Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Renee B Kim
Hanyang University
School of Business
Seoul Korea
Tel 822.2220.2597
Fax 822.2220.1169
Email: Kimrby@gmail.com
Wal-Mart Korea:
Challenges of Entering a Foreign Market
Renee B Kim
Hanyang University
Introduction
Wal-Mart is the world’s largest retailer, operating in 15 countries with 6500 stores, and
generating $62.7 billion in 2006 (Wal-Mart, 2006). Its stock price has skyrocketed over
180,000 percent by 2007 since its IPO in 1972. Wal-Mart has been forced to initiate
international expansion in the early 1990s due to changes in the US market condition.
Market saturation was becoming a problem in the US market. Over 200 new Wal-Mart
stores being opened each year, the rapid growth in the number of stores in the US placed
newer stores close to older ones and the newer stores start to cannibalize the older ones.
Demographics of the US market was also evolving as the baby boomer segment was
increasing and the family sizes were getting smaller, which led to slower growth of US
market on demand side. Dynamics of the US retail industry has also changed
significantly, posing a threat to Wal-Mart’s market leader position.
Wal-Mart’s core competitiveness stems from having a low price/high volume orientation
to dominate the discount retail sector. Wal-Mart implemented a superior information
technology (IT) system (Figure 1) and established a centralized automated distribution
system that connected itself with its supplier through Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
system. The EDI system gave Wal-Mart an access to information on the entire value
chain and allowed maintaining constant cost-cutting. This enabled Wal-Mart to have
superior productivity, significant reduction of operational costs and overall lean business
model. This enabled Wal-Mart to offer the lowest retail prices. Wal-Mart disrupted US
retail market with its aggressive price offering and had the market dominance for past
few decades. Wal-Mart’s strategy fitted well in North America where consumers were
willing to compromise service and quality for low price. Wal-Mart’s low price offering
was matched with customers’ definition of value and this created “value-exchange”
between Wal-Mart and its customers.
However, other major competitors in the US retail sector have adopted strategies similar
to Wal-Mart, and learned to have a retail-format with superior technology and lean
business operations. The retail price difference between Wal-Mart and other retailers
have narrowed consequently and weakened consumers’ incentives to visit Wal-Mart. All
these factors have contributed to slowing of Wal-Mart’s earning growth in the US, and
international expansions have become a strategic priority for further growth of Wal-Mart.
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While it had considerable success in Mexico, Canada, UK, Wal-Mart failed to position
itself in several oversea markets such as Germany and South Korea. Wal-Mart has
retreated from Korea, however, by selling its 16 stores to a major local discount chain,
Shinsegae Co. at $882 millions in May 2006, and exited from Germany in July 2006.
Wal-Mart's stores in Korea lost about $10 million in 2005 on sales of $720 million
(Ramstad, 2006a). Wal-Mart’s exit from these markets showed that the American Way of
marketing did not translate well in every market. This raises an important question from
an international marketing perspective; how can Wal-Mart localize its products and
services to foreign market’s tastes and preferences when the core existence of Wal-Mart
is primarily associated with marketing and retailing the “American way”? In other words,
how can Wal-Mart strike the balance between localization of its service and products,
while maintaining its core competitive advantage that is ultimately American? How much
of Wal-Mart’s American cookie cutter model of everyday low prices and IT-based
centralized distribution system should be applied to a local condition? How much would
Wal-Mart need to reinvent a localized strategy for consumers who are significantly
different from American consumers? A retailer’s decision to export a retail-format to
another cultural environment may require a drastic modification of initial competitive
advantages (Dupuis and Prime, 1996). The ability to adapt to overseas market conditions
largely determines success of international operations of these firms. The key question in
this regard is how a MNC can convey its competitive advantages and experiences from
domestic market to a new foreign market, which may have significantly different
expectations and market conditions. This paper attempts to address this question with a
comprehensive analysis of the Wal-Mart Korea case.
