HELMUT

RITGEN

THE WESTERN FRONT 1944:

MEMOIRS OF A PANZER LEHR OFFICER

by

Helmut Ritgen
Oberst A.D.

Translated
by
Joseph Welsh

THE WESTERN FRONT 1944:

MEMOIRS OF A PANZER LEHR OFFICER

by Helmut Ritgen, Oberst A.D.

Translated by Joseph Welsh

Published by
J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.
106 Browning Blvd.
Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canada R3K 0L7
(204) 837-6080
Copyright 1995

Printed in Canada
ISBN 0-921991-28-2
Typesetting by George Bradford Type & Design
Printed by FREISEN PRINTERS
This book is dedicated to
our good friend Adrian Bowden.

PUBLISHER'S

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to thank the following individuals who have contributed to the publishing of
this book.
Joseph Welsh - Translation
Richard Derkson - Proof Reading
George Bradford - Proof Reading
Brian Molloy - Signing Box Art
We also wish to thank you the reader for purchasing this book, and all those of you who
have purchased our other books, and have written us with your kind words of praise and
encouragement. It gives us impetus to continue to publish translations of the best German
books and specially commissioned books, as you can see by the additional books which are in
preparation for publication in the near future. Other titles are either being negotiated or seriously contemplated, many as a result of your helpful proposals.
John Fedorowicz & Michael Olive

Books published by J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing

THE LEIBSTANDARTE (I SS Panzer Division) volumes I, II, III and IV/1
EUROPEAN VOLUNTEERS (5 SS Panzer Division)
DAS REICH I (2 SS Panzer Division)
THE HISTORY OF PANZERKORPS GROSSDEUTSCHLAND I
OTTO WEIDINGER
OTTO KUMM
MANHAY, THE ARDENNES; CHRISTMAS 1944
ARMOR BATTLES OF THE WAFFEN-SS 1943-45
TIGER: THE HISTORY OF A LEGENDARY WEAPON 1942-45
HITLER MOVES EAST
TIGERS IN THE MUD
PANZER ACES
FOOTSTEPS OF THE HUNTER
HISTORY OF THE 12 SS PANZERDIVISION HITLERJUGEND
GRENADIERS (Kurt Meyer)
FIELD UNIFORMS OF THE GERMAN ARMY PANZER FORCES IN WW2
TIGERS IN COMBAT I
INFANTERIE ACES
FREINEUX AND LAMORMENIL - THE ARDENNES
THE CAUCASUS AND THE OIL
HISTORY OF THE FALLSCHIRMPANZERKORPS HERMANN GORING
DAS REICH II
THE HISTORY OF PANZERKORPS GROSSDEUTSCHLAND II
HISTORY OF 7 SS-MOUNTAIN DIVISION PRINZ EUGEN
THE WESTERN FRONT 1944: Memoirs of a Panzer Lehr Officer
In preparation for publication
EAST FRONT DRAMA 1944
LUFTWAFFE ACES
MICHAEL WITTMANN AND THE TIGER COMMANDERS OF THE
LEIBSTANDARTE

iii

J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.

iv

FOREWORD
Colonel Helmut Ritgen's book "The Western Front: Memoirs of a Panzer
Lehr Officer" opens with a description of the Wehrmacht's early successes in
the West through to the Dieppe Raid and describes, as only a soldier can, the
days spent waiting for the impending Allied invasion. It continues with an
account of the events of D-Day and the ensuing American and
British/Canadian pushes on and through Caen, describing the German
actions to defend the Scheldt Estuary and delay the Allies as Hitler planned
his great counteroffensive, nicknamed the Battle of the Bulge.
Over fifty years have now passed since the Allies landed on the Normandy
coast on the 6th of June 1944 in the greatest combined naval, air and land
invasion the world has ever seen. In the summer of 1994, thousands around
the world commemorated this historic event in their own countries and especially at all the landing sites, villages, and cities in the Normandy region.
For all Allied veterans who returned to this hallowed ground it was a time of
remembrance, and for most it will be their last opportunity to retrace those
footsteps of their youth. Young people were also there to learn the horrible
mistakes which wars create. Hopefully they realized the importance of their
future dreams to create stable and peace-loving nations.
Colonel Helmut Ritgen, whose military career continued after the war in
the NATO Forces in Germany and a tour of duty in the United States until he
retired in 1976, strongly believes that the WW II Allies made a grave mistake by not inviting German Veterans back to Normandy for the 50th
Anniversary of D-Day. He argues that the changing face of Europe, the
restructuring of Germany after re-unification and the collapse of the Soviet
Union are all major factors that necessitate closer cooperation among the
NATO allies.
This book is written from the author's recollections and those of his soldiers in the Panzer Lehr Division that served in Russia and later on the
Western Front. It was one of Germany's crack Panzer divisions, and was
employed in concert with 21 Panzer Division and 12 SS-Panzer Division
"Hitlerjugend" by Field Marshal Rommel as he attempted to regroup during
the early stages of the Normandy landings to drive the British and Canadians
back into the sea. This plan proved impossible due to overwhelming naval
firepower and the incessant attacks from the air that created major losses.
He describes the various defensive operations in the Normandy campaign,
emphasizing the Allies' overwhelming air superiority, the effects of the
heavy naval guns, the great superiority in artillery and massive supply of
ammunition and war material. This assembly of power not only hampered
viii

German operations and paralyzed the movement of their troops on the battlefield, but in some places it rendered ground operations impossible. He once
told me "at first we were convinced that we would be able to throw the
Allies back from the beaches; but just moving up towards the front in
Normandy under air attack discouraged us."
Colonel Ritgen has previously written the histories of the 6th Panzer
Division and the Panzer Lehr Division, which were well documented and
cover many interesting battles of WW II on the Russian Front and against
the British, Canadians and Americans in Western Europe. An expert historian, he has guided the Headquarters 3 (British) Division, the Canadian Forces
Command and Staff College and 1 Canadian Air Division through the battlefields of Western Europe, and has been interviewed on numerous occasions
by U.S., British and Canadian media. He now focuses the reader's attention
on the Allied invasion of Europe and the operations that led up to the final
turning point and German withdrawal to their homeland, ending with the
Ardennes offensive. He dedicates his book to the memories of the brave soldiers on both sides who fell in battle in the hopes that it will close the last
chapter of past fraternal wars in Europe.
Military strategy, tactics and leadership are learned by those who study history. In the present we must look beyond ourselves and study the kind of
insight, or psychological sense, that leaders on both sides possessed to plan
and execute their battles. As Wellington aptly expressed, we need to know
what is going on "on the other side of the hill." The author has given an
excellent presentation in "The Western Front 1944: Memoirs of a Panzer
Lehr Officer" about what was happening on "his side of the hill," which I
strongly recommend is well worth reading.
Brigadier-General S.V. Radley-Walters
(retd) C.M.M., D.S.O., M.C., C.D.
Royal Canadian Armoured Corps
Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment
(27th Armoured Regiment, D-Day 1944)

ix

PREFACE
It has been five decades since the Allied "D-Day" landings in Normandy
and the ensuing struggle for Europe that led up to the Battle of the Bulge,
Hitler's last gamble. He had predicted that the Allied landings in France
would launch "the decisive land battle of the Second World War." It was
indeed a battle as decisive for Europe as was the Battle of Gettysburg in
1863 for the United States, During the past 50 years Germany has grown
from a national state to a democratic constitutional state within the European
Union and the NATO alliance.
This book is composed of personal recollections and articles that I have
previously published in Germany. It contains descriptions of actions in other
sectors of the Western Front that I felt noteworthy in addition to the fighting
of 1944. While this is not a history book, each statement is documented. This
book is dedicated to the honourable memory of the brave soldiers of both
sides, in the hope that this will have been the very last fraternal war between
major nations in Europe. According to Western tradition, these soldiers
placed the rights and freedom of their country above their own individual
rights and freedom. They conscientiously fulfilled this natural patriotic duty
- as long ago formulated in 429 A.D. by the Athenian Statesman Pericles "to defend that which we love, even with our lives."
Following the Normandy invasion the German soldiers were overcome in
battle by the Allies' superiority in fire-power and supplies. With an unshakable sense of duty, they rebuilt their Germany from the ruins of war.
Chancellor Adenauer's request to merge the ethical values of German military tradition with democracy, originally presented to the Bundestag during
rearmament debates in December 1952, is still being thwarted by politicians
and left-wing elements. Today they slander German soldiers and try to
exclude them from the building of the new Europe.
After such a long period of peace the younger generation has completely
lost track of the threat that can be posed by an external enemy. Therefore,
they are scarcely capable today of realizing the mental and physical trials
and tribulations of those highly-motivated soldiers of 1944. Today, shirkers
and dodgers are often ignored and no longer looked upon as cowards or
undesirables. They are seldom punished.
The majority of the German panzer divisions and the best infantry divisions
were fighting at the Eastern Front in an ideological struggle of unsurpassed
brutality. The war on the Western Front showed quite a different face. Here,
the was was waged in relative fairness by both sides, as overwhelming Allied
power on land, at sea and in the air was thrust against a few poorly-supplied
x

panzer and motorized divisions. Most of the infantry divisions were "static",
unsuited for mobile warfare, they could only be fully utilized in coastal or
point defence. They were, in their training, equipment and mobility, similar
to the infantry of 1918. The capabilities of these soldiers were accurately
described by German post-war historian Hubatsch:
"With reference to training, equipment, age and combat experience, the
German soldiers of the Western Front in 1944 were inferior to those German
forces at the Eastern and Southern Fronts. They could not be considered
qualified to withstand the attackers' superior numbers or power. Lacking
adequate coastal naval and air support, the German soldiers were handicapped by fuel and ammunition shortages. Their mobility was further
restricted to road marches at night due to extensive rail and bridge damages."
It is no surprise that our former opponents were amazed by these soldiers,
whose sense of responsibility, devotion to duty and patriotism enabled them
to effectively resist the Allies for two months, delaying their breakthrough
from Normandy to the West Wall while inflicting heavy losses on them.
During this campaign they were not only vastly undersupported by their mad
Fhrer, they were also deprived of their initiative and mobility by exaggerated orders to hold that relegated them to targets of fire from the air and
ground.
No veteran of the Westfront 1944 will ever forget the bitter and horrid
fighting of the campaign. But no one will either forget the bravery, devotion
and unselfishness of their good comrades. Their fellowship did not allow
some individuals to run away while others stood and faced death and
destruction.
In 1951 General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, apologized
for his earlier incorrect assessment of the German Wehrmacht as being the
champion of Hitler's despotism. He declared that:
"the Wehrmacht did not lose its honour and continued
to fight bravely and decently for its country."
Helmut Ritgen
Oberst a.D.
November 1995

xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publication of this book in English is an honor for me. My thanks go
first to all those who have contributed to my work, but above all, to my old
comrades from the Panzer Lehr Division. Like me, they were lucky to survive the fighting of 50 years ago. Their vivid reports of the dedication, bravery and horror seen in battle have considerably enriched and completed my
own recollections. Representing them all, I would like to single out the late
Erwin Feuerpfeil, Josef Graf and Wolfgang Maas. I am also much obliged to
the late Dr. Guenter Fromm and Hermann Pieper for their many suggestions,
comments, photographs and reports.
I am most grateful to Major Dick Derkson for his incessant advice, help
and support in dealing on my behalf in Canada. Without his invaluable work
my efforts would remain fruitless.
I am deeply indebted to my publisher, J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, and
Mike Olive, who wrestled with problems in translation and editing, compounded by the miles separating us. Their layout of this book is splendid.
Finally, I have to warmly thank my dear wife for her everlasting patience,
sound advice, and performing the irksome task of correcting and polishing
my German manuscript. Without her help and support this book would not
have been possible.
Helmut Ritgen

PHOTOGRAPHIC CREDITS
All photographs have been provided from the collection of Helmut Ritgen
except for the following:
Bundesarchiv - pages; 153, 155, 157, 159, 162 and 163
ECP Armees - page 154

xii

I
FROM VICTORY TO TURNING POINT 1942
1. 1940 - Victory in the West
Dunkirk 1940
The Wehrmacht attacked in the West on 10 May 1940. According to
General von Manstein's ingenious plan, the armored forces of the 4th Army
forced the Meuse crossings and, on 20 May, reached the Somme confluence
near Abbeville after a breathtaking leap. The French-British-Belgian Armies
in Artois and Flanders were encircled. The panzer divisions then advanced
on an inverted front from the west toward Dunkirk against only weak resistance.
On 23 May Panzergruppe Kleist was able to establish several bridgeheads
across the La Bassee - Gravelines canal line. General Guderian requested
permission to launch an immediate attack through to Dunkirk in order to
deny the English withdrawal. Cassel, the headquarters of British General
Lord Gort, lay defenseless "in front of the gate." The attack launched on 24
May had to immediately be recalled due to Hitler's order to hold.
The OKH wanted to undertake the destruction of the pocket being encircled
by Generaloberst von Bock. Without Hitler's consent, the 4th Army, "including all mobile formations," was subordinated to the Generaloberst. These
forces were to form the "hammer" to strike the enemy forces, which were
tied up by the tenacity of the Army Group B armies forming the "anvil" in
the east.
Insulted, Hitler immediately overturned these subordinations and forbade
the 4th Army to cross the canal line, so that the armored forces would be
ready for the coming operations. This order left the panzer commanders
speechless. The glory of the victory was to fall to Gring's Luftwaffe. His
orders to the already weakened Luftwaffe: "Break any resistance offered by
the encircled elements and prevent the escape of British forces across the
canal," was overtaxing. Indeed, Goring ordered, "attack so that they cannot
board their ships." But these orders could not be carried out due to the
attacks launched by the Royal Air Force from bases in England, the weather
and the shortage of ammunition. There were no German fighter-bombers
available.
The eventual panzer attack across the canal line then ran into a well-constructed defensive zone. The English feverishly utilized the unexpected
breather. Hitler's "Halt Order" now had to be paid for with blood and many
panzers.
1

On 25 May, Lord Gort saw the collapse of the Belgian Army as threatening
his left flank, and even presaging an encirclement. He ordered his forces to
withdraw to Dunkirk, rather than breaking out to the southwest.
At the same time, England made preparations for "Operation Dynamo," a
combined Navy, Air Force, Army operation that included the commitment of
almost 1000 ships. The loading of the forces, without weapons and equipment, began on 27 May, at times from the harbor, at times from the beach,
and ended after the successful evacuation of over 340,000 Allied soldiers on
4 July. England had rescued the majority of its Army.
Hitler interfered greatly for the first time in the operational conduct of the
war with his "Halt Order" and forced his own brand of military leadership
down the throat of the OKH. He passed up his greatest chance. Instead of a
British "Cannae," he won in Dunkirk only a tactical victory.

Recollections of May 1940

My 6th Panzer Division, under the command of Generalmajor Kempf,

advanced from the Meuse to the sea, a distance of 350 kilometers, in ten
days, mostly on its own, sometimes with neighboring divisions. The 11th
Panzer Regiment played a decisive role with its three panzer battalions, the
1st, 2nd and 65th Panzer Battalions. These fought primarily in one of the
three division battle groups, von Esebeck, von Ravenstein and Koll, each
coupled in close combat cooperation with a rifle battalion, as well as engineers and artillery. Each panzer battalion had two light panzer companies,
each with 17 tanks Skoda 35(t), and a medium panzer company with 14
Panzer IVs. I was a leutnant and platoon leader in the 7th Company. On 24
May 1940 I had to write the following combat report:

Combat Report

24 May 1940

On 23 May 1940 my reinforced platoon (7th Company) - four Skoda panzers and one Pz IV - was subordinated to the 3rd Company, 4th Schtzen
Regiment, which had the mission of establishing a bridgehead across the
Neuffosse canal in Arques, at the head of Group Koll. There were approximately 20 Frenchmen at the entrance to Arques, then we ran into a fleeing
supply column, whose vehicles were partially shot up and whose men withdrew across the canal bridge on foot. I had to stop in front of the bridge
because of an obstacle. Then the bridge flew into the air with a powerful
explosion. The riflemen crawled across the remnants of the bridge under
covering fire cover from my tanks. We took fire from towed barges, but still
were able to fish a fleeing French lieutenant out of the water. That was when
I noticed the still undamaged railroad bridge 500 meters further to the south.
I immediately dispatched Feldwebel Bess and three tanks to the undamaged
2

bridge. He reported that the bridge was prepared with explosives, but he
drove away a demolition squad and destroyed a defending machine-gun. A
second machine-gun fired at intervals, but its position was still unknown.
Over the radio, I requested our engineers to disarm the bridge demolition
charges. We crossed the bridge and met our riflemen on the far side in
Arques. Oberleutnant Sltmann took out a 15cm gun with a handgrenade.
However, another gun was firing on us from Fort Rouge, a distance of 2000
meters. I offered to assault the gun. Advancing by fire and movement, my
four tanks (the Pz IV shed a track on the railroad bridge) stormed the gun
position. The gun crew fled. From the rear of the gun position I noticed
another three 15cm howitzers beside it, loaded and ready to fire at us, and a
machine-gun which we overran. With the help of the riflemen we flushed
about 75 Frenchmen from hedges and houses.
No sooner had we secured the intersection when, one after another, two
staff cars arrived, one with surprised French, the other with British officers.
They surrendered after a brief resistance.
Feldwebel Bess on horseback fetched riflemen to reinforce us, as we didn't
have radio contact with them. Two tanks reconnoitered up to La Crosse,
where they ran into a road obstacle and captured several prisoners.
Feldwebel Bess reconnoitered up to the forest north of us - we had been taking fire from that direction - but he found no enemy. Shortly after that, our
air reconnaissance aircraft dropped a report which said that he hadn't sighted
any enemy in the forest. Gradually our prisoners were brought back.
At 1700 hours I was ordered to reconnoiter toward Le Nieppe. I had to
remove two road blocks and several English vehicles. A civilian told us that
Englishmen were in positions on either side of the road leading to Cassel.
During the return trip I received new orders in La Crosse to reconnoiter to
Ebblinghem in order to look for the 5th Company, with which communications were lost. On the way I noticed movement in Le Nieppe. A 4.7cm (2
pdr) English anti-tank gun was being brought up into position. I destroyed it
and captured approximately 20 men. In the meantime my Pz IV successfully
engaged the English infantry advancing from Ebblinghem towards Le
Nieppe. Vehicles were approaching from all sides. Unfortunately the requested reinforcements had not arrived, so many of the English forces were able
to escape. The Pz IV fired at and set ablaze some anti-aircraft equipment and
ammunition north of Le Nieppe, when two trucks approached from
Ebblinghem. Their crews dismounted and took up positions, refusing to surrender, although summoned to do so repeatedly. Finally a tank round killed
three of them and wounded several others. The three remaining men were
captured and evacuated with the wounded...
Signed Ritgen, Lt. (II Bn. 11th Pz.Rgt. Combat Diary, Annex 10)
3

The attack prepared against Cassel, the army headquarters of General Lord
Gort, was suddenly cancelled "on the Fhrer's order" that afternoon; we
found this hard to understand. Instead, we had to withdraw behind the canal.
I was posted to the regimental headquarters as orderly officer and had to say
good-bye to my platoon.
On 27 May - three days too late - after two quiet days in the beautiful, but
neglected Chateau Campagne, the order to attack Cassel arrived. The
fortress-like table mountain, which rose above the Flanders plain, was to be
attacked from the west by Kampfgruppe von Esebeck and from the south
(out of Staple) by Kampfgruppe Koll. In the meantime, the 145th British
Brigade established defensive positions there and rained fire down upon us.
The rising terraced terrain could only be negotiated by the tanks using the
roads, which were controlled by the British 17 pounders (87.6mm guns)
from dominant positions on the old city wall.
The attack failed after suffering heavy losses. My old 7th Company lost ten
killed and many wounded, including its commander. At midnight the senseless attack was ordered suspended.
As we observed the defenders of Cassel openly shaving next morning,
Oberstleutnant Koll ordered an immediate pause in the fighting for morning
toilet, a cease-fire which both sides scrupulously maintained for 45 minutes.
Extract from Division Operation Order of the Day, 28 May 1940:

On 27 May 1940 the division's Kampfgruppen von Esebeck and Koll were
engaged in bitter fighting near Cassel against a particularly tenacious
enemy emplaced in favorable terrain conditions. Panzers and infantry
together penetrated into the village by evening, in spite of fierce resistance
and heavy losses, and finally broke off the combat on my order. This fighting is the heaviest that the division has experienced so far. Commanders
and troops have made an extreme effort, for which I express my special
recognition and thanks.

During the early morning of 30 May the defenders of Cassel tried to break
out to the north. On the previous day we had taken Steenvorde and Watou
with Stuka support, then turned toward Winnizeele in the dark.
We destroyed the English brigade near Droogland (northeast of Cassel) in
the early morning fog, and took 2000 prisoners. We were mentioned in the 1
June 1940 Wehrmacht Report. With this impressive success against a modern-equipped, decisively fighting and fresh enemy force, we victoriously
closed the first phase of the 1940 Western Campaign.

Diagram 1

The route of the II Bn., 11th Panzer Regiment during the 1940 Western Campaign.
A commemorative map for the members of the battalion. The panzer in the upper right is a
Czechoslovakian "Skoda 35". The light panzer companies of the 11th Panzer Regiment, the only
German element to be so equipped in 1940, were equipped with these panzers (3.7 cm main gun).
5

2. 1942 - Turning Point in the West

Herkules - The Cancelled Malta Landing

After England turned down all peace offerings Hitler cancelled an immediate but extremely risky naval landing (Operation Sea Lion) against the
British Isles, as the "Battle of Britain" was lost in the air. The "final victory"
over unflappable Great Britain apparently had to be sought by another, easier
indirect approach. The expansion of the German combat zone to the
Mediterranean Sea presented itself, especially since their Italian allies had
been denied any success. An attack against the Suez canal, in order to block
the decisive supply lines of England from the Middle East through the
Mediterranean, appeared very promising. Also, Italy, which Mussolini
allowed to enter the war on the side of Germany even though it was ill-prepared, had suffered serious setbacks in Albania and North Africa. This
required the Germans to send forces to help defend the Italians against
British attacks.
The security of all operations in North Africa was threatened by the rocky
island of Malta, a British naval air and supply base laying between Gibraltar,
1100 miles away, and Alexandria, 900 miles distant. Today these distances
represent no problem to air traffic, but at that time, the range of the fighterbomber was 200 miles. Malta was the thorn in the side of the German-Italian
theater of war, preventing supplies and reinforcements for the North African
theater of war from reaching the front safely. In October 1941, 63 percent of
the supplies were sunk. In November losses rose to 77 percent. The Italian
Air Force and Navy were unable to neutralize Malta, in spite of continued
attempts. Hitler believed in the invincibility of his Luftwaffe, fantasizing that
it could completely destroy the island from the air, and that its actual occupation was unnecessary. Even after the OKW, the Oberbefehlshaber [OB] Slid,
Generalfeldmarschall [GFM] Kesselring, General Rommel and the Italians
requested Malta be captured by an immediate landing, Hitler retreated from
his plans, influenced by the heavy losses suffered by the Fallschirmjgers
during the conquest of Crete. Because of the lack of Italian naval landing
forces, the main burden of conquest would fall on the German Luftwaffe,
which also had to provide protection for the German Afrika Korps and the
Italian coast.
In April 1942, much too late, due to Hitler's indecision, German support for
Operation HERKULES, a combined air and sea landing on Malta was finally
discussed, albeit half-heartedly. Although there was no combined Axis
senior command in the Mediterranean, a mixed German-Italian "Special
Staff for the Preparation of a Landing on Malta" began making plans. Its
German element was led by General Student. Oberst I.G. Trettner was his
6

chief of staff. The planning objective was to capture the island before the
start of Rommel's offensive against Egypt - Operation THESEUS - scheduled
for May/June, in order to finally eliminate the source of threat to future operations in North Africa.
In the heat of the afternoon of X-Day, an airborne operation would take
place to establish an airhead near the Luqua and Hal Far airfields, while the
naval battle group simultaneously left their Sicilian harbors in order to begin
landing forces on various beaches under the cover of darkness. Admiral
Weichhold's German-Italian naval battle group was to put ashore the 66th
Special Purpose German Panzer Company north of Kalafrana in the Bay of
Marsaxlokk, covered by fire from 88mm guns mounted aboard Siebelbarges. With the armoured support, the group was then to expand the beachhead to the west and make contact with the airhead.
The German Army was only weakly represented in this landing by a panzer
company, which, according to OKW instructions from 4 May 1942 was to
consist of a mixture of heavy tanks: 12 uparmoured Pz IVs, five VK 1801s,
five VK 1601s and all available captured Russian KV-1 tanks (at least ten).
The company was put together on 28 April at the Panzer Lehr Regiment in
Wnsdorf near Berlin under the leadership of Knight's Cross winner Hans
Bethke. Its unique armored equipment was determined by its special mission
and the difficult German armament situation in 1942. Because of the anticipated strong anti-tank defenses on the small island of Malta, fire-power and
heavy armour were more important than mobility and reliability. The transport of the landing forces to the island was a problem. Because of the shortage of landing craft and doubts as to the fighting spirit of the Italian Navy,
the attack would have to be led by the German Luftwaffe. It would not only
have to secure air superiority, but also at least suppress all defensive installations in the vicinity of the landings, and take responsibility for escorting the
airborne groups (Fallschirmjgers and transport gliders). The transport of the
airborne groups' heavy weapons was desirable, but only partially possible
because the thermals over the Mediterranean Sea made the maximum loading of the transport gliders too risky. Therefore, no panzers could be transported by the Me323 gliders, even with their 24 ton capacity. They could
only be transported by naval ferries, which were sea-going landing craft that
could carry two panzers each, or Siebel-barges from the Army engineers.
Because of the lack of ground and agent reconnaissance, the enemy situation on Malta was unclear. The guns of the coastal batteries, which were
directed by radar, had still not been fired. The infantry battalions, which
were dug into limestone hollows, approximately 200 anti-aircraft barrels,
and a squadron of heavy Matilda tanks stood ready to conduct a determined
defense, as was the hardy population.
7

Because of insufficient German air power, Operation THESEUS and

could only be conducted in sequence. During Hitler's meeting
with Mussolini on 29-30 April in Klessheim, Rommel's attack took priority
over the Malta landing. Marshal Cavallero, the chief of the Italian armed
forces, declared his agreement with the reservation that HERKULES not be
prejudiced. However, Hitler did not believe it would succeed. Instead, he
dreamed of a national uprising in Egypt after the fall of Tobruk. Contrary to
all concepts of OKW, on 21 May he ordered "only the mental preparation
for" HERKULES be conducted. He also ordered elements of Luftflotte 2 transferred to the Eastern Front. On 26 May Rommel attacked from Libya, and
Tobruk was captured on 20 June.
Immediately after that all planning for H E R K U L E S ceased, much to
Churchill's relief. Churchill wrote to his senior commander in the Middle
East, "the loss of Malta would be a catastrophe of the first order for the
HERKULES

British Coastal Forts

Airfields
Planned Air Landings
Planned Sea Landings

Diagram 2

The Island Malta.

8

British Empire; it would, in the long run, have a mortal effect on the defense
of the Nile delta ... and ... would eliminate any chance for operations
against Italy and ... affect the landing in North Africa."
After Tobruk fell, Rommel, who was promoted to Feldmarschall, continued
the pursuit of the apparently defeated enemy forces toward Cairo and the
Suez canal. This was against specific orders to stop at the Egyptian border in
order to allow preparations for the attack on Malta to take place. The island,
in the meantime, had been reinforced. Hitler's blush of victory was shortlived. Much to Rommel's surprise the attack of his forces against the hills of
El Alamein was stopped by the English. His panzers had reached the end of
their advance. At the end of July, after both sides had attacked and stalled,
the front at El Alamein stabilized into positional warfare.
Hitler's incorrect decision to cancel the Malta landing, along with the failure of political agreements with Vichy France and Spain, surrendered the initiative and Germany's approaches in the south. Before long the Western
Allies would commit their fast-growing offensive potential there against
Germany. On the other hand. Hitler would scatter the bulk of Germany's
armed forces in energy-wasting gains on Russian territory. He would also
neglect his Luftwaffe.

