Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. No.

184379-80, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 545

FACTS: The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction
between the Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and
ZTE Corporation, a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. Former NEDA
Secretary Neri sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The
latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said
transaction involving certain public officials. These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue
Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing
Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008.
Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee. DENR Sec. Atienza announced that Lozada
was in an official trip to London. Because of this, Senate issued an order (1) citing Lozada in
contempt; (2) ordering his arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms to implement such
order and make a return.
Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his
family that he would be arriving in Manila, Feb 5 at 4 pm.
In his petition, Lozada claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms and took his bag. He
allegedly insisted on joining his family but realized that it would be wiser to go with the men when he
heard them say in their handheld radio [H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga
senado.Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while there, called his brother, Arturo and
informed him of his situation. He observed that there were several cars tailing their car. Sec. Atienza
called him and assured him that he was with government people and that Sec. Atienza would confer
with ES and Mam. Lozada surmised them to be ES Ermita and the President. He was also told to
pacify his wife, Violeta, who was making public statements asking for her husbands return. Along the
way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection. Lozada asked to
be brought to his home in Pasig, but was refused due to security risks. They stopped at Outback
restaurant to meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista and Col. Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made
to fill in the blanks of an affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per his request. He observed that
policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his, his family and the
LS brothers, guarded the perimeter of LSGH.
On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and
sign an affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his brother petitioned
for a Writ of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo;
(b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards
documents related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that
would show responsibility for his Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter requesting police
protection. On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the warrant of arrest on him. He claimed that after his press conference
and testimony in the Senate, he and his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.
The respondents avers that Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened from the time of his
arrival, he voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and was never deprived of his liberty and
that since Feb 8, Lozada has been in the custody of the Senate.
1. Habeas Corpus case moot.
2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse
Parties irrelevant to Amparo Case, to require them to testify would be a fishing expedition.

3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent because she enjoys immunity from suit as president.
4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. Petitioners unable to prove through substantial evidence that
respondents violated Lozadas right to life, liberty and security.
ISSUE: Whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him
to the protection.
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Definition: Writ of Amparo (courts lecture)
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to
protect the peoples right to life, liberty and security. Having been originally intended as a response to
the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both
preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation
and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious
violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and
uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or
continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial
character of the writ, thus: The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to
the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to
be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. In cases where the
violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in
an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of
substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case
boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties diverging claims as to what actually
transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of
the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he
disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he
voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of
He was able to go to the mens bathroom and call his brother
He was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, detour appears to
explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through
immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped
No evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made an outcry for help
He testified that nobody held, shouted, or was hostile to him

 He knew and agreed with the plan that he would be fetched at the airport because at that time, it
was his decision not to testify before the Senate
It must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his right
to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and
has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ ofamparo moot.
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody of
the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to [Lozadas] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no
person in his right mind would make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to
threaten somebodys life, liberty and security
Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the LSGH premises where he and his
family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places where he went to. Again,
these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of the
Installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect threat to
his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for
[Lozadas] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed
by the respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security
No evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their
He did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the official
watch
[Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the respondents
ordered the filing of these frivolous cases against him. In any event, said purported cases are to be
determined based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition
filed against the respondents
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance
of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve
the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence (Yano v. Sanchez)
Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have,
in the meanwhile, been commenced.
Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for
amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall
nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule.
In Rubrico v. Arroyo the Court interprets the above sections as follows: (1) the consolidation of the
probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint
before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this
petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of
the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-PC-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and
evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O70602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation
of cases is to be fully effective.
APPLIED: If the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then
the latter action can more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of
the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent

punishment of perpetrators. On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal case lodged before the
courts, then the denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to
have unduly restrained his liberty.
No basis for interim reliefs since writ of amparo denied
In Yano v. Sanchez, this court declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as
Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated public officials were not
accountable for the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant
herein petitioners prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at the same time rule
that there no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozadas right to life, liberty and
security. Thus, there is no basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be
anchored.
Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum proper - for a subpoena to issue, it must first
appear that the person or documents sought to be presented are prima facie relevant to the issue
subject of the CA correctly denied petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum
on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be presented during trial were prima
facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court has repeatedly reminded the parties, in the course
of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not involve the investigation of the ZTENBN contract.
President Arroyo was not proven to be involved in the alleged violation of life, liberty and security of
Lozada
President Arroyos term as president has ended, therefore she no longer enjoys immunity, but an
examination of Petitioners evidence reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or
omission on her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain Ma[a]m, whom
Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that the President was
hurting from all the media frenzy, there is nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish
the link of former President Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to
the subsequent threats that Lozada and his family purportedly received.

Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337

FACTS: Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus
compelling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the
Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the
1973 Constitution which provides:
In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election,
the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the
vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition
for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the
Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in
the legislature.

HELD: No. The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latters
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
Constitution which reads:
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by
this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the
only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist,
would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the
courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role
BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses
thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC,
even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a
petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution
was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary,
subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the
petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the
position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondents appointment.

ISSUE: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.

