Australian Government

STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40(5) OF THE ARCHIVES

ACT 1983-INCLUDING DECISION ON ACCESS
Record Series: A14039
Title: Cabinet Memorandum
International Terrorist
Decision 13904/SEC

Threat

7162 - The
to Australia

Control symbol: 7162

Total number of folios (i.e. equivalent separate
pages) on the record: 11

1. Decision
After examining this record I have decided to open it for public access except for certain
material which is identified below.
2. Basis for decision
I have taken into account:
the content of the record requested;
the relevant provisions of the Archives Act 1983 (the Act);
policy and guidelines of National Archives of Australia that relate to the access
examination of Commonwealth records; and
information provided by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation on which I
have relied in formulating my decision.
3. Material withheld
Category of material withheld

Total number of folios per List each folio separately

category
by category of material
withheld
5, 6, 7, 8, 9
5

Partially
folios
exempted
(certain parts of the text have
been expunged)
Wholly exempted folios
Folios not within the open 0
access period as defined in s3
(7) of the Act
Folios
withheld
pending 0
agency examination and advice

Statement of Reasons page no. 1 of 3

4. Findings of fact and reasons for decision

A. Findings of fact
.
In Table A in Annexure 1, I have provided a summary of my findings of fact where I have
invoked specific provisions under s 33 of the Act. By invoking these provisions, I have relied
on material listed in part 2 above in order .to arrive at my decision.
B. Reasons for decision
In Table A in Annexure 1, I have provided the reasons for my decision for each folio
exempted and those reasons are derived from the findings of fact.
5. Appeal rights
National Archives undertakes careful examination of a record before making a decision to
exempt any part of a record. As part of that process we may consult with other agencies
which have expertise on specific national and international matters.
If you do not agree with my decision to exempt information under a provision of s 33 of the
Act, you can contact a reference officer in National Archives and seek a further explanation.
If you are still not happy with the decision and within 28 days of receiving it, you can
formally appeal by:
1) first applying to Archives for an internal reconsideration of my decision; and
2) if you still do not agree with the decision, you can apply to the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal for a review.

0
0

For more information please read the National Archives Fact Sheet 12- What to do if we refuse
you access. You can also lodge a complaint with the Commonwealth Ombudsman in relation
to the decision.

Decisi<;m maker

Robert Newton

Designation

Access Examiner APS 6

Date

1 January 2016

page no. 2 of 3

Annexure 1
Table A: Material exempted by folio number and grouped by the application of exemption provisions
Relevant legislative
provision invoked
under s33 of the Act

Folio
number

S 33(1) (a) information or matter

the disclosure of
which under this Act
could reasonably be
expected to cause
damage to the
security, defence or
international relations
of the
Commonwealth.

5,6, 7, 8
and 9

Findings of fact

Reasons for Decision

'
These records are exempt as they each may contain the
following references:
1.

intelligence and/ or information of continuing

sensitivity that reveals either intelligence targets,
sources, methodology or capability.

Statement of reasons page no. 3 of 3

The public disclosure of such details could lead

to compromise of past and current procedures
and could reasonably be expected to damage
Australia's continuing requirements to
successfully collect intelligence-related
information. Thus, disclosure could reasonably
be expected to cause damage to the security of
the Commonwealth.

\._..,'

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET IN CON.FIDEN.CE

THIS CABINET

DOCUMENT HAS HAD

A liMITED
CIRCULATION
C A B I N E T

MI N U T E

Security Committee
Canberra, 10 July 1990
No 13904 (SEC)
Memorandum 7162

The International Terrorist Threat to

Australia

The Committee noted the Memorandum.

fl..~
Secretary to Cabinet

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET IN CONFIDEN.CE

I
I
I

THIS

CABINET~

DOCUMENT HAS HAD

A LIMITED
CIRCULATION

No 13904 (SEC)

MINISTERS:

Security Committee

DEPARTMENTS:

Foreign Affairs and Trade

Defence
Chief of Defence Force
Attorney-General's
Finance
ASIO
ASIS
JIO
DSD
ONA

INTERNAL:

FAS, International
AS, OSIC

Mr Hazell d
Mr Ives

I
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:!jJ.