The Korean discount market was estimated to be approximately at $26 billion (28 trillion
won), with 300 stores nationwide in early 2000s (Park, 2003). In the late 1990s and early
2000s, the Korean retail industry experienced globalization, industry consolidation,
increased costs of procurement and merchandising, continued pressures on food safety
and supply chain management costs, and an increasingly competitive marketplace, with
an imperative for providing customer service and promotional campaigns. Major
international retailers such as Price Club, Carrefour, Wal-Mart and Tesco entered the
Korean discount retail market in the late 1990s in response to the liberalization of the
retail sector by the Korean government in 1997 (SERI, 2006).
However, when the foreign retailers were allowed to enter the Korean retail market in
1997, the Korean retail market was already saturated. Strategically critical commercial
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areas for discount outlets had been mostly taken by the local retailers. Korean local food
retailers such as Lotte, Shinsegae, Samsung and LG developed their own discount retail
outlets (Table 1). Conglomerates called “Chaebols” own diversified business units, and
all of them merchandise everything from discount items to luxury goods through various
retail outlet options. For example, LG Trading Co., the largest Korean retailer, has four
distinctive retail divisions, including LG Supermarkets, LG25 convenience stores, LG
Department stores and LG Mart (the discount chain). These four divisions comprise 1600
LG stores in South Korea (Scardino, 2004). Shinsegea is the second best performing
Korean retailer and its E Mart discount retail format has 86 stores, accounting for 30% of
the Korean discount market. In terms of marketing, it is critical that the stores are built in
lucrative locations such as residential and key commercial areas with high levels of
consumer traffic. However, it appeared the foreign late-comers such as Wal-Mart were
not able to capture strategically important retail locations in Korea which may be critical
in effective market entry and positioning.
Wal-Mart attempted to penetrate the Korean market by building stores in distant areas
where land prices were low, replicating the US strategy of smaller city store build-up.
Wal-Mart had only 16 stores in all of Korea with just one in the Seoul metropolitan area
and could not achieve the economies of scale. Wal-Mart expected the Korean consumers
to drive to its stores for price shopping as the American consumers do. However, this
location strategy did not match well with the Korean consumers’ lifestyle and shopping
habits. Korean consumers have substantially different shopping styles and preferences
compared to North American consumers. They prefer to purchase smaller units on a more
frequent basis and to have accessibility to a store in walking distance. Convenience and
store location are major determinants of where a consumer will shop. Wal-Mart failed to
attract Korean consumers as their locations were not strategically well positioned to
create sufficient customer traffic.
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Day Low Price” (EDLP) strategy which ensured the lowest price among competitors. The
EDLP strategy led to a high volume sales and higher earnings and company growth. The
earnings were reinvested into further advancement of the operating system, and resulted
in further reduction of the operating cost. This “Productivity Loop” was a key driver in
Wal-Mart’s rapid success in the U.S. Wal-Mart managed to set the competitive retail
price with its EDLP strategy in the US and acquired its market dominance in the US retail
industry for past few decades. Wal-Mart was price competitive and successful in
attracting price conscious shoppers who were willing to compromise customer service
and quality for the low price in the US. Given its previous success in the US market,
Wal-Mart intended to employ this EDLP strategy in the Korean market as its core value
proposition to the Korean consumers.
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Korean consumers’ shopping behavior and their preference did not match with the Wal-
Mart’s retail format which was set up to serve consumers’ infrequent large bulk
shopping. The local retailers such as E-Mart offered discounted pricing in smaller
quantities and in familiar environments similar to conventional department stores rather
than warehouses, while offering more fresh produce and feature special in-store events
(Coyner, 2007).
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satisfaction do not illuminate the value exchange that needs to be created between the
company and customers.