HELD: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the
power to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light
of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Luison v. Garcia, 101 Phil 1218

FACTS: In the general elections held on November 8, 1955, Anacleto M. Luison and Fidel A. D.
Garcia were the only candidates for mayor of Tubay, Agusan. The certificate of candidacy of Luison
was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the locality duly signed by the chairman and secretary
respectively, while the certificate of candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal
Party but it was merely signed by one who was a candidate for vice mayor. For this reason, the
executive secretary of the Nationalista Party impugned the sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy
filed in behalf of Garcia, whereupon the Commission on Elections, after making its own investigation,
issued Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office. Consequently, the
Commission on Elections who immediately implemented it by striking out the name of Garcia from
the list of registered candidates. Said secretary also relayed the instruction of the Commission on
Elections to the board of inspectors of every precinct and the board of canvassers so that they may be
guided accordingly and votes cast for him may not be counted and instead be considered as stray
votes. Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, as well as the dismissal of
the petition for prohibition sued out by Garcia, the latter continued with his candidacy and the
question of his ineligibility became an issue in the campaign. And when the time came for the
counting and appreciation of the ballots, the board inspectors, in spite of the adverse ruling of the
Commission on Elections, counted all the votes cast for Garcia as valid and credited him with them in
the election returns with the result that he garnered 869 votes as against 675 of his opponent Luison.
Consequently, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the mayor elect of Tubay,
Agusan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the protestee being ineligible and protestant having obtained the next highest
number of votes, the latter can be declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. As this Court has held, "The general rule is that the fact a
plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election does not
entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case
the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. In a subsequent case, this Court
also said that where the winning candidate has been declared ineligible, the person who obtained
second place in the election cannot be declared elected since our law not only does not contain an
express provision authorizing such declaration but apparently seems to prohibit it.
Moreover, a protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of ineligibility is different from that a
protest based on frauds and irregularities where it may be shown that protestant was the one really
elected for having obtained a plurality of the legal votes. In the first case, while the protestee may be
ousted the protestant will not be seated; in the second case, the protestant may assume office after
protestee is unseated.

Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 433 SCRA 119

FACTS: The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City.
Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines.
The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their
private clinics, as well as to other private parties. The right portion of the lot is being leased for
commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The petitioner accepts paying and
non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying.
Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the
government.
Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million,
predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim. When appealed to
the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was
affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its
hospital beds are used exclusively for charity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the
fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and
articles of incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as
such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether
out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the
money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve;
and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.
Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not
exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. (strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:
- income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies
to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of
the Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and
- taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion
alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).

Luz Farms, Inc. vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990)
FACTS: Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to
be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a)
Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
(b)
Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c)

Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d)
Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to
summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law
(e)

Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed
within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers
in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive xxx

ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
HELD: Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional in so far as they include lands devoted
to raising livestock, swine and poultry within its coverage. The use of land is incidental to but not the
principal factor or consideration of productivity in this industry. The Supreme Court held that:
The transcripts of deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of RA
3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle
and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The Supreme Court noted that the intention of the Committee to limit the application of the word
"agriculture" is further shown by the proposal of Commissioner Jamir to insert the word "arable" to
distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and
residential properties. The proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee
contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore,
do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, 7 August 1986, Vol.
III, p. 30).

Moreover, in his answer to Commissioner Regalado's interpellation, Commissioner Tadeo clarified

that the term "farmworker" was used instead of "agricultural worker" in order to exclude therein
piggery, poultry and livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

Lyons v. United States of America, 104 Phil. 593

FACTS: Plaintiff brought this action to the lower court to collect several sums of money arising from
a contract entered into between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The
lower court sustained this motion on the grounds that (a) the courts lacks jurisdiction over defendant,
it being a sovereign state which cannot be sued without its consent; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies provided for in Article XXI of the contract. Plaintiff took the case on
appeal directly to this Court.
It appears that plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for stevedoring service at the U.S. Naval
Base, Subic Bay, Philippines, and the contract to terminate on June 30, 1956. This contract was
entered into pursuant to the provisions of Section 2 (c) (1) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of
1947 of the United States of America (Public Law 413, 80th Congress).
Defendant avers that the claim and judgment will be a charge against and a financial liability to the U.
S. Government because the defendants had acted in their official capacities as agents of said
Government. Consequently, the present suit should be regarded as an action against the United States
Government. Therefore, the suit cannot be entertained by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.
However, plaintiff contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person
the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it
can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract.

HELD:
Considering that the United States Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a
contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay area, a
U. S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual
liability that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction
to entertain this case in so far as appellee is concerned.
But assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain this case, as set out above, did said court
err in dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff has failed to comply with the condition
prescribed in the contract before an action could be taken in court against the U. S. Government?
Article XXI of the contract provides:
"ARTICLE XXI. Disputes. Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a
question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by
the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy
thereof to the Contractor. Within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor may
appeal by mailing or otherwise furnishing to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the
Secretary, and the decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative for the hearing of
such appeals, shall, unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent,
arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessary to imply bad faith, be final and conclusive,
provided that, if no such appeal is taken, the decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and
conclusive. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final

decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of the
contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officers decision."

