Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Labor Law 1
ISSUES
1. WON the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the complaint
filed by the employees of BBGMI
2. WON the auction sales conducted by the said Special Sheriff
are valid
HELD
1. YES
- The subject labor standards case of the petition arose from the
visitorial and enforcement powers by the Regional Director of
DOLE.
- Labor standards refers to the minimum requirements
prescribed by existing laws, rules and regulations relating to
wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other
monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety
and health standards. Labor standards cases are governed by
Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.
- Even in the absence of E.O. 111 , Regional Directors already
had enforcement powers over money claims, effective under
P.D. 850, issued on December 16, 1975, which transferred labor
standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement
system.
- E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three(3)
months after the promulgation of the Secretary of Labor's
decision upholding private respondents' salary differentials and
ECOLAs on September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial
and enforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128(b))
by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy
Instructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to
resolve uncontested money claims in cases where an employeremployee relationship still exists. This intention must be given
weight and entitled to great respect.
- The Court would have ruled differently had the petitioner
shown that subject labor standards case is within the purview of
the exception clause in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code. Said
provision requires the concurrence of the following elements in
order to divest the Regional Director or his representatives of
jurisdiction, to wit: (a) that the petitioner (employer) contests the
findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues
thereon; (b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need
to examine evidentiary matters; and (c) that such matters are
not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
- Petitioner's refusal to allow the Labor Standards and Welfare
Officers to conduct inspection in the premises of their head
office and the failure to file their position paper is equivalent to a
waiver of its right to contest the claims of the employees.
- This involves a labor standards case and it is in keeping with
the law that "the worker need not litigate to get what legally
belongs to him, for the whole enforcement machinery of the
Department of Labor exists to insure its expeditious delivery to
him free of charge.
- The present law, RA 7730, can be considered a curative statute
to reinforce the conclusion that the Regional Director has
jurisdiction over the present labor standards case.
2. NO
- As a general rule, findings of fact and conclusion of law arrived
at by quasi-judicial agencies are not to be disturbed absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion tainting the same.
- There was grave abuse of discretion when the Undersec,
without any evidentiary support, adjudged such prices as
"scandalously low". He merely relied on the self-serving
assertion by the petitioner that the value of the auctioned
properties was more than the price bid.
- The sales are null and void since on the properties of petitioner
involved was constituted a mortgage between petitioner and the
Development Bank of the Philippines
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FACTS
- Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized primarily for the
purpose of engaging in real estate business. On December 1,
1952, it started doing business with only six (6) employees.
- January 28, 1957: petitioner entered into a contract of
management with one Eufracio D. Rojas for the operation and
exploitation of the forest concession. The logging operation
actually started on April 1, 1957 with four monthly-salaried
employees. As of September 1, 1957, petitioner had 89
employees and laborers in the logging operation.
- December 26, 1957: petitioner revoked its contract of
management with Mr. Rojas.
- August 1, 1958: petitioner became a member of the
Social Security System with respect to its real estate
business. On September 6, 1958, petitioner remitted to
the System the sum of P203.13 representing the initial
premium on the monthly salaries of the employees in its
logging business.
- October 9, 1958: petitioner demanded the refund of the
said amount.
- On November 10, 1958, petitioner filed a petition with the
Social Security Commission praying for the determination of the
effectivity date of the compulsory coverage of petitioner's
logging business.
- January 14, 1960: the instant petition was denied and petitioner
was adjudged to be subject to compulsory coverage as Sept. 1,
1957 and the Social Security System was directed to effect such
coverage of petitioner's employees in its logging and real estate
business conformably to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1161, as
amended.
- Petitioners Claim
CMS Estate, Inc. is not yet subject to compulsory coverage with
respect to its logging business because it does not have the
minimum required number of employees (per company).
- Respondents Comments
The logging business was a mere expansion of petitioner's
activities and for purposes of the Social Security Act, petitioner
should be considered a member of the System since December
1, 1952 when it commenced its real estate business.
ISSUES
1. WON the contributions required of employers and employees
under our Social Security Act of 1954 are obligatory because the
said Act was allegedly enacted by Congress in the exercise of
the police power of the State, not of its taxing power
2. WON a contractee-independent contractor relationship existed
between petitioner and Eufracio Rojas. during the time that he
was operating its forest concession at Baganga, Davao
3. WON Section 9 of the Social Security Act on the question of
compulsory membership and employers should be given a liberal
interpretation
HELD
1. Ratio The said enactment implements the general welfare
mandate of the Constitution and constitutes a legitimate
exercise of the police power of the State.
Reasoning
- The Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the policy of
the government "to develop, establish gradually and
perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to
the needs of the people throughout the Philippines, and
shall provide protection against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death" (Sec. 2, RA 1161, as amended).
- Membership in the SSS is not a result of bilateral,
concensual agreement where the rights and obligations
of the parties are defined by and subject to their will, RA
1161 requires compulsory coverage of employees and
employers under the System. It is actually a legal imposition on
said employers and employees, designed to provide social
security to the workingmen. The principle of non-impairment of
the obligation of contract as provided in the Bill of Rights is not a
proper defense, the enactment being a lawful exercise of the
police power of the State.
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HELD
1. YES
Ratio It must be noted that both parties admit the existence of
said MOA and that they have voluntarily entered into said
agreement. Furthermore, neither of the parties deny that the 61
employees have indeed been regularized by private respondent.
The MOA, being a contract freely entered into by the parties,
now constitutes as the law between them, and the interpretation
of its contents purely involves an evaluation of the law as
applied to the facts herein. It is the contention of petitioner that
the date 1 December 1998 refers to the effective date of
regularization of said employees, while private respondent
maintains that said date is merely the reckoning date from which
the one year employment requirement shall be computed. We
agree with petitioner. It is logically absurd that the company will
only begin to extend priority to these employees on a date that
has already passed, when in fact they have already extended
priority to these employees by agreeing to the contents of the
MOA and signing said agreement. It is erroneous for the NLRC to
conclude that extending to them the benefits of the MOA would
NATURE
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
dismissing petitioners complaint against private respondent
FACTS
- On 30 June 1998, the CBA for the years 1995-1998 executed
between petitioner union and private respondent company
expired. Petitioner submitted its demands to the company for
another round of collective bargaining negotiations. Said
negotiations came to a gridlock as the parties failed to reach a
mutually acceptable agreement with respect to certain economic
and non-economic issues.
ISSUES
1. WON the regularization of the 61 employees was effective
December 1, 1998
2. WON the closure of the plants was legal
Labor Law 1
violate the principle of "no-work-no-pay" as they are actually
rendering service to the company even before 1 December
1998, and continued to do so thereafter. Moreover, under Article
280 of the Labor Code, any employee who has rendered at least
one year of service, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists. Also, under
the law, a casual employee is only casual for one year, and it is
the passage of time that gives him a regular status. Even if we
were to follow private respondents contention that the date 1
December 1998 provided in the MOA is merely a reckoning date
to determine who among the non-regular employees have
rendered one year of service as of said date, all those who have
been with the company for one year by said date must
automatically be considered regular employees by operation of
law.
2. YES
Ratio The characterization of the employees service as no
longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly
terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of
the employer. The wisdom or soundness of such characterizing
or decision is not subject to discretionary review on the part of
the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation
of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown. The
private respondents decision to close the plant was a result of a
study conducted which established that the most prudent course
of action for the private respondent was to stop operations in
said plants and transfer production to other more modern and
technologically advanced plants of private respondent. The
subject closure and the resulting termination of the 639
employees was due to legitimate business considerations, as
evidenced by the technical study conducted by private
respondent.
Disposition The assailed Decisions are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The 61 subject employees are hereby declared
regular employees as of 1 December 1998 and are entitled to
the benefits provided for in the Memorandum of Agreement.
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quoted San Miguel decision on February 24, 1981, when
petitioner purportedly "discovered" its mistake. From 1975 to
1981, petitioner had freely, voluntarily and continuously
included in the computation of its employees' thirteenth
month pay, the payments for sick, vacation and
maternity leaves, premiums for work done on rest days
and special holidays, and pay for regular holidays. The
considerable length of time the questioned items had
been included by petitioner indicates a unilateral and
voluntary act on its part, sufficient in itself to negate any
claim of mistake.
- A company practice favorable to the employees had indeed
been established and the payments made pursuant thereto,
ripened into benefits enjoyed by them. And any benefit and
supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced,
diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, by
virtue of Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
P.D. No. 851, and Article 100 of the labor of the Philippines,
which prohibit the diminution or elimination by the employer of
the employees' existing benefits (Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr., 122
SCRA 267, [1983]).
2. Petitioner cannot invoke the principle of solutio indebiti which
as a civil law concept that is not applicable in Labor Law.
Besides, in solutio indebiti, the obligee is required to return to
the obligor whatever he received from the latter (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Arts. 2154 and 2155). Petitioner in the instant
case, does not demand the return of what it paid respondent
ALU from 1975 until 1981; it merely wants to "rectify" the error it
made over these years by excluding unilaterally from the
thirteenth month pay in 1982 the items subject of litigation.
Solutio indebiti, therefore, is not applicable to the instant case.
Disposition finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the questioned
decision of respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED
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There was a meaningful implementation of WO#01 and #02.
SMs contention on the issue of wage distortion and the resulting
allegation of discrimination against the TFM's employees are
anchored on its dubious position that TFM's promise to grant an
across-the-board increase in government-mandated salary
benefits reflected in the Minutes of the negotiation is an
enforceable part of the CBA.
Disposition NLRC resolutions affirmed. Petition dismissed.
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signing of this AGREEMENT, the Management is willing to give
the following increases, to wit:
July 1, 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . P20.00 per day per employee
July 1, 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . P25.00 per day per employee
July 1, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . P30.00 per day per employee
- The difference of the first year adjustment to retroact to July 1,
1999.
- The across-the-board wage increase for the 4th and 5th year of
this AGREEMENT shall be subject for a re-opening or
renegotiation as provided for by Republic Act No. 6715.
- On October 14, 1999, Wage Order No. NCR-07 was issued, and
on October 26, 1999, its Implementing Rules and Regulations. It
provided for a P25.50 per day increase in the salary of
employees receiving the minimum wage and increased the
minimum wage to P223.50 per day. Petitioner paid the P25.50
per day increase to all of its rank-and-file employees.
- On July 1, 2000, the rank-and-file employees were granted the
second year increase provided in the CBA in the amount of
P25.00 per day.
- On November 1, 2000, Wage Order No. NCR-08 took effect.
Section 1 thereof provides:
Section 1. Upon the effectivity of this Wage Order, private sector
workers and employees in the National Capital Region receiving
the prescribed daily minimum wage rate of P223.50 shall receive
an increase of TWENTY SIX PESOS and FIFTY CENTAVOS (P26.50)
per day, thereby setting the new minimum wage rate in the
National Capital Region at TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P250.00) per day.
- Then Union president Lucenio Brin requested petitioner to
implement the increase under Wage Order No. NCR-08 in favor
of the companys rank-and-file employees. Petitioner rejected
the request, claiming that since none of the employees were
receiving a daily salary rate lower than P250.00 and there was
no wage distortion, it was not obliged to grant the wage
increase.
- The Union elevated the matter to the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board. When the parties failed to settle, they agreed
to refer the case to voluntary arbitration.
- The Union alleged that it has been the companys practice to
grant a wage increase under a government-issued wage order,
aside from the yearly wage increases in the CBA.
- Petitioner alleged that there is no such company practice and
that it complied with the previous wage orders (Wage Order Nos.
