. After satisfying his lust, the appellant restored AAAs panty and returned to his mosquito net. AAA noticed blood in her private parts. When BBB returned from the prayer service (held at the residence of a certain Edna M. Almonte in observance of the feast of Sto. Nio), she noticed blood at the hemline and at the back part of AAAs dress. Upon inquiry, AAA disclosed to her what the appellant did to her. BBB confronted the appellant who denied the allegations and threatened to slap AAA. BBB wanted to go out to ask for help, but the appellant threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. BBB brought AAA the following day to the Cabadbaran Emergency Hospital because AAA could not stand, could hardly urinate, and felt extreme pain in her abdomen. Dr. Mora, who medically examined AAA, found that her hymen was no longer intact, and that she had an anterior vaginal laceration. He also noticed the reddish discoloration of her labia minora. Specimen taken from her genitalia also tested positive for the presence of human spermatozoa. The appellant, interposing denial as a defense, alleged that BBB fabricated the charge due to his rejection of her sexual advances, and to extort money. The RTC found the appellant guilty of statutory rape in its May 4, 1999 decision. The CA affirmed the RTCs appreciation of AAAs clear, straightforward, and spontaneous testimony that pointed to the appellant as the person who raped her. ISSUE: WON the guilt of the Accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt HELD: We affirm the appellants conviction. 75 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons Based on the records before us, we see no reason to disturb the RTCs appreciation of the credibility of AAAs testimony. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; his findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court when affirmed by the CA. We differ from the lower courts conclusion that AAAs minority can be appreciated to qualify the crime as statutory rape since her minority was not proven by independent evidence. In People v. Pruna, the Court set out the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of live birth or any similar authentic document to prove the age of AAA when she was sexually violated. Neither did the appellant expressly admit AAAs age. Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, and was properly sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CONRADO LAOG Y RAMIN G.R. NO. 178321, OCTOBER 5, 2011. FACTS: Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident. The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC. AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000. When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had died. Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left the following morning at around seven oclock. An hour later, he left his house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because that was the time when he went wild after seeing his wife with another man. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters away from the scene of the crime.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The CA affirmed with modification the trial courts judgment. ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the offenses charged HELD: The appeal lacks merit. Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts and absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case. This rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial court. While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties. The facts alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.[ Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape. Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual 78 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.[50] It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHRISTOPHER PAREJA Y VELASCO G.R. No. 188979, September 05, 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J.) Simply put, rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ. Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. Facts: The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that AAA, 13 years of age, sister of the common law spouse of appellant, was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sisters room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket. The appellant removed AAAs clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs. The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant stopped when AAAs cry got louder. The appellant put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone. Thereafter, AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister, and narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards, AAA, accompanied by her brother and sister went to the Women and Childrens Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police Station and reported the incident. For his defense, the appellant declared on the witness stand that he hauled filling materials at his house, on the day of the incident. After trial, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision. It explained that a slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape, and held that a slight penetration took place when the appellants penis touched AAAs vagina as he was trying to insert it. In his brief, the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him for the crime of rape, as the prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis into the victims vagina. ISSUE: Whether the accused appellant is guilty of consummated rape. Held: CARNAL KNOWLEDGE NOT PROVEN WITH MORAL CERTAINTY. We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime. From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellants penis did not penetrate, but merely touched (i.e., naidikit) AAAs private part. In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay also disclosed that the appellant was holding the victims hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance coupled with the victims declaration that she was resisting the appellants attempt to insert his penis into her vagina makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CAs conclusion that the appellants penis penetrated, however slightly, the victims female organ. In People v. Campuhan, the Court laid down the PARAMETERS OF GENITAL CONTACT in rape cases, thus: 80 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape. The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ. Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. As earlier discussed, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required penile penetration. AAAs testimony did not establish that the appellants penis touched the labias or slid into her private part. Aside from AAAs testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could confirm whether there indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the victims labias. In the absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness. In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing AAAs nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. The totality of the appellants acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victims private parts. In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. We emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. In the present case, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape. 81 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape is VACATED, and we find appellant Christopher Pareja y Velasco GUILTY of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDGAR PADIGOS G.R. No. 181202, December 05, 2012 FIRST DIVISION (LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) In the case at bar, the prosecution may have been unable to present AAAs birth certificate or other authentic document such as a baptismal certificate during trial, however, that failure to present relevant evidence will not deter this Court from upholding that qualified rape was indeed committed by appellant because he himself admitted, in his counter-affidavit which formed part of the evidence for the defense and the contents of which he later affirmed in his testimony in open court, that AAA was below 7 years old around the time of the rape incident. In the Courts view, this admission from appellant, taken with the testimony of the victim, sufficiently proved the victims minority. Facts: The evidence for the prosecution discloses that AAA who was then only six-years old was sleeping inside their house on August 26, 2002 when her father, herein accused-appellant raped her. He undressed her and removed her panty. He also took off his pants. He inserted his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. She felt pain in her private organ. Her mother was not around as it was only her and her father who were home. The next day, accused-appellant made her hold his penis. He, on the other hand, touched her genitals and inserted his fingers into her vagina causing her to feel pain. She related the incidents to her mother who simply gave her father a fierce piercing stare but did nothing. She also confided to her aunt, sister of her mother, who brought her to a doctor for medical examination and to the police station to report the matter. According to the accused, the present charges were merely fabricated by his wife as they have been estranged from each other because she was cohabiting with another man prior to the incidents complained of. His wife prevented their daughter/victim herein from returning to their house. A few days hence, to his surprise, he was arrested by police authorities and was detained at the Talisay City Jail for having raped his own daughter. Their daughter never returned to their house since he and his wife separated. After trial, the trial court convicted appellant of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness both in relation to Republic Act No. 7160. The death penalty was imposed by the trial court because it found the appellant guilty of qualified rape. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, albeit reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. Issue: Whether the victims minority has been sufficiently proved. Held: Petition DENIED Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code which deals with the offense of rape provides: Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. Through force, threat or intimidation; b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons 2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. As cemented in jurisprudence, the elements of rape under the said provision of law are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age. Thus, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old, which is the subject of this case, is considered as statutory rape in this jurisdiction. According to the sixth paragraph of Article 266-B, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. It would appear from the death penalty imposed by the trial court that it found appellant guilty of qualified rape. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, albeit reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. After a careful review of the records of this case, we are persuaded that appellant is indeed guilty of qualified rape. In People v. Pruna, we formulated a set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victims age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as follows: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a) If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. In the case at bar, the prosecution may have been unable to present AAAs birth certificate or other authentic document such as a baptismal certificate during trial, however, that failure to present relevant evidence will not deter this Court from upholding that qualified rape was indeed committed by appellant because he 84 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons himself admitted, in his counter-affidavit which formed part of the evidence for the defense and the contents of which he later affirmed in his testimony in open court, that AAA was below 7 years old around the time of the rape incident. In the Courts view, this admission from appellant, taken with the testimony of the victim, sufficiently proved the victims minority. In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant for qualified rape and acts of lasciviousness. Further, he is to suffer the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals which is reclusion perpetua.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE v. EDMUND VILLAFLORES G.R. No. 184926, 11 April 2012, FIRST DIVISION, (Bersamin, J. ) Under Article 266-A, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape. FACTS: Accused Appellant Edmundo Villaflores also known as Batman in their neighborhood and known to be a drug-addict was charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide of a four-year old girl named Marita. Based on the testimony of the mother of the victim, On July 2, 1999, Marita was last seen to be playing at the rear of their residence. When her mother noticed that she was missing, she called her husband who rushed home to find their daughter. At 6:00AM of July 3, 1999, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with blue and yellow sack five houses away from their home. The result of the postmortem examination showed that the child was raped and the cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation .Two (2) witnesses pointed Villaflores as the culprit. Both witnesses narrated that at about 10:00AM on July 2, 1999, they saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. At noon, the three used shabu for a while, but the witnesses did not see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores house. It was only on 3:00PM that they heard cries of a child. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Villaflores carrying a yellow sack which appears heavy, the same sack that he saw when they are still inside the house of Villaflores. The wife of the accused also gave a supporting testimony that on the night of July 2, 1999 she saw his husband place some sacks under their house and then went closer and saw a protruding elbow inside the sack, when she confronted his husband who was on drugs, Villaflores said it was nothing. B a s e d f r o m t h e s e circumstances, the RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with homicide holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction. The accused appealed and argued that both RTC and CA erred in convicting him of a composite crime of Rape with homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of Rape with Homicide? HELD: No. Decision of Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides: Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed 1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstance mentioned above be present. xxx 86 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Xxx When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.xxx The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide. In both composite crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. As can be noted, each of said composite crimes is punished with a single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter with death. The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in determining whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To understand what homicide may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the rape, a resort to the meaning the framers of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful. Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to the rape, became evident. Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit K) disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape. We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several circumstances, which when appreciated together and not piece by piece, according to the CA, were seen as strands which create a pattern when interwoven, and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with homicide.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons JOJIT GARINGARAO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 192760, 20 July 2011, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio, J.) The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will. The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. FACTS: AAA, 16 years of age, was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. AAA was admitted at the hospital for further observation. The next day, her father and mother left the hospital to process AAAs Medicare papers and to attend to their store, respectively, leaving AAA alone in her room. When her father returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home. The doctor allowed them due to AAAs insistence but instructed her that she should continue her medications. At home, AAA told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her. They went back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the nurses station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day. An Information was filed against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. During the trial, AAA testified that, Garingarao, entered her room to check her medications and if she was still experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAAs bra and touched her left breast and insisted that he was only examining her. Garingarao also slid his finger inside AAAs private part and only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period. In his defense, the accused testified that he went inside AAAs room to administer her medicines and check her vital signs. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the argument he had with AAAs father about the administering of medicines. He was supported by the testimony of the nursing aide, Tamayo. Garingarao further alleged that, assuming the charges were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. The RTC found Garingarao guilty as charged and gave credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingaraos denial, which was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the single incident of act of lasciviousness would suffice to hold the accused liable under RA 7610? RULING: YES. Decision of CA is AFFIRMED. The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. It is a settled rule that denial is a weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim. Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible witness. Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides: Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in 88 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious conduct is defined as follows: [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just examining her. The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will. In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her. Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true, he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident happened only once. Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA 7610. This argument has no legal basis. The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610. The Court finds Jojit Garingarao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DINA DULAY y PASCUAL G.R. No. 193854. September 24, 2012. THIRD DIVISION, PERALTA, J.

