Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IN THE
v.
DAVID KNUTSON, AN INDIVIDUAL; JOHN AND MARY DOES
1-20
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This case presents issues of judicial immunity for Dakota
County, Minnesota Judge David Knutson under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 USC 1983, including one
extraordinary issue of first impression regarding this
Courts Article III jurisdiction to construe Section 1983,
and two additional issues reflecting division among the
circuits regarding the appropriate test to apply when
deciding questions of judicial immunity:
(1) Whether a district court may extend immunity to a
judge accused of violating the Civil Rights Act,
without conducting a historical analysis of immunity
for the functions at 1871 common law as instructed
under Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497 (2012).
(2) Whether a family court judge is immune under Stump
v. Sparkman for the functions of (a) administratively
overriding the case assignment process to assign all
cases relating to a party, including family, criminal,
and third party cases to himself; (b) conducting a
psychological listening session upon a litigants
children, absent any motion or relevance to any issue
before the judge; (c) issuing a stream of stay away
and property control commands and compelling a
family to undergo counseling; and (d) conducting a
trial with the attorney handcuffed in a wheelchair,
and forced to proceed with the clients case, without
files, notes, evidence, eyeglasses, pen, paper or the
litigant? Whether these behaviors, performed by a
family court judge, are judicial acts within the
jurisdiction of a family court under Stump v.
Sparkman.
ii
(3) Whether this Court possessed jurisdiction under
Article III, of the United States Constitution in
Pierson v. Ray to construe Section 1983 contrary to
its unambiguous language and vividly-recorded
congressional intent, thereby exercising legislative
power vested exclusively in Congress under Article I
of the United States Constitution, and in excess of its
judicial power.
iii
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............................................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................. v
OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................................... 1
JURISDICTION ............................................................................... 1
APPENDIX E:
The March 29, 2013 Order and
Memorandum Sealing Listening Session held
for the sole purpose of facilitating therapy; the
District Court of Minnesota for Dakota County,
case no. 19AVFA-11-1273. ................................................... 67a
APPENDIX F:
Form COL Violation Warning
by Sandra Grazzini-Rucki Denial of Rights
Under Color of Law, 42 USC 1983 --- to (Judge)
David L. Knutson, July 23 , 2013 ....................................... 70a
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
ADAMS V. MCILHANY, 764 F.2D 294 (5TH CIR. 1985)........21, 23
ANTOINE V. BYERS & ANDERSON, INC. 508 U. S.
429 (1993) ........................................................................ PASSIM
ASHELMAN V. POPE, 793 F.2D 1072 (9TH CIR. 1986).............. 23
AUSTIN V. BOREL, 830 F.2D 1356, 1363 (5TH CIR.
1987) ......................................................................................... 25
BABCOCK V. TYLER, 884 F.2D 497, 502-03 (9TH
CIR.1989) ................................................................................. 30
BELTRAN V. SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 514 F.3D 906,
908 (9TH CIR. 2008)................................................................. 30
BRADLEY V. FISHER 80 U.S.335 (1872) ..................................... 8
BREWER V. BLACKWELL, 692 F.2D 387, 396 (5TH
CIR. 1982) ................................................................................ 23
BUCHANAN V. FORD, 638 F. SUPP. 168 (N.D.N.Y.
1986) ......................................................................................... 25
BURNS V. REED, 500 U. S. 478 (1991)..................................10, 11
BUTZ V. ECONOMOU, 438 U. S. 478, 516 (1978)........................ 14
CLEAVINGER V. SAXNER, 474 U. S. 193, 207-08
(1985)........................................................................................ 14
CONCEPCION V. CINTRON, 905 F. SUPP. 57, 61 (D.
P.R. 1995) ................................................................................ 23
CTS CORP. V. WALDERBURGER, 573 U. S. ___, ___
(2014)........................................................................................ 32
CZIKALLA V. MALLOY, 649 F. SUPP. 1212 (D.COLO.
1986) ......................................................................................... 26
D.T.B. V. FARMER, 114 F. APP'X 446, 447 (3D CIR.