The foregoing lays down the procedure to be followed by plaintiff should it desire to obtain a remedy
under the contract. Its remedy is to file its claim, not with the court, but With the Contracting Officer
who is empowered to act and render a decision. If dissatisfied with his decision, plaintiff may appeal
to the Secretary of the Navy where he would be "afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer
evidence in support of its appeal", and the decision of the Secretary shall be final and conclusive
"unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious,
or so grossly erroneous as necessary to imply bad faith." Hence, it is only after the claim has been
decided on appeal by the Secretary that plaintiff can resort to a court of competent jurisdiction.
It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in Article
XXI of the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or,
stated differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies against said Government,
the lower court acted properly in dismissing this case.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the
lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House
Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the
Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled
bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective
House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to
vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.
Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House
and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the
basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did
not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals
behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if
the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission,
or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the
journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In
case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. 157013, July 10, 2003

FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following
grounds, among others:
That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to
participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;
That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress
which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall
be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating
the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
HELD: (1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this
Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit
prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return
shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of the
Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a
resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an
election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may
have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the
presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to
have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not
only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green

card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences
will be met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to vote,
the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is
found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this
probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he
was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of
the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally
defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs
to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and
Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning
candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing
Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.

Macalintal V. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 239

FACTS: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the
formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution
does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President
or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

HELD:
1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting
the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what
was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed
by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and
statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests
which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17,
Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

Macalintal V. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010

FACTS: Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) on the grounds that it violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The petitioner chafes
the creation of the separate tribunal which was complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of
personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the instant petition.

HELD: NO. The petitioner does not possess the locus standi in filing the instant petition as he was
unmistakably estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledge its jurisdiction in 2004 therefore making the petitioners
standing still imperiled by thee white elephant in the petition. Judicial inquiry requires that the
constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity to challenge the constitutionality
of the Tribunals constitution. The 1987 Constitution introduces an innovation about the Supreme
Courts independence as cited in Section 4, Article VII. The judicial power expanded, but it remained
absolute.

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a
project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963.
Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the
decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares
subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E
to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the
CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code,
Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing
the complaints against Judge Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the
Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be
exonerated.

ISSUE: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010
and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of
the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?

RULING: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming
of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the
sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010
which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an
appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation.
Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes
after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the
Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether

compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative
act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently,
Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent
Judge Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of
the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his
judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate
withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)

FACTS: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

HELD: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.

Macias v. Commission on Elections, 3 SCRA 1

FACTS: Petitioners are 4 members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis
Oriental and Bulacan & the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that the
respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative
districts in the country. They alleged that their respective provinces were discriminated because they
were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void
because:
1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the HOR at
least 3 calendar days prior to passage
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.
Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer) contend that they
1. were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and allege to be
constitutional
2. petitioners have no personality to bring such action

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring such action.
2. Whether or not the act conformed to the printed form and 3 day requirement.
3. Whether or not the act of apportionment is within the 3 year requirement.
4. Whether or not the apportionment of members of the HOR is valid.

HELD: The petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved provinces have
the personality to sue. The passage of the act did not conform to the printed-form and the 3 day
requirement, and that there is no certificate of urgency from the President was received by the HO.
The requirement that the apportionment must be done within 3 year following the last census is
complied with. The apportionment of members of the HOR is not valid because it is not based on the
number of inhabitants a province has. Some provinces were given more representation despite the
inferior in number of inhabitants. The Court held that RA 3040 infringed the provisions of the
Constitution and is therefore void.

Madarang vs Sandigangbayan, G.R. No. 112314, March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 525
FACTS: Petitioner Vicente R. Madarang was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
Malversation. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and stood trial, resulting in a judgment of
conviction. The amount malversed having been restituted, no civil liability is imposed upon
Madarang.
It appears from the pre-trial stipulations and the evidence of the parties that the City of Cebu owned a
parcel of land at Panganiban Street, Barangay Pahina Central, Cebu City. With the previous
permission of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City and for the purpose of raising funds for the
operations of the Barangay Tanods and installation of a water system in the barangay hall, Barangay
Pahina Central, represented by Barangay Captain Vicente R. Madarang, and Mrs. Dora M. Lim,
owner of Louis Pharmacy, executed a Lease Agreement on January 17, 1984, over a portion of the
property. Mrs. Lim undertook to pay to the Barangay a monthly rental of P300.00 for a period of 20
years from that date.
In July 1986 COA conducted an audit and in the course, thereof, they found that Madarang had
collected advance rentals from Mrs. Lim amounting to P20,700.00. The receipts issued for the
collections were not the official receipts but pieces of bond paper. The auditor also discovered that the
amounts collected had not been deposited with the Treasurer of Cebu City. Accordingly the City
Auditor of Cebu City, wrote Madarang a letter dated September 5, 1986, requiring him to issue the
necessary official receipts and deposit the amounts with the City Treasurer.
Madarang, however, offered an explanation for his failure to deposit. According to him, P1,200.00 of
the P20,700.00 which he collected in cash, was paid to suppliers of materials for the water system of
the barangay hall. The amount of P7,200.00 of the P20,700.00, which he also collected in cash,
Madarang continued, was paid to suppliers of barangay police uniforms. The balance of P12,300.00
was, Madarang further explained, the costs of medicines which members of his barangay bought from
Mrs. Lim on credit, which he guaranteed payment, but which she charged against the rentals due from
her. Madarang and Mrs. Lim agreed that she would sell medicines on credit when presented with the
doctors prescriptions bearing his signature.
Petitioner assails his conviction, insisting that: the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try the
criminal case for malversation of public funds against him; even if it has jurisdiction, the
Sandiganbayan committed serious errors of judgment and grave abuse of discretion in finding
petitioner guilty of the crime charged, when all the elements thereof are not attendant; petitioners
conviction was made solely on the basis of the feeble and uncorroborated testimony of the
prosecutions sole witness failing to recognize that the evidence for the prosecution is too frail and
inadequate to support petitioners conviction; and the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him
notwithstanding the deposit he made with the City Treasurer despite the absence of an official and
unverified report and findings of shortage of funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandigangbayan has jurisdiction to try the criminal case and whether
Madarang is guilty of malversation.