Private complainant AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister introduced Dina Dulay to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, Dina convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino to look for Dina's boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Nio at Don Galo. However, her boyfriend was also not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish, they saw her boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, Dina and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, Dina suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to Dina and heard "Speed" tell her to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for Dina's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but she did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and Dina told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her. AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police station. Thus, an Information was filed. , appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Therafter, trial on the merits ensued. RTC found appellant Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The appellant Dulay brought the case to the CA. The latter, on August 4, 2010, promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC with a modification on the award of damages Issue Whether Dina Dulay Is guilty of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. Held The appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby DISMISSED. However, the Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610, amended, for which she is sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity. In sustaining the conviction of the appellant as co-principal by indispensable cooperation, the CA, ratiocinated: To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of each case. The cooperation must be indispensable, that is, without which the commission of the crime would not have been accomplished. x x x 90 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons xxxx The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely on the above-cited example. It will be noted that the cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted in performing an act which is different from the act of execution of the crime committed by the rapist. Accused-appellant cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by "Speed" by acts without which the crime would not have been consummated, since she prepared the way for the perpetration thereof, convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her boyfriend and upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the victim inside a room where "Speed" was waiting, delivered the victim to him, and then after receiving some amount of money from "Speed" she settled in another room together with her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely consummate the rape with violence and intimidation, as he did. However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the trial court, as sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape. Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed. In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states that: Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: (a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons (1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; (2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; (3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; (4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or (5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.21 The elements of paragraph (a) are: 1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution; 2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means: a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution; 3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and 4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit. As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant facilitated or induced child prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. Thus, the act of apellant in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go with her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the above-mentioned law. The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and 92 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. A child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused of Rape under Article 266A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, and then went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610 in its body. The Information partly reads: x x x the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent x x x Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant acting as a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be remembered that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK G.R. No. 174659, July 28, 2008. EN BANC. CORONA, J. At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonalds outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mothers sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment. The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christopher s whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating her misery. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy. On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresas niece.Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place. At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitangs Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher. Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with Christopher.Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no 94 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as surname. Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Tauraks watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom. Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty. The trial court rendered a decision on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Issue Whether the accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping for ransom. Held We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty. Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659: ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. 95 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim7 or a public officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official. If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces ones right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare. The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only after almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived or restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants custody and return to his family on his own. He had no choice but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At such a very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother. Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte. She demanded P30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantaks actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence. The Court of Appeals considered the demand for P30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, 96 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-lodging.") Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial. In this case, the payment of P30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for ransom. One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 9346 has banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MILLANO MUIT et. al. G.R. No. 181043, 08 October 2008 SECOND DIVISION (Tinga, J.) The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. The totality of the prosecution's evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The crime of carnapping was also committed in this case when the victim's Pajero was forcibly taken away from him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site. Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at the latter's house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.), Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and four other men to convince him to use his house as a safehouse for their "visitor." Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky for him and his family. Hermano however told Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they will get would be shared equally among them. Later, five other men came and they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri. That evening, Morales handed to Ferraer for safekeeping a folded carton which contained guns. Pancho, Jr. introduced Romeo to Ferraer as the informant since he is an insider and a trusted general foreman of the victim. On December 2, 1997, the group received a call from Romeo informing them that the victim was already at the construction site. Hermano, Morales, Udon, Manuel, Bokbok, and Muit then commuted to the construction site. At around two o'clock in the afternoon of the same date, Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan and the victim to visit the Flexopac project site. Seraspe talked with Armand Chavez (Chavez), the warehouseman of ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss. After the site inspection, three armed men surrounded the Pajero. Two of them approached Seraspe and Chavez. One of the armed men, Muit, poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and Chavez to lay prostrate on the ground. The assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero. They forced the victim to order Seraspe to give them the keys to the Pajero. They then started the Pajero and drove away together with the victim. The incident was reported to the authorities and who later proceeded to set up a barricade. Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was spotted. When policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle. While two policemen approached the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened their car doors and started firing at the policemen. At this point, all the policemen present at the scene fired back. All the occupants of the Pajero, except the driver and the front passenger who managed to escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the escapees who turned out to be Muit, the driver of the Pajero. On the other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their agreed meeting place but did not find Hermano's group there. Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway in front of the construction site. He thought that he had been left behind when he did not see the group, so he left. At around 5:30 in the morning of December 3, 1997, Ferraer saw on the news the Pajero riddled with bullets. That night, Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers of Udon, Morales, Manuel, Bokbok and the victim, and the Pajero riddled with bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs. They were later charged with kidnapping with homicide and carnapping. They were convicted by the trial court of the charge and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition. 98 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and carnapping HELD: Petition DENIED. The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. The totality of the prosecution's evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, defines "carnapping" as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. The crime was committed in this case when the victim's Pajero was forcibly taken away from him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site. The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached and convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to kidnap. They planned the crime in Ferraer's house and waited for the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at the construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on December 2, 1997 informing them that the victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry out their plan. At the construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group pointed their guns at the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot out in which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a shoot out and most of them were killed, and that Muit was arrested by the police.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM and MARON LAJIM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179570, 4 February 2010 THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.) Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. A fifteen-year-old minor AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Brgy. Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan when suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the hair of AAA and told her, Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with me, I will kill you. Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to shield herself with a plastic container. AAA was crying while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon Dama and said, If you will not go, I will shoot you. Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on. While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire, her life would be spared. She was sexually abused three times on the ground, where she was made to lie down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest in the morning of the following day and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape. Upon learning of the incident, AAAs mother came to the house of Egap to get her but Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities. Egap asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown document, which she was not able to read. Nine days after the abduction upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time. The mother of AAA and Inon Dama later decided to go to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's abduction to the proper authorities. The defense denied having committed the crimes charged. Sajiron claimed that he and AAA were engaged for three years prior to their elopement. The RTC rendered a 100 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security Decision finding Sajiron and Maron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron were also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused of the crimes charged HELD: Petition DENIED. The assertion of the accused that the reason why a criminal case was filed against him was his failure to pay the P10,000.00 dowry is too lame to be accepted as true. No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she has been raped unless that is the truth. Even in these modern times, this principle holds true. When the offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by a court trial, if their accusation were not true. Neither is the Court convinced of the sweetheart theory, the defense of the accused, by alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their elopement and marriage. The sweetheart theory proffered by the accused is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim, which consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence. The sweetheart theory hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts. In the case at bar, Sajiron was unable to present any evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense and mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from the charges filed against them. It bears stressing that during her testimony before the trial court, AAA vehemently denied that she and Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that the latter never lived in their house. However, the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the trial court's judgment finding Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties. Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction is against her will; and (c) that the abduction is with lewd designs. A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would readily show that the allegations therein do not charge the accused with forcible abduction, because the taking, as alleged, was not with lewd designs. The only act that was alleged to have been attended with lewd design was the act of rape. Upon further perusal of the allegations in the information, it appears that the crime charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. 101 | P a g e

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Although the information does not specifically allege the term kidnap or detain, the information specifically used the terms take and carry away. Tokidnap is to carry away by unlawful force or fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away. Whereas, to take is to get into one's hand or into one's possession, power, or control by force or strategem. Thus, the word take, plus the accompanying phrase carry away, as alleged in the information, was sufficient to inform the accused that they were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA. The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron and Maron against her will and brought to the forest; and, on the occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation -- had carnal knowledge of AAA. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In the present case, although AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home. The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault. The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v. Larraaga, the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime: This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be 102 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659." Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. Thus, the Court holds that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 12281. In Criminal Case No. 12309, the Court also finds Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention. All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant case: AAA, a female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was raped in the forest, she was brought to and detained at the house of Egap and forced to cohabit with Sajiron. From the very start of her detention on July 2, 1994, Egap directed Sajiron to guard her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape. She did not dare to escape because the accused threatened to kill her and her family if she attempted to flee. AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife. Even the two sons of Egap, upon the latter's instruction, constantly guarded and threatened her to keep her from leaving. In fine, the accused had successfully instilled fear in AAA's mind that escaping would cause her not only her own life, but also the lives of her loved ones.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR., G.R. No. 186417 27 July 2011 SECOND DIVISION (PEREZ, J) The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped

AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife.
FACTS: AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla. It was eve of the fiesta, At the plaza, AAA was dancing with her elder sister. AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knifes point thrust at her right side. * She only came to know the mans name after her escape, at the police station. He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped through crowd, walked farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. After hours of walking, they reached a hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing the cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis where AAA was first raped. Mirandilla and his gang epeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth from one place to another on the following nights and was raped repeatedly. She was allegedly raped 27 times One afternoon, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran. Finally, she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the mans face she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. In his defense, Mirandilla said that he could not have kidnapped and raped the victim, AAA whom he claims to be his live-in partner

RTCs Ruling: Mirandilla guilty of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual
assault

Reasons :
1. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the company of three others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA 2. Held her in detention for thirty-nine days in separate cells 3. Carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty seven times, employing force and intimidation. 4. The twenty seven sexual intercourses were eventually perpetrated in diferrent cities and towns 5. Once, Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA against her will while employing intimidation, threats, and force

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CAs Ruling: Affirmed with modification. Mirandilla, guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape. four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault. rejected Mirandillas defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual Reason: Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to sustain his defense. ISSUE: Whether or not Mirandilla is guilty of of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape. HELD: The appealed decision is DENIED. Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v. Larraaga this arises where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses. Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.[ It having been established that Mirandillas act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JERRY JACALNE y GUTIERREZ G.R. No. 168552 3 October 2011 THIRD DIVISION (PERALTA, J) The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with the intent of the accu sed to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. FACTS: The prosecution established the following facts: The victim then seven (7) years of age, female While on her way home, she noticed that Jacalne was following her. She ran, but appellant eventually caught up with her. Jacalne told her that she should go with him, but refused and told him that her mother would be angry. The victim held on to a post, but appellant dragged and forced her to go to his house at which is 100 to 150 meters away. When they reached Jacalnes house, he placed her at the back of the steel gate of his fenced residence. Thereafter, appellant went inside the house then returned with a piece of rope. He used the rope in tying the hands of the victim. The latter pleaded that she be released because her mother would be worried, but appellant refused. After more or less one hour,Jacalne untied victims hands and instructed her to walk straight toward the road. He even told her not to turn left, otherwise, she would not be able to reach home. Appellant also threatened her not to tell anybody of what happened or else he would kill her. Jomarie reached home around noon then took her lunch. She did not tell her mother Marissa Rosales (Marissa) about the incident because of fear, until after three days. Marissa reported the incident to the barangay and had it blottered. Jacalne denied the accusation against him. He explained that, while in his house, painting a tricycle, the victim and her mother Marissa, and two others approached him then asked if he is familiar with a nipa hut or a house surrounded by plants, which he answered in the negative. They likewise mentioned to him about an incident whereby a child was tied and raped. After telling them that he was not aware of the incident, the four left.

RTC s Ruling: Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. CAs Ruling: Affirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo ISSUE: Whether or not the accused appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention HELD: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official. Records show that the prosecution established the above elements. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. Appellant dragged the victim, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her hands. When the victim pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he refused. Although the victim only stayed outside the house, it was inside the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant tied the hands of the victim, the formers intention to deprive the victim of her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of her tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more or less one hour, released the

victim and instructed her on how she could go home.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEOFILO BAYUGAN G.R. No. 187733, February 8, 2012 (Brion, J.) Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes were committed at the same time. FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Teofilo Bayugan (Bayugan) guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. The RTC based their decision on the witnesses testifying that they saw Bayugan shot Jun Calixto when he and another person (John Doe) robbed the WT Construction Supply store. The RTC also gave credence on the testimonies of witnesses saying that they saw Bayugan shot Police Officer 2 Arsenio Osorio while the latter was chasing him. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the lower court explaining that in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Bayugan is not guilty of the complex crime robbery with homicide HELD: Petition DENIED. Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes were committed at the same time. In the present case, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The eyewitness accounts of the prosecution witnesses are worthy of belief as they were clear and straightforward and were consistent with the medical findings of Dr. Vladimir Villaseor. The records show that after John Doe robbed the WT Construction Supply store, he casually walked away from the store but Calixto grabbed him. While John Doe and Calixto were grappling with each other, the Bayugan suddenly appeared from behind and shot Calixto on the head. Immediately after, both the Bayugan and John Doe ran towards the Hilltop Road going to the direction of the Hangar Market. Clearly, the two accused acted in concert to attain a common purpose. Their respective actions summed up to collective efforts to achieve a common criminal objective. In People v. Ebet, we explained that homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if its commission was (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate 108 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery. Under the given facts, the Bayugan clearly shot Calixto to facilitate the escape of his robbercompanion, John Doe, and to preserve the latters possession of the stolen items.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO SUYU, WILLY SUYU, FRANCIS CAINGLET and ROMMEL MACARUBBO G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006 (Callejo, J.) The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. FACTS: Clarissa Angeles (Angeles) was eating with her boyfriend William Ferrer (Ferrer) inside a pick-up truck in a parking lot when they were approached by men. Rommel Macarubbo (Macarubbo) appeared in front of the truck and declared a hold-up. Willy Suyu (Willy) entered the truck and took Ferrers wallet. Another man which is Francis Cainglet (Cainglet) took Angeles jewelries. After the men took their possessions, Willy clubbed Ferrer and dragged him out of the truck. Ferrer then took the chance and escaped and went immediately to the police station to report the incident. The men dragged Angeles to a hilly place and brought her to the house of Rodolfo Suyu (Rodolfo). Macarubbo and Willy Suyu held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked a fan knife at her. They gave Angeles to Rodolfo, who tried to rape her. The other 3 served as look out. However, they saw a beam of light, thus they transferred to the top of the hill. There, the Rodolfo and Cainglet succeeded in raping Angeles while the remaining 2 served as lookouts. After, they released Angeles. At the police station, she declared that there was merely an attempt to rape her. At that time, she was ashamed to admit in front of her boyfriend that she had been abused. Angeles filed a complaint for robbery and rape against Rodolfo, Willy, Cainglet and Macarubbo (appellants). The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found them guilty of the crime robbery with rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are not guilty of the crime of robbery with rape HELD: Petition DENIED. The trial court found Clarissa's testimony to be consistent, believable, and credible, hence, is worthy of full faith and credit. The CA reviewed Clarissa's testimony and found the same to be clear, sincere and could have only come from the mouth of a victim. During the grueling cross- examination conducted by three separate counsels of appellants, she remained steadfast in her testimony that she was raped. The credibility of complainant's testimony is a primordial consideration in rape cases for the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she was raped after the robbery, this does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a rape victim right after her ordeal to remain mum about what really transpired. Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. Understandably, Clarissa was reluctant to reveal, while at the police station, the fact that she was raped, considering that her boyfriend was present when she made her first statement before the police investigator. Further, one of the investigating officers was her townmate. Indeed, the fear of social humiliation prevented Clarissa from revealing, at the time, the details of her defilement. She was in a state of trauma, impelled by her natural instinct to put out of her mind such a painful and disturbing experience. Oftentimes, victims would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private than reveal their shame to the world. In her desire for justice, she, nonetheless, later revealed the true events that happened on that fateful night. Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr. Pintucan does not conclusively suggest that Clarissa was raped, for during the examination, her deportment was not of that of a rape victim and the examination of her cervix did not even suggest forcible assault. The said argument is, however, without merit. Hymenal lacerations which are usually inflicted when there is complete penetration are not essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of the vagina takes place. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration; the rape is deemed consummated in either case. Dr. Pintucan further found contusion and hematoma on the victim, which bolsters Clarissa's recount that she was dragged, forced to lie down, and raped. The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is correct. The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. We note that aside from raping the victim, appellant Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in her sexual organ. Appellant Suyu, thus, committed sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353. Also, aside from Rodolfo Suyu, Cainglet raped the victim. Nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN CABBAB, JR. G.R. No. 173479, 12 July 2007, FIRST DIVISION (Garcia, J.) In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery Facts: Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police Officer William Belmes was supposed to attend a fiesta, however, the fiesta had already ended. On their way home, the group met Juan Cabbac, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who invited them to play Pepito. Winner ended up winning the game. Again on their way home, gunshots were suddenly fired and Belmes saw that Winner and Quindasan got hit. The unwounded group members reported the incident to the police, leaving their companions behind thinking that they were dead. When the group returned to the scene with the police, however, they saw that Quindasan was still alive. Quindasan told them that it was Cabbab and Calpito who ambushed them and took Winners winnings Quindasan died the following day. Cabbab and Calpito, were charged with the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery before the RTC. Both accused interposed the defense of alibi that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed. George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he conducted an examination on the paraffin cast on Cabbab but the test came out negative. RTC acquitted Calpito of the crime for lack of but held Cabbab, Jr. guilty of (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. As RTC sentenced Cabbab of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the case was transmitted to SC on automatic review but the SC transmitted it to CA instead. CA affirmed the RTCs decision, hence, the present automatic review. Issue: Whether or not Cabbab is criminally liable for robbery with homicide Held: The decision subject of automatic review is AFFIRMED. The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery with Homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed.. The Court feels, however, that the courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime of attempted murder for the shooting of Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO M. BASAO alias "Dodong,", et al G.R. No. 189820, 10 October 2012, FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro, J.) When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. Facts: Emelie Hashiba testified that as she was preparing supper for her family, five (5) men entered their house with gun pointed to her younger brother, Crisologo Lopio. One of them announced and said; "Dont worry, we are NPA" (New Peoples Army) and continued to say; "Huwag kayo matakot, pera lang ang kailangan namin", which means, (Do not be afraid, we only need money.) "Hindi kayo maano." (You will not be harmed.) All of them were terrified seeing the armed men with their guns and a hand grenade. The accused bought Emelie to the bedroom and there she was divested of money and jewelries. She was asked if that was her only money and she answered in the affirmative. The accused then asked for 3Million pesos but for failure to produce it, the accused kidnapped Emilies husband but was later on released. Accused were charged with Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for Ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention. RTC convicted the accused of the crimes charged in the information and sentenced the accused to death penalty for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. On automatic review by CA, CA reduced the penalty, hence, the accused seeks recourse through the present appeal. Issue: Whether or not the accused are criminally liable for the crimes of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for Ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention Held: The crime of robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) intent to gain, (b) unlawful taking, (c) personal property belonging to another, and (d) violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things. Under Article 296 of the same Code, "when more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band." All of the foregoing elements had been satisfactorily established herein. At least five (5) people, carrying guns and a hand grenade, barged into the home of, and forcibly took pieces of jewelry and other personal properties belonging to the spouses. Accused themselves made their intent to gain clear when they assured their victims that they were only after the money.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property People vs Hipona G.R. No. 185709, Feb. 18, 2010 Robbery was the main intent of Hipona, and AAAs death resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery Facts: AAA, aunt of Michael Hipona, was found dead on the morning in her house in ICagayan de Oro City. She was raped, physically manhandled and strangled, which eventually led to her death. AAAs necklace with two heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag were likewise missing. BBB, Hipona's mother executed an affidavit that her son-appellant had told her that "Mama, Im sorry, I did it because I did not have the money,". On the basis of BBBs information, the police arrested Hipona. He was at the time wearing AAAs missing necklace. In the presence of the media, Hipona confessed to the killing then implicated his co-accused Romulo B. Seva, Jr. (Seva) alias "Gerpacs" and a certain "Reypacs." On the basis of the confession, Hipona, together with Romulo Seva, Jr. and one John Doe, was charged with Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) for the rape and subsequent death of (AAA) who is Hipona's the aunt. The RTC convicted Hipona of "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" and the CA affirmed the decision. Hipona argued that he should only be held liable for robbery and not for the complex crime of "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" Issue: Whether the charge "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" against Hipona was correct. Ruling: Petition DENIED From the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of Hipona, and AAAs death resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. Following Article 294(1)16 and Article 62(1)117 of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead. A word on the amount of exemplary damages awarded. As the Court finds the award of P100,000 exemplary damages excessive, it reduces it to P25,000, in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property People vs Evangelio In the crime of robbery with rape, band is considered as an aggravating circumstance. . Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. Facts: Edgar Evangelio, Joseph Evangelio, Atilano Agaton and Noel Malpas forcibly entered the inhabited residence of BBB and CCC. While inside, they took several jewelries, wallets, bags and cameras. The four men accosted AAA, BBB and CCC's servant, warned her to keep quiet, and brought her to the living room. There, they herded all the other members of the household whom they caught and bound their hands and feet, and thereafter, placed masking tapes over their captives eyes. With her eyes partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant inside the comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the robbers stripped off AAA's clothes and removed her panty. AAA resisted and fought back but they slammed her head twice against the concrete wall, causing her to lose consciousness. The accused were charged and convicted in the RTC with robbery with rape. The CA affirmed the decision. Issues: 1. Whether the accused were properly convicted of Robbery with Rape 2. Whether dwelling and commission of a crime by a band can be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance Ruling: Petition DENIED 1. To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.[29] In the case at bar, the original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery. In this case, the prosecution established that appellant and his three co-accused took the pieces of jewelry and valuables of the spouses BBB and CCC by means of violence and intimidation. Appellant and his co-accused barged into the house of the victims armed with a handgun and knives and tied the hands and feet of the members of the household. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Having established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by the appellant, intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Thus, the first three elements of the crime were clearly established. 115 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property 2. The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of the commission of a crime by a band and dwelling. In the crime of robbery with rape, band is considered as an aggravating circumstance. The prosecution established that one of the accused was armed with a handgun, while the other three had knives when they committed the crime The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was also attendant in the present case. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. In this case, robbery with violence was committed in the house of the victims without provocation on their part. In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt hi m or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property RICKY TOOTSIE MARQUEZ, et. al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.No. 181138, 3 December 2012 (Del Castillo, J.) "The testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of a deliberate afterthought. "If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate house, the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302." and not Article 299 of the RPC.

