JULY 1999 LAST OF THE DIVE BOMBERS en Ia er _S Py. pa best og ~e te" a one ee. oe AMAZING CAREER OF AERONAUT Pere Bhai 3 EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW NORWAY’S TOP ACE ~ [iauatumendll||| CZECH BATALOST IN TH BERMUDA E TRIANGLE A re-examination of the probable fate of five TBM Avengers that disappeared in the Bermuda Triangle during a routine training mission. By Ron Edwards v Jaree months after World War II ended, five military ‘planes took off rom Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Naval Air Station in Florida and vanished somewhere over the Atlantic in the area known as the Bermuda Triangle. For more than 60 years, military and eivilian experts have tried to find an explanation for their disappearance. On December 5, 1945, the Fort Lauderdale—Hollywood airport ‘was a bustling naval air station, where war-weary veterans \aited for their discharge papers, For servicemen on the sprawl. ing base, it was just another day of business as usual. ‘Marine Corporal Allen Kosner, Sergeant Robert Gallivan and. Private First Class Robert Gruchel had just eaten lunch and ‘were on their way back to the barracks. They were scheduled for an afternoon training flight but did not have to report for another hour, As the three Marines strolled from the mess hall they talked about their forthcoming holiday plans and decided ‘to attend the base theater that evening to see What Next, Cor- poral Hargrove? starring Robert Walker and Keenan Wynn, Tt was an exciting day for Robert Gallivan. Four years had passed since he had enlisted, and he had recently completed Above: A photo of torpedo bomber No. 28, the lead plarieof the Lost Squadron," taken on June 26, 1945, at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywoed Naval Air Station, The personnel shown didnot ‘yin the December § mission. Opposite: Six General Motors-built TEM Avengers commence their fateful light to oblivion, in a painting by Bob Jenny. 50 AVIATION HISTORY. JULY 1900 438 months of combat duty in the South Pacific. This day would ‘mark his last fight as an aerial gunner. He was scheduled to be discharged the next day and would be on his way home to Northamptos, Mass. Robert Grucbel was also in high spirits, even though he still hhad three more years before is enlistment expired, Gruebel was Fhappy just knowing he would soon be in the ai again. Although, his enthusiasm for lying was insatiable, Gruebel did not plan a career in aviation. Upon leaving the Marines he intended to become a priest, He had written his parents in Long Island, NY, tosay he would be home in time to attend Christmas Mass ‘The men rested in their rooms until it was time for thei pre- it briefing. As Allen Kosner rose from his bunk, he suddenly decided not to go on the mission, He had already logged his re quired monthly time and had no difficulty getting excused. Kosner could not have known that during the next few hours a sequence of strange events would take five airplanes and 14 men on a course to oblivion, ‘At pm. the offers and enlisted men of Fight 19 waited impatiently in the Operations building. Four pilots were being checked out that day in TBM Avenger bombers by an instructor who would be joining them on the light, while nine en- listed men were taking advanced combat airerew training, The takeoff was set for 1:45, but everyone knew they would not leave on time. Their instructor had not yet arrived, ‘The TBM Avenger earned a reputation rng Worl War I as the moc deadly torpedo bomber ever built, Avengers ha ‘vo designations, depending upon who ‘made them those constructed by Gram. man Aircraft Corporation were called ‘TBFs, and the General Motors version ‘was Known as the TBM. Regardless of which plant they came from, Avengers lived up to their name while operating from both land bases and aircraft carriers. They began service in the spring of 1942 and were responsible for sinking the Japanese battleship Yamato, hher escort of four destroyers and the cruiser Yohagi. ‘The Avenger’s wingspan was 54 feet. Ite Wright Cyclone R-2600 engine devel-‘This 1948 photograph of five Grumman TBF-1 Avengers—ohile not ‘the planes that actually disappeared in 1945—has frequently been used fo ilustrate accounts ofthe incident. ‘oped 1,600 horsepower, giving the plane a top speed dase to 300 tiles per hour for 1,000 miles, The Avenger carried one stan- dard torpedo or a 2,000-pound bomb. Armament included 50. caliber machine gun under the forward cowl and another in a Power-operated ball turret