LESZEK P Y R A

Y A L U K S WITHIN RELATIONS

The central category of Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue is

undoubtedly the relation I-You, standing in opposition to the relation
I-It, which is in fact a separation. In order to achieve his fuli humanity
a mań should take a relation I-You as often as possible. Just to this
relation arę unbindingly attached the values presented by Martin Buber
in his theory. Such values will be analysed below. The analysis consists
accordingly of: A) a description of the construction of the I-You relation,
B) a discussion of its properties (values), and C) a description of spheres
in which the relation may appear.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF THE RELATION I-YOU

Writing about construction of the relation I-You, Buber firstly charac-

terizes its first part, namely the You. The notion "You" means man's
certain, specific attitudes towards a partner in dialogue, characterized
by respect due to the partner's existential value. Under the word "You"
the author means not only an object of relation, but something that
appears in a given situation between a subject and an object, and this
means the confirmation of the others's value. 'The essence of a dialog-
ical situation is expressed by Buber in the following words: "Spirit is
not in the I, but between I and You. It is not like the blood that circu-
lates in you but like the air in which you breathe."1 You, in opposition
to It, cannot be influenced by the categories that rule in the materiał
world, i.e. time, space, causality. The being treated as You is saturated
by spirit.
When in turn the "I" is considered (of course the "I" of the I-You
relation), it is internally well-ordered and can be named "person." In
Buber's understanding the notion "person" means a mań open to dialogue,
ready at every moment to lead a dialogue with a being from which a
cali comes.

55

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXVII, 55—63.