In North America where consumers want low price, Wal-Mart’s low price offering was
matched with customers’ definition of value, resulting in effective value exchange
between Wal-Mart and its customers (Figure 1). However, Korean consumers in the
discount retail market proved to have a different definition of “value” in the retailers’
product and service offerings. Korean consumer responded more to free products and
promotional sales than to everyday low price and expected more customer service and
tailored retail environment. Thus, Wal-Mart’s EDLP which was its core competence and
competitive advantage in other international markets was not perceived to have the
“value” that the Korean consumers expected from retail products. Several local Korean
discount retailers offered cash or free product incentives worth up to $200 for spending a
certain amount in the store. These promotions enhanced “perceived value” of the stores
among consumers and increased visits to these local stores. Wal-Mart’s lack of
understanding regarding Korean consumers’ taste and preference and mismatch of the
definition of “value” between the Korean consumers and Wal-Mart resulted in
insufficient value exchange. Wal-Mart’s attempt to employ its standard EDLP strategy,
lack of adaptation to the local supply chain conditions, ineffective market entry time led
to the failure in market penetration in the Korean retail sector.
Second, mismatched merchandising, assortment and marketing that missed local needs
and context were other factors that contributed to Wal-Mart’s failure in Korea. Tesco, a
British origin global retailer, is a successful case that had effective ‘localization’ strategy
for downstream activities. Tesco Korea has enjoyed significant success in the Korean
discount retail market (Table 1). Tesco entered the Korean market by forming a joint
venture with a major local partner, “Samsung” and leveraging on Samsung’s knowledge
and expertise of the local market condition. Tesco devoted considerable attention to
transferring its core capabilities to this new market, yet did not attempt to reiterate the
British version of its retail format in Korea. For example, it preferred to hire local
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managers with only a few operational experts from the U.K. Tesco learned to strike a
balance between the Western style hypermarket retail format and the Korean way of
retailing that entailed extra services from its local partner.
One key factor that contributed to Tesco’s success was its ability to create ‘value’ that are
suitable for the Korean tastes and preference. For example, Tesco offered fresh produce
/fruits that have been partially processed and repackaged into a form that is ready to cook
or eat. Tesco also had a deli section that sold popular Korean traditional food items, while
its meat section had sales staff that cut and custom-packaged meat product according to
each consumer’s preference. Wal-Mart, on the other hand, entered the Korean market
without any local partner, and implemented its original merchandise mix from the US
model, yet its ‘global standardization’ strategy did not elicit sufficient responsiveness
from the Korean consumers. This shows that the entry mode can have a significant
impact on how an international retailer develops its strategy and on how the retailer
positions itself in a foreign market.
Third, effective channel mix organization was an important part of the competitive
advantage that was missing in Wal-Mart’s business model for the Korean market. In
other words, Wal-Mart needed to build a strong alliance with local suppliers, as this
facilitated effective merchandising and tighter integration along the value chain.
Consequently, Wal-Mart could not obtain the ability to control all logistic phases, from
sourcing to delivery, which dampened Wal-Mart’s price competitiveness, which was its
core competitive advantage in the US market.
Wal-Mart originally had a very clear definition of its strategic positioning in the US
market that brought a rapid growth and profitability. Its strategic positioning was derived
from its core competence of EDLP and centralized distribution network which were
considered to be unique and to have perceived value in the minds of American
consumers. Wal-Mart was able to create and capture this value from the consumers which
led to its impressive profitability and rapid profit growth. Thus, its strategic positioning
had a fit with the US demand market conditions. The timing also seemed to be working
for Wal-Mart as its high growth period matched with the period of the US retail sector
restructuring and consolidation. Wal-Mart has attempted to employ this business model
in the Korean market which resulted in failure. Wal-Mart’s competitive advantage of low
cost, low price was not suitable in the Korean competition and consumption context.
Prior to the market entry, Wal-Mart should have asked : whether the timing of the market
entry was appropriate ; whether to have a joint venture with a local partner; how to
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project or employ its core competence to the Korean market ; how to develop and execute
a business strategy for long-term growth in the Korean market; how much of Wal-Mart’s
American cookie cutter model of EDLP and low cost centralized distribution system
should be applied; how much Wal-Mart should develop a localized identity in Korea;
how fast Wal-Mart should expand and allocate its investment capitals among the target
markets.