behind the cockpit. Bach plane had a three-man crew—pilot, gunner and radiomain. ‘Thoir instructor, Lieutenant Charles C. Taylor, arrived at the briefing room at 1:15 pm. and went to the duty officor Instead of offering an apology for being late, he asked to be relieved. ‘Taylor gave no reason other than saying, “T just don't want to take this one out." He was informed that no other instructors ‘were availabe, a Contrary to most accounts of Flight 19, it was not a patrol but a training fight, “Navigation Problem Number Ono The men ‘would leave Fort Lauderdale and fly a course of 091 degroes for 56 miles, then practice low-level bombing at Hens and. Chicken Shoals. ARerward, they would continue on the same course another 67 miles to complete the first leg. The second les. of the flight would take them 73 miles northwest, on a heading of 346 degrees. Finally, they would turn left to 241 degrocs, course that would bring them 120 miles back tothe air station, twas aroutine pattern, to be flown within the mysterious area mown as the Bermade Triangle. Flight 19 was supposed tobe the final hop forthe four pilots, who had already completed two similar exercises in the same area, Although they were students, all were qualified naval aviators, each with an average of 300 hours’ fight time, Lieutenant Taylor, 27, was a six-year Navy veteran with more than 2,000 hours in his logbook, After attending Texas A&M University, he had bocome an aviation cadet. Upon receiving his wings, he joined Air Group 7 aboard USS Hancock. In January 1946 Taylor became a flight instructor in Miami—relatively (2 AVIATION MISTORY JULY 1989 peaceful duty after serving 10 months fying combat missions in the South Paci ‘Thestudents analyzed weather charts and winds alof. Betwoen 8,000 and 4,000 feet, Flight 19 would find broken clouds with Visibility 8 to 10 miles. At 4 pum. they could expect scattered zain showers and thick clouds, Lieutenant Taylor was to lyin the lead plane, whose radio call sign was FI-28. With him were Walter R. Parpart and Sepia Svar Povey id, was fying PT.36 aptain Baward J, Powers, Jz, 26 years old, was fying FT: with Howell 0. Thompson and George R. Paonessa, Powers had entered the Marine Corps after graduating from Princeton, He was the only married man in Flight 19, Second Lieutenant Forrest J, Gerber, 24, would fly FPS with William E. Lightfoot. Gerber had received his commission and gold wings four months earlier (Allen Kosner would have flown in this plane had he not opted out.) Captain George W. Stivers would fly F-II7 with Robert F Gallivan and Robert F. Gruebel. The 25-yearold pilot had graduated from the US. Naval Academy, then served asa combat officer for two years inthe South Pacific before apply. ing for fight schoo. Ensign Joseph T Bossi was in FI'S with Herman A. Thelander and Burt E. Baluk Bossi had attended the University of Kansas bofore enlisting as an aviation cadet. He planned to be home ith his parents on Christmas Day—which would also be his 2st birthday. ‘Taylor took off at 2 pm. and 10 minutes later the other four ‘TBMs were in formation ese him. Despite a delay, Flight 19 ‘as finally on its way, carrying M men ona journey destined to end in one ofthe most balling mysteries of naval aviation, ‘At 2:80 they arrived over an area commonly known as Chicken Shoals, about 22 miles north of Bimini in the Bahamas. The pilots took turns making low-level passes and releasing ‘bombs on an old conerete hulk. ‘At 8:00 the fight left the target area to fly another 67 miles onthe same course and complete the firs leg. A fishing boat skip. per gazing skyward saw the planes heading east at that point. ‘He was apparently the lst person to see the ill ated fight. Lieutenant Robert . “Bob” Cox was fying over Fort Lauder- dale with a group of students 40 minutes later when he heard a signal that he thought was from a boat or plane in distress. A ‘oice was coming in on 4,805 kilocycles and talking to someone ‘named Powers. The anxious speaker provided no identification but repeatedly asked Powers what his compasses were show: ‘ng, then said, “We must have got lst ater that last turn." Five minutes later, Cox called Operations at Fort Lauderdale and told them what he had hoard. They aclmowledged and alerted Air Sea Rescue Task Unit 4 at Port Everglades ‘Lieutenant Cox then tried to find out who was in trouble, “This is FP-74," Cox radioed. “Plane or boat ealling Powers, please identify yourself so someone ean help you ‘There was no answer ‘At 405 radioman Rolland