NCR-01-05) because some of its employees were receiving
wages below the minimum prescribed under said orders. As for
Wage Order No. NCR-07, petitioner alleged that its compliance
was in accordance with its verbal commitment to the Union
during the CBA negotiations that it would implement any wage
order issued in 1999.
- On June 6, 2001, the VA rendered judgment in favor of the
company and ordered the case dismissed.
- The Union filed a petition for review with the CA. On September
23, 2004, the CA rendered judgment in favor of the Union and
reversed that of the VA. But the findings of the CA were
grounded on the CBA and not on the issue of past practices.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner is obliged to grant wage increase under
Wage Order No. NCR-08 as a matter of practice
HELD
Ratio To ripen into a company practice that is demandable as a
matter of right, the giving of the increase should not be by
reason of a strict legal or contractual obligation, but by reason of
an act of liberality on the part of the employer.
Reasoning
- The only instance when petitioner admittedly implemented a
wage order despite the fact that the employees were not
receiving salaries below the minimum wage was under Wage
Order No. NCR-07. Petitioner, however, explains that it did so
because it was agreed upon in the CBA that should a wage
increase be ordered within six months from its signing, petitioner
would give the increase to the employees in addition to the CBAmandated increases. Respondents isolated act could hardly be
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Labor Law 1
of P1,507,736.79 representing 90% of the total loss of
P1,675,263.10 incurred by the petitioner Bank.
- However, in view of his resignation and considering the years
of service in the petitioner Bank, the management earmarked
only P836,637.08 from the respondents total separation benefits
or pay.
- In the Letter dated May 26, 1997 addressed to B, Remedios
Cruz, CBanks VP of the HR Division, again informed him that the
management would withhold the sum of P836,637.08 from his
separation pay, mid-year bonus and profit sharing.
- The said amount would be released upon recovery of the sums
demanded from Maniwan in Civil Case No. 97174 filed against
him by CBank with the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City.
- Consequently, the B, through counsel, made a demand on the
CBank for the payment of his separation pay and other benefits.
- The CBank maintained its position to withhold the sum of
P836,637.08.
- B filed with the NLRC, the complaint for payment of separation
pay, mid-year bonus, profit share and damages against the
petitioner Bank.
- The Labor Arbiter (LA)-dismissed the Bs complaint, for B had
committed a serious infraction when, in blatant violation of the
banks SOP and policies, he approved the DAUD/BP
accommodations in favor of Maniwan without authorization by
senior management. B even had admitted this breach in the
letters that he wrote to the senior officers of CBank.
- LA- made the finding that B offered to assign or convey a
property that he owned to CBank, as well as proposed the
withholding of the benefits due him to answer for the losses that
the petitioner Bank incurred on account of unauthorized
DAUD/BP accommodations.
- LA also held that CBanks act of withholding the benefits due
the respondent was justified under its Code of Ethics and that B
as an officer of the CBank, was bound by the provisions of the
said Code.
- B appealed to the NLRC.
- NLRC- affirmed in toto the findings and conclusions of the LA.
And ruled that the LA committed no grave abuse of discretion
when he decided the case on the basis of the position papers
submitted by the parties.
- B file a MR but the NLRC denied his motion. So he filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA.
- CA -set aside the decision of the NLRC and ordered that the
records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further
hearings on the factual issues involved.
- CBank filed a MR but the CA denied as it found no compelling
ground to warrant reconsideration.
ISSUES
Procedural
WON the CA erred in remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter/
WON Bs right to due process was violated by CBank since no
administrative investigation was conducted prior to the
withholding of his separation benefits
Substantive
WON B pledged his benefits as guarantee for the losses the bank
incurred
resulting
from
the
unauthorized
DAUD/BP
accommodations in favor of Maniwan/
WON CBank could impose the penalty of restitution against B
HELD
Procedural
YES, CA committed reversible error/
NO, No formal administrative investigation was necessary
Reasoning
- It is settled that administrative bodies like the NLRC, including
the Labor Arbiter, are not bound by the technical niceties of the
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law.
- Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC, where decisions may
be reached on the basis of position papers.
- The holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the
Labor Arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand
as a matter of right.
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Labor Law 1
- CBanks business is essentially imbued with public interest and
owes great fidelity to the public it deals with.
- It is expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
- As a corollary, and like all other business enterprises, its
prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose
appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company
rules and regulations must be respected.
- DAYAN v BPI ~ The law, in protecting the rights of labor,
authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an
employer company which itself is possessed of rights that must
be entitled to recognition and respect
Disposition
Petition is GRANTED. CAS DECISION AND
RESOLUTION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. NLRCS DECISION,
affirming that of the Labor Arbiter, is REINSTATED.
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without the rate adjustment called for Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6
being implemented. By the time of the filing of respondent's
Complaint, the rate adjustment payable by defendant amounted
to P462,346.25. Plaintiff opposed the Complaint.
- The trial court decided in favor of the respondent. Plaintiffs
MOR was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2. WON petitioner is liable to the private respondent for the
wage adjustments provided under Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 and
for attorney's fees
HELD
1. YES
- The enforcement of the written contract does not fall under the
jurisdiction of the NLRC because the money claims involved
therein did not arise from employer-employee relations between
the parties and is intrinsically a civil dispute. Thus, jurisdiction
lies with the regular courts. The RTC has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the present case. It is well settled in law and
jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship
exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may
be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes
or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial
Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is
not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment
of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's
alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard Service
Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence
jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While
the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws,
reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the
solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no
employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of the Labor Code
as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original
jurisdiction only over the following:
1.
Unfair labor practices;
2.
Termination disputes;
3.
If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those
cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4.
Claims for actual, moral exemplary and other form of
damages arising from employer-employee relations;
5.
Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this
Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and
lockouts; and
6.
Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social
Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other
claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household
service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
- In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an
indispensable jurisdictional requisite; and there is none in this
case.
2.
Private respondent admits that there is no employeremployee relationship between it and the petitioner. The private
respondent is an independent/job contractor1 who assigned
security guards at the petitioner's premises for a stipulated
amount per guard per month. The Contract of Security Services
expressly stipulated that the security guards are employees of
the Agency and not of the petitioner. Articles 106 and 107 of the
Labor Code provides the rule governing the payment of wages of
employees in the event that the contractor fails to pay such
wages1.
1
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VILLAMARIA, JR. V CA
liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the
work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable
to employees directly employed by him.
Art. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article
shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which,
not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the
performance of any work, task, job or project.
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the
obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose
which offer to accept.
He who made payment may claim from his codebtors only the share which
corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made. If the
payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period
may be demanded. . . .
Labor Law 1
CALLEJO, SR.; April 19, 2006
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA which
set aside the Resolution of the NLRC which in turn affirmed the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint filed by
respondent Bustamante.
FACTS
- Petitioner Oscar Villamaria, Jr. was the owner of Villamaria
Motors, a sole proprietorship engaged in assembling passenger
jeepneys with a public utility franchise to operate along the
Baclaran-Sucat route. By 1995, Villamaria stopped assembling
jeepneys and retained only nine, four of which he operated by
employing drivers on a boundary basis. One of those drivers
was respondent. Bustamante remitted P450 a day to Villamaria
as boundary and kept the residue of his daily earnings as
compensation for driving the vehicle. In August 1997, Villamaria
verbally agreed to sell the jeepney to Bustamante under the
boundary-hulog scheme, where Bustamante would remit to
Villarama P550 a day for a period of 4 years; Bustamante would
then become the owner of the vehicle and continue to drive the
same under Villamarias franchise. It was also agreed that
Bustamante would make a downpayment of P10,000.
- On August 7, 1997, Villamaria executed a contract entitled
Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Sasakyan sa Pamamagitan ng
Boundary-Hulog over the passenger jeepney. The parties
agreed that if Bustamante failed to pay the boundary-hulog for 3
days, Villamaria Motors would hold on to the vehicle until
Bustamante paid his arrears, including a penalty of P50 a day; in
case Bustamante failed to remit the daily boundary-hulog for a
period of one week, the Kasunduan would cease to have legal
effect and Bustamante would have to return the vehicle to
Villamaria Motors.
- Bustamante continued driving the jeepney under the
supervision and control of Villamaria. As agreed upon, he made
daily remittances of P550 in payment of the purchase price of
the vehicle. Bustamante failed to pay for the annual registration
fees of the vehicle, but Villamaria allowed him to continue
driving the jeepney.
- In 1999, Bustamante and other drivers who also had the same
arrangement with Villamaria Motors failed to pay their
respective boundary-hulog. This prompted Villamaria to serve a
Paalala, reminding them that under the Kasunduan, failure to
pay the daily boundary-hulog for one week, would mean their
respective jeepneys would be returned to him without any
complaints. He warned the drivers that the Kasunduan would
henceforth be strictly enforced and urged them to comply with
their obligation to avoid litigation. On July 24, 2000, Villamaria
took back the jeepney driven by Bustamante and barred the
latter from driving the vehicle.
- Bustamante filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against
Villamaria and his wife Teresita. He narrated that in July 2000,
he informed the Villamaria spouses that the surplus engine of
the jeepney needed to be replaced, and was assured that it
would be done. However, he was later arrested and his drivers
license was confiscated because apparently, the replacement
engine that was installed was taken from a stolen vehicle. He
was no longer allowed to drive the vehicle unless he paid them
P70,000.
ISSUES
1. WON the existence of a boundary-hulog agreement negates
the employer-employee relationship between the vendor and
vendee
2. As a corollary, WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over a
complaint for illegal dismissal in such a case
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Under the boundary-hulog scheme, a dual juridical
relationship is created: that of employer-employee and vendorvendee. The Kasunduan did not extinguish the employer-
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ANINO V NLRC
PANGANIBAN; May 21, 1998
Labor Law 1
NATURE
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
FACTS
- Complainants are supervisors of Hinatuan Mining Corporation
(HMC) who planned the formation of a supervisors union. The
HINATUAN MINING SUPERVISORY UNION was formally organized
and registered with the DOLE. Complainants Anino, Navarro,
Daug-daug and Filoteo were elected officers, while complainants
Baladja and Ceredon were active members of the union.
- On 3 November 1993, HIMSU formally notified the company of
its legal existence through a letter addressed to HMC President
Zamora. It informed the company of its desire for a collective
bargaining agreement and submitted its proposals under letter
dated 16 November 1993, which again was addressed to
Zamora, VP-Operation Ganigan and VP-Finance Nacorda.
However, the company ignored these proposals.
- Union filed an unfair labor practice case against HMC on 13
May 1994.
- HMC dismissed the complainants under letter dated 16 June
1994.
- Labor Arbiter Legaspi held that the services of petitioners were
illegally terminated, ordered their reinstatement and the grant of
back wages and attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of monetary
award; that there was no positive showing that petitioners were
retrenched purposely to weaken or destroy their union; hence,
claim of unfair labor practice was dismissed. Likewise, claim for
damages was denied since no fraud or bad faith was committed
by private respondents in dismissing them.
- NLRC reversed Legaspis ruling, rejected all petitioners claims
and questioned complainants actuations considering that they
only challenged 2 months after dismissal and after receiving
separation pay. It also took judicial notice of the economic
difficulties suffered by the mining industry.
Petitioners Claim
- Dismissal was done with malicious intent to cause them and
the union damage for their exercise of the right to selforganization, in defiance of Labor Code Art. 248. Complainants
pray that respondents be: (a) declared guilty of unfair labor
practices; (b) ordered to reinstate complainants to their former
positions with backwages and to pay complainants jointly and
severally the amount of P150k, as moral damages and litigation
and attorney's fees, respectively.
