New America Foundation
Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper
The Militant Pipeline
Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West
Paul Cruickshank
February 2010
In the majority of the 21 'serious' terrorist plots against the west since 2004, plotters either
received direction from or trained with al-Qaeda or its allies in Pakistan, throwing into sharp relief
the danger posed by terrorist safe havens in Pakistan.
Despite growing concerns over Yemen, Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and swaths of the
country’s northwest remain al-Qaeda’s main safe haven.1
rising number of Westerners are travelling to the region for
paramilitary training, with 100 to 150 suspected of making
the trip in the last year, according to Western
counterterrorism officials.2 While many went there because
the area is the principal gateway to join the fighting in
Afghanistan, the presence of al-Qaeda, and its continued
ability to train recruits and persuade them to launch attacks
in the West, continue to make the FATA what President
Obama has called “the most dangerous place in the world.”
This paper will chart the emergence and evolution of the
FATA and bordering areas of the North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP) as a terrorist safe haven through five case
studies of clusters of Western militants who trained there
in the last seven years. These cases were chosen because
the most open-source information was available about
them.
• The U.K. fertilizer bomb plotters (training sponsored by
al-Qaeda in 2003)
Paul Cruickshank, an alumni fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security, is currently working on a CNN series on the U.S. domestic
terrorism threat.
• The U.K. airline plotters (trained by al-Qaeda in 2005-
06)
A • The German “Sauerland” group (trained by the Islamic
Jihad Union in 2006)
• The Danish recruit Hammad Khurshid (trained by al-
Qaeda in 2007)
• Bryant Neal Vinas and the Belgian-French group
(allegedly trained by al-Qaeda in 2008)
Drawing on interrogation reports, courtroom testimony,
confessions, and statements of these Western recruits, this
3
paper will describe al-Qaeda’s mountainous sanctuary from
the perspective of the Western militants who traveled there.
Their rare eyewitness accounts—in large part viewed as
credible by Western intelligence agencies—shed light on
how al-Qaeda’s capabilities have been affected by drone
strikes, the types of training camps it now runs, how its
relations with other jihadist groups have deepened, how it
has continued to attract Western recruits and persuade
them to launch attacks in the West, and the degree to which
it can now control such operations from its mountain base.
The paper will also examine the degree to which
Westerners are joining militant groups allied with al-Qaeda
in the FATA and bordering areas of the NWFP.
A Survey of Serious Plots Against the
West 2004-2009
In order to gauge the recent danger posed by terrorist safe
havens along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the author
examined the links between the region and what he
assesses to have been the “serious” Islamist terrorist plots
against the homelands of Western countries since 2004,
the year in which al Qaeda and its allies started to
consolidate their position along the border. By “serious,”
the author means every plot in which Islamist terrorists
killed or were acquiring the capability to kill a significant
number of people. By “significant,” the author means at
least 10.
Methodology
It is, of course, very difficult to be categorical about what
constitutes a “serious” terrorist plot, because it is hard to
measure the true danger posed by plots that were thwarted
before terrorists could carry out their plans. Nevertheless,
the author attempted to build a list using certain objective
criteria.
First, the author included the three plots that killed 10 or
more people.
Second, the author included the plots that likely would have
killed a significant number of people if explosive devices
had not malfunctioned—a total of four plots, including
most recently the Christmas Day 2009 attempt to blow up
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 by Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian.
Third, the author included the thwarted plots in which
suspected cell members were alleged to have acquired—
without the assistance of undercover law enforcement
agents or informants—bomb-making components or a
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
stockpile of weapons that they planned to use to kill a
significant number of people. This category totaled 14 plots,
including most recently the September 2009 plot to blow
up targets in New York by Afghan immigrant Najibullah
Zazi.
By this author’s assessment, there have been, according to
this criteria, 21 serious plots against the homelands of
Western countries in the six years since 2004.4
The author accepts that these categories are not a perfect
means by which to classify serious terrorist plots. By the
author’s assessment, five additional plots posed a
significant potential threat because plotters undertook
detailed target planning and surveillance: the August 2004
U.K. “gas-limo plot,” the December 2008 plot by Rany
Arnaud to target the headquarters of the French
counterterrorism services in Paris, the alleged April 2009
“Manchester plot” targeting Britain, the alleged August
2009 plot by al Shabab-linked terrorists to attack a military
base in Australia, and the alleged October 2009 plot by
suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba operative David Headley, an
American, to target a Danish newspaper. Three of these
were directed from Pakistan. However, all these plots were
thwarted before plotters acquired any bomb components or
weapons enabling them to realize their plans, so they were
excluded from the survey of serious plots.5
The 21 serious plots and their operational and training links
to jihadist groups overseas are outlined chronologically in
the table below.
page 2
 2004 to 2009: Serious Plots Against the West

2004-
2004-09 Target Why classed as Operational direction Did at least one Resolution of
21 SERIOUS description “serious”? from overseas?
overseas? plotter train overseas case
PLOTS after 9/11?
1. Madrid Madrid 191 killed and more Possible. One No. The Madrid cell 7 blew themselves
bombings, commuter than 1,000 injured ringleader had acquired dynamite in up rather than
March 2004 trains communications Spain rather than surrender to
with an al-Qaeda traveling overseas to police. 17 found
operative in the tribal receive bomb-making guilty in relation
areas of Pakistan.6 instruction.7 to plot.8
2. U.K. Civilian targets Sophisticated Yes. Al-Qaeda leaders Yes. All 7 of those 5 convicted of
fertilizer in London planning and directed group to convicted trained in conspiracy to
bomb plot acquisition of launch attacks in NWFP in 2003.9 murder in the
foiled by bomb components Britain. U.K. 2 others
Operation linked to plot
Crevice, convicted in U.S.
March 2004 and Canada.10
3. Torrance, Military Plotters acquired No. The plot was No. The plotters did 4 were convicted
California, facilities and weapons (which entirely homegrown. not travel outside the for their role in
plot, thwarted Israeli and they used for United States. the plot.12
in July 2005 Jewish facilities armed robberies to
in Los Angeles finance plot).11
area
4. London London 52 killed Yes. Directed by al- Yes.
Yes 2 of the bombers The 4 suicide
bombings, transport Qaeda, as indicated trained in NWFP in bombers were
July 7, 2005 system by videos recorded by 2003 and are believed killed in the
(known as two plotters and later to have trained in attacks.
7/7) released by al- FATA in 2004.14
Qaeda’s propaganda
unit, as-Sahab. 13
5. Attempted London Would likely have Yes.
Yes Ringleader Yes. Ibrahim is 4 were convicted
London transport killed dozens if Muktar Said Ibrahim believed to have in the U.K. for
bombings, system TATP detonators is suspected of received explosives conspiracy to
July 21, 2005 (which detonated) having met with al- training in Pakistan.16 murder.
(known as had created Qaeda leaders in
7/21) enough energy to Pakistan in winter of
explode main 2004-05.15
charge

New America Foundation -- Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 3

6. Australian Targets in Acquisition of No.
No The militants Yes. One of the 17 have been
plot thwarted Melbourne and bomb components appear to have acted Sydney-based plotters convicted in
by Operation Sydney and sophisticated independently of any is alleged to have connection to the
Pendennis, planning and established jihadist trained in Lashkar-e- plot, 8 from
17
November surveillance group. Taiba camp in Melbourne and 9
2005 Pakistan in late 2001 from Sydney.19
and early 2002. One
of the Melbourne
plotters trained in
Pakistan before 9/11.18
7. Plots in Assassination Stockpiling of No. The plots appear Yes. Two members of 10 were originally
Netherlands of Dutch weapons to have been hatched the Hofstad group are convicted in
by Hofstad filmmaker autonomously. believed to have relation to the
group, 2003- Theo van Gogh received training in plots, including
06 and targets in Pakistan in 2003. A ringleader
Amsterdam third traveled there Mohammed
but likely did not Bouyeri. After a
receive training.20 series of legal
judgments, 7 will
be retried.21
8. Plot by Targets in Acquisition of No.
No The plot appears Yes. One of group is 4 have been
Toronto 18, Ontario bomb to have been hatched believed to have convicted in
thwarted June components22 autonomously. traveled to Pakistan’s connection to the
2006 NWFP for training.23 plot, 7 await trial,
and 7 have been
released.24
9. Attempted Two German German No.
No The plot appears No. The men did not 2 have been
attack on commuter authorities say to have been hatched receive any explosives convicted for the
German trains leaving device could have autonomously. training. plot. An
commuter Cologne killed up to 72 additional suspect
trains, July people if it had was killed in
2006 been properly clashes between
25
constructed. Fatah al-Islam
and the Lebanese
government in
May 2007.26

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 4

10. At least seven Acquisition of Yes.
Yes Plot was Yes.
Yes Several of the 10 have been
Transatlantic transatlantic bomb components orchestrated by al- plotters trained in convicted in
airline plot, airliners. More and sophisticated Qaeda commanders FATA between 2004 relation to the
thwarted than 1,500 planning. Police in FATA. and 2006. 7 of those plot, 4 of whom
August 2006 could have seized hydrogen convicted were in were convicted of
been killed. peroxide and Pakistan sometime in conspiracy to
chemical 2004-06.27 blow up
constituents of airliners.28
HMTD.

11. Denmark Undisclosed Acquisition of No. The cell acted No. Bomb-maker 3 were convicted
“Vollsmose” targets in bomb-making autonomously. Mohammed Zaher, a of the plot.30
case foiled, Denmark components. Dane of Palestinian
September Police seized origin, claimed in
2006 ammoniun nitrate court he had learned
and 50 g of TATP. how to make TATP
from the Internet. He
testified that “military
training” in his youth
helped him handle
the explosives.29
12. Attempted A London Dozens could have No.
No According to No. The cell did not 1 died in the
bombings in nightclub and been killed had British authorities, travel to receive attack and 1 was
London and Glasgow propane bombs Iraqi doctor Bilal training. convicted for the
Glasgow, June Airport detonated.31 Abdulla had links to attack.33
2007 al-Qaeda in Iraq but
no evidence has
emerged showing he
was acting under its
orders.32
13. Fort Dix Fort Dix Army Acquisition of No. The plot was No. The cell 5 were convicted
plot thwarted, base in New weapons, entirely homegrown. conducted weapons of conspiring to
May 2007 Jersey including assault training on a kill American
rifles shooting range in the soldiers.35
United States.34
14. Targets in Acquisition of Yes.
Yes Ringleader Yes. Khurshid 2 were convicted
Copenhagen Europe bomb-making Hammad Khurshid received al-Qaeda in connection to
“Glasvej” plot components met with top al- instruction in how to the plot.36
thwarted, Qaeda leaders in make TATP bombs in
September FATA. FATA.
2007

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 5

15. Alleged plot American Acquisition of Yes.
Yes Plotters were Yes.
Yes 4 trained in how 5 are on trial in
by Sauerland service bomb-making directed to attack to concentrate Germany. They
group in members in components targets in Europe by hydrogen peroxide for have made
Germany Germany at Islamic Jihad Union bomb-making in detailed
37 38
thwarted, discos and leaders in FATA. FATA. confessions. 39
September other crowded
2007 spaces
16. Barcelona Barcelona Acquisition of Yes.
Yes Allegedly Yes. One of the 11 were convicted
plot thwarted, Metro system bomb-making directed by the plotters is alleged to of membership in
January 2008 components40 Pakistani Taliban. have trained in FATA. a terrorist
In total 8 plotters organization
spent time in plotting to stage
Pakistan in the suicide attacks. A
months leading up to protected witness
the plot.41 was not tried.42
17. U.K. plot to Bristol Andrew Ibrahim No. No. Ibrahim was
launch suicide shopping put together a convicted for the
bombing in center suicide vest and plot.44
Bristol, successfully
thwarted manufactured
April 2008 HMTD in
preparation for his
planned attack.43
18. Alleged Marine Corps Acquisition of No.
No No.
No But one 2 were indicted
plot against Base Quantico guns and individual linked to for plot.
Quantico ammunition the alleged cell is
Marine believed to be at large
Barracks in in FATA. Ringleader
Virginia, Daniel Boyd is
thwarted July alleged to have
2009 trained in
Afghanistan and
Pakistan in the
1990s.45

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 6

 19. Plot by Several New Acquisition of Yes. Directed by al- Yes.
Yes Zazi and two 3 were indicted
suspected cell York subways bomb-making Qaeda leaders in other alleged plotters for direct role in
led by components Pakistan. are suspected of conspiracy.
Najibullah training with al-
Zazi to attack Qaeda in FATA in fall
New York, 2008; Zazi himself
thwarted has admitted this.46
September
2009
20. Shooting U.S. military 13 killed Possible No. Nidal Hasan faces
at Fort Hood, personnel “Sanctioning.” Nidal trial.
Texas, deploying for Hasan was in
November Iraq and communication with
2009 Afghanistan Anwar al-Awlaki, a
cleric linked to al-
Qaeda in Yemen
(AQAP).47
21. Attempted A passenger jet Authorities said Yes. Plot directed by Yes. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
attack on en route to that if main PETN al-Qaeda in Yemen Abdulmutallab faces trial.
Northwest Detroit charge had been (AQAP).49 received instruction
Airlines Flight detonated, plane in Yemen.
253, could have been
Christmas brought down.48
Day 2009
TOTALS 8 plots directed from 11 plots involved 131 plotters in
21 plots Pakistan training in Pakistan serious terrorist
1 plot directed from after 9/11. cases convicted,
the Middle East: the Up to 37 individuals deported,
2009 Detroit case trained in Pakistan in awaiting trial, or
(Yemen). these plots. deceased.
1 plot involved
training in the Middle
East: the 2009
Detroit case (Yemen).

Color Key
Gray = link to Pakistan; Light gray = possible link to Pakistan.
Green = link to the Middle East; Light green = possible link to the Middle East.

