SMCEU v. Judge Bersamira (Review, Art. 212) G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990 J.

Melencio-Herrera Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the DOLE. In said contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be no employeremployee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other. Petitioner is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rankand-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement effective 1 July 1986 to 30 June 1989. Section 1 of their CBA specifically provides that "temporary, probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement." In a letter dated 20 November 1988, the Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with SMC. The Union alleged that this group of employees, while appearing to be contractual workers supposedly independent contractors, have been continuously working for SanMig for a period ranging from 6 months to 15 years and that their work is neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SanMig. Thus, it was contended that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. It was then demanded that the employment status of these workers be regularized. On 12 January 1989 and 30 January 1989, the Union filed two notices of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting. Conciliatory meetings were then held before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of DOLE (NCMB-DOLE). Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices. On 6 March 1989, SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages before respondent Court enjoining petitioner from representing and/or acting in behalf of the employees of Lipercon and DRite, and of calling a strike among others. Respondent Court found the Complaint sufficient in form and substance and issued a Temporary Restraining Order, and subsequently, an Order granting the complaint of SanMig. Issue: Whether or not there exists a labor dispute such that the RTC may not validly assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NCMB-DOLE. Held: A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof. Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not determined by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist here is evident. What the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employeremployee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation

and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE. As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals.

Okol v. Slimmers World International G.R. No. 160146 December 11, 2009 J. Carpio

(Art. 217)

Facts: Respondent employed petitioner Leslie Okol as a management trainee on 15 June 1992. She rose up the ranks to become Head Office Manager and then Director and Vice President from 1996 until her dismissal on 22 September 1999. On 28 July 1999, prior to Okols dismissal, Slimmers World preventively suspended Okol. The suspension arose from the seizure by the Bureau of Customs of seven Precor elliptical machines and seven Precor treadmills belonging to or consigned to Slimmers World. The shipment of the equipment was placed under the names of Okol and two customs brokers for a value less than US$500. For being undervalued, the equipments were seized. On 19 September 1999, Okol filed her written explanation for the incident. However, Slimmers World found Okols explanation to be unsatisfactory. Through a letter dated 22 September 1999 signed by its president, Slimmers World terminated Okols employment. Okol filed a complaint with the Arbitration branch of the NLRC against respondents for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, damages and attorneys fees, with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages. On 22 February 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the case with a reservation of their right to file a Position Paper at the proper time. Respondents asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. In an Order, dated 20 March 2000, the labor arbiter granted the motion to dismiss. The labor arbiter ruled that Okol was the vice-president of Slimmers World at the time of her dismissal. Since it involved a corporate officer, the dispute was an intra-corporate controversy falling outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitration branch. Okol filed an appeal with the NLRC. In a Resolution dated 29 May 2001, the NLRC reversed and set aside the labor arbiters order. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC but were denied. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction Held: The issue revolves mainly on whether petitioner was an employee or a corporate officer of Slimmers World. In Tabang v. NLRC, it was held that an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee. In the present case, the respondents, in their motion to dismiss filed before the labor arbiter, questioned the jurisdiction of the NLRC in taking cognizance of petitioners complaint. Respondents presented the General Information Sheet, Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors and Secretarys Certificate,and the Amended By-Laws of Slimmers World as submitted to the SEC to show that petitioner was a corporate officer whose rights do not fall within the NLRCs jurisdiction. The GIS and minutes of the meeting of the board of directors indicated that petitioner was a member of the board of directors, holding one subscribed share of the capital stock, and an elected corporate officer. Clearly, from the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and officer of Slimmers World. In a number of cases, it was held that a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. Thus, under the law, it is the regular courts which has jurisdiction over the present case. DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191 (Art. 217) September 18, 1996

J. Vitug Facts: On 27 January 1993, private respondent filed a complaint for his alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs, both with a copy of the complaint. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Office, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters. The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the National Labor Relations Commission. In its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." The NLRC, in its reply to the letter, said that it is not competent to review a decision of the Labor Arbiter as it only exercises administrative supervision over the Arbiter. Dissatisfied, the DFA lodged the instant petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Asian Development Bank Held: Article 50(1) of the Charter provides: The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities. Under Article 55 thereof All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including experts performing missions for the Bank: (1) shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity. The above stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be able, to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippines government which must be respected. The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attack.

there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner. The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for; reinstatement of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: (1) Unfair labor practice; (2) Termination disputes; (3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; (4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; (5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and (6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer- employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos, whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor arbiter is both original and exclusive. The only exceptions are where the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory arbitration, or the parties agree to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private respondents' petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes."

Ong v. Court of Appeals (Art. 223) G.R. No. 152494 September 22, 2004 J. Ynares-Santiago Facts: Petitioner is the sole proprietor of Milestone Metal Manufacturing, which manufactures, among others, wearing apparels, belts, and umbrellas. Sometime in May 1998, the business suffered very low sales and productivity because of the economic crisis in the country. Hence, it adopted a rotation scheme by reducing the workdays of its employees to three days a week or less for an indefinite period. On separate dates, the 15 respondents filed before the NLRC complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and attorneys fees against petitioner. Petitioner claimed that 9 of the 15 respondents were not employees of Milestone but of Protone Industrial Corporation which, however, stopped its operation due to business losses. Further, he claims that respondents Manuel Abuela, Lolita Abelong, Ronnie Herrero, Carlos Tabbal, Conrado Dabac, and Lodualdo Faa were not dismissed from employment; rather, they refused to work after the rotation scheme was adopted. Anent their monetary claims, petitioner presented documents showing that he paid respondents minimum wage, 13th month pay, holiday pay, and contributions to the SSS, Medicare, and Pag-Ibig Funds. The Labor Arbiter, however, sided with the private respondents. The NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal on the ground of failure to pay the required docket fees. Issue: Whether or not there was proper appeal to the NLRC Held: Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, sets forth the rules on appeal from the Labor Arbiters monetary award: ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both

PAL v. NLRC G.R. No. 120567 J. Martinez

(Art. 218) March 20, 1998

Facts: Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by the dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction which was granted. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC may validly acquire jurisdiction despite the fact that there is no complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter in this complaint for injunction Held: In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC (e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party; It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as

parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. () In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The pertinent provisions of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which were in effect when petitioner filed his appeal, provide: Section 1. Periods of Appeal. Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter and the POEA Administrator shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter () Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal. Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorneys fees. The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine. The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. In the case at bar, petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on January 6, 2000. He filed his notice of appeal with memorandum of appeal and paid the corresponding appeal fees on January 17, 2000, the last day of filing the appeal. However, in lieu of the required cash or surety bond, he filed a motion to reduce bond alleging that the amount of P1,427,802,04 as bond is "unjustified and prohibitive" and prayed that the same be reduced to a "reasonable level." The NLRC denied the motion and consequently dismissed the appeal for non-perfection. Petitioner now contends that he was deprived of the chance to post bond because the NLRC took 102 days to decide his motion. While, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRCs New Rules of Procedure allows the Commission to reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the authority is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a memorandum of appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites mentioned shall not stop the running of the period for perfection of appeal. The posting of cash or surety bond is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and non-compliance therewith is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. This requirement is intended to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees just and lawful claims. The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the

employer to be the exclusive means by which an employers appeal may be perfected. The fact that the NLRC took 102 days to resolve the motion will not help petitioners case. The NLRC Rules clearly provide that "the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal."Petitioner should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten-day reglementary period following the receipt of the order, resolution or decision of the NLRC to forestall the finality of such order, resolution or decision. In the alternative, he should have paid only a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond.

Lansangan v. Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc. Reinstatement of LAs Decision) G.R. No. 177026 January 30, 2009 J. Carpio-Morales

(Art. 223,

Facts: An anonymous e-mail was sent to the General Manager of Amkor Technology Philippines detailing allegations of malfeasance on the part of its supervisory employees Lunesa Lansangan and Rosita Cendaa (petitioners) for "stealing company time." Respondent thus investigated the matter, requiring petitioners to submit their written explanation. In handwritten letters, petitioners admitted their wrongdoing. Respondent thereupon terminated petitioners for "extremely serious offenses" as defined in its Code of Discipline, prompting petitioners to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against it. The labor arbiter Arthur L. Amansec dismissed petitioners complaint, he having found them guilty of "[s]wiping another employees [sic] I.D. card or requesting another employee to swipe ones I.D. card to gain personal advantage and/or in the interest of cheating", an offense of dishonesty punishable as a serious form of misconduct and fraud or breach of trust under Article 282 of the Labor Code: () which allows the dismissal of an employee for a valid cause. The Arbiter, however, ordered the reinstatement of petitioners to their former positions without backwages "as a measure of equitable and compassionate relief" owing mainly to petitioners prior unblemished employment records, show of remorse, harshness of the penalty and defective attendance monitoring system of respondent. Respondent assailed the reinstatement aspect of the Arbiters order before the NLRC. In the meantime, petitioners, without appealing the Arbiters finding them guilty of "dishonesty as a form of serious misconduct and fraud or breach of trust," moved for the issuance of a "writ of reinstatement." After consolidating respondents appeal from the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement and subsequent appeal/order denying the quashal of the alias writ of execution and lifting of the notice of garnishment, the NLRC granted respondents appeals by deleting the reinstatement aspect of the Arbiters decision and setting aside the Arbiters Alias Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution having been denied, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which while affirming the finding that petitioners were guilty of misconduct and the like, ordered respondent to "pay petitioners their corresponding backwages without qualification and deduction for the period covering October 20, 2004 (date of the Arbiters decision) up to June 30, 2005 (date of the NLRC Decision)," citing Article 223 of the Labor Code and Roquero v. Philippine Airlines. Issue: Whether or not Art. 223 is applicable in the present case Held: It is not applicable. The decision of the Arbiter finding that petitioners committed "dishonesty as a form of serious misconduct and fraud, or breach of trust" had become final, petitioners not having appealed the same before the NLRC as in fact they even moved for the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the decision. It bears recalling that it was only respondent which assailed the Arbiters decision to the NLRC to solely question the propriety of the order for reinstatement, and it succeeded. Article 223 concerns itself with an interim relief, granted to a dismissed or separated employee while

the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as what happened in Roquero. It does not apply where there is no finding of illegal dismissal. Thus, petitioners are entitled neither to full backwages nor to reinstatement as they are not unjustly dismissed.

Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 126322 January 16, 2002 J. Pardo

(Art. 224)

"A person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over the levied properties is not precluded, however, from taking other legal remedies." A separate civil action for recovery of ownership of the property would not constitute interference with the powers or processes of the Arbiter and the NLRC which rendered the judgment to enforce and execute upon the levied properties. The property levied upon being that of a stranger is not subject to levy. Thus, a separate action for recovery, upon a claim and primafacie showing of ownership by the petitioner, cannot be considered as interference. CITIBANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 108961., November 27, 1998 FACTS Citibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. entered into a contract for the latter to provide security to the bank's premises. On April 22, 1990, the contract between Citibank and El Toro expired. On June 10, 1990, petitioner Citibank served on El Toro a written notice that the bank would not renew anymore the service agreement with the latter. Citibank hired another security agency, the Golden Pyramid Security Agency, to render security services at Citibank's premises. CIGLA filed a notice of strike directed at the premises of the Citibank main office. Faced with the prospect of disruption of its business operations, Citibank filed with the RTC Makati, a complaint for injunction and damages. CIGLA filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint which was denied. CIGLA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the proceedings had before the regional trial court. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in CIGLA's favor. Citibank filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Citibank contends that there is no employer-employee relationship between Citibank and the security guards represented by respondent CIGLA and that there is no "labor dispute" in the subject controversy. The security guards were employees of El Toro security agency, not of Citibank. Its service contract with Citibank had expired and not renewed. ISSUE: WON it is the labor tribunal or the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by Citibank with the trial court. HELD: NO.In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are generally considered: 1.the selection and engagement of the employee; 2.the payment of wages; 3.the power of dismissal; and 4.the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished" It has been decided also that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over a claim filed where no employer-employee relationship existed between a company and the security guards assigned to it by a security service contractor. In this case, it was the security agency El Toro that recruited, hired and assigned the watchmen to their place of work. It was the security agency that was answerable to Citibank for the conduct of its guards. The question arises. Is there a labor dispute between Citibank and the security guards, members of respondent CIGLA, regardless of whether they stand in the relation of employer and employees? Article 212, paragraph l of the Labor Code provides the definition of a "labor dispute". It "includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." If at all, the dispute between Citibank and El Toro security agency is one regarding the termination or non-renewal of the contract of services. This is a civil dispute. El Toro was an independent contractor. Thus, no employeremployee relationship existed between Citibank and the security guard members of the union in the security agency who were assigned to secure

Facts: It appears from the records that petitioner is alleging ownership over a number of properties located in the compound and buildings of Artex Development Corporation, which were erroneously levied upon by the sheriff of the NLRC as a consequence of the decision rendered by the said Commission in a labor case. As a consequence of the erroneous and unlawful levy of the properties, the petitioner filed a Notice of Third Party Claim with the Labor Arbiter, an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the NLRC, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC of Manila all of which were dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners subsequent appeal to the NLRC from the decision of the Labor Arbiter was likewise dismissed. Its appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed despite petitioners protestations that the filing of a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it is a remedy specifically granted to an owner whose properties were subjected to a writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which it was not a party. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was forum shopping and on dismissing the petitioners accion reinvindicatoria on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court Held: Anent the first issue, there is no forum shopping. In the case at bar, there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of action and reliefs sought. The case before the NLRC where the labor arbiter issued a labor dispute was between Artex and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to the case. The only issue petitioner raised before the NLRC was whether or not the writ of execution issued by the labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property of petitioner, not a party to the labor case. On the second issue, a third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of. Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies: a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC. Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper action with a competent court to recover ownership of the property illegally seized by the sheriff. The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing a subsequent action for recovery of property and damages with the Regional Trial Court. And, the institution of such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of forum shopping. The power of the NLRC to execute its judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. "The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party claimant is involved. When a third-party, or a stranger to the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the judgment debtor." In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that: "The well-settled doctrine is that a 'proper levy' is indispensable to a valid sale on execution. A sale unless preceded by a valid levy is void. Therefore, since there was no sufficient levy on the execution in question, the private respondent did not take any title to the properties sold thereunder ().

the bank's premises and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no right to strike against the bank.