FACTS: Ricky "Totsie" Marquez (Marquez), Roy Bernardo (Bernardo), Jomer Magalong (Magalong) and Ryan Benzon (Benzon) were charged with the crime of Robbery. The above-named accused with Marlon Mallari (Mallari), destroying the door lock of the stall of one Sonia Valderosa by using a lead pipe, entered the store and carried away all the items inside it which consisted of rice cookers, a blender and food items. The total value of these stolen items was approximately P42,000.00. When Valderosa reported the robbery to the police, Mallari, who served as look-out during the incident, informed his older brother of his involvement in the said robbery. The next day, Mallari confessed to Valderosa. The petitoners, on their part, however, denied the same. They said that on the day of the incident, they were having videoke session near UE, and before going home, they decided to eat lugaw. On their way to lugawan, they saw Mallari standing in front of the store, and when they were on their way home they saw the store was already opened. However, they did not report the incident to the police or barangay authorities. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the prosecution. The RTC ruled that Mallaris personal identification of petitioners and Benzon, and his narration of their individual participation in the robbery were sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court disregarded the petitioners denial and alibi considering that it was not physically impossible for them to be in the crime scene or its vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. It stressed that the place petitioners claimed to be in was a mere walking distance from the site of the burglary. On appeal, the petitioners raised that the trial court should not have given credence to Mallaris testimony because he is not a credible witness and that the trial court erred in ruling that there was conspiracy since the participation of Bernardo in the alleged robbery was vague. The CA held that while Mallari was a co-conspirator and his testimony was uncorroborated, same was still sufficient to convict petitioners since it "carries the hallmarks of honesty and truth." It clearly established Bernardos participation in the conspiracy in that he, together with another petitioner, carried away from the 117 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property store all the stolen items. Hence, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding the petitioners guilty of the crime under Article 299 of the RPC. ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of denial and alibi of the petitioners should be disregarded and the petitioners should be convicted of the crime of Robbery based only on the uncorroborated testimony of Mallari. HELD: Mallaris positive identification of petitioners as the perpetrators of the robbery and the absence of any ill motive on his part to testify falsely against them prevail over petitioners denial and alibi. As repeatedly held, alibi is the weakest defense since it can easily be fabricated and difficult to disprove. Hence as a rule, the defenses of denial and alibi can only prosper if there is evidence that the accused were not only in another place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for them to be within the immediate vicinity. Here, while petitioners denied being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, they failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be in the store at the time of the robbery. In fact, they testified that they were in a place only about 15 meters away from the scene of the crime. Moreover, while the Court is well-aware of the general rule that "the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless such testimony is supported by evidence,"there is, however, an exception. Thus, "the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought," as in this case. A review of the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of Mallari showed that same was sincere since it was given without hesitation and in a simple manner. His recollection of the events was detailed and candid such that it could not have been a concoction from a polluted mind. Thus, Mallaris testimony, even if uncorroborated, deserves full weight and credence and, therefore, sufficient to establish petitioners commission of the crime charged.

Robbery with force upon things in an uninhabited place under Article 302 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) Under Article 293 of the RPC, robbery is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another by using force upon anything. When committed in an uninhabited place or a private building with the circumstance, among others, that any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken, the same is penalized under Article 302. "If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate house, the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302." and not Article 299 of the RPC, which refers to robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Luis Marcos Laurel v. Hon. Zeus Abrogar, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES& PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, GR No. 155076; 13 January 2009 CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal property. Consequently,any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos; US v Tambunting; US v Genato*), so long as the same is not included in the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code. The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it be subject to appropriation. xxx. The human voice and the electronic voice signals or current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession, occupation or appropriation FACTS: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is the holder of a legislative franchise to render local and international telecommunication services under Republic Act No. 7082. Under said law, PLDT is authorized to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase telecommunication systems, including transmitting, receiving and switching stations, for both domestic and international calls. Laurel, a member of the board of directors and corporate secretary of Baynet, and the other members of the board of directors of said corporation, namely, Yuji Hijioka, Yasushi Ueshima, Mukaida, Lacson and Villegas, were charged of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly taking, stealing, and using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of outing and completing international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and caused damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92. Laurel moved to quash the complaint for theft as the property (service/business) contemplated by PLDT is not the one embraced in ART 308 of RPC nor any special law for that matter. PLDT opposed the motion to quash alleging that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft. RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Quash the Amended Information. The court declared that, although there is no law that expressly prohibits the use of ISR, the facts alleged in the Amended Information "will show how the alleged crime was committed by conducting ISR," to the damage and prejudice of PLDT. The appellate court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not the proper remedy of the petitioner. On the merits of the petition, it held that while business is generally an activity 119 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property which is abstract and intangible in form, it is nevertheless considered "property" under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA opined that PLDTs business of providing international calls is personal property which may be the object of theft. Thus he filed a motion for certiorari before the SC alleging the following: the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information. As gleaned from the material averments of the amended information, he was charged with stealing the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT, not its business. Moreover, the RTC failed to distinguish between the business of PLDT (providing services for international long distance calls) and the revenues derived therefrom. He opined that a "business" or its revenues cannot be considered as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, since a "business" is "(1) a commercial or mercantile activity customarily engaged in as a means of livelihood and typically involving some independence of judgment and power of decision; (2) a commercial or industrial enterprise; and (3) refers to transactions, dealings or intercourse of any nature." On the other hand, the term "revenue" is defined as "the income that comes back from an investment (as in real or personal property); the annual or periodical rents, profits, interests, or issues of any species of real or personal property."

ISSUE: Whether or not the property contemplated by PLDT falls within the ambit of ART. 308 of RPC.