Recollections of June 1942

Without realizing what has been described in the preceding chapter, we in

the 6th Panzer Division whole-heartedly followed Rommel's trail of victory
in Africa. At that time we were in Brittany for refitting from the hard
Russian winter; in the peaceful surroundings we felt like "God in France."
In the meantime, I had been promoted to Hauptmann and became the adjutant of the 11th Panzer Regiment. I was preparing for the change of command from Oberst Koll to Oberst von Hnersdorff, who, as trusted chief of
staff of the 3rd Panzer Army, and previously considered outstanding, had
fallen into disfavor for his unvarnished sarcasm concerning the German war
situation and had been transferred from the General Staff back to the troops
for "disciplinary reasons." On 27 June the regimental officer corps was
assembled in Beignon Castle to bid farewell and honor our old, highly
respected commander. In a moving speech, Oberst Koll praised the efforts
made by the regiment during three campaigns under his command. He
closed, somewhat optimistically, with the words: "After a very difficult climb
to the recent successes, the conquest of the fortress of Tobruk and the
advance in southern Russia to Mt. Elbrus, the tip of the Caucasus, we have
reached the climax of the war, and now gaze before and below us onto the
wide, sunny plains of peace!"
In his thanks, Oberst von Hnersdorff agreed that we had reached the war's
9

climax, "but before us lay no chance for peace, before us lay the abyss of the
Tarpei Rock!" (The Tarpeian Rock, on the western slope of the capital in
Rome, from which in ancient times, state criminals were thrown.)
As if struck by lightning, the faces of those gathered round, which had so
recently reflected happiness, froze. A dark shadow fell over all of us as we
absorbed the bitter truth of the new commander's words. From then on, the
war presented a different face to us.
After 1 July El Alamein became an almost daily repeated theme in
Wehrmacht Reports. Oberst von Hnersdorff was born in Cairo and often
discussed Egypt and the Near East. After we were examined medically for
tropical conditions (East), we imagined commitments in Asia a la Karl May.
(Karl May was a well-known German Travel and Fiction writer.) The new
commander demanded much from himself and his soldiers. Gradually the
new panzers arrived. Their increased capabilities required different combat
methods than the old Skodas for commitments in support of "Defence in the
West" or "in the East." Company training was supplemented by planning,
sports, alert exercises, reconnaissance and terrain orientation. To protect
against air attacks, the companies had to be dispersed from the training
camps into small villages. Even in Brittany matters were getting more serious.

Jubilee - The Repulsed Raid on Dieppe

In December 1941 Hitler ordered the construction of the New West Wall later renamed the Atlantic Wall - in order to be able to release soldiers for
the Eastern Front and to increase security against the rapidly reinforcing
British Army. However, the alleged "impregnable fortification front" from
Narvik (Norway) to Spain remained, due to the shortage of personnel, "no
more than a thin strip with several knots tied in it," as the Oberbefehlshaber
West, Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt, scoffed.
In 1942 one of these few knots, Dieppe, with its harbor on the Channel
coast, was within range of English fighters. It was protected by nature with
up to 250 feet high cliffs, as well as man-made fortifications and weapon
installations of all types. The defense of "Strong Point Dieppe" was entrusted to the commander of the 571st Infantry Regiment, Oberstleutnant Battel.
He had two infantry battalions, an engineer battalion and a reinforced
artillery battalion from the 302nd Infantry Division, which was formed in
1940, but had never been in combat. His division commander,
Generalleutnant Haase was responsible for the 70 kilometer-wide sector
from the Somme estuary to Veules-sur-Roses. However, in contrast to the
integrated commands of the Allies in England, his authority was limited to
his division, in accordance with Hitler's principle of divide and dominate.
10

Only in case of an enemy landing attempt would the local naval and
Luftwaffe forces be subordinated to him. Most important were the two
150/170mm Army Coastal Batteries, (H.K.B.) the 813th near Varengeville
and the 2nd of the 770th near Berneval, whose fire could place any landing
attempt at Dieppe into question. However, during the landing on 19 August,
two hours passed before permission to fire was granted by the naval commandant, as the Army Coastal Battery was positioned outside the Dieppe
security area. Fortunately, the battery commanders acted on their own initiative.
The attack on the city and harbour was to be conducted at daybreak by the
2nd Canadian Division ( Major General Roberts) in the strength of almost
5000 men, reinforced by tanks of the Calgary Regiment, equipped with
heavy "Churchill" infantry tanks, and with the support of strong naval and
air forces. Thirty minutes prior, two British commando elements were to
silence the two Army coastal batteries. Besides the garrison, all dry docks,
harbour installations and defensive positions were to be destroyed. In addition, detailed knowledge of the German radar equipment was to be obtained,
all before the planned withdrawal at noon.
The British air reconnaissance was conducted brilliantly and resulted in the
distribution of excellent maps. On the other hand, it appeared that local
agents had failed to locate command posts, troop designations and the positions of the Freya radar equipment of the 23rd Flugmelde Company near
Puys. Their assumed positions near Pourville were supposed to be destroyed
instead.
The success of the raid depended on complete surprise, but the landing was
dogged by bad luck. "Directive Nr, 40," which was issued in March because
of a successful English commando attack on a "Wrzburg" radar site,
ensured that the coastal forces would be particularly watchful and at constant
defensive readiness. At 0332 hours on 19 August the Freya radar near Puys
located and reported "very many targets" approaching at a distance of 35
kilometers. Then a German convoy ran into the boats of the English commandos. The ensuing fire-fight at sea brought the 302nd Infantry Division to
full defensive readiness at 0500 hours. So much for surprise!
At dawn heavy air attacks with bombs and on-board weapons, as well as
fire from naval artillery, were conducted against known and assumed positions before and on either side of Dieppe. Because of poor visibility, they
caused little damage, but they did interrupt many telephone lines. Therefore,
the two coastal batteries were isolated from the security region. Lacking any
radio equipment they were unable to report enemy attacks launched against
them.
11

Planned Attack
Actual Attack
Planned Blocking Positions
Coastal Defense Guns
Heavy Flak Guns
Light Flak Guns
Machinegun Positions

Diagram 3

Dieppe - Operation Jubilee

When "swarms of landing craft in waves of 40 to 50" advanced toward the

beach out of the natural haze of the early morning fog, they were met by the
concentrated fire of all weapons at most locations, even though both sides
had problems observing due to the fog.
"Commando No. 3" (250 men), which was landed near Berneval, was supposed to capture and destroy the 2nd of the 770th Army Coastal Battery and
the special Luftwaffe Gleiwitz equipment ("five to seven high masts," mission unknown, probably radio monitoring) that was committed nearby.
Indeed, hand-to-hand combat developed around the battery position, but the
attack failed. Many were killed and 82 prisoners were left behind.
More successful was "Commando No. 4" near Varengeville. During the
attack against the 813th Army Coastal Battery, which was conducted from
all sides and the air, stores of ammunition and gun positions were set afire.
The English destroyed the rest and re-boarded their boats. The brave resistance of the battery, which lost 28 killed and 29 wounded, went unnoticed
and unaided.
The main attack on Dieppe, which was conducted on a wide front against
Puys, the harbour, the casino and near Pourville, failed completely with
enormous losses inflicted on the attackers, who were never able to penetrate
the defenses at any one location. The 28 landed tanks were unable to negotiate the high sea wall. The enemy engineers could not blow the wall because
of the German fire. If they had succeeded, the situation would have become
critical, because the 302nd Infantry Division had no anti-tank weapons that
could take on the "Churchills."
Only the South Saskatchewans and Cameron Highlanders, who had landed
near Pourville, were able to achieve some initial success. But only half of
them were able to re-board their boats.
Meanwhile the German corps and army staffs were acting. The corps
reserve was subordinated to the 302nd Infantry Division, the 10th Panzer
Division was set in march toward Dieppe at 1000 hours and the 6th Panzer
Division in Brittany was alerted. The Luftwaffe committed strong fighter and
combat elements. General Roberts had to break off the operation.
Of the 253 committed enemy ships and boats, the destroyer Berkeley was
sunk and the Calpe, Fernie and Brocklesby were damaged. Thirty-three landing craft, 106 aircraft and all 28 tanks were lost. Personnel losses totaled
4,350 men, of which 1,179 were killed (approximately 700 of them now lie
in the Canadian military cemetery at Dieppe) and 2,460 were either severely
wounded or taken prisoner. Of the 4,963 landed Canadians - the flower of
their Army - only 2,210 returned to England. German losses totaled 48 aircraft and 600 men.
13

Jubilee did not fail due to the lack of bravery of the Canadians, but because
of the concentrated defensive fire from all German weapons. The German
forces did no more than their duty. Knight's Crosses, therefore, were not
awarded.
One instinctively asks how could the British General Staff, which was so
experienced in conducting landings, plan a narrow frontal attack on such a
fortified Channel harbour, in light of the known strength of the Wehrmacht
around Dieppe, without anticipating failure? The reasons subsequently given
- as a reconnaissance and a probing raid for the later invasion, in order to
gather amphibious and combat experience, test new landing equipment and
learn about German armaments - shed little light. The military catastrophe at
Dieppe is only understandable politically.
Churchill was responsible for it. As the leader of the British Empire in 1942
he was being pressured from all sides to establish a second front in Western
Europe. Stalin in particular increased these pressures after the failure of the
Soviet spring operations in the Crimea and the Ukraine and the German
summer offensive to the Caucasus and toward Stalingrad was in full swing.
He threatened with suing for a separate peace with Hitler. Roosevelt and his
military staff discussed with the Russians the possibility of establishing a
second front in 1942, Operation Sledgehammer, a projected large-scale landing at Pas de Calais, which hoped for an inner collapse of the Reich, or at
least a sacrificial attack to relieve the Soviets. After the British failures in
Africa (Tobruk), the low morale in the USA and England had to be raised.
There was already a mistrust of Churchill in the lower house of parliament.
He feared the after effects of a failed major landing in France. Instead, he
strove for the defeat of Germany from another direction, where the enemy
would least expect it; an Allied landing in French North Africa, Operation
Torch. In order to convince his wavering partners and soothe the French,
however, he had to take some action. But the action he chose was more of a
sacrifice! Dieppe demonstrated convincingly to the world what the result of a
premature large-scale landing in France in 1942 would be. I should note,
however, that it was inconceivable to us Germans that the British and
Canadian generals would agree to submit their troops to such a sacrificial
defeat. A successful raid would have been catastrophic for Churchill's politics. The bloody sacrifice of the Canadians in Dieppe was not guaranteed.
They served honorably and admirably, we were impressed. They paved the
way for the successful policies of Churchill through North Africa - Sicily Italy until the invasion of France in 1944, unfortunately avoiding the
Balkans, which were promised to Stalin. Because of this oversight, the
unfortunate populations living there and all of Europe suffered for over 50
years.
14

In the technical realm, the ingenious idea of artificial supply harbours "Mulberries" - which paved the way for the surprise major landing in
Normandy in 1944, resulted from the failure of the attack on Dieppe harbour.

Recollections of August 1942

The reconnaissance of possible landing sites along the Brittany coast was a
welcome diversion from the constant alert readiness and immobility caused
by the fuel shortage. Thus, we came to know St. Malo and Mont St. Michel
(without tourists at that time), Brest, Quimper, Lorient and La Baule, along
with French cuisine, especially in the nearby forests, where King Artus supposedly had dined. We anxiously followed the manifold events on the far-off
fronts in the Wehrmacht comuniques. The nearby airfield made its wellstocked book store available to us. The commander, in the meantime, recommended Marshal Caulaincourt's two volumes ("With Napoleon in Russia"
and "Under Four Eyes With Napoleon"), whose books were banned from the
book market, "because of their defeatist views on Russia." We anticipated
being transferred to Russia at any time.
On 19 August, after our committment battalion returned in unfriendly
weather from an alert exercise, we received alert orders, but without any
details. An hour later we learned of the landing at Dieppe. We prepared for
commitment to "Channel Coasts A, B or C." This meant a march to the
northeast, with the departure point of St. Samson. The regiment was ready to
march at 1545 hours. English transports were sighted near the Isle of Wight
and near Brighton. The command group redeployed to St. Samson. The commander believed that the attack on Dieppe was a diversion in order to draw
off the German reserves, while a second landing with stronger forces had to
be anticipated at another location. I had a bottle of Mosel wine, Auslese,
1921. Since we could be in combat at anytime, I drank it that evening. But
the transport did it no good, it had turned, and was no more than vinegar. A
bad omen. We returned to our old quarters on the following day.
Thus the summer passed. The regiment, meanwhile, had almost become
completely combat ready. On 25 October the Wehrmacht report noted the
start of the British offensive in Egypt. We anxiously followed its course. The
fighting in Russia also increased in intensity. On 5 November we learned that
the division would be transported to Russia on 12 November, even though
we lacked winter equipment. Indeed, the equipment did arrive, but it had to
be hastily installed in the panzers.
On 8 November at 2000 hours we received an unexpected alert order! The
Americans and English had landed in North Africa! We were to redeploy to
southern France, tracked elements by rail, wheeled elements by road march.
15

Our transport trains arrived on 9 November. I was able to report the completion of the tank loading operations to the division at 1600 hours. Only the
locomotives were missing. However, three hours later this "intermission"
was over, as the transfer to Russia was now back on. The transfer to Russia
required the re-equipping of our tanks with winter equipment that had just
been removed. This caused considerable effort, especially for our maintenance personnel, who had to obtain winter equipment, winter fuel, oil and
tracks. Transport orders were then submitted to move one battalion into the
Donets Basin and the other to Belgorod.
"We can thank our beloved Fhrer for this confusion!" the commander
mocked at our departure on 14 November, "Now our enemies have seized
the initiative everywhere, in Africa they have us in a pincer, our cities are
being bombed and the Russians will be attacking at any moment!" On our
departure, the pleasant airfield commandant, an old world war one pilot who
had as much disdain for Hitler as Oberst von Hnersdorff, presented us a
title page of a journal showing a ram leading a large flock of sheep. Oberst
von Hnersdorff signed it laughingly "FHQ" (Fhrer Headquarters). It was
then passed from command post to command post in Russia for the amusement of all.
Passing Brest-Litovsk we learned about the offensive towards Stalingrad.

16

II

NORMANDY - THE BRITISH SECTOR

3. The Western Front Before "D-Day"
During 1943 the initiative on all fronts passed irrevocably to the Allies.
Since Casablanca, January 1943, the Allies demanded the "unconditional
surrender" of the German Reich and thereby also closed the door to all
efforts by the German Resistance to obtain peace without Hitler. The
German strength was wearing out. Several hard blows fell in the space of a
few weeks: first Stalingrad and the collapse of the southern portion of the
Eastern Front, then the capitulation of the German Africa Army, the capture
of Sicily, the defection of the Italians, the loss of Southern Italy, the failure
of Operation "Citadel" at Kursk and the subsequent retreat to the Dnepr.
German submarine warfare and the Japanese defense in the southern Pacific
was no match for the enormous American material superiority and will-towin. After air superiority in the west shifted to our enemy, the residential
areas of all German cities, whether large or middle-sized, collapsed into soot
and ashes. Nevertheless German armament production was still increased by
concentration of all means.
The determination and devotion of the German people and their soldiers
remained unbroken. Hitler's politics needed to be changed from the demand
to defend every meter of the vast fronts and the crimes of violence that continued to be committed by small groups, inviting the immense hatred of the
rest of the world. Retreats in the east, southeast and south would not only
free-up forces for the formation of strong operational reserves on land and in
the air. They would also complicate an attack on Fortress Europe. Under
these circumstances, the way would be paved for a tolerable peace, if Hitler
had not decided to make the supreme sacrifice as did Napoleon and Kaiser
Wilhelm II before him. Unfortunately, for the deluded Hitler there was only
"victory or death!"
In this situation, Hitler issued Directive No. 51 on 3 November 1943:
...The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the
West: The Anglo-American landing! In the East the vastness of space will,
as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance for survival.
Not so in the west! If the enemy here succeeds in penetration of our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow with17

in a short time...
For that reason I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in
favour of other theaters of war. I have, therefore, decided to strengthen the
defenses in the West, particularly at places from which we will launch our
long-range battle against England. For those are the very points at which the
enemy must and will attack; there - unless all indications are misleading will be fought the decisive invasion battle.
The anticipated strong attacks by air and sea must be relentlessly countered
by Air Force and Navy with all their available resources.

Recollections of May 1944

In March 1943, much to my deep disappointment, I was posted from a

course at the Battalion Commander School in beautiful Paris, not as a battalion commander to my old regiment in the East, but as a company commander to the Panzer Lehr Regiment at Wunsdorf near Berlin. My new battalion
commander was the admired Major Prinz Wilhelm von SchnburgWaldenburg, an aristocrat from head to toe. The officer corps was first-rate,
so was my tank company. The battalion exuded discipline and confidence.
The training courses at Wunsdorf were mainly for German officers from all
branches and our allies. Training was constantly being interrupted by air
raids, which necessitated the evacuation of the buildings in the Berlin area.
Therefore, in August 1943 the Panzertruppen School, including the Panzer
Lehr Regiment, was transferred to the Bergen Training Area in the Luneburg
Heath. We were garrisoned at the Fallingbostel Camp. The news of heavy
fighting on all fronts grew ever more serious. Italy defected. My former commander, von Hnersdorff, now Generalmajor, was killed at the head of his
6th Panzer Division near Kursk.
Even here we frequently had to interrupt training to clear bombing damage
in Hamburg and Hannover. A few days before Christmas we unexpectedly
received the order to raise the Panzer Lehr Division from the Lehr (school)
units of all Panzertruppen Schools.
For the readers of today a short review may be appropriate as to how
Germany's Panzertruppen came into being since the Great War, and how
they developed into their final wartime product, the Panzer Lehr Division.
The first German tanks, no more than 24 "A7V" tanks, reinforced by captured enemy tanks, were committed on the Western Front in 1918. They
came too late, as the German High Command had failed to foresee their
potential. By the Treaty of Versailles Germany was one-sidedly disarmed,
her army reduced to 100,000 men. She was forbidden to produce, import or
18

have an airforce, aircraft and AA-weapons, armoured fighting vehicles and

anti-tank weapons, heavy artillery or to exceed specific numbers of other
arms and equipment.
The new professional army, the Reichswehr, was regarded as an interim
force by its C-in-C, General von Seeckt. In regard to training and education
of its officers he demanded a high educational standard in and beyond military matters, to enable each soldier to command in a higher post in a future
modern unrestricted German army. This included high morale with discipline, mutual confidence between all ranks, responsibility and initiative. For
Seeckt the meaning of war in Germany's Central European situation was
decisive, only to be achieved by mobile operations and surprise, not by positional warfare. Thus attack and offensive operations took precedence over
the defence. Tanks and motorization would replace horses and cavalry.
Following the books of General Fuller, Liddel Hart and others, General
Guderian developed his fundamental idea of Panzer Divisions. Contrary to
foreign planners he stressed his dogma that the potential of tanks could only
be exploited optimally if their cooperating and supporting arms were able to
accompany them in respect to speed, cross-country capability and protection
everywhere in battle.
During 1935 the first three panzer divisions were formed by a small number of ardent tankers and old horse-cavalry units, provisionally equipped
with small tanks, Pz I (based on British tankettes), later on Pz. II; their
infantry and combat engineers were still mounted on small trucks or motorbikes, except for some small armoured cars for reconnaissance. All the
remaining arms and supply units were motorized using commercial vehicles.
The entire division, units and all fighting vehicles were in contact by wireless nets, enabling them to fight in closely coordinated teams. Later
improved tanks (Pz III and IV; in 1943 Tiger and Panther), with increased
calibre guns and armor protection, followed. The infantry, now called panzergrenadiers, received armoured fighting and transport vehicles (SPW)
enabling them to fight mounted or dismounted. Self-propelled artillery, antitank, and anti-aircraft guns followed. However, one must not forget that 90%
of all German soldiers still had to fight on foot up to the war's end, 1945;
their equipment being moved by horses and horse-drawn vehicles; whilst all
their infantry opponents, having got rid of horses, used only motor transport.
During the armored warfare of 1939-1945 about 30 German panzer divisions were raised, their number limited by industrial and materiel shortages.
Their members never forgot the meaning of tradition and the cavalry spirit,
now: Panzer Spirit.
The two homes of the German panzertruppen were the Panzertruppen
19

PANZER-LEHR-DIVISION

Diagram 4

Organization of the Panzer Lehr Division (June 1944)

With an authorized personnel strength of 14,634 officers and men; a strong tank regiment with one Panther and one
Pz. IV battalion; two panzergrenadier regiments with a total of four panzergrenadier battalions, fully armored on
SPWs, a new type armored reconnaissance battalion, a tank destroyer (Panzerjger) and a heavy AAA battalion, a
field artillery regiment with three battalions (one self-propelled) as well as the usual combat support troops and
supply services. Panzer Lehr Division represented the best balanced and equipped German panzer division, capable
of offensive and defensive actions. It comprised in all 79 Panthers, 103 Pz. IV, 31 Jpz. IV and 674 SPW, 42 Field
Howitzers (105-152mm), and 18 88mm Flak guns.
20

Schools Wunsdorf (near Berlin) and Krampnitz (initially Cavalry, near

Potsdam). There their officers and specialists were trained, their tactics and
battle methods developed, and their equipment tested. When training at these
schools was increasingly threatened by bombing raids on Berlin, in the summer of 1943, both schools were relocated to the Bergen Training Area (today
Bergen-Hohne). In January 1944 their Lehr (school) troops, a combat elite,
were transferred to France in order to form a Panzer Lehr Division, "something for the Western Front", according to Hitler's Directive No. 51.
Reequipped with new materiel, it was the only German panzer division fully
outfitted with armored fighting vehicles according to the 1935 ideas of
General Guderian (see Diagram 4). In contrast to its splendid fighting troops
were the insufficiently equipped divisional artillery and the supply services,
whose stock of wheeled vehicles looked like a vehicle museum.
At New Year's Eve we celebrated farewell from our comrades, who had to
stay behind, as they were not fit for combat, with Rhubarb wine, which was
the best the mess officer would serve us.
At the beginning of January our regiment HQ and our battalion assembled
at the old Meuse fortress Verdun. Here the former I Battalion was redesignated as the II. The equipment status required that one battalion be equipped
with Panzer IVs, while the I Battalion of the panzer regiment receive
"Panthers." It was not until July 1944 that a Panther battalion was assigned
to the 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment, as it was then called. In the interim the I
Battalion (Panther) of the 6th Panzer Regiment was subordinated until
October. At Verdun the battalion was reorganized to a new system. In order
to save personnel and vehicles, all supply and maintenance elements of the
four tank companies were concentrated into a new supply company. I
appointed a company commander and a deputy battalion commander. Our
new Panzer IVs arrived, but no wheeled vehicles yet. We had to temporarily
make do with those we had brought from Fallingbostel.
On 2 January 1944 the battalion left Fallingbostel by rail, without tanks and
with only a few wheeled vehicles. I was permitted to travel by regular train
via Paderborn, in order to see my wife. This was not so easy and rather cold,
as the passenger trains were no longer heated. At Hamm I boarded an
express train called "Ruins Express," (it was so-called because it travelled
through the ruins of the city of Hamburg). It brought me, on time, to
Nancy/Lorrain. There I first learned that our new post was not Luneville, as
originally assigned, but the old Meuse fortress of Verdun. Delayed by poor
connections, I did not arrive until 0030 hours, after twelve and a half hours
of travelling. In spite of that, I found a room in a good hotel, the Bellevue on
the banks of the Meuse. The charming hotel manager spoke German, as he
21

had studied in Paderborn and treated us with courtesy. However, he made no

secret of the fact that our days in France were numbered and that we had
already lost the war. In case someone hung their pistol in the cloak-room, he
brought it in remarking: "We have enough pistols but a theft here would be
unpleasant to me!". Unfortunately, the rooms were unheated and there was
only cold water. Because of the icy weather, one had to stay in bed if he
wanted to sit, read or write. Until special officer quarters were assigned in
the city, even the most senior officers of the battalion had to accept hotel
accommodations here. The NCOs and junior officers were quartered in
crowded conditions in an old, and very primitive, French barracks. A nearby
mess and a well-stocked movie theater supplied the soldiers needs. Verdun
was not suitable for a large garrison, especially a unit with panzers, as the
Meuse bridges were too weak and they had to be strengthened to 60 tons
capacity.
One day the initial combat ammunition outfit for our 100 tanks arrived by
train. It had to be stored in the magazine of the old citadel in view of the air
threat. From the ceiling of the high vault projected the tip of a German heavy
shell from 1916 into the room. With a little more energy it would have penetrated into the ammunition store and blown up the entire citadel. All available soldiers were ordered to the unloading operation , among them our 40 to
50 HIWIs (Hilfswillige = auxiliaries), who had just arrived. They were former Soviet prisoners of war, mostly Georgians, in German grey uniforms
without insignia or weapons. They had volunteered to serve in the German
Army and were mainly used in supply elements. With their incredible working pace the ammunition was stored much faster than expected. We always
treated out HIWIs well, and they proved worthy of our trust. They stuck with
us until the bitter end in 1945 - with only one exception - ever loyal and
reliable. After the war the Americans delivered them against their will to the
Soviets, according to the Yalta agreement. Most of them were executed
there.
Because of the initial shortage of panzers and vehicles, no regular training
was possible at the beginning. The Landsers (soldiers) were getting completely out of hand. The old discipline returned only slowly. There were few
traces of war in Verdun. Since food rationing in occupied regions was not as
inside the Reich, one could still eat and drink well in the numerous restaurants, but for a higher price. The French population were reserved and correct, but by no means hostile. One day a soldier was fished, dead, out of the
Meuse, but it was unclear whether he had fallen in accidentally or whether
he was thrown in by a rival or a terrorist. Without concern we went hunting
in the large forests, but always in twos and threes. With awe, we visited the
old battlefields of the First World War, crawled through the entrances of the
22

contested forts and quietly inspected the charnel house of Douaumont and
the nearby huge cemeteries. The battlefield around the hill 'le Mort Homme'
was an excellent training area for tanks. Here we diligently exercised in conjunction with armored infantry. No admonishment by higher authorities was
required to keep us going..
In mid-January, I and Hauptmann Reche were assigned private quarters,
with central heating. However, we were not issued any coal and, in any case,
the heater was broken. Also, the plumbing was very unreliable. We were
supplied with gas for the hearth and even the boiler for the bath, which was
the reason we always had so many "guests." We did have electricity and we
finally received a coal ration of twenty kilograms a month. Then the evening
air raid alerts increased. Since our black-out facilities were so poor, I
wrapped my only table cloth over our lamp and it suddenly burst into flames.
We anxiously listened to all news, as depressing as it was, from the Eastern
Front, from Italy, where the Allies had also landed near Nettuno, and from
the homeland, which suffered from heavy bombing. To compensate for that,
rumors started flying. A clairvoyant had predicted that the war would be
decided in May, in our favour. This corresponded with Churchill's prophesy
that the war would be decided - by landings in France within 90 days. If it
did not succeed, then, under the circumstances, we would destroy the invasion forces! This of course was the main topic of conversation! The skeptics
and realists separated themselves from the optimists.
Our new officers mess, although sparsely furnished, offered compensation
and relaxation from the hard duties. We often gathered together for discussion, to find out the latest news or to celebrate one thing or another. The
French champagne elevated our mood from time to time. Prinz Schnburg
was temporarily posted and replaced by Major Darius as commander. During
the farewell party, we composed an epic "in open hexameter, like Homer." It
would have been accepted as world literature, if we had recorded it. Our two
division chaplains would also attend to perform services and discuss individual concerns. Church attendance was less than desirable.
We set up a "South Seas Bar" for NCOs and men in a large room. It was
pleasantly decorated and staffed. The Landser could buy drinks there, keeping their money in the company, instead of in town. The music of our company band and the beautiful old soldier's songs loosened the tongues and
opened the heart.
At the beginning of February our new division commander appeared,
Generalmajor Bayerlein, Rommel's former chief of staff in Africa. He made
a good impression and exuded trust and confidence. Fourteen days later we
were loaded up for Luneville, for a training exercise that was to be conducted before Generaloberst Guderian. On the evening of the firing, we had to
23

wait until 2330 hours for a messenger to bring the recently published panzer
firing manual. Thus, during the night, we struggled with the new firing commands so that we would be familiar with them when we performed in front
of the searching eyes of the inspector general. He divided up all of the officers into panzer commanders and gunners and tested each individually.
Naturally, many of them failed. Then it was the unteroffizier's turn. In closing, the Generaloberst gave a class in tank gunnery to everyone. Then he left.
We were able to breathe again. The regimental training on the following day,
in snow and an icy wind, did not go very well. Guderian exploded during the
briefing and made a classic statement: "This is the worst nonsense I have
seen in my entire military career!" Then he left. We consoled ourselves at the
officer's mess with a first class dinner. No air attacks disturbed the return trip
to Verdun.
Anxiously we followed the fighting around the Nettuno beachhead in the
Wehrmacht Reports. If this could be eliminated, then we believed the Allies
would avoid an invasion of France. But the beachhead remained.
At the end of February, every night enormous British bomber squadrons
flew over us and, as every soldier learned from letters, bombed every part of
the Reich. The air war was expanded to more and more cities. Apparently,
the enemy deployment in England was completed, they could be set loose at
any time. The Panzer Lehr Division was to be operational by 1 March, but it
still lacked formations, weapons and equipment.
A completely unexpected order surprised us: "The division will be transferred into the Vienna area. Advance parties will be dispatched by road on
the following day. The tracked vehicles will be transferred by rail!" After
everything was loaded. I was allowed to take a scheduled train through
Paderborn to visit my wife, who was expecting our first child. Without major
delays in unheated, overcrowded trains, I arrived via Vienna, at my company
at Bruck in the Leitha training area. Here two of our tank companies had
already been entrained. Did this mean commitment on the Eastern Front
after the hotly contested battle of Tarnopol? Or, perhaps, deployment to
Hungary, but as friend or foe? At the last minute, the division received
weapons, trucks and the majority of the missing units. Only the artillery and
the supply troops still had problems. Then it was to be Hungary!
In retrospect the five-week stay in Hungary seems like a beautiful dream, a
trip to paradise before the anticipated expulsion. But American bombs were
dropped on us and near Budapest, which inflicted losses on the division and
terrified the population. The railroad trip to Paderborn and the christening of
our first daughter and the return trip was delayed by detours and stops
caused by track damage. On the return trip in Vienna, I had to leave the train
for an air raid shelter. The war was also getting close to Vienna.
24

The beautiful days in Hungary came to an end for my company on 4 May.