J. Koch, in Fort Lauderdale’ control tower, heard about the TBMS in trouble and sounded the alarm, Seven minutes later, Cox trod to contaet Taylor, Flight 19% in: structor “This is FT-74,*he radioed, “What is your trouble” He received no reply but kept trying to radio Tayloz ‘Taylor finally answered him at 4:21. “This is FE-28” Taylor said, “Both my compasses are out and Tm trying to find Fort Lauderdale, Tm over land, but is broken. I'm sure Tm in the Keys, bt I dont know how far down” Cox thought it odd that both of Taylors compasses should be cut ofcommission at the same time, and he was concerned about the nervous tone in Taylor's voice. “Put the sun on your port Heft wing if you're in the Keys and fly up the coast until you Bet to Miami,” Cox told him. “Then Fort Lauderdale is 20 milesfarther. What is your position? Il fly south and meet you.” ‘Taylor responded, ‘I know where I am now. I'm at 2,300 feet. Don't come after me.” “FT:28, Roger” Cox said. “You're at 2,300 feet. 'm coming to meet you anyhow” ‘Moments later, Taylor said, “We have just passed over a small island, We have no other land in sight.” Cox could not under- stand why Taylor was unable to see other islands as wel as the Florida peninsula if he was really over the Keys. ‘Taylor called again, “Can you have Miami or someone turn on their radar and pick us up?” he asked Cox. “We don't seem ‘tm be getting far. We were out on a navigation hop, and on the second leg I thought they were going wrong. I took over and was flying them back to the right position. But I'm sure that neither ‘one of my compasses is working.” “Turn on your emergency IFF gear, or do you have it on?" Cox radioed. The Identification Friend or Foe transponder was used by ground stations to identify aircraft. Taylor said he did not have his IFF on. Cox suggested he use his ZBX homing receiver, but he reveived no answer. Cox passed along Taylor's request for assistance to radar sta- tions in the area. Merchant vessels were alerted to the situa- tion, and the Coast Guard prepared to launch search aircraft. ‘The control tower at Fort Lauderdale never maintained radio contact with overwater flights but could monitor the pilots’ eon- Tate in the afternoon of December 5, to Martin PEM Mariner fin boats similar fo this one took of rom Banana River Naval Air Staton to search fr the missing planes Searten aboard the tanker Gaines Mil su one ofthe Mariners explode and crash into the sea 28 minutes later. versations. All radio contact with the lost TBMs was handled by AirSea Rescue Task Unit 4 at Port Everglades, about a mile from the naval air station. ‘At 425 Stivers, in FT-17, radiood: “We are not sure where \weare. We think we must be 225 miles east of base There were afew seconds of static, and then he continued, “It looks like we are entering white water” “We're eampletaly los,” another Flight 19 pilot radioed. ‘At 4:28 Cox called Taylor again. He received no reply but heard Taylor and his students discussing their estimated posi- tion and compass problems. ‘Taylor was ignoring all of the standard procedures that were drummed into students during classroom lectures throughout the course. In ease of disorientation, a pilot was supposed to ‘tumon the IFF, climb for altitude, and try to pick up the homing transmitter from the air station. He would tune to 3,000 kilo- cycles. Ihe was over water he was supposed to fly ward the west; ifhe was over land, he was to fly east. (Cox then began to have problems of his own. A relay burned cout in his radio, and he was no longer able to communicate with fanyone, He tried all frequencies but heard only silence as he banked his plane toward the ar station. ‘After landing, he went tothe duty officer to report on the war- risome situation. “I know where the planes are,” Cox said, "Td like to take the ready-plane ont and lead them back to base.” JULY 1999 AVIATION HISTORY 63Diration finding stations could no pinpoint the exe cation of Flight 1 They obtained a single bearing fat 5:50 pm, ut twas so impreca thatthe plans could have bench within the 10 aie radius representa bythe cn “Very defintely no” said Lt. Cmdr Don Poole, who was expost= ‘nga postion fix onthe TBMs, He told Cox to wait. Unfortunately the fix was delayed, and the ready-plane never left the ground Radioman Melvin Beker and two assistants were on duty at Air Sea Rescue Task Unit 4. They had been monitoring oon: Yersations from Flight 19 since the first indication of trouble, At5:07 Baker heard Taylor tell his students: ‘All planos in this flight join up in close formation. Let's turn and fy east. We are {Going too far north instead of east.” ‘Two students objected to the course change. “If we'd just fly ‘west, we would get home,” sad one pilot. “Head west, dammit!” said another exasperated airman. ‘Still unsure ofhis location, Taylor remained on his eastbound heading for only eight minutes, then called Port Everglades at, 5:5. “Treeive you very weak” sid Taylor “We are now flying 270 degroes. We will fly 270 until we hit the beach or run out of gas” ‘Baker urged Taylor to change to 3,000 kilocyeles, the emer- gency channel, but Taylor said he must keep his planes together and could not change frequencies. Communications on 3,000 [iloeyeles were lear and staticreo, while signals on 4805 kilo- cycles were weak and garbled. ‘When Flight 19 had less than two hours’ flying time until the planes exhausted their fuel supplies, Taylor deseribed a lange ssland he had just seen during a break inthe cloud cover Baker vas sure the Avengers were over Andres Island, the largest in the Bahamas. Baker gave Taylor a heading that would take him te Fort Lauderdale. Once Flight 19 assumed the new course, ‘Taylor's voiee kept coming in stronger over the radio as the ‘TBMs approached Florida. But after flying his western heading for a few minutes, Taylor suddenly changed his mind again at 609, For some reason, he 4 AVIATION HISTORY JULY 1900 id not believe he was going in the right direction, Tt was apparently at this time the instructor made a decision that would seal Flight 19% fate, Taylor told Powers in FTE36: “We didn't go far enough east, Turn ‘around again and go east. We should have a better chanoo of being picked up loser to shore.” ‘Taylor was so confused that he sil ould not decide ether he was over the Gulf of Mexico or the At- antic Ocean. He erroneously concluded he was over the Gulf Tuylor’s transmissions bogan to weaken as ho continued flying eastward, out of radio range. Radioman Baker heard Taylor say: ‘All planes, close up tight, Will have to ditch unless landfall ‘When the first plane drops to 10 gallons, we all go down together” Later analysis revealed that one of the pilots in Flight 19 apparently realized an eastbound heading would only take them farther out to sea, That man— itis unclear which one—defied regulations, broke away from the formation and started flying west toward the enast. ‘The network of direetion-finding stations finally obtained a reliable single-bearing fix on Flight 19 at 5:50 pm. But two bearings were needed to pin- point the Avengers. Two PBM Mariner seaplanes ‘were sent to investigate the area where Flight 19 might be found. One of the PBMs exploded and crashed 23 minutes after takeoff, kiling all 13 men aboard. Merchant seamen on the oil tanker Gaines Mill saw the Mariner explode and fall into the soa, Confirmation of this unfortunate accident came from radar operators aboard the aireraft carrier USS Solomons. They looked for survivors but found only ‘twisted debris in the rough seas. There was no ex- tensive investigation of the explosion. ‘What caused the PBM to explode in midair? Some have speculated it was a crewmen smoking tobacco. Anyone a signed to PBMs was aware that the nickname for the Mariner ‘Was “the flying gas tank.” Smoking restrictions were posted in all PBMs and as a rule were strictly enforced. But it i possible ‘that a crewman ignored the regulations. Ifthe planes of Flight 19 ditched at sea on that night, they faced nearly insuperable ‘dds. The weather conditions were against them. It was a cloudy, dark, moonless night. The merchant ship Viscount Empire re. ported “tremendous seas and winds of high velocity” At 7.04 the tower at Opa Locka picked up a faint transmis- sion: “FT...PT....”Tt was part of the callsign used by Flight 19, and it seemed to be coming from one of the lost pilots. It was ‘the last message received from the doomed flight, AA rescue boat patrolling the waters off Miami called Port Everglades at 8:13 and said they had boen unable to contact the ‘missing planes, They were told to secure for the night. The Avengers’ fuel supply would have been exhausted at § o'dlock. Just before midnight, Joan Powers, the wife of Captain Edward Powers, who had been piloting FT'36, avwoko in her apartment in Mount Vernon, N.Y, suddenly overeome by an overpowering fear that something terrible had happened to her husband, Unable to shake her fea, she called the operations of ficer at Fort Lauderdale, asking to speak to her