HELD: Petition is granted. The assailed decision of RTC and CA is hereby reversed and ser aside. The Regional Trial Court is directed to issue an order granting the motion of the petitioner to quash the Amended Information. The court finds that the international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The rule is that, penal laws are to be construed strictly. It is Congress, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow interpretation" is appropriate. And only when the congressional purpose is unclear that court my rule on its lenity. Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows: Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent. For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property which intent is apart from and concurrently with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolus malus). An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with intent to gain; and (d) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation of person/s or force upon things. One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing alone, covers both tangible and intangible properties and are subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must be considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law. The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only movable properties which have physical or material existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of theft. According to Cuello Callon, in the context of the Penal Code, only those movable properties which can be taken and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft. Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not subject of theft because the same cannot be "taken" from the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated. A naked right existing merely in contemplation of law, although it may be very valuable to the person who is entitled to exercise it, is not the subject of theft or larceny. Such rights or interests are intangible and cannot be "taken" by another. Thus, right to produce oil, good will or an interest in business, or the right to engage in business, credit or franchise are properties. So is the credit line represented by a credit card. However, they are not proper subjects of theft or larceny because they are without form or substance, the mere "breath" of the Congress. There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of personal property even if for a short time; or if such property is under the dominion and control of the thief. The taker, at some particular amount, must have obtained complete and absolute possession and control of the property adverse to the rights of the owner or the lawful possessor thereof.It is not necessary that the property be actually carried away out of the physical possession of the lawful possessor or that he should have made his escape with it.Neither asportation nor actual manual possession of property is required. Constructive possession of the thief of the property is enough. Gas and electrical energy should not be equated with business or services provided by business entrepreneurs to the public. Business does not have an exact definition. Business is referred as that which occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit. It embraces everything that which a person can be employed. Business may also mean employment, occupation or profession. Business is also defined as a commercial activity for gain benefit or advantage. Business, like services in business, although are properties, are not proper subjects of theft under the Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be "taken" or "occupied." If it were otherwise, as claimed by the respondents, there would be no juridical difference between the taking of the business of a person or the services provided by him for gain, vis--vis, the taking of goods, wares or merchandise, or equipment comprising his business. If it was its intention to include "business" as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the Philippine Legislature should have spoken in language that is clear and definite: that business is personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. 121 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Respondent PLDT does not acquire possession, much less, ownership of the voices of the telephone callers or of the electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls. The human voice and the electronic voice signals or current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession, occupation or appropriation by the respondent PLDT or even the petitioner, for that matter. PLDT merely transmits the electronic voice signals through its facilities and equipment. Baynet Card Ltd., through its operator, merely intercepts, reroutes the calls and passes them to its toll center.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. 160188, June 21, 2007, En Banc, Tinga, J Theft is already produced upon the taking of personal property of another without the latters consent. Theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. FACTS: Petitioner Valenzuela and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Petitioner then left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00. The Regional Trial Court convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioners conviction. Hence the present Petition for Review. ISSUE: Whether petitioner should be convicted of frustrated theft rather than consummated theft. HELD: Petition denied. The determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony was produced after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. 123 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property The following are elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft is already produced upon the taking of personal property of another without the latters consent. U.S. v. Adiao apparently supports that notion, where, in support of its conclusion that the theft was consummated, the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. In those cases, the criminal actors had been able to obtain full possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension. Synthesis of the 3 decisions is in order. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary. Such conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in determining whether theft had been consummated. No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether the Spanish cases or authorities who may have bolstered the conclusion. For such reasons, the Spanish cases/ authorities cannot be considered. Even if such were offered, given that there has been no reaffirmation by the SC, such rulings cannot be applied. Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective, as the SC is not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage. With such considerations, the SC can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ANITA MIRANDA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 176298, January 25, 2012, First Division, Villarama, Jr., J As long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property. FACTS: Video City Commercial, Inc. (VCCI) and Viva Video City, Inc. (Viva) were sister companies which managed a chain of stores known as VideoCity. These stores, some company-owned while others were operated in joint ventures with franchisees, were engaged in the sale and rental of video-related merchandises. During the period of April 28, 1998 to May 2, 2002, petitioner was the accounting clerk and bookkeeper of VCCI and Viva. One of her duties was to disburse checks for the accounts she handled. She was assigned to handle twelve (12) VideoCitystore franchise accounts, including those of Tommy Uy, Wilma Cheng, Jefferson Tan and Sharon Cuneta. As regards the franchisee Jefferson Tan, who was out of the country most of the time, Tan pre-signed checks to cover the stores disbursements and entrusted them to petitioner. The pre-signed checks by Jefferson Tan were from a current account maintained jointly by VCCI and Jefferson Tan at BPI Family Bank, Sta. Mesa. There was also an existing agreement with the bank that any disbursement not exceeding P20,000.00 would require only Tans signature. Taking advantage of Tans constant absence from the country, petitioner was able to use Tans joint -venture bank account with VCCI as a clearing house for her unauthorized transfer of funds. Petitioner deposited VCCI checks coming from other franchisees accounts into the said bank account, and withdrew the funds by writing checks to her name using the checks pre-signed by Tan. It was only after petitioner went on maternity leave and her subsequent resignation from the company in May 2002 that an audit was conducted since she refused to turn over all the financial records in her possession. The audit was made on all the accounts handled by petitioner and it was discovered that she made unauthorized withdrawals and fund transfers amounting to P4,877,759.60. The prosecution, in proving that petitioner had unlawfully withdrawn P797,187.85 for her own benefit, presented as its witness Jose Laureola, the assistant manager/acting cashier of BPI Family Bank, Sta. Mesa Branch. Laureola presented a microfilm of the checks, the encashed checks and deposit slips. He also presented the bank statement of VCCI which showed the encashment of forty-two (42) checks from the account of VCCI and Jefferson Tan amounting to P797,187.85. Both the RTC and CA found petitioner guilty of qualified theft. RTC held that petitioner took advantage of her position with VCCI and her access to the checks and its bank accounts. While CA held hat contrary to petitioners claim that the prosecution failed to show who was the absolute owner of the thing stolen, there was no doubt that the personal property taken by petitioner does not belong to her but to Jefferson Tan and his joint venture partner VCCI. Thus, petitioner was able to gain from taking other peopl es property without their consent. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. 125 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property HELD: Petition denied. Petitioner insists that she should not have been convicted of qualified theft as the prosecution failed to prove the private complainants absolute ownership of the thing stolen. Further, she maintains that Jefferson Tans signatures on the checks were not identified by any witness who is familiar with his signature. She likewise stresses that the checks and vouchers presented by the prosecution were not original copies and that no secondary evidence was presented in lieu of the former. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances under Article 310 is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. Here, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P797,187.85 taken does not belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it without VCCIs consent and with grave abuse of confidence by taking advantage of her position as accountant and bookkeeper. The bank account was merely the instrument through which petitioner stole from her employer VCCI. As correctly held by the CA, the subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMEDIOS TANCHANCO y PINEDA G.R. No. 177761 April 18, 2012 DEL CASTILLO, J. The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal property; (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another; (3) x x x the taking [was] done with intent to gain; (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent of the owner; and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Under Article 310 of the [RPC], theft [becomes] qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence. x x x The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. FACTS: Private complainant Atty. Rebecca Manuel (Rebecca) knew Remedios Tanchanco (appellant) for more than 25 years. During this period, Rebecca and her children established a close relationship with appellant to the point that they treated her as a member of their family. Rebecca hired appellant to work in her office as legal secretary and liaison officer. One of appellants tasks as liaison officer was to process the transfer of titles of Rebeccas clients. In the course of appellants employment, Rebecca noticed that the completion of the transfer of titles was taking longer than usual. Upon inquiry, appellant attributed the delay to the cumbersome procedure of transferring titles, as well as to the fact that personnel processing the documents could not be bribed. Rebecca took appellants word for it. However, appellant suddenly abandoned her job. And when Rebecca reviewed appellants unfinished work, she discovered that the latter betrayed her trust and confidence on several occasions by stealing sums of money entrusted to her as payment for capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, transfer tax and other expenses intended for the transfer of the titles of properties from their previous owners to Rebeccas clients. The trial court found Tanchanco guilty of qualified theft because it found the existence of a high degree of confidence between Rebecca and appellant. It noted that the relationship between the two as employer-employee was not an ordinary one; appellant was being considered a part of Rebeccas family. Because of this trust and confidence, Rebecca entrusted to appellant cash in considerable sums which were liquidated through appellants own handwritten statements of expenses. However, appellant gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Rebecca when she pocketed the money entrusted to her for processing the clients land titles. And as a cover up, she presented to Rebecca either fake or altered receipts which she did not even deny during trial. The trial court thus found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling. ISSUE: Whether Tanchanco is guilty of qualified theft. 127 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property HELD: The appeal is DENIED. The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal property; (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another; (3) x x x the taking [was] done with intent to gain; (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent of the owner; and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. As to the first and second elements, the Court gave weight to the circumstances established by the prosecution which constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant took sums of money that were entrusted to her by the private complainant, to wit: (1) the appellant was the only person working for the private complainant during the period when she was hired as legal secretary and liaison officer; (2) her duties included the payment of taxes for the transfer of title from previous owners to new owners/buyers of the property; (3) the appellant admitted that she often received money from private complainant for payment of capital gains and transfer taxes; (4) the appellant was given a free hand in liquidating her expenses in her own handwriting; (5) upon verification from banks and government agencies with which the appellant transacted in relation to her tasks, the private complainant discovered that what the appellant submitted were handwritten padded liquidation statements because her reported expenses turned out to be higher than what she actually spent; and worse, the official receipts she submitted to private complainant were fake; and (6) conceding her guilt, the appellant suddenly disappeared leaving some of her tasks, unfinished. With regard to the third element, the intentional failure by appellant to properly and correctly account constitutes appropriation with intent to gain. Anent the fourth element pertaining to Rebeccas lack of consent, same is manifested by the fact that it was only after appellant abandoned her job that Rebecca discovered the missing sums of money. With regard to the fifth element, it is clear from the facts that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Under Article 310 of the [RPC], theft [becomes] qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence. The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. Here, it is undisputed that appellant was a close friend of Rebecca and her family. It was due to this personal relationship that appellant was employed by Rebecca as a legal secretary and liaison officer. By reason of this, all matters essentially pertaining to the conduct of business of the law office were known by, and entrusted to, appellant. This included the safekeeping of important documents and the handling of money needed for the processing of papers of Rebeccas clients. And as Rebecca trusted appellant completely, and by reason of her being the liaison officer, she handed the monies to appellant without requiring the latter to sign any paper to evidence her receipt thereof. It thus becomes clear that it is because 128 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property of the trust and confidence reposed by Rebecca upon appellant that the latter was able to make it appear from her liquidation statements that she spent the sums she received from Rebecca for their intended purposes. To conceal this, she presented to Rebecca fake or altered receipts for the supposed payment, all of which form part of the records as evidence. The Court therefore concludes that appellant took undue advantage of Rebeccas confidence in her when she appropriated for herself sums of money that the latter entrusted to her for a different purpose. The theft in this case was thus committed with grave abuse of confidence. Hence, appellant was correctly held by the lower courts as liable for qualified theft.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ERNESTO PIDELI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 163437 February 13, 2008 REYES, R.T., J. Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. Not all misappropriation is estafa. FACTS: Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson Pideli (Wilson) entered into a verbal partnership agreement to subcontract a rip-rapping and spillway project. They agreed to undertake the project in favor of ACL Construction (ACL). Petitioner Ernesto Pideli (petitioner), brother to Wilson and neighbor and friend to Placido, offered the duo the use of his credit line with the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH). With the said arrangement, Wilson and Placido, with the assistance of petitioner, were able to secure an assortment of construction materials for the rip-rap and spillway contract. After the completion of the project, ACL summoned all its subcontractors to a meeting. Placido, Wilson and petitioner were in attendance. At the meeting, ACL management informed Placido and Wilson that the final payment for the work that they have done would be withheld. It was learned that they failed to settle their accountabilities with the MTFSH. Placido, Wilson and petitioner made representations with the accountable ACL personnel, a certain Boy Candido, to facilitate the release of their payment. They assured Boy that the matter of the unpaid obligations to MTFSH has been resolved. Boy acceded to the request and proceeded to release the final payment due to Placido and Wilson. Consequently, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their expenses and arrived at a net income ofP130,000.00. Petitioner advised the two to first settle their accountabilities for the construction materials taken from the hardware store. Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full amount to petitioner, with express instructions to pay MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them. The following day, Placido attempted but failed to contact petitioner. He had hoped to obtain his share of the partnership income. Placido got hold of petitioner the next morning. Unexpectedly, petitioner informed Placido that nothing was left of the proceeds after paying off the supplier. Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to give Placido his share in the net income of the contract. Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a complaint for theft against petitioner. The RTC rendered a judgment CONVICTING the accused of the crime of theft. Petitioner appealed to the CA, which affirmed the trial courts disposition. ISSUE: What is the crime committed by Pideli, estafa or theft? 130 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property RULING: The appealed decision is AFFIRMED. Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the concept of the crime of theft as committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent. Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows: 1. That there be taking of personal property; 2. That said property belongs to another; 3. That the taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and 5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the construction contract. In an effort to exculpate himself, petitioner posits that he cannot be held liable for theft of the unaccounted funds. The monies subject matter of the complaint pertain to the partnership. The CA correctly debunked petitioners postulation in the following tenor: We likewise find no merit in appellants contention that the money did not belong to the private complainant as the latter was only claiming for his share. Complainants share manifestly belonged to and was owned by the private complainant. Appellants argument that since the money belonged to the partnership, hence, cannot be the object of the crime of theft as between the partners, and that appellant as their agent acted in good faith and without intent to gain, holds no water. Appellant was not complainants partner but his brother. As for his alleged acting in good faith and without intent of gain, it is jurisprudentially settled that intent is a mental state, the existence of which is made manifest by overt acts of the person. The intent to gain is presumed from the taking of property appertaining to another. When appellant received the disbursement, he had only physical custody of private complainants money, which was supposed to be applied to a particular purpose, i.e. settle the account with the supplier. Appellants failure to do so or to return the money to the private complainant renders him guilty of the crime of theft. We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that appellant had but the material/physical or de facto possession of the money and his act of depriving private complainant not only of the possession but also the dominion (apoderamiento) of his share of the