'()()() A / m i r r Aciulemii' Puhlishem. Printed In the Netherlands.
56 LESZEK P Y R A
B. FEATURES OF THE RELATION l Von
According to Buber, such a relation is characterised by the following
features: presence, unmediating, exclusiveness, mutuality, impermanence
and responsibility.
The feature of presence means readiness of a subject for the meeting,
readiness to accept a cali and answer it. It is the presence understood
as "nic et nunc," because: "The I of the basie word I-It . . . has only
past and no present," whereas "What is essential is lived in the present."2
The feature of being unmediated means that nothing appears between
the two objects of dialogue. According to my interpretation it can be
understood in two ways: cognitively, as the łąck of any prior assump-
tions, and valuationally. In the first case there is nothing conceptual
between I and You. As far as the valuational sense of being unmedi-
ated is concerned, this means that all additional aims, however worthy
they might be, should be excluded from the relation, because the only
aim of the dialogue is the dialogue itself.
The feature of exclusiveness means that only two beings can partici-
pate in a given dialogue at a given moment, because man's possibili-
ties of initiating and sustaining a given dialogue arc l i m i l c d , and complete
concentration upon one partner in dialogue excludes the possibility of
being involved in dialogue with other partners at the same time. It should
be mentioned that this limitation does not refer to Ihc Hlernal You (God)
- able to lead simultaneous dialogues with all other beings. Buber stresses
this fact many times. And here is an example: "Evcry actual relation-
ship in the world is exclusive. . . . Solely in the relation to God arę
unconditional exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness one. . . ."
3
The feature of mutuality means interaction between Ihc Iwo partners
involved in dialogue. Buber states this outright thusly: "Relation is
reciprocity. My You acts on me as I act on it. Our students teach us,
4
our works form us." Before mutuality appears, we have a siluation in
which one of the sides in the dialogue sends an invitation to dialogue,
and the other side answers it. It is the characteristic trait of such a
dialogue that every being can send a cali to dialogue, whereas the answer
can be supplied only by a being which is a person, first of all by mań.
The feature of impermanence means in turn that the I-You relation
does not last forever, that it has a tendency to become the I-It relation,
and therefore constant effort is needed to sustain the first relation and
to limit the second. No mań, however, is capable of being in constant
relation of I-You, and Buber stresses this sad fact numerous times.
Y A I . U H S WITHIN RELATIONS 57
Accordingly, in Buher's theory one can distinguish two kinds of
responsibility. This - unfortunately - has remained unnoticed so far by
all Ihc interpreters of Buber's theory whom I know of. The first one,
i - . \ p l k - i i l y expressed by the author himself and therefore generally
acknowledged by critics, is the responsibility of the I for the You.
Howcver, one can talk about the second kind of responsibility, expressed
by the author only implicitly and strongly connected with the category
of freedom, which is the responsibility for giving up the I-It relation in
order to get involved in the I-You relation, as often as possible.
C. SPHERES OF DIALOGUE
Ouile a separate problem is the question referring to potential partners
i n dialogue, in regard to which a dialogue can be initiated, or who initiate
it themselves.
Firstly, dialogue may be initiated with naturę, that is with different
forms of the materiał world. In this case, "The relation vibrates in the
dark and remains below language. The creatures . . . arę unable to come
to us, and the You we say to them sticks to the threshold of language."5
Because beings coming out of this sphere cannot use speech, they turn
towards mań with a cali formulated in a way suited to their particular
level of development. In the very important Afterword to "I and Thou"
written in 1957, that is, after morę than thirty years of thinking about
the theory under discussion, the thinker answered the ąuestion concerning
the character of mutuality given to mań by naturę. And so in this sphere,
rcaching from stones to stars, one can basically talk about "the threshold
ni mutuality" in which we find "reciprocity of being itself- a reciprocity
l hal has nothing except being," 6 and therefore is identical with such a
being.
Secondly, dialogue may be initiated with mań. According to Buber:
"Herę the relation is manifest and enters language. We can give and
receive the You."7 A mań sends his appeal using speech, with one of
mc languages. This is truły the most essential kind of dialogue. In the
above-mentioned Afterword, the author answers the ąuestion of whether
t u l i mutuality is always possible in this sphere. Hę claims that fuli
m i i l u a l i t y is not possible in every particular relation, that it may or may
not happen. What is morę, there exist such I-You relations in which
din- a priori cannot count on fuli mutuality. Such a situation is typical
ol i l u - l o l l o w i n g relations: educator-pupil, psychotherapist-patient,
58 LESZEK PYRA
clergyman-worshipper. For exampłe: in case of the i r l a l i o n educator-