The railroad trip to the west appeared to be endless. We made forward
progress only in spurts. Our heavy railroad cars could scarcely be pulled by
the weak locomotives that were provided. The wear and tear and the airstrikes were taking their toll on the railroad stock. While still in Hungary, the
section of the train behind the passenger cars broke away and was left coasting behind, but the engineer did not seem to notice. We applied the emergency brakes, which brought the train to a halt. It took us twenty hours to
reach St. Plten. Twenty-four hours later we crawled from Nrnberg to
Karlsruhe and, after another twenty-four hours, we finally reached Forbach,
where my old regiment returned home in 1940 after the Western Campaign.
Our zig-zag trip through central France took us through a wonderful spring
landscape. Unfortunately, the march rations we had taken from Hungary,
which were to last five days had long been eaten and everyone had to go
hungry; the air threat would not allow any stops at railroad stations.
After five days we finally passed through Orleans into Chartres, where we
unloaded and then marched 45 kilometers at night to our new bivouac area
located in parks and forests. So that we would not be discovered from the air,
vehicles could only move at night or in bad weather and tracks had to be
removed immediately. During the past few weeks, the air situation over
northern France had changed completely. Thick groups of bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and fighter-bombers flew overhead both day and night.
This was the cause of our many railroad transfers and detours. We heard that
all of the Seine bridges were destroyed, so that the crossing had to be temporarily made over the Loire. We wondered if the gentlemen from England
would arrive at all as its was wearing, to sit idle in the countryside without
being allowed to show ourselves in daylight. The good points were that
"Tuerken" (fancy exercises for high ranking visitors) had to be cancelled.
Every crew set up a tent next to their vehicle and a trench, some were furnished with wooden makeshift tables and chairs. Food and drinks were sufficient, but this life made many soldiers unruly and they could only be disciplined by strenuous sports and long night exercises. Also, pranks were helpful to shorten the time. One day we buried the silver fuel container of a fighter-bomber in front of the prince's quarters, making it appear to be a real
bomb. During the racket made by an overflight of bombers we simulated the
whistling and detonations of bombs with a whistle signal and a burstingcharge. This bang woke up and alarmed the residents of the castle, who
requested an engineer from the nearby airfield, to discharge the "dud". Only
the prince was not disturbed. But the comte with his family preferred to
move into the basement. The laughter of the battalion was Homeric.
In comparison to the homeland, which was under heavy threat of bombing
25

at almost all hours or had already been bombed, or the railroad workers, who
had to fulfill their duty under constant physical threat, we soldiers in the
west were living gloriously in a health resort, although we had to put up with
the nerve-wracking effects of constant alert readiness and the total cancellation of all leaves. Fortunately the field post was operating smoothly. The
mail also brought concerns about the increasing bomb damage and its
results. Because of the complete cancellation of leave, we could not help
those back home, we could only send our consolation.
Hungry for news, we followed every detail of the daily Wehrmacht
Communique. On 17 May the "Southern Front," (Italy), replaced the Eastern
Front from its number one position, which it had held since 1941. On 18
May the Allied spring offensive led to the evacuation of long contested
Cassino and, on 4 June, to the fall of Rome, which the Allies occupied
breaching the "Open City" agreement they made with the Vatican. Nearby,
we listened to the forbidden British broadcast in German "Soldatensender
Calais" (directed by Sefton Delmer) regularly. Besides lively music, it carried amusing propaganda, which ranged from slight falsehoods to out and
out lies. Strange to say I never heard a word about the mass murder of Jews
or the progress of resistance fighters, etc. I never learned why these themes
were tabu for the broadcasts. As everyone knows, England was very particular about the refugees it would accept, never allowing one person in who was
seeking asylum, even withholding support from our own "resistance fighters."
One morning we heard that a British commando element was able to kidnap a German general. Since the Germans jammed the broadcast on our side,
we misunderstood the name "Kreipe" (from Crete) for "Keitel." We generally called this feldmarschall "Lakeitel." We began to applaud spontaneously
and drank a bottle of Champagne in celebration of the abduction. To our
deep disappointment, we were informed of the misunderstanding soon thereafter.
At the end of July, the broadcasts were giving a better rendition of the military situation in France than German enemy intelligence, so we accepted its
broadcasts at face value. Mobile combat erupted after the breakthrough at
Avranches and, when the broadcasts tried to draw us into the Falaise pocket,
they again lost all credibility.
The weekly company information classes were difficult for me at that time.
I could only report what I had heard from the newspapers or radio. This was
very little. The great questions remained whether and where the Allies would
cross the Channel. There seemed to be no doubt that a strike would come.
Germany's economic situation became even more serious. With surprise we
26

heard that the mail would only be delivered once a day in the homeland,
compared to twice a day in France. Every day in France the electricity was
being turned off from 0700 to 1900 hours. The French could only cook with
gas from 1000 to 1200 hours. Film teams appeared regularly and showed
news and films to the troops in barns and other shelters. Going out into the
nearest villages, towns and pubs was no longer possible.
Bombs fell here and there in our area. We did not let the bombs bother us,
as long as we slept in deep trenches that were well-camouflaged. There were
also false alarms, because someone would mistake a flak burst for a parachute.
On 4 June the regiment received, for us, the unbelievable order to send the
Panther battalion (I Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment) and the Funklenk
Company to the Eastern Front. The prinz turned over the command of the
battalion to me for the duration of his trip home.
The long-expected invasion began on 6 June! I was wakened at 0415 hours
with an alert order: "English landing in the early morning imminent!"
Although I doubted the order, I had to get the battalion ready to march.
Reconnaissance aircraft and fighters circled high above us, looking for targets. Our uncertainty lasted all day, we had to wait.

4. June 44 - The Landing

Breaking Through the Atlantic Wall

Hitler's reference in his Directive No. 51, that the "decisive land battle will
be fought in the west", was fascinating, but the German combat formations
in France, in the west, remained Hitler's stepchildren, despite the enormous
Allied buildup in England. As before, Hitler would not consider voluntary
withdrawals in the north, east and southeast, or from Finland to the
Dodekanes, in order to free up forces for the West. In spite of spirited equipment production, the enormous losses suffered on the Eastern Front since
Stalingrad were not replaced. Although the number of western divisions was
raised from 38 to 54 from December 1943 to May 1944, this number, however, was merely eye wash. The newly created units were formed primarily
by reorganizing, combing through older units and filling them with old men
and foreigners (eastern troops and Hiwis). This increased number was only
valid on paper. It did not represent any effective reinforcement of the combat
strength. The following map gives a better picture: (See Diagram 5).
The great majority (33) of the infantry divisions committed to coastal
defense consisted of static divisions with very limited combat strength. They
were "insufficiently equipped." Besides assault rifles and panzerfaust, many
27

were equipped only with captured weapons. Because of the lack of primemovers, heavy weapons were immobile and depended upon being supplied
by local divisional supply organizations. They were primarily manned by
older men, who were poorly trained and lacked any combat experience. They
"were not up to facing the anticipated enemy mobility, if the fighting evolved
into mobile warfare" (Speidel). Their combat value corresponded to a 1918
positional division. Rommel's measures to strengthen the defenses along the
coast against attack came in good stead. But the mobility of an attack reserve
was not improved.
GRENZE DER HEERESGRUPPE
ARMEEGRENZE
INFANTERIEDIVISION
FALLSCHIRMJAGERDIV
PANZERDIVISION

Diagram 5

Dispositions of the German Divisions in the West on 6 June 1944.

28

The few panzer and panzergrenadier divisions were insufficient for mobile
combat against armored and motorized formations. The ground battle would
depend upon these formations, as long as the Luftwaffe was to secure the airspace over and behind them. The reinforcement of the Luftwaffe, especially
for air reconnaissance and interdiction, was not accomplished, nor were the
Navy's coastal defenses improved. The Army stood alone and had to make it
without the Luftwaffe.
On 6 June the Western Allies landed at an unexpected location, on a 70
kilometer front of the Calvados coast, with three airborne divisions and five
infantry divisions supported by tanks in the first wave, under an enormous
screen of naval artillery fire. They immediately broke through the so-called
impregnable Atlantic Wall and advanced inland without stopping.
The Luftwaffe and Navy failed to detect the approach of the enormous
landing flotilla of almost 6000 craft. The German radar station network
between Boulogne and Guernsey was systematically reduced to 5% capability by repeated air strikes shortly before D-Day and further confused during
the landing by radio jamming and deception.

Diagram 6

British Radio Jamming and Deception Program - June 5/6 1944.

29

Diagram 8
NAVAL ARTILLERY TARGETS ON D-DAY

The deception operation ("Mandrel") was successful and the deceiving of

the Germans was effective. From approximately 2300 hours onwards, on 5
June 1944, German radio stations between Cherbourge and Le Havre reported that they had been heavily jammed. At the same time, stations between
Fecamp and Calais reported unusually heavy ship movements in the
Channel. These and other reports compelled the 15th Army, which was
located in the area northeast of Caen to Calais, to alert its units and commit
in the direction of Calais (2300 hours). An alerting of the rest of the front to
the west was not ordered by either Army Group B or by Oberbefehlshaber
West. The fast boat formations charged with naval reconnaissance in the
Channel area could only take to sea during the darkness and in forecasted
weather conditions reflecting wind speeds of level 7, because of Allied air
superiority.
The lack of sufficient coastal batteries for use against naval targets did not
allow, as planned, for the destruction of the attackers in the water before they
reached the coast. Typical was the demise of the Longues Naval Coastal
Battery. Shortly before the start of the invasion it was constructed on the
steep coast between sectors Gold and Omaha, approximately 74 to 60 meters
above the sea. It was armed with four 152 mm cannon of German manufacture, and emplaced under concrete shelters still preserved today. Its fire
direction post was located about 300 meters in front of these bunkers, on the
edge of the steep coast. It was the only battery on the invasion front to be
equipped with the "Parallax Fire Direction System," which permitted firing
at mobile naval targets. The firing data was passed to the guns by telephone.
The telephone cable, which was buried 1.8 meters deep, was destroyed by
bombs before the start of the landing and, because of the depth, could not be
repaired. The battery lacked radio sets. The smoke of battle prevented the
battery from direct fire against observed targets. The guns were blind, and
they did not have the capability of conducting indirect fire and adjusting it.
They couldn't hit anything.
With its firing radius of 180 degrees, the battery could have also been able
to place beaches Gold and Omaha under fire, but as the battery had a purely
naval mission, it had neither contact with the Army nor a view of the landing
beaches.
On 6 June, at 0315 hours, the battery was hit by 700 tons of bombs, then
with artillery fire from the cruisers Ajax and Argonaut. Its own fire conducted against the battleship Arkansas was ineffective. Its next target, the command ship Bulolo, started a smoke screen and shifted its position out to sea.
During another exchange of fire with the above-named cruisers, Ajax
achieved hits on the battery's Number 2 and Number 3 guns. The battery
went silent after firing 115 rounds. In the afternoon the Battery Commander
31

surrendered his battery without a fight to the attacking 231st British Brigade.
The command authority for the coastal defense was outlined in Hitler's
Directive No. 40 (and 40a). It did not provide for integrated command and
control. The engagement of the enemy before the coast was the mission of
the Navy alone, which due to shortage of naval forces before Normandy,
could commit only the two coastal batteries, "Marcouf' and "Longues". The
sinking of the destroyer Corry by "Marcouf' was the only success enjoyed
against the enemy armada. The German Navy and Luftwaffe had long ago
been overtaken by the technical progress of the British and Americans with
their enormous research and development capabilities. They had become
hopelessly inferior, both technically and numerically.
In order to achieve his objective, of repulsing the enemy attack, if not
before, then after it reached the coast, Generalfeldmarschall Rommel had
only seven battalions of the 716th Infantry Division to defend the landing
sites Gold, Juno and Sword. They had been formed for coastal defense back
in 1942 and consisted of older soldiers lacking combat experience, who
manned an extensive chain of partially concreted nests of resistance and
strong points in the neighborhood of the beach. Some were armed with 50,
75 and 88mm guns. The division was dependent on local logistics because it
lacked vehicles and horses. The artillery lacked telephone equipment and
prime-movers, so firing missions were limited to battery-size and they could
not change their positions. The two battalions that were committed on the
beach line were so suppressed from the air, from the sea and by the landing
ships that they could seldom fire and could not issue even one report.
Meanwhile, the British and Canadians landed at low tide and overcame the
only partially completed beach obstacles and mine-fields and immediately
advanced inward, without running into any noteworthy resistance. The weak
local reserves, which were on foot, were prematurely destroyed by air strikes
and by tanks. Since the command and control nets were failing, the division
CP was not aware of the situation, and therefore the senior command was not
informed until the following day. On 6 June the Atlantic Wall was more
effectively broken through than was ever achieved in the trench warfare of
1914 to 1918. In this case, however, there was neither a secondary defensive
position nor any effective counter-fire by the artillery; which had been
silenced by air strikes. There was no effective response from the Luftwaffe.
Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt ordered the linear arm of the "Atlantic
Wall" - the "thin strip with a couple knots tied into it" - be reinforced by a
second defensive belt corresponding to German "Hindenburg Line" preparations for a strong fortified line in 1917. This construction did not take place
due to the shortage of labor. Hitler wanted every available man at the Eastern
Front and doubted any serious landing on the Channel coast until the inva32

sion actually took place.

The overwhelming effect and range of the enemy's naval artillery was completely underestimated due to the lack of our own experience. All movement
was paralyzed under its devastating fire, even that by local, non-armored
reserves. Thus, all counter-strikes and counterattacks by forces of the 716th
Infantry Division were nipped in the bud. They were finally overrun by the
enemy and had, by evening of D-Day, melted down into one pitiful battalion
and several guns. There was no second defensive position to withdraw to. In
spite of their exhaustion from the Channel crossing in high seas, the assault
forces were able to advance to the south, almost without resistance, until
they reached the Bayeux-Caen rail line with patrols, although utterly
exhausted.
Unnoticed by the German command, on 6 June elements of the 7th
(British) Armored Division were landed and, by 9 June, two armored
brigades with about 400 tanks were operational in the British sector of the
beachhead.
The 21st Panzer Division, which was the Army Group B attack reserve,
was thrown into the fighting at 0245 hours on either side of the Orne.
Delayed by confusing orders they attacked with a poorly equipped panzer
regiment west of the Orne to the north, in the direction of the coast. They ran
into a superior enemy force near Lebisey in well-prepared defensive positions supported by tanks. The attack stalled after losing 13 panzers. The
panzergrenadiers from Group Rauch attacked to the east of the panzers. They
attacked Lion-sur-Mer under the personal leadership of the commander,
General Marcks, and reached an area of the beach free of enemy forces at
1900 hours. At that time, the attackers watched as about 250 cargo gliders,
being towed by transport aircraft and accompanied by numerous fighters,
landed east of the Orne to reinforce the 6th (British) Airborne Division.
Impressed by this enormous air fleet, the division commander wrongly
expected an airborne landing in his rear and ordered the attack suspended
and his units withdrawn to the departure positions. Only the 1 st Company of
the 192nd Panzergrenadier Regiment withdrew to the Luftwaffe "Distelfink"
radar station near Douvres, where the company, together with 152 men from
the radar station, was encircled. After the Dieppe raid, this radar station was
reinforced with concrete and anti-tank defenses, as well as flak weapons.
"Distelfink," due to its situation, could not report any radar contacts, but it
continued to report enemy movements by telephone. In fact, it continued to
defend bravely against all attacks from the ground and the air until it surrendered on 17 June.
However, already on the first day, the 21st Panzer Division was so splintered into several groups on either side of the Orne and so tied up in sec33

ondary missions that it was, for all intents and purposes, unable to accomplish any offensive mission. The enemy's surprise, deception and speed were
not properly anticipated.
On the evening of 6 June I British Corps occupied a ten kilometer-long
strip of coast with sufficient depth. Fresh forces, weapons and supplies were
landed during the night. The exhausted remnants of the German defenders
waited in vain for reinforcements and supplies. Confusion dominated at the
headquarters of the 716th Infantry Division in Caen. All of the reserves from
LXXXIV Army Corps were used up. Now they had to use the operational
reserves.
Long before the landings, the so-called 'Panzer Controversy' had evolved
between Field Marshal Rommel, C-in-C Army Group B, and General von
Geyr, CG Panzer Group West, i.e. the top panzer commander of OB West. It
opposed the notion of linear defense to defense in depth, static warfare to
mobile operations, the holding of ground to battles of annihilation, the primary dependence of concrete fortification to the primary dependence on
armored striking power.
Field Marshal Rommel advocated, due to his African experience, static
defense, fearing that Allied air power would prevent a timely deployment of
operational reserves - today known as "Follow-on Forces." In contrast,
General von Geyr had mobile defense in mind, as the strength of the German
panzer divisions could only be used effectively in this way.
The weaker the forces, the more flexibility they must have to fight. By sacrificing operational ground and avoiding battle at the area of the enemy's
choosing, it is essential to keep the mobile forces concentrated and to strike
partial blows. Fighting in static lines without reserves will force armies to
retreat, even when there are only small operational break-throughs.
General von Geyr differentiated two phases of the defensive:
a. fighting for in current terminology FEBA (Forward Edge of the
Battle Area): Here part of the mobile force should be committed as soon as
the enemy shows signs of being successful. The main effort of a landing
operation could hardly be located on the first day. It is more likely that the
enemy would determine the main effort only after the course of the first
day's fighting; and
b. the main effort of the enemy's landing is taking shape, the bridgehead is growing. Now everything depends on throwing all mobile forces even those committed already at secondary fronts - concentrated into the
battle.
Hitler ended this "Panzer Controversy" with the compromise of dividing up
the few operational reserves. Therefore, their commitment in mass, which
34

was to be supported by air reconnaissance and interdiction by the Luftwaffe,

was impossible because of Hitler's decision. (It should be explained that
Hitler had not intervened, but decided at the request of von Runstedt).
The transmission of Eisenhower's orders in the early morning hours confirmed that this was, in fact, the long-awaited D-Day ... But it was still not
clear whether this first attack was meant to tie up our forces, or if it was the
actual main attack.
It was surprising that there were no marked increases in sabotage.
Therefore, it was possible that the enemy first wanted to slice off the
Cotentin peninsula, thereby capturing Cherbourg in order to simultaneously,
or subsequently, attack the 15th Army with forces waiting in southeastern
England ...
OB West reacted logically, even if the course of events can only be partially
reconstructed because numerous war diaries were lost. According to the first
reports of the air landing, OB West ordered at 0410 hours:
Alert Level II for the 15th Army and the 7th Army, according to the
more detailed instructions from commander Army Group B. Increased
march readiness for commander Panzergruppe West with the 12th SS
Panzer Division, Panzer Lehr Division and 17th SS Panzergrenadier
Division...
Then OB West requested release of the 12th SS Panzer Division from
OKW. This division was already arbitrarily subordinated to Army Group B
at 0505 hours and ordered to move into the 711th Infantry Division sector
(east of the Orne) at 1000 hours in order to engage the air-landed enemy
forces.
Churchill's "bodyguard of lies," (the exaggerated agent strength reports,
radio deception, air landing east of the Orne, etc.) appeared to confirm the
initial contention of the OKW that the main landing would still be made in
the 15th Army area of operations at Pas de Calais, because the Calvados
coast did not offer any harbors capable of accepting cargo and because OKW
was still unaware of the existence of the artificial "Mulberry" harbors.
Therefore, the 12th SS Panzer Division was sent in the wrong direction.
At 1430 hours, when the OKW released the two panzer divisions, the situation had been somewhat clarified. They were no longer concerned with the
air landing, but the sea landings on the beaches between the Orne and the
Cotentin peninsula. At 1500 hours the 7th Army ordered a counterattack for
7 June under the command of the LXXXIV Army Corps, with the 21st
Panzer Division, 12th SS Panzer Division and 716th Infantry Division, west
of the Orne, in order to throw the enemy into the sea. In addition, LXXXIV
Army Corps diverted the 12th SS Panzer Division into the area southwest of
35

Caen. Because of the effect of enemy fighter-bombers, by early 7 June only

the 12th SS Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and the reinforced 25th SS
Panzergrenadier Regiment (Oberst Meyer) reached their assigned assembly
areas. The rest of the division had its arrival delayed for 24 hours due to
march difficulties.
At 1507 hours I SS Panzer Corps was subordinated to the 7th Army in
order to conduct the counterattack in the Caen area. During the evening the
7th Army reported its "intentions for 7 June":
Commit the 12th SS Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr Division to
counterattack against enemy forces broken- through east of Bayeux, as
well as the 21st Panzer Division out of the Caen direction in the direction of Lion-sur-Mer, under the command of I SS Panzer Corps.
The corps, which was coming out of St. Germain, had lost many radio stations to air attack and, from the very beginning, had great problems making
contact with superiors and subordinates alike. The corps could neither transmit orders to its subordinates, situation reports to the army, nor receive situation developments from the army.
It was not until 1440 hours on 7 June that radio contact was established
between the Army Group B commander and I SS Panzer Corps, and then for
a short time only. A corps liaison officer, who was sent to the Panzer Lehr
Division with signal data for radio documents, was, unfortunately, killed
before reaching his objective. The commander of the Panzer Lehr Division,
Generalleutnant Bayerlein, could only find the corps command post after a
long search. He found it at 1600 hours near Thury-Harcourt.
The Panzer Lehr Division remained in its assembly area, as ordered, until
1900 hours. It then advanced along three earlier reconnoitered march-routes,
presumably to be made available to LXXXIV Army Corps in the Flers-Vire
area. The night march went off well, as enemy air reconnaissance discovered
it too late. The 130th Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion (ALA) war
diary noted: "Nothing to report." Individual deep air strikes and destroyed
urban roadways, which had to be bypassed, complicated the march of the
following formations. The march objectives were reached without delay.
Because of the urgency of the situation, the march into the area south of
Villers Bocage was ordered to be continued even in the daytime, so that the
division would come under the command of I SS Panzer Corps on the
evening of 7 June.
After dawn the author's II Battalion, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment was
located near Alencon. While refuelling, it was discovered and attacked from
the air. Fuel trucks and tanks caught fire; there were killed and wounded.
Soon pyres of smoke indicated the routes of the three columns to the fighter36

bombers. In spite of increased distances and separation into smaller march

groups, this daytime march cost time and losses. The ALA - almost fully
armored - crossed the stretch from Andre de Messey to Roucamps (40 kilometers) in over seven and a half hours. Losses of men and vehicles were
unavoidable, even though the first loss reports were considered to be inflated
- even more in literature - under the principle: "Always double them!" There
was no way the Panzer Lehr Division could attack on 7 June. No one had
anticipated such delays.
The 21st Panzer Division also could not attack on 7 June. The groups fighting east of the Orne could not break contact from the enemy. West of the
river, the two battle groups von Oppeln and Rauch were forced onto the
defense by a British armored attack near Lebisey. The division lost the freedom of maneuver.
The 12th SS Panzer Division had learned little of the combined attack other
than its subordination to I SS Panzer Corps and the start of the attack at 1600
hours. While the 12th SS Armored Reconnaissance Battalion reconnoitered
to the west and clarified the situation east of Bayeux for the 7th Army, the
reinforced 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment alone was prepared to attack
on the morning of 7 June. It was ordered to secure the Carpiquet airfield. As
the 7th (Canadian) Brigade set out west of Caen to bypass the city and occupy the airfield, Oberst Meyer decided on his own to counterattack at 1400
hours. After initial success he became involved in costly fighting, without
any chance of receiving reinforcement, since the 21st Panzer Division was
tied up everywhere and other units had still not arrived.
Generalfeldmarschall Rommel's plan to throw I (British) Corps back into
the sea by 7 June had failed. Fighter-bombers and conflicting orders and
reports had paralyzed the leadership. On order of the 7th Army, the counterattack by I SS Panzer Corps was postponed to early 8 June.
The commander and Chief of Staff of the Panzer Lehr Division went to the
corps command post to receive orders for the 8 June attack. The corps order
was immediately converted into a division operation order and distributed.
Unfortunately, the order corresponded to the situation that was prevalent on
6 June. The corps lacked any means to monitor the enemy and it was
unaware of the situation in the 21st Panzer Division and 12th SS Panzer
Division areas of operation. The absence of all long-range communications
with superiors and subordinates was blamed on the loss of almost all radio
stations, except for four. Under these circumstances, the unit commanders
had to take personal responsibility. We do not know what they were trying to
do, but we do know that it was not enough.
To defend against German counterattacks on the coast, the enemy landing
37

units not only had strong fighter-bomber formations available, but also the
vast firepower of two battleships and seven cruisers, as well as numerous
destroyers. Their fire was directed during the daytime by observer aircraft.
Wolfgang Maas,
I was a radio operator in our SPW, which was assigned to the headquarters, 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment. I was still a "little
shaver" at 19 years old, but I learned very quickly - either one did so or
one made mistakes.
During the deployment fighter-bombers attacked from the right. I
was sitting on the right front of the SPW and saw them come at us over a
row of trees. "Fighter-bombers from the right," and the driver quickly
buttoned up as I took cover beneath the armor. The SPW suddenly
jerked. We ran into a ditch. When the fighter-bombers turned away, several trucks and other vehicles were left behind, burning. Even our SPW
was hit by a heavy machine-gun round, that penetrated directly over my
head. The shot ricocheted, but did little damage.
Neither the commander nor the operations officer of the Panzer Lehr
Division learned on 7 June what was already known by the 12th SS Panzer
Division and the senior commander, namely that the enemy had captured
Bayeux and was already fighting his way along the rail line towards Caen.
This explains why General Bayerlein ordered his units move to contact,
unorganized for battle; into an area that was partially occupied by the enemy
and partially occupied by the 12th SS Panzer Division, instead of cautiously
advancing with deployed march security. If it had done so, the division
would still have been able to turn north after attacking further to the west.
While the march groups strived to reach their objectives under constant air
attack, General Bayerlein was shaken by a fighter-bomber attack shortly
before darkness. The attack cost his orderly officer, Leutnant Graf
Pappenheim, and his driver their lives. He himself was lightly wounded, but
the shock had a paralyzing effect until the next day.
The ALA had occupied its assigned security line by 8 June at 0900 hours. It
then conducted flank reconnaissance. Obviously undetected by the enemy,
the 130th Armored Engineer Battalion and the tanks led by the author
reached their areas in the early morning. The tanks found shelter and concealment in the park of Chateau Monts-in-Bessin. They were resupplied and
remained un-harassed by artillery fire and air attack all day. The anticipated
commitment order did not arrive. The Panzer Lehr Division Panther battalion
(I Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment) was still in transit, returning from the
38

ordered transfer to the Eastern Front.