2004) ......................................................................................... 29
DOE V. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 494 F. SUPP. 179
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) ...................................................................... 25
DOE V. LEBBOS, 348 F.3D 820 (9TH CIR. 2003),
ABROGATED IN BELTRAN V. SANTA CLARA
COUNTY, 514 F.3D 906 (9TH CIR. 2008)................................ 26
DUZYNSKI V. NOSAL, 324 F.2D 924, 929 (7TH CIR.
1963) ......................................................................................... 29
vii
viii
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. 242 ............................................................................ 33
20 U.S.C. 76cc........................................................................... 15
28 U.S.C. 1254(1)........................................................................ 1
28 U.S.C. 1291 ............................................................................ 1
28 U.S.C. 1331 ........................................................................... 1
42 U.S.C. 1983 .................................................................... 1, 2, 9
Minn. Stat. 148.88 ....................................................................... 24
Minn. Stat. 484.1 ........................................................................ 5
Minn. Stat. 518 ............................................................................ 27
Minn. Stat. 518.17 subds.1-2..................................................... 6
The Federalist No. 78 (1788)..................................................... 32
ix
RULES
Supreme Court Rule 10(a) .................................................. 12, 16
Supreme Court Rule 10(c)......................................................... 13
OTHER AUTHORITIES
J. Feinman, R. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and
Theory, 31 S. C. L. Rev. 201, 243-249, 254-56
(1979)........................................................................................ 37
Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79
YALE L.J. 322, 327-328 (1969)............................................. 33
M. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not A Big Tent: The
Improper Expansion Of Absolute Judicial
Immunity To Non-Judges In Civil-Rights Cases,
59 SMU L.Rev. 265, 276 ........................................................ 26
N. Blake, The Road To Reno, A History of Divorce
in the United States 56 (1962)............................................... 26
1
OPINIONS BELOW
2
RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED
JURISDICTION
STATEMENT
This petition arises from a suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota under 42
U.S.C. 1983 and state-law claims brought by
Plaintiffs-Petitioners,
Sandra
Grazzini-Rucki,
individually and on behalf of her minor children against
Defendant-Respondent, David L. Knutson, a judge of
the Dakota County, Minnesota District Court. Judge
3
Knutson presided over matters involving GrazziniRucki, subsequent to Petitioners May 12, 2011
Stipulated Judgment and Decree. App. 6a-7a. After the
Decree was entered, Petitioners ex-husband David
Rucki changed his mind, moving to set aside the
Decree, alleging he was tricked into settling. App.7a.
Judge Knutson thereafter assigned himself to vacate
the Decreeforcing the parties back to court. App. 9a.
Judge Knutson instructed Judicial District Deputy
Administrator Susan J. Reichenbach to assign him to
all court proceedings of any type involving the
parties, even future cases involving third parties, and
even criminal matters. App. 8a, 44a-66a. He thereafter
proceeded to issue over 3,400 directives to regulate this
family including stay away orders separating the
children from both parents, kicking the mother out of
the home, ordering psychological examinations of
family members, and requiring custody evaluations and
therapy for the entire family without any trial or
finding of abuse. App. 10a-15a, 22a-24a. Judge Knutson
command the children to attend what he called a
listening session which he admitted was for the sole
purpose of facilitating therapy. . . This session was not
pursuant to any motion or issue under consideration at
the time. App. 3a, 67a-69a. At the listening session,
Judge Knutson threatened the children. App. 21a-25a.
Two of the children ran away. App. 72a Grazzini-Rucki
and the children sued Judge Knutson alleging
deprivation by:
(a) Judge Knutsons bypassing standard case
assignment procedure to assign all pre-existing
and future hearings relating to Grazzini-Rucki to
himself;
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5
The district courts conclusion was based on the
following findings:
(a) Judge Knutson has not interacted with
Plaintiff outside of his courtroom or his judicial
chambers and
(b) [T]he underlying family law case was within
Judge Knutsons jurisdictional authority under
MINN. STAT. 484.1 (state district courts have
original jurisdiction in all civil actions within
their respective districts).