pupil, the educator, in order to bring out what is best in l i i s pupil, must
participate in the meeting by also looking at it from Ihe pupil's point
of view, practising the kind of relation which embraccs Ihc whole situ-
ation. Similar situations appear in two other cases.
Thirdly, dialogue may be initiated with spiritual beings. Herę, ". . . the
relation is wrapped in a cloud but reveals itself, it lacks but creates
language. We hear no You and yet feel addressed; we answer - creating,
thinking, acting. . . ."8 The above-mentioned spiritual beings arę first
of all, it seems, the products of culture. In case of dialogue with them,
the I of an artist - every mań is an artist in certain situations! - answers
a cali through the realisation of his own artistic visions, whereas the I
of the receiving person does so through reception of the work of art,
within concrete aesthetic experience.
In the Afterword of 1957, Buber distinguishes "the spirit that has
already entered the world" from "the spirit that has not yet entered the
world but is ready to do so."9 As examples of the first, hę mentions
concrete products of people who died thousands of years ago: the
traditional sayings of a master, and the Doric colunin. In the second case,
Buber refers to creative influences and inspiration of the spirit that every-
one has felt at some time. Such spirit demands a realisalion, a fulfillment
on behalf of the person within the frame of a given artistic actiyity.
Among the above-mentioned kinds of dialogue, the most important
is the dialogue with mań. According to Buber, only in tlić dialogue of
mań with mań one can achieve fuli mutuality, becausr o n l y in such
cases does a cali eąual an answer with respect to ąuality - in both aspects,
that is with respect to the ąuality of beings engaged i n a given relation,
and with respect to means of communication (human speedi).
Some commentators of Buber's theory cali him a "personalist". I think
they arę right, all the morę so as hę often stresses the fact Ihal the effort
connected with achieving and sustaining the relation I-You confirms
the development of personality, the fact that the person is being created.10
Much attention is payed in Buber's considerations to the dialogue
of a human being with the Eternal You. In spite of appearances of other
kinds of dialogue, I am not certain whether the fourth kind of dialogue
is considered in this case. The author stresses the fact that the dialogue
I-Eternal You is superior to the dialogues with naturę, mań and spiri-
tual beings, that it constitutes their base, conditions them and becomes
realised in each I-You relation.
VAI Ul S W I T H I N RELATIONS 59
According to the uuthnr, every encounter ultimately leads to the Eternal
Y m i , but "when the perfect encounter is to occur, the gates arę unified
i n i o i l u - one gate of aclual life, and you no longer know through which
ulu- you have entered."" Buber is deeply convinced that when a given
lu-ing does not answer a cali directed towards it, the answer is supplied
somcwhat as a s u b s l i l u t e - by the Eternal You, and it is done by
particular beings and events of the world.
CONCLUSIONS
In reference to the above-mentioned views certain ąuestions and doubts
may appear. Nów I would like to pay some attention to several of them.
One of the most intriguing and unresolved ąuestions is the ąuestion
concerning the naturę of the dialogue, namely whether it happe.ns on
Ihe basis of positive feelings only or is also possible in regard to the
negative ones. Although the author himself does not give an explicit
answer in this respect, one can draw the conclusion on the basis of
some of his expressions that hę allows the possibility of meetings based
on negative feelings, too. Hę writes, for example: "Yet whoever hates
directly is closer to a relation than those who arę without love and hate."12
Accordingly, the philosophy of dialogue, in order not to lose any of its
cognitive and explanatory value, should not limit itself to meetings based
only on positive feelings.' 3
A well known and often cited saying of Buber's: "Every real life is
a meeting," should perhaps be followed by "not only with others but also
w i t h oneself." But is it possible to conduct a dialogue with oneself?
Tlić author of "I and Thou" does not accept such a possibility. According
ui li i m this would be a false dialogue, in fact, a monologue. But never-
ilu-less, some theoreticians try to build a theory of such a dialogue. For
r \ample, Reinhold Niebuhr does this, and at the same time confirms a
! ' i r a l influence exerted upon him by Buber.'4 Recalling the theory of
l ' i v u d , hę points out the possibility of leading the dialogue among par-
i i r u l a r spheres of personality: id, ego and superego. Hę tries to prove that
\\v often have to deal with a personality splitting into two foci that arę
a h k - to hołd a dialogue with each other. One of them appears in a
s i i b j e c l i y e aspect and the other in an objective one.15 According to
N i r b n h i , such a situation appears first of all in cases of self-evaluation.
A vvi y serious counter-argument against this is the opinion that only fully
•.iil>|tviiw beings aro ahle to conduct such a dialogue. 16
60 LESZEK P Y R A
A very interesting question is the problem of chan^os appearing in
mań during meetings. According to Buber, during a givon nieeting man's
potentiality is strengthened. This means that firstly, ho is given reci-