In the early morning II Battalion, 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
and the regimental staff approached their march objective. Combat reconnaissance by Oberfeldwebel Gnther's platoon (7th Company, 902nd)
reported that Brouay was occupied by the enemy. The regimental commander, Oberst Gutmann, ordered an attack. During the fighting that took place
around the town at 0430 hours, II Battalion, 902nd Regiment was soon
forced onto the defense. A direct artillery hit during an orders briefing put
Oberst Gutmann and several company commanders out of commission.
Subsequently, British reconnaissance tanks and probably naval artillery
destroyed the command post in the Brouay Chateau park with fire. Soon
Brouay lay under heavy fire from naval artillery directed from the air,
Canadian divisional artillery and, possibly also our own fire from the 12th
SS Panzer Division. Completing the picture, Brouay was also attacked from
the rear by III Battalion, 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment. The battalion,
which was being pressured from all sides, was temporarily leaderless, had
suffered heavy casualties, especially in officers, and was permanently damaged from the unfortunate baptism of fire. With the loss of all radio communications, the battalion's situation was not made known to the division staff
near Cheux until much later. The other battalion (I Battalion, 902nd
Regiment) was still lagging behind.
When III Battalion, 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment reached the Chateau
Brouay park it found Oberst Gutmann's destroyed regimental command
post, one of the most "dismaying pictures of the war," as one SS man
remembered after the war.
The 130th Armored Artillery Regiment has also suffered loss of command
and had to endure difficulties. Very early the commander, Oberst
Luxenburger, the commander of III Battalion, Major Zeisler, and two other
officers followed the panzergrenadiers in order to reconnoiter firing positions. At one observation point, Point 102 near Christot, a Canadian scouting
party returning to its unit surprised the command group. The one-armed
Oberst Luxenburger was struck down and tied to one of the reconnaissance
tanks. The enemy tank was later destroyed by an anti-tank gun from II
Battalion, 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment. Only Major Zeisler was able
to flee unharmed. He took command of the Panzer Lehr Divisional artillery
later that afternoon.
After crossing the Channel, the Canadians had to overcome the exhaustion
of the subsequent day-long combat operations by taking Benzamine, stayawake tablets. These "Benzies" - similar to the German Pervitin, increased
one's physical capability, but also reduced scrupulousness and thus increased
39

one's bloodthirstiness - were the continuation of the despised chemical warfare of the First World War in another form.
The commander of the 901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment, Oberst
Scholze, ran into the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment when his I Battalion
arrived in the assigned assembly area north of Cheux. Both units were
assigned the same area. He ordered his panzergrenadiers to take cover,
reported and awaited orders. His II Battalion was still on the march. The
strong Panzer Lehr Division was, except for two panzergrenadier battalions,
assembled. It was unable to strike as ordered or to shift its sector.
Kampfgruppe Meyer, of the 12th SS Panzer Division, had for the past day
been tied up in alternating action, costly for both sides, fighting northwest of
Caen in the 12th SS Panzer Division area of operations. The 26th SS
Panzergrenadier Regiment, held up by constant air attacks and road damage,
did not reach the assembly area assigned for the 7 June attack until early on
8 June. After arriving, its three battalions attacked Brouay one after the
other. The corps order for a coordinated attack did not get through.
The extent of ignorance of the situation in the senior leadership is reflected
in the 7th Army combat diary entry for 8 June:
Since there still is no contact with I SS Panzer Corps, the C-in-C set out
to the CP of I SS-Panzer Corps in order to inform himself firsthand of the
situation in the Calvados beachhead at the I SS Panzer command post.
There were still no reports on the situation in the Caen combat area at
noon. It appears that the I SS Panzer Corps attack has still not begun.
Time was the main factor in repulsing the invasion, to assemble sufficient
forces to counterattack against the still weak beachhead. However, the strong
enemy influence from the air and from the sea led to unforeseen delays and
excessively high losses of officers and communications. In such circumstances the force commander is obliged personally to act decisively on his
own. The subordinate commanders did not know what was going on and
were unable to act for the force as a whole. Thus, the opportunity had passed
for a vigorous and coordinated counterattack with the three panzer divisions
abreast towards the north.

40

5. Defense Near Tilly-sur-Seulles and Villers-Bocage

Transition to the Defense in Bocage
The traveller, who today visits the Bocage area between Caen and around
St. Lo, will find only a few traces of the hedge-rowed terrain of 1944, which
so influenced the conduct of combat. Modern technology has turned the area
into flat farmland. At that time, the close-meshed network of impenetrable
bushes and walls of stone and earth dominated the landscape. The limited
field of vision made it difficult to maintain contact and surveillance, but the
hedge-rows did not offer any protection from indirect artillery and mortar
fire with sensitive fuses that detonated in the bushes. Movement, even by
tanks, was limited to the narrow trails between the hedge-rows, which only
allowed for one-way traffic and prevented withdrawal past damaged vehicles
that often blocked the narrow passages for hours. Armored attacks were the
exception, artillery was limited to planned fires. Even without the threat from
the air, reserves could not be quickly deployed and committed. As during the
First World War individual tanks became infantry weapons and armored
observers, distributed along the thinly occupied front as links in a pearl necklace to form the backbone. Without the tanks, the unnerved and exhausted
panzergrenadiers could not hold out under the almost constant fire. The
panzer divisions committed there were robbed of their strength, mobility,
flexibility and firepower. They were worn thin because of Hitler's fantasy
that holding terrain at any price was more important than maintaining the
strength of the troops, as he had experienced in Flanders in 1917/18.
The command authorities of the German Command still harbored thoughts
of attacking, now on 9 June. The Panzer Lehr Division was to attack after
assembling abreast the Tilly-Bayeux road behind the city of Bayeux. In spite
of the difficulty of oblique movement, all available elements stood ready to
attack Bayeux as ordered on the morning of 9 June. On the right the 901st
Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment, reinforced by the Panzerjger Battalion,
stood on either side of the Seulles. On the left Was Group Schnburg (II
Battalion, Panzer Lehr Regiment and I Battalion 902nd Panzergrenadier
Lehr Regiment). The rest of the 902nd Rgt. was still located in Brouay and
would not be able to leave until the afternoon. The Panther Battalion, which
was being transported through Germany, was not expected to arrive before
10 June. As ordered on 7 June, the 130th Armored Reconnaissance Lehr
Battalion secured the left - still open - division flank on a line EllonTrungy.
Meanwhile, enemy pressure near Tilly forced the abandonment of Audrieu.
In order to cover the important town of Tilly, the 901st Rgt. had to be diverted towards this village. The attack to the north had to be conducted by Group
41

Schnburg alone. Group Schnburg had already advanced through Ellon by

1700 hours, but, on order of the division commander, was then stopped and
ordered to return to its departure positions. The only classic panzer attack by
the Panzer Lehr Division in Normandy was over before it had begun.
In the meantime, the 901st Rgt. was involved in heavy defensive fighting
around Tilly. New enemy forces were advancing from Hill 103 toward the
town and even the 12th SS Panzer Division was forced onto the defensive
near Christot. The initiative had passed over to the enemy. I SS Panzer Corps
was forced onto the defensive.
Indeed, the order placing the Panzer Lehr Division onto the defensive was
not issued until 11 June. Nevertheless, it merely confirmed the existing situation that had already been in effect since the day before. The division was
supposed to defend its achieved line: les Hauts Vents-St. Pierre (south) Tilly (north)-Yerrieres (south)-la Senandiere (north). On the right was the
901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment; in the center was the 130th Armored
Engineer Battalion and the 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment under the
command of Oberst Gerhardt, CO Pz Lehr Rgt. On the left ALA was securing the division's left flank on the Laurette stream, from the source to la
belle Epine.
In this sector the XXX British Corps, with two British elite divisions that
had already proven and distinguished themselves during the North African
Campaign, the 7th Armored Division (Desert Rats) and the 50th
(Northumbrian) Infantry Division, planned to capture the high ground of
Evrecy via Villers-Bocage and the Odon.
The 7th Armored Division consisted of one armored brigade (22nd) with
three armored battalions equipped with Cromwell and Firefly tanks in a ratio
of approximately four to one respectively, and an infantry battalion equipped
with Lloyd tracked vehicles; an infantry brigade (131st Queen's) with three
battalions and a heavy support company. These elements were supported by
two artillery battalions with armored howitzers and the usual combat support
weapons and naval artillery.
The 50th Infantry Division had three infantry brigades (69th, 151st, 231st)
each with three infantry battalions, besides the required combat support
troops. For the Normandy landing the division received an additional
infantry brigade (56th) and the independent 8th Armored Brigade, as well as
corps troops, particularly artillery. Including its reinforcements, on 6 June
the division numbered approximately 38,000 men.
The correlation of forces between the Panzer Lehr Division with its supposed strength of 14,654 and the British formations, over 50,000 men on 10
June, worsened as a result of the British supply system. While the German
42

panzer divisions had to be committed until they were completely exhausted

before they were sent to the homeland for refitting, the British commanders,
for the most part, could count upon immediately receiving replacements for
tanks and guns that could not be repaired locally. Often, Allied armored regiments were even over-equipped. As for infantry, the enemy's regimental system took care of everything, while the combat strengths of the German divisions, which were only fed by their weak field replacement battalions, quickly sank to a fraction of their original. The Allied supply of ammunition, fuel
and rations, as well as their medical services, was enviable.
The almost total Allied air superiority was another concern, even though
the German flak was feared, shooting down, for example, 50 percent of all
English Typhoon fighter-bombers. (Ambrose)
On the evening of 6 June, Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt already
doubted, in the light of the overwhelming material superiority of the enemy,
that he could eliminate the beachheads with his available forces. In spite of
this, another attack towards the coast was planned under command of
Panzergruppe West during the night of 11 June. Even before the order could
be issued, the Panzergruppe command post was almost destroyed by an air
attack. General von Geyr was wounded. Therefore, all German attack plans
were temporarily unhinged.
After the British breakthrough attempt toward Caen had failed - the 12th SS
and the 21st Panzer Divisions repulsed them - Field Marshal Montgomery
shifted his main effort to the west, between Seulles and Aure. On 10 June the
50th Infantry Division and the 7th Armored Division were supposed to
attack through TillyVillers-Bocage toward Evrecy, after an enormous fire
preparation by the cruiser ORION and organic artillery. The 22nd Armored
Brigade was to attack on the right along the Bayeux-Tilly road, the 8th
Armored Brigade was to advance on the left through Audrieu toward St.
Pierre, whose approaches were forced on the previous day against Battalion
Uthe (I Battalion, 901st Regiment).
However, in the early morning of 10 June, after a heavy fire preparation by
mortars and artillery, Battalion Uthe, utilizing trails through an apple
orchard, penetrated into the town of St. Pierre and subsequently into the
positions near Point 103. Only with great effort were the British able to hold
their positions near point 103 and in the northern portion of St. Pierre, in
spite of support received from the fire of their tanks, artillery and war ships.
The cruiser ORION alone supported the British troops on that day with 1000
rounds of 6" shells, 186 of them fired at Lingvres.
On the British side, the 22nd Armored Brigade attacked along the main
43

road from Bayeux to Tilly. Near Jeruzalem they ran into resistance, apparently outposts from Battalion Zwierzynski (I Battalion, 902nd Regiment) reinforced by remnants of an East Battalion from the 352nd Infantry Division.
The lead British battalion was stopped until an infantry battalion arrived to
assist the tanks and capture the position. Meanwhile, the armored brigade
escaped using a parallel road just 2 kilometers further to the west. However,
the "Desert Rats" were still not familiar with the hedge-row terrain and
would not progress without infantry. Close-in fighters continuously tried to
throw hand-grenades into the hatches of the tanks or destroy the Cromwells
and Shermans with panzerfaust or ofenrohr. In the afternoon, several
Cromwells were able to achieve a deep breakthrough. Leutnant Werner
(130th Panzerjger Lehr Battalion) was believed to have destroyed three
tanks. Two others became stuck and were abandoned by their crews.
Further to the west, the recently deployed 56th Infantry Brigade attacked
the northern flank of the 130th ALA, which received a requested Panzerjagd
kommando or anti-tank squad at 1500 hours, a Panther platoon from the 2nd
Company, 6th Panzer Regiment, whose forward elements were returning to
the division by rail transport. The Panthers secured the intersection east of
Abbaye de Mondaye, but the enemy pressure was so strong that the division
commander ordered the withdrawal to a line Bernieres-Trungy. The gap in
the front further to the west to the 3rd Fallschirmjger Division was still
open. Increased enemy reconnaissance activity was discovered there.
Cooperation with organic artillery, which still lacked experience - from
deployment until the first round was fired took eight hours - did not bring
the hoped-for relief. The ALA lost one eight-wheeled SPW, seven SPW and
one A/T gun.
The anticipated heavy British attack on 11 June changed the situation very
little, even though the English formed mixed armored and infantry battle
groups for the fighting in Bocage. The 69th Infantry Brigade attacked east of
the Seulles toward Christot on the boundary between the Panzer Lehr
Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division. The fighting in the open terrain
raged to and fro. After an enemy penetration, Oberst Scholze (commander
901st Regiment) requested Panzer Battalion Schnburg to counterattack.
Prinz Schnburg's objections to such a poorly prepared and insufficiently
supported panzer attack in unfavorable terrain against a prepared enemy who
had tanks and anti-tank weapons fell on deaf ears. He succeeded in penetrating into the enemy positions. However, two panzers, including the command
vehicle, were destroyed by the strong defensive fire. Major Prinz SchnburgWaldenburg, his communications officer, Leutnant Herrmann, and Leutnant
Finsterwalder were killed.
44

West of the Seulles, the 56th Infantry Brigade attacked Tilly and the 22nd
Armored Brigade attacked Lingvres. Contact between Tilly and the rear
was temporarily disrupted. The fighting around Tilly was decided when
Oberst Scholze personally reached Tilly with a small kampfgruppe. The
22nd Armored Brigade captured Verrieres. After a counterattack by I
Battalion, 902nd Regiment failed, the panzergrenadiers counterattacked
again at midnight. This attack also collapsed in strong defensive fire, but it
cost the British defenders approximately 150 men.
The enemy probed with strong combat reconnaissance against the positions
of the Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion on the Aure, on the division's
left flank. The la belle Epine intersection was lost to superior English forces.
This enemy activity indicated that, besides preparing an attack against Caen,
the enemy was still planning to advance into the gap between the Panzer
Lehr Division and the 352nd Infantry Division. German armored reconnaissance to the west was able to repulse weaker American patrols near Caumont
and to establish contact with elements of the approaching 2nd Panzer
Division's Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and the right wing of
LXXXIV Army Corps. The seriousness of the British intentions were underlined that night by 16" high-explosive shells fired from the battleship Nelson
against Hottot and other road intersections.
On 12 June the enemy resumed the attack on the division's positions with
the main effort against St. Pierre-Lingvres. In spite of the British superiority, the Panthers and panzergrenadiers were able to repulse all attacks. The
3rd Company of the 6th Panzer Regiment particularly distinguished itself.
American forces approached Caumont. In order to protect against being outflanked to the west, the Division Begleit Company was committed near
Anctoville and subordinated to Major von Fallois. The ALA harassed recognized enemy movement to the south. I SS Panzer Corps directed its 101st
Heavy Panzer Battalion (Tiger) from Beauville through Paris to the VillersBocage area.
The Battle of Villers-Bocage
After the failure of the British frontal attack through Tilly, the commander
of XXX (British) Corps ordered an attack by the 7th Armored Division
through the gap between the British and American beachheads to the Villers
Bocage high ground in preparation for a later advance to the south, as soon
as the resistance of the Panzer Lehr Division was broken. Moreover, on the
afternoon of 12 July the 7th Armored Division was withdrawn from the front
and directed across the Aure to Livry, which was reached by the advance
guard, the 8th Hussars (armored reconnaissance), at 1500 hours. On the way,
45

Diagram 9

The Battle of Villers-Bocage. The counterattack was conducted in the afternoon.

The encircled 22nd Armored Brigade established an all-round defense west of the town.

they were fired upon by the Panzer Lehr Division Begleit Company and lost
three tanks. In Livry, the 22nd Brigade was reinforced by additional reconnaissance, infantry, an artillery battalion and an anti-tank company. The
night saw celebrations of "liberation" with flowers and wine. In the meantime, heavy naval artillery prepared the attack on Villers-Bocage with fire.
Located there were only the two medical companies and the division's ambulance platoon which had established a main dressing station and a local hospital there. The division's supply route also ran through the town. The detonations of the shells sounded like an honor guard's salute as Prinz Schnburg
and his comrades were buried in nearby Parfouru!
Early on 13 June the 22nd Brigade turned to the east toward Villers, in
order to occupy Hill 213 as flank security against Caen. The lead element
was a Cromwell company (A Squadron, 4th Company, "Sharpshooters") and
a company of armored half-tracks from the 1st Rifle Brigade, followed by
the headquarters and reconnaissance of the "Sharpshooters." When they
reached Hill 213 without further combat reconnaissance and began to establish positions, Hauptsturmfhrer Wittmann and his Tigers suddenly
46

appeared. He immediately destroyed the first and last tanks in the column on
the road from Villers. Then he destroyed all the remaining tanks and halftracks trapped along the road. In no time approximately 50 combat vehicles
were in flames, including the artillery observation tank. Almost all of the
officers who were summoned to the front to receive orders were caught in
the trap. Only the brigade commander, who had suspected trouble, was able
to escape. The survivors established a hasty, all-round defense on Hill 213
and offered brave resistance as they were being attacked by Tigers and other
soldiers in the area. Even Captain Lex, commander of the supply company of
II Battalion, Panzer Lehr Regiment in Parfouru participated in this fighting
with several damaged panzers. The battle ended at 1300 hours.
Meanwhile, Wittmann and about four or five high-spirited Tigers, without
accompanying infantry, drove, firing, along the main road into the town,
until he received a direct hit from a "Firefly." He withdrew back to the following Tigers and had to bale out. Gradually all of the Tigers and individual
Pz IVs located in the town were put out of commission by the English.
Wittmann himself escaped on foot to Chateau Orbois, the Chief of Staff
command post of the Panzer Lehr Division.
General Bayerlein was informed of the threat to his rear earlier by various
sources. Based on his reports, the corps admonished the 2nd Panzer Division
to hasten from the south. This division's forward elements, the 2nd
Panzergrenadier Regiment, soon joined in the fighting southwest of TracyBocage, forcing the English to evacuate the town of Villers-Bocage and
established an all-round defense "box" on the hills to the west.
Before 1100 hours the author received orders to advance to the area north
of Villers with every available panzer - about 15 - in order to prevent the
feared strike into the division rear. The division general staff officer, Major
Kauffmann, gathered all available soldiers from his staffs and other units in
order to cover towards the south. All elements, especially the supply
columns, were warned to avoid Villers-Bocage.
Driving along the road from Juvigny, the author received instructions
directly from General Bayerlein in Villy-Bocage. I was ordered to advance
along the road to the west, block all exits from the town at positions north of
the stream, in order to prevent an attack into the division rear. When the lead
panzer reached the road to Anctoville northwest of the town, it was
destroyed by a concealed anti-tank gun and burst into flames. We had run
into the British all-round defense west of Villers. The panzers could not
attack through the heavy underbrush without panzergrenadiers and artillery
support. General Bayerlein, who accompanied us in his command vehicle,
ordered the attack broken off and that these positions be held. At 2000 hours
the mission was accomplished and the panzers returned to their departure
47

positions.
In the morning, the lb. Major Werncke, was on his way from his command
post through Villers-Bocage to the la command post in Chateau Orbois. He
reported:
The noise of combat grew louder and louder. Shortly before reaching the
town, I ran into a stream of wounded with bandages on every part of the
body. They warned me about continuing, that the enemy had penetrated
into the town, that they had overrun the medical company and the main
first aid station. The enemy was now advancing to the east, "deep into
the flanks" of our forces. The wounded had fled through the windows.
What was I to do? I had to get to the command post, which couldn't be
that far away. I told my driver to take cover behind a hill and return to
the lb command post in thirty minutes, if I didn't return by then. I fought
my way through the bushes on foot in order to get to the main road that
led to the east and reconnoiter the situation. When I crawled over a
hedge-row, I saw four Cromwell tanks on a small lot in front of me.
Their crews were gathered around their commander; they were worrying
over a map.
The tanks were empty, their motors running. Since, as an old panzer
company commander, I was familiar with such vehicles, and it appeared
that I could use the armored protection - this time British - for my further trip through no-man's land, I crawled into the nearest Cromwell,
hidden by the other vehicles. I grabbed the steering mechanism - which
was similar to ours - and drove the tank over the road-side ditch onto the
main road, turning to the east.
The situation was curious. I passed burning British tracked vehicles,
tanks and trucks. I had to be in the Tommies' rear area. Later I heard that
Wittmann had caused this total confusion. My "advance" continued
without incident. After about two kilometers I saw a confused looking
infantryman in German uniform in a ditch, and waved him over. He was
reluctant but he came and I ordered him onto the turret to wave a white
rag if any of our own forces appeared. That was how I reached the division command post.
Since the gate was too narrow, I drove over the iron fence up to the front
of the chateau. When they saw us coming all the Staff and guards dove
for cover. That was the first time I heard the enemy radio traffic coming
from the headsets hanging inside the turret of the tank. I asked a translator to listen to the traffic. He couldn't hear much until the motor was
turned off. Ignorant of how to turn off the engine, I stalled it against a
large tree.
48

Meanwhile, the heavy attacks against the division's northern front continued all day, with strong artillery support. During a counterattack the commander of the 7th Coy, Pz Lehr Regt, Oberleutnant Freiherr Marschal von
Brachtenbrock, was killed.
Near Tracy-Bocage the enemy had orders to hold his positions at any price.
The Panzer Lehr Division order for 14 June honored our action:
Enemy attacks into the deep flank and rear of the division with armored
formations were defeated in cooperation with elements of II Bn, Pz Lehr
Regt and the Tiger Battalion from the 12th SS Panzer Division, as well
as hastily gathered together forces in the Villers area. About 40 tanks
and 20 tracked vehicles were destroyed ... I express my heartfelt thanks
to all division elements for their excellent efforts during the recent heavy
English attacks. We can be proud of your efforts. In all, 110 enemy tanks
have been destroyed by the division ...
On 14 June, in order to establish contact with the 22nd Brigade, the 50th
Division launched a bitter attack against Tilly, Lingvres and la Senaudiere.
This was the climax of the breakthrough attempt near Tilly.
The German positions, which had been improved in the meantime, were
attacked not only by strong artillery from the 50th Division and 7th Armored
Division from XXX (British) Corps and V (US) Corps, as well as naval
artillery, but also by bombs, rockets and onboard weapons of the combat aircraft of 11 RAF Squadron. Then the 151st and 231st Infantry Brigades
attacked on a narrow 3500 meter front.
"To protect themselves from the artillery fire, the panzergrenadiers used the
little cover offered by the Bocage hedgerows. However, they were doomed
by the splinters that rained down upon them from the towering poplars,"
Major Zwierzynski remembered on that day. A salvo hit his battalion command post. The commander, communications officer, orderly officer, several
NCOs and Oberleutnant von Glysczinski, the commander of the 4th
Company, were wounded. Hauptmann Bhm temporarily took over the battalion.
Fighting lasted the entire day. The 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
and 130th Armored Engineer Battalion, after suffering losses during the past
few days, could only thinly occupy the front. Battalion Mller (II Battalion,
902nd Rgt.), whose 6th Company was almost destroyed, stopped the 151st
Brigade from penetrating into the village of Lingvres. Further to the south,
the 231st Brigade took la Senaudiere.
As II Battalion, 130th Pz Lehr Rgt. prepared to counterattack against
Lingvres in the forest near Longraye, the British thought these were preparations to attack the 7th Armored Division and ordered "Pandemonium"
49

(concentrated artillery fire by all British and American guns within range)
against the forest. This indicated the high level of cooperation between the
Anglo-Americans, as concentrated artillery fire was conducted within minutes. The panzer attack was brought to a halt in the marshy forest by an enormous ammunition expenditure. As the author remembers well, his battalion
was not destroyed yet, but it could not be controlled, as antennas and vision
slots were damaged.
"But nowhere could they break the German front. The fact that 7 miles
away to the South the Seventh Armored Division had thrust an arm into the
enemy's side had not weakened his determination to hold his forward positions." (Ellis, Victory in the West, p.256)
Then the exhausted 7th Armored Division, which was also attacked on 14
June by the 2nd Panzer Division, first received orders to withdraw its outstretched arm to the south during the following night, "in order to prepare for
a larger attack within the next few days." As long as the 50th Division made
no progress against the Panzer Lehr Division and the 7th Armored Division
was not reinforced by the 33rd Armored Brigade, the unsecured positions
near Tracy-Bocage and Amaye were only a burden.
The withdrawal of the 7th Armored Division began on 15 June at 0000
hours. It was camouflaged by the noise of over 300 heavy bombers from the
Royal Air Force, which dropped over 1400 tons of bombs onto assumed
troop concentrations south and east of Villers-Bocage, near Aunay and
Evrecy. The withdrawal went according to plan. After the heavy fighting, no
element of the Panzer Lehr Division was capable of disrupting it.
The operation to capture Villers-Bocage ended with the success of the
Panzer Lehr Division and bitter disappointment for the enemy. One must
agree with Chester Wilmot that the outcome was decided by the strong
German nerves. The British suffered from bad luck, and this time the fortunes of war smiled on the Panzer Lehr Division.
Defense of Tilly
Both sides were exhausted and bloodied by the heavy fighting of the past
few days. In order to preserve the force, it was necessary to shorten the
Panzer Lehr Division front by withdrawing its left flank. Lingvres was
given up. During the evening before the 901st Rgt. had to extend its sector to
the stream one kilometer west of Tilly. The 902nd Rgt. had become too weak
to be able to hold the entire sector. Its remnants were to be reorganized near
Sermentot. The abbreviation of the front and the withdrawal of the panzergrenadiers were made possible by the arrival of the 2nd Panzer Division on
the left of Panzer Lehr.
50

On 15 June the enemy also withdrew east of Tilly. They prepared to be

relieved by the recently-landed 49th (British) Division. This division pursued
the German withdrawal cautiously. The panzer battalions had to act as
"panzerjgers," each having to detach a tank company to the infantry battalion in the front line, for their anti-tank defence. This commitment in small
groups as "fire brigade" contrasted with all the principles of armored warfare, but it was unavoidable, because there weren't enough panzergrenadiers
and the air situation, terrain and artillery fire limited the mobility of our
tanks. These tactics proved to be effective in holding the front. However, it
depleted the strength of the tanks and prevented the withdrawal of the panzer
division for its usual mission, the conduct of mobile combat.
My tank ran unexpectedly into an enemy tank in the bend of a wooded
trail. Both tanks fired at the same time. The enemy round penetrated our
gun mantle near the gunner's optics. My panzer commander,
Oberfeldwebel Sand and his gunner were killed immediately. I heard the
loader screaming. The enemy tank was also hit and probably towed away
during the night. After we were hit, I immediately gave it full gas in
reverse and ended up in a hedge-row. Then I brought it slightly forward
and slowly back. I drove the vehicle to the repair site. It was repaired and
was later committed. (Remembered by Obergefreite Emmert.)
On 16 June a threatening gap appeared on the left flank. In the morning the
enemy had broken through the thin security line on either side of the road
with tanks and infantry and was advancing to the Hottot-Torteval road. By
1800 hours, an assembled counterattack by tanks and hastily thrown-together
alert units was able to restore the old line. The 12th SS Panzer Division
Begleit (Escort) Company was attached to the ALA to strengthen its front
line.
There the 69th (British) Brigade tenaciously continued to try to break
through the thinly-occupied positions of the 130th ALA. However, the old
line was always restored by counterattack. On 18 June the 7th Green Howard
Battalion attacked the 3rd Company of the 130th ALA in Longraye after a
strong mortar preparation. The company withdrew, but was able to create the
prerequisite for a counterattack to restore the old line with the support of an
eight-wheeled armored car, light infantry guns and the engineer platoon. The
3rd and 4th Companies of the 130th ALA conducted this counterattack with
such surprise and motivation, together with the 12th SS Panzer Division
Begleit Company, that the enemy was actually overrun. The enemy battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Williamson, his staff and 120 men were
captured. He alone was able to escape some time later.
In the meantime, the other elements of the Panzer Lehr made use of the
brief respite to reinforce the positions and the foreground with mines and
51

earthworks. In spite of this, the constant strong artillery fire and small local
attacks cost the division approximately 60 losses per day. The losses of personnel and equipment continued unabated, especially since the quality of the
replacements fell short of that required for major combat.
A daily announcement praised the bravery of Knight's Cross winner Rudolf
Brasche, who destroyed five enemy tanks in close combat, and damaged two
others. He was promoted to Unteroffizier. Brasche fired his "ofenrohr" from
behind a hedge and was then wounded.
The anticipated new attack against Tilly started on 18 June with the commitment of strong artillery and with the support of simultaneous attacks conducted along the entire front. The fresh 49th Division attacked east of the
Seulles. It occupied Christot, which was just evacuated by the SS, and penetrated into St. Pierre from the northeast. At the same time, the 50th Division
attacked Tilly from the northwest. Tilly was held by Battalion Schne (II
Battalion, 901st Rgt.) with support from assault guns of the
Funklenkkompanie. After heavy fighting, the enemy was able to capture St.
Pierre and suppress a portion of the combat positions, formed out of the
ruins of houses, in Tilly. The counterattack conducted that evening by the
Panther Battalion made only slow progress. Its commander, Major
Markowski, was wounded by artillery fire. Hauptmann Jahnke took over the
battalion. Due to the shortage of forces, the hotly-contested Tilly was given
up, after it was mined, and the main line of resistance was withdrawn to the
Montilly-Sagy line. Further to the left, Group Gerhardt counterattacked
against enemy forces that had penetrated southwest of Longraye and captured 14 prisoners.
The morning of 19 June passed quietly. The 50th Division established itself
in Tilly, dispatched reconnaissance and prepared for another major attack. A
heavy two-hour artillery barrage was started at 1500 hours against the front
line and artillery positions. At 1515 hours the enemy attacked at the seam
between the 901st and 902nd Regiment. While Regiment Welsch (902nd)
was able to eliminate all penetrations, the enemy pushed back the German
line in the Regiment Scholze sector of operations to the edge of Hottot. The
counterattack by the reinforced Panther Battalion first swayed to and fro and
then enjoyed some success, after it was resumed during the morning. Fifteen
enemy tanks were destroyed, but friendly losses were also high.
At that point in time the division reported losses of 2300 men, mainly
panzergrenadiers. If one takes into consideration that 75 percent of these
losses were suffered by the 40 panzergrenadier and reconnaissance platoons
(altogether with a strength of 1600 men), it follows that more than the entire
compliment of these platoons became casualties. In fact, a fortunate core of
"alter Hasen [experienced soldiers]" still remained. But in the long run, only
52

the efficient man is lucky.