Respondents Comments
- Retrenchment was a management prerogative implemented in
order to prevent further losses. It affected rank-and-file,
supervisors and managerial staffs and was done with due notice
to take effect 30 days from receipt thereof.
- Complainants had accepted separation pay equivalent to 1
month pay for every year of service plus other monetary
benefits, and complainants executed a waiver and quitclaim for
value received.
- Complaint was an afterthought in order to give semblance of
credence to their position/opposition to conduct a certification
election, as manifested by complainants counsel declaration in
open court that they were still filing a new complaint for unfair
labor practice (this case)
ISSUES
1.
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it absolved
respondents from their duty to prove losses as a just ground for
retrenchment
2. WON the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction in recognizing the
waivers/quitclaims executed by petitioners as an effective bar to
this complaint
3. WON the NLRC abused its discretion when it ordered the
dismissal of the instant complaint and totally disregarded the
labor arbiters findings of facts and petitioners motion for
execution
HELD
1. YES
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company. Absent any proof of the extent of the participation of
the VP in the formulation and the implementation of
management policies and programs, he cannot be held
financially liable for the illegal dismissal of employees.
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offense involving moral turpitude x x x, the employer may not be
required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or
financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the
ground of social justice."
- Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v
Court of AppealsWe are of course aware that financial assistance may be
allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional
circumstances and as an equitable concession. We are
likewise mindful that financial assistance is allowed only
in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or
those reflecting on his moral character (Zenco Sales, Inc.
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA 689). x x x."
- In the case at bar, there is NO exceptional circumstances to
warrant the grant of financial assistance or separation pay to
petitioner.
G did not only violate company disciplinary rules and
regulations. He falsified his employment application form
by not stating therein that he is the nephew of Mr.
Danao,
respondent
Wyeths
Nutritional
Territory
Manager.
- G manifested his slack of moral principle through his
infractions. In simple term, he is dishonest.
- Philippine Long Distance Telephone vs. NLRC and
Abucay- [T]hose who invoke social justice may do so only if
their hands are clean and their motives blameless x x x." Here,
petitioner failed to measure up to such requirement.
Disposition Petition is DENIED
***Wyeth did not interpose an appeal to this Court. Hence, no
affirmative relief can be extended to it. So it has to comply with
the CAs decision to grant G his SP.
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Reasoning
- PhilCom, being in the communications industry, is engaged in a
vital industry protected from strikes and lockouts by PD 823 as
amended by PD 849
- The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction. Striking
employees defied the return-to-work order.
- Regardless of their motives, validity of claims, or pending
motions, the striking employees should have ceased and
desisted from all acts undermining the authority granted to the
Secretary under Art. 263(g)
- A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory
despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be
strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity
- A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged
more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the
workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of
severing their relationship with their employer as it is valid
ground for dismissal. Art. 264(a) governs defiance of such order.
1. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means.
- PEU posted human barricades at all entrances to and
egresses from the company premises and used
coercive methods to prevent company officials and
other personnel from leaving the company premises.
Art. 264(a) prohibits the commission of such acts during
a strike and declares any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates to have lost his employment
status.
- As PEU never disputed PhilComs assertions of
unlawful strike, the former is deemed to have admitted
to such acts.
2. PEU declared the strike (Nov 17) during the pendency of
preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB (Nov 11).
Such is a blatant violation of Section 6, Book V, Rule XXII of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which
explicitly obliges the parties to bargain collectively in good
faith and prohibits them from impeding or disrupting the
proceedings
- Article 264(a) of the Labor Code also considers it a
prohibited activity to declare a strike during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the same strike.
3. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance
procedure established in the CBA
- A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not
been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the
CBA of the parties is premature and illegal.
- PEU could have just taken up their grievances in their
negotiations for the new CBA which was already pending
Disposition Petition is dismissed and the decision of the CA is
affirmed. The issue of who participated in the illegal
strike, being questions of fact, must be resolved in
appropriate proceedings with the Secretary of Labor
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as reflected in the records showing that petitioner was formally
investigated and given the opportunity to refute the alleged
findings by the management of WNC. The Labor Arbiter held that
frequent absenteeism and tardiness of the petitioner constituted
not only willful disobedience but also gross and habitual neglect
of duties, which are valid grounds for termination of
employment. He stressed that petitioners frequent absences
without proper leave of absence was not only unfair to WNC and
the petitioners co-employees but also set an undesirable
example to the employees under his supervision, considering
that the petitioner was not a mere rank-and-file employee but
one who owed more than the usual fealty to the organization.
- On appeal to the NLRC, the latter affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, sustained the latters findings of facts, and made
its own findings of the apprehension of the petitioner for
possession of prohibited drugs. Petitioner then filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA but this was dismissed for
lack of merit. Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA.
ISSUE
WON petitioner was validly dismissed from employment on the
ground of serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of
duties, including habitual tardiness and absenteeism
HELD
YES
- So irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a
place in the workplace, and it is within the managements
prerogative of WNC to terminate his employment. Even as the
law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect
the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly
management prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of
those rights and prerogatives is in good faith to advance its
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements,
such exercise will be upheld.
Disposition Assailed decision and resolution affirmed with
modification.
ACUAV CA
QUISUMBING; May 5, 2006
FACTS
- Petitioners are Filipino overseas workers deployed by private
respondent Join International Corporation (JIC), a licensed
recruitment agency, to its principal, 3D Pre-Color Plastic, Inc.,
(3D) in Taiwan, Republic of China, under a uniformly-worded
employment contract for a period of two years. Herein private
respondent Elizabeth Alaon is the president of Join International
Corporation.
- September 1999 petitioners applied for employment abroad
with JIC. They each paid placement fee of P14,850. They signed
a uniformly-worded employment contract which stipulated that
they were to work as machine operators with a monthly salary of
NT$15,840.00, exclusive of overtime, for a period of two years.
- December 9, 1999 they left for Taiwan. Upon arriving at the
factory owned by 3D, they were made to sign another contract
which stated that their salary was only NT$11,840.00. - They
were also told that their dormitory was still under construction.
In the meantime, they were brought to a small room where forty
women were jampacked and each person was given a pillow.
Since the ladies' comfort room was out of order, they had to ask
permission to use the men's comfort room. Petitioners claim
they were made to work twelve hours a day, from 8:00 p.m. to
8:00 a.m.
- December 16, 1999 due to unbearable working conditions,
they informed management that they were leaving. They booked
a flight home, at their own expense. Before they left, they were
made to sign a written waiver. In addition, petitioners were not
paid any salary for work rendered on December 11-15, 1999.
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resolved in the worker's favor. The policy is to extend the
applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees
who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor. Accordingly, the private
respondents are solidarily liable with the foreign principal for the
overtime pay claims of petitioners.
No Moral and Exemplary Damages
- Moral and exemplary damages are recoverable only where the
dismissal of an employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The person
claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith
by clear and convincing evidence, for the law always presumes
good faith. Petitioners allege they suffered humiliation, sleepless
nights and mental anguish, thinking how they would pay the
money they borrowed for their placement fees. Even so, they
failed to prove bad faith, fraud or ill motive on the part of private
respondents. Moral damages cannot be awarded. Without the
award of moral damages, there can be no award of exemplary
damages, nor attorney's fees.
Private Respondents Need Not Pay the Petitioners
- Quitclaims executed by the employees are commonly frowned
upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for
the full measure of the workers' legal rights, considering the
economic disadvantage of the employee and the inevitable
pressure upon him by financial necessity. Nonetheless, the socalled "economic difficulties and financial crises" allegedly
confronting the employee is not an acceptable ground to annul
the compromise agreement unless it is accompanied by a gross
disparity between the actual claim and the amount of the
settlement.
- The petitioners were not in any way deceived, coerced or
intimidated into signing a quitclaim waiver in the amounts of
P13,640, P15,080 and P16,200 respectively. Nor was there a
disparity between the amount of the quitclaim and the amount
actually due the petitioners. Conformably then the petitioners
are each entitled to NT$3,959.99 in Philippine Peso at the rate of
exchange prevailing at the time of payment. Since the prevailing
exchange rates on December 1999 was NT$1 to P1.268805, the
amount of the quitclaim paid to petitioners was actually higher
than the amount due them.
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- There was no justification for terminating their services and
there was no due process as Oriental did not serve two written
notices to respondents prior to their termination from
employment, as required by the Labor Code.
- In this connection, paragraph 5; Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 provides:
- In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less. The SC also noted that there is no
evidence on record of payment of placement fee. Hence, it is
unable to award reimbursement of the same. Cuesta is also
entitled to vacation leave pay. Lastly, for petitioner's breach of
contract and bad faith, respondents should be awarded P50,000
in moral damages and another P50,000 as exemplary damages.
In addition, they should also be awarded attorney's fees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the aggregate monetary
awards.
Disposition Petition is DENIED
PERIQUET V NLRC
CRUZ; June 22, 1990
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the NLRC
FACTS
- The petitioner, Corazon Periquet, was dismissed as toll collector
by the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP), private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and
unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly
found in her purse during a surprise inspection.
- She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming that she was
framed
- Said complaint was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered
her reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and with full back wages to be
computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to date of her
actual reinstatement.
- On appeal, the order was affirmed by the NLRC on August 29,
1980.
- On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
decision, which was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an
order dated June 26, 1989, requiring payment to the petitioner of
the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of
the judgment amount" due from the private respondent.
- Said amount was garnished by the NLRC sheriff.
- On September 11, 1989, however, the NLRC sustained the
appeal of the CDCP and set aside the order dated June 20, 1989,
the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the
notice of garnishment.
- In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for
execution was time-barred, having been filed beyond the fiveyear period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor
Code.
- It also rejected the petitioner's claim that she had not been
reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she
had signed waiving her right to reinstatement and
acknowledging settlement in full of her back wages and
other benefits. (Facts relating to quitclaims italicized in
reasoning)
- The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal.
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ISSUE
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that the motion for
execution was time-barred, and ruled as valid the two quitclaims
petitioner had signed
HELD
NO
On prescription
- Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides: A
judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action.
- A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as
amended by RA 6715, viz. ART. 224. Execution of decision,
orders, awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or
any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or
Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on
motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a
judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and
executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to
execute or enforce a final decision, order or award.
- Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and
prevented the execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is
not the way the SC sees it.
- The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten
days from receipt thereof following its affirmance by the NLRC
on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded
her reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was
rejected. What appears is that she entered into a
compromise agreement with CDCP where she waived her
right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the
sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the
date of her dismissal to the date of the agreement
On validity of quitclaims
- After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private
respondent and waiving her right to reinstatement in the
compromise agreement, she applied for re-employment with the
CDCP and was on March 16,1987, given the position of xerox
machine operator.
- On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP
and asked that the rights granted her by the decision dated
August 29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had
signed was invalid
- On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the
private respondent recommended the payment to the petitioner
of the additional sum of P9,544.00, representing the balance of
her back pay for three years at P654. 00 per month
- On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this
additional amount and signed another Quitclaim and
Release
- In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments
- Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against
public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered
into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding
on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is
clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law
will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But
where it is shown that the person making the waiver did
so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible
and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
valid and binding undertaking.
Disposition Petition denied
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NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision declaring EMCOs
attempted retrenchment of its employees as legally ineffective
FACTS
- EMCO is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
wood processing, operating through its sawmill and plymill
sections where respondents used to be assigned as regular
workers.