HELD: Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try the criminal charge of malversation of public funds
against petitioner. Both the offices of the Solicitor General and Special Prosecutor are in concurrence.
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses or felonies committed by public officers and

employees in relation to their office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for 6 years or a fine of P6,000.00 (Sec. 4(a)(2), P.D. No. 1606, as
amended). The vital fact is that petitioner is an employee of, or in some way connected with, the
government and that, in the course of his employment, he received money or property belonging to
the government for which he is accountable. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the information
The crime of malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the
pertinent provisions of which read:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property Presumption of malversation. Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or
shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:

xxx

xxx

xxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than 12,000 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 are that: (a) the offender be a
public officer; (b) he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Vol. II, 1993 ed., p.
363).
Concededly, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. Lacking any evidence, however, of
shortage, or taking, appropriation, or conversion by petitioner or loss of public funds, there is no
malversation (Narciso vs. Sandiganbayan, 229 SCRA 229 [1994]). True, the law creates a
presumption that the mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come
into his hand on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie evidence
of conversion. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present

adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use,
then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is reversed and set aside, and
petitioner is acquitted of the crime of malversation of public funds for insufficiency of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

Madriaga V. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560

FACTS: Spouses Trajano were the original registered owners of the properties in dispute. ).
Sometime in 1991, they agreed to sell the properties to the petitioners father, Cesar Madriaga, Sr.
(Madriaga, Sr.) for P1,300,000.00 payable on installment basis. Upon completion of payment,
Spouses Trajano executed in Madriaga, Sr.s favor a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 2, 1992.
However, they failed to deliver the lot titles so Madriaga, Sr. sued for specific performance with the
RTC. The parties entered into a compromise agreement, but to which the Spouses failed to comply
with. On motion of Madriaga, Sr., the RTC issued a writ of execution on September 6, 1994, and
several properties of Spouses Trajano were levied upon, including the disputed properties. After being
declared as the winning bidder, a final deed of sale was issued covering TCT Nos. 114853(M) and
114854(M). Both were cancelled and replaced by TCT Nos. T-284713(M) and T-284714 in his name.
On January 27, 1997, he secured an ex parte writ of possession.
Meanwhile, on January 2, 1995, Spouses Trajano obtained a loan from China Bank in the amount of
P700,000.00, payable in one year and secured by a mortgage over TCT Nos. 114853(M) and
114854(M). They defaulted on their loan, and on October 20, 1997, China Bank foreclosed the
mortgage and was declared the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. TCT Nos. 114853(M) and
114854(M) were replaced for the second time, in favor of China Bank.
China Bank then filed a petition for writ of possession. Writ was granted and a copy of it was served
upon Madriaga Sr. He then filed an opposition to the writ asserting that he is the true owner of the
properties, having obtained them at an earlier execution sale, and that his titles were subsisting. The
RTC dismissed his opposition and denied his motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner, who succeeded to his fathers properties then filed a petition for certiorari to the CA
averring that the RTC gravely and seriously abused its discretion in denying the motion to abate/quash
the writ of possession; in considering the issuance of the writ as ministerial; and in not declaring
China Bank in bad faith, hence, not entitled to possession of the properties. CA affirmed RTCs
decision stating moreover that the motion had already been moot and academic after the writ was
satisfied on April 15, 2005 with the physical removal of Madriaga, Sr. from the premises. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the case has been rendered moot and academic by the full
implementation/satisfaction of the writ of possession.
2. Whether or not the issuance of the ex parte writ of possession violated Madriaga, Sr.s right to
due process.

HELD:

1. YES. With the writ of possession having been served and satisfied, the said motions had
ceased to present a justiciable controversy, and a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. Where there
is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling
or make any pronouncement. Courts generally decline jurisdiction on the ground of mootness
save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when the case is
capable of repetition yet evading judicial review, which are not extant in this case.

2. NO. Indeed, the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in
nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice
by the court to any person adversely interested. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted
without affording the person against whom the relief is sought the opportunity to be heard. No
notice is needed to be served upon persons interested in the subject property. And as held in
Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the ex parte nature of the proceeding does not deny due process to
the petitioners because the issuance of the writ of possession does not bar a separate case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale. Hence, the RTC may grant the petition even in
the absence of Madriaga, Sr.s participation.
Moreover, records show that Madriaga, Sr. was able to air his side when he filed: on
November 1, 2002 an opposition to the writ; on April 13, 2005, a "Motion to Quash/Abate the
Writ of Possession"; and on March 6, 2006, a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
February 6, 2006 denying his motion to quash/abate the writ of possession. When a party has
been afforded opportunity to present his side, he cannot feign denial of due process.