husband. She ‘was told he eould not be reached. Amassive search effort was launched the following morning. Searchers based their efforts on the direction finding fix as well as the maximum distance the planes could have flown before they ran out of fuel. Search operations continued for five days and included the whole state of Florida, extending north into Georgia and south, ‘through the Keys. More than 200,000 square miles of the At-F ocean wore crisscrossed by searchers, as wells the Gulf Facets enc ofthe Avene BF sical hearing was ordered by Fr Forrestal, and a board of saber 10, 1945. The board mem ‘completely Fri, soemed inconceivable that a highly experienced Be tor such as Charles Taylor could lose a grip on his Band become so confused that he was unable to rer F-if and lead his flight back to Fort Lauderdale. The board luded, “The five TBMs and naval personnel disappeared F vof causes or reasons unknown after having taken off on ne navigational fight out of Fort Lauderdale on 5 De Fier 1945. ‘Navy Department offered no explanation for Fight 19% ippearance or the fate of the 14 men aboard the TBMs, esti at the hearing provided some interesting facts BF should be subjected to further scrutiny. An incredible string jpusual coineidences had taken place on the afternoon o ber 5. ht 19 was Lieutenant Taylors a at Fort Lavderdale. He had been transferred érom Miami ick of aviation experience in played a part in the tragedy? cue effort throughout tion between Florida ‘And communica Biidor observers aboard the escort carrer USS Solomons, shown h Biearea in h arrier'® crew saa confirmed the de tions were further impeded because transmissions from Cuban b ations interfered with reception. "After Flight 19 tumed onto the second leg ofthe fight, weather played a eruel trick onthe unsuspecting pilots. A secondary cod front was sweeping across the Florida mainland, bringing heavy clouds, rain showers and gusty winds. Conditions had clearly changed in the interval since Taylors preflight briefing. Both of Taylor's re probably working perfect. He was compensating for winds of 30 to 40 mp, but his TBM was facing winds up to 87 mph. Probably beeause of the strong headwinds, he turned onto the third leg before he erased the checkpoint. When he failed to arrive at Fort Lauderdale at the ‘expected time, he decided that his compasses were fault ‘Pethaps the most critical setback in the search process for the vanished flight was the mysterious failure of the Air Sea Rescue—Gulf Sea Frontier teletype syste search facilities were foreed to use telephones for s persing information, and congested lines hindered communi tions during that critical period. One soarch plane, a Consolidated PBY Catalina investigating the single-bearing fix ares, might; Ihave been able to establish contact with Taylor had it not suf- fered complete radio failure when its antenna iced up. ‘Why was radar unable to find the missing plan mander Ray Crandell said atthe time that al the radar equip- ‘ment was “for training use only, and is limited in its range to ‘the immediate vicinity. Its ofno value for oft shore operations While Taylor was facing a difficalt situation somewhere over the Atlantic that afternoon, another fight that had taken off from the same base on the same miscion—Navigation Problem ‘Number One—completed the task without problems. Flight 18, led by Lioutenant Willard L. Stoll, had doparted at 1:45—only ‘minutes before Taylor took off Both fights encountered the ion ofthe Martin Mariner and hastened to isin the rough JULY 1999, AVIATION HISTORY. 56‘A Consolidated PBY Coalina departed Dinner Rey Naval Air Staton to onthe earch of the single-earing fare, but experienced radio failure when its andenna iced up. same weather conditions and were using the same radio fre- quency. But Flight 18 returned to the air station without inci dent. It was a coincidence that investigators find interesting as well as confusing. In addition tothe coincidental circumstances brought out in the hearing, there are some serious questions that should have been considered in any investigation into the ultimate fate of Flight 19. Since Lieutenant Stoll was able to compensate for the Weather changes and bring Flight 18 home safely, why did Flight 19 have more problems with the weather? One possible answer may lie in Lieutenant Taylor's mental state, Why did Charles Taylor not want to fly the mission? And what isthe sig- nificance of his eryptic remark at the briefing: "just don't want {take this one