- On Jan 20, 1993 and Mar 2, 1993, EMCO, represented by its
Gen Manager Lim, informed the DOLE of its intention to
retrench some of its workers on the ground of purported
financial difficulties.
- EMCO then issued a memorandum, addressed to all its
foremen, section heads, supervisors and department heads, with
the instruction of retrenching some workers based on the ff
guidelines:
a) Old Age (58 years and above except positions that are really
skilled);
b) Performance (Attitude, Attendance, Quality/ Quantity of Work)
- Per EMCOs notice to the DOLE, 104 workers were proposed for
inclusion in its retrenchment program. EMCO terminated 250
workers.
- Those terminated then received their separation pay of P4,815
each. But deductions were made by EMCO purportedly for the
attorneys fees payable to respondents lawyer, for his efforts in
renegotiating an increase in the wages contained in their CBA.
- Upon receipt of such pay, respondents were made to sign
quitclaims, releasing EMCO and all its officers from all forms of
actions/suits, debts, sums of money, etc.
- About 2 years later, they then lodged a complaint, through
their labor union, against EMCO for illegal dismissal, damages
and attys fees.
- EMCO interposed the defense of lack of cause of action;
respondents had waived whatever claims they may have against
the corporation after signing the quitclaims in favor of EMCO.
- LABOR ARBITER dismissed the complaint.
- Appeal to the NLRC was also dismissed. It anchored its
dismissal on the effect of the respondents waivers or
quitclaims. There is no doubt that the respondents voluntarily
executed their quitclaims/waivers as manifested by the fact that
they did not promptly question their validity within a reasonable
time. It took them two (2) years to challenge and dispute the
validity of the waivers by claiming belatedly that they were
either forced or misled into signing the same.
CA Ruling
- EMCO did not comply with one-month prior notice requirement
under LC:
a) Memorandum merely provided the guidelines on the conduct
of the intended lay-off; this did not constitute notice.
b) It was not addressed to the workers, but to the foremen, the
department supervisors and the section heads.
c) There was no proper notice to DOLE. EMCO terminated the
services of 250 employees but included only 104 of them in the
list it filed with DOLE.
- Before EMCO resorted to retrenchment, it failed to adduce
evidence of its losses and prove that it had undertaken
measures to prevent the occurrence of such losses.
- EMCO had not paid the legally prescribed separation pay.
EMCO violated the LC in deducting the amount of attorneys
fees. 3
- Employees cause of action had not yet prescribed when the
case was filed, because an action for illegal dismissal constituted
an injury to their rights. (Art.1146 of NCC is applicable: 4 yrs
prescription period)
ISSUES
3
"Article 222. APPEARANCES AND FEES. (b) No attorneys fees, negotiation fees
or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or
conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual
member of the contracting union: Provided, however, That attorneys fees may be
charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any
contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void."
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- The corporation, and not its employees, has the burden of
proving that the Quitclaims were voluntarily entered into.
(Salonga v NLRC)
- Because the retrenchment was illegal and of no effect, the
Quitclaims were therefore not voluntarily entered into by
respondents. Consent was similarly vitiated by mistake or fraud.
(Trendline Employees Assoc-Southern Phil Federation of Labor
(TEA-SPFL) v NLRC)
Reasoning
- EMCO claimed that aside from Eddie de la Cruz, the other
respondents did not submit their respective supporting affidavits
detailing how their individual consents had been obtained.
Allegedly, such documents do not constitute the clear and
convincing evidence required under the law to overturn the
validity of Quitclaims. But the SC held that the burden of proof is
actually on the part of EMCO.
- As a rule, deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees
from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled.
Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel;
however, amounts already received are to be deducted from
their respective monetary awards.
3. YES
Ratio The lower tribunals factual findings will not be upheld
where there is a showing that such findings were totally devoid
of support, or that the judgment was based on a
misapprehension of facts.
Disposition Petition is DENIED (EMCO is ordered to REINSTATE
employees with full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits)
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HELD
NO
- In Commonwealth Act No. 103, and by it, our Government no
longer performs the role of a mere mediator or intervenor but
that of the supreme arbiter. The policy of laissez faire has to
some extent given way to the assumption by the government of
the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interests. Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay, and National
Workers Brotherhood v Court of Industrial Relations, and
National Labor Union, Inc. states that our Constitution was
adopted in the midst of surging unrest and dissatisfaction
resulting from economic and social distress which was
threatening the stability of governments the world over.
Embodying the spirit of the present epoch, general provisions
were inserted in the Constitution which are intended to bring
about the needed social and economic equilibrium between
component elements of society through the application of what
may be termed as the justitia communis advocated by Grotius
and Leibnits many years ago to be secured through the
counterbalancing of economic and social forces and
opportunities which should be regulated, if not controlled, by the
State or placed, as it were, in custodia societatis. 'The promotion
of social justice to in sure the well-being and economic security
of all the people' was thus inserted as vital principle in our
Constitution. (Sec. 5, Art. II, Constitution.) And in order that this
declaration of principle may not just be an empty medley of
words, the Constitution in various sections thereof has provided
the means towards its realization, For instance, section 6 of
Article XIII declares that the State 'shall afford protection to
labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture.' The
same section also states that 'the State may provide for
compulsory arbitration.' In extraordinary cases mentioned in
section 16, Article VI, of the Constitution, the President of the
Philippines may be authorized by law, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as the National Assembly may
prescribe, to 'promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy.' Albeit, almost at the same time the
Congress of the United States approved the National Labor
Regulations Act (49 Stat., 449) on July 5, 1935, commonly known
as the Wagner Act, we were in the Philippines headway towards
the adoption of our fundamental law, pursuant to congressional
authority given in the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act,
approved March 24, 1934. In our Bill of Rights we now find the
following provision 'The right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.' (Par. 6,
section 1, art. III, Constitution.) What was an agitation in the
United States which brought about the recommendation by the
Commission on Industrial Relations created by an Act of
Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights as an
amendment to the United States Constitution is, in our case,
virtually an accepted principle, which may be expanded and
vitalized by legislation to keep pace with the development of
time and circumstances.
- By and large, these provisions in our Constitution all evince and
express the need of shifting emphasis to community interest
with a view to affirmative enhancement of human values. In
conformity with the constitutional objective and cognizant of the
historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes had given
rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country, the
National Assembly enacted Commonwealth Act No. 103, entitled
'An Act to afford protection of labor by creating a Court of
Industrial Relations empowered to fix minimum wages for
laborers and maximum rental to be paid by tenants, and to
enforce compulsory arbitration between employers or landlords,
and employees or tenants, respectively; and by prescribing
penalties for the violation of the orders' and, later,
Commonwealth Act No. 213, entitled, 'An Act to define and
regulate legitimate labor organizations.'
- Commonwealth Act No. 213 was enacted in pursuance of what
appears to be the deliberate embodiment of a new social policy,
founded on the conception of a society integrated not by
independent individuals at dealing at arms length, but by
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interdependent members of a consolidated whole whose
interests must be protected against mutual aggression and
warfare among and between divers and diverse units which are
impelled by countervailing and opposite individual and group
interests, and this is particularly true in the relationship between
labor and capital. Social and industrial disturbances which fifty
years ago were feudal-like and of isolated importance may now
well result in a serious strain upon the entire economic organism
of the nation. Several attempts at meeting and solving our
peculiar social and economic problems have already been made.
The system of voluntary arbitration devised by Act No. 4055 of
the defunct Philippine Legislature has apparently been
abandoned by the enactment of the aforementioned
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213.
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the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
- As a final note, let it be emphasized that the constitutional
policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a
sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to
the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the
employer when it is in the right.
Disposition Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
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- when the respondents first presented their complaint on August
21, the petitioner (through Mr. Abad) failed to act on it
- if the provision would be interpreted as to allow the
management to act on their laborers complaints after the acting
officer returned from a leave then the causes of the
workingmen would be delayed, thus suffering a great injustice.
That could not have been the intendment of the pertinent
provision of the CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying
our labor laws.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision
of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.
This judgment is immediately executory.
CALALANG V WILLIAMS
LAUREL; December 2, 1940
FACTS
- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC)
approved with modification the recommendation that originated
from the National Traffic Commission (NTC), which was favorably
indorsed by the Director of Public Works (PW), that Rosario
Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours from 7 a.m. to
11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be
enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places abovementioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.
- Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communications the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads.
- Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private citizen and as a
taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
against the Chairman of NTC, Director of PW, Acting Secretary of
PWC, Mayor of Manila and Acting Chielf of Police of Manila.
ISSUES
1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because
it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an
unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion
3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being of all the people
HELD
1. NO
- The Legislature cannot delegate power to make law; but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state
of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action depend.
Reasoning
- adherence to precedent
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Wayman vs. Southard it
was held here that discretion may be delegated to executive
departments or subordinate officials the execution of certain
acts, final on questions of fact.
- textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548
The provision that .the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly.
- practicality
The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of
the subjects of govtl regulations, and the increased difficulty
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PLDT V NLRC
ROMERO; July 23, 1997
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to revoke NLRCs Nov. 16, 1992 decision
affirming the resolution of Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera and
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
FACTS
- Private respondent Lettie Corpuz was employed as traffic
operator at the Manila International Traffic Division (MITD) by
PLDT for 10 years 9 months from Sept. 19, 1978 until her
dismissal on June 17, 1989. She was tasked with facilitating
requests for incoming and outgoing international calls using a
digital switchboard.
- Sometime in Dec. 1987, PLDTs rank-and-file employees went
on strike, prompting MITD to discharge the formers duties to
prevent a shutdown of its operations. In the course of their
assignments, 2 supervisors received 2 overseas calls bound for
the Middle East, both callers reporting the same calling number
(98-68-16). It was shown that the number had been permanently
disconnected on Sept. 1987 but 439 overseas calls had been
made through it from May to Nov. 1987.
- It was further found that among the 235 telephone operators
who handled those calls (averaging 1.8% calls each), private
respondent had handled 12.8% of the total calls. Some calls,
though registered as partly unavailable or busy, yielded
unusually long operator call durations. Private respondent also
used said number to make several personal calls. Based on
these finding, MITD Manager Erlinda Kabigting directed
respondent to explain these allegations.
- instead of complying, respondent requested a formal
investigation to confront and rebut the witnesses allegations.
On grounds of misconduct and breach of trust, respondent was
terminated.
- In a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondent, Labor
Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering the
reinstatement of private respondent, later affirmed by NLRC.
ISSUE
WON the NLRC erred in ordering the reinstatement of private
respondent
HELD
NO. Although the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the
employer, the right to discharge employees is regulated by the
States police power in line with its duty to preserve its citizens
rights.
- Petitioner insists that respondent was guilty of defrauding them
by taking several calls through the disconnected number.
However, records show that these calls were neither unusual nor
made in connivance with certain subscribers as other operators
shared similar experiences. Although it is quite certain that there
were certain PLDT personnel who tampered with the line, the
Labor Law 1
ultimate blame cannot be set solely on private respondent based
on mere suspicion, but only with concrete and substantial
evidence.
- In the instant case, the petitioner failed to establish valid bases
of the alleged misconduct, thus denying private respondent her
right to due process. The requirement of notice and hearing
affords the worker ample opportunity to be heard and defend
himself.
- Art. 4 of the Labor Code states that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor, that is, the workers welfare is of
paramount importance. The Constitution furthers that the State
shall afford full protection to labor, promote full employment
opportunities for all and guarantee the right to security of
tenure.
Disposition instant petition is DISMISSED and the decision
dated Nov. 16, 1992 is AFFIRMED.