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 7

Survey Findings
This survey of the 21 “serious” plots against the West since
2004 throws into sharp relief the danger posed by terrorist
safe havens in Pakistan. In the majority of these cases (52
percent), plotters either received direction from or trained
with al-Qaeda or its allies in Pakistan. In just nine cases
were there no indications of any connection between
plotters and terrorists in Pakistan.
Underlining Pakistan’s emergence as an operational
headquarters for terrorists determined to attack the West,
al-Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan had direct operational
ties to 38 percent (eight out of 21) of the serious plots in the
West since 2004. “Core” al-Qaeda was responsible for six of
those plots, 29 percent of the total.
The survey also indicates that there is a strong
correlation between plotters travelling to train
in Pakistan and the most serious terrorism
plots.
The survey also indicates that there is a strong correlation
between plotters travelling to train in Pakistan and the most
serious terrorism plots. In just over half of the serious plots
against the West, alleged terrorists received training in
camps in Pakistan. The exact location of training is not
known in every case, but in at least seven cases there are
indications that it occurred in the FATA or bordering areas
of the NWFP.
In the 52 percent of serious terrorism cases with a training
link to Pakistan, the pattern was often for only some of the
group—frequently the leading figures in the conspiracy—to
make the trip for terrorist instruction. This is reflected in
the fact that of the 131 individuals implicated in the serious
cases surveyed, only up to 28 percent received training in
New America Foundation -- Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
Pakistan after the September 11, 2001, (9/11) attacks on the
United States.50
These figures have important implications for policymakers
weighing the relative threat of autonomous “homegrown”
plots and conspiracies directed by established overseas
jihadist groups. This subject has divided some leading
terrorism experts in the United States. Marc Sageman,
author of the 2008 book, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks
in the Twenty-First Century, for example, has emphasized
the threat posed by autonomous homegrown plots. In an
exhaustive survey of all terrorism plots in the West from
2004 to 2008, Sageman found that 78 percent of all 33
plots during this period came from “autonomous
homegrown groups without any connection, direction or
control from al-Qaeda Core or its allies.”51 This data led
Sageman to argue that the greatest terrorist threat to the
West now came not from al-Qaeda’s old guard, but from a
new wave of “homegrown young wannabes who dream of
glory and adventure, who yearn to belong to a heroic
vanguard and to root their lives in a greater sense of
meaning. Inspired by tales of past heroism, they hope to
emulate their predecessors, even though, for the most part,
they can no longer link up with al-Qaeda Central in the
Pakistani badlands.”52
While the evidence suggests that al-Qaeda’s operations have
indeed become more decentralized and that a new
generation of recruits is showing more self-initiative, my
survey indicates that al-Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan have
nevertheless continued to direct a significant proportion of
the serious terrorist plots hatched against the West. More
precisely, 38 percent (8) of the serious plots in the West in
2004-09 were directed by jihadist groups in Pakistan alone.
If plots hatched by al-Qaeda affiliates in other non-western
regions are also taken into consideration, then 43 percent of
all serious plots in the West since 2004 (9) were
orchestrated by established jihadist groups, demonstrating
the continued relevance of “leader-led” jihad. The
proportion of such plots with some link to organized
page 8
jihadist groups worldwide was higher still. Overall, there
were 12 serious plots in which participants either received
training or were given mission orders at a jihadist
encampment overseas, or 57 percent of such plots.

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These findings have important implications for Western
policymakers. The fact that the majority of serious plots in
the West since 2004 saw plotters either trained or directed
by established Jihadist groups means that high priority
should be given to developing comprehensive strategies to
shrink terrorist safe havens around the world, particularly
in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The threat posed by plots
hatched in the FATA was underscored by the 2006
transatlantic airline plot, which officials say had the
potential to kill over 1,500 people—arguably as deadly as all
the other plots in the last six years combined.53
Terrorism Made in Pakistan: an
Overview
Until recently Britain was unquestionably the Western
country most vulnerable to al-Qaeda’s safe haven in
Pakistan. In 2008, U.K. authorities judged that 75 percent
of plots since 9/11 could be traced to Pakistan.54 In early
2004, a British al-Qaeda operative, Dhiren Barot, traveled
to meet al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan to present his plans for
an attack on U.K. targets using gas canisters in limousines.
He and seven associates were subsequently convicted in the
55
plot.
All five of the British men found guilty of plotting to attack
London targets with fertilizer bombs in March 2004 were
trained in how to make these explosives the previous spring
in camps in the NWFP bordering Pakistan’s tribal areas.56
So too were a Canadian accomplice also convicted in
relation to the plot and Mohammed Junaid Babar, a Queens
taxi driver, who had arranged training for the group in
Malakand in the NWFP.57 The Malakand camp was also
attended by two of the British al-Qaeda operatives who
bombed the London Underground in July 2005—
Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer.58
duo had received additional training in 2005 in how to
make bombs out of concentrated hydrogen peroxide and
HMTD, a powerful citric acid-based detonating substance,
which they exploded to devastating effect on London tube
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trains and a bus. According to British authorities, that
training possibly took place in the FATA.59
On July 21, 2005, two weeks after the London bombings,
another U.K. al-Qaeda cell, led by Muktar Said Ibrahim,
attempted to launch a follow-on attack. But their devices,
which used a different detonating substance—TATP—
failed to set off the concentrated hydrogen peroxide in their
makeshift bombs. Ibrahim had traveled to Pakistan the
previous winter, during which time British
counterterrorism investigators believe he received
60
explosives training for the attack.
In August 2006, British police broke up a plot to blow up at
least seven transatlantic airliners with liquid explosives, al-
Qaeda’s most ambitious plot since 9/11. According to U.S.
counterterrorism officials, several of the plotters were
trained in how to make the devices by al-Qaeda in the
FATA. As in the transit system suicide attacks, the devices
were made out of concentrated hydrogen peroxide with
HMTD detonators, a combination that has emerged as al-
Qaeda’s signature choice of explosives for attacks in the
West. Evidence presented in court suggested that this
bomb-making training occurred in 2005-06 in Pakistan.61
The July 7, 2005, plot, the July 21, 2005, plot, and the 2006
airline plot were all in Pakistan at the same time—during
the winter of 2004-05, suggesting possible coordination
between the plots.62
The type of bomb-making training that
different groups of plotters received in
Pakistan was in many instances remarkably
similar.
The
The type of bomb-making training that different groups of
plotters received in Pakistan was in many instances
remarkably similar, suggesting either that they were trained
page 10
by the same instructors or that al-Qaeda, having worked out
which types of devices can be constructed by plotters in the
West, established standardized bomb-making courses.63
The al-Qaeda bomb-makers who have provided explosives
training to Western recruits in the FATA are arguably the
terrorist organization’s most valuable asset.
In April 2009, British police broke up what security
services at the time described as a “very serious plot” to
attack shopping centers in Manchester by 12 individuals
reported to have links to al-Qaeda, mostly visiting students
from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, the FATA,
and Punjab.64
Since 2006 a growing number of militants from
Continental Europe have traveled to Pakistan and received
terrorist training. Four men arrested in Germany in
September 2007 for plotting to attack American targets in
the country trained with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic
Jihad Union (IJU) in North Waziristan in the summer of
2006. Like in the recent al-Qaeda plots against the West,
the IJU taught the men how to build hydrogen peroxide
devices.65 The Islamic Jihad Union is a splinter
organization of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), a militant group engaged in a struggle to remove
the Uzbek regime from power and establish an Islamist
state in the country. Government repression in the past
several years has led both organizations to move their
center of operations to the tribal areas of Pakistan.66
In spring 2007, Hammad Khurshid, a Danish al-Qaeda
recruit of Pakistani origin, was taught by al-Qaeda
instructors how to make TATP detonators in a camp in
North Waziristan. He was arrested in Copenhagen in
September 2007 and subsequently convicted of plotting to
launch attacks on targets in Denmark and elsewhere in
67
Europe.
In January 2008, Spanish police arrested members of an
alleged Pakistani Taliban cell in Barcelona accused of
plotting to attack the city’s Metro system and other targets
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
in Europe. Some of them are alleged to have received
training in the tribal areas.68
That same month, a group of seven militants from Belgium
and France entered Waziristan, where some of them
subsequently allegedly received explosives training with al-
Qaeda. Several of the group will be tried in March 2010 in
Brussels, accused of being part of an alleged sleeper cell.69
Disturbingly for U.S. counterterrorism agencies, in the last
two years, a growing number of American residents have
also traveled to Pakistan and received terrorism training.
For example, Bryant Neal Vinas, a Catholic Latino convert
to Islam from Long Island, received bomb-making training
from al-Qaeda in Waziristan after joining the terrorist outfit
in March 2008. After his arrest, Vinas confessed to helping
al-Qaeda develop a plot to attack the Long Island Rail
Road.70
Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan American limousine driver
from Denver, received terrorist training from Al-Qaeda
after traveling to Pakistan in August 2008.71 Joining him on
the trip were two New York high school buddies—Adis
Medunjanin, an American of Bosnian descent, and Zarein
Ahmedzay, an Afghan.72 Medunjanin was subsequently
charged with having received training during the trip.73
According to U.S. prosecutors, Zazi scanned handwritten
instructions on how to make TATP detonators and e-mailed
them to himself after being trained in Pakistan’s tribal
areas. After his arrest in September 2009, Zazi was
charged with planning to attack targets in New York City
with hydrogen peroxide bombs and TATP detonators.74 In
February 2010 Zazi pleaded guilty to planning to attack
New York City subway lines.75
Another American resident, David Headley, spent
significant time in the FATA in recent years. Headley, a
Chicagoan of Pakistani descent, is charged with
involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and a plot to
attack the offices of the Danish newspaper that published
controversial cartoons of the prophet Mohammed.
page 11
According to the criminal complaint, he had key planning
meetings in Pakistan in the first half of 2009 with a
militant commander allied to al-Qaeda.76
Americans are still believed to be at large in the FATA,
including Jude Kenan Mohammad, an individual with links
to an alleged North Carolina jihadist cell charged with
plotting to attack the Quantico Marine Barracks in
77
Virginia.
2002-04: The Emergence of a Safe
Haven
The loss of safe haven in Afghanistan was traumatic to al-
Qaeda. No less distressing for the group’s leaders was the
decision by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to join
the U.S. war on terrorism, something few top al-Qaeda
leaders imagined possible before 9/11.78 In late 2001 and
early 2002, dozens of al-Qaeda operatives were arrested
trying to cross the border into Pakistan, a country that
many had assumed would be a sanctuary. “We are going
from misfortune to disaster.... Pakistan has almost been
drowned in one push,” an operative believed to be Saif al-
Adel, a senior Egyptian al-Qaeda commander, wrote to
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in June 2002.79 Those al-Qaeda
leaders who were not captured crossing the border mostly
fled to Pakistani cities or across the border into Iran. In the
following months, several key leaders who went into hiding
in Pakistani cities were arrested by authorities there,
including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who
apprehended in Quetta in February 2003.80 Such arrests
contributed to al-Qaeda concentrating its operations
increasingly in Pakistan’s tribal areas.81 According to
Mohammed Junaid Babar, an American al-Qaeda recruit,
al-Qaeda operatives could lie low in the FATA because it
was outside the control of the Pakistani government.82
The U.K. Fertilizer Bomb Plotters – trained in
NWFP, 2003
Babar was a close associate of a cluster of several dozen
U.K. extremists who traveled to Lahore, one of Pakistan’s
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
major cities, to “support the jihad” shortly after 9/11. Most
of the Western militants then traveling to Pakistan were
Several from Britain, a function of its large Pakistani diaspora
community, the large number of visits members of this
community made each year (400,000) to their home
country, and the fact that al-Qaeda’s ideology had made
more inroads in Britain than in any other Western
country.83 Only later did Pakistan become the preferred
destination for militants from the European continent,
countries with much smaller Pakistani communities.84
Like most Western Islamist militants who traveled to
Pakistan after 9/11, most of these British recruits had an
ambition—if not always well defined—to receive military
training so they could join the fighting ranks of the
“mujahideen.” While a surprisingly high number initially
viewed Chechnya as an ideal place to fight, the perception
that it was difficult to get there meant that most set their
eyes on fighting the United States and its allies in
Afghanistan.85 By this author’s assessment of the hundreds
of Western militants who have gone to Pakistan since 9/11,
very few made the journey expressly to get terrorist training
to launch attacks in their home countries.
Of the hundreds of Western militants who
have gone to Pakistan since 9/11, very few
was
made the journey expressly to get terrorist
training to launch attacks in their home
countries.
Five of the British extremists with whom Babar associated
in Pakistan were subsequently convicted of participating in
an al-Qaeda plot to bomb targets in London with fertilizer-
based devices. In March 2004, British police arrested the
plotters, including its U.K. ringleader, Omar Khyam. The
raid was the culmination of Operation Crevice, a fast-paced
international investigation into a conspiracy discovered by
intelligence agencies just weeks earlier. The 2006-07 trial
page 12
of the fertilizer bomb plotters—in which Babar testified
against his former al-Qaeda comrades—shed much light
into how northwestern Pakistan, and Pakistan’s tribal areas,
were emerging as a safe haven for Osama bin Laden’s
86
terrorist group.
Khyam, who by 2000 had already developed close
connections with the Kashmiri militant group Lashkar-e-
Taiba, got in touch with senior al-Qaeda leaders in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area shortly after 9/11, likely by
using his contacts in Kashmiri militant circles and with
U.K.-based facilitators.87 Connecting with al-Qaeda was not
then difficult for British radicals. During the 1990s, British
extremists had built up a web of connections with al-Qaeda
operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the first few
years after 9/11 there were plenty of facilitators around to
connect would-be British jihadists with al-Qaeda operatives
in Pakistan.88 The pattern was for small groups of British
extremists to fly to major Pakistani cities such as Lahore,
Islamabad, and Karachi, and be met by U.K. contacts at the
airport, who would house them and eventually help link
them up with training. Helpful in this regard was the fact
that U.K. extremists were present in several Pakistani cities,
forming a loose network that spanned the country from
Lahore to Islamabad and from Karachi to Peshawar.89
British militants often traveled back to Britain
to meet with accomplices there, or to try to
raise money.
Babar’s account revealed that British extremists in Pakistan
were in contact with associates in the United Kingdom.
British militants often traveled back to Britain to meet with
accomplices there, or to try to raise money. And while in
Pakistan, they clandestinely maintained contact with U.K.
associates through instant-messaging sites or by accessing
draft messages in shared e-mail accounts.90
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
Khyam’s group took its orders from al-Qaeda operatives in
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Initially the group
wanted to fight in Afghanistan. But in early 2003 Abdul
Hadi, their al-Qaeda handler, sent word that al-Qaeda
already “had enough people” in Afghanistan and that “if
they really wanted to do something they could go back [to
Britain] and do something there.”91 Several other groups of
Western militants would be similarly retasked by al-Qaeda
in the following years.
While Khyam’s group waited for mission orders in spring
2003, several of them were ordered to flee from Lahore to
Kohat, a mountainous district of the NWFP bordering the
FATA, to escape Pakistani authorities after the arrest of one
of their associates, illustrating the growing importance of
the NWFP-FATA area as a hiding place for al-Qaeda.92
In June 2003, three of the leading figures in the group,
including Khyam, received explosives training from Dolat
Khan, a freelance Afghan bomb-maker, in an apartment
they rented in Kohat. The training included hands-on
instruction about how to make bombs from easily
purchasable fertilizer—devices they tested in a nearby
river.93 They were also taught how to manufacture the
deadly poison ricin, a potentially useful tool for
assassination.
The following month a larger contingent of Khyam’s group
traveled to Malakand, a mountainous region to the north of
Kohat in the NWFP, to receive similar training. At the
camp, the group successfully tested a fertilizer bomb
similar to the type they planned to use in London. Those
taking part included Mohammed Siddique Khan and
Shehzad Tanweer, who would bomb London’s transport
system on July 7, 2005.94
Even though Khyam’s group had been under al-Qaeda’s
orders, it had been left to them to organize much of the
training in Kohat and Malakand—a significant departure
from the way al-Qaeda had operated in Afghanistan.
Although al-Qaeda was beginning to reconstitute itself in
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and around the tribal areas of Pakistan, its organized
structures had been weakened. Consequently, recruits were
expected to show much more initiative. As Khyam’s group
searched for training during the previous months, it
reached out to a variety of contacts, including Laskhar-e-
Taiba, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda.95
Babar himself had taken the initiative to organize training
for the group in Malakand through his militant contacts.
The U.K. group offered a local mualana, or Muslim scholar,
over £3,000 for use of a makeshift facility in the hills above
his school, an encampment consisting of two tents and a
small area in which they could fire weapons. Rather than
being trained by al-Qaeda instructors, the group got its
96
bomb-making lessons from the maulana’s son. All this
was a far cry from the large training complexes that had
been at al-Qaeda’s disposal in Afghanistan. But the training
in Malakand nevertheless had an immediate impact on the
men. Babar later testified that, from this point forward, the
group became much more serious in preparing for an
attack on Britain.97
Khyam, who had brought significant cash with him from
Britain, handed £5,500 over to al-Qaeda after his al-Qaeda
98
handler requested money. Others in the group also
provided cash and equipment in 2002-03.99 In the years
that followed, such cash injections from recruits would
provide important revenue to al-Qaeda. The post-9/11 years
have created cash-flow problems for the terrorist group, a
result of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates cracking down on funding sources from the
Persian Gulf region. This was demonstrated by Ayman al-
Zawahiri’s 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader
of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in which he pleaded for money because
“the [funding] lines have been cut off.”100
Whenever Khyam met with his al-Qaeda handlers, he did so
in and around the tribal areas of Pakistan. The handlers did
not appear to regard other parts of Pakistan as secure and
were nervous about meeting the whole of Khyam’s group.
In a meeting in Kohat in August 2003, Khyam was tasked
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
with setting off multiple bombs simultaneously against
targets in London. But he did not have the authority to
choose the targets himself, Babar testified, illustrating that
al-Qaeda, while outsourcing important tasks, was still
determined to make the key decisions.101
Once Khyam’s cell returned to Britain, they communicated
little with their handlers in Pakistan. In February 2004,
when Khyam wanted to check his bomb-making formula
with his al-Qaeda handlers, there was a delay of two to three
weeks in getting a response because he had to go through
an accomplice in Pakistan who then traveled all the way to
the tribal areas to get the reply, which was then transmitted
to Khyam via an Internet chat room.102 The episode
illustrated that while al-Qaeda was rebuilding its operations
in and around the tribal areas, it had yet to reestablish a
network able to quickly relay instructions to operatives
overseas.
While al-Qaeda was rebuilding its operations
in and around the tribal areas, it had yet to
reestablish a network able to quickly relay
instructions to operatives overseas.
2005-07: A Safer Safe Haven
In 2004, under pressure from the United States, the
Pakistani army launched a number of offensives against
militants in the Waziristan agencies. However, these
operations succeeded only in temporarily displacing al-
Qaeda and its Taliban allies.103 Their heavy-handed nature,
and the perception that Pakistan’s army was fighting on
behalf of an infidel power that had invaded two Muslim
countries, contributed to the growing radicalization of
Pashtun tribes in the area—leading them to afford al-Qaeda
greater sanctuary. Bin Laden’s terrorist network took full
advantage by increasingly integrating its fighters with local
tribes through marriage. Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s
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increasingly close relationship with powerful Kashmiri
militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammed helped it build its capabilities across
northwestern Pakistan.104 The Kashmiri groups had
increasingly bought into bin Laden’s concept of global jihad
because of the Iraq war and Musharraf’s participation in
the war on terrorism.
All this was compounded by a series of hollow peace deals
the Pakistani military signed with militants in South and
North Waziristan in 2004-06 that made the area yet safer
for al-Qaeda.105 Emboldened, Taliban fighters increasingly
killed off or intimidated tribal elements who did not agree
with their hard-line view, neutralizing potential opposition
to al-Qaeda’s foreign recruits. Facing no interference from
the Pakistan military, al-Qaeda took advantage of its new
freedom of movement in North and South Waziristan to set
up training facilities deep inside the FATA.
Kashmiri militant group with close links to al-Qaeda.110
Several members of Ali’s group were trained in how to
make liquid explosives from hydrogen peroxide and
HMTD. That training, according to British intelligence, was
overseen by Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, an Egyptian al-Qaeda
operative, who intelligence sources believe was based near
Mir Ali in North Waziristan.111 Evidence presented at trial
suggested that the men most likely trained there in 2005-
06.112
Militants who received hands-on explosives
training have over the years constituted a far
more serious threat than those who merely
downloaded bomb-making instructions from
the Internet.