Magallona V. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011

FACTS: In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines
as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties
over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A.
3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

HELD:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints
along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international
community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.
The fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in
lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

Magarang v. Jardin, Sr., 386 Phil 273, 284 (2000)

FACTS: The case is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Saphia M. Magarang on
January 06, 1999, with the Court Administrator, Supreme Court charging respondent Judge Galdino
B. Jardin, Sr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 05, Butuan City with corruption, incompetence ignorance
of the law, and grave abuse of discretion.
On July 22, 1998, the President of the Philippines appointed complainant's husband, Nuruddin-Ali M.
Magarang, Director III for Caraga of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
On August 6, 1998, Alexander P. Mama-O filed with the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, assigned
to Branch O5 a petition for quo warranto with injunction, damages, attorney's fees and temporary
restraining order, questioning the appointment of Magarang.
On August 10, 1998, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining
Nuruddin Magarang from assuming the office of Director III.
After the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction on August 28, 1998, complainant went
to the house of respondent judge to request the latter to fairly decide the application for injunction and
to deny the preliminary injunction. Respondent judge expressed his willingness to help complainant,
but said that he had to return the P200,000.00 he received from petitioner Mama-O. The complainant
committed herself to pay the said amount to respondent judge at a later date.
The next day, August 29, 1998, respondent judge granted a writ of preliminary injunction against
Nuruddin Magarang, thus, his lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting
preliminary injunction.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, complainant went to respondent judge's office
at the Butuan Hall of Justice. She handed him P80,000.00 and committed to give P200,000.00 later, in
exchange for a favorable action on her husband's motion for reconsideration. Respondent judge asked
the complainant when she could give the P200,000.00. The judge denied the motion for
reconsideration, so the complainant went to respondent judge's office to recover the P80,000.00 she
gave him. A heated argument ensued between complainant and respondent judge, with the latter
uttering unsavory words tending to malign complainant's marital fidelity. Angered, complainant poked
her index finger at respondent judge's mouth to stop him from further hurling invectives at her.
Respondent judge, bit complainant's finger, causing her to forcibly pull it off, which paused
respondent judge's tooth to falloff.
On his part, respondent judge denied receiving P80,000.00 from the complainant, or that there was a
commitment for her to give him P200,000.00 in consideration of the denial of the application for writ
of preliminary injunction. To prove his good moral character, respondent judge presented several
citations/awards given by private organizations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jardin is guilty of corruption.
FACTS: Yes. The corruption consists in respondent judge's receiving P200,000.00 from petitioner
Mama-0 and P80,000.00 from complainant Magarang in consideration of favorable action on

complainant's request for "justice" for her husband in the same case. Complainant and her witness,
Naima Capangpangan, proved these facts vividly and convincingly. The findings of investigating
magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their unmatched
opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The alibi of respondent judge
necessarily crumbles in the face of his positive identification, by complainant and her witness Naima
Capangpangan.

It is worthy to note that none of the colleagues of respondent judge categorically and positively
testified that he was a man of integrity and probity. When asked about the character and reputation of
the respondent judge, all of them avoided saying that respondent judge was a man of unquestioned or
unblemished integrity and probity. While every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the
administration of justice.
Respondent Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr. of Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Branch 05 was
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits, with prejudice
to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government
including government owned or controlled corporations.

Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, 673
SCRA 651

FACTS: Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the
National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where it
held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C,
Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman,
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian
personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the
mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their
goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for
resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December
2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections
as a party-list group. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
MAGDALO.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through
violent or unlawful means?

HELD: COMELEC Resolutions are sustained. To join electoral contests, a party or organization must
undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party
v. COMELEC:
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to
qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once
registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that
"seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which
seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of
vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that
force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the
other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the
latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the
elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to
assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by
employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although
this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the
evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is
nonetheless analogously applicable. CASE DISMISSED.

Magkalas v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 138823, September 17, 2008

FACTS: Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as TAG-770063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.
On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named Administrator of the
Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project with the former to take possession, control (sic) and disposition of
the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. During the Census survey of the area, the
structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies of the area, the
NHA determined that the area where plaintiffs structure is located should be classified as an area
center (open space). The Area Center was determined in compliance with the requirement to reserve
30% open space in all types of residential development.
Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, through counsel,
filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff and the two other spouses
have erected structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In a letter, dated
August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff recognizing the latter as a
Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified for relocation.
On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City.
The Order denying plaintiffs prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was appealed, by
way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 33833). On
March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing petitioners complaint.
Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court in its Order
dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for review of the said decision and order of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioners structure will violate the
vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired property under the social justice clause of the
constitution.

HELD: Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of this
case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to order her
relocation and the demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed under the
Constitution.
Petitioners contentions must necessarily fail. The NHAs authority to order the relocation of
petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315.

Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and
was thereby declared expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included petitioners
property. The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national government, was
empowered to take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power
of demolition of their improvements.
P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take possession, control and
disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by force of
law, has the authority to order the relocation of petitioner, and the demolition of her structure in case
of her refusal as this is the only way through which the NHA can effectively carry out the
implementation of P.D. No. 1315.
Inasmuch as petitioners property was located in the area identified as an open space by the NHA, her
continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, in accordance with P.D.
No. 1472, petitioner could lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested right over the
subject property when the NHA recognized her as the census owner by assigning to her a tag number
(TAG No. 77-0063).