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property money such that he (the appellant) could dispose of the money at will constitutes the element of "taking" in the crime of theft. Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v. De Vera, the Court has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined: The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) orde facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Ferdinand A. Cruz v. The People of the Philippines G.R. No. 176504, 3 September 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario, J.) The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things. FACTS: Cruz, a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone which is a domestic corporation engaged in the lease of cellular phones and other communication equipment, took hold of a pad of official receipts from the desk of PortaPhones collection officer. With the pad of official receipts in his hands, Cruz proceeded to his client, Hemisphere, and delivered articles of communication equipment. Although he was not an authorized person to receive cash and issue receipts for Porta-Phone, Cruz received from Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00 as refundable deposit for the equipment. The next day, Cruz went to Porta-Phone and returned the pad of receipts, but failed to deliver the cash he received from Hemisphere. This incident came to the knowledge of the Chief Executive Officer. Thus the CEO invited Cruz to a meeting. In the meeting, the CEO demanded that Cruz return the collection. Cruz refused to turn over the amount and said that he would return the amount only upon his receipt of his reimbursements from the company. This prompted PortaPhone to file a criminal complaint for Qualified Theft against Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz should be convicted of the crime of Qualified Theft HELD: The RTC correctly convicted Cruz of the crime charged. The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things. Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence. The prosecution established, beyond the shadow of doubt that Cruz took and kept the P15,000 collection from the companys client. The collected amount belonged to Porta-Phone and not to Cruz. When he received the same, he was obliged to turn it over to the company since he had no right to retain it or to use it for his own benefit, because the amount was a refundable deposit for the communication items leased out by Porta-Phone to Hemisphere. As he had kept it for himself while knowing that the amount was not his, the presence of the element of unlawful taking is settled. 133 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information, in which it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of asportation. In this case, it was apparent that the reason why Cruz took the money was that he intended to gain by it. In the meeting held, Cruz admitted having received the amount and kept it until his reimbursements from the company would be released to him. The lack of consent by the owner of the asported money is manifested by the fact that Porta-Phone consistently sought the return of the same from Ferdinand in the meetings held for this purpose and in the various letters issued by the company. As a marketing manager of Porta-Phone, Ferdinand made use of his position to obtain the refundable deposit due to Porta-Phone and appropriate it for himself. He could not have taken the amount had he not been an officer of the said company. Clearly, the taking was done with grave abuse of confidence.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Rommel C. Briones v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 156009, 5 June 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J.) The distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. FACTS: S/G Dabbin Molina (S/G Molina) is a security guard of Fuentes Security and Allied Services; in the course of his employment with the security agency, S/G Molina was issued a .38 caliber revolver (firearm). While S/G Molina and S/G George Gual (S/G Gual) were manning a gate of BF Homes, Paraaque. They noticed a homeowner, being mauled by four (4) individuals, two (2) of whom were later identified as Briones and his brother, Vicente Briones (Vicente). S/G Molina and S/G Gual approached the group to stop the mauling; it was at this point that S/G Molina lost his firearm to Briones. A criminal information for robbery was filed against Briones. The RTC found Briones guilty of simple theft, while on appeal to the CA, the CA found him guilty of robbery. ISSUE: Whether or not there was accompanying violence or intimidation in the taking of firearm HELD: We agree with the RTC that only the crime of theft was committed in the case as S/G Gual's testimony does not show that violence or intimidation attended the taking of the firearm; S/G Gual only testified that Briones merely grabbed the firearm and ran away with it. Thus, we can only convict Briones for the crime of theft for taking S/G Molinas firearm without his consent. Theft is produced the moment there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking with intent to gain. To show that robbery was committed, the following elements must be proved: (1) the taking of personal property be committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; and (3) the taking be done with animo lucrandi. On the other hand, the elements constituting the crime of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. 135 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property BELEN REAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 152065, 29 January 2008, FIRST DIVISION (Azcuna, J.) Disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. FACTS: Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. On several occasions, Uy entrusted to Real pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of time. One day, Real arrived at Uys house and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as she had a buyer at that time. Because Real is his kumadre, since Uy was one of the sponsors in the wedding of Reals daughter, and because Real was his agent for quite a time, Uy agreed. Real selected seven pieces of jewelry for which Uy prepared a receipt (entitled Katibayan) and handed the same to Real. The receipt reflects the obligation of Real to return the said pieces of jewelry, if unsold, or to deliver the proceeds of the sale, if sold within ten days from receipt. Ten days thereafter, when Uy inquired about their transaction, Real told him that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but requested for an extension of the date of payment because the payment tendered to her was in the form of check. Thereafter, Uy patiently returned to Reals house for several times so that she could remit the proceeds of the sale to him. However, accused did not comply with her obligation. A final demand letter was sent, but still remained unheeded. Hence, Uy lodged a criminal complaint against Real before the City Prosecutor of Batangas. Thereafter, an Information for estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC was filed against Real. The trial court found Real guilty of the said crime. In its decision, it elaborated on the existence of the elements of abuse of confidence and misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the accused. Further, because of the fact that Real reached third year college and was Uys sales agent for quite a time, the RTC did not give credit to Reals denial of the Katibayan and allegation that she was made to sign in a blank piece of paper. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Now, Real posits that the RTC decisions total silence on the presence of damage or prejudice caused to private complainant Uy reveals the absence of the same, so as to constitute the crime of estafa. ISSUE: Whether or not the presence of damage or prejudice caused to the private complainant exists. HELD: Petition DENIED. 136 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to private complainant Uy, it cannot be denied that there exists a factual basis for holding that Reals refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry had prejudiced the rights and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. In this case, Uy, who is a businessman, not only failed to recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in as he ran the risk of being sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the same pieces of jewelry. To assert his legal recourse, Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ELISEO R. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 177720, 18 February 2009, THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario, J.) The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) does not require that the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party. FACTS: Private complainant Bankard, Inc. is a credit card company engaged in issuing credit cards and in acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from the purchase of goods and services by credit card holders using Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by other banks and credit card companies. Mastercard or Visa pays Bankard for the amount Bankard has paid the commercial establishments for the invoices it acquires. On the other hand, Mastercard or Visa debits Bankard for the amount due to other credit card companies or banks which acquire the invoices where the credit card used for the purchase is issued by Bankard. Procedurally, Bankard transmits to Equicom Computer Services, Inc. (Equicom) the invoices, instructions for debiting, credit advances and other documents relevant to encoding and posting. Thereafter, Equicom transmits through electronic mail the reports on the transactions to Bankard. Petitioner Eliseo Francisco Jr., then employed as the Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor of Bankard, was the only one tasked to convert the Equicom reports sent through electronic mail from its original ARJ Text Format to the Amipro Format used by Bankard. One time, Solidbank, one of the companies which issues credit cards, relayed to Bankard that there were four questionable transactions reflected in a Solidbank Mastercard account under the name of petitioner Francisco. An amount of money was allegedly credited to said account of petitioner Francisco, the credit apparently being a reversal of charges from four establishments. Another amount was also credited to petitioner Franciscos AIG Visa Card based on another supposed credit advance. The investigation conducted by Bankard confirmed that there were indeed anomalous reversals of charges and crediting of sums of money to petitioner Franciscos credit cards. Since there were no original purchase transactions charged against petitioner Franciscos credit cards, these credits appeared to be fictitious. As a result of these fraudulent acts by petitioner Francisco, Bankard was made to pay the same to Solidbank in the course of the settlement of transactions between the issuing banks from the time of the crediting of the amount to petitioner Franciscos credit card account until the fraudulent credits were charged back to Solidbank. Solidbank again charged back Bankard for the said amount. Thus, during the time the amount was charged against Bankard, the latter was unable to use such amount. Also, Bankard was unable to recover the amount which petitioner Francisco fraudulently credited to his AIG Visa Card. With this, an Information charging petitioner Francisco with estafa defined under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the RPC was filed with the RTC of Pasig City. The RTC found petitioner Francisco guilty of the crime charged. Petitioner Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial, which the RTC denied. The CA affirmed the conviction, ratiocinating that as a result of the fictitious credits which the accused caused to be posted in his credit cards, Bankard suffered damages because the latter was made to pay the same to Solidbank and AIG Visa. 138 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property

Hence, this petition, where petitioner Francisco contended that his lack of privity to the business deal between Bankard and the credit card companies (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa), could not have induced Bankard to part with its money or property because of any false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means committed by him, directed to the credit card companies. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of estafa requires that the fraudulent act should have intentionally been directed to the offended party. HELD: Petition DENIED. The following are the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(a) of the RPC as held by the Supreme Court in several cases: (1) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. (Emphasis supplied.) The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. It does not require that the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party. Thus, in this case wherein a person pretended to possess credit in order to defraud third persons (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa), but the offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof, such person is liable for estafa under Article 315(a), even though the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended party. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him. Moreover, CA correctly held that, contrary to the contention of petitioner Francisco, Bankard also suffered damages by reason of his fraudulent acts; thus, making Bankard a proper party to bring an action against him.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOURDERS LO, et al. G.R. No. 175229, 29 January 2009, FIRST DIVISION (LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value. FACTS: Accused-appellants Grace Calimon and Aida Comila were charged with illegal recruitment and estafa penalized under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the RPC. According to the information filed against them, the accused-appellants confederating and working together with a certain Lourdes Lo defrauded the private complainants Fe Magnaye, Lucila C. Agramon, and Daisy Devanadera. According to the private complainants, Lo persuaded the complainants to apply for a job in Italy through the services of the accusedappellants. Lo introduced them to Grace Calimon who represented herself as a sub-agent of Axil International Services and Consultancy (AISC) a legitimate recruitment agency. In the course of their business transactions accused-appellant Calimon introduced the complainants to Aida Comila who also misrepresented herself as an employee of AISC. Through these misrepresentations the accused-appellants were able to defraud the private complainants certain sums of money. Private complainants upon verification with the POEA discovered that the accused-appellants were not employees of AISC. Thereafter, the POEA filed the criminal charges against the accused-appellants. Accused Lourdes Lo was not apprehended and remains at large. In their defense, accused-appellant Calimon contends that she was also an applicant for overseas employment and that she was also recruited by Lo together with private complainants, She likewise denied having received any money from the private complainants and that it was her co-accused Comila who received the money. Comila on the other hand denied having known Lo. She also maintained that it was Lo who received the money from the complainants. The RTC of Manila found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against them. ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GRACE CALIMON FOR ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AND THREE (3) COUNTS OF ESTAFA AND AIDA COMILA FOR SIMPLE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ONE (1) COUNT OF ESTAFA DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. HELD: Petition is DENIED The Accused-appellants' acts of deliberately misrepresenting themselves as having the necessary authority to recruit the private complainants for overseas employment and collecting money from them but failing to deploy them and to return the money despite several demands clearly amounts to estafa through false statement of fraudulent misrepresentation. To convict for this type of estafa the element of deceit must be present. It is necessary that the false statement or representation was the very cause or the only motive which induced the complainant to part with a thing of value. In this case the deceit consists of the accusedappellants' false statement or representation made prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of money by the complainants. 140 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property CRESENCIO C. MILLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 188726, 25 January 2012, SECOND DIVISION (SERENO, J.) The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not affected by the subsequent novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State in its own conation. FACTS: Petitioner Milla was convicted of two counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. In the information filed against him, the respondent Carlo Lopez the Financial Officer of Marker Pursuits, Inc. (MPI). Milla misrepresented himself as a real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development Corporation and offered to sell to MPI business properties in Makati owned by Spouses Farley and Joseline Handog. As proof of his authority Milla presented to Lopez a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title of the property and a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by the Spouses. MPI then purchased the property for 2 million and gave checks to Milla as payment. Milla then issued to Lopez a notarized deed of absolute sale allegedly executed by the spouses Handog in favor of MPI and an original Owners Duplicate Copy of the property. Thereafter, Lopez after verifying the documents with the Register of Deeds found out that said Owner's Duplicate Copy submitted by the Milla were fraudulent and that there was no transfer of property by the spouses Handog. Lopez then demanded the return of the amount of 2 million paid by MPI. Milla then issued two checks worth 1 million each representing the amount paid by MPI for the properties however said checks were later dishonored for having been issued against insufficient funds. The RTC of Makati found Milla guilty of the charge which was later affirmed by the CA. In his appeal Milla contends that his payment of the checks representing the amount paid by MPI resulted in the extinction of his criminal liability due to novation. ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF NOVATION IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE HELD: Petition is DENIED The acceptance of partial payments without further change in the original relation between the complainant and the accused does not result in novation. For novation to exist there must be proof of the intent to extinguish the original relationship and such intent cannot be inferred from the acceptance of payment of the amount due. The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not affected by the subsequent novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State in its own conation. In this case the acceptance of MPI of the checks were merely intended to secure the return of the 2 million due from Milla. Even then, the checks also bounced thus unable to satisfy his liability. Additionally, the estafa involved here was not simple misappropriation but was committed through Milla's falsification of public documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by novation.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER G.R. No. 184053, August 31, 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro, J.) The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee. FACTS: An information was filed against Virginia Montaner charging her of defrauding Reynaldo Solis by means of issuing in favor of the latter 10 checks, each in the amount of P5,000, which were misrepresented to be fully funded when in fact they were not. The total value of the 10 checks amounted to P50,000 and all of them were postdated. These checks were dishonored when presented for payment for the reason that the account was closed. Solis demanded from Montaner the satisfaction of the obligation but to no avail. Montaner denied the allegations stating that the 10 checks she issued in favor of Solis were borrowed from her by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money to secure a loan. She claimed she signed the checks albeit the space for the date, amount and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any negotiation. She also informed Galope that the checks were not funded. Upon learning of the estafa case filed against her, she confronted Galope and the latter told her that the money will not be given to her if she will not issue the said checks. She further claimed she was not aware of the notice of dishonor and that it was her husband who had notice thereof but left for abroad and returned only after a year. This being said, she claims that no transaction has ever occurred between her and Solis. She admitted her imprudence in issuing the checks but according to her such simple imprudence does not equate to criminal liability. The RTC found Montaner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC? HELD: Petition DENIED. Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides: ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x: xxxx 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: 142 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property xxxx (d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee. In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Soliss clear and categorical testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in exchange for their cash equivalent. Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which was received by appellants husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. As for appellants claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them as a guarantee for a loan, the Court views such statements with the same incredulity as the lower courts. Appellant wishes to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on them. Verily, appellants assertion defies ordinary common sense and human experience.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property JOEL P. GONZALES, JR. v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 159950, February 12, 2007, SECOND DIVISION (Quisimbing, J.) In prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. FACTS: On June 26, 1997, Jose P. Gonzales, Jr., the accused, willfully unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire to an inhabited two-storey residential building which [was] partitioned into dwellings rented out to tenants. The building located in La Loma, Quezon City was owned and occupied by one Carlos C. Canlas. When Canlas was called to the witness stand, he testified that at about 9:30 p.m. of said date of occurrence, he was watching television in his room when his daughter called his attention to check the commotion in an adjacent room. On his way to the room rented by Gonzales Jr., he smelled gas. He saw Gonzales Jr. ignite a flame and throw it on a pile of clothes in the middle of the living room where Gonzales Jr. had also placed an LPG tank. Thereafter, fire quickly spread on the building. Two tenants were also presented as witnesses. One tenant testified that he heard Gonzales Jr. and his aunt quarreling before the fire. He said he heard Gonzales threatened to burn the house down. He reported the incident to the Barangay Hall but he hurriedly went back to his place when he was informed that his house was on fire. The other witness testified that he saw the fire coming from Gonzales Jr.s room and that Gonzales Jr. was laughing while the building was burning. Gonzales Jr.s' aunt told Simpao that her nephew was to blame. The police officers who arrived at the crime scene testified that Gonzales Jr. admitted responsibility for the fire. On the other hand, Gonzales Jr. averred that the fire was caused by faulty electrical wiring. When he was awakened by the heat of the fire he shouted for Canlas' help. They tried to put out the fire but to no avail. He also denied that he had a quarrel with his aunt the night before the fire started. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Physical Science Report stated that no flammable substance was found in the specimen ashes. The RTC of Quezon City found Gonzales Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson. He appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the RTC's decision. He further moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzales Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson. HELD: Petition DENIED. Petitioner seeks to discredit the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses for being self-serving and illmotivated. He avers that both the trial court and the appellate court failed to consider the Physical Science Report which stated that no flammable substance was found in the specimen ashes. 144 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property