The Airline Plotters – Trained in the FATA, 2005-

The fact that Ali’s cell traveled to Pakistan to receive
06
training underlined the importance of bomb-making
instruction in terrorist plots. In order to launch attacks in
It was during this period that a group of U.K. radicals
the West, al-Qaeda has had to rely on its operatives
journeyed to the tribal areas to receive instruction in
constructing bombs and detonators out of easily
building bombs capable of destroying transatlantic
purchasable materials such as bleach, fertilizer, hexamine
airliners. From 2002 onward, several members of the
(a substance used to fuel camping stoves), and citric acid.
group, including its U.K. ringleader Abdulla Ahmed Ali,
Such devices, however, are tricky to build and often very
spent time in Pakistan, where they established contact with
unstable. Training and practice in making them has
al-Qaeda.106 Ali’s contact may have been facilitated by his
therefore been seen as essential by plotters. Ali testified at
East London gym buddy Mohammed al-Ghabra, who
trial that while his group looked up Web sites in their
allegedly met Abu Faraj al-Libbi, a senior al-Qaeda
bomb-making research, he found them to be “wishy-washy”
operative, on a trip to Pakistan in 2002.107 Al-Ghabra, who
and stated that “the whole point of us learning how to do it
is also believed to have connected 7/21 plot ringleader
from someone who’s done it before—or someone [who]
Muktar Said Ibrahim with al-Qaeda in Pakistan, has been
would know about the thing—is obviously [that] it’s quite
designated an al-Qaeda facilitator by U.S. authorities.108
dangerous dealing with these materials. We don’t want to
injure ourselves or anything.”113 By this author’s count,
Like the fertilizer bomb plotters, members of the group
there has been only one case in the West in which a plotter
flew directly back and forth from Britain to Pakistani
with no previous experience successfully made explosives
cities.109 Their key contact within al-Qaeda was Rashid
using instructions from the Internet—the 2008 plot by
Rauf, a Pakistani-born Briton from Birmingham who
Andrew Ibrahim to launch a suicide bombing in Bristol
developed close ties to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a
town center using HMTD.114