When an international business identifies a foreign market with a high potential for
growth and profit, the firm must consider the scale of entry and strategic commitments. A
large scale market entry involves the commitment of significant resources and enables the
firm to capture first-mover advantages that are associated with demand preemption,
economies of scale, and switching costs. If a firm decided to be a late entrant to a foreign
market, it should be well prepared to deal with ‘late mover disadvantages’. When the
Korean retail market opened its door to foreign retailers in late 1990s, it was already
saturated with highly competitive domestic players. Wal-Mart entered the Korean market
on relatively small scale, and did not obtain a rapid entry. Prior to the market entry, Wal-
Mart should have defined its ‘strategic commitments’ for the Korean market. In other
words, Wal-Mart should have asked whether Korea was a strategically important market
to enter for its international expansion and whether it was worthwhile to allocate
significant capital resources to capture customers and distributors in Korea. Wal-Mart
was not prepared to develop an effective localization strategy which might have stemmed
from not having a clear projection of how much it was willing to invest and grow in this
market.
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References:
Choe Sang-Hun. (2006). Wal-Mart Selling Stores And Leaving South Korea. New York
Times. (Late Edition (east Coast)). New York, N.Y.: May 23, 2006. p. C.5
Colla Enrico and Dupuis Marc (2002). Research and managerial issues on global retail
competition : Carrefour/Wal-Mart. International Journal of Retail & Distribution
Management. Bradford:2002. Vol. 30, Iss. 2/3, p. 103-111.
Dupuis Marc and Nathalie Prime (1996). Business distance and global retailing: a model
for analysis of key success/ failure factors. International Journal of Retail & Distribution
Management. Bradford:1996. Vol.24, Iss. 11, p. 30
Park, C., Kim, D., Kim, I., Ahn, S., Oh, C., Son, I., and Lee, K. (2003), Korea 's Retail
Industry in the New Millennium, Seoul: KCCI (Korea Chamber of Commerce &
Industry).
Ramstad Evan. (2006a). Wal-Mart Leaves South Korea By Selling Stores to Local Rival;
Sale to Shinsegae Follows April Pullout by Carrefour As Domestic Firms Prevail
Wall Street Journal. (Eastern Edition). New York, N.Y.:May 23, 2006. p. A.2
Ramstad Evan (2006b). South Korea’s E-Mart is no Wal-Mart, which is precisely why
locals love it. Wall Street Journal. ( Eastern Edition). New York, NY. Aug, 10, 2006. p 1.
Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) 2006. M&As in Korea's Discount Store
Chains (May 26, 2006), Kim, Jin-Hyuk / Researcher .
Alan W.H. Grant and Leonard Schelsinger (1995). Realize your customers’ full profit
potential. Harvard Business Review. September-October, 1995. p 59-72.
Scardino Emily (2004). “Mass merchant breaks new ground in profitable South Korean
market.” DSN Retailing Today, Dec 13,2004.
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Shah Amit, Evan Offstein, and Tyra Phipps (2005). “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 2004” Case
10, Strategic Management, 10th edition. Pearson-Prentice Hall. NJ.
Troy Mike (2006). Wal-Mart cuts losses, exits South Korea. Retailing Today. New York.
June 12, 2006. Vol. 45, Iss.11, p.52-54.
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Table 1. Top Five Retailers in Korea by Market Share*
Company 2003 Sales 2002 Sales
LG Corp $7,499 $6,129
Shinsegae $5,804 $5,172
Lotte Shopping Co. Ltd. $3,330 $3,187
Tesco - Samsung $2,817 $2,147
Samsun Cheil Industries $2,086 $2,088
Source: Euromonitor International
* sales are in South Korea only, in millions; in $US terms based on exchange rate for 2003 and 2002.
Superior Inputs
Superior Offering
Superior Access
Superior Segments
Superior Customers
Source: Robert Lamb’s Competitive Strategy 2005. New York University, New York.
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