RURAL BANK OF CORON vs. CORTES G.R. No. 164888 December 6, 2006 FACTS: Respondent was the Financial Assistant, Personnel Officer and Corporate Secretary of The Rural Bank of Coron. On examination of the financial books of the corporations it was found out that respondent was involved in several anomalies, drawing petitioners to terminate respondents services. Respondents counsel conveyed respondents willingness to abide by the decision to terminate her but reminded them that she was entitled to separation pay as well as to the other benefits provided by law in her favor. However, this demand remained unheeded, so respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other benefits. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, contending that the case was an intra-corporate controversy involving the removal of a corporate officer, hence, cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to Section 5 of PD 902A. It was denied and eventually, the Labor Arbiter found for respondent, computing the monetary award due her. The Labor Arbiter disposed his decision. On last day of the period of appeal, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion for Reduction of Bond to which they attached a Memorandum on Appeal. In their Motion for Reduction of Bond, petitioners alleged that the corporations were under financial distress and the Rural Bank of Coron was under receivership. They thus prayed that the amount of bond be substantially reduced, preferably to one half thereof or even lower. The NLRC, while noting that petitioners timely filed the appeal, held that the same was not accompanied by an appeal bond, a mandatory requirement under Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure. It accordingly dismissed the appeal. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it. Hence this petition faulting the appellate court for dismissing their petition, saying that they did such based on mere technicality and failure to decide based on merit. ISSUE: 1. 2.

FACTS Florence Cabansag arrived in Singapore as a tourist and applied for employment with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank, a private banking corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. PNB found her eminently qualified and offered her a position as Branch Credit Officer. She then filed an Application, with the Ministry of Manpower of the Government of Singapore, for the issuance of an Employment Pass. Her application was approved for a period of two (2) years. Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the employment contract Cabansag and she was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, an Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. On April 16, 1999 PNB demanded that she submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the local market. Cabansag asked that she be given sufficient time to look for another job. She was told that she should be out of her employment by May 15, 1999. She was again summoned and adamantly ordered to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20, 1999, she received a letter terminating her employment with the Bank. |The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Cabansag. PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. The Commission affirmed that Decision. In disposing of the Petition for Certiorari, the CA noted that petitioner bank had failed to adduce in evidence the Singaporean law supposedly governing the latters employment Contract with respondent. The appellate court found that the Contract had actually been processed by the Philippine Embassy in Singapore and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), which then used that Contract as a basis for issuing an Overseas Employment Certificate in favor of respondent. ISSUES 1. WON the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant controversy; WON the arbitration of the NLRC in the National Capital Region is the most convenient venue or forum to hear and decide the instant controversy

2.

WON the Labor Arbiter has thus jurisdiction over respondents complaint. WON the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition "on a mere technicality."

HELD: 1.

YES. While, indeed, respondent was the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, she was also its Financial Assistant and the Personnel Officer of the two other petitioner corporations. Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v. Movilla23 instructs that a corporation can engage its corporate officers to perform services under a circumstance which would make them employees. 2. NO The non-posting of an appeal bond within the reglementary period divests the NLRC of its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The requirement for posting the surety bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with. Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. The petitioners cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of rules for their act of negligence. In the case at bar, petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond within the prescribed period, thus, no appeal was perfected from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. For this reason, the decision sought to be appealed to the NLRC had become final and executory and therefore immutable. Clearly then, the NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. CABANSAG G.R. No. 157010. June 21, 2005

HELD: 1. YES. Based on Art 217 of the Labor Code and Section 10 of RA 8042, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW). Respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country. Similarly, the Philippine government requires non-Filipinos working in the country to first obtain a local work permit in order to be legally employed here. That permit, however, does not automatically mean that the noncitizen is thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does not at all imply a waiver of ones national laws on labor. Absent any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such permit simply means that its holder has a legal status as a worker in the issuing country. Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that she was considered at the start of her employment as a direct hire governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in Singapore, she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. At the time her employment was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate.

Moreover, petitioner admits that it is a Philippine corporation doing business through a branch office in Singapore. Signifi cantly, respondents employment by the Singapore branch office had to be approved by the president of the bank whose principal offices were in Manila. This circumstance militates against petitioners contention that respondent was locally hired; and totally governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason does this fact reinforce the presumption that respondent falls under the legal definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in Singapore. Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the labor arbiter. 2. YES. Based on Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure reads: Section 1. Venue (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner; Provided, however that cases of Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) shall be filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch where the complainant resides or where the principal office of the respondent/employer is situated, at the option of the complainant. For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to their employers. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042), a migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.[21] Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus falls within the category of migrant worker or overseas Filipino worker. As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her Complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal. The law gives her two choices: (1) at the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where the principal office of her employer is situated. Since her dismissal by petitioner, respondent has returned to the Philippines -- specifically to her residence at Filinvest II, Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.

YES. The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here. The employment contract. Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government. Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.37 The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar. Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines. No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made). The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the People's Republic of China. No power to determine the facts. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment. Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither are we saying that we do not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If Santos were an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an "overseas contract worker" a fact which he admits with conviction. Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on the merits, the NLRC's decision cannot be sustained.

THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD. vs. NLRC G.R. No. 120077, October 13, 2000 FACTS Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker employed as a printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. Subsequently, in June 1988, he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, People's Republic of China and later terminated due to retrenchment. Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, which decided in his favor, Petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC declared the decision null for want of jurisdiction and enjoined the complainant to file his complaint with the POEA. Santos moved for reconsideration arguing that the case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not an "overseas contract worker. NLRC granted the moti on and reversed itself. Labor Arbiter found that respondent Santos was illegally dismissed from employment and recommended that he be paid actual damages equivalent to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Labor Arbiter de Vera's recommendation had no basis in law and in fact. ISSUE: WON the NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LISTANA G.R. No. 152611, August 5, 2003 FACTS Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land in Sorsogon. He voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),3 under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the respondent. Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation of the land. On October 14, 1998, the DARAB

rendered a Decision, valuing the land as P10,956,963.25 for the acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. A Writ of Execution was issued by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner provided by law. Listana filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB. PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt. Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order, which was however denied by the PARAD. Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to the DARAB Central. PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent. On a separate date, he also directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes. ISSUE: WON the order for the arrest of petitioners manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid or not. HELD: NO. There are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio. In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides: Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore. The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit: 1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce documents when required to do so by the official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the official or body with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.

PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondents "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Lorayes, are null and void.

ROSEWOOD PROCESSING, INC vs. NLRC [G.R. Nos. 116476-84. May 21, 1998] FACTS A a complaint for illegal dismissal; underpayment of wages; and for nonpayment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, thirteenth month pay, cash bond deposit, unpaid wages and damages was filed against Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency and/or Sergio Jamila IV. Thereafter, petitioner was impleaded as a third-party respondent by the security agency. In due course, Labor Arbiter rendered a consolidated Decision ordering Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency, Sergio Jamila IV, and third-party respondent Rosewood Processing, Inc. to pay the complainants jointly and severally. The appeal filed by petitioner was dismissed by the National Labor Relations Commission in its Resolution promulgated April 28, 1994, for failure of the petitioner to file the required appeal bond within the reglementary period. As earlier stated, Respondent Commission dismissed petitioners appeal, because it was allegedly not perfected within the reglementary ten-day period. Petitioner received a copy of the labor arbiters Decision on April 2, 1993, and it filed its Memorandum of Appeal on April 12, 1993. However, it submitted the appeal bond on April 26, 1993, or twelve days after the expiration of the period for appeal per Rule VI, Sections 1, 3 and 6 of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. Thus, it ruled that the labor arbiters Decision became final and executory on April 13, 1993. In the assailed Order, Respondent Commission denied reconsideration, because petitioner allegedly failed to raise any palpable or patent error committed by said commission. ISSUE WON the appeal from the labor arbiter to the NLRC was perfected on time. HELD YES. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. The Labor Code provides: ART. 223. Appeal.Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. xxx xxx xxx xxx

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. xxx xxx x x x.

Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision involving a monetary award in labor cases may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.[10] The lawmakers intended the posting of the bond to be an indispensable requirement to perfect an employers appeal.[11]

However, in a number of cases, this Court has relaxed this requirement in order to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of controversies on the merits.[12] Some of these cases include: (a) counsels reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter that the aggrieved party may appeal xxx within ten (10) working days; (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; and (d) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved.[13] In Quiambao vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[14] this Court ruled that a relaxation of the appeal bond requirement could be justified by substantial compliance with the rule. In Globe General Services and Security Agency vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[15] the Court observed that the NLRC, in actual practice, allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of the appellant and on meritorious grounds; hence, petitioners in that case should have filed a motion to reduce the bond within the reglementary period for appeal. That is the exact situation in the case at bar. Here, petitioner claims to have received the labor arbiters Decision on April 6, 1993. [16] On April 16, 1993, it filed, together with its memorandum on appeal [17] and notice of appeal, a motion to reduce the appeal bond[18] accompanied by a surety bond for fifty thousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.[19] Ignoring petitioners motion (to reduce bond), Respondent Commission rendered its assailed Resolution dismissing the appeal due to the late filing of the appeal bond. The solicitor general argues for the affirmation of the assailed Resolution for the sole reason that the appeal bond, even if it was filed on time, was defective, as it was not in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The Court disagrees. We hold that petitioners motion to reduce the bond is a substantial compliance with the Labor Code. This holding is consistent with the norm that letter-perfect rules must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice.[20] Where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight because labor determinations should not only be secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.[21] A judicious reading of the memorandum of appeal would have made it evident to Respondent Commission that the recourse was meritorious. Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion in peremptorily dismissing the appeal without passing upon -in fact, ignoring -- the motion to reduce the appeal bond. We repeat: Considering the clear merits which appear, res ipsa loquitur, in the appeal from the labor arbiters Decision, and the petitioners substantial compliance with rules governing appeals, we hold that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing said appeal and in failing to pass upon the grounds alleged in the Motion for Reconsideration. GENUINO vs. NRC G.R. Nos. 142732-33, December 4, 2007 FACTS Genuino was employed by Citibank, an American banking corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, sometime in January 1992 as Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of Assistant Vice-President. Genuino's employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of (1) serious misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust reposed upon her by the bank, and (3) commission of a crime against the bank. On October 15, 1993, Genuino filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint against Citibank for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering her reinstatement immediately to her former position, with backwages, moral and exemplary damages plus 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's fees.

Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision, declaring the dismissal of the complainant valid and legal on the ground of serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence and consequently dismissing the complaint a quo; but (3) ORDERING the respondent bank to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date it reinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at P60,000.00 a month, as found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until the date of this decision. The parties' motions for reconsideration were denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated October 28, 1994.18 Genuino prayed for the reversal of the NLRC's decision insofar as it declared her dismissal valid and legal. Meanwhile, Citibank questioned the NLRC's order to pay Genuino's salaries from the date of reinstatement until the date of the NLRC's decision. The Court found that the dismissal of Genuino is for a legal and valid ground. ISSUE: WON Citibank needs to "to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date it reinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at P60,000.00 a month, as found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until the date of this decision," HELD Anent the directive of the NLRC in its September 3, 1994 Decision ordering Citibank "to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date it reinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at P60,000.00 a month, as found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until the date of this decision," the Court hereby cancels said award in view of its finding that the dismissal of Genuino is for a legal and valid ground. Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code, which states: In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices.42 However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund. Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision.

ANDO vs. CAMPO G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011 FACTS Paquito V. Ando was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Respondents They filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents favor. PACSI and petitioner were directed to pay respondents separation pay and the award of attorneys fees. Upon finality of the decision, respondents moved for its execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property in the name of Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S. Ando., prompting petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) befiore the RTC Branch 50, Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latters properties. The RTC denied the prayer for a TRO, holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The RTC ruled that, pursuant to the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment, petitioners remedy was to file a third-party claim with the NLRC Sheriff. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order. Instead, he filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He contended that the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Order. Petitioner argued that the writ of execution was issued improvidently or without authority since the property to be levied belonged to him in his personal capacity and his wife. The RTC, respondent contended, could stay the execution of a judgment if the same was unjust. He also contended that, pursuant to a ruling of this Court, a third party who is not a judgment creditor may choose between filing a thirdparty claim with the NLRC sheriff or filing a separate action with the courts. ISSUE WON the Petitioner can choose between filing a third-party claim with the sheriff of the NLRC or filing a separate action. HELD NO, but his petition in meritorious and, justice demands that this Court look beyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition. The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body. Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character. NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment deals specifically with thirdparty claims in cases brought before that body. It defines a third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of the property levied upon.[24] It also sets out the procedure for the filing of a third-party claim, to wit: SECTION 2. Proceedings. If property levied upon be claimed by any person other than the losing party or his agent, such person shall make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title and shall file the same with the sheriff and copies thereof served upon the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ and upon the prevailing party. Upon receipt of the third party claim, all proceedings with respect to the execution of the property subject of the third party claim shall automatically be suspended and the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ shall conduct a hearing with due notice to all parties concerned and resolve the validity of the claim within ten (10) working days from receipt thereof and his decision is appealable to the Commission within ten (10) working days from notice, and the Commission shall resolve the appeal within same period. There is no doubt in our mind that petitioners complaint is a third party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a third party in relation to the property subject of the execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said

that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is a third party within contemplation of the law. The Courts pronouncements in Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Cabato[25] are instructive: Whatever irregularities attended the issuance an execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.