AGABON V NLRC
DAYAN V BPI
VITUG; November 20, 2001
NATURE
Review seeking reversal of the decision and resolution of CA
reversing the resolution of the NLRC.
FACTS
- Petitioner Rogelio C. Dayan (Dayan) started his employment on
30 June 1956 with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company
(CBTC). CBTC was eventually absorbed by the Bank of the
Philippine Islands. (BPI) where Dayan was maintained as
employee. In 1981, Dayan was promoted Administrative
Assistant by respondent bank in its centralized accounting office.
He held several positions thereafter - Assistant Manager of
Internal Operations in 1983, Assistant Manager of Correspondent
Bank in 1988, Assistant Manager of Branch Operations in 1990,
Assistant Manager of the Supplies Inventory in 1991, and then
Senior Assistant Manager of the Supplies Inventory in 19911992. In addition to the series of promotions, Dayan was the
recipient of various commendations.
- December 1991, the post of Purchasing Officer became vacant.
The vacated position was offered to Dayan which he initially
declined but, due to the insistence of his superiors, he later
accepted on a temporary basis in February 1993.
- 10 June 1993, Asst VP Gerlanda E. De Castro of the bank, in a
memorandum, placed petitioner under suspension.
- Dayan is placed under suspension due to matters presented to
him in a meeting on the same morning of the suspension memo.
- It appears that BPI conducted earlier interviews regarding
supposed malpractices committed by Dayan during his term as
Purchasing Officer. The report signed ad noted by Rololfo
Bernejo (Mgr) and Victor Guillermo (Sr Mgr) contained alleged
misconduct such as asking for 5% commission on purchase
orders, donations totaling 5K for medical bills, overpricing BPI
Family Banks passbook, etc. The report also made negative
findings and observations about his work performance.
- 14 June 1993, petitioner wrote a memorandum to the bank
narrating what had transpired in his meeting with the bank on 10
June 1993 where he denied all the accusations against him
and contested his preventive suspension. His denials and plea
for compassion notwithstanding, petitioner was dismissed by
respondent bank via a notice of termination, dated 25 October
1993, signed by AVP Gerlanda de Castro. In a letter of
confession, dated 28 October 1993, petitioner ultimately
admitted his infractions and instead asked for financial
assistance. He, at the same time, executed an undated
"Release Waiver and Quitclaim" acknowledging receipt of
P400,000.00 financial assistance from the bank and thereby
releasing and discharging it from any action or claim arising from
his employment with the bank and membership in the
retirement plan.
- Subsequently, however, petitioner claimed that the letter
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HELD
1. NO
Ratio The CA was convinced that Dayans guilty of malfeasance
and that the petitioner's dismissal had been justified under
Article 282 of the Labor Code.6
Reasoning
- CA did not commit error in holding to be justifiable the
dismissal of Dayan from BPI as evidence of malpactice is too
numerous to be ignored. Contrary to Dayans claim, the
suppliers who complained executed affidavits as part of
the records of the case. An employee under his supervision even
narrated other incidents of malpractices. These charges were
even backed up by the audit report of the banks audit team.
- Dayan is not a rank and file employee. His job involves much
exercise of independent judgment and discretion. A bank, being
essentially imbued with public interest, cannot be compelled to
continue in its employ a person whom it has lost trust and
confidence.
Obiter
- The policy of preventively suspending an employee under
investigation for charges involving dishonesty is an acceptable
precautionary measure in order to preserve the integrity of vital
papers and documents that may be material and relevant to the
case and to which he, otherwise, would have access by virtue of
his position. It was only after an exhaustive investigation that
respondent bank finally decided to terminate the services of
petitioner on 25 October 1993.
2. NO
Ratio The law requires the employer with 2 written notices
before termination can be legally affected as well as a hearing
where the employee can explain his side.
A consultation or conference with the employee is not a
substitute for the actual observance of notice and hearing.
6
"`(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative.'
Labor Law 1
Reasoning
- The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which the dismissal is sought. The second notice
informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.
- In the case at bench, Dayan was called to a meeting June 10
where he denied all charges against him. After which, he was
issued a notice of preventive suspension. After investigation, he
was given notice of dismissal. There was failure on the part of
BPI to conform to the notice and hearing requirement. The
preliminary meeting is not sufficient compliance rather it was
merely exploratory. Where the employee denies charges against
him, a hearing is necessary to thresh out any doubt.
3. NO
Ratio The 2 notice and hearing rule is indispensable for a
dismissal to be validly effected, but if it is for a just and
valid cause, the failure to observe procedural requirements
does not invalidate the dismissal of the employee. Instead,
he must be granted separation pay. Whether reinstated or
given separation pay, he should be paid backwages if he
has been laid off without written notice 30 days in advance.
For the omission, an appropriate sanction should be
imposed depending on the fact and gravity of the situation.
Reasoning
- In the case at hand, the purpose of the notice and hearing
requirement is not to comply with due process.
- Art 283 originated from the Spanish Code of Commerece of
1882, which gave either party to the employer-employee
relationship the right to terminate their relationship by giving
notice to the other a month in advance. This was repealed by
Art. 2270 of the Civil Code, then by RA 1052 or Termination Pay
Law, and finally by RA1787 providing for the advance notice or
payment of compensation at the rate of month for every year
of service.
- The Termination Pay Law is a regulatory measure to give
opportunity for the employer to look for a replacement or
substitute and for the employee to look for another job. The
notice was not required if the dismissal is for just cause. The
notice requirement is only implemented by BP130 amending the
Labor Code.
- The employer cannot be expected to be an entirely impartial
judge of his own cause.
4. NO
Ratio Quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned
upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar
claims for the full measure of a workers legal rights.
However, if the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not be disowned unless there is clear proof
that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting gullible
person, or the terms are unconscionable on its face.
Reasoning
- Dayan is a managerial employee with vast experience. He
cannot be willing to compromise his future by agreeing to
execute a document highly prejudicial to his interest.
Complainant was well aware of the consequences of his acts.
Disposition decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and setting aside the NLRC's
decision is AFFIRMED.
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Labor Law 1
> SIGNING BONUS, RED-CIRCLE-RATE ALLOWANCE
> SICK LEAVE RESERVE OF 15 DAYS, 40-DAY UNION LEAVE
- Non-economic issues
> Scope of the bargaining unit - employees holding a
confidential position are prohibited from joining the union of the
rank and file employees
> Security demand - the Secretary cannot rule on the union
security demand because this is not .1 mandatory subject for
collective bargaining agreement
> UNION REPRESENTATION IN COMMITTEES
> RETROACTIVITY OF THE CBA
Ratio The Secretary of Labor's statutory power under Art. 263
(g) of the Labor Code to, assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and, to
render, an award on compulsory arbitration, does not exempt
the exercise of this power from the judicial review. Under this
constitutional mandate, every legal power of the Secretary of
Labor under the Labor Code, or, for that matter, any act of the
Executive, that is attended by grave abuse of discretion is
subject to review by this Court in an appropriate proceeding. To
be sure, the existence of an executive power alone - whether
granted by statute or by the Constitution cannot exempt the
executive action from judicial oversight, interference or reversal
when grave abuse of discretion is, or is alleged to be, present.
Thus, the actions of the Sec. of Labor is subject to judicial
review.
- The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labor's
arbitral award is not limited to a determination of grave abuse in
the manner of the secretary's exercise of his statutory powers.
This Court is entitled to, and must - in the exercise of its judicial
power - review the substance of the Secretary's award when
grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the award, i.e.; in
the appreciation of and the conclusions the Secretary drew from
the evidence presented. The natural and ever present limitation
on the Secretary's acts is, of course, the Constitution. But in this
case we believe that the more appropriate and available
standard - and one does not require a constitutional
interpretation - is simply the standard of reasonableness. In
layman's terms, reasonableness implies the absence of
arbitrariness
Disposition
petition is granted and the orders of public
respondent Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996 and
December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above.
The parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining
Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions contained in
the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labor's orders of
August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications
set forth above. The retirement fund issue is remanded to the
Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and determination
of the legal personality of the MERALCO retirement fund.
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HELD
YES
- There is lack of evidence to establish the charges of
absenteeism and tardiness.
- A workers employment is property in the constitutional sense.
He cannot be deprived of his work without due process. In order
for the dismissal to be valid, not only must it be based on just
cause supported by clear and convincing evidence, the
employee must also be given an opportunity to be heard and
defend himself. It is the employer who has the burden of
proving that the dismissal was with just or authorized cause. The
failure of the employer to discharge this burden means that the
dismissal is not justified and that the employee is entitled to
reinstatement and backwages.
- Company submitted mere handwritten listing and computer
print-outs. The handwritten listing was not signed by the one
who made the same. The handwritten listing and unsigned
computer print-outs were unauthenticated and, hence,
unreliable.
- Company failed to present a single piece of credible evidence
to serve as the basis for their charges against Asuncion and
consequently, failed to fulfill their burden of proving the facts
which constitute the just cause for the dismissal of the
petitioner.
- Asuncions letter did not amount to an admission of her alleged
absences. Her alleged absences were incurred on Saturdays.
These should not be considered as absences as there was an
arrangement between her and the private respondents that she
would not be required to work on Saturdays.
- Neither had the Company shown by competent evidence that
Asuncion was given any warning or reprimanded for her alleged
absences and tardiness.
- The two-day period given to Asuncion to explain and answer
the charges against her was most unreasonable, considering
that she was charged with several offenses and infractions (35
absences, 23 half-days and 108 tardiness), some of which were
allegedly committed almost a year before, the charges leveled
against her lacked particularity.
- The law mandates that every opportunity and assistance must
be accorded to the employee by the management to enable him
to prepare adequately for his defense.
If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted
in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause.
- Asuncion has been illegally terminated, she is necessarily
entitled to reinstatement to her former previous position without
loss of seniority and the payment of backwages.
ASUNCION V NLRC
KAPUNAN; July 31, 2001
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V CA
CALLEJO, SR.; May 25, 2004
AGABON V NLRC
FACTS
- Asuncion was employed as an accountant/bookkeeper by the
respondent Mabini Medical Clinic.
- Officials of the DOLE conducted a routine inspection of the
company and discovered upon the disclosure of Asuncion
violations of the labor standards law. The company was made to
correct these violations.
- Dr. Juco charged Asuncion with offenses such Chronic
Absentism, Habitual tardiness, Loitering, Disobedience and
insubordination and consequently dismissed Asuncion on the
ground of disobedience of lawful orders and for her failure to
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- The Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCOPhil) filed on July 17, 1995 a petition for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 0f the Rules of Court with the RTC of Quezon City to
declare as unconstitutional portions of RA 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining
Labor Law 1
order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
government from enforcing the said portions of the law. The
questioned portions of the said RA deal with illegal recruitment,
penalties for illegal recruitment, and on the venue of criminal
action for illegal recruitment.
- On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order on the implementation or effectivity of the
questioned provisions based on the allegations of the private
respondents that they will suffer grave or irreparable damage or
injury if the law is implemented.
- ARCO-Phil was joined in the petition by eleven other
corporations which were allegedly members of the organization
when it filed an amended petition. The amended petition also
questioned other sections of the law which dealt with the
overseas deployment only of skilled Filipino workers alleging
discrimination against unskilled workers.
- The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on August
21, 1995 upon a bond of Pesos 50,000.
- Petitioners filed a petition with the court of Appeals assailing
the order and the writ with the court of Appeals on the grounds
that respondent, ARCO-Phil, is not the real party-in-interest and
that it has not shown any convincing proof that in fact damage
or injury would result in the implementation of the questioned
statute. The Court however dismissed the petition. It
subsequently dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.