procity; secondly, hę receives inexpressible confirmation of meaning; and
thirdly, the meaning of his own life "here and nów" becornes clear to
him. The author stresses the fact that every meeting constitutes a fact,
individualised and unique to the highest degree. Hę writes: "The meaning
we receive can be put to proof in action only by each person in the
uniąueness of his being and in the uniqueness of his life."'
One cannot agree without objections with Buber's opinion, which says
that "no prescription can lead us to the encounter." 18 Because even if
no method can guarantee a concrete encounter - and this refers mainly
to the interhuman sphere - I think that a good teacher may prepare his
pupil, for example, for an encounter with a piece of art, by teaching
him to be really sensitive to art. In generał such a pupil is well prepared
to "meet" works of art in the world around him.
Buber's philosophy of dialogue, a phenomenon appearing in three
spheres, proves that there is no sharp distinction between sacred and
profane, because both mań and the world s u r r o u n d i n g him arę satu-
rated by spirit, and the only linę of division we can l a i k about is the
one separating You and It. Every being may becomc You and similarly
every being may, or even must - after some time - bccome It. Of course
this does not refer to the Eternal You.
The question referring to the possibility of direcl mcelings with the
Eternal You is also justifiable. Martin Buber allows lor ihc possibility
of such meetings, describing them as the "highest." However, they happen
rather rarely and only in a true community, when "men's rclations to their
true You, being radii that lead from all I-points to the centcr, create a
circle. Not the periphery, not the community comes first, but the radii,
the common relation to the center."19 In the above-mentioned case, Buber
adapts to his own use the concept transferred from the Hasidic movement
(about which morę later on), according to which the central point of
all relations of a given community is its spiritual leader, the zaddik.20
Martin Buber's philosophical views do not pretend to be strictly
scientific, if only because of the fact that they arę not based on any
objective, empirical studies. They seem to be inspired by the Hasidic
inheritance, the existential thought of Herman Cohen, and "existential
experiences" of the author from his youth. 21 The first one especially,
the Hasidic movement, influenced Martin Buber's views, and to such
Y A l . l I l i S WITHIN RELATIONS 63
.111 c Mont that these viows may be defined as neo-Hasidic. The thinker
lor an answer aboul the sense of life and found it in the Hasidic
Mce (one of the currents of Judaism), in the trend initiated by
i l u - 1'olish .lew named l/rael ben Eliezer (1700-1760). The essence of
Ihis i i o i u l may be cxprcsscd in the comdction that life in this world and
loj-.oihor w i l h the world is the superior duty of mań; the trend also payed
atlonlion lo Ihe fact that all reality was of a spiritual character. Buber
m o d i l i o d and developed the Hasidic inheritance understood in such a
way; one can even venture the statement that its fullest explication was
i n i i i p r i s o d in "I and Thou."
A i c o u l i n g to his theory, the most fundamental vocation of mań "in
I h i s world" sustains a realisation of man's humanism by means of dif-
h - i o n i r o l a l i o n s of the I-You type. The author also intercepted, for his
own use, the Hasidic belief that real life appears in normality of evefyday
l i l r , i hal the mań about whom Buber writes is an everyday mań - not
ul Ihe Sahbalh.
One can say that the philosopher is an existentialist, but only in the
sonso Ihat ho is not interested in any abstract naturę of mań. Hę is
inloroslod in a widely understood situation of mań in the world which
o l l o r s possibilities for meetings of a different type - every single one
ni i i i i i c | u e character. In constructing his theory, the author gives up sharp
t l i v i s i o n s into subject and object. In his theory, subject and object,
i oimected by a spirit that appears between them, create a qualitatively
nów wholeness, a new structure, and the life in their meeting appears
.is somcthing most important. Buber underlines the totally personal
• h . n . u lor of human existence, and according to him, the adjective
l » i .onal" means much morę than "subjective." It is like this because
in onlor lo become personal, what is subjective must be accomplished
l'\ " l i n o relatedness," by an element of spirit. And this, first of all,
. i i l n l e s the metaphysics of a Buberian conception. In the light of
i l i * .il>ove, it is also obvious that there is no possibility of coming back
in .1 metaphysics offering the dualism based on contrast between
n.inonce and transcendence. It should be also stressed that Buber's
l Y i i n r e l a t i o n has no mystical character, that,hę treats all beings as
< n . i i i n j 1 . a community, whereas the assumption that God is present in
r \ v i \ parlicular relation remains a ąuestion of faith.
l h o i o is no doubt that "relation" is the most basie category of Buber's
l > l i i l i ' M i | t l i v . Only rnan's "true relatedness," and therefore live dialogue
mi spniitaiieity and trust, allows mań to create true community. The
62 LESZEK P Y R A Y A l . l l h S W 1 T H I N RELATIONS 63