There is no denying that the present controversy arose from the complaint for illegal dismissal. The subject matter of petitioners complaint is the execution of the NLRC decision. Execution is an essential part of the proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated,[27] and there can be no end to the controversy without the full and proper implementation of the commissions directives. Further underscoring the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over petitioners complaint is Article 254 of the Labor Code, to wit: ART. 254. INJUNCTION PROHIBITED. No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.

That said, however, we resolve to put an end to the controversy right now, considering the length of time that has passed since the levy on the property was made. Petitioner claims that the property sought to be levied does not belong to PACSI, the judgment debtor, but to him and his wife. Since he was sued in a representative capacity, and not in his personal capacity, the property could not be made to answer for the judgment obligation of the corporation. The TCT[28] of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation and, therefore, not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process. Moreover, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.[29] A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor.[30] Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation. In sum, while petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice demands that this Court look beyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition.

1.

PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN (6 March 2012) FACTS:

- Private respondent Juezan filed a complaint with the DOLE Regional Office, Cebu City against petitioner for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. - DOLE Regional Director found that Juezan was indeed an employee of petitioner and was entitled to money claims. - On appeal, DOLE Secretary denied petitioner on the ground that he submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit instead of posting a cash bond. - On appeal with the CA, petitioner was again denied on the ground that he was accorded due process and that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction. - The SC reversed the CA decision because there was no EE relationship between the two, and that the NLRC is the primary agency that determines whether an EE relationship exists or not, not the DOLE. - It was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence of an EE relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. Thus, an EE relationship must already exist before the DOLE can exercise its visitorial and enforcement powers (Art. 128 (b)). - Under Art. 129 of the Labor Code, the power of the DOLE and its duly authorized hearing officers to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims was qualified by the proviso that the complaint not include a claim for reinstatement, or that the aggregate money claims not exceed PhP5,000. RA 7730, or an Act Further Strengthening the Visitorial and Enforcement Powers of the Secretary of Labor, did away with the PhP5,000 limitation, allowing the DOLE Secretary to exercise its visitorial and enforcement power for claims beyond PhP5,000. The only qualification to this expanded power of the DOLE was only that there still be an existing employer-employee relationship. ISSUE: WoN the DOLE Secretary may make a determination of whether or not an EE relationship exists. WoN the DOLE has jurisdiction over the case at bar. HELD: No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. Under Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employeremployee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC. IN A NUTSHELL: 1. If a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing EE relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no EE relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217 (3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions

4.

of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an EE relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional Director that there was an EE relationship has been subjected to review by this Court, with the finding being that there was no EE relationship between petitioner and private respondent, based on the evidence presented. Private respondent presented selfserving allegations as well as self-defeating evidence. The findings of the Regional Director were not based on substantial evidence, and private respondent failed to prove the existence of an EE relationship. The DOLE had no jurisdiction over the case, as there was no EE. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint against petitioner is proper.

2.

2. 3.

PAUL SANTIAGO vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. (10 July 2007) FACTS: Petitioner: seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for 5 years Feb. 1998: Petitioner signed a new contract of employment (9month duration, salary of $515, OT pay, other benefits). It was approved by POEA. He was to be deployed aboard MSV Seaspread for Canada from Manila. A week before his departure, the respondents Vice-Pres., Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, sent a fax message to the captain of MSV Seaspread stating that Santiago should not be deployed anymore for fear that he might jump ship like his brother. Thus, petitioner was sent back but reassured of his deployment in the future. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd. The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Teresita Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not commenced since petitioner was not deployed. According to her, respondent violated the rules and regulations governing overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages representing lost salary income for nine (9) months and fixed overtime fee, all amounting to US$7,209.00. On appeal, NLRC ruled: No EE relationship because the POEA Standard Contract shall commence only upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employeremployee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and attorney's fees should be dismissed. Also, the NLRC found respondent's decision to be a valid exercise of its management prerogative. On appeal, CA ruled: NO EE relationship because petitioner had not departed yet from Manila port, and thus not entitled to actual damages. Petitioner alleges: (1) That he was an employee since he had been working with them for 5 years; (2) That there was no sufficient cause for abandoning the contract since they relied merely on phone calls (unidentified callers; wife executed an affidavit strongly denying the fax she supposedly sent) Respondent alleges: That the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC do not have jurisdiction. The controversy involves a breach of contractual obligations and such is cognizable by civil courts. ISSUE: WoN the LA/NLRC have jurisdiction over the case at bar. HELD:

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A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employeremployee relationship. The commencement of the employeremployee relationship would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. But even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, Respondent's act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner's cause of action. NLRC has jurisdiction, despite absence of EE relationship. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that: Sec. 10.Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. . . . [Emphasis supplied]

LA Aliman Mangandogs decision: DISMISS PETTIONERS COMPLAINT on the ground that respondent had been generous in giving assistance, and that the separation pay, among others, had already been integrated in the retirement plan. On appeal, the NLRC partly granted the petition, emphasizing that the petitioner was not retired from the service pursuant to law, collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or other employment contract; rather, she was dismissed from employment due to a disease/disability under Article 284 of the Labor Code. In view of her non-entitlement to retirement benefits, the amounts received by petitioner should then be treated as her separation pay. On appeal, CA affirmed NLRC. Respondent argues that the legality of the deduction from petitioner's total benefits cannot be taken cognizance of by this Court since the issue was not raised during the early stage of the proceedings.

Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC. Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner the 9-month salary ($4,635) he should have received and attorneys fees, but not the OT pay and moral damages (no bad faith proved on the part of respondent to not continue his employment).

ISSUE: WoN a claim for illegal deduction (from 1M to P700k+ due to P300k+ taxes) falls within the jurisdiction of LA and/or NLRC. HELD: It is noteworthy that petitioner demanded the completion of her retirement benefits, including the amount withheld by respondent for taxation purposes. The issue of deduction for tax purposes is intertwined with the main issue of whether or not petitioner's benefits have been fully given her. It is, therefore, a money claim arising from the employer-employee relationship, which clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. For the issue of WoN the retirement benefits are taxable, SC held that under the National Internal Revenue Code Sec. 32B6(a), exclusion from withholding tax shall only be granted to the employee who has been in service for more than 10 years, among others. Petitioner was only in the service for 8 years. Thus, she was not entitled to the tax exemption. Respondent is correct in deducting P300k+ for taxes.

4.

3.

MA. ISABEL T. SANTOS, represented by ANTONIO P. SANTOS vs. SERVIER PHILIPPINES, INC. and NLRC (28 November 2008) FACTS: Petitioner: HR Manager of respondent from 1991-1999 (termination of service) March 1998: Sent to Paris to attend a meeting of all HR managers of respondent. She also decided to spend a European vacation there with her family as a gift to her only child who graduated. They had dinner at a place known for mussels. She complained of stomach pains and vomited while having dinner. Afterwards, she was brought to a hospital, was in a coma for 21 days and stayed in the ICU for 52 days. The probable cause was alimentary allergy from the mussels she ate. Respondent paid all her hospital expenses as well as her husband and sons stay in Paris. In June 1998, she went back to Philippines. Continuous medical care was given by St. Lukes. The hospital expenses here and her salaries were paid by respondent still. August 1999: Respondent decided to terminate her with a retirement package amounting to over P1M because a letter dated March 1999 from her physician stated that she still had not fully developed, physically and mentally. Of the promised over P1M benefits, only P700k+ was given to her husband due to taxes. Thus, Petitioner, represented by her husband, instituted the instant case for unpaid salaries; unpaid separation pay; unpaid balance of retirement package plus interest; insurance pension for permanent disability; educational assistance for her son; medical assistance; reimbursement of medical and rehabilitation expenses; moral, exemplary, and actual damages, plus attorney's fees.

MERALCO vs. JAN CARLO GALA (7 March 2012) FACTS: Respondent: probationary lineman of Meralcos Valenzuela sector starting March 2006 After 4 months, he was dismissed due to alleged complicity in pilferages of Meralcos electrical supplies, as well as misconduct and dishonesty. A Noberto Llanes, a non-Meralco employee, boarded the trucks without being stopped (since most of the employees knew him) and took out electrical supplies. When respondent was being investigated, Gala denied involvement because he did not want to meddle with his superiors businesses. July 2006: He was dismissed, September 2007: LA Teresita Castillon-Lora dismissed the case for lack of merit. Galas participation in the pilferage rendered him unqualified to become an employee. On appeal, NLRC reversed the LA decision since there was no concrete showing of his wrongdoing, thus Gala was illegally dismissed, On appeal, CA denied Meralcos petition for lack of merit and partially granted Galas petition for reinstatement with full backwages. With respect to the merits of the case, Gala bewails Meralco's reliance on the joint affidavit of the task force not only because it was presented for the first time on appeal to the CA, but also because it was a mere afterthought. This earlier statement did not even mention Gala, but the later joint affidavit "splashes GALA's name in a desperate attempt to link him to an imagined wrongdoing." Gala posits that there is clear lack of basis for the termination of his employment. Thus, he wonders why Meralco did not present as evidence the video footage of the entire incident which it claims exists. He suspects that the footage was adverse to Meralco's position in the case. ISSUE: WoN Art. 221 of the Labor Code applies to the case at bar. HELD:

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Gala would want the petition to be dismissed outright on procedural grounds, claiming that the "Verification and Certification," "Secretary's Certificate" and "Affidavit of Service" accompanying the petition do not contain the details of the Community Tax Certificates of the affiants, and that the lawyers who signed the petition failed to indicate their updated MCLE certificate numbers, in violation of existing rules. We stress at this point that it is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, provided due process is duly observed. In keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it proper to give due course to the petition, especially in view of the conflict between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other. As we said in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union , "the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice."

5.

LYDIA BUENAOBRA, et. al. vs. LIM KING GUAN (20 January 2004) FACTS: Petitioners: employees of respondent Unix International Export Corp. (business of manufacturing wallets, bags) Sometime in 1991 and 1992, petitioners filed several cases against UNIX for unfair labor practice, illegal lockout/dismissal, underpayment of wages, holiday pay, proportionate 13th month pay, unpaid wages, interest, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. February 23, 1993: LA Jose S. de Vera rendered a decision against UNIX. There being no appeal by either, the decision of labor arbiter de Vera eventually became final and executory. However, petitioners complained that the decision could not be executed because UNIX allegedly diverted, invested and transferred all its money, assets and properties to respondent Fuji Zipper Manufacturing Corporation (FUJI) whose stockholders and officers were also those of UNIX. March 25, 1997: Petitioners filed another complaint against respondents UNIX and FUJI. Petitioners mainly prayed that respondents UNIX and FUJI be held jointly and severally held liable for the payment of the monetary awards ordered by labor arbiter de Vera. May 31, 1998: labor arbiter Felipe Pati rendered a decision on the second complaint against UNIX and FUJI. July 30, 1998: FUJI filed a memorandum on appeal on the ground that they were not petitioners employers. February 15, 1999, the NLRC, Third Division judged in favor of respondents. Petitioners filed a petition in the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC, Third Division when it allowed private respondents to post the mandated cash or surety bond four months after the filing of their memorandum on appeal. On May 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. ISSUE: WoN the NLRC Third Division committed grave abuse of discretion (Art. 223 paragraph 3 of the Labor Code) when it allowed private respondents to post the mandated cash or surety bond four months after the filing of the respondents memo on appeal. HELD: - The provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring the posting of bond on appeals involving monetary awards must be given liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits. If only to achieve substantial justice, strict observance of the reglementary periods may be relaxed if warranted. The NLRC, Third Division could not be said to have abused its discretion in requiring the posting of

bond after it denied private respondents' motion to be exempted therefrom. It is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of making the judgment final and executory. However, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. We have allowed appeals from the decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. The facts and circumstances of the instant case warrant liberality considering the amount involved and the fact that petitioners already obtained a favorable judgment on February 23, 1993 against their employer UNIX. It is only fair and just that respondent FUJI be afforded the opportunity to be heard on appeal before the NLRC, especially in the light of labor arbiter Pati's later decision holding FUJI jointly and severally liable with UNIX in the payment of the monetary awards adjudged by labor arbiter de Vera against UNIX. In the absence of any showing that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion, or otherwise acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, this Court is bound by its findings. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed orders of the said Commission.

6.