Finally, petitioner claims that although he had in the past threatened to burn the house, he never really meant it. The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses and their sworn statements were not substantial to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the trial court. The OSG asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified, corroborated and complemented his affidavit. Likewise, the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses corroborated Canlass testimony. The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is covered by Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613. In Physical Science Report which stated that no flammable substance was found in the specimen ashes. In prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. When these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject. In this case, the eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. As a general rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this Court will not reverse their findings of fact. Furthermore, in our view, the findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative evidence and taken together with the bare denial of petitioner, supported only with testimonies of relatives, constitute inferior evidence as against the circumstantial evidence coupled with the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible witness.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Reyes, J.) The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender FACTS: Adelina B. Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child when she heard some noise. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help, but the petitioners fled. The RTC found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arson. While the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson in its simple form Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present course. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for simple arson or for arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty up to reclusion perpetua RULING: The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present. Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x 146 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire." [Emphasis supplied] Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods. The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v BENJAMIN BRAVO y ESTABILLO GR No. 185282, September 24, 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Perez, J) In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. FACTS: Mauro Camacho (now deceased) was lying in bed inside his bedroom on the second floor of his house when he heard gunshots. He then heard appellant Benjamin Bravo calling for him to come down, but Mario did not heed appellants call, hence the latter went up the stairs and pointed a gun at Mauro and demanded that he bring out the akusan an object used in witchcraft. Appellant was accusing Mauro of putting a curse on the latters father, but M auro remained tight lipped prompting appellant to turn around. On his way down the stairs, appellant supposedly uttered: "I will burn you all. All of you will die. Subsequently, Mauro saw a big fire on the second floor. After trial, appellant was found guilty by the Trial Court of Arson. The Trial Court relied on circumstantial evidence to convict appellant of Arson. The Appellate court affirmed the factual findings of the trial court and agreed that the circumstantial evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had set the houses on fire. ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence is enough to convict the appellant of the crime of Arson RULING: In the prosecution for Arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. The occurrence of the fire was established by the burnt house, the charred bodies of the two fire victims and testimonies of prosecution witnesses. As to the identity of the arsonist, no direct evidence was presented. However, direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides: 148 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused As to the penalty, under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when death results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. We likewise affirm the award of damages. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding appellant BENJAMIN BRAVO y ESTABILLO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ROBERT TAGUINOD v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 185833, 12 October 2011, THRID DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J.)

FACTS: On May 26, 2002 at the parking area of the Rockwell Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara), when they were about to queue at the corner to pay the parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. This prompted the Angs wife and daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the Taguinod. Taguinod appeared to be hostile, hence, the Ang instructed his wife and daughter to go back to the CRV. While they were returning to the car, Taguinod accelerated the Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane. Ang was able to pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp. As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the front bumper, the repair of which amounted to P57,464.66. The insurance company shouldered the said amount, but the private complainant paid P18,191.66 as his participation. On the other hand, the Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper. Thereafter, an Information was filed in the MeTC of Makati City against petitioner for the crime of Malicious Mischief as defined in and penalized under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Taguinod pleaded Not Guilty during his arraignment. The prosecution presented the testimony of private complainant. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Mary Susan Lim Taguinod, the wife of petitioner, Jojet N. San Miguel, Jason H. Lazo and Engr. Jules Ronquillo. The MeTC, in its Decision, found petitioner guilty of the crime Malicious Mischief. The case was appealed to the RTC of Makati City, which rendered its Decision, affirming the decision of the MeTC. Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA, praying for the reversal of the decision of the RTC. The CA, in its Decision, partly granted the petition thereby reducing the penalty of imprisonment, the award of moral damages and the attorneys fees. Taguinod filed with the SC a petition foron certiorari which was denied. However, after Taguinod filed a motion for reconsideration, the SC reinstated the present petition and required the Office of the Solicitor General to file its Comment.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime Malicious Mischief. 2. Whether or not the award for moral damages and attorneys fees was proper.

HELD: 1. Obviously, the first issue raised by petitioner is purely factual in nature. It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. This doctrine is premised on the undisputed fact that, since the trial court had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while on the stand, it was in a position to discern whether or not they were telling the truth. Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein. It is apparent in this present case that both the RTC and the CA accorded respect to the findings of the MeTC; hence, this Court finds no reason to oppose the other two courts in the absence of any clear and valid circumstance that would merit a review of the MeTC's assessment as to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it. 2. The private complainant is entitled to the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the New Civil Code because the injury contemplated by the law, which merits the said award, was clearly established. Private complainant testified that he felt bad and lost sleep. The said testimony is substantial to prove the moral injury suffered by the private complainant for it is only him who can personally approximate the emotional suffering he experienced. However, anent the award of attorney's fees, the same was not established. In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that there must always be a factual basis for the award of attorneys fees. This present case does not contain any valid and factual reason for such award.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents. G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010 CORONA, J.: "The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest." FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, the accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, who was already then blind and 79 years old, to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City. The accused moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance. The trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case. On Appeal, the. Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial's Court decision and denied the motion for reconsideration of the prosecution. Hence, the present petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the fact of death of Zenaida extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita which warrants the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1). 2. Whether or not the Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability Is applicable to The Complex Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents HELD: 1. the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato. The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit steprelatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. 152 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused. 2. The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document. Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest. The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL MENDOZA CERBITO et al. G.R. No. 126397 , February 1, 2000, THIRD DIVISION (Gonzaga-Reyes J.) Highway robbery/brigandage is defined in Section 2(e) of P.D. 532 entitled "Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law" as "(t)he seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway." The robbery must be directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims. FACTS: On the 3rd day of September 1992 at around 2:20 p.m. the passengers of a Philippine Rabbit Bus travelling on the North Expressway on its way to Manila were victimized in a hold-up committed by four men who boarded the bus as it was approaching the Tabang tollgate. A policeman who was a passenger in the bus shot one of the holduppers. The policeman was shot in turn by another holdupper; the policeman died. An information was filed against Daniel Cerbito, Vicente Avedera, Jimboy Cerbito and John Doe, all of Laoang, Northern Samar, for violation of P.D. 532 (otherwise known as the Anti-Highway Robbery Act). Two passengers of the bus were presented by the prosecution. The accused raised the defense of denial and alibi. They insisted that they were in some other place when the crime was committed. The trial court convicted them for violation of P.D. 532 (otherwise known as the Anti-Highway Robbery Act). ISSUE Whether or not the above accused were liable for violation of P.D. 532 (otherwise known as the AntiHighway Robbery Act). HELD: YES After a careful examination of the entire evidence, we resolve to affirm the judgment of conviction. We agree with the trial court's rejection of the defense of alibi for the reason that said defense cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the two eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution. Confronted with contradictory declarations and statements, the trial court cannot be faulted for giving greater weight to the positive testimonies of the witnesses who have not been shown to have any motive to falsely implicate the accused-appellants, and whose credibility has not been placed in doubt. Alibi has generally been regarded with disfavor by the court because it is easily fabricated and we have no reason to deviate from this rule. Highway robbery/brigandage is defined in Section 2(e) of P.D. 532 entitled "Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law" as "(t)he seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway." The robbery must be directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims. All the above elements were established. 154 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property TAN v. PEOPLE 500 SCRA 183, AUG. 30, 2006

WONG v. PEOPLE 351 SCRA 100, FEB. 2, 2001

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Josephine Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines G.R. No. 139292, 5 December 2000, THIRD DIVISION, (Vitug. J.) The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. FACTS: Petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice President of METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner and gave the latter a loan. In exchange, petitioner issued and delivered to the complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. When the checks were, in time, deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason: Account closed. The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up petitioner at her office. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored checks, the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored the demand. A Criminal Case was lodged against petitioner for Violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC Makati. Petitioner filed a demurrer to the evidence, with leave of court, premised on the absence of a demand letter and that the checks were not issued as payment but as evidence of indebtedness of petitioner or as collaterals of the loans obtained by petitioner. Opposed by the prosecution, the demurrer was denied by the trial court. The lower court rendered judgment convicting petitioner. Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. CA predicated the conviction of petitioner on the supposed fact that petitioner was informed of the dishonor of the checks through verbal notice when the complainant had called her up by telephone informing her of the dishonor of the checks and demanding payment therefor. The appellate court said that the maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his check. The law does not require a written notice of the dishonor of such check. MR was also denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not a written demand to pay necessary for the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (YES) HELD: Petition GRANTED. The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose. The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank. In Lao vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained: x x x. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check. It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator `a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. This was also compared `to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a `complete defense. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees. While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property GRIFFITH vs. COURT OF APPEALS 379 SCRA 94 MARCH 12, 2002 The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user.[25] It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.[26] Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to best serve the ends of crim inal justice. QUISIMBING, J.: FACTS: Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued checks. The checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments incurred by Lincoln Gerard, Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner, the president of Lincoln Gerard. It was a condition written on the voucher for each check that the check was not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to be given at a specific date. However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing to a labor strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to the companys inability to fund its checks. Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher attached thereto that if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30, 1986, the checks would be presented for payment. This is final and irrevocable, according to the note that was written actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored and Phelps Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing took place only after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with more than one million pesos to spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerards properties earlier impounded by Phelps Dodge. The MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B.P. 22. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower courts decision. Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals but was denied. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate Court hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law HELD: NO. The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law. Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to best serve the ends of criminal justice.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school that imposes penalties for retribution, such retribution should be aimed at actual and potential wrongdoers. Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards property for cash amounting to P1,120,540 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically.[35] We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtors criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENATO LAGAT and JAMES PALALAY G.R. No. 187044 September 14, 2011 Leonardo-De Castro, J.: The records of the case show that all the elements of Carnapping are present and proven during trial, to wit: (1) That there is actual taking of the vehicle, (2) that the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender, (3) that the taking is without consent of the owner thereof, or the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things, and (4) that the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. FACTS: Renato Lagat and James Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping for mutual helping each other and with intent to gain in a Yasuki tricycle owned by Jose Biag. In the course of the commission of the crime, they allegedly attacked Biag with a knife thereby inflicting upon him 5 stab wounds which directly caused his death. Policemen caught the accused in possession of Biag's tricycle loaded with stolen palay which they intended to sell in the palay station. The accused ran immediately when they say the policemen approaching them. During the search, policemen found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biag's wallet with documents to prove that Biag owned the tricycle. The policemen contacted Santiago City PNP to inquire about Biag. It was later found out that Biag did not return home. The accused admitted to the commission of the crimes and led the policemen to where they dumped the body of Biag. The accused pleaded not guilty but subsequently made admissions about the commission of the crime. The accused claimed that the admissions they made were not voluntary because as their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly violated as they were interrogated for hours without counsel. Moreover, there were no documentary evidence to support their admissions. Palalay further claim he was maltreated while under police custody to make the admissions. The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to convict them by reason of the fact that aside from the admissions they made, the prosecution had nothing else, there was no object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle, the murder weapon was not found and no eyewitness was presented aside from the policemen who testified that they were in the possession of the tricycle at the time they were arrested. Accused argued that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Carnapping qualified by the killing of Biag. It held that the prosecution established enough circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay committed the crime. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that the elements of Carnapping were all present. Furthermore, the accused failed to explain as to how they came into possession of the tricycle. the CA was convinced that circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution supported the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of qualified Carnapping RULING: Petition Denied. 160 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property