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 15

Militants who received hands-on explosives training have
over the years constituted a far more serious threat than
those who merely downloaded bomb-making instructions
from the Internet. Such autonomous homegrown cells
simply have not had the same tradecraft as recruits trained
by al-Qaeda, nor the same sense of shared mission or
"religious obligation" that al-Qaeda can inculcate in its
115
recruits in the mountains of Pakistan. Terrorism expert
Marc Sageman has found that over the last 20 years,
jihadist plots in the West in which cell members received
116
formal training were four times as likely to succeed.
Once the airline plotters returned to Britain, they
communicated much more with their al-Qaeda handlers
than did the fertilizer bomb or 7/7 plotters.117 During the
final months of the plot, the British al-Qaeda operative
Rashid Rauf, based in Bahawalpur in southern Punjab, was
in near constant communication with the U.K. cell—
through coded e-mails, texts, and phone calls. By delegating
significant authority to a senior operative outside the tribal
areas, al-Qaeda was able to exert more control over the
airline plot than any since 9/11.118 The terrorist group’s
ability to communicate with operatives overseas seemed to
be improving. Further evidence of this was the growing
number of audiotapes and videotapes being produced by al-
Qaeda, which was able to distribute them increasingly
quickly. By 2006, as-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s propaganda arm,
was responding to news events by producing and
distributing videos in less than a week.119
The Sauerland Cell – trained in the FATA, 2006
In the summer of 2006, at the same time as Ali’s U.K. cell
was making final preparations for the attack
transatlantic airliners, four militants from Germany arrived
in North Waziristan to train with the Islamic Jihad Union
(IJU), an Uzbek militant group.120 The men were arrested
in Germany in September 2007 and accused of plotting to
attack American targets in Germany, including discos
popular with U.S. troops and the Ramstein Air Base. At the
time of their arrest, police seized 410 kg of hydrogen
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
peroxide from their safe house in the resort town of
Sauerland near Frankfurt—a hundred times the amount
used in the July 7, 2005, London bombings.121 During their
trial, in which verdicts are expected in March, several of the
alleged plotters made detailed confessions to German
security services about their time in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border region, shedding light on how the terrorist
safe haven was evolving. Their accounts, running to about a
thousand pages, made clear that the IJU had built up a
significant presence in North Waziristan and had fully
committed itself to al-Qaeda’s global jihad.122 The close
relations between al-Qaeda and the IJU were demonstrated
by a 2009 video in which al-Qaeda spokesman Abu Yahya
al-Libi was shown lecturing IJU recruits.123
The tribal areas were not, however, the Sauerland group’s
first choice for jihad. In 2005, members of the cell traveled
to Syria in an attempt to join al-Qaeda in Iraq, but failed to
connect with the group. In Damascus, however, they met
an Uzbek militant who agreed to recommend them for
membership in the IJU.124 When they eventually set out for
Pakistan, they traveled through Turkey and the town of
Zahedan in eastern Iran, which was emerging as a staging
point for would-be jihadists traveling from the Middle East
and Europe to Pakistan and Afghanistan.125
The Sauerland group spent three months
during summer 2006 training at an IJU
facility near Mir Ali, where they were
instructed in weapons, martial arts, and
on
poisons.
The Sauerland group spent three months during summer
2006 training at an IJU facility near Mir Ali, where they
were instructed in weapons, martial arts, and poisons. They
were also taught how to make hydrogen peroxide bombs.
They practiced boiling down small amounts of hydrogen
peroxide in metal pots on the same stoves they used to cook
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their strictly rationed food. In the courtyard of their simple
lodgings, they experimented to see whether the explosive
mixture worked, creating small holes in the soil. They were
also taught how to make timing detonators from Casio
watches. (The watches were later recovered from their safe
house by German police.) Even though the facility where
they trained appears to have been small, the training was
very methodical. One group member recalled an
examination in which circuits had to be assembled from
memory.126
When the men arrived in Pakistan, their goal was to fight
U.S. forces in Afghanistan rather than to launch attacks in
the West. That summer the men were granted their wish,
joining IJU fighters on the front lines in Afghanistan,
where they participated in attacks on U.S. military forward
operating bases. One of the group, Adem Yilmaz, later
testified that he would have preferred to stay on the front
127
lines, “savoring every moment” of his time there.
The time the plotters spent in camps in the
rarefied air of Waziristan’s mountains had
deepened their commitment to “the cause.”
But on the group’s return to North Waziristan, their
handlers had other ideas, asking them to launch an attack
in Europe. The request came personally from the IJU’s
emir, Najmiddin Kamolitdinovic Jalolov, to whom the
group swore loyalty oaths, and his deputy, known as
Suleyman. After some deliberation, because they first
thought themselves “not particularly suitable,” the German
group agreed, but on the condition, they later claimed, that
they would mainly attack U.S. targets and that the plot
would take place in their native Germany, where they felt
they had the best chance of launching a successful
128
operation. It would appear that, as with the fertilizer
bomb plotters, the time they spent in camps in the rarefied
air of Waziristan’s mountains had deepened their
commitment to “the cause.”
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
Members of the Sauerland group have testified that they
themselves selected locations to inflict “targeted
retribution” against American interests in Germany,
illustrating the growing decision-making role and self-
initiative that Western militants were taking in terrorist
plots.129 When the men got back to Germany, they started
plotting attacks on U.S. troops there. During this time, IJU
deputy commander Suleyman gave directions—in
English—to the plotters in coded phone calls and messages
left in the draft folder of a shared e-mail account,
demonstrating jihadists’ growing ability to exert command
and control over operations from Pakistan’s tribal areas.
But the IJU, like al-Qaeda with Mohammed Atta in the 9/11
plot, also delegated a significant amount of authority to
alleged cell ringleader Fritz Gelowicz.130 At one point, the
IJU requested that the group target German politicians for
assassination, but the members, demonstrating their
autonomy, resisted because they viewed such attacks as too
expensive.131
The Danish Plotter – trained in the FATA, 2007
In April 2007, Hammad Khurshid, a Danish citizen of
Pakistani origin who was part of a cluster of radicals linked
to a Copenhagen mosque, traveled to Pakistan’s tribal areas
and received terrorist training.132 Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s
increasing difficulties, and the perception that joining its
ranks meant quickly becoming a suicide bomber, meant
that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region was by then
replacing Iraq as the destination of choice for militants
from the European continent, according to European
counterterrorism officials.133 In September that year,
Khurshid was arrested by Danish authorities for a
conspiracy to blow up unspecified targets with bombs made
out of TATP and hydrogen peroxide. Danish intelligence
had filmed him in his Copenhagen apartment making 10
grams of TATP, a significant quantity, in only 27 minutes,
something that would have required considerable training.
Khurshid was convicted of plotting the attacks, along with
an Afghan accomplice, in September 2007.134
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Khurshid’s motives when he traveled to Pakistan are
unclear. After arriving, he attended a wedding, which may
have been his initial reason for the trip. The time he spent
that spring in Islamabad’s Red Mosque, then a gathering
place for pro-Taliban militants, appears to have provided
him connections to al-Qaeda in the tribal areas. He later
told Danish security services that he traveled to Mir Ali in
North Waziristan with somebody he met at the mosque.
According to U.S. and Danish intelligence sources, he was
trained in Mir Ali in how to make the explosive devices
under the tutelage of Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, the Egyptian
al-Qaeda operative who masterminded the 2006 airline
plot. (Al-Masri died in December 2007 of hepatitis.)
Khurshid also received handwritten instructions from his
135
handlers on how to make TATP. He returned from
Pakistan with $5,000 in cash, indicating that this may have
been one of the few plots funded by al-Qaeda in recent
years.136
2008: Adapting to Drones
In summer 2007, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate
judged that al-Qaeda in the FATA had regenerated “key
elements of its Homeland attack capability.”137 In the
second half of 2007, al-Qaeda further strengthened its
position in the tribal areas. The Pakistani army’s storming
of the Red Mosque in July 2007 intensified an insurgency
among Pashtun militants and contributed to the emergence
of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, or the Pakistani
Taliban), a conglomeration of extremist groups in
Pakistan’s tribal areas sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s goals and
ideology.138 Its leader, Baitullah Mehsud, offered al-Qaeda
even greater sanctuary and protection in South Waziristan.
This was offset, however, by an escalation of U.S. drone
strikes in the tribal areas. In 2008, the strikes began to
inflict significantly more pain on al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
According to a count by Peter Bergen and Katherine
Tiedemann of the New America Foundation, there were 34
strikes in the FATA that year, compared to just nine in the
139
previous four years. According to the study, at least 105
militants were killed by drone strikes in 2008, more than in
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
the four previous years combined.140 Of those killed in
2008, about a dozen were senior al-Qaeda operatives whose
expertise and experience made them difficult to replace.141
Bryant Neal Vinas and the Belgian-French Group –
trained in the FATA, 2008
In early 2008, a new wave of Western recruits entered the
tribal areas for training with al-Qaeda. They included an
American—Bryant Neal Vinas, a Latino convert to Islam
from Long Island—and a group of seven militants from
Belgium and France. Vinas, who befriended members of
the Belgian-French group in the FATA, was arrested in
Peshawar in November 2008 and subsequently pleaded
guilty to assisting al-Qaeda in a plot to attack the Long
Island Rail Road. Four of the Belgian-French group, who
had returned to Europe, were arrested in December 2008
and charged with participation in a terrorist group.
Authorities described the group as a potential national
security threat, but the suspects maintained that their
intention had been only to receive the military training
needed to fight in Afghanistan.142
Accounts suggest that al-Qaeda successfully
adapted to the harsher security environment
by further decentralizing its operations in
Pakistan’s tribal areas.
The descriptions of their experiences—provided by Vinas in
more than 100 interviews with the FBI and by members of
the Belgian-French group in their interrogations and
statements to prosecuting authorities—provide a snapshot
of the state of al-Qaeda’s safe haven in 2008. The picture
they presented was of a terrorist organization being forced
to adapt under growing pressure from drone strikes. One of
the Belgian recruits, Hicham Beyayo, stated that during
their time in the FATA, they were moved around a lot
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because the drone strikes were known to be “very
143
effective.”
Their accounts suggest that al-Qaeda successfully adapted
to the harsher security environment by further
decentralizing its operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Because of the threat from drone strikes, al-Qaeda decided
to spread out its fighters across the mountains of North and
South Waziristan in groups of no more than 10 men.144
And to avoid having electronic communications pinpoint
militant locations, most messages were sent through
couriers. As in previous years, training was provided at
small makeshift camps, but greater security precautions
were taken. The Belgian-French group was trained inside
small mountain shacks, away from the all-seeing eyes of the
drones. The loss of an increasing number of operatives
prompted an order from al-Qaeda's top command that
fighters remain inside as much as possible, according to
Walid Othmani, a French recruit. “When spies spotted
jihadists,” Othmani explained, “the Americans would then
destroy those houses.”145
Such adaptations allowed al-Qaeda to continue to offer
bomb-making training to Western recruits during 2008,
some of it sophisticated. Vinas stated that between March
and July 2008, he attended three al-Qaeda training courses,
which focused on weapons, explosives, and rocket-based or
propelled weaponry. During these classes, attended by 10 to
20 recruits, Vinas was taught how to handle a wide variety
of weapons and explosives, some of military-grade
sophistication, according to his account. Vinas said he
became familiar with seeing, smelling, and touching
different explosives such as TNT, as well as plastic
explosives such as RDX, Semtex, C3, and C4, which U.S.
authorities have stated was used in al-Qaeda’s attack on the
USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. Vinas also learned how to
make vests for suicide bombers. He revealed that he was
also instructed in preparing and placing fuses, testing
batteries, using voltmeters, and building circuitry for a
bomb. According to his account, al-Qaeda offered a variety
of other courses including electronics, sniper training, and
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
poisons. Instruction in the actual construction of bombs, he
said, was offered to al-Qaeda recruits who had become
more advanced in their training. Vinas also stated he had
received weapons “funded by the al-Qaeda coffers.”146
Vinas’s training during this period was very similar to that
described by members of the French-Belgian group.
Othmani, the French recruit, said that group members
were given explosives training and taught how to fire rocket
launchers and rocket-propelled grenades. Their instructors
were mostly Arabs. Like other Western militants before
them, they also received religious instruction preparing
them for jihad.147
Vinas described a course offered by Abu Hafith, who he
stated was al-Qaeda’s head of international operations,
which taught techniques for assassination and breaking-
and-entering, suggesting al-Qaeda may be plotting new
types of attacks in the West.148
The large number of training courses described by Vinas
and Othmani suggests that al-Qaeda had been able to adapt
well to the new security environment. By operating a larger
number of smaller facilities, the terrorist group may have
increased its resilience in the face of attacks.
By operating a larger number of smaller
facilities, the terrorist group may have
increased its resilience in the face of attacks.
But the decentralization of al-Qaeda’s
structures appears to have created some costs
for recruits.
The decentralization of al-Qaeda’s structures appears to
have created some costs for recruits. Two members of the
Belgian-French group described feeling increasingly cut off,
bored, and fed up with the primitive living conditions in
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their mountain shacks. They often did not seem to know
what their next orders would be or where their handlers
would take them. They also described feeling deeply
frustrated about being repeatedly given false promises that
they would be able to fight in Afghanistan. According to
their accounts, it was this frustration—and for some,
frequent bouts of sickness—that led four of the group to
return to Europe in 2008.149
The Belgian-French group had had to show great
perseverance in traveling to the tribal region. Allegedly
recruited online and in person by Moez Garsallaoui, a
Tunisian, and his wife Malika El Aroud, the militants had
taken the long way to Pakistan, presumably for security
reasons. Instead of flying directly to Pakistan, they had
congregated in Istanbul and from there paid €2,000 apiece
to a series of people smugglers to take them to the tribal
areas. The smugglers took them across the mountainous
border to the Iranian town of Zahedan. From there they
crossed into Baluchistan, then traveled up to Peshawar, and
finally entered the tribal region through the gateway town
of Bannu.150
Othmani described the group’s frustration at having to pay
for their own weapons and training—at a cost of €1,300 per
head (about $1,800), suggesting that al-Qaeda was still
collecting such funds from recruits out of financial
necessity.151 From 2003 to 2007, Aleem Nasir, a German
recruit, had supplied al-Qaeda with around $111,000 in cash,
152
using his gemstone business as cover. Despite al-Qaeda’s
close ties to the Pakistani Taliban, its need for cash appears
to be unchanged. In June 2009, Mustafa Abu Yazid, one of
al-Qaeda’s top commanders, issued a statement pleading
153
for more funds.
The Western recruits have described moving around a lot
within the tribal areas, spending time in different locations
in North and South Waziristan. Vinas’s account revealed
that fighters from different militant groups—al-Qaeda, the
Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Uzbeks—mixed freely.
Hierarchies were not always clear. Bands of fighters from
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
different groups spontaneously merged to undertake cross-
border raids in Afghanistan, something the recruits appear
to have relished above almost anything else.154
The Western recruits have described moving
around a lot within the tribal areas, spending
time in different locations in North and South
Waziristan.
The strong demand from recruits to fight may explain why
al-Qaeda allowed some of its Western recruits to fight in
Afghanistan, arguably a risky step for such potentially
valuable operatives. However, it could also have been a way
to test recruits for loyalty or increase their commitment to
the “cause.”
According to the accounts of Vinas and the Belgian-French
group, life for an al-Qaeda recruit in 2008 was not without
structure. After recruits completed training courses,
instructors were required to submit written evaluations that
were stored in file cabinets, indicating al-Qaeda had lost
none of its penchant for paperwork. Othmani stated that
their oath of loyalty to al-Qaeda included a pledge of
absolute obedience. Vinas described waiting around for
orders from senior al-Qaeda commanders. For instance, in
late summer 2008, Vinas was ordered by a senior
commander to join a band of fighters in a raid against a
U.S. forward operating base along the Afghan border.155
Around September, al-Qaeda commanders questioned
Vinas closely about the Long Island Rail Road, which they
were considering targeting.156
Vinas and members of the Belgian-French cell described
meeting with several of al-Qaeda’s top commanders while
in the tribal areas, but they were never introduced to either
al-Zawahiri or bin Laden. Both Vinas and Othmani, the
French recruit, were told by their al-Qaeda handlers that,
for security reasons, nobody got to meet bin Laden.
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Othmani stated that al-Qaeda in the tribal areas was known return home to conduct suicide operations. Zazi
as the “Arab group” and had about 300 to 400 members, subsequently received additional training in constructing
fewer than some other groups. “Most of the group were bombs out of Hydrogen Peroxide and TATP for an attack
from Saudi Arabia ... you find people from the Middle East, on New York and discussed target locations in New York,
North Africa, Africans, Turks, but the majority are Arabs,” including subway trains in New York City.160
he told his French interrogators.157

The descriptions provided by Vinas and the Belgian-French

The Zazi case revealed the continued
group of how they first connected with al-Qaeda further importance of Peshawar as gateway to al-
illustrate the changed circumstances for bin Laden’s
terrorist organization. After 9/11, al-Qaeda was not able to
Qaeda.
maintain the large guesthouses in Peshawar through which
it had previously processed arriving volunteers, nor was it
The Zazi case revealed the continued importance of
able to cherry-pick recruits from two dozen large training
Peshawar as gateway to al-Qaeda. While the city no longer
facilities previously maintained by jihadists in Afghanistan.
has the network of guesthouses that were used to process
The accounts by the Westerners also indicate that al-Qaeda
arriving recruits, a more informal facilitation network
is increasingly dependent on whichever militants reach its
appears to exist for volunteers looking to receive jihadist
safe haven in the tribal areas. But that has created
training. It was through contacts in Peshawar that
headaches for both al-Qaeda and potential recruits. Both
Mohammed Junaid Babar organized the training for the
Vinas and the Belgian-French group were initially regarded
fertilizer bomb plotters in 2003. Five years later, Vinas
as potential spies when they first entered the tribal region
connected with al-Qaeda through an intermediary in the
and tried to connect with al-Qaeda. Vinas, in particular, had
city. While still under al-Qaeda orders, he returned to
to show great persistence in order to join. After flying to
Peshawar in search of a wife, indicating that al-Qaeda views
Lahore in September 2007 with just a few contacts in
the city as a place where its recruits can safely get
militant circles, he spent six months before connecting with
downtime.161 In recent years, even senior al-Qaeda
al-Qaeda in the tribal areas. That included months in
operatives have felt comfortable traveling to Peshawar. Abu
Peshawar trying to find the right contacts and several trips
Laith al-Libi, for example, used to move around the city
from there into the tribal areas until he was accepted into
freely before his death in the tribal region in January 2008,
al-Qaeda’s ranks.158
according to residents.162

However, some Western recruits to al-Qaeda’s camps in the

tribal region appear to have had a smoother ride. A group
Western Recruits to Other Jihadist
led by Najibullah Zazi, for example, is alleged to have
Groups
trained at an al-Qaeda facility just days after flying into
In the past two years, more Western recruits may have
Pakistan from the United States in August 2008.159 Zazi’s
joined jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda than have
group initially intended to fight on behalf of the Taliban but
enlisted in bin Laden’s terrorist organization itself. By this
they were recruited by Al-Qaeda shortly after arriving in
author’s count, only around a dozen Westerners are known
Peshawar. Al-Qaeda operatives transported Zazi and his
to have joined al-Qaeda in 2008-09, compared to the 100
group to the Waziristan region of Pakistan and provided
plus Western militants believed to have traveled to the
them weapons instruction. During the training, like in
Pakistani tribal region for training during this period. The
several other plots, Al-Qaeda persuaded Zazi’s group to
known cases of Westerners allegedly joining al-Qaeda in