- Hence, the petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES
1. WON private respondents have standing to file suit
2. WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only
Pesos 50,000
3. WON the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts
order and the writ it issued
HELD
1. The SC ruled that the respondents have locus standi citing it
earlier ruling in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines vs Commission of Elections. It was held in that
case that standing jus tertii would be recognized if it can be
shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the
third party, or that the right of the third party would be diluted
unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys
constitutional rights.
With regard the portion relating to
discrimination against unskilled workers, the SC ruled that
respondents have no standing as they failed to implead any
unskilled worker in their petition.
2. The order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court is a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction. The SC citing jurisprudence ruled that a
law is presumed constitutional until the same is declared
unconstitutional by judicial interpretation. This is so because
suspension of the operation of the law is an interference with the
official acts of the duly elected representatives of the people and
also of the highest magistrate of the land.
The possible
unconstitutionality of a statue, on its face, does not of itself
justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it,
unless there is showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other
unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief. To be
entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish
that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive
relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the
merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to
the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its
favor. This higher standard reflects judicial deference towards
legislation or regulations developed through presumptively
reasoned democratic process. In this case, none were shown.
3. The SC also held that the assailed order and writ of
preliminary injunction is mooted by case law. The SC cited
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Labor Law 1
administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility
in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected. -Protect parties in their right to know and
meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract
from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for
that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to
the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given
case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations
may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter
under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry,
a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in
any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public
official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial
Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not
affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates
to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
- The record of the proceedings had before the CIR in this
particular case had no substantial evidence that the exclusion of
the 89 laborers was due to their union affiliation.
- The whole transcript of the hearing is just a record of
contradictory statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views
- these statements have no evidentiary value
Respondents' Comments
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938,
there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by
the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts
of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated
September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from
the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective
bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly
essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been
(the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in
Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting
and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor
legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has
always been the rule.
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Labor Law 1
1968, subject to the conditions that (a) the flight between Manila
and San Fernando, La Union, F210/211 of the same timetable, be
operated daily instead of twice a week as proposed, and (b) that
all schedules under DTS-35, for which no previous approval has
been granted by the Board are to be referred to a hearing
examiner for reception of evidence on its economic justification.
- After the examiner's report, several of the proposed flights
were approved for 30 days from July 31 1968.
- On May 31 1968, Air Manila, Inc., filed the instant petition
claiming that the respondent Board acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with abuse of discretion in issuing its
Resolution No. 139 (68).
- Petitioner alleged that the proposed new schedule, involving an
in crease of frequencies, would not only saturate the routes
served also by petitioner, but would also affect its schedule; that
the Board's approval of said Domestic Traffic Schedule without
receiving the evidence of the parties constituted a deprivation of
petitioner's light to be heard; and that such authorization to PAL
to operate the proposed schedule without economic justification
amounted to a capricious and whimsical exercise by the Board of
its power amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES
1. WON the Board acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
and/or with abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution No. 139
(68)
2. WON the Board's approval of said Domestic Traffic Schedule
without receiving the evidence of the parties constituted a
deprivation of petitioner's light to be heard
HELD
1. NO
- It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are
not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in
investigations and trials. And this administrative due process is
recognized to include (a) the right to notice, be it actual or
constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect
a person's legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in
his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable
assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent
jurisdiction; and (4) a finding or decision by that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties
affected.
- However, it can not truthfully be said that the provisional
approval by the Board of PAL's proposed DTS-35 violates the
requisites of administrative due process. Admittedly, after PAL's
proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights had been
referred to a hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL
submitted a so-called consolidated schedule of flights, DTS-35,
that included the same Mercury night flights, and this was
allowed by Board Resolution No. 139(68). According to
respondents, however, the Board's action was impelled by the
circumstance that at the time, the authorizations of certain flight
schedules previously allowed but were incorporated in DTS-35
were about to expire; thus, the consolidated schedule had to be
approved temporarily if the operations of the flights referred to
were not to be suspended. In short, the temporary permit was
issued to prevent the stoppage or cessation of services in the
affected areas. This point petitioner has failed to refute.
- Under the law, the Civil Aeronautics Board is not only
empowered to grant certificates of public convenience and
necessity; it can also issue, deny, revise, alter, modify, cancel,
suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, any temporary operating
permit, upon petition or complaint of another or even at its own
initiative. The exercise of the power, of course, is supposed to be
conditioned upon the paramount consideration of public
convenience and necessity, and nothing has been presented in
this case to prove that the disputed action by the Board has
been prompted by a cause other than the good of the service.
2. NO
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Labor Law 1
employee who poses a threat to the lives of other employees.
Therefore, separation pay must be paid in lieu of reinstatement
Disposition Petition for certiorari DISMISSED. TRO and
Resolutions WITHDRAWN. Decision in NLRC case affirmed with
modifications on awarding to of three years back wages and
addition of separation pay
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Labor Law 1
enjoyment of concessions and benefits the union might secure
from the employer)
6. RA 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding the
promotion of social justice.
7. The amendment by RA 3350 in the form of the exception in
favor of religious sects prohibiting union membership is
necessary rooted in whether the Closed Shop Provision is
violative of religious freedom.
Respondents' Comments
1. No. The right to join associations includes the right not to join;
the Act actually prohibits compulsion of workers to join labor
organization
2. No. The Act formed part of, and was incorporated into, the
terms of the Closed Shop Agreement
3. No. The Act instead accommodated the religious needs of
workers and balanced the collective rights of organized labor
with the constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his
chosen religion.
4. No. The constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise
his chosen religion has primacy over union security measures
which are merely contractual.
5 No. The classification of workers depending on their religious
tenets is:
a. based on substantial distinction
b. germane to the purpose of the law, and
c. applies to all the members of the given class
6. No. The Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment
opportunities for all citizens in the midst of diversities of religious
beliefs, a manifestation of social justice.
ISSUES
1 WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form
lawful associations
2 WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of
contracts
3 WON RA 3350 discriminatorily favors religious sects while
leaving no rights or protection to labor organizations.
4 WON RA 3350 violates the constitutional provision that no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right,
5 WON RA 3350 violates equal protection of laws
6 WON RA 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding
the promotion of social justice
7. WON the amendment in the form of the exception in favor of
religious sects prohibiting union membership is necessary
HELD
1. NO
- The RA does not prohibit the members of such religious sects
from joining unions. Both RA 3350 and the Constitution
recognize the right of freedom of association.
A right
comprehends two broad notions:
a. Liberty or freedom absence of legal restraint whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law
b. Power whereby an employee may join or refrain from joining
Because before RA 3350, if any person, regardless of his
religious belief, wishes to be employed, he must become a
member of the Collective Bargaining Union. With the exception
provided in RA 3350 to member of religious organizations,
employees who are members of the same are given the power
to join or not to join. They cannot be compelled to join even
when the unions have closed shop agreements with employers.
2. NO
- The prohibition on impairment of obligations by Statute is not
unqualified. It prohibits only unreasonable impairment. In spite
of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of the people. The
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is read into
contracts as a postulate to the preservation of the legal order.
The contract clause of the Constitution must therefore be not
only in harmony with, but also in subordination to the reserved
power of the state to safeguard vital interests of the people.
3. NO
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-In Aglipay v Ruiz, the Court said that the government should not
be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character
even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or
sect, as long as it has a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
- The purpose of RA 3350 is secular: to advance the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion, by averting that
certain persons be refused work by reason of their religion and
union security agreements.
- The primary effect of the exemption in favor of members of
sects prohibiting union membership is the protection of said
employees against the aggregate force of the CBA, and relieving
certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs.
- Although it may benefit some sects in particular, the benefits
are merely incidental and indirect, not primary.
4. NO
- The Act does not require as a qualification for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion; neither does
the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its
members from joining a labor union.
- Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive
act.
The Act only exempts members with such religious
affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. Thus, a
religious objector is not required to do a positive act. He is
exempted ipso jure. How can there be a religious test required
for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?
5. Equal protection is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of laws upon all citizens, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them.
It does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. All that is required
of valid classification is that it be:
a. reasonable, i.e. based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences real: based on WON by reasons of their
religious belief, cannot sign up with a labor union
b. germane to the purpose of the law the purpose of the law is
precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious
belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to
work
c. it must not be limited to existing conditions only
d. apply equally to each member of the class
Every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature
involves inequality. Whenever it is apparent from the scope of
the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and means
by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character,
the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may
occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public.
6. NO
- It is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited.
Social justice does not require social or legal equality. Social
justice guarantees equality of opportunity, and this is precisely
what RA 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for
work.
7. A statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason,
unconstitutional. Legislatures, being chosen by the people, are
presumed to understand the needs of the people, and it may
change the laws accordingly. For the validity of a statute, the
essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion, as in its effects on a
particular case, is the criterion.
Disposition appeal is dismissed. The decision of the CFI
appealed from is affirmed.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur]
- Stressing the transcendent character of religious freedom and
its primacy even as against the claims of protection to labor.
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- Gerona v Secretary of Education: But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of
road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with
established institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield. The specific circumstances of the right
curtailed as against religious freedom should be given
consideration on a case to case basis.
ALALAYAN V NPC
FERNANDO; July 29, 1969
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Perez, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FACTS
- The National Power Corporation was given the power (Sec. 3,
R.A. 3043, approved June 17, 1961, entitled "An Act to
Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered
Twenty Six Hundred and Forty-One) to require from
franchise holders the conditions that:
a) they shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve
percent annually of its investments plus two-month
operating expenses;
b) NPC can renew all existing contracts with franchise
holders for the supply of electric power and energy.
- National Power Corporation has for some years now been
supplying, distributing, servicing and selling electric power and
energy at fixed rates schedules to the latter who have for some
years now been and still are, legally engaged in re-supplying, redistributing, re-servicing and re-selling the said electric power
and energy to individual customers within the coverage of their
respective franchises.
- Reference was made to the particular contracts petitioners
entered into with respondent, the contracts to continue
indefinitely unless and until either party would give to the other
two years previous notice in writing of its intention to terminate
the same.
- On June 18, 1960, an act authorizing the increase of the capital
stock of the National Power Corporation to P100 million took
effect. On June 17, 1961, it was alleged that the challenged
legislation became a law, purportedly to increase further the
authorized capital stock, but including the alleged rider referred
to above.
- National Power Corporation approved a rate increase of at least
17.5%, the effectivity of which, was at first deferred to
November 1, 1962, then subsequently to January 15, 1963, with
the threat that in case petitioners would fail to sign the revised
contract providing for the increased rate, 'respondent National
Power Corporation would then cease "to supply, distribute and
service electric power and energy to them."
- On March 21, 1963, the lower court, considering that there was
"no sufficient ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction Petitioners Claims, dismissed the same.
- It was alleged in the facts that Alalayan did purchase and take
power and energy as follows: "Sixty (60) kilowatts and of not less
than 140,000 kilowatt-hours in any contract year at the rate of
P120.00 per kilowatt per year" payable in twelve equal monthly
installments, "plus an energy charge of P0.013 per kilowatt hour,
payable on the basis of monthly delivery.
- A letter of June 22, 1962 of respondent National Power
Corporation to petitioner approved his 17.5% rate increase of
power so that beginning July 1, 1962, the demand charge would
be P10.00 per kilowatt per month and the energy charge would
be P0.02 per kilowatt hour.
- The lower court, in a decision of January 30, 1965, sustained
the validity and constitutionality of the challenged provision,
hence this appeal.