App. 40a. The district court entered a Final Opinion
and Order on May 29, 2014.
Grazzini-Rucki appealed the finding of immunity,
arguing (1) Judge Knutson failed to carry his burden of
proving 1871 common law extended an absolute
immunity to the accused functions; (2) the (a)
administrative case assignment, (b) psychotherapeutic
listening session, (c) stay away and property control
orders, and (d) arrest and conducting of trial with her
attorney in shackles could not be immune under any
construction of immunity doctrine; and (3) Pierson v.
Ray was an unconstitutional exercise of legislative
powers vested solely to Congress under Article I of the
United States Constitution. Opening Brief, Sept.25,
2014, Response & Reply Brief,March 4, 2015, Case no.
14-2569.
4. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal
stating:
6
(a) Judge Knutsons self-assignment of
related matters was a judicial act because it is
still a judicial function in the sense that it
directly concerns the case-deciding process,
citing out-of-circuit authority of Martinez v.
Winner, 771 F. 2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985),
vacated as moot after remand, 800 F.2d. 230 (10th
Cir. 1986).
(b) the psychotherapeutic listening
session was a judicial act because:
(i) The listening session was held at the
courthouse;
(ii) . . . attended by the parties, the
attorneys, the guardian ad litem,
and
the
therapist;
and
(iii) . . . was recorded by a court
reporter.
The court reasoned that Minnesotas custody laws are
so flexible that the listening session was a function
normally performed by a judge in deciding custody
disputes. . . App. 4a. (citing Minn. Stat. 518.17
subds.1-2 establishing best interests standard for
determining custody). Judge Knutson in his order
characterized it as a non-judicial act himself. The court
disregarded Judge Knutsons admission that the
listening session was held for the sole purpose of
facilitating therapy previously ordered by the Court,
concluding that Judge Knutsons characterization does
not require the conclusion that the listening session was
something other than a judicial act. App. 3a
The court of appeals ignored both (c) movement
and property control orders and (d) conducting a child
7
custody trial without Grazzini-Rucki present, and while
her attorney was in handcuffs.
5. Grazzini-Rucki petitioned for rehearing and
hearing en banc, arguing:
(1) The panel failed to address Grazzini-Ruckis
argument that neither Judge Knutson nor the
district court conducted historical analysis of
immunity at 1871 common law for the four
accused functions;
(2) The panel (a) applied a four-factor immunity
test from the Fifth Circuit rather than Stumps
(controlling) two-factor test, (b) confused the
within the jurisdiction prong with the
ordinarily performed by a judge prong from
Stump, and (c) failed to address the stay-away
orders and shackling of counsel behavior;
(3) The panel applied mooted authority of
Martinez inconsistent with this Courts
precedent; and
(4) Pierson v. Ray was an unconstitutional
exercise of Article I authority by this Court, in
excess of the judicial power vested under Article
III.
6. The Eighth
petitions for rehearing.
Circuit
denied
both
8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) this Court
construed Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
contrary to its unambiguous language and vividlyrecorded congressional intent, wrongly analogizing the
legislative speech and debate liberty from Tenney v.
Brandhove 341 U. S. 367 (1951) to the sovereign judicial
function. Contradicting the unambiguous statute and
clear congressional record, the Court presumed that
congress did not intend Section 1983 to abrogate
immunity of state judges to common law torts which
existed under nineteenth century English common law,
as recited in Bradley v. Fisher 80 U.S.335 (1872).
Following this presumption, this Court has instructed:
Our initial inquiry is whether an official claiming
immunity under 1983 can point to a common-law
counterpart to the privilege he asserts. Malley v.
Briggs 475 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1986).
The Eighth Circuit failed to conduct this initial
inquiry, instead construing the doctrine of judicial
immunity contrary Stump v. Sparkman 475 U. S. 335,
339-340 (1986). The court extended immunity to Judge
Knutsons administrative case assignment function
under authority from the Tenth Circuit, Martinez v.
Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985), which was
mooted in Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231
(10th Cir. 1986), that is directly contrary to Ex parte
Virginia 100 U. S. 339, 228 (1879); Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Consumers Union of United State 446 U. S.