MT. CARMEL COLLEGE vs. JOCELYN RESUENA, et. al. (10 October 2007) FACTS: - Petitioner: private educational institution administered by the Carmelite Fathers at New Escalante, Negros Occidental - Respondents were employees of petitioner, namely: Jocelyn Resuena (Accounting Clerk), Eddie Villalon (Elementary Department Principal); Sylvia Sedayon (Treasurer), and Zonsayda Emnace (Secretary to the Director). - November 1997: respondents, together with several faculty members, nonacademic personnel, and other students, participated in a protest action against petitioner. Because of this, respondents were terminated by petitioner on 15 May 1998. - Separate complaints were filed before Regional Arbitration Branch VI of the NLRC in Bacolod City, charging petitioner with illegal dismissal and claimed 13th month pay, separation pay, damages and attorney's fees - Labor Arbiter Drilon found that they were not illegally dismissed but ordered that they b e awa rded 13th month pay, se paration pay and attorneys fees in the amount of P334,875.47. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter ruling that th e termination of respondents was illegal and ordering the payment of back wages of respondents from 15 May 1998 up to 25 May 1999. It further directedthe rei nstatement of respondents or payment of s eparation pay, with back wages. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: (1) WoN reinstatement in the i nstant case is self executory a nd does not need a writ of execu tion fo r i ts enfo rcement; and (2) WoN the continuing award of backwages is proper. HELD: An order for reinstatement must be specifically declared and cannot bep resumed; like back wages, it is a separate and distinct relief given to an illegally dismissed employee. There being no specific order for reinstatement a n d t h e o r d e r being for complainants separation, there can be no basis for the award of salaries/back wages during the pendency of appeal. T h i s C o u r t h a d d e c l a r e d i n t h e a f o r e s a i d c a s e t h a t r e i n s t a t e m e n t d u r i n g a p p e a l i s warranted only when the Labor Arbiter himself rules that the dismissed employee should be reinstated. But this was precisely because on appeal to the NLRC, it found that there was no illegal dismissal;

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thus, neith er reins tatement nor back wages may b e awarded. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: back wages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are s eparate and distinct. In instances where reins tatement is no longer feasible because of strained rel a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e e m p l o y e e a n d t h e empl oyer, separation pay is granted. In effect, a n i l l e g a l l y d i s m i s s e d e m p l o y e e i s entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and back wages. The normal consequences of respond e n t s i l l e g a l d i s m i s s a l , t h e n , a r e reinst atement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of back wages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1)m o n t h salary for every year of service should be a w a r d e d a s a n a l t e r n a t i v e . T h e payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of back wages.

The CA annulled the NLRC findings saying that in an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established. It is incumbent upon private respondent Javier to prove the employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence that he is an employee of petitioners, but he failed to discharge this burden. The non-issuance of a companyissued identification card to private respondent and his failure to present salary vouchers, payslips, or other pieces of evidence supports Fly Aces contention that private respondent was not its employee. The CA also declared that the facts alleged by Javier did not pass the control test. He contracted work outside the company premises; he was not required to observe definite hours of work; he was not required to report daily; and he was free to accept other work elsewhere as there was no exclusivity of his contracted service to the company, the same being co-terminous with the trip only. Since no substantial evidence was presented to establish an employer-employee relationship, the case for illegal dismissal could not prosper. Issue: Whether or not Javier is an employee of Fly Ace.

BITOY JAVIER VS. FLYACE CORPORATION February 15, 2012 (Existence of ER-EE Relationship) Facts: On May 23, 2008, Danilo Bitoy Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits. He alleged that he was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing various tasks at the respondents warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before their delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he would be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as stevedore or pahinante; that he reported for work from Monday t o Saturday from 7:00AM to 5:00PM; that during his employment, he was not issued an identification card and payslips by the company; That on May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of his superior Ruben Ong as he has been terminated from his employment without notice. Javier was neither given the opportunity to refute the cause/s of his dismissal from work. For its part, Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries. Sometime in December 2007, Javier was contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of P300.00 per trip, which was later increased to P325.00 in January 2008. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available. On April 30, 2008, Fly Ace no longer needed the services of Javier. Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace insisted that there was no illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Javier failed to present proof that he was a regular employee of Fly Ace because complainant has no employee ID showing his employment with the Respondent nor any document showing that he received the benefits accorded to regular employees of the Respondents. On appeal with the NLRC, Javier was found to be a regular employee and Fly Ace was found to be liable for illegal dismissal. It was of the view that a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of employeremployee relationship. Payment by result x x x is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. It is a mere method of computing compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. The NLRC further averred that it did not follow that a worker was a job contractor and not an employee, just because the work he was doing was not directly related to the employers trade or business or the work may be considered as extra helper as in this case; and that the relationship of an employer and an employee was determined by law and the same would prevail whatever the parties may call it.

Held: No. The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished. In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case. He could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at work. In other words, Javiers allegations did not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-employee relationship on the basis of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Also, payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that the petitioner is not covered by the SSS affect the employer-employee relationship. However, in determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered. Unfortunately for Javier, the attendant facts and circumstances of the instant case do not provide the Court with sufficient reason to uphold his claimed status as employee of Fly Ace. REYES VS. RTC OF MAKATI Art 217 Jurisdiction of the LA Facts: Zenith Insurance Corp. and Rodrigo Reyes filed a derivative suit against his brother Oscar to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of the family corporation that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated by Oscar for himself. When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799[7] took effect, the SECs exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC designated as a special commercial court. Oscar moved to declare the complaint as a nuisance and harassment suit and should be dismissed according to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies; and that it is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.

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Issue: Whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Rodrigos complaint. Held: To resolve it, we rely on the judicial principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by Oscar, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial court's jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were not explained nor elaborated on. Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of action. AUSTRIA VS. NLRC Art 217 Jurisdiction of the LA Facts: Private Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists (hereinafter referred to as the SDA) is a religious corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law and is represented in this case by the other private respondents, officers of the SDA. Petitioner, on the other hand, was a Pastor of the SDA until 31 October 1991, when his services were terminated. The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the SDA for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991.[2] He began his work with the SDA on 15 July 1963 as a literature evangelist, selling literature of the SDA over the island of Negros. From then on, petitioner worked his way up the ladder and got promoted several times. In January, 1968, petitioner became the Assistant Publishing Director in the West Visayan Mission of the SDA. In July, 1972, he was elevated to the position of Pastor in the West Visayan Mission covering the island of Panay, and the provinces of Romblon and Guimaras. Petitioner held the same position up to 1988. Finally, in 1989, petitioner was promoted as District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA and was assigned at Sagay, Balintawak and Toboso, Negros Occidental, with twelve (12) churches under his jurisdiction. In January, 1991, petitioner was transferred to Bacolod City. He held the position of district pastor until his services were terminated on 31 October 1991. On various occasions from August up to October, 1991, petitioner received several communications[3] from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. In his written explanation petitioner reasoned out that he should not be made accountable for the unremitted collections since it was private respondents Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time. Thereafter, on 16 October 1991, petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, the president of the Negros Mission, and had a heated argument with the latter. n 17 October 1991, petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the Executive Committee meeting at the Negros Mission Conference Room on 21 October 1991. To be discussed in the meeting were the non-remittance of church collection and the events that transpired on 16 October 1991. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. Sensing that the result of the investigation might be one-sided, petitioner immediately wrote Pastor Rueben Moralde, president of the SDA and chairman of the fact-finding

committee, requesting that certain members of the fact-finding committee be excluded in the investigation and resolution of the case. Out of the 6 members requested to inhibit themselves from the investigation and decision-making, only 2 were actually excluded, Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo. Subsequently, on 29 October 1991, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employers duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services. Petitioner filed a complaint on 14 November 1991, before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with backwages and benefits, moral and exemplary damages and other labor law benefits. LA ruled in his favor. There was one appeal to the NLRC and two motions for reconsideration. Ultimately, NLRC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint since the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state Held: The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form or worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with which attached religious significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the abovecited examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation. As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for petitioners dismissal, namely: misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and commission of an offense against the person of his employers duly authorize representative, are all based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of employment. By this alone, it is palpable that the reason for petitioners dismissal from the service is not religious in nature. Coupled with this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of petitioners letter of term ination. As aptly stated by the OSG, this again is an eloquent admission by private respondents that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification that petitioner has been its employee for 28 years. SDA even registered petitioner with the SSS as its employee. As a matter of fact, the workers records of petitioner have been submitted by private respondents as part of their exhibits. From all of these it is clear that when the SDA terminated the services of petitioner, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee.

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The Court sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was terminated from service without just or lawful cause. LUNZAGA VS. ALBAR SHIPPING Art 217 Jurisdiction of the LA Facts: Romeo Lunzaga was a seaman working for respondent Albar Shipping and Trading Corp, assigned as Chief Engineer. One month later, Romeo suffered a heart attack and was repatriated to the Philippines only to die on September 5, 2008. Sometime in early 2009, Gilda Lunzaga, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Romeo, filed with the NLRC a complaint against Albar for payment of death benefits, damages and attorney's fees. It should be noted that Gilda was the designated heir in Romeo's OFW Verification Sheet and PhilHealth Information Sheet. Darwin, Venus, Romeo Ulysses and Marikit Odessa Lunzaga (Lunzaga siblings), the children of Romeo from his first marriage that was judicially declared null and void, opposed the complaint through a complaint-in-intervention. The Lunzaga siblings claimed that Gilda is not entitled to the death benefits of Romeo, as she had a subsisting marriage when she married him. They claim that her marriage with Romeo was, therefore, bigamous. During the mandatory conferences of the parties before the Labor Arbiter, Albar signified its willingness to pay Romeo's death benefits in the amount of USD 55,547.44. However, Gilda and the Lunzaga siblings could not agree as to the sharing of the benefits. Thus, on August 28, 2009, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order temporarily dismissing the complaint and directing the parties to file their case with the regular courts. Gilda filed an appeal to the NLRC beyond the reglementary period and the NLRC rendered a Decision dismissing said appeal. On appeal, the CA ruled that the petition is devoid of merit. The CA wrote, "Indeed, the matter of the parties' entitlement is inherently intertwined with their status as legal heirs of Romeo Lunzaga. Clearly, this is a matter not within the competence of the Labor Arbiter to decide." Gildas motion for reconsideration was denied. Issues: 1. Whether the Labor Arbiter has the jurisdiction to decide as to whether the heirs of Romeo are entitled to receive his death benefits. 2. Whether the Labor Arbiter has the jurisdiction to decide as to who is the proper beneficiary. Held: 1. The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over this issue and the case itself, involving as it does a claim arising from an employer-employee relationship. Albar is liable to the heirs of Romeo for the amount of USD 55,547.44. Albar hereby is ordered to deposit this amount in an escrow account under the control of the NLRC in order to protect the interests of Romeo's heirs. 2. No. The parties claiming to be the beneficiaries of Romeo are directed to file the appropriate action with a trial court to determine the true and legal heirs of Romeo entitled to receive the disability benefits. The amount in the escrow account will only be released to the legal heirs per the decision of a trial court. GARCIA VS. KJ COMMERCIAL ART 223 Facts: Respondent KJ Commercial is a sole proprietorship which owns trucks and engages in the business of distributing cement products. On different dates, KJ Commercial employed as truck drivers and truck helpers petitioners Cesar Garcia and others. On 2 January 2006, petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary increase. To pressure KJ Commercial to grant their demand, they stopped working and abandoned their trucks at the Northern Cement Plant Station in Sison, Pangasinan. They also blocked other workers from reporting to work. On 3 February 2006, petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary and nonpayment of service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay.