The supply situation grew increasingly worse. The requirements for fuel,
ammunition and rations exceeded the limited supply by approximately tenfold. In order to improve rations, the units established cattle farms behind the
combat zone. The cattle driven there were either milked or slaughtered.
French women did the laundry for the front line troops. As far as possible,
the troops lived off of the land, only ammunition and fuel could not be
obtained locally. Precautionary supply dumps had not been established sufficiently before the landing. Ammunition had to be fetched from south of the
Loire, fuel from east of Paris, because the Allied air forces had systematically destroyed the bridges and railroads. Long distances and the air situation
delayed the supply transports. It was not unusual for supply columns to take
five nights to travel with fuel from the railroad terminals.
The shortage of captured 152mm ammunition for the III Battalion was so
great that the division applied for its rearming with heavy field howitzers of
German origin, otherwise the batteries would have to be taken out of action.
The German tendency to underestimate supplies cost them blood. On the
other hand, it appeared that the enemy had inexhaustible supplies of ammunition. Their harassment fire on positions and intersections not only never
ceased, but always increased to new heights. In order to protect the non-combat elements from this fire, they had to be located further to the rear.
During the next few days, the enemy pressure lessened. The British attempt
to break through into the Tilly area was stalled. A new operation, "Epsom,"
was being prepared for further to the east. On the other hand, the war of attrition against the German panzer divisions in the Bocage and the German supply lines was continued by air. The constant harrassing fire and barrages on
the forward positions, road intersections, command posts and supply points
kept the overworked and anxious troops holding their breath. Then the onset
of rain cleared the sky of fighter-bombers, but the continuous rain filled the
foxholes and trenches with water, soaking clothing and rations.
The severe storm in the Channel on 19 June forced the enemy to postpone
their planned major attack against Caen - Operation "Epsom" - to 25 June.
Besides XXX British Corps, the newly landed VIII British Corps was also
committed. The initial attack objective was the Odon bridges near Tourville.
The 49th British Division was ordered to conduct a preliminary attack on 25
June to capture Juvigny, Vendes and Rauray, thereby creating the prerequisite for the VIII Corps' attack. The ridge line near Rauray denied the attacker
a view into the Odon valley. The 49th Division was reinforced by artillery
and, at the start of the attack, had the support of all of VIII Corps artillery
and five additional artillery battalions, as well as several anti-aircraft batteries committed on the ground.
53

The fire preparation began on 24 June at 2000 hours with extraordinary

massed barrages against German battery positions and road intersections. A
few hours later, the fire rose in its intensity as barrages hit the front lines,
particularly in the Fontenay-Juvigny sector. The 146th and 147th Infantry
Brigades attacked Fontenay at 0400 hours in a thick ground fog that lasted
for hours and blinded the defenders. The former captured Bas de Fontenay
on the boundary with the 12th SS Panzer Division at 0915 hours, after facing
stubborn resistance. The enemy brigades then advanced further to the south
to the northern edge of the forest, a mile west of Tessel upon a hill. In the
meantime, fiercer combat raged around the ruins of Fontenay between the
147th Brigade and Battalion Uthe (I Bn., 901st Rgt.), whose brave commander was killed during this fighting. Hauptmann Philipps took command of
the battalion. After heavy losses on both sides, the British could not advance
across the northern edge of the town. Only after committing another battalion were they able to force the last panzergrenadiers out of the town at night.
After bitter resistance from Battalion Schne (II Bn, 901 Rgt), Juvigny was
also lost. Here, the 5th Company under Hauptmann Philipps particularly distinguished itself.
The 7th Army war diary had the following to say about 25 June:
After heavy fighting on the severely weakened inner flanks of the 12th
SS Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr Division, the enemy was able to
tear a five kilometer wide and two kilometer deep gap between Tilly and
Fontenay, after committing strong material and personnel resources and
continuous air strikes. Fontenay and Juvigny were lost... I SS Panzer
Corps therefore regards the situation with concern, Panzer Lehr's
infantry units in particular had been decimated severely by the previous
fierce defensive battles and their awaited replacements have not arrived
yet.
On 26 June Panzer Lehr earned special recognition. The Wehrmacht Report
noted:
In combat against three of the best English divisions, the Panzer Lehr
Division, under the command of Generalleutnant Bayerlein, proved
itself...
Here are also the words of the British writer Chester Wilmot in his book
"The Struggle For Europe," for Panzer Lehr are quoted:
During the ten-day struggle of Tilly-sur-Seulles, the Panzer Lehr
Division fought with such skill and spirit that veterans felt they were
meeting a reincarnation of "Ninety Light", which they had fought so
long in Africa.
54

An Act of Humanity 1944

Normandy, 2 July 1944 - A battle of equipment, with artillery, tanks and air
sorties in previously unheard of numbers, raged in undiminished fury after
the Allied landing on 6 June. Several days before, on 28 June, the Americans
had captured fortress Cherbourg and, almost simultaneously, the British
achieved a deep penetration west of Caen. In the meantime, the 130th
Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion (ALA) secured along the border
between the American and British armies east of Chaumont, on the western
flank of Panzer Lehr. The ALA command post was located in La Mogisiere,
five miles south-southeast of Aunay-sur-Odon. There, the radio section
Derenburg with an 80 Watt transmitter on frequency 2743 khz monitored
signals on the battalion supply net.
At 1350 hours a voice that spoke German well, with an American accent,
suddenly reported in a clear voice, obviously from a powerful American
transmitter:
Attention, Attention! German commands on this frequency. This is the
American Army. I have an important message for you. Over!
German radio procedures strictly forbade any contact with the enemy. What
to do? The radio station commander called his communications officer,
Lieutenant Schultz-Balluff. Then the next American call came through. It
was the same as before, with the supplement:
We want to turn over six German Red Cross nurses to you. Over!
In spite of thoughts to the contrary, Lieutenant Schultz-Balluff made the
forbidden contact, taking a risk of severe punishment that is inconceivable
today, 50 years later. The following is a short record of the radio traffic that
was exchanged at that time:
German [G1: This is the requested German command, please reply. I
request the names of the nurses. Please reply! Over.
American [A]: This is the American Army. We want to return six German
Red Cross nurses from Pasteur Hospital in Cherbourg. Over.
G: German command here. I request the names of the German Red Cross
nurses. Please reply! Over.
Reception was poor. Apparently the German transmission was not strong
enough.
A: I don't understand you. You are coming in very weak. Please switch to
frequency 2700. Over.
G: I will remain on the same frequency. You want to locate [radio direction
finding] us. This is a trick! I am switching off.
A: Why are you no longer transmitting? I cannot understand you. Over.
55

G: I understand. I asked for the names of the six German nurses.

A: We have here six German nurses, who we want to return to you. Here
are their names: Marie Binder, 23 years old; Ursel Brtigam, 30 years old;
Hedwig Beusch, 48 years old; Berta Geissler, 25 years old; Annemarie
Leidinger, 24 years old; Christl Bitz, 30 years old. They are all in good
health. Over.
G: Where are the nurses located?
A: ... On the Chaumont-Sept Vents road near Le Bourg. They will be
accompanied by three unarmed American officers with white flags. We
request two German officers meet them half-way. The American officers will
be there at 1430 hours. Over.
G: I understand. I propose the exchange take place at 0800 hours. I cannot
approve the exchange. Please call back at 1800 hours.
Thus ended the radio traffic from the Armored Reconnaissance Lehr
Battalion. The proposed exchange site was in the 2nd Panzer Division area
of operations, their left neighbor, who was informed.
The continuation of the story is told from the American side by Anthony
Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, London 1977, page 710:
"At three o'clock that afternoon, the guns went silent. Incredulous
grenadiers and GI's alike, men with pink hedge roses stuck in their helmets
for camouflage, rose out of their positions in meadows that were rich with
clover and tall grass and saw three American officers coming down the road
from the direction of the hamlet of Sept Vents. The American party was led
by Captain Quentin Roosevelt, a G2 with the 1 st Infantry, and Captain Fred
Gerke, a prisoner of war interrogator. With them were eight German women.
From out of a hedge stepped a Major Heeren, the commanding officer of the
2nd Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion of the 2nd Panzer Division of General
von Luttwitz - one of the two panzer divisions, which Rommel had intended
to keep out of the line to deal with "internal enemies", when the rebellion
came. There was a brief conversation and the nurses were transferred at 3:10
P.M.
The imagination of the author saw the above-mentioned as being more than
an act of humanity, namely a ruse used by Rommel to make contact with the
enemy. However, this assumption is today baseless. The Ic morning report
from Army Group B on 3 July 1944 noted:
An American command authority turned over eight German Red Cross
nurses in the Caumont sector after previous contact was made over radio.
56

On 9 July there was another exchange in the same location. After radio
contact could not be made with a German station, Captain Roosevelt and two
other officers under the protection of a white flag approached with nine additional women, two nurses and seven staff assistants from Cherbourg. Again
both sides immediately silenced their weapons. After the exchange, the men
returned to their respective positions.
As General Speidel reported in "Invasion 1944," these proceedings "wakened particular fury and mistrust in Hitler." Local cease-fires for humanitarian purposes were not extraordinary in the west, they were used to evacuate
the wounded or for other reasons. The author remembers a cease-fire for
morning toilet during an attack on Cassel on the morning of 28 May 1940,
when the English left their shelters to go shave. It was similar up to the end
of the war. Friend and foe utilized the same frequencies for their radio traffic
at the front and often one would overhear the other. Occasional radio contact
was unavoidable. Certainly the Americans were glad to turn over the women.
They could not guarantee their safety for very long and they could make use
of the propaganda concerning their treatment of German prisoners of war.
Nevertheless, this was still an "act of humanity" as described by General
Speidel.

6. Recollections of June 1944

"Today the invasion has been launched!" I wrote my wife on 6 June, before
marching to the front. This march and those that preceded it in 1939, 1940
and to Russia in 1941 and 1942 were recalled when, in September 1990, a
British tank with the well-known red Desert Rat designation (7th Armored
Division) passed me on the autobahn on its way for shipment to the [Persian]
Gulf War. The thoughts of the British tank crew could not have been much
different from ours at that time. The heart is always heavy. What was waiting
for you and your troops during the commitment? Did you do everything to
prepare yourself and your soldiers? I was convinced and I had great trust in
my supply company and the entire battalion. We faced the decisive engagement with our main English enemy. They formed the backbone of the enemy
resistance against the Reich and demanded unconditional surrender.
We knew that it would be difficult. But we were confident, the officers and
NCO's were well trained "alte Hasen," (old hands) most had front line experience and faith in the regiment and its weapons. Indeed, we would have preferred "Panthers" in place of our Panzer IVs, but we also had faith in and
were proud of them. During the formation period, in Hungary and up to
May, we trained closely with our panzergrenadiers. We knew and trusted
57

each other very well. The civilian population remained loyal and we had no
reason to mistrust the descriptions of the strength of the Atlantic Wall, but
we had no illusions that it could not be broken through. However, we would
be there in order to throw the enemy back. The fact that we had not seen any
German fighters in the skies over France was understandable. It was more
important for them to be committed at home. They would be there to help us
when we needed it, as they had been throughout the war; or so we believed!
All day, in clear skies, enemy reconnaissance aircraft had searched in vain
for our well-camouflaged vehicles. When we began the march to the front
that evening, it didn't take long before the first bombs fell. The fighterbombers, Typhoons and Lightnings, harassed the wheeled vehicles, but not
our panzers, whose flak platoons were well respected by the pilots.
Nevertheless, soon after we started the first deep air strikes were conducted
and we suffered some damage. Shortly after that we were able to shoot down
a fighter-bomber with an anti-aircraft machine-gun. That encouraged the
Landser!
We marched through the night without further incident, except for having to
detour around bomb damage, which we had to first reconnoiter and then
remove, so that our supply vehicles could get through. Our support vehicles
were integrated into the column and often had to be pulled out of craters or
marshes by the panzers. Thus, the march was delayed. In the north, heavy
artillery fire, flak and the slowly descending "Christmas Trees" (illumination
flares) lit up the sky.
Although we still had not reached our march objective, at daybreak we
occupied a forest near Alencon, in order to resupply.
Then a messenger gave me an order to immediately continue the march to
the north into the Villers-Bocage area, disregarding the air threat. No sooner
had the first tanks moved out onto the road then we were attacked by aircraft
and fired at with on-board weapons and rockets. A fuel truck was set on fire.
A black column of smoke rose into the sky, alerting other fighter-bombers.
Bombs fell. The noise and confusion was hellish. We were surprised. We still
had not learned to fire all available weapons, including rifles and pistols, at
the aircraft. We all sought cover until the attack was over instead of spending
our impotent rage against the pilots by shooting, like we would later. After
the war, British pilots told me that such fire in itself was seldom threatening,
but it would damage their aircraft so that their next sortie would be delayed.
Although these fighter-bomber attacks inflicted only little damage on the
men and equipment, they did make a great impression and cost time, because
we would drive more cautiously than before and the wheeled vehicles would
have to seek cover during every attack, which also delayed the panzers.
58

In order to be able to reconnoiter the assigned assembly area near Montsen-Bessin while it was still daylight, I rode ahead of the column on a motorcycle with sidecar [B-Krad]. The farther I drove, the more I could see that
the fighter-bombers had been busy. Here were the results of their work, burning vehicle wrecks on the side of the road spewing black smoke. At
times men would suddenly appear through the smoke as through a fog. At
the fall of darkness the fighter-bombers disappeared from the sky. Before
dawn, the battalion was quartered in the park of Chteau Monts. It was camouflaged and supplied, waiting for orders to attack to the coast.
My supply company settled down in and south of Parfouru-sur-Odon, the
medical company, which followed our march column, set up in and near
Villers-Bocage. We still did not know what the other march columns, the
902nd and 901st Regiments, had suffered. Their SPWs, for the most part,
were equipped with 2 cm anti-aircraft cannon, but they still lacked the necessary suspension mounts so that they were defenseless against air attack. The
SPW's did not arrive, in sections, until the afternoon.
Nothing bothered us all day, neither fighter-bombers nor any orders. During
the evening the Prinz and Captain Lex returned from Germany; I changed
quarters to the squire-house in Parfouru. The attack to the coast was planned
for the next morning. There were still no traces of German fighters in the
sky.
9 June. Unexpectedly, the attack on Bayeux was prematurely broken off.
During the evening I led the supply vehicles to the corps. The Prinz was laying on the engine compartment of his command tank. He called to me. He
was deeply depressed as he told me that the division commander ordered
him to return to the departure positions just before they were ready to
exchange fire with enemy tanks in the distance near Bayeux. The order was
probably given because of a penetration on the division right flank.
Underneath the swelling and receding thunder and lightning of the powerful
artillery in the north, we spoke of God and the world, about our present situation, which, in light of the already evident enemy superiority, there was little we could do about, and how completely different from the Eastern Front
the war would become out here. The Prinz had lost his usual composure and
confidence and I could find no words to comfort him.
10 June: In the afternoon the first Panthers from the I Battalion, 6th Panzer
Rgt. arrived from their trip through Germany. No one knew why they were
supposed to be transferred to the struggle on the Eastern Front just before the
anticipated invasion. How were we expected to throw the enemy back into
the sea? They still spoke of attacking, even though we had to stick our heads
in the sand because of the enemy air superiority. With their front line experi59

ence from Russia, the old soldiers took pains to prepare everyone for "the
phenomenon of war", - which will shock and terrify soldiers for the first
time - before they have experienced it for themselves at the front.
(Clausewitz, First Book). Even we were unprepared for such material superiority.
11 June: In the afternoon I drove forward in order to supply the panzers and
talk with the commander. When I arrived, he had been summoned to a briefing with the commander of the 901st Rgt. Before my arrival, a bomb had
slammed into the command post. It was a miracle that none of the company
commanders were wounded. Only the Prinz' old valet, Obergefreiter Fssel,
who had driven forward with the supply vehicles, was killed. A little later the
Prinz returned with an attack order to eliminate the enemy penetration. He
was very shaken by Fssel's death. He said that he had lost his best friend.
Fssel had been with him for 25 years. Moreover, his heart was not in the
ordered attack. He judged the terrain to be totally unsuitable for an armored
commitment.
With my coaxing, he drove again to Oberst Scholze to present his ideas. On
his departure, he said to me: "Who knows if we all will die!"
I returned to Parfouru unsuspecting, until 2200 hours, when the battalion
adjutant, Oberleutnant Meyer, briefed me on what had happened. After
reaching the attack objective, Hill 103, the Prinz' command vehicle was hit
in the turret. The commander and Leutnant Herrmann, the communications
officer, were killed immediately. The rest of the crew were unhurt, they
brought the panzer back and I later took it over. While breaking contact from
the enemy, Leutnant Finsterwalder was also mortally wounded. Additional
losses were suffered. The death of our beloved commander struck deep into
our hearts, but there was no time for us to mourn.
I drove forward in a B-Krad to the panzers with hastily assembled supplies.
The panzers were concealed in a forest. I spoke with Meyer and then hurried
to my regiment commander, Oberst Gerhardt, who commanded the left division sector. He temporarily entrusted me with the command of the battalion.
How often in silence had I longed for this position, but not under these tragic
and horrible circumstances. The death of the Prinz touched me deeply, but
not only me! Almost all of the members of the battalion felt as I did. During
a visit to the grave of the Prinz, 40-50 years later, all of us old soldiers still
felt great reverence for this extraordinary officer and nobleman.
I arrived at my headquarters, where our panzers were camouflaged in an
apple orchard, with only a small pack. The enemy's reaction was unfriendly
and unforgettable: I was greeted by the heavy naval guns. The 15" or 16"
shells were announced initially by deep organ tones, then high ascending
60

organ tones up to the impact flash, to be followed by a breathtaking and

deafening blast. They hit right in between the panzers. This was followed by
silence one hoped would never end. But it did. followed by more "blessings"
from above. When I raised my head, I noticed that my rucksack, together with
the iron luggage rack at the back of the turret was basted away; and with it,
my Leica that I had carried since the first day of the war. Cautiously, I
ordered the panzers shifted further to the rear. I figured that this greeting
from the Royal Navy was only our first of many to come.
12 June: After 0800 hours the battalion was divided into companies as "fire
brigades," preparing for counterattacks behind the panzergrenadiers, who
were being hard-pressed by either the Tommies, artillery and mortar fire or
air strikes. After one bombing attack on Headquarters, Panzergruppe West
(General von Geyr) our division was forced onto the defense in the Bocage
area, which may have been suitable for a forest fight, but never for an
armored battle. For the most part, we were degraded by being turned into
panzerjgers or bunkers. Nevertheless, I was able to break free in the evening
to bury the dead. The dead were carried out of the panzers and laid out in the
Parfouru village church in a sea of flowers. Their graves were dug where
they still rest today under the marble cross, which their families ordered after
the war.
Because of the large number of wounded, unfortunately neither of our two
divisional chaplains were able to attend the burial. Due to the air threat, the
Prinz could not be buried until it was dark. I made a short speech, then we
lowered the fallen leader into his grave. Prinz Schnburg, his valet and his
communications officer now lay side by side. We said the Lord's Prayer
together. During the brief burial ceremony, English naval artillery fired a
salute at the neighboring Villers-Bocage. Subsequently, I drove back to my
panzers.
13 June: The English artillery preparation increased during the morning to
the level of barrage fire and the panzergrenadiers ran back to the panzers. I
received orders to prevent a British attack from Villers-Bocage into the rear
of the division with all panzers not needed on the front. British tanks had
attacked through the town, which was only occupied by our medical companies, at 1000 hours. Apparently they would turn to the north through VillyBocage. Therefore, all of the northern exits from the town had to be blocked
and a counterattack prepared. On the way through Juvigny to the south with
about 15 panzers, I met General Bayerlein, who was waiting for me north of
Villy. From him I learned of Hauptsturmfhrer Wittmann's Tiger's successful attack east of Villers-Bocage and the subsequent raid into the town. With
my panzers, minus infantry, I blocked the narrow road leading from Villy to
the west past Villers-Bocage. We began taking fire from the hills northwest
61

of the town, from well-camouflaged anti-tank guns that we could not make
out and, therefore, could not effectively engage. When my lead panzer,
Stabsfeldwebel Bobrowski, was hit and set aflame, General Bayerlein
ordered me to call off the attack. He, in the meantime, was informed of the
attack by the newly arrived 2nd Panzer Division on the English flank west of
Villers and the evacuation of the town. To my great dismay, I, meanwhile,
learned of the death of Oberleutnant Freiherr von Marschalk during a counterattack near Tilly. He had just taken over my 7th Company. We buried him
on the following day near le Mesnil Anzouf.
The next few days flew by. We had plenty to eat. Besides the good combat
rations, which the company sergeants brought forward at night, we obtained
a small butter-barrel and a cream-pot from a dairy in the combat zone - an
excellent nerve relaxer. This was, however, necessary to survive the almost
constant fire from the artillery on the ground, from the air and from the sea.
In general, one heard the detonations subliminally if they were not in the
immediate area, but one still could not sleep deeply. I and my excellent crew
slept in a deeply dug, covered trench under our panzer. Those who had no
overhead protection had it bad. The trees and bushes blocked one's vision,
but not the shell fragments from above, which were set loose by very sensitive fuzes that were ignited by the thinnest branch.
It was no wonder that I had a stomach upset and often had to go "into the
bushes." This was particularly embarrassing when one was leading an
armored column and had to stop so many times. However, opium and carbon
helped me get back on my feet.
Particularly dreadful was a heavy artillery barrage that broke over us when
we were jammed in a sunken road between other tanks. The fragments
rained down like hail onto the panzers, damaging periscopes and antennae
and covering everything in smoke. My driver lost his nerve, cried for his
mother and got us stuck. When the fire momentarily decreased in intensity,
my gunner and I had to quickly dismount in order to tie our tow cable to the
panzer behind us, so it could pull us out. We were fortunate that Tommy
waited until our hatches were sealed before starting the next barrage.
From the outside our panzers looked a mess. Antennae, vision blocks, tool
boxes, etc., as well as the 'zimmerit' were no feast for sore eyes. We could
not fight without radio communications. We had to withdraw unsuccessful,
but we also suffered no losses. The British also did not reach their objective.
But their losses were made up for during the night, ours were not. During
this senseless combat in the bushes, one vehicle was lost after another.
With all of the horrors of the front, it was a joy that my soldiers survived,
even though the commitment of our panzers in this situation ran contrary to
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all principles of armored warfare. Without the self-sacrifice and inexhaustible work of the recovery vehicles and the men from the maintenance
service, the losses would have been worse than they actually were. Many
times a vehicle could not be towed away for several days. Therefore, the
dead in the tank also could not be buried for several days.
Particularly tragic were the losses from laziness or indolence. Naturally
everyone froze in the face of fire and danger, but all officers had the obligation of forcing their people to entrench and, during attacks, to take cover by
jumping into the trenches or under the panzers. Gradually the survivors
acquired a good nose for dangerous fire and near impacts, like the sense of a
fox for danger. The war reversed a lot of our previous opinions. Before the
war we enjoyed sunshine and good weather. Now we found low-hanging
clouds and rain more to our liking and grumbled out loud when the sun was
shining, because it certainly brought with it enemy aircraft.
The Tommies had certainly fought already during the First World War in
another way and by different principles against we Germans, who always
wanted to attack and to beat the enemy. For them it mattered primarily to do
harm to their enemies and take care of themselves. In Normandy they
attacked only after precedented fire preparation and with additional tank support. Then they entrenched themselves, to wait for the enemy.
If one was able to counterstrike immediately, before they were settled in
they abandoned all their gains and one could recapture those. This of course
could not be accomplished without losses, which we could not adequately
replace, while the British received replacements during the night. The most
noticeable gaps were in the officer corps, and the panzergrenadiers suffered
the most. Fortunately, we did not suffer a shortage of brave NCO's and experienced men.
In general, we lived in the ground like foxes, under our panzers that were
surrounded with earthen walls (to protect against shell fragments). We were
able to disappear underground at a moment's notice, especially when the air
was no longer clear. We lived with danger both day and night. During the
day, with a clear sky came the fighter-bombers, otherwise there was always
artillery and mortar fire. Our command post was also set up under our
panzer, along with a shelter and sleeping area for my panzer crew. A little
room was left so visitors could conduct business. In spite of the close, stale
air, at that time we felt this was much better than the alternative. Today it
would only be tolerable with face masks.
There was a problem with water and washing. There were no nearby
streams. Undressing and bathing were excessive luxuries, but one took every
opportunity to shave. The dry summer weather and the constant strain on the
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nerves caused powerful thirst, so we drank large quantities of cider, calvados, wine and cognac, without becoming drunk. Rations could only be delivered at night. They were often taken with the nerve salve from our "dairy,"
the butter and cream. To relax ourselves we smoked cigarettes. Their blue
haze could not worsen the already unhealthy air. Nevertheless, we remained
confident, sometimes swearing profusely or with grim humor.
The strong bonds of comradeship maintained us and mitigated our misery
and distress. No one spoke of military virtues, we lived them. No one even
spoke of trust in God. One either possessed it or did not. Those who did, had
stronger support to overcome the anxiety and horror of war.
The enemy strived to kill us with artillery and mortars, with fighterbombers, tanks and machine-guns. He inflicted losses on us without gaining
ground. We had to hold as ordered, even when it appeared to make no sense
and it cost our proud division strength and nerve.
16 June: The Wehrmacht Report provided news of the "Vergeltung [retaliatory weapons]." The first "new, heavy caliber warheads" were fired, the V-1.
Maliciously, as human nature is, the report generally released in us satisfaction and relief. Why should just our major cities fall into soot and ashes? We
only wished that we had received the news earlier. It offered little comfort to
us in our defensive combat, since we were not allowed to conduct a mobile
battle. The combat elite of our division was being destroyed.
I had contact with the outside world by telephone, radio and messenger.
One of my radio operators always sat at the equipment in my panzer. The
foxholes also had telephones.
The terrain and air situation would only allow for company-sized commitments. The panzers rarely used the trails. Today walking the forest trails is
peaceful. Then, all intersections and choke points were placed under fire.
One had to move in leaps and bounds. The panzers that had been committed
in the front lines could only be reached at night. The enemy lay close by in
the opposing hedge-rows. The slightest movement would unleash fire and
the panzergrenadiers would suffer losses. Iron Crosses were rationed sparingly. I gladly issued them to the deserving.
Early on 19 June the bitterly-contested Tilly-sur-Seulles fell. It appeared
that the English had achieved their objective and went over to the defense,
abetted by dreadful rainfall, which we enjoyed because it kept the aircraft
away. I transferred my command post from a foxhole into a house that hadno windows that had not been demolished by shell fragments, but was otherwise sound. We found it somewhat better than conditions under the panzer.
However, the days of rain and the hours-long artillery fire weakened even the
strongest. The panzergrenadiers and panzer crews, who were committed for64