out”? What caused Taylor's confusion? During the entire flight the instructor's judgment was ap- parently adversely affected. He was eventually overwhelmed With confusion. The available evidence suggests that his actions that afternoon were contrary to everything he knew he should have ne According to his roommate, Taylor was very upsetoveraleter he had received just before the fight was scheduled to depart. ‘Taylor apparently said nothing to anyone about the contents of the letter. He just shoved it into his pocket and took it with him (on Flight 19, t seems likely thatthe leter may have contributed {o Taylors anxiety and lack of concentration during the flight, Radioman Baker at Port Everglades was unable to convince the bewildered fight leader he was over the Atlantic Ocean not the Keys or Gulf of Mexico, Taylors apprehension seemed to be greater than his students. But they eould not persuade ‘him to fly west. ‘What happened to the one pilot who left the formation and flew toward the air station? Boker never heard from him again, and he never reached the Florida coast. ‘Noone can explain why Taylor or any of the other pilots failed to use their radio homing devices, which could have guided them to the air station, The base transmitter was working all afternoon, and each TBM had a receiver, Taylor refused to 50 AVIATION HISTORY JULY 2909 change to 3,000 kilcyctes, saying that he needed to concentrate on keeping his planes together. That was an illogical excuse, however, because each of the 'TBMs could have switched to the emer. ‘gency frequency, which was free of static and other interference. ‘Many accounts of Flight 196 final mis- sion have daimed that Allen Kosner, who opted out of the mission, had a premoni- tion of disaster. Actually, Kosner denied any ominous feelings about the hop. "I just decided I didn’t want to fly that da.” he said when asked about his reasons, “and told the scheduler in Operations to find another man.” Other airerewmen ‘were available to flyin Kosner’s place, but none was assigned. Why did the board of investigation's report remain classified for more than three decades? Some have argued that the Navy wanted to conceal certain facts showing that Fight 19 had been captured or destroyed by extraterrestrals, A more logical reason surfaced when the official report of the investigators finally became available to the public. ‘The secrecy surrounding Flight 19 may have been the result ofan attempt to con eal the inefficiency evidenced by rescue units when the flight disappeared. During the search, Captain J.D. Morrison, an Eastorn Airlines pilot, saw red flares rising into the hight sky while fying 10 niles south of Melbourne, Fla. The airline pilot knew that they were coming from a smal island, of which there were hundreds in that area, Captain Morrison agreed to lead a team tothe site, where he witnessed the Navy's procedure for a ‘carefil search of the area” A careful search consisted ofa single helicopter that flew three passes over one island that was surrounded by ‘marshy terrain, No ground units were involved in the effort, and the thick marshes could have easily prevented searchers from locating any of the airmen who might have crashed in that, area especially if they were unconscious or unable to signal for help. The board criticized the individuals who had been in charge of search operations—commentary that ultimately re- sulted in the demotion of several high-ranking officers, includ ing one admiral No one really knows where or how the planes and airmen of Flight 19 finally ended their journey that fatefal Wednosday afternoon. Over the years, a Variety of theories have been pro. Posed to explain their disappearance—some fanciful and somo based on factual evidence. Perhaps, as some contend, they flew into another dimension or encountered electromagnetic anomalies. Maybe the TBMs ‘went down as a result of structural failure—or because of human, error in calculating their location. Perhaps the pilots eneoun- tered vicious weather. It is not unreasonable to believe the five TTBMs simply flew until they ran out of fuel and then tried to ditch in a stormy sea on a moonless night. Ifso, the Avengers today aro where they have been for more than 50 years—resting serenely on the sandy carpet ofthe Atlantic Ocean, 0 ea of be Amati Ocean. Ron Edwards isa former airline pilot who writes from Phoenix, Ariz, For further reading, he suggests: The Bermuda Triangle ‘Mystery Solved and The Disappearance of Flight 19, both by Larry Kusche,