Labor Arbiter held that KJ Commercial illegally dismissed petitioners. KJ Commercial appealed to the NLRC. It filed before the NLRC a motion to reduce bond and posted a P50,000 cash bond. NLRC found no merit on the motion. The reduction of the required bond is not a matter of right onthe part of the movant but lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds x x x. In this case, we find that the instant motion is not founded on a meritorious ground. x x x Moreover, we note that the P50,000.00 cash bond posted by respondents-appellants which represents less than 2 percent of the monetary award is dismally disproportionate to the monetary award of P2,612,930.00 and that the amount of bond posted by respondents-appellants is not reasonable in relation to the monetary award. x x x A motion to reduce bond that does not satisfy the conditions required under NLRC Rules shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal x x x. Conversely, respondents-appellants failed to perfect an appeal for failure to post the required bond. However, the motion for reconsideration with NLRC was granted saying that the paramount interest of justice is better served in the resolution of this case. CA also sided with the NLRC s ruling. Issue: Whether or not KJ Commercial failed to perfect an appeal since the motion to reduce bond did not stop the running of the period to appeal. Held: The appeal was perfected. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. The Labor Code provides: ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision involving a monetary award in labor cases may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The lawmakers intended the posting of the bond to be an indispensable requirement to perfect an employers appeal. However, in a number of cases, this Court has relaxed this requirement in order to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of controversies on the merits. Some of these cases include: "(a) counsels reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter that the aggrieved party may appeal within ten (10) working days; (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; and (d) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved." In the present case, KJ Commercial showed willingness to post a partial bond.1wphi1 In fact, it posted a P50,000 cash bond. In Ong, the Court held that, "Petitioner in the said case substantially complied with the rules by posting a partial surety bond of fifty thousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. while his motion to reduce appeal bond was pending before the NLRC." Aside from posting a partial bond, KJ Commercial immediately posted the full amount of the bond when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs 9 March 2009 Decision. AIR PHILIPPINES VS. ZAMORA

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Reinstatement aspect of LAs decision Facts: Enrico Zamora was an employee of Air Phils. Corp. as a flight deck crew. He applied for promotion to the position of airplane captain and underwent the requisite training program. After training, he inquired about his promotion but APC did not act on it, instead, it continued to give him assignments as flght deck crew. He filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter with the contention that the withholding of his promotion amounted to constructive dismissal. APC, on its side, contended that complainant stopped reporting for work, not because he was forced to resign but because he had joined a rival company, Grand Air. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Zamora and declared APC liable for constructive dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC held that there was no dismissal, constructive or otherwise because it was Zamora himself who voluntarily terminated his employment by not reporting for work and by joining the competitor Grand Air. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by Zamora, the NLRC affirmed its decision but ordered APC to pay Zamora his unpaid salaries and allowances in the total amount of P198, 502.00. It said, The grant of salaries and allowances to complainant arose from the order of his reinstatement which is executory even pending appeal of respondent questioning the same, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code. In the eyes of the law, complainant was as if actually working from the date respondent received the copy of the appealed decision of the Labor Arbiter directing the reinstatement of complainant based on his finding that the latter was illegally dismissed from employment. ISSUE Whether or not APC should be made to pay respondents unpaid salaries and allowances? HELD The premise of award of unpaid salary to respondent is that prior to the reversal of NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the order of reinstatement embodied therein was already the subject of an alias writ of execution pending appeal. Although petitioner did not comply with this writ of execution, its intransigence made it liable nonetheless to the salaries of respondent pending appeal. In Roquero vs Philippine Airlines, Inc. 401 SCRA 424(2003), it was ruled that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied ony in suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of reinsatment of the labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. SY VS. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT ART 224 Facts: Fairland is a domestic corporation engaged in garments business, while Susan de Leon (Susan) is the owner/proprietress of Weesan Garments (Weesan). On the other hand, the complaining workers (the workers) are sewers, trimmers, helpers, a guard and a secretary who were hired by Weesan. They filed a complaint for underpayment and/or non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, 13th month pay and other monetary benefits against Susan/Weesan. On February 5, 2003, Weesan filed before the DOLE-NCR a report on its temporary closure for a period of not less than six months. As the workers

were not anymore allowed to work on that same day, they later filed an amended complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal and impleaded Fairland and its manager as additional respondents. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit; and ordering the respondents to pay each complainant P5,000.00 by way of financial assistance. The NLRC granted the appeal of the workers and ordered to reinstate complainants to their original or equivalent position with full backwages with legal interests thereon from February 5, 2003, until actually reinstated and fully paid, with retention of seniority rights and are further ordered to pay solidarily to the complainants the difference of their underpaid/unpaid wages, unpaid holidays, unpaid 13th month pays and unpaid service incentive leaves with legal interests thereon. And In the event that reinstatement is not possible, respondents are ordered to pay solidarily to complainants their respective separation pays. The CAs First Division denied Fairlands petition. It affirmed the NLRCs ruling that the workers were illegally dismissed and that Weesan and Fairland are solidarily liable to them as labor-only contractor and principal, respectively. The CAs Special Ninth Division reversed the First Divisions ruling. It held that the labor tribunals did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Fairland, and even assuming they did, Fairland is not liable to the workers since Weesan is not a mere labor-only contractor but a bona fide independent contractor. The Special Ninth Division thus annulled and set aside the assailed NLRC Decision and Resolution insofar as Fairland is concerned and excluded the latter therefrom. Likewise, the CA likewise emphasized that in labor cases, both the party and his counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution unlike in ordinary proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to the party. It then quoted Article 224 of the Labor Code. The CA then concluded that since Fairland and its counsel were not separately furnished with a copy of the August 26, 2005 NLRC Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration of its November 30, 2004 Decision, said Decision cannot be enforced against Fairland. The CA likewise concluded that because of this, said November 30, 2004 Decision which held Susan/Weesan and Fairland solidarily liable to the workers, has not attained finality. Issue: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the November 30, 2004 Decision of the NLRC has not attained finality because Fairland and its counsel were not separately furnished with a copy of the decision. Held: SC did not agree with the CA. Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final decisions, orders or awards both to the parties and their counsel in connection with the execution of such final decisions, orders or awards. However, for the purpose of computing the period for filing an appeal from the NLRC to the CA, same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, order or award by the counsel of record pursuant to the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party. And since the period for filing of an appeal is reckoned from the counsels receipt of the decision, order or award, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for their finality is likewise the counsels date of receipt thereof, if a party is represented by counsel. Hence, the date of receipt referred to in Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in force New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC106 which provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the same, refers to the date of receipt by counsel. Thus contrary to the CAs conclusion, the said NLRC Decision became final, as to Fairland, 10 calendar days after Atty. Tecsons receipt thereof. In sum, we hold that the Labor Arbiter had validly acquired jurisdiction over Fairland and its manager, Debbie, through the appearance of Atty. Geronimo as their counsel and likewise, through the latters filing of pleadings on their behalf.

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PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GODOFREDO CABLING G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998 Facts: Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction. On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of dismissal. On April 15, 1993, the petitioners were instructed to attend an investigation by respondents Security and Fraud Prevention Sub-Department regarding an April 3, 1993 incident in Hongkong at which Joseph Abaca, respondents Avionics Mechanic in Hongkong was intercepted by the Hongkong Airport Police at Gate 05 xxx the ramp area of the Kai Tak International Airport while xxx about to exit said gate carrying a xxx bag said to contain some 2.5 million pesos in Philippine Currencies. Abaca was made to identify petitioners as co-conspirators; that despite the fact that the procedure of identification adopted by respondents Disciplinary Board was anomalous as there was no one else in the line-up (which could not be called one) but petitioners xxx Joseph Abaca still had difficulty in identifying petitioner Pineda as his co-conspirator, and as to petitioner Cabling, he was implicated and pointed by Abaca only after respondents Atty. Cabatuando pressed the former to identify petitioner Cabling as co-conspirator. Abaca finally gave exculpating statements to the board in that he cleared petitioners from any participation or from being the owners of the currencies, and at which hearing Mr. Joseph Abaca volunteered the information that the real owner of said money was one who frequented his headquarters in Hongkong to which information, the Disciplinary Board Chairman, Mr. Ismael Khan, opined for the need for another hearing to go to the bottom of the incident. Abaca was simply made to be the courier while another mechanic placed the bag in the same flight PR 300 where petitioners (herein private respondents) were stewardess. Just as petitioners thought that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received any summons/notices on the intended additional hearings mandated by the Disciplinary Board, they were surprised to receive on February 23, 1995 xxx a Memorandum dated February 22, 1995 terminating their services for alleged violation of respondents Code of Discipline effective immediately. Issue: What is a labor dispute? Held: Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC"(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party; x x x." , Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows: "Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute.-A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in

the petition that the acts complained of, involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party." The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees." The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for: reinstatement of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes". An examination of private respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might suffer. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages.

HALAGUENA vs., PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. GR No. 172013 October 2, 2009 Facts: Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on different dates prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP). On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005. Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that: A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996: xxxx 3. Compulsory Retirement Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. x x x. In a letter dated July 22, 2003, petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male counterparts. On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, docketed

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as Civil Case No. 04-886, against respondent for the invalidity of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. The RTC set a hearing on petitioners' application for a TRO and, thereafter, required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the controversy since such controversy did not arise from a labor dispute rather it arose from the unconstitutionality of that certain provision in the CBA as well as its violation of the Labor Code and the CEDAW. CA ruled that RTC had NO jurisdiction over the case. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between respondent PAL and FASAP Held: In the case at bar, the allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly show that petitioners' cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. It is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PALFASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional. Here, the petitioners' primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW. Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears. The dispute in the case at bar is not between FASAP and respondent PAL, who have both previously agreed upon the provision on the compulsory retirement of female flight attendants as embodied in the CBA. The dispute is between respondent PAL and several female flight attendants who questioned the provision on compulsory retirement of female flight attendants. Thus, referral to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration would not serve the interest of the petitioners. BANEZ vs., HON. VALDEVILLA and ORO MARKETING CORP. GR No. 128024 May 9, 2000

Facts: Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its branch in Iligan City. In 1993, private respondent "indefinitely suspended" petitioner and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in Iligan City. In a decision dated July 7, 1994, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and of backwages and attorney's fees. The decision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of time. Elevated by petition for certiorari before this Court, the case was dismissed on technical grounds On November 13, 1995, private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Misamis Oriental, a. P709,217.97 plus 12% interest as loss of profit and/or unearned income of three years; b. P119,700.00 plus 12% interest as estimated cost of supplies, facilities, properties, space, etc. for three years; c. P5,000.00 as initial expenses of litigation; and d. P25,000.00 as attorney's fees. On January 30, 1996, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint. He interposed in the court below that the action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code and is barred by reason of the final judgment in the labor case. Complaint briefly narrated the modus operandi of defendant, quoted herein: Defendant canvassed customers personally or through salesmen of plaintiff which were hired or recruited by him. If said customer decided to buy items from plaintiff on installment basis, defendant, without the knowledge of said customer and plaintiff, would buy the items on cash basis at ex-factory price, a privilege not given to customers, and thereafter required the customer to sign promissory notes and other documents using the name and property of plaintiff, purporting that said customer purchased the items from plaintiff on installment basis. Thereafter, defendant collected the installment payments either personally or through Venus Lozano, a Group Sales Manager. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over private respondents claims for damages Held: There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, private respondent's claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. In the first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with petitioner's "doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations ---in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code. Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim.

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Thus, it is obvious that private respondent's remedy is not in the filing of this separate action for damages, but in properly perfecting an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision. Having lost the right to appeal on grounds of untimeliness, the decision in the labor case stands as a final judgment on the merits, and the instant action for damages cannot take the place of such lost appeal. Respondent court clearly has no jurisdiction over private respondent's complaint for damages.

proceed hearing the main case on the merits. Issue: Whether the NLRC has contempt powers; Whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable; and Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the contempt charge against the respondents. Held: Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when there is no law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contempt charges against the respondents before the NLRC. We find that there was no violation of the said order. A perusal of the records would show that in compliance with the temporary restraining order (TRO), respondents reinstated back to work the sales drivers who complained of illegal dismissal. We find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed NLRC ruling. It rightly avoided delving into issues which would clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they are issues involving the merits of the case which are by law within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.[38] To be sure, whether payroll reinstatement of some of the petitioners is proper; whether the resignation of some of them was compelled by dire economic necessity; whether the petitioners are entitled to their money claims; and whether quitclaims are contrary to law or public policy are issues that should be heard by the labor arbiter in the first instance. The NLRC can inquire into them only on appeal after the merits of the case shall have been adjudicated by the labor arbiter. The NLRC correctly dismissed the contempt charges against the respondents.

ROBOSA vs., NLRC GR. No. 176085 February 8, 2012 Facts: Federico S. Robosa, Rolando E. Pandy, Noel D. Roxas, Alexander Angeles, Veronica Gutierrez, Fernando Embat and Nanette H. Pinto (petitioners) were rank-and-file employees of respondent Chemo-Technische Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI), the manufacturer and distributor of Wella products. They were officers and members of the CTMI Employees Union-DFA (union). Respondent Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. (P & GPI) acquired all the interests, franchises and goodwill of CTMI during the pendency of the dispute. Sometime in the first semester of 1991, the union filed a petition for certification election at CTMI. On June 10, 1991, Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah of the Office of the Department of Labor and Employment in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) granted the petition. The DOLE-NCR conducted a consent election on July 5, 1991, but the union failed to garner the votes required to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company. On July 15, 1991, CTMI, through its President and General Manager Franklin R. de Luzuriaga, issued a memorandum announcing that effective that day: (1) all sales territories were demobilized; (2) all vehicles assigned to sales representatives should be returned to the company and would be sold; (3) sales representatives would continue to service their customers through public transportation and would be given transportation allowance; (4) deliveries of customers orders would be undertaken by the warehouses; and (5) revolving funds for ex-truck selling held by sales representatives should be surrendered to the cashier (for Metro Manila) or to the supervisor (for Visayas and Mindanao), and truck stocks should immediately be surrendered to the warehouse. On August 1, 1991, the union and its affected members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, with a claim for damages, against CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other CTMI officers. The union also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). On August 23, 1991, the NLRC issued a TRO. It directed CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company executives to (1) cease and desist from dismissing any member of the union and from implementing the July 23, 1991 memorandum terminating the services of the sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them if the dismissals have been effected; (2) cease and desist from implementing the July 15, 1991 memorandum grounding the sales personnel; and (3) restore the status quo ante prior to the formation of the union and the conduct of the consent election. Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRCs August 23, 1991 resolution. They instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the unions petition for preliminary injunction. On September 12, 1991, the NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction.The respondents moved for reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the responsible CTMI officers in contempt of court. Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge. On October 31, 2000, it issued a resolution dismissing the charge. It ordered the labor arbiter to

GARCIA vs., PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. GR No. 164856 January 20, 2009 Facts: The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by PAL against its employees-herein petitioners after they were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Centers Tool room Section on July 24, 1995. After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners on October 9, 1995 for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline, prompting them to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages which was, by Decision of January 11, 1999, resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their favor, thus ordering PAL to, inter alia, immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision.