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 21

the last two years are Vinas, the Belgian-French group
(seven members), and the Zazi group (two or three
members).
Increasingly, however, recruitment into an affiliated
organization rather than al-Qaeda may be a distinction
without a difference, as the lines between al-Qaeda and
other militant groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
region have blurred. These other groups now cooperate
with al-Qaeda on a day-to-day basis. They also have started
to plot terrorist attacks against the West themselves, a
worrying new development explained by their growing
ideological commitment to global jihad and their
calculation that such attacks can boost their prestige and
recruitment efforts. Like for al-Qaeda, no recruits could be
more valuable to them in plotting attacks against the West
163
than citizens of Western countries.
Kashmiri Militant Groups
Cases in point are the Kashmiri jihadist groups Laskhar-e-
Taiba (LeT) and Harakat-ul-Jihad-Islami (HUJI). During
2009, both sponsored a plot hatched by David Headley, a
Chicago resident of Pakistani descent, to attack the offices
of the Copenhagen newspaper that printed controversial
cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed. In furtherance of this
plot, Headley journeyed in the first half of 2009 to
Pakistan’s tribal region, where he allegedly met with Ilyas
Kashmiri, a senior commander within HUJI with close ties
to al-Qaeda.164
A number of Western extremists convicted of
terrorism offenses in recent years are alleged
to have received training with Kashmiri
militant groups.
Kashmiri militant groups forged closer ties with al-Qaeda
after 9/11 out of frustration with President Musharraf’s
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
support for the U.S. war on terrorism and anger over U.S.
actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their increasingly close
relationship was demonstrated by the fact that in several
terrorist plots, Kashmiri groups were a gateway for recruits
into al-Qaeda. For example, Omar Khyam, the fertilizer
bomb plot ringleader, trained with LeT in 2000 and is
thought to have exploited those contacts to connect with al-
Qaeda.165 Rashid Rauf, the British al-Qaeda operative who
coordinated the 2006 airline plot, likely became involved
with al-Qaeda through Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).166
A number of Western extremists convicted of terrorism
offenses in recent years are alleged to have received training
with Kashmiri militant groups. For example, four members
of the so-called “Virginia jihad network,” a cluster of
extremists arrested in the Falls Church area in 2003 for
conspiring to fight with the LeT, trained in the terrorist
organization’s camps in late 2001.167 Willie Brigitte, a
French LeT operative, was dispatched to Australia in 2003
to plot attacks.168 Additionally, several of the extremists
arrested in Sydney and Melbourne in 2005 for plotting
terrorist attacks on Australian soil were alleged to have
trained with Kashmiri militant groups.169 Mohammed
Ajmal Khan, a British citizen, was convicted in 2006 after
admitting being a “quartermaster” for LeT in 2001-05 and
sending it equipment for use in attacks on U.S. forces in
Afghanistan.170 The continued potential of LeT and JeM to
attract Western recruits was underscored by five Virginia
men allegedly traveling to Pakistan in December 2009 in
an attempt to join the terrorist groups.171
While most of LeT’s camp infrastructure is in Kashmir and
the Punjab, the group also has a significant presence in the
FATA. From there it sends fighters into Afghanistan;
Vinas, the American recruit, observed LeT recruits in the
area. Other Kashmiri groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed
and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—part of the so-called “Punjab
Taliban”—have a significant presence in the FATA, where
they appear to have cooperated with the Pakistani Taliban to
launch attacks within Pakistan.172
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Taliban Elements
A number of Western recruits appear to have fought with
Taliban elements crossing from the tribal areas into
Afghanistan. One example is Moez Garsallaoui, the
Tunisian recruiter of the Belgian-French cell, who in May
2009 posted a statement online in which he claimed to be
fighting with the Taliban. In the message entitled “We
Need You” and posted on his wife’s Web site, he said he
had joined up with Taliban elements who were making
cross-border raids against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. “The
Jihad is going well and the Taliban are stronger than ever,
they are gaining territory every day and more important
than that they are winning the trust of the local population,”
he claimed.173 In December 2009, Garsallaoui sent a
Belgian newspaper what he asserted to be a new picture of
himself fighting with the Taliban.174 Garsallaoui has posted
several messages on European militant Web sites during
his time in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and
even communicated with his wife in Belgium by Skype,
illustrating that fighters in the border area are finding it
easier to communicate with the West. 175
A number of Western recruits appear to have
fought with Taliban elements crossing from
the tribal areas into Afghanistan.
Since the Pakistani Taliban formed in December 2007
under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, the group has
given unconditional support to al-Qaeda in territory it
controls across the tribal areas. In interviews, Mehsud
spoke admiringly of bin Laden and pledged
commitment to al-Qaeda’s global jihad.176 His successor,
Hakimullah Mehsud, maintained the network’s loyalty to
al-Qaeda. Underlining the continued close ties between al-
Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, the Jordanian “triple
agent” Humam al-Balawi, who killed seven CIA operatives
in Afghanistan in a suicide attack in December 2009,
appeared alongside Hakimullah Mehsud in a video
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
produced by the Pakistani Taliban. Al-Balawi said the
bombing was to avenge the death of Baitullah Mehsud,
killed in a drone strike four months previously.177
Vinas and members of the Belgian-French group described
the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Pakistani
Taliban as so close that lines between the two organizations
were sometimes blurred. Some members of al-Qaeda were
also simultaneously members of the Pakistani Taliban,
recalled Vinas, who met some of the Pakistani Taliban’s top
commanders in the tribal region. 178
According to Spanish prosecuting authorities, the Pakistani
Taliban was behind a January 2008 plot against the
Barcelona Metro system and potential follow-up attacks
against targets across Europe. Several of the alleged
plotters—mostly Pakistani nationals—were longtime
residents of Barcelona. One of them, Hafeez Ahmed, the
alleged bomb-maker, had recently returned from a five-
month trip to Pakistan when he was arrested, suggesting he
may have traveled to receive training there. The confidential
informant who unraveled the plot claimed to have had
explosives training in the Waziristan mountains as well as
Afghanistan. Other plotters had never been to Barcelona
and were allegedly dispatched there by Baitullah Mehsud as
suicide bombers.179 In December 2009, 11 were convicted in
Spain in connection with the plot. The case may signal that
the Pakistani Taliban will attempt to mount other
international operations.180
Uzbek Groups
Among al-Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan’s tribal areas, it is the
Uzbek groups that may have attracted the most Western
his
recruits recently. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) and a splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),
appear to have recruited several dozen Westerners into
their ranks in the last three years. 181 The majority have been
from Germany. There are two likely reasons for this. The
first is Germany’s large Turkish diaspora population. Since
2007, both Uzbek groups have focused on recruiting ethnic
page 23
Turks by translating much of their propaganda into About 90 militants are believed to have returned from
182
Turkish. camps there in recent years, while dozens of others are
believed to be preparing to travel to Pakistan.189 The
The second is that the Sauerland group, which trained with returnees include 10 individuals linked to the Sauerland
the IJU in North Waziristan in 2006, established a group who are currently under investigation in Hamburg,
recruiting and facilitation network for Germans that has suspected of having received weapons training in the tribal
continued to serve as a pipeline for recruits. Members of areas.190
the Sauerland group are accused of recruiting eight young
men in Germany for the IJU’s Waziristan camps, including
Eric Breiniger, who has been regularly featured in IJU
German security services are worried about
propaganda videos. At trial, Adem Yilmaz of the Sauerland this migration of militants and their families
group admitted to seeking out recruits in Germany and
recommending them for membership in the IJU. “I
to al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Pakistan.
decided who was suitable,” Yilmaz stated.183 Some
participated in attacks, while some returned to Germany.184
While the IMU has not explicitly targeted the German
During the last three years, the German recruits have
homeland in its statements, the IJU has thrown its weight
handed over thousands of euros and provided equipment to
fully behind al-Qaeda’s global jihad. The IJU’s ever-closer
the IJU, again demonstrating that Westerners have become
ties to al-Qaeda were demonstrated by al-Qaeda’s chief
a valuable funding source for such groups.185
propagandist, Abu Yahya al-Libi, lecturing IJU recruits in a
video posted on IJU’s Turkish-language Web site in June
A similar facilitation network may have been set up more
2009.191 Based mainly in North Waziristan, the IJU has
recently by the IMU. Both the IJU and IMU regularly
cooperated closely with the Haqqani network, which has
release recruitment videos in German, featuring their
offered it protection in the region.192 In October 2009, an
German members. In a January 2009 IMU video, a
IJU propaganda video featuring fighters training in the
militant called Abu Adam asked Germans to join their
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region included footage of a
efforts. Another German on the video implored, “Bring
man it identified as American recruit “Abu Ibrahim,”
along your wives and children.”186 Such propaganda efforts
suggesting the Uzbek group is extending its recruitment
appear to be bearing fruit. A September 2009 IMU video
reach.193
showcased an entire village of German militants and their
families living in the Waziristan mountains. These videos
That will concern counterterrorism officials because for
sell potential recruits the chance to take part in an idealized
some Western recruits, the IJU has been a gateway into al-
jihadist lifestyle, in some ways similar to the one al-Qaeda
Qaeda itself. Bekkay Harrach, a Moroccan-born German
promised recruits in 1990s Afghanistan. By most accounts,
from the Rhineland region, was allegedly recruited to train
however, conditions today in the FATA are much tougher.
in Pakistan by Omer Ozdemir, an alleged Turkish member
“Many Europeans really can’t take it there and break off
of the IJU Sauerland cell.194 In early 2007, Harrach traveled
their training,” the IJU recruiter Yilmaz stated.187
overland to Pakistan, transiting through Turkey and Iran
with the help of people smugglers, like the Belgian-French
German security services are worried about this migration
group did the following year. Equipped with a
of militants and their families to al-Qaeda’s safe haven in
recommendation from German al-Qaeda militant Aleem
Pakistan. At least 30 militants are believed to have traveled
Nasir, Harrach quickly joined al-Qaeda and rose in its
from Germany to the tribal areas for training in 2009.188
ranks, and like Nasir also received one-on-one training with