CABINET -IN-CONFIDENCE

SECRET
FOR CABI NET

3
7162

MEMORANDUM Noo....r ooT oo ~

COPY Noo ......U...:J..: ....

Title

THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT TO AUSTRALIA

Date

21 June 1990

Originating
Department(s)

Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)

Cabinet or
Ministerial
Authority for
Memorandum

N/A

Purpose of
Memorandum

To advise Cabinet of the current externally-generated terrorist threat

to Australia

REC~='\' 11 D
2 2 JU \990
'0
''

Legislation

N/A
Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security(the Departments
of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Attorney-General, Finance, Foreign
Affairs and Trade and Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force , the
Australian Security Intelligence Organization and the Office of
National Assessments)

Consultation:
Departments
consulted
Is there
agreement?

Yes

Cost:
This fiscal year
year 2
year 3

Nil

------~------S_E_C_R_E_
T ______________~
This document is the property of the Australian Government and is not to be copied or reproduced

CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE

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INTRODUCTION
This Memorandum describes the threat to Australia from terrorism
inspired by external issues and events. In this context, terrorism is defined as
premeditated politically motivated violence which is life threatening and
intended to create fear beyond the immediate target. International terrorism
of this type threatens foreign interests and the dissidents of foreign states
located here.
OVERVIEW OF THREAT
2.
There have been fewer international terrorist attacks relevant to
Australia in recent years. The main reasons for this are the sustained
commitment to political means of achieving Palestinian statehood by the
groups within the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), principally Al
Fatah; the reluctance of Libya, Syria and Iraq to finance and to use their
tclient' Palestinian terrorist groups outside the PLO (usually referred to as
trejectionist' groups); and the fragmentation and quiescence respectively of
the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and
Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). A more recent
development is the loss of traditional support from the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Ironically for Australia's security, this is apparently leading
to greater interest and activity in Asia by some groups.
3.
The terrorist sources currently the most relevant to Australia are Iran
and allied Islamic terrorist groups; the Palestinian trejectionist' groups,
notably the Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO); and the JCAG. The PLO groups
are also considered in this context although they appear still to represent a
low threat.
4.
Iran has continued its campaign against dissidents abroad. For
example 17 attacks have been attributed to it since 1987, the most recent in
Switzerland in April 1990. Moreover, since 1983 Iranian complicity has been
shown or is suspected in operations attributed to, or claimed by Hizballah
(often using the name Islamic Jihad). The seizure of caches of weapons and
explosives in 1988 and 1989 in Europe, apparently for use by Hizballah,
suggests that further terrorist attacks in Europe are planned. Iranian
sponsorship of the attack on Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988 is
suspected. Iran is now seen to be the principal proponent of state terrorism,
ahead of Libya, Syria and Iraq.
5.
The ANO has a long history of terrorism extending back to the mid
1970s, although it appears largely to have been operationally inactive since
July 1988. Contributing factors to this inactivity include extensive internal
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dispute and the refusal of Libya, the ANO's principal patron, to sanction
operations for fear of international isolation and physical and economic
retaliation. Nevertheless, the ANO retains its operational infrastructure
abroad and, being too small and isolated to have an effective military or
political role, can assert itself only through terrorism. It is a most dangerous
and brutal group capable of almost any outrage. It cannot be expected to
remain passive indefinitely. It is one of the groups moving into A s i a 6.
Several other 'rejectionist' group are considered to have the potential
for mercenary attacks on behalf of a wide range of potential 'employers' as
their traditional sources of funds, principally Libya and Syria, dry up. One of
these, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command) is
held responsible for the destruction of Pan Am 103.
7.
The JCAG has carried out some 30 attacks on Turkish targets over the
period 1975 to 1984 but its ruling body, the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation, decided to seek international recognition and support by political
means. However, the continued quiescence of the JCAG cannot be relied on,
and it remains in an excellent position to resume terrorism should the
Armenian cause fail to gain the recognition the Federation seeks. Moreover,
there is the potential of JCAG supporters to conduct maverick operations as
they did in Canada in 1985 and Melbourne in 1986. There is no identifiable
threat from AS ALA.
The capacity of Arafat to adhere to his diplomatic strategy is placed in
8.
jeopardy by the failure of his political campaign, the PLO's inability to exploit
the intifada (Islamic Palestinian groups closer to Iran now prevail), and the
prospect of Soviet Jewish emigration into the Occupied Territories. Whether
the pressure on Arafat will lead to international terrorism by one or several of
the PLO groups is not clear; however, his previous success in resisting such
pressure cannot be guaranteed.
9.
The trend is for international terrorist groups to conduct attacks in
ways and places which reduce the risk of danger to themselves. In this regard
the increased number of attacks in, or originating from, Asia is significant for
Australia. In recent years the most common targets have been diplomats and
officials of 'hostile' countries, the aircraft of those countries and dissidents of
Iran. This is likely to continue, with the dissidents of Iraq increasingly
targeted. The list of such 'hostile' countries is very long given the variety of
conflicts overseas, but Israel, the United States, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, West
Germany, Britain, France and Turkey would head the list.