719, 734-737 (1980); and Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,
Inc. 508 U. S. 429 (1993).
10
11
12
13
14
1.
Martinez was Mooted and is
Inconsistent with Generations of This
Courts Precedent
In extending immunity under Martinez, the court
of appeals erred under this Courts precedents holding
that judicial officers performing executive functions are
not immune. See, e.g, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,
228 (1879) ([a]dministrative decisions, even though
they may be essential to the very functioning of the
courts, have not...been regarded as judicial acts.);
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of
United States, 446 U. S. 719, 734-737 (1980) (refusing to
extend immunity to behavior promulgating a code of
conduct for attorneys because it was not an act of
adjudication but one of rulemaking.); Antoine v. Byers
& Anderson, Inc., 508 U. S. 429, 435 (1993) (finding
court reporters part of judicial function yet not
absolutely immune); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U. S. 118
(1997) (reasoning prosecutors investigation concerns
adjudication but not judicial).
15
16
17
18
19
20
1.
The Court of Appeals Cited Stump,
but Applied the Abrogated Fifth Circuit
Test from McAlester v. Brown
The court of appeals focused on the location of the
session, attendance by parties, and recordation. App.
3a-4a. These are not relevant under Stump, but may be
relevant under a test originating in the Fifth Circuit
McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.1972)a
test that was abrogated in Stump at p. 361, yet today
somehow thrives within the circuits, requiring the
Courts supervisory and conflict resolution jurisdiction
under Rules 10(a) and (c).
Stump settled cacophony among the circuits
extending immunity inconsistently. Stump at 360-363
and n.10. Justice White cast aside considerable debris
among the circuits, including McAlester, the leading
immunity case from the Fifth Circuit. See Harper v.
Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
454 U. S. 816 (1981). McAlesters test found an act
judicial in nature based on four factors: (1) the
precise act complained of . . . is a normal judicial
function; (2) the events involved occurred in the judge's
chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case
then-pending before the judge; and (4) the
confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a
visit to the judge in his official capacity. McAlester at
1282 (analyzed in Stump at 361).
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22
2.
The Circuits Have Consistently
Mis-Construed Stump
McAlesters persistence despite abrogation in
Stump follows an aberration occurring in the Fifth
Circuit case of Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294 (5th
Cir. 1985). Seven years after Stump, the Fifth Circuit
in Adams refused to recognize Stumps abrogation of
McAlesters four factors. As if the Supreme Court were
a sister circuit, the Fifth Circuit cited Stump, then
turned its back on it. Id. at 297 (The four factors
generally relied upon by this circuit . . . .) (emphasis
added).
Adams proceeded to analyze under
McAlesters test rather than Stump, erroneously
relying on the four-factor test debris cast aside by
Justice White. Adams at 297.
Adams misperceived McAlesters vitality because
of a peculiar outcome in the case of Harper v. Merckle,
638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981). In Harper, the Fifth
Circuit determined that Judge Merckle was not
immune for falsely arresting Harper, a man who had
attempted to make a spousal support payment directly
to the judge in the judges chambers. The judge
attempted to place Harper under oath to learn his
address, whereupon Harper fled.
Judge Merckle
ordered bailiffs to chase. They shortly captured and
returned Harper to Judge Merckles chambers
whereupon Judge Merckle placed Harper under oath
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1
24
4
3.
25
26
immunity
by
analogy
12
27
28
4.
Under Bradley, Family Court
Functions are Inferior, and Thus Not
Entitled to Absolute Immunity
5.
The Court of Appeals Conflated (1)
Judicial in Nature and (2) Subject
Matter Jurisdiction
29
30
17
18
19
17
See, e.g., Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898-900 (9th Cir.
2003) (reversing Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 502-03 (9th
Cir.1989) as fundamentally inconsistent with this Courts
decisions in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U. S. 429
(1993) and Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U. S. 118 (1997)); Beltran v.
Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing
Doe v. Lebbos , 348 F. 3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) as inconsistent with
Antoine and Kalina, and finding social workers not immune for
investigative conduct); and Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577
(9th Cir. 2000) (finding no firmly rooted tradition at common law
of absolute immunity for psychiatrist function).
22
The court of appeals may have ignored the argument as
outside the scope of the opening brief, citing Jasperson v.
Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736 (1985). Such would be error.
Grazzini-Ruckis opening brief set forth all four categories, arguing
not one was immune.
31
and supervised visitation. [O]ver three thousand
four hundred (3,400) directives of Defendant David L
Knutson [sic] regulate this [Plaintiffs] family, without
due process or rule of law or rule of evidence seizing
Plaintiff from her home, children and Property.
App.22a. Given that these sweeping powers to control
family are enabled by twentieth-century legislation
and only in twentieth century family courtsJudge
Knutson could not carry his burden of proving such
function as judicial in 1871.
Regarding (d) --- arrest and shackling of counsel
--- several courts have held physical assault or evicting
litigants are not judicial acts. See, e.g., Greggory,
Harper, supra. It is apparent that Judge Knutson
could not have carried his burden of showing immunity
for the illegal arrest and shackling of Petitioners
counsel, and then carrying on the trial with the
attorney in handcuffs.
I.
PIERSON AND STUMP STAND IN ERROR
FOR EXCEEDING THE JUDICIAL POWER
VESTED IN UNITED STATES COURTS UNDER
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION
In deciding Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967),
this Court construed Section 1983 to narrow its
sweepfinding an immunity which is inconsistent with
the face of the statute restraining every person.
Imbler at 417 (The statute thus creates a species of
tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities.);
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 US 158, 163 (1992). Clearer language
has likely never emerged from Congress. Id.
32
A.
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction
Construe An Unambiguous Statute
to
33
B.
Any Construction of The Civil Rights
Act Must Admit Congresss Remedial Intent
Congress adopted the language of Section 1983
from its criminal predecessorthe 1866 Civil Rights
Act, today codified at 18 U.S.C. 242. Monroe v. Pape,
365 U. S. 167 (1961).23 Section 1983 was introduced by
Ohio Representative Shellabarger, who explained his
bill on the House floor by referencing Section 2 of the
1866 Act: that section provides a criminal proceeding
in identically the same case as this one provides a civil
remedy for . . . 24 Section 1 of the 1871 Act (now
Section 1983) passed rapidly through Congress because
Congress recognized Section 1 as merely adding a
civil remedy to the 1866 Act, for which there is no
absolute immunity. United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S.
259, 266 (1997) (per curiam). The Acts thus must be
construed as in pari materiaany construction of the
1871 Act must admit congressional intent in enacting
the 1866 Act. Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d
240 (3rd Cir. 1945).
On that record it is incontrovertible that the 42nd
Congress affirmatively rejected common law judicial
immunity.
[T]he decisions of the county judges, who are made
little kings, with almost despotic powers to carry out
the demands of the legislature which elected thempowers which, almost without exception, have been
23
34
exercised against Republicans without regard to law
or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs,
outrageous violations, and evasions of the spirit of
the new constitution, unscrupulous malignity and
partisan hate never paralleled in the history of
parties in this country or any other.
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1871) (remarks
of Representative Platt).
What is to be the case of a judge? . . . Is that State
judge to be taken from his bench? Is he to be liable in
an action? ... It is the language of the bill: for there is
no limitation whatsoever on the terms that are
employed, and they are as comprehensive as can be
used.
(remarks of Senator Thurman).25
(1866) (remarks of Representative Lawrence). The
1866 Act was vetoed by President Johnson because it
abrogated common law judicial immunity.26 In the fight
to defeat the veto, Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Trumbull expressed revulsion at the entire
concept of judicial immunity: It is the very doctrine out
of which the rebellion was hatched.27
25
35
C.
Piersons Adoption of Tenney v.
Brandhove Was Startling Error
Instead of applying the unambiguous statute, Chief
Justice Warren in Pierson adopted analysis of
legislative privilege from Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.