Petitioners Claims
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- While not explicitly avowed by petitioner, there is the
intimation that to apply the challenged legislation to contracts
then in existence would be an infringement of the constitutional
prohibition against any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a
proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable
not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its
passage, but likewise to those already established and in
operation.
Disposition The decision of the lower court dismissing the
petition is dismissed.
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of transparency in managerial moves affecting employees'
rights.
Disposition Petition dismissed.
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Complainant-appellants
prolonged
absences,
although
unauthorized, may not amount to gross neglect or abandonment
of work to warrant outright termination of employment.
Dismissal is too severe a penalty...Reliance on the ruling
enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart is quite misplaced
because of the obvious dissimilarities-- complainant in the
Shoemart Case was an inveterate absentee who does not
deserve reinstatement compared to herein complainantappellant who is a first offender
ISSUE
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying
the decision of the Labor Arbiter
HELD
NO
Ratio a) Petitioners finding that complainant was guilty of
abandonment is misplaced. Abandonment as a just and valid
ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal
of the employee to resume his employment. Two elements must
then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship.
b) Verily, relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor
contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.
While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules
and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable.
Reasoning
- complainants absence was precipitated by a grave family
problem as his wife unexpectedly deserted him and abandoned
the family. Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no
one to whom he could entrust the children and he was thus
compelled to bring them to the province. He was then under
emotional, psychological, spiritual and physical stress and
strain.
The reason for his absence is, under these
circumstances, justified. While his failure to inform and seek
petitioner's approval was an omission which must be corrected
and chastised, he did not merit the severest penalty of dismissal
from the service.
- the elements of abandonment are not present here. First, as
held above, complainant's absence was justified under the
circumstances. As to the second requisite, complainant
immediately complied with the memo requiring him to explain
his absence, and upon knowledge of his termination,
immediately sued for illegal dismissal. These plainly refuted any
claim that he was no longer interested in returning to work.
- our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and
protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state
policy, but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights,
thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater
safeguards.
- While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules
and Regulations on continuous, unauthorized absences, what is
plain is that it was wielded with undue haste resulting in a
deprivation of due process, thus not allowing for a determination
of just cause or abandonment. In this light, petitioner's dismissal
was illegal. This is not to say that his absence should go
unpunished, as impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining to
award back wages.
Disposition petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of
the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED.
PT&TC V NLRC
REGALADO; May 23, 1997
NATURE
PT&TC seeks relief through certiorari on decision of NLRC
FACTS
- Private respondent Grace De Guzman (GdG) was initially hired
by PTTC, on 3 separate occasions, to relieve 2 of its employees
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who went on maternity leave. The Reliever Agreement stated
that her employment was to be immediately terminated upon
expiration of the agreed period.
- She was later asked to join the company as a probationary
employee with the probation period covering 150 days. On her
application form, she indicated that her civil status was single
although she had contracted marriage 3 months earlier.
- Upon discovery, PTTC, through its Baguio branch supervisor,
sent a memorandum to GdG requiring her to explain the
discrepancy and reminding her of the companys policy of not
accepting married women for employment. GdG, in her response
dated Jan.17, 92, explained that she was not aware of such a
policy and that she had not deliberately hidden her true civil
status.
- PTTC was unconvinced and dismissed GdG on Jan. 29, 92
which GdG then contested before the regional arbitration branch
of the NLRC in Baguio through a complaint for illegal dismissal.
PTTC claimed that the dismissal was due to the fact that she had
concealed her civil status not because of the fact that she was
married.
- The Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that GdG,
who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was
illegally dismissed by petitioner.
Her reinstatement, plus
payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA (cost of
living allowances), was ordered, with the view that the ground
relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was
clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been
discriminated against on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company rules
- PTTC appealed but the NLRC upheld the decision of the labor
arbiter with only the modification that GdG deserved to be
suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of
her acts. The subsequent MFR by PTTC was likewise rebuffed by
NLRC hence this special civil action.
ISSUE
WON the PTTC erred in dismissing GdG
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior
to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his
employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence,
the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the
services of such employee, ones labor being regarded as
constitutionally protected property.
- On the other hand, an employer is free to regulate, according
to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of
employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law
Reasoning
- The petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and
by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to petitioners
assertion, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the
company were dissolved principally because of the companys
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in
PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
- That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent
to private respondent by the branch supervisor of the company,
with the reminder that youre fully aware that the company is
not accepting married women employee, as it was verbally
instructed to you. Again, in the termination notice sent to her by
the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to
understand that her severance from the service was not only by
reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and
on top of that, was her violation of the companys policy against
marriage (and even told you that married women employees
are not applicable or accepted in our company.) Parenthetically,
this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear
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repeated violation of defendant bank's policies and directives
regarding credit accommodations and for over-appraisal of the
real estate collateral for Domingo Chua's account, among others
- June 6, 1969, the plaintiff received the said letter of defendant
Salvador D. Tenorio but found it impossible to render the
required explanation in 24 hours
- June 19, 1969 defendant Jose D. Santos went to Cebu City and
served plaintiff with the letter of defendant Salvador D. Tenorio,
dated June 18, 1969, suspending the plaintiff;
- July 22, 1969 plaintiff was served with the order of his
termination signed by defendant Clarencio S. Yujuico, dated July
18, 1969."
- CFI found the dismissal of plaintiff as without just cause or
otherwise illegal arbitrary, oppressive and malicious, and
ordering defendants to pay to the plaintiff, jointly and severally,
the following sums: (a) P1,000.00 a month, as consequential
damages for the loss of his salaries and allowances, from the
date of his dismissal until the judgment shall have become final
and executory; (b) P2,500.00 as termination pay; (c) P106.63
representing unpaid salaries from the 16th to 19th of June 1969;
(d) P200,000.00 in concept of moral damages; (e) P50,000.00 as
exemplary or corrective damages; (f) P15,000.00 as attorney's
fees; and to pay the costs of the suit."
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be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one company.
-The absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital
discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.
The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and
extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the
legislatures silence that married persons are not protected
under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a
prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present
undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule
that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management
prerogative.
2. Simbol and Comia MOOT and ACADEMIC
Estrella - NO
- Questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management
prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents
Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and
academic.
-We have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is
compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from
employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an
office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is
illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of
petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrellas
dismissal is declared illegal.
Disposition Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73477 dated August 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED.
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Labor Law 1
- This order was later set aside upon motion of both the BATU
and the ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in
the NLRC. The MOLE then returned the case to the respondent
NLRC and directed it to expeditiously resolve all issues relating
to the dispute.
- Conformably, the NLRC issued on January 13, 1987 a
resolution, which it affirmed in its resolution of February 12,
1987, denying the motion for reconsideration.
- Three criminal complaints filed against the petitioning workers,
two by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC and the
third by the Philippine Constabulary.
- The first two complaints, were for "Violation of Article 265, par.
1, in relation to Article 273 of the Labor Code of the Philippines."
The third, was for coercion.
In all three complaints, the
defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike,
barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the
workers through intimidation, harassment and force from
reporting for work.
- Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the
petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later
ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the
municipal mayor of Calamba, Laguna.
- The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant
of arrest and the referral of the coercion charge to the NLRC and,
later, for the dismissal of Criminal Cases on the ground that they
came under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRC.
ISSUES
1. WON a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the
National Labor Relations Commission pending determination of
the legality of the strike
2. WON, pending such determination, the criminal prosecution of
certain persons involved in the said strike may be validly
restrained
HELD
1. YES
- The question of competence is easily resolved. The authority
for the order is found in Article 264(g) of the Labor Code, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 227, which provides as follows: - When in
his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause
strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such
as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies
engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks,
hospitals, and export- oriented industries, including those within
export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment
shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify
the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption order. If one has already taken place
at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked
out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of
law-enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as such orders as he may issue to enforce the
same.
- There can be no question that the MOLE acted correctly in
certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC, given the predictable
prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more
especially to the national interest. Affirming this fact, we
conclude that the return-to-work order was equally valid as a
statutory part and parcel of the certification order issued by the
MOLE on November 24, 1986. The challenged order of the NLRC
was actually only an implementation of the above provision of
the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive earlier issued
by the MOLE in its own assumption order of September 9, 1986.
- It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return-towork order is to protect the workers who might otherwise be
locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike,
the more important reason is to prevent impairment of the
national interest in case the operations of the company are
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PCIB V JACINTO
GANCAYCO; May 6, 1991
FACTS
- Nilda S. Jacinto is a PCI Bank (NAIA branch) customer relation
assistant (CRA) who acts as alternate FX Clerk or Teller.
- 1 May 1984: PCIB discovered the loss of some travelers checks
amounting to P 25,325.00 in peso equivalent transacted 30 April
1984. As Jacinto acted as FX clerk on said day, an investigation
was conducted by PCIB allowing Jacinto and other personnel to
explain their side.
- Jacinto was found guilty of gross negligence, meted a 10-day
suspension w/o pay (7-20 May 1984), and required to pay the
loss by way of salary deductions (P200/month + 50% of mid-year
& Xmas bonus and profit sharing). She was transferred to the
Baclaran branch, 21 May 1984.
- 14 Aug 1986: Jacinto filed a complaint with NLRC questioning
her suspension, penalty and transfer of assignment.
- 19 Feb 1988: The labor arbiter found the 10day suspension and
the deductions to be unjustified and ordered PCIB to erase from
Jacinto's 201 file said suspension and to return to her the
amount so far deducted from her salary, bonuses and 13th
month pay. PCIB was further directed to return Jacinto to her
former assignment at MIA branch, if she so prefers. PCIB
appealed.
- 23 Oct 1989: NLRC affirmed the appealed decision with the
only modification that the transfer of Jacinto was found to be an
appropriate prerogative of management. Hence, this petition for
certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE
[responsibility of a bank employee for the loss of certain funds of
the bank]
Labor Law 1
WON NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that gross
negligence cannot be attributed to Jacinto as she was not
formally designated to perform the functions of an FX clerk
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Any employee who is entrusted with responsibility by his
employer should perform the task assigned to him with care and
dedication. The lack of a written or formal designation should not
be an excuse to disclaim any responsibility for any damage
suffered by the employer due to his negligence. The measure of
the responsibility of an employee is that if he performed his
assigned task efficiently and according to the usual standards,
then he may not be held personally liable for any damage arising
therefrom. Failing in this, the employee must suffer the
consequences of his negligence if not lack of due care in the
performance of his duties.
- NAIA branch OIC, Mr. Gilberto C. Marquez, verbally requested
Jacinto to assume the duties of the FX Clerk who was on leave
(no written memo of assignment). Jacinto accepted the request;
she herself stated that she received the travellers checks, made
the proof sheet thereof, and thereafter pllaced the checks and
proof sheet in the FX cash box. The following day, she reported
the loss of said travellers checks from the FX cash box.
- Although she claimed to have prepared the proof sheet, none
was found in the box. She did not microfilm the checks as a
matter of course. She did not formally endorse the FX box to the
night shift FX clerk or to the cashier. More so, considering that
she knew the lock of the box was defective. By and large, the
finding of PCIB that Jacinto was grossly negligent is well-taken.
- Jacinto's 10-day suspension w/o pay is a proper penalty in
accordance with the prescribed rules of PCIB. But, since PCIB is
guilty of contributory negligence in failing to have the lock of FX
box fixed and to have taken other security measures in the bank
premises, the penalty of reimbursement of the full value of the
loss is mitigated by requiring Jacinto to reimburse the petitioner
only 1/2 of the loss by way of salary deduction.