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From the Labor Arbiters decision, respondent appealed to the NLRC which, by Resolution of January 31, 2000, reversed said decision and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit. Subsequently or on October 5, 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting the reinstatement aspect of his January 11, 1999 Decision, and on October 25, 2000, he issued a Notice of Garnishment (Notice). Respondent thereupon moved to quash the Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved to release the garnished amount. Issue: Whether petitioners may collect their wages during the period between the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of the Labor Arbiter Held: There are 2 views regarding this issue based on existing jurisprudence.

motion for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter shall thereafter motu proprio issue the writ (PLEASE NOTE: There was another issue regarding PALs financial instability which resulted in receivership proceedings during the pendency of the said case. The minor issue was whether PAL was still required to comply with the order of reinstatement despite it being in receivership. The answer is no, PAL need not comply with the reinstatement during the receivership proceedings since it was in a state of rehabilitation. Such obligation of PAL was merely in SUSPENSION. However, when it finally exited from receivership, PAL had the obligation to comply with the order of reinstatement or payment of wages from the time of the reinstatement order of the LA until the reversal of the higher court of the LAs decision.)

FILIPINAS SYSTEMS INC. v. NLRC GR No. 153859 December 11, 2003 Facts:

1st View (cases such as Air Philippines Corp vs. Zamora) x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. 2nd Vew (recent case of Geniuno vs. NLRC) If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund. The social justice principles of labor law outweigh or render inapplicable the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment espoused by Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr. in his Separate Opinion. The constitutional and statutory precepts portray the otherwise unjust situation as a condition affording full protection to labor. Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the mundane realities of human experience, the refund doctrine easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of insolvency. The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries. The new NLRC Rules of Procedure, which took effect on January 7, 2006, now require the employer to submit a report of compliance within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision, disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The employee need not file a

Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims for service incentive leave, 13th month pay and night shift differential in the NLRC which in turn raffled the case to Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. who ordered the parties to file their position papers. Respondents complied, but not the petitioners despite several warnings and time extensions. The Labor Arbiter decided the complaint on the merit and ruled in favor of respondents. He sustained their claim of illegal dismissal as petitioners failed to adduce contrary evidence. Petitioners were ordered to reinstate respondents. The monetary claims of the respondents were likewise granted. Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. For the first time, they submitted evidence that respondents were project employees and that their dismissal was due to the discontinuation of the Jaka Tower I project where they were assigned. Respondents, however, assailed the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the appeal for failure of the petitioners to file the appeal bond within the ten (10)-day reglementary period. The NLRC nevertheless assumed jurisdiction over the appeal. Due to the evidence presented by petitioners on the issue of illegal dismissal, it remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. Issue: Whether the NLRC has the power to assume jurisdiction over the appeal of the petitioner Held: No. The Labor Code provides a ten (10)-day period from receipt of the decision of the Arbiter for the filing of an appeal together with an appeal bond if the decision involves a monetary award in favor of the employees, viz: ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. x x x In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The NLRC Rules of Procedure likewise require the appeal and the appeal bond to be filed within the ten (10)-day reglementary period.

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We have consistently ruled that payment of the appeal bond is a jurisdictional requisite for the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC. It is only in rare instances that the court relaxes the rule upon a showing of substantial compliance with it and to prevent patent injustice. In the case at bar, petitioners alleged that they received a copy of the Arbiters decision on October 31, 1998. Their memorandum of appeal was dated November 9, 1998, but their appeal bond to stay execution of the decision was executed only on November 17, 1998. The records show no partial payment of the bond was made during the reglementary period nor was there any explanation for its late filing. Given these facts, the late filing of the bond divested the NLRC of its jurisdiction to entertain petitioners appeal.

ABS-CBN engaged SONZAs services to co-host its television and radio programs because of SONZAs peculiar skills, talent and celebrity status. SONZA contends that the discretion used by respondent in specifically selecting and hiring complainant over other broadcasters of possibly similar experience and qualification as complainant belies respondents claim of independent contractorship. However, independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary employees. The specific selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent contractual relationship. If SONZA did not possess such unique skills, talent and celebrity status, ABS-CBN would not have entered into the Agreement with SONZA but would have hired him through its personnel department just like any other employee. B. Payment of Wages

JOSE SONZA vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION G.R. No. 138051 June 10, 200 FACTS: In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and Development Corporation (MJMDC). ABS-CBN was represented by its corporate officers while MJMDC was represented by Sonza, as President and general manager, and Tiangco as its EVP and treasurer. Referred to in the agreement as agent, MJMDC agreed to provide Sonzas services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay Sonza a monthly talent fee of P310, 000 for the first year and P317, 000 for the second and third year. On April 1996, Sonza wrote a letter to ABS-CBN's President, Eugenio Lopez III, where he irrevocably resigned in view of the recent events concerning his program and career. The acts of the station are violative of the Agreement and said letter will serve as notice of rescission of said contract. The letter also contained the waiver and renunciation for recovery of the remaining amount stipulated but reserves the right to seek recovery of the other benefits under said Agreement. After the said letter, Sonza filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a complaint alleging that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries, separation pay, service incentive pay,13th month pay, signing bonus, travel allowance and amounts under the Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP). ABS-CBN contended that no employee-employer relationship existed between the parties. However, ABS-CBN continued to remit Sonzas monthly talent fees but opened another account for the same purpose. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and found that there is no employee-employer relationship. The LA ruled that he is not an employee by reason of his peculiar skill and talent as a TV host and a radio broadcaster. Unlike an ordinary employee, he was free to perform his services in accordance with his own style. NLRC and CA affirmed the LA. Should there be any complaint, it does not arise from an employer-employee relationship but from a breach of contract. ISSUE: Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between the parties. HELD: D. Power of Control There is no employer-employee relationship between Sonza and ABS-CBN. Petition denied. Judgment decision affirmed. Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employee-employer relationship are selection and engagement of the employee, the payment of wages, the power of dismissal and the employers power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The last element, the so-called "control test", is the most important element. A. Selection and Engagement of Employee First, SONZA contends that ABS-CBN exercised control over the means and methods of his work. SONZAs argument is misplaced. ABS-CBN engaged SONZAs services specifically to co-host the Mel & Jay programs. ABSCBN did not assign any other work to SONZA. To perform his work, SONZA only needed his skills and talent. How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBNs control. SONZA did not have to render eight hours of work per day. The Agreement required SONZA to attend only rehearsals and tapings of the shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings. ABS-CBN could not dictate the contents of SONZAs script. However, the Agreement prohibited SONZA from criticizing in his shows ABS-CBN or its interests. The clear implication is ABS-CBN directly paid SONZA his monthly talent fees with no part of his fees going to MJMDC. SONZA asserts that this mode of fee payment shows that he was an employee of ABS-CBN. SONZA also points out that ABSCBN granted him benefits and privileges which he would not have enjoyed if he were truly the subject of a valid job contract. All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of negotiations that led to the Agreement. If SONZA were ABS-CBNs employee, there would be no need for the parties to stipulate on benefits such as SSS, Medicare, x x x and 13th month pay which the law automatically incorporates into every employer-employee contract. Whatever benefits SONZA enjoyed arose from contract and not because of an employer-employee relationship. In addition, SONZAs talent fees are so huge and out of the ordinary that they indicate more an independent contractual relationship rather than an employer-employee relationship. ABS-CBN agreed to pay SONZA such huge talent fees precisely because of SONZAs unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees. C. Power of Dismissal For violation of any provision of the Agreement, either party may terminate their relationship. SONZA failed to show that ABS-CBN could terminate his services on grounds other than breach of contract, such as retrenchment to prevent losses as provided under labor laws. During the life of the Agreement, ABS-CBN agreed to pay SONZAs talent fees as long as AGENT and Jay Sonza shall faithfully and completely perform each condition of this Agreement. Even if it suffered severe business losses, ABS-CBN could not retrench SONZA because ABS-CBN remained obligated to pay SONZAs talent fees during the life of the Agreement. This circumstance indicates an independent contractual relationship between SONZA and ABS-CBN. SONZA admits that even after ABS-CBN ceased broadcasting his programs, ABS-CBN still paid him his talent fees. Plainly, ABS-CBN adhered to its undertaking in the Agreement to continue paying SONZAs talent fees during the remaining life of the Agreement even if ABS-CBN cancelled SONZAs programs through no fault of SONZA.

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that SONZA had a free hand on what to say or discuss in his shows provided he did not attack ABS-CBN or its interests. Second, SONZA urges us to rule that he was ABS-CBNs employee because ABS-CBN subjected him to its rules and standards of performance. SONZA claims that this indicates ABS-CBNs control not only [over] his manner of work but also the quality of his work." The Agreement stipulates that SONZA shall abide with the rules and standards of performance covering talents of ABS-CBN. The Agreement does not require SONZA to comply with the rules and standards of performance prescribed for employees of ABS-CBN. The code of conduct imposed on SONZA under the Agreement refers to the Television and Radio Code of the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster sa Pilipinas (KBP), which has been adopted by the COMPANY (ABS-CBN) as its Code of Ethics. The KBP code applies to broadcasters, not to employees of radio and television stations. Broadcasters are not necessarily employees of radio and television stations. Clearly, the rules and standards of performance referred to in the Agreement are those applicable to talents and not to employees of ABS-CBN In any event, not all rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party indicate that the latter is an employee of the former. In this case, SONZA failed to show that these rules controlled his performance. We find that these general rules are merely guidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result, which are top-rating television and radio programs that comply with standards of the industry. Lastly, SONZA insists that the exclusivity clause in the Agreement is the most extreme form of control which ABS-CBN exercised over him. This argument is futile. Being an exclusive talent does not by itself mean that SONZA is an employee of ABS-CBN. Even an independent contractor can validly provide his services exclusively to the hiring party. In the broadcast industry, exclusivity is not necessarily the same as control. The hiring of exclusive talents is a widespread and accepted practice in the entertainment industry. This practice is not designed to control the means and methods of work of the talent, but simply to protect the investment of the broadcast station. The broadcast station normally spends substantial amounts of money, time and effort in building up its talents as well as the programs they appear in and thus expects that said talents remain exclusive with the station for a commensurate period of time. Normally, a much higher fee is paid to talents who agree to work exclusively for a particular radio or television station. In short, the huge talent fees partially compensates for exclusivity, as in the present case. ARSENIO LOCSIN VS. NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILS. ET AL. G.R. NO. 185567, 10 OCTOBER 2010 FACTS: On January 1, 1992, Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and Treasurer (EVP/Treasurer) of Nissan Lease Phils. Inc. (NLPI). As EVP/Treasurer, his duties and responsibilities included: (1) the management of the finances of the company; (2) carrying out the directions of the President and/or the Board of Directors regarding financial management; and (3) the preparation of financial reports to advise the officers and directors of the financial condition of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for 13 years, having been re-elected every year since 1992, until January 21, 2005, when he was nominated and elected Chairman of NCLPIs Board of Directors. On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as Chairman of the Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda was the election of a new set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman nor reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer. Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorneys fees before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who was then President of NCLPI. Instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did

not have jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsins removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute. The LA denied the motion, holding that the office had jurisdiction to arbitrate and/or decide the instant complaint finding extant in the case an employer-employee relationship. NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiters Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a corporate officer. The CA concluded that Locsin does not have any recourse with the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC since the removal of a corporate officer, whether elected or appointed, is an intra-corporate controversy over which the NLRC has no jurisdiction.19 Instead, according to the CA, Locsins complaint for "illegal dismissal" should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Thereafter, Locsin filed for a petition for review with the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over Locsins complaint for illegal dismissal HELD: NO, the LA has no jurisdiction over the complaint of illegal dismissal. The CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists between Locsin and Nissan. Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these positions by the Nissan board pursuant to its By-laws.39 As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. The CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on Presidential Decree 902-A, which defines corporate officers as "those officers of a corporation who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations bylaws." Likewise, Section 25 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines (Corporation Code) provides that corporate officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. Given Locsins status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with Nissan. Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (PD 902-A) provided that intra-corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). ubsection 5.2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8799, which took effect on 8 August 2000, transferred to regional trial courts the SECs jurisdiction over all cases listed in Section 5 of PD 902-A. Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, the SC is forced to remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if it were to dismiss the petition outright due to the wrongful use of Rule 65. The SC cannot close its eyes, however, to the factual and legal reality, established by evidence already on record, that Locsin is a corporate officer whose termination of relationship is outside a labor arbiters jurisdiction to rule upon. PERPETUAL HELP CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. BENEDICTO FABURADA, SISINITA VILLAR, IMELDA TAMAYO, HAROLD CATIPAY, and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 121948, October 8, 2001

FACTS: On January 3, 1990, Benedicto Faburada, Sisinita Vilar, Imelda Tamayo and Harold Catipay, private respondents, filed a complaint against the Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PHCCI), petitioner, with the Arbitration Branch, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Dumaguete City, for illegal dismissal, premium pay on holidays and rest days, separation pay, wage differential, moral damages, and attorney's fees.

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Forthwith, petitioner PHCCI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between them as private respondents are all members and co-owners of the cooperative. Furthermore, private respondents have not exhausted the remedies provided in the cooperative by-laws. PHCCI also filed a supplemental motion to dismiss alleging that RA 6939, theCooperative Development Authority Law, requires conciliation or mediation within the cooperative before a resort to judicial proceeding. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondents, holding that the case is impressed withemployer-employee relationship and that the laws on cooperatives is subservient to the Labor Code. The NLRC affirmed the LA's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between the parties and that private respondents were illegally dismissed HELD: YES; thus petition is DENIED, and the decision of respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1 ) the selection and engagement of the worker or the power to hire; (2) the power to dismiss; (3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. No particular form of proof is required to prove the existence of an employeremployee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence may show the relationship. The above elements are present here. Petitioner PHCCI, through Mr. Edilberto Lantaca, Jr., its Manager, hired private respondents to work for it. They worked regularly on regular working hours, were assigned specific duties, were paid regular wages and made to accomplish daily time records just like any other regular employee. Faburada was a regular part-time Computer programmer/ operator, whereas Tamayo, Villar, and Catipay were clerks. They worked under the supervision of the cooperative manager. But unfortunately, they were dismissed.