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 24

Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, the senior Egyptian al-Qaeda
195
operative. In the run-up to Germany’s September 2009
general election, al-Qaeda’s propaganda arm As-Sahab
released several videos featuring Harrach— now named Al
Hafidh Abu Talha der Deutsch—threatening Germany with
attacks unless it withdrew its forces from Afghanistan.196
The U.S. drone campaign appears to have made life more
difficult recently for Uzbek groups in the tribal areas.
Several key commanders have been killed in strikes,
including Najmiddin Kamolitdinovic Jalolov, the IJU emir.
Jalolov, who orchestrated the 2007 Sauerland plot, was
killed by a drone strike near the town of Mir Ali in North
Waziristan in September 2009.197
The Haqqani Network
The Haqqani network appears to have recruited few
Westerners directly into its ranks. However, a number of
Westerners are involved with groups, such as al-Qaeda and
the IJU, operating in areas under Haqqani control. One
man who has become closely involved with the Haqqani
network is Harrach, al-Qaeda’s German spokesman.
According to an operative in the Haqqani network,
interviewed by the German magazine Der Spiegel, Harrach
met with Sirajuddin Haqqani, the network’s day-to-day
commander, sometime in 2008. The operative stated that
Sirajuddin Haqqani admired the German for his technical
skill in making bombs, but was primarily impressed with
his ability to draw up attack plans “very precisely on
198
paper.” According to the commander, Harrach was
closely involved in planning many of the Haqqani
network’s operations. While such operations have so far
been directed mostly at U.S. troops in Afghanistan,
Harrach would be a valuable resource if the Haqqani
network ever wished to launch attacks independently in the
West. However, the Haqqani network’s focus
Afghanistan and its close ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence agency make it very unlikely that the network
itself would launch such strikes.199
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
Other Militant Groups in the FATA
According to Walid Othmani, the French al-Qaeda recruit,
foreign militants traveling to Pakistan’s tribal areas could
choose from a large variety of jihadist groups. Beyond al-
Qaeda and the Pakistani and Uzbek groups, options for
training included a Turkish militant group comprising
1,000 to 2,000 fighters, a group of “mixed nationalities” led
by an Uzbek, and two militant groups from the Kurdistan
region. Othmani said the largest group was from
Turkestan, presumably the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement based in China’s Xinjiang province, a region
populated predominantly by Uighur Muslims.200 Yemenis
traveling to the FATA could also join a separate Yemeni
group. According to Hicham Beyayo, a Belgian jihadist
recruit, some Yemeni jihadists, although they cooperated
closely with al-Qaeda, operated separate camps.201
The large number of Turks training in the FATA is of
particular concern to European counterterrorism services,
especially those in countries with sizable Turkish diaspora
populations, such as Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
France, Austria, and Switzerland.202 The U.S. invasion of
Iraq, and some of the other controversial policies during the
Bush administration, appear to have contributed to
increased support for al-Qaeda within Turkey.
Furthermore, Turkey’s role as a stopover for jihadists
traveling overland from the Arab world or Europe to
Pakistan has made it easier for Turkish militants to reach
the tribal areas. One of the Turkish gunmen who attacked
the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul in July 2008 is believed to
have received terrorist training in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border region.203 Like the IJU and IMU, al-Qaeda has
stepped up its efforts to recruit Turks. Mustafa Abu Yazid, a
senior al-Qaeda operative, praised Turks in a June 2009
statement for their involvement in jihadist operations.204
on
The FATA Safe Haven Today
There are few eyewitness accounts available about the
nature of al-Qaeda’s safe haven in the FATA in 2009-10.
page 25
The terrorist group appears to have come under increased
pressure due to a record number of drone strikes during
2009. According to the New America Foundation count,
there were 53 such strikes in 2009, killing at least 284
militants, nearly triple the number in 2008.205 Also
according to the New America Foundation research, around
half a dozen of these were senior al-Qaeda operatives, half
206
the figure of the previous year. The lower number of top
al-Qaeda commanders being killed may be a result of the
extra precautions taken by senior operatives within the
group.
The drone strikes, while by most accounts very effective,
appear to have provided the Pakistani Taliban with an
additional recruiting tool. According to the New America
Foundation study, around 320 of those killed in drone
strikes between 2004 and February 2010—one-third of the
total—were civilians.207 David Rohde, a New York Times
reporter who was held hostage by the Taliban in the tribal
areas during much of 2009 and has provided one of few
recent eyewitness accounts, described the drones as a
“terrifying presence.” He wrote:
“Remotely piloted, propeller-driven airplanes, they could
easily be heard as they circled overhead for hours. To the
naked eye, they were small dots in the sky. But their
missiles had a range of several miles. We knew we could be
immolated without warning.... The drones killed many
senior commanders and hindered their operations. Yet the
Taliban were able to garner recruits in their aftermath by
exaggerating the number of civilian casualties. The strikes
also created a paranoia among the Taliban. They believed
that a network of local informants guided the missiles.
Innocent civilians were rounded up, accused of working as
American spies and then executed.” 208
In August 2009, a Predator strike killed Baitullah Mehsud
in South Waziristan, eliminating one of al-Qaeda’s
strongest protectors in the tribal areas and creating
uncertainty in the ranks of the Pakistani Taliban. In the
months that followed, however, his successor Hakimullah
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
Mehsud established his authority and continued to give al-
Qaeda full backing.209 Hakimullah Mehsud appears to have
been killed by a drone strike against his compound in
North Waziristan in January 2010.210
A rare recent glimpse into conditions in the FATA came
from an e-mail sent by David Headley, the Chicago-based
alleged Lashkar-e-Taiba operative, to several associates in
May 2009, shortly after he traveled to the area. Headley
described how the local tribes in North Waziristan were still
offering sanctuary to foreign fighters and their families,
who he said made up a little less than a third of the
population in the area. “Just walk around the bazaar in
Miranshah [Miram Shah, the capital of North Waziristan].
This bazaar is bustling with Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks,
Russians, Bosnians, some from EU countries and of course
our Arab brothers,” he wrote. “Any Waziri or Mehsud I
spoke to seemed grateful to God for the privilege of being
able to host the ‘Foreign Mujahideen.’” 211
David Rohde, the New York Times reporter taken hostage,
wrote that he “found the tribal areas—widely perceived as
impoverished and isolated—to have superior roads,
electricity and infrastructure compared with what exists in
much of Afghanistan.” Rohde described both North and
South Waziristan as a safe haven for foreign militants.
When Rohde was taken by his captors to South Waziristan
in March 2009, he observed that it “teemed with Uzbek,
Arab, Afghan and Pakistani militants.” 212
The pressure on al-Qaeda from drone strikes
may have led the group to begin reevaluating
the tribal areas as a safe haven.
The pressure on al-Qaeda from drone strikes may have led
the group to begin reevaluating the tribal areas as a safe
haven. In the second half of 2009, U.S. intelligence
officials began to see evidence that a small handful of al-
page 26
Qaeda recruits were leaving the tribal areas for other
213
jihadist fronts such as Yemen and Somalia.
In October 2009, Pakistan sent 30,000 ground troops into
South Waziristan in an attempt to clear the area of pro-al-
Qaeda militants. According to a senior
counterterrorism official, the ongoing Pakistani military
operation could be a game-changer, even though al-Qaeda
has shown significant resilience in the tribal areas. “For the
first time you have Pakistani boots on the ground and U.S.
pinpoint strike capability,” said the source, “and this may
hurt al-Qaeda.”214 Pakistani military pressure may have led
some al-Qaeda operatives to move across the border into
215
Afghanistan in December. According to reports, the
Pakistani military has seized most of the major militant
strongholds in South Waziristan. However, the majority of
Pakistani Taliban militants appear to have fled to other
tribal agencies well before the troops arrived.216
intelligence agencies do not yet judge the Pakistani Taliban
to have been defeated.217
While life may have been made more difficult
for al-Qaeda in South Waziristan, the group
will continue to enjoy a safe haven to the
north unless the Pakistani military extends its
campaign to North Waziristan.
While life may have been made more difficult for al-Qaeda
in South Waziristan, the group will continue to enjoy a safe
haven to the north unless the Pakistani military extends its
campaign to North Waziristan. The area in and around Mir
Ali, the second-largest town in the tribal agency, has
arguably been ground zero for al-Qaeda terrorist plots in
recent years. The airline plotters, the Danish recruit
Hammad Khurshid, the German recruit Aleem Nasir, the
Sauerland group, the Belgian-French group, and Bryant
Neal Vinas all trained or spent time in that area. And new
waves of Western recruits are traveling there. In August
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
2009, four Swedes were arrested trying to cross into North
Waziristan.218 New York Times journalist David Rohde
underlined the extent to which the Haqqani network, a key
al-Qaeda ally, was present in the area:
U.S. “The Haqqanis oversaw a sprawling Taliban mini-state in
the tribal areas with the de facto acquiescence of the
Pakistani military.... Throughout North Waziristan, Taliban
policemen patrolled the streets, and Taliban road crews
carried out construction projects. The Haqqani network’s
commanders and foreign militants freely strolled the
bazaars of Miram Shah and other towns. Young Afghan
and Pakistani Taliban members revered the foreign
fighters, who taught them how to make bombs.”219
Al-Qaeda has likely continued in recent months to adapt to
the intensified drone strikes. The terrorist network may
U.S. have increasingly taken its instruction on the road, training
recruits from different militant groups such as JeM, the
Pakistani Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Janghvi in temporary
training camps set up by the groups, according to
researchers at West Point’s Combating Terrorism
Center.220 Al-Qaeda also appears to have adapted its
propaganda operations. As-Sahab released nearly 100 tapes
in 2007, but that number was halved in 2008, presumably
because of the intensification in the drone campaign. As-
Sahab’s propaganda output was restored in 2009, however,
suggesting it moved its media operations deeper into
Pakistan.221
According to a U.S. counterterrorism official, Britain still
has the most expansive jihadist facilitation network of any
Western country. Militants on the European continent
(with the exception of Germany) find it more difficult to
make contact with al-Qaeda in the tribal areas. In the
United States, there is very little in the way of an al-Qaeda
facilitation network.222
The continued threat posed by al-Qaeda in the FATA was
underlined by a January 2010 RTL interview in the tribal
region with Adelbert Naaktgeboren, a militant claiming to
page 27
be a Belgian al-Qaeda operative from the city of Ghent.
Naaktgeboren, who spoke in English, claimed that he had
been fighting U.S. troops in Afghanistan for five years and
that he had traveled to the region after being exposed to the
online sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemen-based
American cleric. The militant stated he was currently
leading a small band of al-Qaeda fighters on raids to attack
NATO troops across the border in Afghanistan, but that he
had other ambitions, too: “If God wills it we will fight you
in your own countries: We will not stop till all your people
223
are converted to Islam.”
Conclusion
The tribal areas of Pakistan—the likely current hiding place
of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri—remain al-
Qaeda’s number one safe haven. According to U.S.
intelligence officials, al-Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan is in
communication more frequently than before with the
group’s affiliates in Yemen and Somalia, in an effort to
coordinate operations.224
While drone strikes and the recent Pakistani military
operation in the tribal areas have knocked al-Qaeda onto the
defensive, the terrorist group has to a significant degree
successfully adapted its operational structures to take
account of the harsher security environment. The latest
eyewitness accounts from Western recruits suggest that as
recently as 2008, al-Qaeda was able to offer recruits the sort
of bomb-making training that would be useful for attacks in
the West. And Western militants have continued to travel to
the tribal areas in the post-9/11 period, perhaps in record
numbers in 2009.225
In the last three years, a growing number of Westerners
have also joined groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. Of all
Western countries, Germany has seen the most alarming
rise of its citizens traveling to the tribal areas, largely a
product of recruitment drives by Uzbek jihadist groups.
New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
While terrorist groups have managed to sustain their
operations in the tribal areas, it is axiomatic that the more
time al-Qaeda and its allies spend avoiding strikes or
fleeing from advancing Pakistani troops, the less time they
will have to plot attacks against the West. This may have
reduced the number of plots they have been able to hatch.
At the time of this writing, no terrorist plots against the
West had emerged in which militants had received training
in the tribal areas during 2009.226 Additionally, while al-
Qaeda remains under pressure in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border region, it will have more difficulty developing the
capability to launch even crude chemical, biological, or
radiological attacks, forms of terrorism that have long been
of concern to Western governments.
And as the FATA is perceived by militants as a riskier place
to get training necessary to fight in Afghanistan, fewer will
make the journey. And fewer recruits may travel there if
most of the fighting in the immediate region is perceived as
being between the Pakistani army and local Taliban
elements. While Western recruits have been determined to
fight U.S. troops in Afghanistan, they may have little
appetite for fighting the troops of a Muslim power.
The unfortunate reality remains that as long
as al-Qaeda bomb instructors and operational
planners are present in parts of the FATA
accessible to Western recruits, the area will
remain a significant national security concern
for the United States and other Western
countries.
While these latter trends may be encouraging, the
unfortunate reality remains that as long as al-Qaeda bomb
instructors and operational planners are present in parts of
the FATA accessible to Western recruits, the area will
remain a significant national security concern for the
page 28
United States and other Western countries. In February
left off was a 2008 attempted bomb attack at a restaurant in Exeter, England, by
2010, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair
testified that while U.S. counterterrorism efforts against Nicky Reilly. The plot was not classed as “serious” because Reilly was attempting only

to detonate a rudimentary nail bomb.

“core” al-Qaeda had “slowed the pace of anti-US planning
5 See Adam Fresco, “Terror Cell Jailed for Planning Attacks,” Times (London), June
and hindered progress on new external operations, they
have not been sufficient to stop them.”227 15, 2007; Jean Chichizola, “Un apprenti terroriste voulait faire sauter la Direction du

renseignement,” Le Figaro, March 10, 2009; Andrew Carey, “12 Arrested in ‘Very

Serious’ Terror Plot in UK,” CNN, April 8, 2009; Cameron Steward and Lauren
As the 9/11 attacks illustrated, a small group of determined
terrorists can create great carnage. In 2006, al-Qaeda Wilson, “Police Swoop on Melbourne Homes after Somali Islamists’ Terror Plot

Exposed,” Australian, August 4, 2009; David Crosling “Australia Foils Terrorist Plot
operatives in North Waziristan recruited, trained, and
to Attack Army Base,” Associated Press, August 4, 2009; Criminal Complaint -
directed a group of British militants to blow up more than
United States of America v. David C. Headley, United States District Court, Northern
half a dozen transatlantic airliners, a plot that if successful
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, October 11, 2009.
could have killed more than 1,500 people and created
6 The degree of al-Qaeda direction over the 2004 Madrid bombings is unclear.
significant global economic repercussions. According to
Although none of the 2004 Madrid bombers trained in Pakistan, there were allegedly
British authorities, the airline plotters were just weeks away
communications in the previous year between one of the ringleaders and a senior al-
from building bombs that would have been undetectable by
Qaeda operative in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Fernando Reinares, “Al-Qaeda Is Back,”
airport scanners and powerful enough to bring down
airliners.228 Almost half a decade later, al-Qaeda operatives National Interest, January 8, 2010.

7 Thomas Catan, “191 Dead, Thousands of Victims--but the “Mastermind’ Is Cleared,”

still enjoy significant sanctuary in North Waziristan,
Times (London), November 1, 2007.
demonstrated by their continued ability to distribute videos
from the region.229 As long as Western militants continue 8 “Four Madrid Bomb Convicts Cleared,” BBC, July 17, 2008.

9 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., Prosecution Opening Statement, Central Criminal

to stream in, al-Qaeda and allied groups will continue to
Court, March 21, 2006.
have the opportunity to plot attacks of similar ambition and
10 Ibid.; “Khawaja Sentenced to 10½ years in Prison,” CBC, March 12, 2009.
retain the capability to launch attacks in Europe and the
11 Rachanee Srisavasdi, “Man Sentenced for Role in Plot to kill Jews, Attack Military
United States on a scale similar to the 2005 London
Bases,” Orange County Register, August 17, 2009.
bombings.
12 Ibid.

1 See for example British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “Statement on Security and 13 “Tracking Al-Qaida’s Media Production Team,” NPR.org, July 11, 2006

Counter-Terrorism,” House of Commons, January 20, 2010. 14 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “Al-Qaeda-on-Thames: UK Plotters

2 Craig Whitlock, “Flow of Terrorist Recruits Increasing,” Washington Post, October Connected,” washingtonpost.com, April 30, 2007; Massoud Ansari, “British Afghan

19, 2009; Lolita C. Baldor, “Terror Training Camps Are Smaller, Harder to Target,” Hunted as the Link Between Tube Bombers and al-Qaeda,” Daily Telegraph, July 9,

Associated Press, November 9, 2009. 2006

3 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Prepared Remarkes of President 15 Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, “Inside the Terror Plot

Barack Obama: A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 27, 2009. that ‘Rivaled 9/11,’” “Dateline NBC,” September 15, 2008.

4 Only plots in North America, Australia, and Europe were included. Plots in the 16 Ibid.

Balkans and Russia were excluded. Where clusters of militants plotted multiple 17 The Australian militants’ purchases included all the ingredients necessary to make

attacks, the author included them as one plot. For example, the Hofstad group plotted the explosive chemicals hydrogen peroxide, TATP, and HMTD, according to

a series of attacks in the Netherlands in 2003-06 that are covered as one plot. To help Australian prosecutors. “Nine ‘Plotted Violent Sydney Jihad,’” Sydney Morning

understand the criteria for inclusion on this list, it is useful to explain why certain Herald, March 6, 2007. Although no direct operational ties between the Australian

plots were not judged as “serious.” All plots in which participants relied exclusively plot and al-Qaeda have emerged, such explosives have commonly been used in al-

on undercover law enforcement agents to acquire explosives were left off the list. Also Qaeda plots against the West.

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 29

18 Four of those arrested in Sydney and Melbourne in November 2005 are suspected Leader’s Friends Convicted of Terror Offences,” Times (London), December 10,

of having trained at some point with Kashmiri militant groups. Mitchell D. Silber and 2009.

Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” NYPD, 2007. At 29 Elisabeth Arnsdorf Haslund, “Titalt: Mit TATP var ikke farligt,” Berlingske

the trial of the Sydney suspects, prosecutors alleged that one of the plotters, Moustafa Tidende, September 13, 2007.

Cheikho, received training with Lashkar-e-Taiba in a camp in Pakistan in late 2001 30 “Denmark Convicts Men in Bomb Plot,” BBC, November 23, 2007.

and early 2002. Malcolm Brown, “Terrorism Suspect’s Training Camp Link,” Sydney 31 “Police avert car bomb ‘carnage’,” BBC, June 29, 2007.

Morning Herald, July 29, 2009. 32 Sean O’Neill, Steve Bird and Michael Evans, “Glasgow bomber Bilal Abdulla was

19 Katelyn Catanzariti, “Convicted Would-Be Terrorists Face Jail,” Age, October 16, in Iraq terrorist cell,” Times (London), December 17, 2008.

2009; Karen Kissane, “Guilty Findings for Six Men in Terrorist Trial,” Sydney 33 Ibid.

Morning Herald, September 16, 2008; Reko Rennie, “Terror Trial Over: Amer 34 Paul von Zielbauer and Jon Hurdle, “Five Are Convicted of Conspiring to Attack

Haddara Guilty, No Verdict on Shane Kent in Supreme Court,” Age, September 16, Fort Dix,” New York Times, December 22, 2008.

2008; Gary Hughes, “Shane Kent Pleads Guilty on Eve of Terror Trial but al Qa’ida 35 Ibid.

