Professional Documents
Culture Documents
File No. 3
4. GOVERNMENT
CASES
b) Classification
i) de jure or de
facto
v) Others
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• Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the
validity of Presidential Decree 73.Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73
purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the
issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the
authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has
passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the
Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly
provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases
involving said issue.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the
Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on
the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions & deny prayer for
issuance of injunction restraining respondents from holding
election and 5 declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant
the injunction. Since there are less than the required 10 votes to
declare BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed
& writs prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since
only a resolution was issued (PBA vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455).
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order
issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief –
addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP
1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the
military and the police should take only the “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O.
No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.
While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in media, no law
has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts,
to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this
portion of G.O. No. 5 (David vs. Macapagal – Arroyo, GR 171396, May 3,
2006).
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ii) Universal
suffrage (right and duty), popular
election, rule of
the majority
Classification of Rights:
iv) Accountability of
Public Officials
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the
rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same
salary which shall not be decreased during their term of office.
Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a
term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be
qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.
Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer
or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law.
vi) Separation of
Powers
Purpose of the separation of powers: to prevent the concentration
of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to
irreparable error or abuse in the exercise to the detriment of
republican institution.
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vii) Non-delegation of
powers
Permissible Delegation
• The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a system of
probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are
convicted of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That
said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2)
that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3)
that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
• Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its
nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved,
and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution
provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a
limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted;
bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in
duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in
the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive
in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be
an emergency."
The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would
not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and
different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the
period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would
be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent
law,"; for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would,
the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this
would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its
powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not
right and is not, and ought not to be, the law.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the
Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its
authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies
operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the
emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended
while Congress was in session and be revived after each
adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a
two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the
President during congressional recess, and the President in turn
could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress,
laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in
two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only
by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former
President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals
after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export
control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and
did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally
declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend
that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect,
would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while
Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words,
it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the
law."
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