G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003 FACTS: Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of respondent PAL. From the evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed possessing and using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM personnel. Roquero and Pabayo received a notice of administrative charge for violating the PAL Code of Discipline. They were required to answer the charges and were placed under preventive suspension. Roquero and company alleged that they were set up by PAL to take the drugs through a certain trainee. In a Memorandum dated July 14, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. Thus, they filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled against Roquero and upheld the validity of their dismissal, but awarded separation pay. While the case was on appeal with the NLRC, the complainants were acquitted by the RTC, in the criminal case which charged them with conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated drug in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425, on the ground of instigation. The NLRC ruled in favor of complainants as it likewise found PAL guilty of instigation. It ordered reinstatement to their former positions but without backwages. Complainants did not appeal from the decision but filed a motion for a writ of execution of the order of reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion but PAL refused to execute the said order on the ground that they have filed a Petition for Review before this Court. In accordance with the case of St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC and Bienvenido Aricayos, PALs petition was referred to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and held that petitioners dismissal was valid, but it denied the award of separation pay. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not PAL can validly refuse to execute an order for reinstatement on the ground that the case is still on appeal HELD:

The Labor Code comprehends three kinds of employees: Regular employees, Project employees, and Casual Employees. There are 2 separate instances whereby it can be determined that an employment is regular: 1) If the particular activity performed by the employee is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, and 2) If the employee has been performing the job for at least a year. Private respondents were rendering services necessary to the day-to-day operations of PHCCI. This alone qualified them as regular employees. Moreover, all of them except one worked with PHCCI for more than 1 year. As regular employees or workers, private respondents are entitled to security of tenure. Thus, their services may be terminated only for a valid cause, with observance of due process. Petitioner contends that the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint of private respondents considering that they failed to submit their dispute to the grievance machinery as required by P.D. 175 (strengthening the Cooperative Movement) 8 and its implementing rules and regulations under LOI 23. Likewise, the Cooperative Development Authority did not issue a Certificate of Non-Resolution pursuant to Section 8 of the Cooperative Development Authority Law. The above provisions apply to members, officers and directors of the cooperative involved in disputes within a cooperative or between cooperatives. There is no evidence that private respondents are members of petitioner PHCCI and even if they are, the dispute is about payment of wages, overtime pay, rest day and termination of employment. Under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, these disputes are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. ALEJANDRO ROQUERO vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

NO, PAL cannot refuse to execute an order for reinstatement on the ground that the case is still on appeal. Article 223(3) of the Labor Code (as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code) provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal. In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working man. These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for the nations progress and stability. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family. The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him

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despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court. We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. Dismissal of Petitioner is affirmed, but respondent PAL is ordered to pay the wages to which Roquero is entitled from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the finality of this decision. JULIUS KAWACHI and GAYLE KAWACHI vs. DOMINIE DEL QUERO and HON. JUDGE MANUEL R. TARO, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City G.R. No. 163768, March 27, 2007 FACTS: Private respondent Dominie Del Quero charged A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc., Virgilio Kawachi and petitioner Julius Kawachi with illegal dismissal, non-execution of a contract of employment, violation of the minimum wage law, and non-payment of overtime pay. The complaint was filed before NLRC. The complaint essentially alleged that Virgilio Kawachi hired private respondent as a clerk of the pawnshop and that on certain occasions, she worked beyond the regular working hours but was not paid the corresponding overtime pay. The complaint also narrated an incident on 10 August 2002, wherein petitioner Julius Kawachi scolded private respondent in front of many people about the way she treated the customers of the pawnshop and afterwards terminated private respondents em ployment without affording her due process On 7 November 2002, private respondent Dominie Del Quero filed an action for damages against petitioners Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi before the MeTC of Quezon City. The complaint for damages specifically sought the recovery of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint in the MeTC on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and forum-shopping. Petitioners argue that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the action for damages because the alleged injury is work-related. They also contend that private respondent should not be allowed to split her causes of action by filing the action for damages separately from the labor case The RTC held that private respondents action for damages was based on the alleged tortious acts committed by her employers and did not seek any relief under the Labor Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in this instant actio HELD: NO, the RTC has no jurisdiction in the instant case. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.

Under the reasonable causal connection rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor courts. In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. It is clear that the question of the legality of the act of dismissal is intimately related to the issue of the legality of the manner by which that act of dismissal was performed. But while the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the remedy available as regards the first the employees separation from employment it does not at all deal with the second the manner of that separation which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In addressing the first issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears to be the plain and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal from employment, no other damages may be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee other than those specified by the Civil Code. Hence, the fact that the issueof whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to him in the circumstancesis determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, obviously was not meant to create a cause of action independent of that for illegal dismissal and thus place the matter beyond the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction. In the instant case, the allegations in private respondents complaint for damages show that her injury was the offshoot of petitioners immediate harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to the supposedly sloppy manner by which she had discharged her duties. Petitioners reaction culminated in private respondents dismissal from work in the very same incident. The incident on 10 August 2002 alleged in the complaint for damages was similarly narrated in private respondents Affidavit-Complaint supporting her action for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Clearly, the alleged injury is directly related to the employer-employee relations of the parties. Where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation, the Court has not hesitated to uphold the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Where the damages claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in the enforcement of a prior employment contract, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld. The scenario that obtains in this case is obviously different. The allegations in private respondents complaint unmistakably relate to the manner of her alleged illegal dismissal. In the instant case, the NLRC has jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for illegal dismissal and damages arising therefrom. She cannot be allowed to file a separate or independent civil action for damages where the alleged injury has a reasonable connection to her termination from employment. Consequently, the action for damages filed before the MeTC must be dismissed. Petition is granted. PFIZER, INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR FERDINAND CORTES, AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON, AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE vs. GERALDINE VELASCO G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 201 FACTS: Private respondent Geraldine L. Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health Care Representative since 1992. Sometime in April 2003, Velasco had a medical work up for her high-risk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. While Velasco was still on leave, PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager, herein petitioner Ferdinand Cortez, personally served Velasco a "Showcause Notice". Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her possible

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violations of company work rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks" and instructing her to submit her explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the same, the notice also advised her that she was being placed under "preventive suspension" for 30 days and consequently ordered to surrender the following "accountabilities;" 1) Company Car, 2) Samples and Promats, 3) CRF/ER/VEHICLE/SOA/POSAP/MPOA and other related Company Forms, 4) Cash Card, 5) Caltex Card, and 6) MPOA/TPOA Revolving Travel Fund. The following day, petitioner Cortez together with one Efren Dariano retrieved the above-mentioned "accountabilities" from Velascos residence.

execution. Thus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to her under the aforementioned writ of execution. At most, PFIZERs payment of the same can only be deemed partial compliance/execution of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated October 23, 2006 and would not bar respondent from being paid her wages from May 6, 2005 to November 23, 2005.

To reiterate, under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement "shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll." It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by the employee. Applying the foregoing principle to the case before us, it cannot be said that with PFIZERs June 27, 2005 Letter, in belated fulfillment of the Labor Arbiters reinstatement order, it had shown a clear intent to reinstate respondent to her former position under the same terms and conditions nor to a substantially equivalent position. To begin with, the return-to-work order PFIZER sent respondent is silent with regard to the position or the exact nature of employment that it wanted respondent to take up as of July 1, 2005. Even if we assume that the job awaiting respondent in the new location is of the same designation and pay category as what she had before, it is plain from the text of PFIZERs June 27, 2005 letter that such reinstatement was not "under the same terms and conditions" as her previous employment, considering that PFIZER ordered respondent to report to its main office in Makati City while knowing fully well that respondents previous job had her stationed in Baguio City (respondents place of residence) and it was still necessary for respondent to be briefed regarding her work assignments and responsibilities, including her relocation benefits. In view of PFIZERs failure to effect respondent's actual or payroll reinstatement, it is indubitable that the Roquero ruling is applicable to the case at bar. The circumstance that respondent opted for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as manifested in her counsels Letter dated July 18, 2005 is of no moment. We do not see respondents letter as taking away the option from management to effect actual or payroll reinstatement but, rather under the factual milieu of this case, where the employer failed to categorically reinstate the employee to her former or equivalent position under the same terms, respondent was not obliged to comply with PFIZERs ambivalent return-to-work order. To uphold PFIZERs view that it was respondent who unjustifiably refused to work when PFIZER did not reinstate her to her former position, and worse, required her to report for work under conditions prejudicial to her, is to open the doors to potential employer abuse. Foreseeably, an employer may circumvent the immediately enforceable reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter by crafting return-towork directives that are ambiguous or meant to be rejected by the employee and then disclaim liability for backwages due to non-reinstatement by capitalizing on the employees purported refusal to work. In sum, the option of the employer to effect actual or payroll reinstatement must be exercised in good faith. NOTES!!! (Ang haba kasi ng ruling dito ng SC kaya eto na muna para maintindihan) It is well-settled that when a person is illegally dismissed, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. In the event, however, that reinstatement is no longer feasible, or if the employee decides not be reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Such a rule is likewise observed in the case of a strained employer-employee relationship or when the work or position formerly held by the dismissed employee no longer exists. In sum, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled

In response, Velasco sent a letter addressed to Cortez denying the charges. Velasco claimed that the transaction with Mercury Drug, Magsaysay Branch was merely to accommodate two undisclosed patients of a certain Dr. Renato Manalo. In support thereto, Velasco attached the Doctors letter and the affidavit of the latters secretary. Later on, Velasco received a "Second Show-cause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their investigation. According to the notice, a certain Carlito Jomen executed an affidavit pointing to Velasco as the one who transacted with a printing shop to print PFIZER discount coupons. Jomen also presented text messages originating from Velascos company issued cellphone referring to the printing of the said coupons. Again, Velasco was given 48 hours to submit her written explanation on the matter. Velasco sent a letter to PFIZER asking for additional time to answer the second Show-cause Notice. That same day, Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch. The following day,, PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the hearing "can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference. She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice. Thereafter, Velasco received a "Third Showcause Notice," together with copies of the affidavits of two Branch Managers of Mercury Drug, asking her for her comment within 48 hours. Finally, PFIZER informed Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating her employment. The Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of Velasco illegal, ordering her reinstatement with backwages and further awarding moral and exemplary damages with attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the same but deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages. Undaunted, PFIZER appealed to the CA to annul and set aside the aforementioned NLRC issuances. The CA upheld the validity of respondents dismissal from employment. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein the CA affirmed the validity of respondents dismissal from employment but modified its earlier ruling by directing PFIZER to pay respondent her wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters Decision up to the Court of Appeals Decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters decision ordering her reinstatement until the time when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velascos dismissal valid HELD: NO. As far back as 1997 in the seminal case of Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that an award or order of reinstatement is immediately self-executory without the need for the issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code. In the case at bar, PFIZER did not immediately admit respondent back to work which, according to the law, should have been done as soon as an order or award of reinstatement is handed down by the Labor Arbiter without need for the issuance of a writ of

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to: (1) either reinstatement if viable or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (2) backwages.

Also, note the divergent application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code:

person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. In addition to the standard of right-of-control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, can help in determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship. The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative employers power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship. In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, the court observed the need to consider the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, in addition to the standard of right-of-control like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, to give a clearer picture in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship based on an analysis of the totality of economic circumstances of the worker. Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the circumstances of the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral part of the employers business; (2) the extent of the workers investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the employer; (4) the workers opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill, judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that line of business. The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business. By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporations Technical Consultant. It is therefore apparent that petitioner is economically dependent on respondent corporation for her continued employment in the latters line of business. There can be no other conclusion that petitioner is an employee of respondent Kasei Corporation. She was selected and engaged by the company for compensation, and is economically dependent upon respondent for her continued employment in that line of business. Her main job function involved accounting and tax services rendered to Respondent Corporation on a regular basis over an indefinite period of engagement. Respondent Corporation hired and engaged petitioner for compensation, with the power to dismiss her for cause. More importantly, Respondent Corporation had the power to control petitioner with the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.

A majority of recent cases, such as Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora and Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., have held that: [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period The opposite view is articulated in Genuino which states the "refund doctrine": If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries [he] received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from [his] employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund. IT IS THE FORMER DOCTRINE THAT HOLDS, the "refund doctrine" has been erroneously applied in Genuino. The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. 1. ANGELINA FRANCISCO vs. NLRC

Facts: Petitoner was hired by Kasei Corporation during the incorporation stage. She was designated as accountant and corporate secretary and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of the company. She was also designated as Liason Officer to the City of Manila to secure permits for the operation of the company. In 1996, Petitioner was designated as Acting Manager. She was assigned to handle recruitment of all employees and perform management administration functions. In 2001, she was replaced by Liza Fuentes as Manager. Kasei Corporation reduced her salary to P2,500 per month which was until September. She asked for her salary but was informed that she was no longer connected to the company. She did not anymore report to work since she was not paid for her salary. She filed an action for constructive dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed the decision while CA reversed it. Issue: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship. Ruling: The court held that in this jurisdiction, there has been no uniform test to determine the existence of an employer-employee relation. Generally, courts have relied on the so-called right of control test where the

2. EX-BATAAN VETERANS SECURITY AGENCY, INC., VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA

THE

Facts: Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. (EBVSAI) is in the business of providing security services while private respondents are EBVSAIs employees assigned to the National Power Corporation at Ambuklao Hydro Electric Plant, Bokod, Benguet (Ambuklao Plant). Private respondents instituted a complaint for underpayment of wages against EBVSAI before the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). EX-BATAAN VETERANS SECURITY AGENCY is ORDERED to pay the computed deficiencies owing to the affected employees. EBVSAI filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that the Regional Director does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the money claim of each private respondent exceeded P5,000.