The records of the case show that all the elements of Carnapping are present and proven during trial, to wit: (1) That there is actual taking of the vehicle, (2) that the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender, (3) that the taking is without consent of the owner thereof, or the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things, and (4) that the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. The tricycle was ascertained to belong to Biag as shown by the registration papers found in the accused possession. Lagat and Palalay failed to give an explanation as to how they came into possession of the tricycle. Their unexplained possession raises the presumption for unlawful taking of the tricycle. Unlawful taking is the taking of a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means if violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the things, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Lagat and Palalay's intent to gain was proven as they were caught in a palay buying station on board the stolen tricycle used to transport the palay they stole and were going to sell in the station. Intent to gain is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order to steal the tricycle. When a person is killed in the course of the Carnapping, the crime of Carnapping is qualified.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property MEL DIMAT, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent., G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012 FACTS: This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or ought to have known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery. The Facts and the Case The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law1 before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgados wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Gallerias parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG. For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle. The RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property HELD: The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. Here, someone carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimats defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. But Dimats defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis. Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts. Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentinos failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt. Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity DR. RICO S. JACUTIN v.PEOPLE G.R. No. 140604, 6 March 2002, THIRD DIVISION, (Vitug, J.) While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Ju liets employment. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juli et had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. Facts: Petitioner Dr. Rico Jacutin is the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City. Complainant Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing went to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Dr. Jacutin offered complainant a job where she would be the subject of a "research" program. On the understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. Inside the car, Dr. Jacutin asked her if she has taken a bath. She explained that she was not able to do so because she left the house hurriedly. Still inside the car, accused directed her to raise her foot and lower her pants so he could see whether she has varicose veins on her legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. Then Petitioner pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses. Petitioner interposed the defense of alibi saying that he was at a meeting of the Committee on Awards when the incident happened and added that only the City Mayor had the power to appoint city personnel. Sandiganbayan found Dr. Rico Jacutin guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment. In appeal, Petitioner contended that he cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual harassment as defined and punished under R.A. 7877? Held: Yes. Decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. Rationale: Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides: SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or trainingrelated sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence 164 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act. (a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when: (1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee. Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her about accepting a job in a family planning research project. While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed, petition er himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity JOCELYN S. PAISTE v. APRONIANO V. MAMENTA, JR. A.M. No. P-03-1697, 01 October 2003 EN BANC (Per Curiam) The acts of Mamenta, which are an affront to women, constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment for his female subordinates. He abused the power and authority he exercises over them, which is the gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. Complainant Goltiao is a Stenographer I of the MCTC of Tayug-San Nicolas, Pangasinan since 1997. She testified that a representative from the Plaridel Insurance Co. came to their office seeking clearance. She immediately prepared the necessary form and, together with the representative, went to see respondent in the courtroom to obtain his signature. When she asked him to sign the document, Mamenta, who was at that time playing tong-its at the lawyers table with unnamed individuals, got angry and threw his cards. He shouted at her: Why did you bring them with you? Did you like them to bring me to the Supreme Court? She responded that such was not her intention and reminded him of his requirement that he must first see the applicants before he sign their clearance. He did not sign the clearance, sent then out and shouted Bullshit ka! at her thrice. They all then went out of the courtroom and proceeded back to the staff room. Respondent followed her and continued uttering unsavory remarks: Bullshit ka! Vulva of your mother! Why did you take the client there and even raised your voice? (Bullshit ka! Okinnam nga babai! Apay ta innalam dagita kliyente idiay sanak to rinayawan!) She replied that her parents taught them not to answer back at older people. He still shouted: Vulva of your mother! I wish you will die now! Whom are you bragging of? We will try each other. (Okinnam nga babai! Matay ka koma itattan! Apay sinno aya ti paglaslastog mo? Sige, agpipinnadas tayo.) Thereafter, he asked the utility aide to buy him four bottles of beer. Goltiao declared that her working relationship with Mamenta is sometimes good and sometimes bad because of his ill temper. He easily gets mad at her even for small, trivial mistakes. This situation started, according to her, when she told him to stop courting and sending her love notes as she is already a married woman. She related an incident which happened early one morning when he asked her to see him inside the judges chamber. At that time, the designated judge was not around. Once inside, she was told to sit in one of the chairs in front of the judges table. Mamenta, who was sitting at the judges chair, then extended his hand to her, as if he wanted to shake her hands. She reciprocated by extending her hands and jokingly put his hands on her forehead (agmanmano). She afterwards tried to free her hands off his but he would not let her. Instead, he told her, Wait for a while, I would just like to tell you something. I love you, is that okay? Tell me that you love me too. No strings attached. She retorted, As if you are my father. Spurned, he got mad. This kind of incident happened at least ten more times. In A.M. No. P-03-1697 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1196-P), complainant Paiste is the owner of JCP72 Insurance Agency, and as its proprietor, has transactions with the MCTC Tayug-San Nicolas. She testified that she went to the court, together with a client, to post bail. When they arrived, they could not find Mamenta. An employee named Marilyn accompanied then to one of the rooms at the hall of justice where the Mamenta was holding game cards and playing tong-its with some people. Marilyn called his attention telling him that somebody wants to post bail. Mamenta retorted, You just go ahead upstairs. Why, could you not wait? They went ahead and Mamenta followed fifteen minutes after. She noticed that he was mad. They told him they want to post bail and he asked for the records of the case. After examining the records, he 166 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity slammed it and said, You go to Rosales! That is not our work! He also became angry when they followed him. On April 20, 2001, Paiste, an officemate and a client again went to the MCTC in Tayug-San Nicolas to post bail in connection with Criminal Case No. 7461. Mamenta instructed them to go to the house of Judge Pastor. They went there as told but the judge rejected their papers. They returned the next day, a Saturday, after completing their documents. They came from the court where they met Mamenta, who accompanied them to the judges house. The judge approved the surety bond. Later, they handed three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) to Mamenta, two thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) of which was for the JDF. They gave him the remaining six hundred pesos (P600.00) after he asked them, Paano naman yung sa akin? They understood that to mean that he was expecting some form of compensation as he accompanied them outside the office on a non-working day. They then demanded an official receipt for the two thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) they paid him corresponding to the amount of the JDF. He told them to go to the court and get it the following Monday. That Monday, she sent one of her staff to get the receipt, but the latter reported to her that he did not issue one. She added that this is not the only time that he failed to issue her a receipt. In other cases, he also neglected to do so even after she has paid the mandatory JDF fees. After investigation, the investigating judge rendered a Consolidated Report and Recommendation finding Mamenta guilty of serious misconduct and accordingly proposed that he be sternly reprimanded and fined ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). The report was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). After evaluating the report and the records, the OCA proposed that a stiffer penalty must be imposed on Mamenta and recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year having been found Guilty of various offenses including the Grave Offenses and disgraceful and immoral conduct. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the offender is guilty of the offenses charged HELD: Time and again, this Court have emphasized that court officers, circumscribed with heavy responsibility, must be the paragon of propriety and good behavior. This is especially true for a clerk of court like Mamenta. As a ranking officer of the court, it is incumbent upon him to set an example to his coemployees as to how they should conduct themselves in office; to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with the rules and regulations of the civil service and the judiciary; and to provide then with a healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end public interest will be benefited. Mamenta failed to measure up to these standards. His use of offensive language towards complainant Goltiao reflects his impoliteness and lack of decorum. He shouted profanity at her, verbally abused her and even disrespected her mother. He did this in the presence of so many employees and clients of the court. Worse, there was no reason for him to unleash to her a fury of this kind. She was merely asking him to sign a clearance form and to examine the applicant pursuant to his specific instruction that he should first see the applicant for the clearance before he sign the form. In fine, she was just doing her job. The truth is, he 167 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity got mad at her out of his fear that the client she brought along might report him to this court when they caught him in flagrante delicto gambling. Similarly objectionable is Mamentas penchant for playing tong-its (a card game) and gambling with other employees of the court. Gambling is illegal and is absolutely forbidden at court premises during office hours. It generates unwholesome consequences on the gambler as it diverts his attention from the more important responsibilities of his job. Respondent himself was very much aware of this prohibition and this is exactly the reason why he castigated the complainant for approaching him while he was playing cards, thus: Why did you bring then with you? Did you like them to bring me to the Supreme Court? The undue advances Mamenta made to complainant Goltiao betrays his twisted sense of propriety. Many times, he declared his feelings for her and handed her love notes. He would then beseech her to say the same things to him. He proposed to have dinner dates with her at Jollibee. There were times that he cornered her at the judges chamber and unnecessarily held her hand. While professing ones amorous intention is not something that usually causes a hullabaloo, it becomes indecent and improper in this case considering he is complainant Goltiaos superior and both of them are married. His dissoluteness told itself when he went to the extent of calling her at her mothers house and persuading her not to tell her husband about these incidents. It appears too that the complainant was not the exclusive object of respondents advances. Witnesses Marilyn de Leon and Glenda Ramirez testified that they also received love notes and invitations for dinner from him. Like a hunter out on the prowl, he victimized other female workers unabashedly professing his alleged feelings for them in utter disregard of the fact that they were his subordinates, they were married and they were young enough to be his daughters. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, he preyed on them as he took advantage of his superior position. Under the circumstances, the Court finds Mamenta guilty of sexual harassment. His severely outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment for his female subordinates. He abused the power and authority he exercises over them, which is the gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. There is likewise sufficient evidence in A.M. No. P-03-1697 to hold respondent administratively liable for his failure to issue official receipt after receiving court fees and for discourtesy. The evidence shows that on April 21, 2001, complainant Paiste gave to the respondent the amount of two thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) as bail bond of the accused in Criminal Case No. 7461. When she asked for an official receipt, he told her to get it the following Monday at the court. She sent an office representative that Monday as told but respondent did not issue any receipt. Further verification from the records of Criminal Case No. 7461 reveals that no copy of the official receipt appears on file indicating that no receipt was ever issued to complainant Paiste. Undoubtedly, respondent should have issued an official receipt when he received the sum of money from complainant Paiste. His failure to do so is a violation of the National Accounting and Auditing Manual 168 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity which mandates that no payment of any nature shall be received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an official receipt, in acknowledgment thereof. It bears emphasis that there is no valid reason for his non-issuance of a receipt. Even if he argues that he could not issue an official receipt to the complainant Paiste as the transaction transpired on a Saturday and outside court premises, still, his failure to issue a receipt the following Monday is totally unjustified.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS L. Articles 347-352: Crimes Against Civil Status CANON R. TEVES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO R. BONGALON G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011 (Perez, J.) It is evident therefore that Cenon has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. FACTS: Cenon Teves (Cenon) married Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) in Muntinlupa. After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to the Philippines for vacation. On one of her vacations here in the country, she was informed that her husband Cenon, contracted another marriage with Edita Calderon (Edita). She obtained a copy of the marriage certificate of the 2 from the National Statistics Office. Thus, Thelma filed a complaint for bigamy against Cenon. During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, Caloocan City, rendered a decisiondeclaring the marriage of Cenon and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), where the criminal case is pending, rendered its decision finding Canon guilty of the crime of bigamy. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Cenon is not guilty of the crime of Bigamy HELD: Petition DENIED. Cenon claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of. He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined. However, the instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of Cenon. Cenon was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of Cenon with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Cenon has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage. 170 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS L. Articles 347-352: Crimes Against Civil Status It is evident therefore that Cenon has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. If Cenons contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in Cenons case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following Cenons argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, Cenons strained reading of the law is against its simple letter. Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by Cenon on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS L. Articles 347-352: Crimes Against Civil Status Nollora vs People Facts: Jesusa Nollora, while working in a hospital in Saudi Arabia, heard rumors that her husband, Atilano O. Nollora, has another wife. Upon arrival in the Philippines, she learned that her husband indeed contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino. She subsequently learned that Nollora Jr. a second marriage with Jesusa Pinat. Subsequently Jesusa Nollora filed a bigamy charge against her husband, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. The RTC convicted Nollora of Bigamy and the CA affirmed the decision. Issue: Whether Nollora's prior conversion to Isalm absolves him of criminal liability for Bigamy Ruling: Petition DENIED Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has this authority. However, yhere is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation. It is axiomatic that (E)very circumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor ROBERTO BRILLANTE v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571 November 11, 2005, Second Division, Tinga, J An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. FACTS: Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the press conference, Brillante accused Jejomar Binay (OIC Mayor and a candidate for the position of Mayor in Makati) of plotting the assassination of Augusto Syjuco, another candidate for Mayor of Makati. He further accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against Binay. The pertinent portions of the open letter read: 4. We have received reports that Atty. Binay and his group are plotting the assassination of Mr. Augusto "Bobby" Syjuco, now frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race. These reports are: 1. On December 14, 1987, Atty. Binay and Dr. Nemesio Prudente, president of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), met at Puerto Azul in Cavite with, among others, a Commander Luming, a Major Rafael Nieva, and a commander Francis Baloloy. Subject of the meeting was "Winning the Election at all Costs." xxx xxx xxx

3. On December 17, 1987, Dr. Prudente, Atty. Binay and others including some unidentified government officials discussed operation "Dirty Fingers" after the ASEAN Summit Meeting. The operation involves terrorism, the use of public school teachers, the threat to kill or hurt political ward and precinct leaders not supporting or opposed to Atty. Binay, and to use these as samples to show rivals that his group is capable of doing so, the planting of his squads in places close to potential targets, the mobilization of "marshals" who will bring firearms and to ferry hitmen to target points. The "marshals" will also be used as "pointers" and to shelter the hitmen after accomplishing or performing their missions. xxx xxx xxx

4. On December 8, 1987, a certain Emilio Anecito, tagged as a hitman in the group of Dr. Prudente, has been specifically assigned to assassinate Mr. Syjuco, Aniceto has been described as Iranian mestizo looking, about five (5) feet in height, fair complexioned curly haired, sporting a mustache, and fairly built bodily. He is said to be a silent person and supposedly has a perfect score in hit missions assigned to him.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor xxx xxx xxx