Magno Vs. People, GR No. 171542, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA 362
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder against several accused, including MAGNO, who were public officers working
under the NBI. Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy,
who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The RTC issued an Order, ruling that the Ombudsman is proper, legal and authorized entity to
prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other than those authorized under R.A.
6770. This prompted the respondents to file a petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA original decision: Declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in the case,
but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the case is concerned.
CA AMENDED decision: Ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in Criminal
Case to intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration with any lawyer deputized
by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case. This amended CA decision in turn made Magno file for a
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure before the SC.
Petitioners Arguments:
CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the power to hear and decide that
question is with the Sandiganbayan. The private prosecutor cannot be allowed to intervene for the
respondents. Section 31 of RA No. 6770 does not allow the Ombudsman to deputize private
practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Respondents Arguments:
The Ombudsman did not address the contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate
jurisdiction over the RTC in this case. The Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in
the case pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the appellate jurisdiction over the RTCc decision
in not allowing Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman NONE

HELD: The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, as well as its Resolution is NULL AND
VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. PD No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section
4 thereof establishes the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complex with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.
In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari. The
ombudsman should have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive

appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are public officials charged of committing
crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the NBI
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the CAs judgment, issued without jurisdiction, is VOID. There is
no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law and any
judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void and cannot be given any effect. This rule
applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final
judgment.

Mahawan v. People of The Philippines, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008

FACTS: Private complainant Diosdada S. Paradero operates a store on the ground floor of her house
in B. Aranas Extension, Cebu City. On 5 October 1996, Paradero was tending her store when
petitioner Fernando Estabas Mahawan arrived and asked her for a bottle of beer. She told petitioner
that there was no more beer. When she was about to open the refrigerator in the store to show
petitioner that there was really no more beer, petitioner sneaked inside the store. Suddenly, petitioner
pulled out a gun (caliber .38 revolver) and shot her on the left chest. She retreated and fell on the
ground. Private complainant grabbed a kitchen knife nearby to defend herself. Petitioner shot
Paradero again but the bullet this time merely grazed her left earlobe. Petitioner snatched the kitchen
knife from her hand and escaped from the store.
Paraderos sister and some neighbors brought her to Chong Hua Hospital where the gunshot wound in
her left chest was treated. She also underwent a surgical operation on her colon, liver and diaphragm
as these vital organs were hit by the trajectory of the bullet. After the incident, petitioner immediately
went to his brothers house and thereupon called via telephone a policeman named SPO2 Quevedo.
He told SPO2 Quevedo that he wanted to surrender. On 18 October 1996, an Information4 was filed
before the RTC charging petitioner with frustrated homicide.
ISSUE:
(1)

Whether or not petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of Paradero.

(2)

Whether or not second and third elements of self-defense are wanting in the case at bar.

(3)

Whether or not petitioner had intent to kill.

HELD:
(1)
Yes, petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of Paradero. The fact that
petitioner sustained injuries on his hand and stomach, allegedly caused by Paraderos knife, does not
signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression. The medical certificate presented by petitioner
states that the latter sustained incised wounds on the 2nd and 5th fingers measuring 2 centimeters and
abdominal abrasion measuring 2.5 centimeters. Petitioner was discharged on the same day he was
treated in the hospital. It is clear from the foregoing that the injuries he sustained were not serious or
severe. The superficiality of the injuries was not an indication that his life and limb were in actual
peril.
(2)

Yes, both second and third elements are wanting in the case.

Second Element: Reasonable means employed to prevent or repel it. The second element of selfdefense requires that the means employed by the person defending himself must be reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim. There was no reason or necessity
for petitioner to shoot Paradero with a gun. Paradero was merely tending her store and did not attack

or place in danger the life of petitioner during the incident. Further, when Paradero allegedly
approached and tried to stab him, petitioner was not trapped or cornered in a specific area such that he
had no way out.
Third Element: Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person making the defense. Petitioner
shot Paradero when she told him there was no more stock of cigarettes. Paradero then was forced to
grab a knife to defend herself. Clearly, petitioner provoked Paradero and not the other way around.
Hence, the element of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person making the defense is
also wanting in the present case.
(3)
Yes, there was intent to kill on the part of the petitioner. An essential element of homicide,
whether in its consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offender to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. The injury on Paraderos colon
was fatal and would have caused her death were it not for the timely medical attention given her. The
seriousness of Paraderos injuries was also shown by the fact that she was confined and operated on
twice in different hospitals for the wound sustained in the colon. Verily, the foregoing circumstances
clearly manifest intent to kill on the part of petitioner.

Malacora v. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51042, September 30, 1982

FACTS: Article X of the 1973 Constitution

Section 11. (1) XX XXX XXX XX
(2) With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate appellate courts, when the applicable
maximum period shall have lapsed without the rendition of the corresponding decision or resolution
because the necessary vote cannot be had, the judgment, order, or resolution appealed from shall be
deemed affirmed except in those cases where a qualified majority is required and in appeals from
judgment of conviction in criminal cases, and in original special civil action and proceedings for
habeas corpus, the petition in such cases shall be deemed dismissed; and a certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Magistrate of the Court shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record
of the case.

**THE PROVISION ABOVE HAS BEEN OMMITTED IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

In the 1987 Constitution:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution
has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
1.

This case is about the implementation of an erroneous writ of execution.

2.
The case was submitted for decision on October 6, 1980, the period of eighteen months for
deciding it, as fixed by the Constitution has already expired.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the CA should be affirmed on the ground that the period of eighteen
months for deciding it, as fixed in section 11, Article X of the Constitution, had already expired.