S. 367 (1951), reading immunity into the statute
becausehe perceivedThe immunity of judges for
acts within the judicial role is equally well established
[as the speech and debate privilege], and we presume
that Congress would have specifically so provided had
it wished to abolish the doctrine. Pierson at 554-555
(1967).
In Tenney Justice Frankfurter aligned the English
speech liberty with the federal speech or debate
analog in the United States Constitution at Article I,
Sec. 6, cl. 1.28 Like Chief Justice Warren, Justice
Frankfurter presumedcontrary to the unambiguous
statute, and analyzing no legislative historythat the
42nd Congress would not have intended to limit any
states legislative activity in enacting the 1871 law
because Congress was itself a staunch advocate of
legislative freedom. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
Tenney also held the narrow immunity was lost if
there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested
in the Judiciary or the Executive. Id.
28
36
Yet judicial immunity is the opposite of legislative
privilegejudges are sovereigns possessing not
rights but delegated authority. While judges have all
the rights of any citizen qua a citizen, a judge qua judge
possesses no rights.
First and Fourteenth
Amendments restrain only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the States. United States v.
Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 621 (2000). The function of a
judge is to adjudicateapply the given law to properlyadmitted facts. Judges are not representatives of
voters, but radically independent of electoral will and
accountability. There is no need for a judge to express
opinions of her own or those she represents to create
lawshe is given law. Other than necessary for faithful
adjudication, a judges private freedom of conscience
is irrelevant to judicial function. Relevant conscience
is given in the form of law that has matured through
free debate elsewhere. County judges do not function
as a body, and (should) have no one to debate. The
framers of the United States and State of Minnesota
constitutions did not draft a judicial speech or debate
privilege because judges are not empowered to speak
or debate.
There is no need to protect a judges speech other
than to preserve ability to pronounce adjudication
merely a substantial state interest29 that must in all
cases yield to fundamental rights. There being no
judicial speech liberty in 1871, there is no reason to
presume that the 1871 Congress would have seen
need to expressly abrogate a tradition of immunity to
constitutional injury that has never existed.
29
37
D.
American Common Law Does
Not Support Judicial Immunity
This Court has commanded that courts considering
an officers affirmative defense of immunity must
examine the common law tradition. In Pierson Chief
justice Warren found that judicial immunity was at
least as well established as legislative privilege in 1871
without conducting any historical analysis of common
law, citing only Bradleys (post-Civil Rights Act)
holding and the Kings Bench case of Scott v.
Stansfield.30 Pierson at 554. Yet Bradley was decided
in 1872a year after Congress passed Section 1983.
Congress could not have had it in mind while debating
Section 1983.
Justice Fields articulation of immunity in Bradley
was innovativenot descriptive.31 Bradley rationalized
adopting the English sovereign immunity as good
policy. This provision of the law is not for the
protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge,
but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their
functions with independence, and without fear of
consequences.
Bradley at n. 16.
This policy
30
38
exhortation was an expansion from the more restrictive
rules analyzed in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U. S. 523
(1868): [Was] the act done a judicial act, done within
his
jurisdiction?
Randall at 531. Randall
acknowledged decisions which denied an absolute
immunity where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are
done maliciously or corruptly.
Moreover, every
authority cited in both Randall and Bradley is or
adopts foreign lawthe English sovereign immunity
rules imposed by an autocracy our nation fought wars
to become independent of. See, e.g., Randall, n. 14.32
Far from an intent to incorporate common an
English monarchical sovereign immunity rule, Congress
in passing the unambiguous Civil Rights Act
specifically intended to eliminate it as the source of the
monumental evil of state-sponsored oppression
jeopardizing our nations existence by precipitating
civil warfare.
Pierson was a startlingindeed
dangerousdeparture from principles settled at the
founding of our nation and cherished for centuries since.
Because the court of appeals extended immunity
relying on Piersons progeny, Stump, it decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but
should be, settled by this Court pursuant to Rule 10(c):
Whether this Court in Pierson exceeded its jurisdiction
under Article III, and invaded legislative power under
Article I, of the United States Constitution.
!
!
32
39
CONCLUSION
The Petition for certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,