ward, bore the brunt of the load. The only consolation was that the Tommies
had it no better. Unfortunately, they would be relieved after a short duration,
and we would not.
It would be a godsend to be able to wash properly and sit at a table to eat.
My staff quietly took care of me. Accordingly to the radio and papers that
reached us, the Normandy Front still appeared all quiet and pleasant. This of
course reassured our relatives at home, but we were enraged at the war correspondents who protested their innocence to us. They also had to follow
orders or could not write a word.
Everyone was a aware of the eighth commandment, "Thou shalt not bear
false witness." Don't tell a lie was not valid for the media then, when Dr.
Gbbels interfered, nor today. But the situation in the Reich had become
more than serious and all men needed comfort and confidence. National
leaders easily lose lost touch with the people. Hitler's only combat experience originated from the battles of Flanders from 1916 to 1918. That was a
war of meters, at most, up to the nearest horizon. On the other hand, in 1944
one needed room to operate, hundreds of kilometers if necessary. It reflected
the mobility of air power, strong armored forces and artillery that needed to
be well supplied. The war would not be won by "Vergeltung" alone. Every
soldier knew that. Nevertheless, no one lost his cheerfulness. One could
express pleasure over the smallest detail. The news reels liked to show this.
I was named battalion commander on 22 June. I was moved when I accepted the congratulations of my men. My adjutant took responsibility for
informing my wife in Silesia. Captured English cigarettes were enclosed in
the letter. On the occasion of this appointment and the bad weather, which
kept the fighter-bombers away, I, for the first time in weeks, spent the night
in pyjamas and got a good night's sleep, following an excellent meal which
my squadron commanders had prepared. The English dinner music was limited to some distant rumbles. I also received a letter from home. In spite of
all expectations and all of the air attacks and the threatening situation on the
Eastern Front, the field post office operated exceptionally well, if often
slowly.
On the way to a commanders' briefing at division, I had to throw myself
down during a fire strike and ended up in two fresh cow patties. I looked
magnificent. Everyone laughed and stood far away from me because of my
perfume.
On 24 June the English attacked our right neighbor ("Operation Epsom"),
but their artillery fire also hit us. Usually they would not start until 1100
hours. I tried to visit my panzers at the front beforehand. I reached the rearmost panzer at 0830 hours and had only entered the men's shelter a brief
65

minute before, when the Tommies covered the area and forced me to beat a
hasty retreat in my Volkswagen. Two days later we had the double pleasure
of experiencing the mention of our division in the Wehrmacht Report and
celebrating the reappearance of two feldwebels who had gone missing two
days before. Every loss, especially an irreplaceable commander, good officers and feldwebels, was painful. So, one celebrated when they returned.
A couple of days earlier there were again rumors of another German attack
to the coast, together with the newly arriving SS panzer divisions. We also
hoped that we could hold Cherbourg. Now Cherbourg had fallen and the new
divisions were tied up by the major English attack to the east of us, although,
my battalion was not affected. We were withdrawn from the front, but the
English still fired at us, at night until 0200 hours, then after 0500 hours and
later after 1400 hours. Therefore, we gave up the house in favor of the hole
under the panzer. Our panzer also suffered artillery hits. They did no damage, of course, but everything was covered in smoke. Gradually, this constant
fire even got on my nerves. We had to comfort ourselves with the thought
that our fathers had survived the even worse battles of materiel from 1916 to
1917. We were told that our division would be relieved by an infantry division within a few days.
A daring move by the British occurred in our front-lines. A bold patrol
infiltrated through the hedgerows to one of our double sentries. They overwhelmed the two Panzergrenadiers. Upright and waving merrily, they withdrew embracing each other and using them as shields, in front of the eyes
and guns of our soldiers. They would not have gotten away with this in
Russia. The Soviets shot their own people.
Rundstedt's, Rommel's and von Geyr's request to quickly remove the
panzer divisions and free them for future operations, was considered to be
ineffective by Hitler. Also, after the fall of Cherbourg, the Allies continued
to deploy fresh divisions onto the beachhead. The longed-for relief by an
infantry division began on 26 June. The division was the 276th Infantry
Division, which had been formed in the west in December 1943 and was
entirely without combat experience. It took over the former Panzer Lehr
Division sector on 5 July. My battalion remained at the front until the
grenadiers took up residence.
While the infantry replaced the division platoon for platoon, my battalion
remained to perform the duties of firemen for the poor stoppelhopser (stubble-hoppers). I was subordinated to an infantry regiment, whose commander,
Oberst Kolsfelder, was a pleasant man. One of his battalion commanders
sent me three ducks so we could live "like God in France."
66

Two of my companies were now also spread across the entire front in security, like fortress bunkers behind the front lines. This was a commitment contrary to our desires, but there was nothing left for us to do because of the
weakness of the infantry. Because the English responded to every sound,
especially the sound of engines, with fire, this cost the lives of infantrymen,
so my panzer men had to persevere three to four days, sitting in the fighting
compartment, until they were relieved. Stiff and swollen limbs were the
result. The first astronauts experienced similar effects until man had learned
to get the blood flowing with local exercise.
Since the butter ration was reduced, we set up a dairy with 200 head of cattle. Subsequently there was a laundry where French women worked because
they profited from our rations. Our lightly wounded and sick members on
barracks duty also lent a hand. Many seemed to develop a special skill for
doing laundry. One of my old batmen did not recover completely until the
beginning of July, when he returned to duty. Even my staff surgeon was "fortunate" enough to break his foot and was now going to the hospital, as was
joked.

7. Hill 112

After the forces of the 7th Army, including the mobile divisions from the
OKW reserve, were unable to penetrate into the enemy beachheads and
throw the Allies back into the sea, the German panzer divisions had to go
over to the defence at the beachheads. The 15th Army waited, inactive, further to the east in Pas de Calais for the landing of additional Allied armies,
which did not even exist, but were well simulated.
On 12 June, under the pressure of the circumstances, Hitler ordered II SS
Panzer Corps, with the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, transferred back to
France. These formations had been involved in heavy fighting in Poland
since the end of March. They were transported to France by rail, but they
were delayed by fighter-bombers and damaged stretches of railroad track.
The majority of the transports had to be unloaded in the Epinal and Nancy
area. Only a few trains made it to the Paris area.
In light of the enemy air superiority, the units could only march during the
night from the unloading railroad stations. Therefore, the two divisions did
not arrive on the invasion front within the three to four days as planned, but
only after 14 days, at the end of June.
The major attack of the II SS Panzer Corps, which was ordered by Hitler,
had the objective of dividing the beachheads in the Balleroy area. The British
attack west of Caen - Operation Epsom - forced a change in the attack plan.
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OB West reported on 27 June:

Because of enemy offensive intentions, the Caen area will be our main
effort.
The linch-pin remains Caen...
and on 28 June:
The denuding of the Caen area has become problematical. It remains the
pivot for the defense and the offense. Without new forces the penetration
in the 12th SS Panzer Division area cannot be parried. By a counterattack, fewer forces are fixed than by blocking positions.
On 29 June Hitler approved the OB West proposal to conduct a flanking
attack and destroy the enemy forces that had advanced through Baron toward
the Orne. The most important mission: "The 7th Army must not allow itself
to be pushed into open terrain!"
At this point, we must return to the terrain of Normandy. The western portion of the beachheads, the American sector, consisted of the "Bocage," a
fertile area of thick hedge-rows, forests and meadows. Today hedges and

Diagram 10: Hill 112.

68

vegetable gardens take up much of the acreage. In the eastern portion, the
British sector, the terrain opens to the south in the direction of Paris and the
Seine harbors. This area offered the best possibilities for large-scale armored
attacks. This was the closest route to Paris!
The major British attack hit the 12th SS Panzer Division, which had been in
sustained combat since 7 June. It was completely exhausted, bloodied and
had been reduced to only a fraction of its former strength. It had no reserves,
and was insufficiently supplied with fuel and ammunition. After several days
of fierce combat, the British were able to penetrate deep into the German
front on the afternoon of 27 June. Two bridges over the Odon were captured
and one bridgehead was established.
On 28 June Scottish troops slowly advanced against Hill 112. Hill 112
formed the western knoll of a blunt ridge that fell off to the southwest to the
northwest and southeast to the 60 to 90 meter deep valleys of the Odon and
Orne. This hill was the key to holding the important road and communications center of Caen and the Orne crossings to the south, opening the way
into the heart of France.
The hill offered good visibility to all sides and, therefore, the possibility of
detecting enemy movement early and being able to place it under fire from
favorable positions. It also hindered enemy observation of the reverse slope
and the river valley beneath. The naked, almost un-vegetated slopes considerably channeled and complicated the advance of attacking infantry and
armor, while the reverse slope provided protected positions for artillery, mortars and the air screen of the flak units.
The seriously battered 12th SS Panzer Division had orders to hold Hill 112
and prevent a British breakthrough to the Orne. On the morning of 28 June
the 5th Company, 12th SS Panzer Regiment - all that was available for this
mission (Panzermeyer) - moved into position east of Esquay. Then the
English occupied the northern slope and the grove on the eastern slope of
Hill 112. Additional companies of the 12th Panzer Regiment stood ready to
attack in the southeast and east. In the morning elements of the 53rd Flak
Regiment supported by a few tanks - probably several Tigers from the 101st
Heavy SS Panzer Battalion - stopped three British attacks, but the groves
were not in friendly hands. A battery from the 83rd Werfer Regiment
knocked out two enemy tanks at close quarters in front of the battery positions. The enemy was unable to capture the knoll. The 12th SS Panzer
Regiment held the northeastern edge and the southern edge of the hill.
Elements of the 53rd Flak Regiment and the 7th Werfer Brigade took up
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positions on the reverse slope.

In the evening II SS Panzer Corps organized an attack against the "Scottish
Corridor," on either side of the Odon. The 9th SS Panzer Division attacked
north of the Odon, south of the 10th SS Panzer Division. Simultaneously,
control in the Verson - Hill 112 - Evrecy area passed from I to II SS Panzer
Corps. The 101st Heavy SS Panzer Battalion was withdrawn, the 12th SS
Panzer Division and the 7th Werfer Brigade were resubordinated to II SS
Panzer Corps, which already had the 8th Werfer Brigade.
On the Morning of 29 June we were awakened by the heavy naval gun
fire of warships. Enemy artillery fire probed the entire area around
Verson and Hill 112. A short time later massive fire hit Hill 112. Were
the British going to bounce one attack after the other off of us? I
observed with uneasiness as British tanks clattered up the slope south of
the Odon and put Hill 112 into a pincers. I could no longer make out the
knoll. The Norman earth was plowed up meter by meter. The British
were preempting Hausser's attack. Artillery fire and rolling bombardment by the enemy air forces engaged our attack divisions in their
assembly areas. II Corps lost Hill 112. The tanks of the 11th British
Armored Division held the key for further operations against the Orne
bridges... (Panzermeyer).
II Corps artillery, that is the heavy howitzer battalion from the 12th SS
Armored Artillery regiment and several hundred barrels from the two werfer
brigades, placed the lead British elements under fire. "The Tommies were
punished heavily! But will that help us?" As soon as the enemy deployed
more reserves, he would be able to turn from Hill 112 to Caen or capture the
Orne bridges!
Delayed by the heavy air attacks, the 10th SS Panzer Division did not
attack until 29 June at 1430 hours. The 11th British Armored Division
immediately suspended its attack and went over to the defence. The Guighe
stream, which ran across the German attack axis, complicated the commitment of tanks in the Avenay area. Therefore, the 10th SS Panzer Division
was to advance its main body on the narrow spit of land between Odon and
Evrecy, then turn to the east and, in cooperation with elements of the 12th SS
Panzer Division in the Eterville-Maltot area, recapture Hill 112.
The attack collapsed in the open terrain under the fire of strong British
artillery from the knoll and close air support. Only on the right flank did the
reinforced 21st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment achieve surprise, capture
Avernay and penetrate into Vieux. II Battalion, 10th SS Panzer Regiment (Pz
IV) followed and, by dark, crossed the stream between Avernay and Vieux.
In the evening II SS Panzer Corps ordered both (10th and 12th) Divisions to
capture Hill 112 on 30 June.
70

On the morning of 30 June, in a light fog, and under the protective fire of
concentrated German artillery and werfer formations, panzers and panzergrenadiers converged on the knoll from the west, south and east. The knoll
was assaulted at midday. A British counterattack supported by tanks was
repulsed. On the left flank, the division attack against Baron stalled under
massive British artillery fire. The attempt in the afternoon to attack from Hill
112 to the north to reach the Caen-Villers Bocage road also failed under
enemy fire.
The major British attack - Operation "Epsom"- did not achieve its objective of Caen and the Orne bridges. Hill 112, the key to the open terrain of
France, to the communications hub of Caen and the Carpiquet airfield,
remained in German hands. The newly deployed German forces from II SS
Panzer Corps recaptured Hill 112, the town of Gavrus and some terrain, but
was unable to completely eliminate the British penetration. Their attack
strength was already broken. Recognizing this situation, General Hausser who, in the meantime, had taken command of the 7th Army - along with all
of the other senior commanders, proposed evacuating Caen in order to avoid
the overwhelming enemy naval gun fire and save the panzer formations
before they were burned out.
Blindly, Hitler turned down the proposal and replaced Generalfeldmarschall
von Rundstedt with Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge. Hitler ordered the
holding of the present positions and "continuing the deployment for a
German counterattack." Without the Luftwaffe to conduct aerial reconnaissance and provide close air support, there was nothing left to do. Hitler had
decided in favor of "tactical patchwork," that is, for a rigid defense that left
the initiative to the enemy. The enemy reinforced his forces in the beachheads considerably faster than the Germans did. Hitler did not want to risk a
mobile defense on the grounds that he could not recoup the losses suffered
by the Luftwaffe.
The 33 day defense of Hill 112 ran its course. The forward edge of the
German defensive area ran north of Noyers-Grainville-Gavrus (north) -Hill
114-Hill 112- Maltot.
The weather on 1 July was unsuitable for flying, so once again the German
formations were to attack the British frontal salient. The attack was again
supported by the fire of division artillery and the 7th and 8th Werfer
Brigades, which occupied new positions on the reverse slope. The enemy hit
the German attack with concentrated fire and then counterattacked against
Hill 1 12 and Esquay with tanks. The 10th SS Panzer Division blocked the
penetration with its last reserves.
On that evening, Generalfeldmarschalls von Rundstedt and Keitel talked on
71

the telephone. To Keitel's question about what to do if the last counterattack

failed, Rundstedt replied:
"Make peace, you fools!"
On 2 July it remained relatively quiet on Hill 112. The panzergrenadiers on
the edge of the hill dug into the stony chalk ground. On the hilltop itself,
only tank wrecks offered cover. Any digging was answered with immediate
fire and had to be stopped.
On the following day (3 July) the fighting around Hill 112 resumed. The
21st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, supported by organic fire, repulsed the
enemy attack and held the hill. In the evening the British attacked again with
two combat groups against the western and eastern slopes. All hell broke
loose on the hilltop. The 10th SS Panzer Division repulsed the attack with its
last reserves. During the commitment, mortars, rocket launchers and guns
constantly had to change position, as they were continuously located by
British direction finders and fired upon.
A hastily assembled kampfgruppe composed of elements of the 10th and
12th SS Panzer Divisions threw the enemy out of Eterville during a night
attack. The town of Eterville had exchanged hands several times during the
previous day. During the following night, the "Forest of the Half Trees" on
the eastern slope of Hill 112 was cleared of enemy forces.
Then it was relatively quiet on the hill until 8 July, when a new directive
from Hitler for the conduct of combat in the west was issued:
... Since a second landing in the 15th Army area of operations and on the
French Mediterranean coast is probable, our emphasis will be on preventing the enemy from penetrating into the open area of France, under
all circumstances. I order the present beachheads be held at their present
limit, the majority of the mobile formations replaced by infantry divisions and the preparation of an operation with the limited objective of
penetrating the beachhead...
Hitler had neither approved the OB West proposal to withdraw nor suspended the plan of launching an armored attack to destroy the enemy.
In order to defend against the anticipated major British attack against Caen,
the 9th SS Panzer Division was relieved by the 277th Infantry Division,
which was newly created, had no combat experience and had neither panzers
nor heavy anti-tank weapons.
On the evening of 7 July, 400 heavy bombers dropped over 2000 tons of
bombs on Caen. Within 40 minutes the city was turned into a pile of rubble
72

that no vehicle could pass through. The actual attack - Operation Charnwood
- followed on 8 July. On 9 July OB West ordered the evacuation of the ruins
of Caen in order to occupy a new defensive position south of the city. The
British also captured Eterville and Louvigny and a crisis developed east of
Hill 112.
On 10 July the British launched a massive attack on a wide front against the
key terrain around Hill 112. At 0500 hours the ground shook under a massive barrage fire that was conducted against the German defensive area. The
British infantry followed immediately - some mounted on carriers - and was
accompanied by many tanks. They attacked from Verson and Baron against
the northern slope of the hill. In the cover of a thick fog, harassed only by
several rocket salvos, the British first wave achieved a wide penetration
between Eterville and Hill 112.
Soon twenty-five enemy tanks reached the knoll. Then Oberfeldwebel
Borrekott and his three Pz IVs (5th Company, 10th SS Panzer Regiment)
opened fire. Both he and his crew were killed but, in the meantime, his panzer battalion (II Battalion, 10th SS Panzer Regiment) was able to throw the
English from the hilltop. Hill 112 remained in German hands. Further to the
right, the Tigers of the 102nd Heavy SS Panzer Battalion restored the situation and recaptured the "Forest of Half Trees." The fiercely contested Maltot
was evacuated during the night because of the massive enemy fire.
During the night before 11 July the English returned to the knoll and the
forests. While the 9th SS Panzer Division, which was relieved by the
infantry, prepared for an attack on Maltot and Eterville, its sister division
(10th "Frundsberg"), supported by the 102nd Tiger Battalion, fought around
Maltot, Eterville and Fontaine. It was impossible to relieve the panzer division with infantry.
During the next few days, the heavy fighting around Hill 112 continued day
and night under artificial combat area illumination. The backbone of the
resistance were the Tigers from the 102nd Panzer Battalion, which were able
to hold their positions by exploiting the terrain, utilizing their great firepower and heavy armor, with the support of panzergrenadiers of the 10th SS
Panzer Division. Panzergruppe West (General der Panzertruppen Eberbach)
expected a new British large-scale attack to the east, probably in conjunction
with the expected landing in the 15th Army area of operations.
On 18 July, a hot summer day with isolated thunder storms, Field Marshal
Montgomery began the major attack ("Goodwood") of the 2nd British Army,
in order to pin the German panzer divisions and gain ground to the east. With
the unheard of carpet bombing by 1700 bombers and 400 fighter-bombers, as
73

well as the fire from 720 artillery pieces, supported by naval gun fire, the
British army attacked with three armored divisions and the II Canadian
Corps launched their attack against the well-fortified German positions. Only
the usual artillery fire and local attacks were evident on Hill 112. The outpost Tiger was able to destroy three enemy tanks and one anti-tank gun.
Hitler's directive ordering the relief of the panzer divisions by infantry divisions was disrupted by "Goodwood". East of the Orne, the 1st SS Panzer
Division was relieved by the 272nd Infantry Division, whose left flank was
located near St. Martin. The 10th SS Panzer Division was adjacent. Its eastern sector was taken over by the 271st Infantry Division on 18 July. Then
came the 277th Infantry Division, closing west of the line Hill 114 - Baron.
Fortunately, the cloudy weather lasted until 21 July, hampering large-scale
combat operations, so that the grenadiers were able to get settled in their
positions. Although the British actually did not stop attacking, penetrations
were quickly straightened out with the help of the 102nd SS Panzer
Battalion. Artillery was fired in support of the neighboring units struggling
east of the Orne.
The major British attack, which commenced with such great optimism, was
stopped after the enemy lost 4000 soldiers and 500 tanks - 36 percent of all
of the British tanks in France. This German defensive success would not
have been possible without the bulwark of Hill 112 securing the flank. Once
again, the British were denied access to the open terrain of France.
On 26 July, when the American Operation "Cobra" was able to break the
German ring of encirclement around the Avranches beachhead, the first
phase of the Allied operations plan was achieved. The occupation of the hills
south of Caen lost its significance. Although Hitler still, on 30 July, demanded, "the holding of the enemy on the coast and the inflicting of heavy casualties on him, in order to exhaust the enemy and ultimately defeat him!" it was
the Allies who kept the initiative.
On 2 August, the majority of the German panzer divisions, including II SS
Panzer Corps, were transferred to the west, in order to prepare for a counterattack to the coast south of Avranches. Also, the 2nd British Army had time
to pause for breath in preparation for the coming operations. During the
night from 3 to 4 August, unhindered by the enemy, the 271st and 277th
Infantry Divisions withdrew from Hill 112. The battle, which had been so
costly for both sides, came to an end!

74

Reflections

The question arises as to what was the strategic sense of the static defence
of Hill 112 by II SS Panzer Corps, with its consequent bloody sacrifices and
the subsequent lessons that could be learned..
1. Undoubtedly, it was clear to all soldiers in the west, at the end of June
1944, that the Allies "had succeeded in penetrating the German defenses and
consequences of staggering proportions would follow ..." (Directive No. 51)
and that, in Hitler's own words, the war would be lost. The Allied foothold
in France and their air superiority were secured, a German breakthrough to
the coast was no longer possible, the commanders of the German armies
considered a withdrawal with a return to a "flexible response, that would at
least regain a portion of the initiative" (General Geyr von Schweppenburg).
At that point in time, such a withdrawal would, indeed, have demanded
much sacrifice. However, it most likely would have been considerably less
costly than the later gutting of the German forces. The relative strengths of
the German divisions were favorable. The effects of air attacks and artillery
fire would have been diminished in the open terrain. German fighting principles and combat experience in mobile warfare could have been fruitfully
employed against a delaying enemy.
2. Also, if there was a German withdrawal, a rapid British breakthrough to
the Orne and, therefore, into the heart of France, would have to be prevented,
and Hill 112 would have had to be held until the areas further to the west
were evacuated. The German withdrawal route to Paris had to be kept open.
Field Marshal Montgomery would have undoubtedly exploited such a breakthrough, even if the Allied operations plan had not provided for it. Operation
"Goodwood," which was so costly for the British, and Operation "Cobra,"
which led to the American breakthrough, would not have occurred. The war
in the west would have taken another course. The successful defense of Hill
112 and the massing of German forces near Caen were essential until the
withdrawal began.
3. Key terrain, such as Hill 112, even with today's effective weapons,
remains decisive for combat. Even with the enemy's air dominance and manifold superiority, it can be held if the commanders and forces fight decisively
and steadfastly, reinforcing the terrain by obstacles and are screened by air
interdiction and their artillery.
4. Many critics have correctly found fault with the use of the panzer divisions for a static defense instead of infantry divisions. It must not, however,
be forgotten that the unarmored German infantry divisions, which were
equipped only with horses and man-power and lacked sufficient anti-tank
75

and anti-air defenses, were not up to the massed enemy fire from the ground,
the sea and the air. The infantry could never have withstood an attack at that
time without the support of panzers, panzerjgers and artillery. Wherever
they were able to stand for any time was due only to British fighting methods
and equipment.
British fighting principles were too rigid and systematic. They allowed the
junior commanders too little initiative. Cooperation of the all-arms-team left
much to be desired. The shortage of armored transports and combat vehicles
for the infantry and artillery observers led to heavy losses from enemy fire
and very high casualties during attacks. The British tanks were either tied to
the tempo of the infantry attacking on foot, or were separated from them.
They suffered corresponding losses and, in spite of the bravery of their
crews, achieved relatively minor successes in relation to their numbers.
5. In contrast to the British, the Germans were forced to conserve their
forces. In the German panzer divisions, one learned early how to fight the
all-arms-battle even in small kampfgruppen (battle groups/teams), in order to
be prepared for all events and round the clock.
6. German artillery was too weak. Only the German werfer brigades were
able to match the superior British fire-power. These carpet fire weapons,
nicknamed "moaning minnies" by the Allies, proved to be particularly effective against unarmored British targets and were, therefore, feared. Some
reports attributed 75 percent of infantry losses to the nebelwerfer.
7. The British were masters at using artificial smoke for the attack and the
defense, in order to avoid observation and the effects of long-range enemy
weapons. This is also significant today.
8. The British seldom succeeded in detecting the positions of German
panzers prior to an attack. Single outpost panzers were often sufficient in
alerting the companies located under cover further to the rear. Thus, time for
vehicle maintenance and crew rest was available.
9. Electronic intelligence often revealed British intentions and respective
warnings could be issued within a short period of time. Thus, surprise and
losses could be avoided.
10. The successful defense of Hill 112 by a few Tiger tanks fighting as
tank destroyers proved that fire-power and protection was as important as
mobility and numbers.
11. Above all stood the bravery and devotion to duty of the defenders.
Whether in such a hard battle the conviction alone is sufficient that the current democratic state is worth defending? Hopefully, this will never again
have to be proven. Logic and conviction disappear quickly under the influ76

ence of fire and stress. Without the soldierly virtues of the German soldier,
the war would have turned out otherwise.