5. On December 10, 1987, it was reported that Major Rafael Nieva had been assigned to work with Mr. Aniceto, Nievas background report is that he: xxx xxx xxx

c. Was hired by Dr. Prudente as security officer and personal bodyguard. d. Is a notorious killer used by the PUP forces and only his employer can control or stop him.6 Both the RTC and CA found Brillante guilty of the crime of libel. ISSUE: Whether Brillante is guilty of libel. HELD: Petition denied. According to Brillante, his statements and utterances were privileged communication because he made them public out of a legal, moral and social duty to safeguard the sanctity of the elections to be held on January 18, 1988, and to avoid the unnecessary loss of life. Since his statements were privileged communication, malice cannot be presumed from them. Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in the cases at bar. An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Brillantes statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference and in the open letter explicitly referred to reprehensible acts allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binays opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjucos assassination.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the defamatory material is communicated to a third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the defamatory statement refers. In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the press conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open letter to be published in several newspapers, namely, News Today, Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer. Further, Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay, Prudente and their associates as the persons who participated in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the assassination of Syjuco not only in his open letter but also during the press conference. Thus, the determination of Brillantes culpability for libel hinges on the question of whether his statements were made with malice. Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed; it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. The law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino, the communication thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in several newspapers of general circulation and was thus made known to the general public. *A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Roberto Brillante (Brillante) assailing the Decision of the Court dated October 19, 2004 which affirmed his conviction for the crime of libel but reduced the amount of moral damages he is liable to pay. The Court AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the Decision dated October 19, 2004 consisting of the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon petitioner.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 142509, 24 March 2006, FIRST DIVISION (Austria-Martinez, J.) Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. The presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication. FACTS: Atty. Pieraz sent a letter to Mrs. Quingco a demanding her to vacate the premises owned by the Rodriguez Estate. Buatis, the atty-in-fact of Mrs. Quingco, answered in response. The letter of Buatis to Atty. Pieraz contained the following phrases: This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter addressed to our client; using carabao English; You may proceed then with your stupidity, and; Yours in Satans name JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR. It was indicated in the letter that it was copy-furnished to several other people. Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel. In his defense, Buatis argued that communication, either verbal or written, by a lawyer under obligation to defend his clients cause is a privileged communication ISSUE: Whether or not the imputation is defamatory and malicious HELD: The words used in the letter sent by Buatis to Atty. Pieraz is defamatory. In using words such as lousy, inutile, carabao English, stupidity, and satan, the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. Under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of Buatis (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that Buatis imputation is malicious (malice in law). The presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication. However the presumption was not successfully rebutted by Buatis. In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latters demand letter sent to a 176 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor member, however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as against the claim of respondents client. The letter merely contained insulting words,i.e, lousy and inutile letter using carabao English, stupidity, and satan, which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingcos right over the premises. Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person who have some interest in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. While petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondents reputation.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor OGIE DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 159787, 25 May 2007, FIRST DIVISION (SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.) In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named.s FACTS: Petitioner Ogie Diaz (Ogie Friaz in real life) was charged with libel by Florinda Bagay. In the information filed against him, the respondent Florinda Bagay alleges that the accused Diaz as the Managing Editor and writer of the newspaper Bandera allegedly wrote a malicious article intended to destroy her reputation. In the alleged article Diaz wrote of the sexual experiences of an actor named Philip Henson with a certain woman which he named Miss S. According to respondent Bagay she was the Miss S pertained in the alleged article. Respondent then narrated her brief stint in show business in which she adopted the screen name Patricia Santillan. It was also during this brief stint that she met and had a romantic relationship with Philip Henson. In his defense Diaz admitted that he indeed wrote the alleged article but denied that he knew Florinda Bagay or Miss S. According to him Phillip Henson was the source of the article. The RTC of Manila found petitioner guilty of the crime charged which was later affirmed by the CA. Hence, the present petition by Diaz seeking to reverse the judgment. ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ARTICLE IS LIBELOUS HELD: Petition is GRANTED For an imputation to be libelous under article 353 and 355 the following requisites must be present: a. it must be defamatory; b. it must be given publicly; c. the victim must be identifiable. Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper. In this case the last element that the victim is identified or identifiable is not present in the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to. The libelous article while referring to "Miss S" does not give a sufficient description or indication of the identity of "Miss S." The said article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one the same person. Thus, Petitioner Diaz is acquitted of the crime charged.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor NICASIO I. ALCANTARA v. VICENTE C. PONCE and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007, FIRST DIVISION (Corona, J.) FACTS: Respondent Vicente C. Ponce filed a string of criminal complaints against petitioner Nicasio Alcantara and his family, including one for Estafa, where Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him out of the shares of Floro Cement Corporation. In the preliminary investigation, Ponce after giving his sur-rejoinder affidavit, submitted to the investigating prosecutor a newsletter purporting to be a belated annex to the affidavit. It was prefaced with the quotation For every extraordinary fortune, there is a great crime and the text a) Overshipment of log b) Land grabbing c) Corruption of public office d) Corporate grabbing The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. 2507 where Ponce accused the Alcantaras for defrauding him of his shares in Iligan Cement Corporation Alcantara filed a complaint for libel against Ponce in connection with the aforesaid newsletter. He claimed that: (1) the statements therein were defamatory; (2) respondent had circulated it in the Makati Prosecutors Office and (3) the newsletter could not be considered an annex to the sur-rejoinder because respondent had not attached it to the said affidavit but had given it thereafter. Prosecutor Saulog issued a Resolution finding probable cause for libel and recommending the filing of Information with the RTC. However, Ponce filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice who reversed the Resolution of the prosecutor. This reversal was based on the finding that the newsletter was a privileged communication, having been submitted to the investigating prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista as an intended annex to respondents sur-rejoinder. The Secretary of Justice thus directed the withdrawal of the information. CA found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, set aside the latters resolution and directed the reinstatement of the criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or not the controversial newsletter constituted privileged communication which would exempt it from libel HELD: Petition is DENIED.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor The subject "newsletter" is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa, and hence the same comes within the protective cloak of absolutely privileged communications as to exempt private respondent from liability for libel or damages. The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. According to the Special Fifth Division of the CA: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. The lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of relevancy. As the Justice Secretary opined and which position the respondent Judge adopted, the "newsletter" containing the defamatory statement is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa then under preliminary investigation. The crime of estafa involves deceit, dishonesty and other fraudulent acts. The inclusion in the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of the "newsletter" discussing the alleged "corporate grabbing" by petitioner will tend to support private respondents case of estafa against petitioner insofar as such alleged "corporate grabbing" will highlight or manifest petitioners propensity for dishonest dealing or fraudulent machinations. There is therefore no doubt that the subject "newsletter" is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa, and hence the same comes within the protective cloak of absolutely privileged communications as to exempt private respondent from liability for libel or damages. In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. Thus, in People vs. Aquino, our Supreme Court has emphasized that "it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally construed to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity. The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose. Our Supreme Court has established the rule that when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication. Applying this rule by analogy to the present case, private respondents submission of the "newsletter" intended as an annex to his Sur Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S. No. 97-39547 to Prosecutor Bautista who was then conducting the preliminary investigation in said case, does not amount to publication for the reason that the sending of such material was made specifically for the purpose of including the same as evidence in the preliminary investigation. Since the newsletter was presented during the preliminary investigation, it was vested with a privileged character. While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the doctrine of absolute privilege extends

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor to statements made in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to the actual trial, the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas18 makes a categorical declaration of the existence of such protection: It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the actual participants therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official nature have been given absolute privilege. Of particular interest are proceedings leading up to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded. Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of initiating a prosecution is protected by the same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for defamation. (Emphasis ours) Furthermore, the newsletter qualified as "a communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest . . . made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained [in]criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable." Here, the controversial statements were made in the context of a criminal complaint against petitioner, albeit for other, separate acts involving greed and deceit, and were disclosed only to the official investigating the complaint. Liberally applying the privileged communication doctrine, these statements were still relevant to the complaint under investigation because, like the averments therein, they also involved petitioners alleged rapacity and deceitfulness. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 157643 March 28, 2008 (NACHURA, J.) Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or publishes it. Therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication.

FACTS: Cristinelli Salazar Fermin, publisher, and Bogs Tugas, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid print and circulate in the headline and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14, 1995 the following material, to wit: MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA DUN, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eddie Gutierrez, two criminal informations for libel were filed against Fermin and Tugas before the RTC Quezon City. Petitioner posits that, to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. The trial court in its Joint Decision found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. The appellate court affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article. The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of libel. HELD: Yes. Petition DISMISSED. Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or publishes it. Therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. A LIBEL is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or 182 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs one's sensibilities; it would certainly prick one's conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation, or vices or defects for being fugitives from the law. and of being a wastrel. The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants. Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because allegedly, the article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa before Judge Palattao's court. It can be gleaned form her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign. Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious, or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents. G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, SECOND DIVISION (CARPIO, J.) Reckless Imprudence is a single crime; its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty. Prior conviction or acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense. Article 48 does not apply to acts penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion. In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. Hence, this petition.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence Issue: (1) WHETHER PETITIONER FORFEITED HIS STANDING TO SEEK RELIEF IN S.C.A. 2803 WHEN THE METC ORDERED HIS ARREST FOLLOWING HIS NON-APPEARANCE AT THE ARRAIGNMENT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 82366; (2) IF IN THE NEGATIVE, WHETHER PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE BARS FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 82366. Held: Petiton is GRANTED. The Court held that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. With respect to the first issue, the mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post -arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing. Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition. On the second issue, Reckless Imprudence is a single crime; its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller that "reckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double 185 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in long line of jurisprudence. The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J)

Edwin Tabao (petitioner) seeks reconsideration of our Resolution, dated June 8, 2009, denying his petition for review on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals (CA) decision to warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising substantially factual issues. The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts: At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving his Toyota Corolla car bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street towards Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over Rochelles body. Bystanders armed with stones and wooden clubs followed Mendez car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez car, sat beside him, got his drivers license, and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice while backing up. Cielo went out of the car and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelles body inside Mendez car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital,where she died on February 6, 1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries. The defense presented a different version of the incident. The petitioner narrated that at around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he was driving along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street when his car ramped on an island at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards, but failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw that its two rear wheels had been elevated. He returned inside his car to turn off its engine; he then noticed that many people were approaching his car. He again alighted from his vehicle and saw a person lying on the road. He looked at his left side and saw a car that was running fast like a wind pass by. He approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she was still breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he saw Mendez car backing up; he carried the victim towards that car. Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the UST Hospital. Mendez, for his part, testified that at around 9:00 to 9:30 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he left his girlfriends house in Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As he was driving along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street on his way home, he saw a vehicle that had ramped on an island divider. Suddenly, another vehicle overtook his car from the right and cut his lane. He slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like object fall from the car that overtook him, and stopped when he realized that what had fallen was a persons body. When he moved his car backwards to help this person, many people approached his car. He alighted from his car and inquired from them what had happened. The people replied that someone was run over; some of them 187 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having run over the victim when they tried to hurt him. The petitioner carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez car. Thereafter, the two of them brought the victim to the UST Hospital The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and thereafter charged the petitioner and Mendez with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Manila. The RTC, in its decision dated September 15, 2003, found that it was very clear that both accused are responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete, and convicted the two (2) accused of the crime charged. It found that the petitioners car first hit the victim, causing her to be thrown into the road on her back, and that Mendez car ran over her as she was lying down. It held that the two failed to observe the necessary precaution and due care in operating their respective vehicles, to wit: the petitioner was not attentive to his driving such that he failed to see the island divider and bumped Rochelle; Mendez was driving his car too fast at nighttime such that he was unable to avoid running over her as her body lay prone on the street. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the petition. ISSUE: Whether accused Tabao is criminally negligent based on the evidence

HELD:

The petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle


The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to other motorists is mutual, coordinate and reciprocal. He is bound to anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal to his own. Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property, it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others as well as for his own. The petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his vehicle on his way home from work on January 21, 1993, he did not notice the island divider at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. As a result, his car ramped on the island so that both its rear wheels became elevated from the road and he could no longer maneuver the vehicle. The petitioner even testified that his car had to be towed. Later, during cross-examination, he admitted that all four wheels of his car, not just the two rear wheels mentioned in his earlier testimony, lost contact with the ground. The entire vehicle, therefore, ended up on top of the island divider. He puts the blame for the ramping and, essentially, his failure to notice the island on the darkness of nighttime and the alleged newness of the island. To our mind, the fact that the petitioners entire vehicle ended up ramped on the island divider strongly indicates what actually happened in the unfortunate incident. The vehicle could not have ended up in that condition had the petitioner been driving at a reasonable speed. We are not persuaded by the petitioners rather simplistic account that mere darkness, coupled with the traffic islands alleged newness, caused his car 188 | P a g e

THE REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence to veer off the traffic trajectory of Governor Forbes Street and to end up jumping on top of the traffic island intended to channel vehicular traffic going to the Nagtahan Flyover. A motorist is expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered, to enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. It has not escaped our notice that the intersection of Governor Forbes Street and G. Tuazon Street is adjacent to the vicinity of the incident. A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty, among others, to keep and maintain his vehicle under control so he can, if needed, stop at the shortest possible notice. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway. The fact that the petitioner was driving near the Governor Forbes Street and G. Tuazon Street intersection gives rise to the expectation that he would drive at a speed that anticipated or would have anticipated that other persons are on the road, whether as pedestrians or as motorists. The facts show, however, that the petitioner was driving his car at an inappropriate speed for a vehicle crossing an intersection. Otherwise, he should have been able to put his vehicle to a complete stop or, at the very least, at a speed that would have prevented his car from climbing entirely on top of the island divider. That the petitioners entire vehicle landed on top of the traffic island body, chassis, four wheels and all sufficiently indicates his speed at that time. The force that propels an entire car off the street and on top of a traffic island could only have been inordinate speed, or at least speed beyond that of a motorist coming from or going to an intersection. In short, the ramping of his vehicle demonstrably indicates to us that the petitioner failed to observe the duty to maintain a reasonable speed. We therefore believe Victors testimony that the petitioner was speeding when he bumped the victim. We are likewise not persuaded by the petitioners claim that darkness and the traffic islands alleged newness justify his failure to notice the island. The petitioners admission that he did not notice the traffic island is in itself an indication of his failure to observe the vigilance demanded by the circumstances. Ultimately, it shows the criminal recklessness for which he has been convicted. The record shows that pedestrians were present in the vicinity at the time of the incident. The CA even pointed out that the vicinity is near residential areas, while we pointed out its proximity to an intersection. The darkness and these circumstances should have caused the petitioner to be more alert and more vigilant, to say nothing of slowing his car down. Newly constructed or not, the island divider should have received the petitioners due attention. His bare allegation that the island lacked markers or reflectorized marks is likewise not persuasive. As the trial court correctly observed, many other vehicles passed the same road that night but only the petitioner failed to notice the island divider. We thus find the trial court to be correct when it held that the petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle on the night of the incident.

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