thinker accepts neither collectivity - because hę I h i n k s of it as the
"atrophy" of personality, nor individualism - because ii is a separation,
and decidedly approves of personality and communily. In the work 7
and Thou hę presents the picture of mań considered as a mysterious unity
of different relations heavily loaded with different ethical categories. And
just this, to me, determines that the basie motif of his creativity may
be described as anthropological and ethical. It should be stressed that
the relational attitude towards the other means neither subjectivism
(tendentiousness) nor sentimentalism. Neither psychological nor socio-
logical interpretations arę able to grasp the essence of true relation. At
least, that is Buber's opinion. Despite the fact that the ontological status
of relation was never fully explained by Buber, his views greatly influ-
enced his contemporaries' ways of thinking. The influence is especially
well seen in theology (especially Protestant), but also in secular ways
of philosophising, because the spheres of dialogue of bom atheists and
believers remain generally the same. I am deeply convinced that Buber's
theory suggests answers which arę especially iinportant to contempo-
rary mań, who is living in a constant hurry and avoiding true meetings
with others. And it is just such meetings that decide the ąuality of our
humanity.
b W) inlense emotional i - x | n - i n - m v s , we arc impelled to point out that Buber's theory
' »' ' • M.mi of its aspects, pice m s o i y in relation to the theory of positive disintegration
•!• • • I"|"-'I I'V Kazimierz Dalmiwski, Dezintegracja pozytywna (Warsaw: 1979); andedited
b) MI, ume toithor: Zdrowie psychiczne (Waisw. 1979), pp. 46-63.
l i u l i r i . / ,iii,l Thou. ,i/>. cii., p. 150.
IbUim, |>. 68.
!'•»<• .lo/rl T i M l m r i . "Spotkania w horyzoncie zła," Analecta Cracoviensia
MII i l ' i s i i. Adam Wegrzecki, O poznawaniu drugiego człowieka (Kraków: 1990), pp.
l ' i i II
K Y i n l i n l d N i r l i i i l n , /'/«• V// ,iml the Dramas of History (London: 1956), p. 11.
Ihiili-in. p I X . Ii slmiilil l H- noticed, however, that the author has in mind the ąuite
l" . i l i h v (m u-'.|ia l ID i i > m,J lu-iillh) personality. But his reaching to Freud's concept in
••'•l' i i" I m i l i l h i s own theory of internal dialogue does not seem to be the most
llc
''•' "!' .L U-rausi-, I n s l of all, Freud's theory seems to lose much of its actuality in
lin h.nr.In
1
H" ' ' l < ' > a i r i i i i i c n t loscs much of its actuality when we recall Buber's spheres
• •l d i . i l i i f i u - w i i h n a i i i i c and with spiritual beings and realise at the same time that only
"prMence" ul In-ing permits engaging in dialogue.
Unln'1, / ,in,l Tłum, p. 159.
lin,!,'ni
lhi,l, ni
I I . n r . K i i l m , Martin Buber. Sein Work und seine Zeit (Koln: 1961), p. 186.
1
['."i- Mic dcscription of meeting a horse, in Buber's Between Mań and Mań
Y o i k I')4X), p. 41.

Academy of Agriculture
Jagiellonian University
Cracow

NOTES
1
Martin Buber, / and Thou, A New Translation, by Walter Kaufmann (New York: 1970),
p. 89; and Ks. Stanisław Kowalczyk, Bóg w myśli współczesnej (Wrocław: 1982), pp.
88-91.
'• Buber, / and Thou, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
' Ibidem, p. 148.
* Ibidem, p. 67.
5
Ibidem, pp. 56-57.
6
Ibidem, p. 173.
1
Ibidem, p. 57.
8
Ibidem.
9
Ibidem, p. 174.
10
Taking into consideration the fact that mań, in his ontogenetic development, must
go through three stages, those of the primary I-You relationship, the I-It relationship,
and the I-You relationship, and also the fact that this "going through" is accompanied