HELD: (Point of view of the ponente, Justice De Castro)

The provision of Article X, Section 11 of the Constitution, is mandatory and should have been
complied with immediately after the effectivity of the New Constitution. This has always been my
position, basically, on the legal principle that all provisions of the Constitution which direct specific
acts to be done, or prohibit certain acts to be done, should be construed as mandatory. To construe
them as merely directory would be to thwart the intention of the Constitution which, its command
being of the highest order should, under no circumstance, be permitted if they are the 'great
ordinances' as Justice Holmes had caned the provisions of the Constitution. The manifest purpose of
the provision is to avoid delay in the disposition of cases, which always is a cause of injustice, under
the familiar aphorism that "justice delayed is justice denied."

Paragraph 2 of Section 11 requires for the appealed decision to be deemed affirmed and original
special civil actions, dismissed, is that the applicable maximum period has lapsed without the decision
of the merits being rendered, because of failure to act on the case and put it to a vote, not that it was
put to a vote, but "the necessary vote could not be had." This phrase would thus appear to be either a
mere surplusage or as merely descriptive of how a decision is reached in the Supreme Court, where
alone that phrase has application. It cannot apply to the Court of Appeals, because there the necessary
votes can always be had for a decision to be reached, just like in the one-man Court of First Instance,
as long as the Court acts. What the Constitution has in and, therefore, is "inaction" on the part of the
court during the applicable period, as the reason or cause for the failure to render a decision or
resolution within the applicable period, not that "the necessary vote cannot be had.

It seems to me crystal clear that the Constitution intends that aside from the way an appealed decision,
order or resolution is deemed affirmed because of lack of necessary vote under Section 2 of Article X,
the same effect is contemplated by reason of the lapse of the period fixed without the case being
decided on the merits. If however, the maximum periods fixed in Section 11, which is the real core of
said provision, its heart and soul, as it were, may be disregarded, because the provision is merely
directory, We would be attributing to the framers of the Constitution, with all their vision and wisdom,
an act of colossal absurdity. They have inserted a new provision which would have no different effect
than what is already covered by Section 2 of the same Article, thus rendering Section 11 a complete
surplusage. Only by holding that Section 11 is of mandatory character would such an absurdity be
avoided, as both Section 2 and Section 11 would each be given distinct Identity achieving a common
objective but through two different and separate ways: (1) the necessary vote could not be had, under
Section 2, and (2) the period fixed had lapsed, under Section 11.

The express mention by Section 11 itself of exceptions to the automatic affirmance of appealed
decisions, orders or resolutions when not reversed or modified within the prescribed period, namely,
(1) cases where a qualified majority is required and (2) appeals from judgment of conviction in c
cases, which even after the lapse of the fixed period may still be decided on the merits, clearly, means
under the maxim "expressio inius est exclusio alterius," that aside from the exceptions expressly
mentioned, all other cases may no longer be decided on the merits after the lapse of the applicable
maximum period. The appealed decision, order and resolution would be deemed affirmed, and shall
then be so certified by the chief magistrate of the court, as provided in the last part of paragraph 2 of

Section 11. Said provision would be rendered also useless by holding Section 11 merely directory
because the occasion for the certification will never arise. It will thus be seen that the exceptions
expressly mentioned in the provision and the certification required thereby as just pointed out, argue
most eloquently and convincingly in favor of the mandatory character of Section 11 of Article X of
the New Constitution.

Maliksi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203302, April 11, 2013

FACTS: During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of Mayor
of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an
election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of
votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the
results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to
cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC.
In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was
then installed as Mayor.
The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots
through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated
requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and
printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected
Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process
because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the
printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there
was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use of the
printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.
The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then pronounced that the
First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper
ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered
original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic
Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered
had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the
revision.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation
of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing and
examination of the digital images of the ballots were done inconspicuously upon motu propio
directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner and for the first time on
appeal.

HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted. POLITICAL LAW notice to parties:
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections,
the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases
should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their
opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be
waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice
to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have
upheld the First Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the
election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the
original official ballots themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned
and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are
the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original documents"
simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as
evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to
quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings
had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted
for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of
the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first
shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.

Mamba v. Lara, G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009, 608 SCRA 149

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed several resolutions authorizing Gov.
Edgar Lara to negotiate, sign and execute contracts or agreements for the issuance and flotation of
bonds to fun the priority projects of the governor and for the construction and development of a New
Cagayan Town Center subject to the approval and ratification of by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Subsequently, the planning, design, construction and site development of the project was awarded to
Asset Builders Corporation.
Petitioners Manuel Mamba, Raymund Guzman and Leonidaz Fausto, a Representative of Cagayan
and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respectively, filed a petition for Annulment of
Contracts entered into by Gov. Lara in connection with the New Cagayan Town Center project.
The Court dismissed the petition for lack of course of action, stating among others, that petitioners did
not have the locus standi to file the present case as they are not parties to the questioned contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the petition.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers. A taxpayer
is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that the public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose or that there is wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. However, for a taxpayers suit to prosper, two
requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision
or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to
challenge its validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question the contracts
entered into by the government.
In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the
proceeds of the bonds, a government support would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds.
As to the second requisite, the court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test wherein ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury by invoking
transcendental importance, paramount public interest or far-reaching implications.

Manalang-Demigillo v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines, G.R.