Charge Dropped,” Australian, July 28, 2009. 36 “United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 -

20 Although it appears the group acted autonomously, two members traveled to Denmark, April 30, 2009.

Pakistan to receive training and had contacts with leaders of groups linked to al- 37 Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, "Explosions in the Sand," Der Spiegel,

Qaeda; Saskia van Reenen, “The ‘Hofstad’ Group: Background and Profiles,” Radio August 11, 2009 (Translation Accessed on World News Connection).

Netherlands, December 23, 2005; Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad Group: The New 38 Ibid.

Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 39 Sauerland Trial: Defendants Make Comprehensive Confessions" Der Spiegel, July

30, Issue 7, July 2007. 9, 2009. (Translation Accessed through World News Connection).

21 “Sentences of Up to 15 Years in Hofstad Trial,” Expatica, March 10, 2006; Ann 40 Only small traces of chemicals useful in preparing explosives were found by

Riley, “Dutch High Court Orders Retrial of Suspected ‘Hofstad’ Terrorists,” Jurist, investigators, but Spanish prosecutors believe the group disposed of additional

February 2, 2010. explosives. Fernando Reinares, “A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb

22 Although the plotters were provided ammonium nitrate by Canadian security Plot in Barcelona,” CTC Sentinel, 2:1 (2009).

services in a “sting operation,” they successfully built a remote detonating device and 41 Ibid.; e-mail communication with Fernando Reinares, principal researcher on

had obtained a viable bomb-making formula for the ammonium nitrate. Isabel international terrorism, Elcano Royal Institute, February 2010.

Tiotonio, “Video Shows Toronto 18 Convict Testing Bomb Trigger,” Star, October 20, 42 Al Goodman, “Spain: 11 guilty of belonging to terror group,” CNN, December 14,

2009. 2009.

23 In late December 2005, one of the Canadian plotters, Jahmaal James, traveled to 43 Duncan Gardham, “Muslim Convert Guilty of Plotting Suicide Attack,” Daily

Balakot in the NWFP where authorities believe he received jihadist training. Mitchell Telegraph, July 17, 2009.

D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” 44 Ibid.

NYPD, 2007. 45 M.J. Stephey, “Daniel Boyd: A Homegrown Terrorist?” TIME, July 30, 2009.

24 “’Toronto 18’ Terrorist Jailed Seven Years,” Canwest News Service, October 5, 46 William K. Rashbaum, “After Months of Scrutiny in Zazi Terrorism Case, Two

2009. Arrests Came as a Surprise,” New York Times, January 8, 2010.

25 “Train Plotter Jailed in Germany,” BBC, December 9, 2008. 47 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi said that he

26 Ibid.; “Lebanese Man Jailed for 12 Years in Germany on Terror-Related Charge,” neither ordered nor pressured Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan to harm Americans,”

Naharnet Newsdesk, December 18, 2007. Washington Post, November 15, 2009.

27 Personal interview with British police investigators, London, summer 2008. 48 Kenneth Chang, “PETN, Explosive Found on Flight 253, Is Among Most

28 Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, “Inside the Terror Plot Powerful,” New York Times, December 27, 2009.

that ‘Rivaled 9/11,’” (updated version) September 14, 2009. Sean O’Neill, “Bomb Plot 49 Peter Baker, “Obama says Al-Qaeda in Yemen Planed Bombing Plot, and He

Vows Retribution,” New York Times, January 2, 2010.

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 30

50 It was not always clear how many individuals in each plot trained in Pakistan after 61 Regina v. Ali et al. Six of the plotters were in Pakistan in 2005 and four in 2006. It

9/11. In these instances, the author included presence in Pakistan in the years before is possible that plot ringleader Ali received some training while in Pakistan in 2004.

the plot as evidence of potential training in Pakistan. According to this criteria, seven 62 For their travel dates to Pakistan see Greenberg, Cruickshank, and Hansen,

of the fertilizer bomb plotters trained in Pakistan, as did two of the 7/7 2005 “Dateline NBC,” 2008.

bombers, one of the 7/21 2005 attempted bombers, one of the 2005 Australian 63 Five sets of Western recruits are believed to have had training overseen by Abu

plotters, two of the Hofstad group, one of the 2006 Toronto plotters, seven of the Ubaidah al-Masri, a senior Egyptian al-Qaeda instructor: two of the July 7, 2005,

2006 airline plotters, one of the 2007 Copenhagen plotters, four of the Sauerland plotters; the airline plotters; the Danish recruit Hammad Khurshid; the German

plotters, eight of the Barcelona plotters, and three of the alleged 2009 New York recruit Aleem Nasir; and another German al-Qaeda recruit, Bekkay Harrach. Al-

plotters. Masri is believed to have died of hepatitis in December 2007. See Sebastian Rotilla,

51 Marc Sageman, “Countering al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan “Alleged Al-Qaeda chief dead, officials say,” The Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2008.

and Beyond,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 64 Because of a lack of admissible evidence, U.K. authorities initiated deportation

2009. How one counts “plots” has a bearing on one’s findings. When a cluster of proceedings against 10 of the men rather than charge them. Duncan Gardham,

militants plotted a series of different attacks, Sageman included all these in his count “Manchester ‘Bomb Plot’ Accused Appeal Against Deportation,” Daily Telegraph,

of plots. This author - by contrast - counted all attack plans hatched by a particular May 6, 2009.

cluster of militants as amounting to one plot. 65 Yassin Musharbash and Marcel Rosenbach, “Explosions in the Sand,” Der Spiegel,

52 Marc Sageman, “The Homegrown Young Radicals of Next-Gen Jihad,” August 11, 2009. (Translation accessed on World News Connection.)

Washington Post, June 8, 2008. 66 Alisher Sidikov, “Pakistan Blames IMU Militants for Afghanistan Border Unrest,”

53 Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, “Inside the Terror Plot Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 2, 2008.

that ‘Rivaled 9/11,’” “Dateline NBC,” September 15, 2008. 67 It remains unclear which targets he wanted to attack. Morten Skjoldager, “Portræt:

54 Sam Coates and Jeremy Page, “Pakistan ‘Linked to 75% of All UK Terror Plots,’ Trænet til terror mod sit fødeland: Portræt, Hammad Khürshid,” Politiken

Warns Gordon Brown,” Times (London), December 15, 2008. (Denmark), November 10, 2009; Elisabeth Arnsdorf Haslund, “Skyldige i terror?,”

55 Adam Fresco, “Terror Cell Jailed for Planning Attacks,” Times (London), June 15, Berlingske Tidende (Denmark), October 18, 2008.

2007. 68 Fernando Reinares, “A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in

56 The five men convicted were Omar Khyam, Jawad Akbar, Salahuddin Amin, Barcelona,” CTC Sentinel, January 2009.

Waheed Mahmood, and Anthony Garcia. “Five Get Life Over UK Bomb Plot,” BBC, 69 Paul Cruickshank, “The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline,” CTC

April 30, 2007. Sentinel, April 2009.

57 Jonathan Wild, “N.Y. man admits he aided al-Qaeda, set up jihad camp,” CNN, 70 Paul Cruickshank, “Homecoming: Al-Qaeda Recruits a Growing Number of

August 11, 2004. Americans,” Newsweek, September 29, 2009.

58 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “Al-Qaeda-on-Thames: UK Plotters 71 Department of Justice Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy

Connected,” washingtonpost.com, April 30, 2007. to Use Explosives,” February 22, 2010.

59 “Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005,” 72 William K. Rashbaum, “After Months of Scrutiny in Zazi Terrorism Case, Two

Home Office, May 11, 2006. According to the Daily Telegraph, Pakistani intelligence Arrests Came as a Surprise,” New York Times, January 8, 2010.

officials believe that Khan received a two-week “crash course” in explosives training 73 Indictment – United States of America v. Adis Medunjanin, United States District

in Pakistan’s tribal region that winter. They believe Tanweer joined him for only a Court, Eastern District of New York, January 8, 2010.

few days, during which time the duo recorded martyrdom videos. Massoud Ansari, 74 Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government’s Motion for a Permanent

“British Afghan Hunted as the Link Between Tube Bombers and al-Qaeda,” Daily Order of Detention - United States of America v. Najibullah Zazi, United States

Telegraph, July 9, 2006. District Court, Eastern District of New York, September 24, 2009.

60 Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, “Inside the Terror Plot 75 Department of Justice Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy

that ‘Rivaled 9/11,’” “Dateline NBC,” September 15, 2008. to Use Explosives,” February 22, 2010.

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 31

76 Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. David C. Headley, United States 94 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central

District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, October 11, 2009. Criminal Court, March 23 - April 5, 2006; Bergen and Cruickshank,

77 Cruickshank, Newsweek (2009). washingtonpost.com (April 2007).

78 Personal interview with Noman Benotman, a former jihadist who met with al- 95 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central

Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan a year before 9/11, London, November 2007. Criminal Court, March 23 - April 5, 2006.

79 “Al-Adl letter” - released February 14, 2006, CTC Harmony Document Database, 96 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. A U.S. counterterrorism official told the Criminal Court, March 24, p. 109, and March 28, 2006, p. 115.

author that Al-Adl was believed to be Sayf al-Adel. 97 Bergen and Cruickshank, washingtonpost.com (April 2007).

80 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: 98 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central

Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 130 – 152. Criminal Court, March 27, 2006, pp. 26-27.

81 The most authoritative account of the establishment of al-Qaeda’s safe haven in the 99 Salahuddin Amin, one of those convicted for the plot, brought money and

tribal areas is Hussain, Frontline Pakistan. supplies from Britain to Pakistan after being asked to do so by Mohammed Quayyum

82 Official transcript obtained by author of Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony Khan. Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., Prosecution Opening Statement, Central

of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central Criminal Court, March 27, 2006, p. 19. Criminal Court, March 21, 2006.

83 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “London Broil: Kashmir on Thames,” New 100 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Iraq Effect,” Mother Jones,

Republic, September 4, 2006. March/April 2007.

84 Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel (April 2009). 101 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central

85 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central Criminal Court, March 23 – April 5, 2006.

Criminal Court, March 23 – April 5, 2008. 102 The accomplice Salahuddin Amin later confessed to the episode, stating he took

86 Elaine Sciolino and Stephen Grey, “British Terror Trial Traces a Path to Militant handwritten notes during his meeting with his al-Qaeda handler Abu Munthir.

Islam,” New York Times, November 26, 2006. Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., Prosecution Opening Statement, Central Criminal

87 Bergen and Cruickshank, washingtonpost.com (April 2007). Court, March 21, 2006.

88 Two such facilitators are thought to be Mohammed Quayyum Khan and 103 C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within,” Survival, 51:6, 161-

Mohammed al-Ghabra. Khan, a part-time taxi driver from Luton, England, is believed 188.

to have helped connect the fertilizer bomb plotters and two of the 7/7 bombers with 104 Ibid.

al-Qaeda training. Ian Cobain and Jeevan Vasagar, “Free – the Man Accused of Being 105 Ibid.

an al-Qaida Leader, aka ‘Q,’” Guardian, May 1, 2007. Al-Ghabra, who was designated 106 Greenberg, Cruickshank, and Hansen, “Dateline NBC,” 2008.

an al-Qaeda facilitator by U.S. authorities in December 2006, is thought by 107 “Treasury Designates Individual Supporting Al Qaida, Other Terrorist

investigators to have helped connect both Muktar Said Ibrahim and members of the Organizations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 19, 2006; Greenberg,

airline plot with al-Qaeda. Personal interview with senior British counterterrorism Cruickshank, and Hansen, “Dateline NBC,” 2008. Personal interview with Hanif

source, London, summer 2008. Qadir, the owner of the gym where Ali and al-Ghabra trained, London, summer

89 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central 2008.

Criminal Court, March 23 – April 5, 2008. 108 Treasury Department press release; personal interview with senior British

90 Ibid. counterterrorism source, London, summer 2008.

91 Ibid.; Bergen and Cruickshank, washingtonpost.com (April 2007). 109 Greenberg, Cruickshank, and Hansen, “Dateline NBC,” 2008. However,

92 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., testimony of Mohammed Junaid Babar, Central Mohammed Gulzar, an alleged British al-Qaeda operative who allegedly oversaw the

Criminal Court, March 27, 2006, p. 19. final stages of the airline plot, traveled first to South Africa before entering Britain

93 “Accused ‘Helped Make Test Bomb,’” BBC, July 24, 2006; Gordon Rayner “In under a false identity. According to a senior British counterterrorism source, greater

Pakistan, British Nationals Met to Rehearse the Bombing of Britain,” Daily Mail, May scrutiny of direct U.K.-Pakistan flights had led to militants increasingly taking

1, 2007. roundabout journeys. The source said South Africa had emerged as a principle hub

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 32

for these trips. Personal interview with senior British counterterrorism source, 125 Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark, “How the CIA Helped

summer 2008. Germany Foil Terror Plot,” Der Spiegel, October 9, 2007. 125 Paul Cruickshank, “The

110 Greenberg, Cruickshank and Hansen, “Dateline NBC,” 2008. 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009).

111Ibid. 126 Yassin Musharbash and Marcel Rosenbach, “Explosions in the Sand,” Der

112 Regina v. Ali et al. Six of the plotters were in Pakistan in 2005 and four in 2006. Spiegel, August 11, 2009. (Translation accessed on World News Connection.)

It is possible that plot ringleader Ali received some training while in Pakistan in 127 “Terrorism Trial: Sauerland Defendants Fired at US Military Camp,” Der Spiegel,

2004. September 9, 2009. (Translation Accessed on World News Connection.)

113 Cruickshank, Newsweek, (2009). 128 Musharbash and Rosenbach, “Explosions in the Sand”; Musharbash, “Jihad

114 Duncan Gardham, “Muslim Convert Guilty of Plotting Terror Attack,” Daily Leader Reportedly Killed in US Drone Attack,” Der Spiegel, September 18, 2009.

Telegraph, July 17, 2009; Mohammed Zaher, the Danish-Palestinian bomb-maker in 129 Ibid.

the 2006 “Vollsmose” plot in Denmark, said he learned how to make TATP by 130 Kaiser, Rosenbach, and Stark, “How the CIA Helped Germany Foil Terror Plot”;

downloading instructions from the Internet but that he learned how to handle Phone conversation with German journalist Marcel Rosenbach, who covered the trial

explosives during military training in his youth. Elisabeth Arnsdorf Haslund, “Titalt: for Der Spiegel, February 2010.