8. The Fighting Around May-sur-Orne on 25 July 1944

South of Caen, east of the Orne, the terrain rose in several stages to the
south. South of the St. Martin - St. Andre-sur-Orne depression the ridges of
Verrieres stretched to May-sur-Orne, the scene of the bitterest Canadian
fighting on 25 July 1944. Colonel Stacey in his Official History of the
Canadian Army, The Victory Campaign, states:
"Three miles or so south of CAEN the present-day tourist, driving
down the arrow-straight road that leads to FALAISE, sees immediately
to his right a rounded hill crowned by farm buildings. If the traveller be
Canadian, he would do well to stay the wheels at this point and cast his

Diagram 11: Fighting Around May-sur-Orne.

77

mind back to the events of 1944; for this apparently insignificant eminence is the VERRIERES RIDGE. Well may the wheat and sugar-beet
grow green and lush upon its gentle slopes, for in that now half-forgotten
summer the best blood of Canada was freely poured out upon them.
The ridge is kidney-shaped, with one end close to the road just north
of the farm hamlet from which it takes its name, and the other descending towards the ORNE above the village of MAY. It is an important tactical position, rising as it does to a height of 88 metres and dominating the
lower ground to the north."
The major attack by the 2nd British Army - Operation "Goodwood" which was conducted on 18 July to pin the German armored forces and
expand the Allied beachhead to the Cintheaux high ground, failed with both
sides suffering heavy casualties. After additional see-saw combat, I SS
Panzer Corps had to withdraw its main combat line on 23 July to a line
Bourguebus-Troteval Farm-Beauvoir-reverse slope of Hill 64 (north of St.
Martin)-St. Andre (center)-Orne railroad crossing. This sector was supposed
to be held by the Niedersachsen 272nd Infantry Division, which arrived from
southern France on 16 July. However, the insufficiently trained and equipped
troops, in spite of a combat experienced cadre, suffered heavy casualties.
Two of its six infantry battalions were left with only remnants and the others
were also battered. Therefore, its sector was reduced to a line BeauvoirOrne. On 25 July a battle group from the 2nd Panzer Division (Major Sterz)
was subordinated to the infantry division as combat reserve. Contact with the
battalion had to be made through the corps chief of staff, because the
infantry had no radio equipment that would allow it to communicate with the
panzer formation.
The division committed the 981st Grenadier Regiment (right), 982nd
Grenadier Regiment (left) and remnants of the 980th Grenadier Regiment
around Fontenay-le-Marmion with the artillery. Battle Group Sterz was committed near Laize-la-Ville. The division command post was located at
Fresnay-le-Puceux. The light platoon from the 3rd Panzer Regiment (four PZ
IVs), Leutnant Prien, was located in May in support of the 982nd Grenadier
Regiment. The Bourguebus-Troteval Farm sector was taken over by the 1st
SS Panzer Division. I SS Panzer Corps reserve consisted of the 9th SS
Panzer Division, 116th Panzer Division and 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion.
The weather improvement on 24 July hinted that the anticipated major
enemy attack was at hand.
On 25 July II (Canadian) Corps was ordered to conduct an attack Operation Spring - in order to capture the terrain up to Cintheaux and pin
the German panzer forces. The corps leadership and troops had little combat
78

experience. The 2nd (Canadian) Division was to attack with the 4th and 5th
Infantry Brigades, one behind the other, west of National Road N 158 to
Falaise under the protection of overpowering fire support from artillery and
tactical air. The attack was to be conducted in three phases: after the preliminary attack to clear the starting line (St. Andre-Hubert-Folie road) with the
6th (Canadian) Brigade at midnight, under "artificial moonlight" - a searchlight platoon shining its lights against the clouds - the 2nd (Canadian)
Division was to capture:
a. capture the line May-sur-Orne-Verrires-Tilly-la-Campagne;
b. capture the line Fontenay-le-Marmion-Rocquancourt (=Verrieres
R) followed by that of Point 122 (supported by tanks) and;
c. exploit as ordered by 2nd Canadian Corps, supported by 22nd
Armored Brigade, and seize Cramesnil Spur (Cintheaux).
During the preliminary attack a company of the Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
(Major Dextraze) threw the 1st Company, 1st SS Reconnaissance Battalion,
the 1st SS Panzer Division's outposts, out of Troteval Farm before midnight.
The farmstead exchanged hands hours later, until the Hamilton Light
Infantry was able to capture Verrieres by storm, behind a powerful wall of
fire.
The continuation of the attack against Rocquancourt by the Royal
Regiment of Canada, with the support of the British 1st Royal Tank
Regiment, failed in the morning with heavy losses inflicted by fire from the
1st SS Panzer Division. C Squadron, 1st R.T.R. lost eight tanks here, in spite
of help from Typhoon fighter-bombers.
Much more difficult was the nighttime house-to-house fighting conducted
by the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, supported by tanks, against the
well-established and bravely defending grenadiers of the 981st Grenadier
Regiment in St, Martin and the 982nd Grenadier regiment in St. Andre. It is
alleged that the defenders skillfully used a labyrinth of underground tunnels
of the coal mines for movement and sudden appearance. Reports that flanking fire from the east of the Orne disturbed the attackers appeared unreliable.
After midnight, in spite of nests of resistance holding out in St. Martin, a
"partial" occupation of the departure line was reported. The complete occupation of the line was reported at 0330 hours, even though there was still
resistance and the attackers were disorganized and confused.
Nevertheless, the Calgary Highlanders attacked May, as ordered, at 0330
hours in the "artificial moonlight" of St. Andre. The grenadiers of the 982nd
Grenadier Regiment prepared a hot welcome for them, as the artificial light
favored the defenders in the village rather than the attackers.
79

Lt. Prien, the light tank troop commander of 3rd Panzer Regt. at May that
night stated:
"I myself with tanks was hidden among deserted houses at MAY, concealed by twigs and hay in a flanking position to the expected ground
attack. On 25 July the infantry alerted me with the news that strong
infantry elements had been observed north of the village, apparently
preparing for attack. The sky was bathed in sallow light, caused by artificial moonlight. It was frightening, but sufficient to illuminate the ground
in front of us. I was however unable before dawn to engage the enemy
with my tanks, as targets could not be pin-pointed by the gunners. At
dawn small enemy elements infiltrated into MAY. Obviously fighting at
ST. ANDRE was still going on ..."
As reported twice during the morning, elements of the Calgary Highlanders
penetrated into the northern outskirts of May but were pushed back on each
occasion to St. Andre with heavy casualties. Their battalion commander,
who was well back, did not have a clear picture of what his companies were
doing because of bad wireless links and lost control. He was unable to exercise effective command or to report the correct situation. Hence without any
adverse reports the Commander of 5th Infantry Brigade assumed that May
had been captured after the noises of battle from that area petered out. He
therefore committed the Black Watch to Phase 2, the capture of Fontenay-leMarmion. Had the Calgaries fallen back to St. Andre using the cover of the
Orne valley without any means of reporting their move?
The Black Watch was marched into the assigned St. Martin assembly area
at 0330 hours in order to attack at 0530 hours. However, much time was lost.
While it was still dark, costly house-to-house fighting erupted. The battalion
commander and his deputy were mortally wounded by machine-gun fire.
After 0500 hours a company commander, Major Griffin, took command of
the battalion. In order to conduct combat reconnaissance toward May and
arrange a new fire plan with the artillery, he first withdrew the battalion out
from under the fire to St. Andre. The officer of the reconnaissance element
sent to May reported they had to operate, for the most part, on foot. They
were unable to find either the Calgaries or the Germans, except for machineguns. Now the brigade commander urged Major Griffin to hurry.
The attack was ordered for 0930 hours. His messenger platoon leader was
ordered to take a couple of soldiers and eliminate the "only" German
machine-gun in May. Apparently, the artillery could only fire on pre-planned
targets, not by observation. Shortly before the attack the irritated brigade
commander appeared at Major Griffin's command post. In order to gain
time, the Black Watch was not to attack Fontenay through May, as first
ordered, but to bypass the town and climb the ridge after crossing open ter80

rain. Apparently, these changes were never made known to the armored company commander, who arrived later. Meanwhile, his tanks, without accompanying infantry, ran into an ambush in May, set up by Leutnant Prien's Pz IVs
and the panzerjgers of the 272nd Infantry Division. They waited until they
"saw the whites of their eyes" and then opened fire, destroying a total of six
tanks.
Meanwhile Major Sterz, the kampfgruppe commander of 2nd Panzer
Division had received orders to counterattack. Now he was advancing with
his AFV from Laize via May to St. Martin. Lt. Prien again:
"Meanwhile it had cleared up and we noticed that from the ST. MARTIN
area a body of infantry of considerable strength - I assume about 300 to
400 men - advanced south. This was most impressive and perplexing.
The soldiers were marching upright holding their rifles across their
breast in readiness, as if on the drill square. Despite the strong fire
immediately initiated on them from MAY and the south scarcely anybody looked for cover. It looked like waves of men rolling steadily forward - no sign of panic despite their visible losses. They did not get
forced into cover but kept on marching upright.
To us, soldiers with four or five years experience, this was a most unreal
sight. I still know exactly that after the first rounds from our 75mm guns
had left, we actually got scruples about firing upon these Canadians
lacking cover and defence weapons. It was, I repeat, an unreal sight but
thus is war.
After a short while Kampfgruppe Sterz appeared with Panther tanks,
tank destroyers and APCs. The attack of the Canadians faded out before
the ridge as actually there was nobody left left to attack. It had been you'd almost have to call it - sheer butchery. Until this moment the
enemy artillery had fired three to four km to our rear."
Leutnant Prien
It seems Major Griffin had put aside his objections. He ordered his battalion to deploy two companies abreast, the other two behind. They attacked
across the field. The defensive fire hindered their advance, so that the creeping barrage sped way ahead. Leutnant Kohler, the adjutant of the I Battalion,
272nd Artillery Regiment in the vicinity of the Laize bridge, was impressed
by the fire. Nevertheless Major Griffin continued the attack to his death. His
radio set was put out of commission from the very start, and without artillery
observers he was unable to either report or request fire support.
Only 15 men from the brave Black Watch returned to St. Andre, approxi81

mately 100 were captured by the Germans. The rest, more than 200 men,
were either killed or severely wounded. It is hard to understand the brigade
commander's inability to avert his battalion's fate. When the Canadian
artillery finally fired smoke and conducted destructive fire against May and
Battle Group Sterz, it was too late.
This attack by the Black Watch resembled the assault of the Prussian
Guards Corps against St. Privat on 18 August 1870. It was conducted over
rising, open terrain, without artillery support, against strong French positions. One can read about it in Generalfeldmarschall Graf Schlieffen's
"Cannae Study." History repeated itself. In both cases the failure of leadership caused the losses, but the incomparable bravery won the respect of the
world.
The counterattack of Kampfgruppe Sterz stalled south of St. Martin in concentrated defensive fire from artillery pieces of all calibers and from the air.
German fire, however, also ended the attempt by Le Regiment de
Maisonneuve to occupy May that evening.
At midday Panzergruppe West reported: enemy forces, which have captured St. Martin and are turning to the east, north of the town in an advance
on May, were pinned in the flanks by German counterattack and an encircled
battalion headquarters was freed on Hill 88.
At 1700 hours elements of the 9th SS Panzer Division launched a counterattack on either side of the Bretteville-Fontenay road. The attack first stalled
in front of a strong enemy anti-tank front, but was continued after regrouping. After being relieved by the 9th SS Panzer Division, Battle Group Sterz
was directed to rejoin its 2nd Panzer Division. In the evening Panzergruppe
West reported to the commander of Army Group B:
... May was captured during a counterattack by elements of the 272nd
Infantry Division and contact with the old main line of resistance on the
Orne, southeast of St. Martin, was reestablished. The attack gained ground
further to the north and reached Mine, directly south of St. Martin, at 2100
hours. ...
The 272nd Infantry Division was mentioned in the Wehrmacht Report. Its
remnants were relieved on 26 July. The Canadians suspended their attack on
26 July. The occupation of Verrieres, along with the surrounding hills, was
an important tactical success. Operation Spring ended with the loss of 1500
men, 450 of them killed, the most costly day for the Canadian Army during
World War Two, with the exception of Dieppe!

82

Organization of the 2nd Canadian Division on 25 July 1944

Major General Foulkes
8th Reconnaissance Regiment (14th Canadian Hussars)
4th Brigade
The Essex Scottish Regiment
The Royal Regiment of Canada
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
1st Royal Tank Regiment
5th Brigade
The Calgary Highlanders
The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada
Le Regiment de Maisonneuve
6th Brigade (Reserve)
Le Fusiliers Mont-Royal
The South Saskatchewan Regiment
The Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG)
The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders
In addition there were also division troops, similar to a German infantry
division.
Corps troops: 2nd (Canadian), 3rd and 8th (British) Army Groups R.A,;
25th Field and 19th Field Army Artillery Regiments, R.A.

Organization of the 272nd Infantry Division on 25 July 1944

Generalleutnant Schack
982nd Grenadier Regiment
Oberstleutnant Roesener
I Battalion
II Battalion (remnants)
981st Grenadier Regiment
83

Major Bodsch
I Battalion (remnants)
II Battalion
980th Grenadier Regiment
Oberst Burian
I Battalion (remnants)
II Battalion (remnants)
272nd Panzerjger Company (twelve 75 mm anti-tank guns (motorized))
272nd Artillery Regiment
I Battalion
II Battalion
III Battalion
Usual division troops
Attachments: Battle Group Sterz (from the 2nd Panzer Division),
Organization: 38th Panzerjger Battalion (self-propelled) (75 mm
Jagdpanzer IVs); I Battalion, 304th Panzergrenadier Regiment (armored), I
Battalion, 3rd Panzer Regiment (12 to 15 panzers) and the light platoon from
the 3rd Panzer Regiment (four Pz IVs)

84

III
NORMANDY - THE AMERICAN SECTOR
9. Defense West of St. Lo
Costly Counterattack
After the Allies, with their overpowering material superiority in the air, on
the sea and on the ground, forced the weak German forces in Normandy
onto the defensive, the emphasis of the fighting in June lay in the British
area of operations. The route to the open terrain leading to Paris led from
Caen. Near Caen eight of the available German panzer divisions (1st SS,
2nd SS, 9th SS, 10th SS, 12th SS, 2nd, 21st and Panzer Lehr Divisions)
were robbed of their strength and mobility in the unsuitable terrain, pinned
and subjected to constant fire of such ferocity that they were systematically
worn down, thanks to Hitler's irresponsible order to hold.
Indeed, the German forces were able to inflict losses of over 110,000 men
onto their enemies. However, they could not prevent the Allies from deploying 1,600,000 men and masses of equipment onto the beachheads. On the
other hand, the German personnel losses were only partially replaced, and
materiel not at all.
On 26 June, on the western side of the beachhead, the Americans captured
the fortress of Cherbourg and then began to systematically wear down the
thin German defensive front at the foot of the Cotentin peninsula with
freed-up and newly deployed divisions. On 7 July the 30th (US) Division
crossed the weakly defended Vire-Taute canal, formed a bridgehead near St.
Jean-de-Daye and advanced from there between Taute and Vire further to
the south, in order to capture St. Lo and the area to the west up to St. Gilles
as a departure area for a breakout. The Germans immediately recognized
the threat posed to the important communications hub of St. Lo, but the
thought of a breakout from the beachhead through the difficult bocage terrain was not considered.
In light of the threat, the immediate German countermeasures consisted of
deploying panzer forces - led by Battle Group Wisliceny of the 2nd SS
Panzer Division, then the Panzer Lehr Division - for a counterattack to
eliminate the bridgehead.
Since 26 June the Panzer Lehr Division was being relieved platoon by platoon by the 276th Infantry Division, except for the Panzer IV Battalion, and
transferred into the area around Aunay as army group reserve, but it
received little rest as a result to the constant harassment from the air. By 30
85

June 3,407 men, 50 panzers, 82 schtzenpanzers and over 200 wheeled

vehicles had been lost. The personnel losses were only half covered by
inexperienced replacements, and to make matters worse, no major equipment items were replaced.
The order for the hasty transfer into the area northwest of St. Lo, hidden
from enemy air and radio reconnaissance, reached the Panzer Lehr Division

U.S. Positions 11:00 hrs.

Counterattack

Diagram 12

Panzer Lehr Division Counterattack on I I July.

86

on the evening of 7 July. The units were immediately sent forward on two
roads, but only the 130th ALA and the subordinate panzerjger company
reached the assigned line, Hebecrevon-Lozon, by the next morning. They
were to reconnoiter and determine the location of enemy and friendly units,
and to secure the deployment of the division. It was an impossible mission
under the circumstances, in the unsurveyable bocage terrain, which no one
from the hastily assembled elements had any familiarity with. They were
also poorly armed and lacked combat experience. The mission was also
complicated by the air situation.
Although the Americans were unaware of the arrival of the Panzer Lehr
Division until 10 July, bombing attacks on the deployment routes and road
sections destroyed by large bomb craters delayed the departure of the 902nd
Pzgdr. Lehr Rgt. until the 8th at 2230 hours. It had to march on two roads,
instead of the one northern route it was assigned. "The vehicles had to stop
constantly during this difficult night march, in order to detour around bomb
craters," remembered the commander of the 7th Company, 902nd Rgt.,
Leutnant Graf. "Only the bad weather made it possible to occupy positions
near Pont Hebert, which was under heavy artillery fire, by 9 July at 1900
hours."
LXXXIV Army Corps, commanded by General von Choltitz, who came
fresh from the Eastern Front replacing the mortally wounded General
Marcks, ordered the attack of the Panzer Lehr Division, which was now
subordinate to the corps, to restore the old main combat line on the Vire
canal on 9 July. On General Bayerlein's urging, the attack was postponed
for forty-eight hours. Nevertheless, the available elements of the 2nd SS
Panzer and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Divisions attacked on the 9th as
they had lost contact with the corps.
After alleged initial success, which had put the enemy to flight, the attackers had to return to their departure positions. After reconnoitering the terrain, General Bayerlein is said to have urged the corps commander to withdraw the order for the senseless attack of his exhausted division in this terrain without effective reconnaissance and support. His concerns fell on deaf
ears, as did those of the Canadian General (Maj. Gen. Roberts) at Dieppe
two years previously.
The attack terrain, which was reconnoitered only by the existing poor
maps and hearsay, not by air reconnaissance or air photos, consisted of, in
the south, bocage terrain, as near Tilly. Further to the north it reflected
"wide, flat, areas broken by many narrow water courses and ponds." It was
also very marshy and impassible to vehicles of all types. In the division
attack sector, only the sandy hills on either side of the St. Jean-de87

Daye-Pont Hebert road were passible by tanks. Then there was the narrow
dam across the Le Desert, if one dared to use it.
On the evening of 10 July Panzer Lehr took command on the sector
between Vire and Taute with its exhausted and weak troops. Included was a
21 cm howitzer battalion that, because of the shortage of ammunition, could
only fire preplanned missions. The three organic artillery battalions and the
heavy infantry weapons of the panzergrenadiers were not much better off.
Where were their targets? Where should they fire? In the interests of surprise and the air situation, which excluded a daytime attack in flying weather, the attack was shifted to the nighttime, when even the American artillery
pieces would be blind. However, no sooner would it get light, when their
eyes, the artillery observer flights, were already in the air.
The attack against the Vire canal, which was launched by four assault
groups on 11 July at 0145 hours, surprised the Americans for only a short
time. In light of their superior forces and the narrow terrain, it was easy for
them to effectively block the few positions and then continue their attack, as
planned, from these bases to the south. They fought in the same manner that
they had learned in France in 1918.
II Battalion of the 902nd Pzgdr. Lehr Rgt. did not attack near Hauts Vents
(Hill 91) until 0400 hours, because the individual companies could not be
relieved fast enough from the heavy defensive fighting of the day before and
reorganized for an attack. Leutnant Graf, the commander of the 7th
Company, remembered:
The panzer advance was only possible on the road, because the fields
had become too marshy from the heavy rainfall of the past few weeks.
No sooner had the panzers driven off, with a flame-thrower panzer in
the lead, followed by the rest of the panzers, my 7th Company to the
left of the road, then we had to attack. The infantry worked their way
through the underbrush from one hedge to the next ... After advancing
about 1000 meters, we ran into the main American attack. The forward
panzers were hit, these were the flame-thrower and a few Panzer IVs. I
lay behind some bushes, when the panzer next to me suffered a direct
hit. The flash of the detonation momentarily illuminated my surroundings and forced us to take cover.
Battalion Philipps (I Bn., 901st Rgt.) advanced farthest, attacking from Le
Hommet toward St. Jean. It surprised American artillery positions, severed
wire communications, overran the 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment
(9th US Division) command post in Le Desert, caused considerable confusion and captured many prisoners. Then the two lead Panthers (1st Co., 6th
Panzer Rgt.) were destroyed on the dam. When the last Panther was also hit,
88

the rest were blocked. There was raging defensive fire everywhere. The
unsuitable terrain did not allow the separated assault groups to provide
mutual flanking fires. At 1100 hours XIX (US) Corps launched a counterattack with two full infantry divisions (30th and 9th) each reinforced by a
combat command from the 3rd Armored Division. The advance was irresistible, particularly when supported by the strong artillery of two corps, as
well as by numerous fighter-bombers.
Only three of the four assault groups were able to return to the departure
positions, after suffering heavy losses in men and equipment. The reinforced I Bn, 901st Rgt, which was cut off near Le Desert, was completely
destroyed, a total strength of 214 men, 35 machine-guns and ten Panthers.
The total loss was later estimated by General Bayerlein at 500 to 700 men,
but it was probably higher, because 344 wounded alone were treated at the
main first aid station on that day. Besides the ten Panthers, eight Panzer IVs
with a portion of their crews, including two officers, Leutnant Peter and
Leutnant Sthr, as well as the 902nd Flammpanzer Platoon and its commander, were lost; a good portion of the division's combat strength.
The attack, which was accompanied by so much momentum and bravery
and with such hope, failed due to the lack of reconnaissance and the marked
disparity between the opposite forces, both on the ground and in the air.
Although causing no more than four weak stings to stir up a hornets' nest,
it had determined the relative strengths of both opponents.

Tenacious Fighting in the Bocage

With the arrival of the Division Order for going over to the defense on 11
July began a 14 day battle of attrition, which exceeded the ferocity of the
fighting near Tilly. Similarly to Tilly, the German forces here also lacked
any operational reserves to relieve the panzer division, which was ill-suited
for fighting in the hedgerows that favoured the infantry.
The division sector stretched from the bank of the Vire near Pont Hebert
through Hauts Vents up to Hommet and was split by the Terrette stream.
Between the Vire and Terrette stretched a ridge whose highest point (Point
91) was near Hauts Vents and whose flanks were visible from the far side of
the water courses. Otherwise, the combat area was covered with thick
bocage hedgerows, which limited visibility and movement, especially that
of the panzers.
The sector was defended on the right, up to the Terrette, by Kampfgruppe
902; Kampfgruppe 901 was on the left. The right flank east of the Vire was
89

held by the 352nd Infantry Division, on the left was the 17th SS
Panzergrenadier Division "Gtz von Berlichingen".
Opposite the division in the right sector lay the 30th (US) Division, reinforced by Combat Command B from the 3rd Armored Division, which
came under XIX (US) Corps until 5 July. The 9th (US) Division attacked on
the left sector, with Combat Command A from the 3rd (US) Armored
Division, under VII (US) Corps. Again Panzer Lehr had to fight against
almost three fresh divisions that were supported by strong artillery from two
American corps. The 11th of July, and the weight of the American attack on
the following day, cost the Division heavy casualties, especially among the
panzergrenadiers, as the artillery fire continued with unabated intensity. The
corps could not ignore Generalleutnant Bayerlein's request for reinforcements.

Front Line on 12 July

Front Line on 15 July
Front Line on 18 July

Diagram 13:
Defense near St. Lo.
90

On the evening of 11 July the 5th Fallschirmjger Division arrived behind

Panzer Lehr. It was just being formed and consisted of good soldiers, but it
proved "to be completely unsuitable for combat, because of the lack of
command and control procedures, (as the officers and NCO's from the
Luftwaffe were untrained in infantry combat techniques)" (von Choltitz).
They were marched on foot out of the Bretagne.
The 14th Fallschirmjger Regiment was subordinated to Panzer Lehr. Its
battalions were supposed to give more depth to the battle area and get used
to combat, but immediately became involved in major fighting. Soon the situation forced them into the front lines. The enemy pressure also complicated the attempt by the corps commander to reorder the formations. On 13
July the troops of II Fallschirmjger Corps - 12th Reconnaissance Battalion
and elements of the 30th Mobile Brigade - as well as elements of the 17th
SS Panzergrenadier Division, were returned to their parent formations.
Battle Groups Heintz and Wisliceny remained with Panzer Lehr, the latter
until 20 July.
On the evening of 11 July the enemy (CCB-3) was able to capture Point
91. This feature dominated the road to Pont Hebert and prevented the
Germans from viewing the adjacent enemy terrain. A counterattack on the
evening of 11 July by Kampfgruppe 902 was physically impossible; they
had come to the defense in an already critical situation.
During the next few days, the enemy pressure continued. It was particularly strong against Kampfgruppe Welsch (902nd). There, the 30th US
Division fought its way to the south with the support of tanks from the 3rd
Armored Division. The Germans failed to recognize the American intentions. When the Pont Hebert bridge fell into American hands and, on 16
July, the 3rd Armored Division was withdrawn from the front, the Germans
had the impression that the American main attack was geared to capture St.
Lo. So, it was no surprise when the main effort of the American attack was
shifted to the Battle Group Scholze (901st) sector. There, the 9th (US)
Division advanced the front parallel to 30th Division.
At that time the main German combat line consisted of a row of strong
points. Each strong point consisted of two or three panzers or panzerjgers.
The panzergrenadiers entrenched around them in order to survive the constant artillery and mortar fire. The well-camouflaged tanks could not move
or even start their engines, otherwise they would have been discovered by
the enemy. The panzer crews were relieved every four days, and every relief
would unleash an enemy barrage that inflicted losses on the panzergrenadiers. During the time they were committed, the panzer crews had to
remain in their seats without being able to stretch or open their hatches,
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because of the camouflage and attraction of enemy fire.