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EBVSAI pointed out that the Regional Director should have endorsed the case to the Labor Arbiter. Issue: 1. Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives acquired jurisdiction over EBVSAI; and 2. Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives have jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents which exceed P5,000. Held: EBVSAI claims that the Regional Director did not acquire jurisdiction over EBVSAI because he failed to comply with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. EBVSAI points out that the notice of hearing was served at the Ambuklao Plant, not at EBVSAIs main office in Makati, and that it was addressed to Leonardo Castro, Jr., EBVSAIs Vice President. 1. In this case, EBVSAI does not deny having received the notices of hearing. In fact, on 29 March and 13 June 1996, Danilo Burgos and Edwina Manao, detachment commander and bookkeeper of EBVSAI, respectively, appeared before the Regional Director. They claimed that the 22 March 1996 notice of hearing was received late and manifested that the notices should be sent to the Manila office. Thereafter, the notices of hearing were sent to the Manila office. They were also informed of EBVSAIs violations and were asked to present the employment records of the private respondents for verification. They were, moreover, asked to submit, within 10 days, proof of compliance or their position paper. The Regional Director validly acquired jurisdiction over EBVSAI. EBVSAI can no longer question the jurisdiction of the Regional Director after receiving the notices of hearing and after appearing before the Regional Director. EBVSAI maintains that under Articles 129 and 217(6) of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter, not the Regional Director, has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case because the individual monetary claim of private respondents exceeds P5,000. EBVSAI also argues that the case falls under the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. EBVSAI asserts that the Regional Director should have certified the case to the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for a full-blown hearing on the merits. 2. In this case, the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents even if the claims exceeded P5,000 because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with Article 128(b) of the Labor Code and the case does not fall under the exception clause. In Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor, we ruled that while it is true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said provisions of law do not contemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative. Rather, said powers are defined and set forth in Article 128 of the Labor Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7730). This was further affirmed in our ruling in Cirineo Bowling Plaza, Inc. v. Sensing, where we sustained the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director and held that the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws can be exercised even where the individual claim exceeds P5,000. However, if the labor standards case is covered by the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, then the Regional Director will have to endorse the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

Private respondent Jaime O. dela Pena was a veterinary aide of Atlas Farms and one of the several employees who were terminated in July 1989. He was re-hired the same month. In 1993, he was caught urinating and defecating on company premises (not in the toilet). He was asked to explain but failed to do so so he was given a notice of termination with monetary benefits and acknowledged receipt of separation pay. At time of his termination, he was receiving Php 180 daily wage or average monthly salary of Php5,402.00. Co-respondent Abion, a carpenter/mason was allegedly in fault of clogging the fishpond drainage when he improperly disposed of grass and other waste materials into the ponds drainage system resulting to damages worth several hundred thousand pesos. He was also terminated. Abion was receving monthly salary of Php 4,500 Both of them were working seven days a week, including holidays, without overtime, holiday, rest day pay and service incentive leaves Both filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal. The claimed that their termination was due to petiotioners suspicion that they were the leaders in a plan to form a union. LA dismissed because the grievance machinery of the CBA had not yet been exhausted. They availed of the grievance process but refied the case before the NLRC. Dissatisfied, brought if before the CA by way of certiorari review. CA denied petiotion and affirmed NLRCs decision.

Issue: 1. 2. Whether or not the private respondents dismissal from work illegal Whether LA and the NLRC had jurisdiction to decide complaints for illegal dismissal

Held:

Yes and Yes

1.

2.

Since this is a question of fact, burden of proving the validity of the dismissal falls upon the petitioner. NLRC found that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that both private respondents committed certain acts that violated the company rules and regulations. They were not also given any hearing to air their side. LA and NLRC had jurisdiction over the cases. Records show that private respondents sought but without success the grievance procedure in their CBA. It is worht pointing out that private respondents went to the NLRC only after LA dismissed their case. Under these circumstances they had to find another avenue for redress. Petitioner failed to show proof that it took steps to convene the grievance machinery after LA first dismissed them and directed them to avail of the grievance machinery in the CBA.

3.

ATLAS FARMS, INC. v. NLRC 4. PEPSI COLA v. GAL-LANG (GR 89621)

Facts:

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Facts: Private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola borrles. 1987, Pepsi files a criminal complaint for theft against them but withdrawn and substituted with a criminal complaint for falsification of private documents. After their case was dismissed in the MTC, Pesi dismissed the petitioners and as a result they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal in the RTC of Tacloban. Pepsi moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over cases involving EE relationship. Pepsi invoked Art. 217 of the LC. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction of the case Held: Yes. The case before us involves a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution which was filed by the RTC by the employees. It does not appear that tere is a causal connection between the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did nota rise from such relations. And in fact could have arisen independently from an employment relationship.. EE relationship is asserted neither a case of unfair labor practice. What the employees are alleging is that petitioners acted in bad faith when they filed a criminal complaint which was intended to harass the poor employees. This is a matter which the LA has no competence to resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the RPC.

Motion to Reduce Bond. These were received by the NLRC. The appeal to the NLRC should have been perfected, as provided by its Rules, within a period of 10 days from receipt by petitioner of the decision on July 16, 1999. Clearly, the filing of the appeal--three days after July 26, 1999--was already beyond the reglementary period and in violation of the NLRC Rules and the pertinent Article on Appeal in the Labor Code. Failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision final and executory. The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the statute or the rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for the orderly discharge of judicial business. It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court will opt not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. The exception does not obtain here. Thus, we are in agreement that the decision of the Labor Arbiter already became final and executory because petitioner failed to file the appeal within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision. Clearly, the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal before it. It follows that the Court of Appeals, too, did not err, nor gravely abuse its discretion, in sustaining the NLRC Order, by dismissing the petition for certiorari before it. Hence, with the primordial issue resolved, we find no need to tarry on the other issues raised by petitioner. Tagalog version of the digest I found on the internet: DAPAT lamang na matapos ang isang labor case sa pinakamadaling panahon. Ito ang sinasabi ng batas. Upang makamit ito, may takdang panahon para i-apela ang mga desisyon. Kapag lumampas ang panahong ito at hindi mo nagawa ang iyong apela, tapos ang laban. Magiging pinal na ang desisyon at wala ka nang magagawa kungdi ang tanggapin ito. Nangyari ang ganitong sitwasyon sa kasong Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al. , G.R. No. 155844, na dinesisyunan ng Korte Suprema noong Hulyo 14, 2008. Sa nasabing kaso, nagsampa ng reklamo ang mga security guard laban sa kanilang kompanya sa tanggapan ng Labor Arbiter . Naglabas ng desisyon ang Labor Arbiter na dapat bayaran ng kompanya ng separation pay ang mga guwardiya. Nag-apela ang kompanya sa NLRC (National Labor Relations Commision). Pinawalang bisa naman ng NLRC ang apela sa dahilang huli na nang ito ay mai-file ng kompanya. Umakyat ang kompanya sa Court of Appeals ngunit ganoon pa rin ang hatol. Napilitang dalhin ng kompanya sa Korte Suprema ang kaso bilang huling hirit. Kinatigan ng Korte Suprema ang mga security guard at sinabing tama ang NLRC at Court of Appeals. Maliwanag sa Art. 229 ng Labor Code na ang gustong mag-apela laban sa desisyon o hatol ng isang Labor Arbiter ay may sampung (10) araw mula sa pagkatanggap ng desisyon para gawin ito. Kung hindi magawa sa nasabing panahon ang apela, magiging pinal ang desisyon. Ganoon din ang sinasabi sa NLRC Rules of Procedure. Sampung araw lamang ang binibigay para i-apela ang desisyon. Hindi ito maaring ipaextend at anumang motion na humihingi ng extension ay ibabasura. Sa kaso ng mga security guard, natanggap ng kompanya ang desisyon noong Hulyo 16. Isinumite ng kompanya ang kanyang apela noong Hulyo 29.

5. NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC. v. CA (GR No. 155844)

Facts: LA Manuel Manasala found petitioner Nationwide Security (a security agency) not liable for illegal dismissal involving 8 security guards. However, LA directed petitioner to pay the 8 guards separation pay, unpaid salaries and attys fees. Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to NLRC which dismissed it for 2 reasons: having filed it beyond the reglementary period within to perfect the appeal for filing an insufficient appeal bond Petitioner appealed to CA. CA dismissed.

Issue: W/N appeal to the NLRC has not been perfected sincei t was filed outside the reglementary period and the bond, insuffucient.

Held:

In the instant case, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter. This factual finding is supported by sufficient evidence and we take it as binding on us. Petitioner then simultaneously filed its Appeal Memorandum, Notice of Appeal and

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Ayon sa batas, dapat ay isinumite ito ng kompanya sampung araw (10) mula ng matanggap nito ang desisyon na dapat ay nong Hulyo 26. Malinaw na nahuli ng tatlong (3) araw ang apela ng kompanya, sabi ng Korte Suprema.

provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative content is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i. e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. 7. BUENVIAJE v. CA (GR No. 147806)

Dapat lamang na mahigpit na sundin ang taning na binibigay ng batas tungkol sa panahon ng pag-aapela. Kailangan ito para tumakbo ng maayos ang ating sistema ng hustisya, paliwanag ng Korte Suprema. Kaya, dapat lamang ibasura ang apela ng kompanya. Kaya kung sakaling kayo ay may labor case at malapit nang hatulan ang kaso ninyo, maging mapagmatyag. Huwag matulog sa kangkungan. Tiyaking nakikipag-ugnayan kayo sa inyong abogado upang magawa niya ang inyong apela sa oras. Kung hindi, baka matulad kayo sa kompanya sa pinag-usapan nating kaso. 6. PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP V. NLRC Facts: Lourde de Jesus was petitioners reviser/trimmer. She based her work on a paper note posted by the petitioners. In 1992, she was terminated by the petitioner for allegedly tampering or trimming P.O. No. 3853. In her explanation she merely committed a mistake of trimming it because it was of the sme style and design with another which required trimming and that she may hve only been negligent but not dishonest. De Jesuse filed a complaint for illegal dismisssal, LA held petitioners guilty of illgal dismissal. Petitioners appealed before the NLRC. NLRC ordered the reinstatement but maintained that de Jesus was negligent Issue: W/N de Jesus was illegally dismissed W/N an order for reinstatement needs a writ of execution

Facts: Petitioners were former employees of Cottonway Marketing Corp., hired a promo girls for their garment products. In 1994, they were terminated from service bec Cottonway is allegedly suffering from business losses. Petitioners filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA finds retrenchment valid. NLRC reversed and ordered reinstatement. CA held that petitioners' reinstatement was no longer possible as they deliberately refused to return to work despite the notice given by Cottonway. The Court of Appeals thus held that the amount of backwages due them should be computed only up to the time they received their notice of termination. Issue: Whether or not the computation of backwages should be limited from the time they were illegally dismissed until they received notice of termination or from the time of their illegal dismissal until their actual reinstatement. Held: Latter or from the time of their illegal dismissal until their actual reinstatement as argued by the petitioners.

Held: 1. Yes. It is clear that petitioners accusation of dishonesty and tampering official records with intention of cheating against de Jesus was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Lack of a just cause in the dismissal from service of an employee, as in this case, renders the dismissal illegal, despite the employers observance of procedural due process. Court also finds the imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal against de Jesus as certainly harsh and grossly disproportionate to the negligence committed, especially where said employee holds a faithful and an untarnished twelve-year service record. 2. No. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715 to Art. 233 is an innovation and a far departure from the old law indicating thereby the legislatures unequivocal intent to insert a new rule that will govern the reinstatement aspect of a decision or resolution in any given labor dispute. In fact, the law as now worded employs the phrase shall immediately be executory without qualificatio n emphasizing the need for prompt compliance. As a rule, shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory. And in conformity with the executory nature of the reinstatement order, Rule V, Section 16 (3) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC strictly requires the Labor Arbiter to direct the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee. Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or awards becomes final and executory. It cannot relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The

Under R.A. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Petitioners' alleged failure to return to work cannot be made the basis for their termination. Such failure does not amount to abandonment which would justify the severance of their employment. To warrant a valid dismissal on the ground of abandonment, the employer must prove the concurrence of two elements: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. The facts of this case do not support the claim of Cottonway that petitioners have abandoned their desire to return to their previous work at said company.

The Cour is, therefore, not impressed with the claim of respondent company that petitioners have been validly dismissed on August 1, 1996 and hence their backwages should only be computed up to that time. We hold that petitioners are entitled to receive full backwages computed from the time their compensation was actually withheld until their actual reinstatement, or if reinstatement is no longer possible, until the finality of the decision

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