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10.
The preferred terrorist weapons continue to be guns and bombs with
the latter increasingly being used indiscriminately and with greater loss of
life. Bombs on aircraft and in vehicles are the major killers.
THE THREAT TO AUSTRALIA
Australia has been relatively untouched by international terrorism.
The reasons for this include Australia's distance from the Middle East and the
other advantages of its geography which deter terrorist travel and allow some
control of entry. Also, Australia does not have the background of political
and economic involvement in the Middle East which in other countries,
particularly Western Europe, has led to a high volume of Middle Eastern
entry. Middle Eastern terrorists have easier access to other countries where
the environment is more conducive to their operations, where targets are
plentiful, and where the opportunities for publicity and impact are as good or
better.
I I.

12.
Nevertheless, in the past 15 years there have been seven international
terrorist attacks in Australia or against Australians, and a further
known or suspected to have been planned here (see Attachment A).

13.

The small JCAG support group in Sydney continues to meet

remains violently inclined and susceptible to external and domestic

provocation.

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20.
To sum up, the threat of international terrorism in Australia is low but
with the prospect of isolated attacks.

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CONCLUSION
21.
Despite some mitigating factors, the threat to Australia from
international terrorism has been increased by a number of significant
developments identified in this Memorandum. Those developments are:

The future terrorist threat to Australia is unpredictable. It could come from

several sources; it is likely to be driven by changes and developments
overseas, and could be directed against any number of the wide range of
potential targets here.
22.
Australia continues to be at risk from international terrorism. That
threat is relatively low and likely to be manifest only episodically, but it
carries the possibility of large loss of life.

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ATTACHMENT A

In the past 15 years there have been seven international terrorist attacks in
Australia or against Australians, and a further- known or suspected to
have been planned here. The seven attacks were:

(a)

the bombing of the Hilton Hotel in Sydney during CHOGRM

in 1978- members of the Ananda Marga were suspected;

(b)

the distribution of poisoned sweets at an Assyrian function

in Sydney by an Iraqi intelligence officer in 1978;

(c)

the murder of the Turkish Consul-General and his

bodyguard in Sydney in 1980;

(d)

two bomb attacks, on the Israeli Consulate-General and a

Jewish social club, in Sydney in 1982 (on the same day and
probably by the same unknown perpetrators);

(e)

the bomb attack by JCAG members on the Turkish

Consulate-General in Melbourne in 1986; and

(f)

the attempted assassination in Scotland by the Yugoslav

intelligence service of Nikola Stedul, an Australian citizen
and leader of the HDP, a Croatian separatist organisation.

The -terrorist operations planned or suspected of being planned

were:
(a)

the assassination by the PFLP of the Israeli Ambassador to

Australia in 1975;

(b)

the bombing campaign in Sydney by Croatian separatists in

1979 ('Lithgow bombers');

(c)

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(d)

action against (presumably) Turkish targets in 1983 and 1985

by JCAG members; and

(e)

the assassinations of prominent Croatian separatists by the

Yugoslav security service, in 1981 and 1985.

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Cabinet
Submission/Memorandum
No 7 16z
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