No. 168613, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 359

FACTS:

Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007

FACTS: Five armed men forcibly entered Polling Precinct 76-A of Barangay Pinagbayanan
Elementary School, and poured gasoline over a ballot box. They fired several rounds of ammunitions
at the premises, setting it ablaze.
In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses identified some of petitioners as the
perpetrators of the school burning. The investigation also yielded that all six petitioners, who are all
members of the PNP, failed to timely respond to the incident.
Acting on the reports, the PNP hierarchy issued three successive memoranda putting the Petitioners
under restrictive custody. The memoranda provided (1) that all movements of the Petitioners within
the camp should be monitored; (2) that when situation warrants their movement outside camp, they
should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and (3) that a logbook should be maintained to
record their place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time of Departure, and Estimated Time of
Return to Station.
Petitioners thus instituted this action praying that a writ of habeas corpus be issued and that the Court
adjudge their restrictive custody status as illegal.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that by a Memorandum Order the Director of
PNP Regional Office has recalled the assailed restrictive custody order embodied in the two
Memoranda. In view of the recall, it is prayed that the petition be dismissed on ground of mootness.

ISSUES:

1. Should the Court dismiss the petition on the sole ground of mootness, the assailed orders
having been recalled?
2. Are Petitioners unlawfully detained or restrained of their liberty under their restrictive
custody status?

HELD:
1. The SC, By Way Of Exceptions, Decides Moot Issues
The release of petitioners by respondents in a petition for habeas corpus does not automatically abate
a decision on the case. Similarly, a recall of the custody order challenged by petitioners will not
necessarily call for a dismissal on the ground of mootness alone. Although the general rule is
mootness of the issue warrants a dismissal, there are well-defined exceptions.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts
in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
The restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is
bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence.
It better be resolved for the education and guidance of all concerned.
2. There Is No Illegal Restraint In The Restrictive Custody and Monitored Movements Of Police
Officers Under Investigation
Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty will a petition for
habeas corpus be granted and the person detained released from confinement.
The petition, on its face, failed to convince the court that petitioners are actually and unlawfully
detained and restrained of their liberty. For the writ of habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty
must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. More
importantly, the prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
Petitioners are not illegally and involuntarily deprived of their freedom of action. Firstly, the assailed
memoranda decreeing the monitoring of their movements cannot, by any stretch of the imagination,
be considered as a form of curtailment of their freedom guaranteed under our Constitution. It is
evident that petitioners are not actually detained or restrained of their liberties. What was ordered by
the PNP is that their movements, inside and outside camp be monitored.
It is crystal-clear that petitioners are free to go in and out of Camp Vicente Lim as they please.
Secondly, the restrictive custody complained of by petitioners is, at best, nominal restraint which is
beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.
Fourthly, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), as amended by R.A. No. 8551 (PNP
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are
subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. The said law provides that
the chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a
criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. (Emphasis supplied)
It can be gleaned from the memoranda issued by the PNP hierarchy that an investigation is being
conducted on the reported involvement of police personnel in the fire that gutted the Pinagbayanan
Elementary School. Evidently, the PNP is well within its authority to relieve petitioners from their

former positions and place them under tight watch, at least until the termination of the said
investigation.
Clearly, placing police officers facing a grave administrative case under restrictive custody is a
disciplinary measure authorized under the PNP law. Thus, petitioners claim that their restrictive
custody is an illegal practice not sanctioned by any existing provision of our constitution and laws
is not true. It must necessarily fail.
Lastly, petitioners contend that by placing them under restrictive custody, they are made to suffer
lesser rights than those enjoyed by private citizens. The Court held that although the PNP is civilian
in character, its members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief, Philippine National
Police, under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by injunction, review, overrule or
otherwise interfere with valid acts of police officials. The police organization must observe selfdiscipline and obey a chain of command under civilian officials.
Elsewise stated, police officers are not similarly situated with ordinary civil service employees. The
PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism different from those of other government
employees.
In sum, petitioners are unable to discharge their burden of showing that they are entitled to the
issuance of the writ prayed for. The petition fails to show on its face that they are unlawfully deprived
of their liberties guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution. No unlawful restraint is foisted on
them by the PNP authorities under the questioned memoranda.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The
writ cannot and will not issue absent a showing that petitioners are deprived of their liberty. Neither
can it relieve petitioners, who are police officers, from the valid exercise of prescribed discipline over
them by the PNP leadership. Wherefore, the petition is denied due course and dismissed.

Mangca V. COMELEC, 112 SCRA 270

FACTS: In a petition for a pre-proclamation controversy, petitioner, who lost in the election, assigned
as error of the COMELEC, the following.
No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. and Sec. 26, Rule XV of COMELEC Resolution No. 1450
dated February 26, 1980, which reads: In deciding contests, the Commission shall follow the
procedure prescribed for the Supreme Court in Secs. 8 and 9, Art. X of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
It appears on record that the COMELEC did not consider petitioner's evidence, particularly the
Memorandum Report of Atty. Mamasapunod Aguam, Regional Election Director for Region XII, to
the effect that there was failure of election in Sultan Gumander.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC.

HELD: Petitioner's contention that the March 31, 1981, resolution is null and void for being violative
of Sec. 9, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec 26, Rule XV of COMELEC Resolution No. 1450 is
untenable. Firstly, both cited provisions are inapplicable to the case at bar since the constitutional
requirement applies only to courts of justice which the COMELEC is not (Lucman vs. Dimaporo, L31558, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 387) while COMELEC Resolution No. 1450, per Sec. I thereof,
applies only to "election contests" and "quo warranto proceedings" which the pre- proclamation cases
are not.