Disposition Petition GRANTED. NLRC decision reversed and set
aside. Jacinto's complaint dismissed. Pebalty modified: Jacinto is
required to indemnify PCIB the amount of P 12,600.00 through
regular payroll deductions.
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ISSUE
WON the union's objections to, or request for reconsideration of
those regulations or policies automatically suspend enforcement
thereof and excuse the employees' refusal to comply with the
same
HELD
Ratio So long as a company's management prerogatives are
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements, this Court will uphold them7
Reasoning
- Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it
must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are
clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management
to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot
be denied.
- Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free
to regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work,
tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and
recall of work. . . .
- In the case of GTE, it must thus be conceded that its adoption
of a new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was within its
management prerogative to regulate, according to its own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
the manner, procedure and processes by which particular work
activities should be done. There were, to be sure, objections
presented by the union, i.e., that the schedule had not been
"drawn (up) as a result of an agreement of all concerned," that
the new policy was incomprehensible, discriminatory and
whimsical, and "would result to further reduction" of the sales
representatives' compensation.
- The Court failed to see how the objections and accusations
justify the deliberate and stubborn refusal of the sales
representatives to obey the management's simple requirement
for submission by all PSRs of individual reports or memoranda
requiring reflecting target revenues which it addressed to the
employees concerned no less than six (6) times.
- To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule
or order laid down by management, on the pleaded theory that
the rule or order is unreasonable, illegal, or otherwise irregular
for one reason or another, would be disastrous to the discipline
and order that it is in the interest of both the employer and his
employees. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules,
defiance of management authority cannot be countenanced.
- Minister Sanchez however found GTE to have "acted evidently
in bad faith" in firing its 14 salespersons "for alleged violations of
the reportorial requirements of its sales policies which was then
the subject of conciliation proceedings between them;" while the
company, in merely implementing its challenged sales policies
did not ipso facto commit an unfair labor practice, it did so when
it in mala fide dismissed the fourteen salesmen, all union
members, while conciliation proceedings were being conducted
Disposition Petition is granted, and the order of the public
respondent is nullified and set aside.
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MANEJA V NLRC
MARTINEZ; 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioner Rosario Maneja. Worked with private respondent
Manila Midtown Hotel as a telephone operator. She was also a
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member of the National Union of Workers, Restaurants and
Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) with an existing CBA with the
private respondent.
- ON Feb. 13, 1990, Rowena Loleng, a telephone operator,
received a Request for Long Distance Call (RLDC) form and a
deposit of P500 from a pageboy for a Japanese guest Hirota Ieda.
The call was unanswered and the P500 was forwarded to the
cashier. Later, Ieda again made an RLDC and the P500 deposit
was collected and given to Loleng. It was also unanswered
- On feb 15, the cashier inquired about the P1000 deposit made.
After a search, the first one was found in the guest folio while
the other in te folder for cancelled calls. Petitioner saw that the
2nd RLDC form was not time stamped and placed it the machine
to stamp it with the date of Feb 15. But after realizing that the
call was made 2 days before, she wrote on it and changed it to
Feb 13.
- On Mar 7, the chief telephone operator asked the petitioner
and Loleng to explain the Feb 15 incident. They submitted their
written explanation.
- On Mar 20, a written report was submitted, saying that their
actions were covered violations of the Offenses Subject to
Disciplinary Action as 1)forging falsifying official documents
2)culpable carelessness and negligence or failure to follow
established procedure. On march 23, petitioner was then served
notice of dismissal effective on April 1. She refused to sign and
wrote therein under protest
- Criminal charges for falsification was charged against her.
However, the resolution recommending the filing of the case was
reversed by the 2nd asst. city prosecutor.
- On Oct 2,1990, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the respondent before the labor arbiter. The Labor
arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, stating
that even though the case revolves on the matter of
implementation and interpretation of company policies and is
thus within the jurisidictional ambit of the grievance procedure
under the CBA, Art 217 of the Labor Code confers original and
exclusive jurisidiction of all termination cases to the Labor
Arbiter.
- Respndent appealed the decision to the NLRC. The NLRC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction of the Labor arbiter
because the same should have been instead subject to voluntary
arbitration.
ISSUES
1. WON the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction to decide the case
2. WON the petitioner was illegally dismissed
HELD
1. YES
- The NLRCs interpretation of Art 217c of the Labor Code is
erroneous. Even though such provision provides that labor
arbiters have no jurisidiction over cases arising from
interpretation and implementation of CBAs (must be submitted
to the grievance machine or voluntary arbitration), it must be
read in conjuction with Art 261 which grants voluntary
arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies. Note the phrase unresolved grievances. In
the case at bar, the termination of petitioner is not an
unresolved grievance.
- According to the Sanyo case, there is the dismissal does not
involve an interpretation or implementation of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement or interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies but involves termination. Where
the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or
enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance
machinery set up in the Collective Bargaining Agreement or by
voluntary arbitration.
Where there was already actual
termination, i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable by
the Labor Arbiter.
- Also, from article 260, it can be deduced that only disputes
involving the union and the company shall be referred to the
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respondent Villareal resigned and thereafter joined Hi-Grade
Industrial and Technical Products, Inc. as executive vicepresident.
- Sometime in August 1994, petitioner sponsored respondent
Frederick So to attend a training course in Kapfenberg, Austria
conducted by BOHLER, petitioners principal company.
This
training was a reward for respondent Sos outstanding sales
performance.
When respondent returned nine months
thereafter, petitioner directed him to sign a memorandum
providing that BOHLER requires trainees from Kapfenberg to
continue working with petitioner for a period of three (3) years
after the training. Otherwise, each trainee shall refund to
BOHLER $6,000.00 (US dollars) by way of set-off or
compensation. On January 16, 1997 or 2 years and 4 months
after attending the training, respondent resigned from petitioner.
- Immediately, petitioner ordered respondents to render an
accounting of its various Christmas giveaways they received.
These were intended for distribution to petitioners customers.
- In protest, respondents demanded from petitioner payment of
their separation benefits, commissions, vacation and sick leave
benefits, and proportionate 13th month pay. But petitioner
refused and instead, withheld their 13th month pay and other
benefits.
- On April 16, 1997, respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for payment of their monetary benefits against
petitioner and its president, Augusto Pardo, docketed as NLRC
NCR Case No. 04-02820-97.
- In due course, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision IN FAVOR
OF So and Villareal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied Hence, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari.
- On October 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed NLRC Decision.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by
the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated May 8, 2000.
ISSUES
1. WON Petitioner may legally withhold respondent Villareals
monetary benefits as a preliminary remedy pursuant to Article
2071 of the Civil Code, as amended
2. WON Petitioner could withhold his monetary benefits being
authorized by the memorandum he signed, the benefits acting
as compensation
HELD
1. NO. It cannot. Article 116 of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides:
ART. 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
to withhold any amount from the wages (and benefits) of a
worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by
force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means
whatsoever without the workers consent.
- The above provision is clear and needs no further elucidation.
Indeed, petitioner has no legal authority to withhold
respondents 13th month pay and other benefits.
What an
employee has worked for, his employer must pay. Thus, an
employer cannot simply refuse to pay the wages or benefits of
its employee because he has either defaulted in paying a loan
guaranteed by his employer; or violated their memorandum of
agreement; or failed to render an accounting of his employers
property.
- Nonetheless, petitioner, relying on Article 2071 (earlier cited),
contends that the right to demand security and obtain release
from the guaranty it executed in favor of respondent Villareal
may be exercised even without initiating a separate and distinct
action.
- There is no guaranty involved herein and, therefore, the
provision of Article 2071 does not apply.
- A guaranty is distinguished from a surety in that a guarantor is
the insurer of the solvency of the debtor and thus binds himself
to pay if the principal is unable to pay, while a surety is the
insurer of the debt, and he obligates himself to pay if the
principal does not pay.
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dispute. DOLE issued an Order resolving the parity and
representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Sec.
Quisumbing denied petitioner's MFR. Petitioner now seeks relief
in this Court.
- Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed
by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
- The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its
faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other
than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local
hires. Also foreign hires have limited contract of employment
unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure
ISSUES
1. WON the International Schools point-of-hire classification for
the distinction in salary rates between foreign-hires and localhires is discriminatory and an invalid classification under the law.
2. WON foreign-hires should belong to the same bargaining unit
as the local-hires
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The Constitution, Labor Code and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism
of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule
applies
to
the
School,
its
"international
character"
notwithstanding.
Reasoning
- The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights in Art.7 provides that: The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
just and favorable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular,
fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value
without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by
men, with equal pay for equal work. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
- The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to
"humane conditions of work." The Constitution also directs the
State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon
by the Labor Code (Art.135)
- The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires
are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them
which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. Hence, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires'
limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction
in salary rates.
2. NO
- It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their
intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy
security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar
functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to localhires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably
related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion
of the former from the latter.
Disposition Petition GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Sec.
of Labor and Employment are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar
as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according
foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
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SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur]
FERNAN [dissent]
GRINO-AQUINO [dissent]
Labor Law 1
adjustments" and "in the absence of clear statutory authority,"
the boards may no more than adjust "floor wages."
ISSUES
1. WON the regional board of NCR performed an unlawful act of
legislation in decreeing an across the board hike
2. WON RA6727 intended to deregulate the relation between
labor and capital
HELD
1. NO
- The National Capital Region, in decreeing an across-the-board
hike did not performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true
that wage-firing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act Congress; it
is also true, however, that Congress may delegate the power to
fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress
leaves sufficient standards. As this Court has indicated, it is
impressed that the law provides standards which are sufficient,
and in the light of the floor-wage method's failure, the Court
believes that the Commission correctly upheld the Regional
Board of the National Capital Region.
- RA 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing
for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second,
by giving the boards enough powers to achieve this objective.
Congress meant the boards to be creative in resolving the
annual question of wages without labor and management
knocking on the legislature's door at every turn.
2. NO
- Apparently, ECOP is of the mistaken impression that Republic
Act No. 6727 is meant to "get the Government out of the
industry" and leave labor and management alone in deciding
wages. The Court does not think that the law intended to
deregulate the relation between labor and capital for several
reasons: (1 ) The Constitution calls upon the State to protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare; (2) the Constitution
also makes it a duty of the State "to intervene when the
common goal so demands" in regulating property and property
relations; (3) the Charter urges Congress to give priority to the
enactment of measures, among other things, to diffuse the
wealth of the nation and to regulate the use of property; (4) the
Charter recognizes the "just share of labor in the fruits of
production;" (5) under the Labor Code, the State shall regulate
the relations between labor and management; (6) under
Republic Act No. 6727 itself, the State is interested in seeing that
workers receive fair and euitable wages;
and (7) the
Constitution is primarily a document of social justice, and
although it has recognized the importance of the private sector,
it has not embraced fully the concept of laissez faire or
otherwise, relied on pure market forces to govern the economy;
We can not give to the Act a meaning or intent that will conflict
with these basic principles.
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employer must pay full backwages from the time of termination
until it is judicially declared that the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause.
Reasoning
a. Constitutional due process is different from statutory due
process.
The former protects the individual from the
government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in
the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees
from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice
and hearing.
b. The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is
not meant to be a sword to oppress employers.
The
commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent
us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right, as in this
case.
Disposition DENIED. But the private respondent is ORDERED to
pay each of the petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal
damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.
SPEARATE OPINION
PUNO [dissent]
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