Mit TATP var ikke farligt,” Berlingske Tidende, September 13, 2007. 131 “Terror Trial: Sauerland Group to Kill German Politicians,” Der Spiegel,

115 For example, according to the testimony of Babar, the fertilizer bomb plotters September 2, 2009. (Translation accessed on World News Connection.)

became much more serious after they received training. 132 Kim McLaughlin, “Danish court convicts two of planning bomb attack,” Reuters,

116 This is if the assassination of Theo van Gogh, which did not require training, is October 21, 2008.

excluded. Marc Sageman, “Confronting Al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in 133 Personal interview with Alain Grignard, head of counterterrorism, Belgian

Afghanistan and Beyond,” testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Federal Police, Brussels, August 2008.

October 7, 2009. 134 Morten Skjoldager, “Portræt: Trænet til terror mod sit fødeland: Portræt,

117 Personal interview with senior British counterterrorism source, February 2009. Hammad Khürshid, Politiken (Denmark), November 10, 2009; Elisabeth Arnsdorf

118 Al-Qaeda kept tight control over the plot until the end. In July 2006, the group Haslund, “Skyldige i terror?,” Berlingske Tidende (Denmark), October 18, 2008;

allegedly sent a senior operative, Mohammed Gulzar--a colleague of Rauf’s--to personal interview with Elisabeth Haslund (a Danish reporter who covered the trial),

oversee final preparations for the attack. Greenberg, Cruickshank, and Hansen, New York, September 2009.

“Dateline NBC,” 2008; personal interview with British counterterrorism source, 135 Ibid.

February 2009. 136 Marc Sageman, “Confronting Al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in

119 “Al-Qaeda Messaging Statistics,” IntelCenter, September 9, 2007. Afghanistan and Beyond,” testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

120 The four, who in early 2010 were still on trial in Düsseldorf, were Fritz Gelowicz October 7, 2009.

(the alleged ringleader of the cell and a German convert to Islam), Adem Yilmaz (a 137 National Intelligence Estimate, “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,” July

Turkish national), Daniel Schneider (a German convert), and Atilla Selek (a German 2007.

of Turkish descent). See Yassin Musharbash and Marcel Rosenbach, “Germany 138 Aryn Baker, “At Pakistan’s Red Mosque, a Return of Islamic Militancy,” TIME,

Prepares for Homegrown Terror Trial,” Der Spiegel, April 16, 2009. April 17, 2009.

121 “German-Turkish Man Charged With Terror Links: Prosecutors,” Agence France- 139 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone,” New America

Presse, December 9, 2009. Foundation, February 2010.

122 “Sauerland Trial: Defendants Make Comprehensive Confessions,” Der Spiegel, 140 Ibid. This was the “low figure” from press reports.

July 9, 2009. (Translation accessed on World News Connection.) 141 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Revenge of the Drones,” Appendix 1,

123 “Terrorism: Islamic Jihad Union Admits Cooperation With Al-Qa'ida,” Der New America Foundation, October 19, 2009.

Spiegel, June 5, 2009. (Translation accessed on World News Connection.) 142 Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Recruits Reveal Al-Qaeda’s Sprawling

124 “Sauerland Trial: Islamists Wanted to Go to Iraq.” Der Spiegel, July 12, 2009. Web,” CNN, July 31, 2009.

(Translation accessed on World News Connection.) 143 Ibid.

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 33

144 Summary of Walid Othmani’s interrogation by French authorities (December 163 Personal Interviews with American and European Counter-terrorism officials,

2008 to January 2009), which was supplied to Belgian prosecutors. The document 2009-10.

was obtained and authenticated by the author. 164 Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. David C. Headley, United

145 Ibid.; Robertson and Cruickshank, “Recruits Reveal Al-Qaeda’s Sprawling Web.” States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, October 11, 2009.

146 Bryant Neal Vinas’s statement to Belgian prosecutors in an FBI office in New Headley, who was arrested in Chicago in October 2009 boarding a flight to meet

York, March 2009. The document was obtained and authenticated by the author. See with Kashmiri, was also charged with involvement in LeT’s November 2008 attack on

also Robertson and Cruickshank, “Recruits Reveal Al-Qaeda’s Sprawling Web.” Mumbai and plotting follow-on attacks against Indian targets.

147 Robertson and Cruickshank, “Recruits Reveal Al-Qaeda’s Sprawling Web.” 165 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” Developments in

148 Ibid. It is possible that Abu Hafith is the German al-Qaeda recruit Bekkay Radicalisation and Political Violence, April/May 2009

Harrach, whose nom de guerre is Al Hafidh Abu Talha der Deutsche. Harrach is 166 Rauf married a relative of Jaish-e-Mohammed’s leader after arriving in Pakistan

described by intelligence officials as central to al-Qaeda’s terrorist planning section. from Britain in 2002.

Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark, "A 167 Silber and Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West.”

German Islamist Rises up al-Qaida's Ranks" Der Spiegel, January 27, 2009. 168 “Brigitte Jailed for Planning Aust Terrorist Attacks,” ABC News (Australia),

(Translation accessed on World News Connection.) March 16, 2007.

149 Ibid. 169 Trevor Stanley, “Australian Anti-Terror Raids: A Serious Plot Thwarted,”

150 Summary of Walid Othmani’s interrogation by French authorities; Cruickshank, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, December 16, 2005.

“The 2008 Belgian Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline.” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009). 170 “British Man Jailed Nine Years for Terrorism,” Metropolitan Police (London)

151 Summary of Walid Othmani’s interrogation by French authorities. press release, March 17, 2006.

152 Cameron Abadi, “Germans Arrest Alleged Al-Qaida Suspect,” Associated Press, 171 “5 American Terror Suspects Appear in Pakistan Court,” CNN, January 4, 2010.

February 15, 2008; "German convicted of al-Qaeda membership," Associated Press, 172 Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, 2:4

July 13, 2009. (2009).

153 Sebastian Rotella, “Turks Increasingly Turn to Islamic Extremism,” Los Angeles 173 The online posting was discovered by the author. See Paul Cruickshank, “Italy

Times, June 28, 2009. Arrests Linked to Brussels ‘al-Qaeda’ Recruiting Network,” CNN, May 15, 2009.

154 Personal interview with senior U.S. counterterrorism source, New York, October 174 Guy Van Vlierden, “Allah helpt mij raak te Shieten,” De Morgen, December 19,

2009. 2009.

155 Bryant Neal Vinas’s statement to Belgian prosecutors. 175 Cruickshank, “The 2008 Belgian Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline,” 2:4 (2009).

156 Robertson and Cruickshank, “Recruits Reveal Al-Qaeda’s Sprawling Web.” 176 See for example “Pakistan Taleban Vow More Violence,” BBC, January 29, 2007;

157 Summary of Walid Othmani’s interrogation by French authorities; Bryant Neal Imtiaz Ali, “Commander of the Faithful,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2009.

Vinas’s statement to Belgian prosecutors. 177 Nic Robertson and Amir Ahmed, “CIA ‘Suicide Bomber’ Vows Revenge in New

158 Ibid.; personal interview with senior U.S. counterterrorism source, New York, Video,” CNN, January 9, 2010.

September 2009. 178 Robertson and Cruickshank, “Recruits Reveal Al-Qaeda’s Sprawling Web”;

159 Indictment – United States of America v. Adis Medunjanin, United States District personal interview with senior U.S. counterterrorism source, New York, October

Court, Eastern District of New York, January 8, 2010. 2009.

160 Department of Justice Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to 179 Fernando Reinares, “A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in

Conspiracy to Use Explosives,” February 22, 2010. Barcelona.”

161 However, Vinas was arrested by Pakistani authorities during this November 2009 180 Doubts have been expressed in some quarters over the Spanish prosecution case

trip. Bryant Neal Vinas’s statement to Belgian prosecutors. because much of it rests on the testimony of a confidential informant. Additionally,

162 Imtiaz Ali and Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda Commander Moved Freely in only small amounts of bomb-making chemicals were found. However, in an August

Pakistan,” Washintgon Post, February 4, 2008. 2008 video interview, a Pakistani Taliban spokesman asserted responsibility for the

plot.

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 34

181 Recent videos by the Uzbek groups feature entire villages in the tribal areas 192 Binnie and Wright, “The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghanistan and

populated by German recruits. According to Walid Othmani, the French recruit, the Pakistan.”

two Uzbek groups had around 3,000 fighters total in the FATA. Some official 193 “German and American Militants Training for Terror in Pakistan,” NEFA

estimates are more conservative. German authorities have estimated that the groups Foundation, October 2009.

have several hundred fighters in the tribal areas. 194 “New Video Threat on the Internet,” Focus, January 24, 2009. (Translation

182 Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright, “The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in accessed on World News Connection.)

Afghanistan and Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, 2:8 (2009). Helpful to the Uzbek 195 Gebauer, Musharbash, Rosenbach, and Stark, “A German Islamist Rises up al-

recruitment drive has been the fact that the Uzbek and Turkish languages have the Qaida's Ranks.”

same Turkic roots. 196 “Treasury Designates al-Qa’ida Member,” U.S. Treasury Department press

183 “Terrorism: Sauerland Group Sent Next Generation to Training Camps,” Der release, October 15, 2009.

Spiegel, September 9, 2009. (Translation accessed on World News Connection.) 197 Yassin Musharbash, “Jihad Leader Reportedly Killed in US Drone Attack,” Der

184 The new wave of German recruits had differing experiences in the tribal areas. Spiegel, September 18, 2009.

One of them, identified as Omid S., an Afghan German convicted in October 2009 of 198 Gebauer, Musharbash, Rosenbach, and Stark, “A German Islamist Rises up al-

supporting a terrorist group, testified at his trial that he had traveled via Afghanistan Qaida's Ranks.”

to attend an IJU training camp in the Waziristan mountains in June 2007 but quit 199 Interview with former jihadist familiar with worldview of Haqqani and his sons

after just 10 days after being criticized for his lack of fitness. “Sauerland Group: and their relations with Pakistani intelligence, January 2010.

Prison Terms For Terror Accomplices,” Der Spiegel, October 13, 2009. (Translation 200 Summary of Walid Othmani’s interrogation by French authorities.

accessed by World News Connection.) Another of those recruited by the Sauerland 201 Personal interview with Beyayo’s lawyer Christophe Marchand, Brussels, January

cell was Cüneyt Ciftci, a German of Turkish descent, who was killed in a March 2008 2010.

suicide attack on a camp of the International Security Assistance Force in Khost, 202 Rotella, “Turks Increasingly Turn to Islamic Extremism.”

Afghanistan. The assault was a joint operation between the IJU and the Haqqani 203 Interview with U.S. counterterrorism official, New York, April 2009.

network. See Binnie and Wright, “The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in 204 Rotella, “Turks Increasingly Turn to Islamic Extremism.”

Afghanistan and Pakistan.” 205 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drones,” New America

185 “Terror Charges Against Two Men in Germany: Prosecutors,” Agence France- Foundation, February 2010. 284 represents the “low figure” from press reports.

Presse, March 18, 2009; “Turk Faces Terror Charges in Germany: Prosecutors,” 206 Ibid.

Agence France-Presse, March 18, 2009. 207 Ibid.

186 “German Propaganda for the Jihad,” Der Spiegel, January 12, 2009. (Translation 208 David Rohde, “A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope,” New York Times, October

accessed on World News Connection.) 21, 2009.

187 “Terrorism: Sauerland Group Sent Next Generation to Training Camps,” Der 209 Mukhtar A. Khan, “A Profile of the TTP’s New Leader: Hakimullah Mehsud,”

Spiegel. CTC Sentinel, 2:10 (2009).

188 Whitlock, “Flow of Terrorist Recruits Increasing.” 210 Zahid Hussain, “CIA Drone Strike Hits Hakimullah Mehsud Compound,” Times

189 “Islamists: Interior Ministers Want to Make Trips to Terrorist Camps More (London), January 14, 2010.

Difficult,” Der Spiegel, May 29, 2009. (Translation accessed on World News 211 Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. David C. Headley, United States

Connection); conversation with Der Spiegel reporter Marcel Rosenbach, February District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, October 11, 2009.

2010. 212 Rohde, “A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope.”

190 “Al-Qa'ida in Hamburg,” Focus, October 28, 2009. (Translation accessed on 213 Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia

World News Connection.) and Yemen,” New York Times, June 11, 2009.

191 “Terrorism: Islamic Jihad Union Admits Cooperation With Al-Qa'ida,” Der 214 Personal interview with senior U.S. counterterrorism official, Washington, DC,

Spiegel, June 5, 2009. (Translation accessed on World News Connection.) October 2009.

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 35

215 Personal interview by telephone with former jihadist, December 2009. The

source had contacts in the region who in turn had ties to militants in the tribal areas.

216 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Assessing the Progress of Pakistan’s South Waziristan

Offensive,” CTC Sentinel, 2:12 (2009).

217 Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of

the U.S. Intelligence Community” for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,

February 2, 2010.

218 Whitlock, “Flow of Terrorist Recruits Increasing.”

219 David Rohde, “You Have Atomic Bombs, but We Have Suicide Bombers,” New

York Times, October 20, 2009.

220 Lolita C. Baldor, “Terror Training Camps Smaller, Harder to Target,” Associated

Press, November 9, 2009.

221 See Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Drone War,” New Republic,

June 3, 2009.

222 Personal interview with senior U.S. counterterrorism official, New York,

September 2009.

223 Melanie Bois, “Recontre avec un Belge d’Al Qaida: il nous menace,” RTL, January

18, 2010. An LeT fighter brought the journalist to the al-Qaeda fighter, underlining

the close ties between the groups in the tribal areas.

224 Schmitt and Sanger, “Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and Yemen.”

225 It is difficult to be certain about the overall number of Westerners traveling to the

tribal areas. The evidence suggests that the number is rising in several Western

countries, such as Germany, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it may have

dropped in others, for example Britain.

226 Chicago-based LeT operative David Headley traveled to the tribal region in 2009

in the furtherance of a plot to attack a Danish newspaper, but did not train there

during this period.

227 Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of

the U.S. Intelligence Community” for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,

February 2, 2010.

228 Greenberg, Cruickshank, and Hansen, “Dateline NBC,” 2008.

229 In recent years these videos have grown in sophistication and the al-Qaeda

leaders featured in them have appeared more comfortable. Ayman al-Zawahiri, for

example, has for the last several years been shown with a bookcase behind him or

with curtains visible.

New America Foundation — Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 36

© 2010 New America Foundation

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