Behind these strong points stood mobile reserves. The Americans considered the commitment of these panzers to be the main German threat.
How strongly the weeks of constant threat, combat, loss of sleep and stress
wore down the combat spirit and the defensive strength of the soldiers can
be shown from the following report by Gefreiter Goller, a radio operator in
Panzer 735:
We were ordered to change position, but our Panzer IV broke down.
Our final drive gear had broken, an old weakness of this tank.
Unteroffizier Klocke towed us back on the road and I was ordered to go
to the battalion command post on foot, in order to report the damage.
American artillery fire fell upon us, presumably directed by aircraft.
How fast the men could suddenly run! We were blocked by a herd of
cattle. Then we jumped onto a passing vehicle, which pushed the cows
to the side, slowly, but surely. Then the vehicle was given the gas! We
did not find the command post. In the afternoon, after failing to achieve
my mission, I left to return to my panzer.
On the way I had to flee the strong artillery fire by going to a first aid
station. The station was not being fired upon. It didn't take long before I
was roused from the station. On the way to my panzer, I caught up with
a Gefreiter from the 7th Company. He said he was waiting for his tank
in a ravine. After going a hundred meters, I fled from a barrage into a
farmhouse. After the firing stopped, I looked for the Gefreiter. I didn't
find him where he had been waiting. I found only fresh craters. Later I
met Leutnant von Landsberg. During the following night a prime mover
towed our panzer. At the end of July I learned the Gefreiter had shot
himself in the foot with a pistol and I had to be a witness at his courtmartial, in order to testify whether his wounds were received from the
enemy. But I couldn't testify for sure.
The last ounce of strength was demanded from each and every fighter.
Nevertheless, the German soldier felt superior to the American G.I. This
belief spurred them to ever greater effort. Only in this manner were they
able to establish a mobile attack reserve in each battalion that repulsed
every enemy attack which was supported by tanks, artillery and often fighter- bombers, although with losses and under severe ammunition constraints.
15 July: My command post was located in a small bunker in a gravel pit. At 0430 hours barrage fire suddenly was unleashed onto the company sector. At 0615 hours the enemy attacked. Contact was lost with
the right flank. By 1400 hours we lost contact with the left. Our selfpropelled guns had all they could handle in repulsing the attack. Enemy
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tanks joined in the fray. When we had to evacuate the command post, I
dispatched my Volkswagen command vehicle back through enemy lines
with several lightly wounded and the medic, as well as a red Cross flag.
They were apparently taken captive ... Then I was able to withdraw the
company to a new line 300 meters south of Mesnil-Durand. We reestablished contact with the right flank. A Fallschirmjger company was
inserted as reinforcement ... At 1900 hours we heard American requests
for defection over loudspeakers. My company and I were specifically
mentioned and asked to cross over and surrender, otherwise we would
be placed under barrage fire at 2000 hours. However, it was still quiet at
2000 hours.
16 July: At 1230 hours we counterattacked with four Panzer IVs.
Thirty Fallschirmjgers also participated. They had earlier suffered
heavy casualties during an artillery fire mission. We penetrated into the
American positions and became involved in close combat. Suddenly the
Fallschirmjgers surrendered. An American took aim at me, but a comrade from my company was faster. I saw the American fall, mortally
wounded. Our attack had failed - our tanks guided us back ...
At 1930 hours we launched another counterattack. This time with
eight Panthers. At the very beginning several panzers were hit from the
flanks. The rest fired as they took cover behind a hedge. Again we lay
alone in our positions. Then a very powerful two-hour-long barrage fire
was conducted. No sooner had it grown quiet then the Americans
attacked. The attack collapsed in the fire of our machine-guns and
machine-pistols. I lay in front of a Panther with two men and a
machine-gun. The Panther could no longer fire. As we crawled forward,
we saw the Panther's crew had been killed. They were lying beside their
tank, which showed a lot of AP shot penetrations.
A stabsfeldwebel had a nervous breakdown at the battalion command post. Several soldiers were unable to subdue him. He was sent to
the hospital.
(from the memoirs of Oberleutnant Graf)
On 17 July the Americans were able to capture the hotly contested Pont
Hebert Vire bridge, the key to St. Lo. Later, they were also able to capture
St. Lo, which had endured many carpet bombings. Its ruins blocked the
streets. Because it was in ruins, it was no longer considered a communications hub for upcoming operations.
Because of the disproportion of strength, the loss of terrain was unavoidable in the long run. On 15 July a crisis developed with Battle Group
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Welsch. Elements of Battalion Bhm were cut off. A counterattack prepared

for the next morning collapsed under fire. An element of the young, combat
inexperienced Fallschirmjgers could not fight its way back to friendly
lines. A counterattack launched the next morning failed.
On the night of 17 July the enemy attacked the left flank of Panzer Lehr
after strong artillery preparation. When the attack was repulsed, the 9th
(US) Division expanded its attack to the unit on Panzer Lehr's left flank. At
1600 hours the Americans reached the le Bernardiere intersection and
advanced from there into the deep flank of Battle Group Scholze. Based on
this situation and the shortage of reserves and ammunition, the division
ordered the almost cut off elements to fight their way back to a line Point 83
- Point 63.
In order to facilitate the withdrawal of the fighting elements, it was necessary to commit the last reserves from right to left. Even staffs and headquarters companies were committed in order to relieve the situation. At 1930
hours the Le Mesnil - Dot forest was recaptured.
The fierceness of the fighting affected both sides. During the 14 days of
fighting against Panzer Lehr the 30th (US) Division lost a total of 3,934
men. General Bradley remarked:
At first glance the casualties would seem to imply 25% losses to the
division. This figure was deceptive because three out of four of those
casualties occurred in rifle platoons, the rate of loss in these platoons
exceeded 90%..
The 9th (US) Division suffered similar losses, approximately 2000 in the
time period from 10 to 20 July. The 3rd Armored Division alone lost 53
tanks. American losses were far higher than the German. General Bayerlein
estimated losses from the arrival on 10 July to 24 July at 1200 men - not
including the attached elements. Losses from 11 July humbled this number.
However, if 2,000 men were lost and double that number were treated at the
Panzer Lehr first aid station in July, even this number would not approach
the American losses. That was the strength of the defense. Nevertheless, the
losses suffered by Panzer Lehr were just as bad as those suffered by the
Americans because, at the end of the fifth year of the war, they were irreplaceable.
On 15 July the number of combat tanks had been reduced to between 30 or
40 percent of their strength at the start of the invasion. Replacements did
not arrive. The main causes of the losses were aircraft and enemy tanks,
which had knocked them out and set them afire. It was only thanks to the
untiring commitment and skill of the technical personnel in the maintenance
sections, repair units and repair shop companies - especially in the towing
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platoons - that, in spite of the severity of the fighting and the lack of supply,
so many tanks could still be maintained at the front. The cushion of a full
vehicle consignment at the start had its advantages.
During the fighting the effectiveness of our artillery in the defense against
the American attacks was notable. Further reinforcement by corps artillery
was desirable, because the heavy field artillery battalion (III Battalion,
130th) suffered from a shortage of ammunition for its captured Soviet howitzers. Therefore, the 311th Army Flak Battalion had to "take up positions
so that they could be as effective in the ground fighting as they were against
air targets" (division order from 12 July). In spite of the fierce fighting, the
130th Artillery Regiment still had 66 percent of its guns operational on 21
July:
16- 105 mm
12 - 150 mm (German) or 152 mm (Russian) pieces.
Even worse than the acute ammunition shortage was the fuel situation.
Because of the destroyed Seine bridges, fuel had to be fetched east of Paris.
A column that started out on 13 July had still not returned on 18 July. On 17
July the fuel shortage - in spite of the static front - was so bad that "the little
fuel available was sufficient only to redeploy a mortar battery and several
tanks."
On 18 July the enemy had advanced in the Panzer Lehr sector up to the St.
L-Priers road. On the same day, the enemy penetrated into St. Lo with
armor and infantry. St. Lo was evacuated beforehand. Heavy bombers had
destroyed the city so badly that first bulldozers had to clear the debris and
fill craters in order to open the routes for combat troops. During the next
few days, enemy pressure was relaxed, although the units committed forward were still being subjected to strong artillery fire and local attacks, and
continued to suffer losses. Since the enemy withdrew to his departure positions in the evening, our troops gained new self-confidence, especially since
the weather limited air activity.
The situation allowed Panzer Lehr to free-up Battle Group Wisliceny for
the 2nd SS Panzer Division. The exemplary commitment of its commander
was particularly praised in a division order.
The awarding of the Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross to
Generalleutnant Bayerlein on 20 July indicated a renewed recognition of the
efforts of Panzer Lehr. Because of the pressure of combat, the members of
the division were not fully conscious of the events that took place on 20
July. (The assassination attempt on Hitler)
Because of the lack of infantry divisions, the relief of the exhausted Panzer
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Lehr Division from the front could not even be considered. Battalion Bohm
(II Battalion, 902nd) and the 130th ALA were withdrawn from the front for
several days. Rumors of the upcoming transfer of the division to Caen were
afoot. The Allied desire to convince the Germans that the main attack would
occur further to the east, near Caen, was achieved.

Recollections of July Part I

On the afternoon of 7 July I was summoned to the regimental HQ. The

division was to immediately transfer into the area west of St. Lo, but avoiding contact with the enemy, with the exception of one panzer company - my
6th, Hauptmann Ritschel - which was to support the infantry for a couple of
days. This meant a night march that would take a lot of time, due to the narrow roads and considerable road cratering caused by the bombings. It would
also take much time because we had to march between the panzergrenadiers
and among many wheeled vehicles.
On the third night we reached the new assembly area near Pont Hebert, at
midnight, shortly before the start of the attack. The companies, reinforced
by elements of the 7th Company, 8th (Peter) on the right and 5th (Lex) on
the left, were assigned to the 902nd Rgt. They had to attack practically from
the march, without prior reconnaissance. Because the Bocage terrain, as in
Tilly with its thick hedgerows, allowed for neither wide fields of fire, nor
movement on either side of the few narrow roads, tank commitment was
difficult. Therefore, I had to remain behind.
As feared, the division attack failed completely, with frightful losses.
Leutnant Peter was shot early on. He still directed his tanks with a wounded
leg, but he never returned. Our hope that he was captured by the Americans
was not fulfilled. He now rests in the Marigny military cemetery. Shortly
after that, Leutnant Sthr was also killed by a shell splinter. Repeatedly,
individual tanks had to secure the possible enemy exits and entrances as
bunkers or panzerjgers, in order to back up the shrinking groups of
infantry that were being destroyed by the withering artillery and mortar fire,
if the front was to be held. With the dwindling numbers of the panzergrenadiers and grenadiers, the tanks had to be committed for longer periods
of time. Any sound made by a tracked vehicle would be picked up by the
Americans and the following artillery barrages inflicted further losses on
the infantry. My crews suffered greatly from the inability to move, with
swollen limbs and shattered nerves.
On 15 July another officer, Leutnant Sander, was mortally wounded by
artillery fire during the redeployment of my command post. He was the fif96

teenth officer we lost, including those from illness or wounds, in the battalion since the start of the invasion. Of the old Leutnants we left Fallingbostel
with, there remained no one. It wasn't much better with the Feldwebels and
tank commanders.
This was bad for the spirit and combat effectiveness of the battalion, especially since the old company commanders were cracking up. I suffered very
much, but I had to maintain my decorum in front of the men, who, with few
exceptions, remained excellent soldiers until the very end. The mail
received at the front was a great support.
If bad weather prevented the launching of the enemy air forces, attacks on
the ground were also not feared. However, the Americans still gave up terrain. We could not understand them. With their material superiority they
could have broken through our lines after the fall of St. Lo on 19 June. Most
evenings they returned to their departure positions. They were trained completely different from us. We were trained to strike the enemy, they, as we
learned previously during the First World War, had to wear us down before
they attacked.
Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge had taken over in the west on 3 July. I
remembered him from my time as escort officer to the then Generaloberst
Model in spring 1942, near Smolensk/Rzhev. We all knew of von Kluge's
great energy, although I never met him myself.
We heard the news of the assassination attempt against Hitler on 20 June
in between American artillery barrages that evening. We were so absorbed
with our own problems at the front that we had no idea of what was taking
place back home, especially the aftermath. It was unclear to us which
Stauffenberg had set the bomb. Was it our old, highly regarded lb of my 6th
Panzer Division in 1940? Although I loathed Hitler, his death would have
been for us, at least temporarily, a disaster and caused such confusion that
the enemy would have been confirmed in his goal of the destruction of
Germany. Guderian's appointment as the Chief of the General Staff was
calming.
We now hoped that our operations would be better than before, especially
with his panzer background. The spreading of denunciations was feared,
especially against the nobility and officer corps, after Himmler took command of the Home Army. Fortunately, we knew nothing of the plot at home.
We fought shoulder to shoulder with the brave soldiers of the Waffen SS.
They were different, but a man couldn't wish for a better comrade. I was
more concerned for my wife and baby. In spite of the threatening news from
the Eastern Front, they tarried for a while in Silesia and then had to return
by rail to the bomb-threatened Paderborn. I could still imagine the "flight
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from Berlin," according to Gbbels' appeal from 12 months before, and the
chaos of the over-crowded refugee trains.

10. Cobra - The Breakout from the Beachhead

The Great Carpet Bombing

From the beginning, the Americans claimed the credit of the breakout for
themselves, while the British were given the task of tying up the German
panzer forces by simulating the main Allied attack toward Caen.
On 10 July - before Panzer Lehr was transferred into the area west of St.
Lo - General Bradley had designated the location and course of the breakout - Operation "Cobra". In place of a long artillery preparation, a carpet

Diagram 14:

C o b r a Carpet Bombing.
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bombing of unheard of strength was to eliminate German resistance in a

2500 x 7000 yard (2.3 x 6.4 kilometer) area. It was to support three infantry
divisions (30th, 9th and 4th) so that the U.S. VII Corps could break into the
German main battlefield with the support of over 1000 artillery pieces.
Then the two "heavy" U.S. armored divisions (2nd and 3rd), with 238
Shermans, supported by the 1st Infantry Division, would expand the penetration into a breakthrough. In all, 140,000 men were concentrated into the
narrow Panzer Lehr Division sector.
The straight St. Lo - Periers road had all the requirements for the attacking
forces' departure line:
- solid assembly terrain south of the Carentan swamp,
- several good roads leading to the south,
- a boundary line between the fronts that could be easily recognized
from the air by bombers.
The Allies saw the carpet bombing as nothing more than a modern type of
fire preparation for a breakthrough attack against enemy positions, if more
brief, more powerful and more surprising than artillery. The fire was to
destroy the enemy, wear them down or force them to take cover, and silence
their weapons.
However, as during the battles of materiel during the First World War, the
mobility of the attacker would be considerably limited. During the Battle of
the Somme in 1916 the terrain became impassible with craters, similar to
the Flanders battlefields that were flooded by the destruction of water
drainage systems. In 1944 the ruins and craters of the bombed targets and
communications centers had to be bypassed. This was the case in Monte
Cassino, Caen and now in St. Lo. Unaware of the Sword of Damocles that
hung over it, Panzer Lehr defended its sector.
The course and occupation of the position of Panzer Lehr at this date are
shown in Diagram 14. Its forward edge generally ran along the road St. Lo
- Periers between the Vire bend south of Rampan, where a kampfgruppe of
352nd Infantry Division was adjacent on the western bank of the Vire and
point 40, east of Le Mesnil-Eury, the connection to 5th Fallschirmjger Div.
As before, the sector right of the Terrette was under command of
Oberstleutnant Welsch (902), on the left of Oberstleutnant Freiherr von
Hauser (901).
The planned transfer of command of the left sector to 14th Fallschirmjger
Regiment, which was committed here, was postponed at the last minute.
This should have been the first step of reverting command to its division.
The front-line was supported on the right around Hebecrevon, by II ./130th
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Panzer Lehr Rgt., on the left by 130th Panzerjger Bn. The regimental commander of Panzer Lehr Rgt. was charged with fortifying the YELLOW
LINE, along the railroad St. Lo - Coutances, by committing all available
divisional forces.
On 24 July, 1140 hrs, initially, many fighter-bombers attacked, followed
by "about 600 four-engined bombers" (Division Operation Order of 24
July). The division area was carpet bombed. The panzers, situated near the
front-line, rocked so much that Leutnant Freiherr von Ladsberg-Velen
reported at night, "he had felt like being in a gale at sea with wind speed of
Force 10". As low clouds and poor visibility prevented accurate bombing,
the operation was cancelled just after it started. Nevertheless 55 tons of
bombs fell. They inflicted more losses on the American - 25 killed and 131
wounded - than on the German side. In the afternoon, when American
infantry reoccupied their previously evacuated positions, General Bayerlein
was right to count the day as a defensive success.
In the Division Operation Order for 25 July the units were instructed;
"because of the anticipated continuation of the major enemy attack,
supported by superior air-strikes, and to minimize the effects of carpet
bombing, the units, primarily reserves, vehicles and staffs, will be quartered and entrenched sufficiently distant from the major roads."
During the night of 25 July, I Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment, with about
16 Panthers, relieved the committed Panzer IVs. These, about 12, were
withdrawn to Dangy to be available at the division's disposal. During this
night only minor harassing fire fell on the division's sector, primarily on
supply routes. The old main line of resistance was reoccupied without
exception.
About 0800 hours German outposts observed American infantry leaving
their positions. At 0940 hours about 50 Thunderbolts (P 47) appeared from
the east, followed by six more waves, each at two minute intervals. They
dropped bombs and napalm, which covered the ground in dust and smoke.
A little later 400 medium bombers bombed crossroads and identified positions in the southern target area with 500 lbs bombs. Then 1500 "Flying
Fortresses" and "Liberators" appeared from the north in endless waves.
They opened their bomb-bays.
Again bombs dropped too far north within the American lines. The bombardment killed 11 of the American troops and wounded 490. Among the
dead was Lt. General McNair, commanding general of the Army Ground
Forces, who was participating only as an observer. Finally, another 300
Lightnings attacked with bombs and napalm. In all 4,200 tons of bombs
were dropped, as was a good deal of napalm. The earth shook.
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The 8.8cm guns of 311th Heeres-Flak-Abteilung, firing at their maximum

rate, brought down a few bombers. This had little effect on events. In the
inferno shelters were destroyed, vehicles turned over and soldiers buried
without a chance of recovering their bodies. Just as heavy was the burden of
the bombardment on the mental condition of the troops, who had been battling fiercely for the past 45 days, nearly without rest and were utterly
exhausted physically and psychologically. Only a few soldiers with nerves
of steel can stand that kind of strain.
Radio-operator Wolfgang Maas witnessed the carpet bombardment at the
command post of 902nd Regiment:
"Reasonably removed from the CP, in a sunken road, our SPW was in
cover, when a vast number of heavy bombers approached us. All of a
sudden bombs detonated nearby. I was struck in the shoulder. Grasping
instinctively up there, I held a shell splinter in my hand. As it was hot, I
threw it away at once. Jacket and blouse were torn. Then the aircraft
dropped target indicators.
At a distance we heard the bombs falling and exploding. We put on our
helmets and jumped under cover, Werner Kramer into his foxhole at the
edge of the ravine, which was covered by timber and earth, Erwin
Ehmann and I underneath our vehicle. Just two yards behind our SPW a
bomb detonated in the sunken road. Our emergency generator and several batteries were lost. Werner Kramer was seriously wounded by two
splinters through his thigh and calf. A small fragment had struck me in
the back, near the spine and tore another hole in my jacket and blouse.
All my other comrades at the command post were unhurt.
Together with some other wounded we were evacuated in an armored
ambulance to the main dressing station. Numerous seriously wounded
were laying on the lawn around the castle, a horrible sight. Our own
seriously wounded were brought directly to the operating room. I made
a driver give me a Tetanus shot and returned with a plaster on my back.
Our SPW looked bad, as splinters through the open rear had smashed a
lot of equipment, among other items the fuel line, speedometer, etc.
With the means at our disposal it was not easy to get our vehicle running again. Without a fuel line we had to pour the fuel from the jerrican
through the open armored engine compartment into a makeshift fuel
tank, a tin which held half a litre. While driving, from time to time it
spilled out onto the hot exhaust pipe and a flame erupted. It was a dangerous solution and required a frightening amount of gasoline. But we
finally reached the company's maintenance squad, which provided us
with a new fuel line and new radio sets. We did not give up our SPW!
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With it we even escaped from the Falaise Pocket at the last minute."
The extent of the losses suffered by Panzer Lehr during the bombing has
not been established. The 14th Fallschirmjger Regiment was hit the heaviest, losing its commander. The panzergrenadiers and Kampfgruppe Heintz
also suffered heavy casualties, but the troops in position (not including the
subordinate elements) lost no more than 500 to 700 men because of their
diminished combat strength and the forewarning. Equipment losses were
relatively minor. No Panzer IVs were destroyed. However, several Panthers
and panzerjgers were buried in the bomb craters or burned. Percentagewise, these losses were considerable for the division.
The carpet bombings looked spectacular and had great propaganda value
but had little military value under the circumstances. With its enormous
material and personnel superiority (artillery, armor and infantry), supplemented by fighter-bombers in never-before- realized numbers, VII (US)
Corps could have broken through without the bombing attack, perhaps even
faster and with fewer losses. The cratering and destruction of the roads considerably delayed American mobility! While the Americans were completely inexperienced in the conduct of mobile warfare, they quickly grasped it
(especially General Patton), and took advantage of the good road network in
France and Germany. Supported by their air forces, they employed mobile
warfare until the end of the war, as long as their supply lines would reach.
As the smoke from the carpet bombing caused delays and the American
infantry hit the German positions on a wide front after a barrage from 1000
artillery pieces, they had to learn the same lessons as did their fathers in
1918. They immediately ran into astonishingly strong defensive fire and
stalled. However, the loss of all telephone communications forward of regiment, together with the shortage of reserves, which, due to the air situation,
could not be moved during the daytime, distorted the leadership's view of
the situation.
German artillery was limited to conducting planned fires, especially since
direct fire support was impossible due to the interlocking of friend and foe.
They fired until they ran out of ammunition.
During the attack on Hebecrevon - St. Gilles, the 120th (US) Infantry
Regiment was stopped by a blocking position shortly after crossing the St.
Lo - Periers road. The core of the block consisted of by three Panthers. A
frontal attack conducted by three enemy companies with armored support
ended with the destruction of three Shermans. A subsequent attempt to
bypass the block also failed. It wasn't until much later that the enemy was
able to knock out the Panthers and overcome the resistance.
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The entrance to Hebecrevon was blocked by a mine-field that was tenaciously defended by Kampfgruppe Heintz. They prevented the mines from
being removed and, therefore, the commitment of tanks. An air attack was
also frustrated by the thickly shrubbed terrain. It was not until after dark
that any progress was achieved. Hebecrevon did not fall until midnight.
The 8th (US) Infantry Regiment from the 4th Division attacked la
Chapelle-en-Juger in the middle of the sector. At first, a German strong
point north of the St. Lo - Periers road was bypassed, then the attack of one
battalion stalled before an apple orchard. Only after the commitment of 18
Shermans did it progress. A little later two panzers (panzerjgers?) stopped
the battalion attack at another German strong point. By nightfall la
Chapelle-en-Juger was still in German hands. The 9th Infantry Division
attacked on the left flank from Point 40 along the road to Marigny. In the
moonlight, they ran into bitter resistance from the Fallschirmjgers.
An attempt to bypass further to the south failed in the face of strong defensive fire from still intact German positions. During the evening, almost all
of the penetrations were blocked without the need to deploy fresh forces.
Two to three kilometer terrain gains were only achieved at a few locations.
During the night, the attackers withdrew in some places to better-secured
positions and evacuated, among others, St. Gilles, which was peacefully traversed early in the morning by the two Panzer IV companies on their way to
support the infantry.
After recognizing the seriousness of the situation and receiving instructions from OB West ("Do not voluntarily give any ground to the enemy"),
the corps ordered the deployment of the last reserves on 26 July, in order to
hold or reestablish the former line instead of withdrawing to the partially
prepared "Yellow Line" on the St. Lo - Coutances rail line, which would
have spared forces. This order gave the enemy the possibility of overrunning and destroying the positions and reserves of Panzer and the 5th
Fallschirmjger Division.
The following brief combat report from the commander of the 7th
Company, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment, Leutnant Freiherr von LandsbergVelen, speaks volumes:
"In the early morning of 26 July, at 0300 hours, I and my company
(7th Co., 130th Pz. Lehr Rgt.) were ordered into the area north of St.
Gilles as the 785th Grenadier Regiment (Oberst Scheele) attack reserve,
together with a stormtroop company. After reporting to the battalion
commander, Hauptmann Schulz, at the regimental headquarters, my
panzers occupied covered positions on either side of the St. Yaast 103

Point 69 road, in conjunction with Oberleutnant Werner's grenadier

assault detachment.
Due to increasing enemy pressure, the regiment ordered a counterattack with panzers at midday. Since the only road passable to panzers
was blocked by three burned-out tanks and the grenadiers were too
weak to attack alone, the counterattack was cancelled.
During the afternoon enemy tanks rolled incessantly to the south,
right and left of us. We heard the sound of heavy fighting to our rear.
Many fighter-bombers and observation aircraft circled above us. No
panzer could move without threat of being fired at.
Later, the grenadiers returned from the front. Only with difficulty
were we able to establish a security line, which soon came under fire.
Feldwebel Kuhpfahl's panzer burst into flame from a direct hit; its commander was killed. Meanwhile, Feldwebel Khn and his two panzers
from the 8th Company were attached to me for the defense.
When the enemy rolled behind us on the St. Gilles - Marigny road,
we were surrounded on all sides. Hauptmann Schulz wanted to withdraw. On my advice, we set up an all-round defense in preparation for a
breakout together that night. We left at dark, at 2300 hours. There were
four panzers - I was in the second - with mounted infantry behind two
groups of grenadiers on either side of the road. The rest of the
grenadiers followed with their horse-drawn supply vehicles, followed
by the remaining three panzers.
When we turned off of the main road to Marigny in the direction of
Quibou, we began to take infantry fire from the front and both sides.
Our reply, a withering fire, silenced the enemy. We progressed another
2000 meters without loss, until two panzers drove into two bomb craters
in the darkness. It took much effort to free them, even with the help of
two other panzers. My panzer suffered damage to the steering gear. We
had to dismantle the weapons and radio equipment and leave our panzer
for, we hoped, later towing. Another two panzers were lost later; one in
a bomb crater, the other destroyed by Hauptmann Schulz.
Approximately 2000 meters in front of Quibou we ran into infantry
and mortar fire. The grenadiers dismounted and massed behind the
panzers, while we fired blindly with all weapons into the hedges. The
grenadiers could not move without attracting fire from the hedges on
the right and left; they suffered losses. Suddenly the call "cease fire!"
came from the front. Apparently these were our own troops. I moved
forward, but discovered an American taking aim at me. But I fired
faster.
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While I reassembled the grenadiers and loaded the wounded onto my

machine, the lead tanks mistakenly drove off. I finally reached Quibou
with the rest (two panzers). There, the commander of I Battalion immediately committed me and my panzers to defend the railroad crossing
north of the village. Enemy infantry soon attacked and we were pinned
down by fighter-bombers. I had no radio communications and none of
the promised grenadiers.
At 1100 hours I went looking for the grenadiers. When I found
them, Feldwebel Ebert reported to me on foot. He said that they were
attacked by several Shermans. They set one on fire, but then he himself
was knocked out. His driver was killed. Now the tanks of the regimental
staff behind me to the south were blown up, why, I do not know. Their
mission had to be taken over by two of my five panzers, which lost their
field of fire to the front. The shots came from Quibou.
Under enemy fire, without visible or radio communications, I
assembled all of my panzer-less crews in a ravine and fought my way
back with them to the 901st Regimental command post. They had, in
total, destroyed four Shermans that morning."
The chance of holding the front on 26 July, which was the hope of the
senior leadership, was misleading. Cohesion and contact between the individual German strong points west of St. Lo was lost. Their weak lines
snapped like an elastic band that had been stretched too far as the American
attack divisions, supported by strong artillery and numerous fighterbombers, attacked to break out.
On 26 July at 0700 hours, after a three-hour air attack and strong artillery
fire, principally against St. Gilles and Marigny, the American infantry
attacked again on a wide front with armored support. The capture of
Hebecrevon during the night had opened the way to St. Gilles, whose northern access was blocked by Oberstleutnant Welsch (902nd Regiment) with
tanks and artillery. Enemy infantry attacks were repulsed. A planned counterattack to the north by tanks and grenadiers had to be given up because the
route had been rendered impassable for tanks by burned-out vehicles and
craters, while enemy air activity tied up all movement.
In the morning the enemy turned his armored forces loose. Combat
Command A from the 2nd (US) Armored Division crossed the St. Lo Periers road at midday and ran into resistance. The weak forces of Battle
Group Welsch tried to delay the enemy with fire. One Sherman was hit. In
the early afternoon the lead American armored elements rolled through St.
Gilles to the south.
In the left Panzer Lehr sector the enemy achieved a deeper penetration
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south of la Chapelle-en-Juger. Because the counterattack by the 941st

Grenadier Regiment did not make it through La Butte, the 3rd (US)
Armored Division was able to advance almost unhindered up to I Battalion,
130th Artillery Regiment positions northwest of Marigny at 1200 hours.
The artillerymen had to withdraw to the south after offering brave resistance
and suffering considerable losses. The 985th Grenadier Regiment, which
was marching from Canisy, was attacked from the air and could not reach
the St. Lo - Coutances road until it was too late.
Although Marigny was held by Fallschirmjgers and SS panzers until 27
July, the lead elements of the 3rd (US)Armored Division crossed the road
south of the city and turned to the west. In the afternoon they grew weary
against this superiority. The Panzer Lehr positions were broken through at
several locations. The panzers still available were pinned down in their covered positions by the heavy commitment of fighter-bombers permitted by
the clear weather and could no longer maneuver into the numerous vegetable gardens as previously. The gardens had been stripped of their vegetation and were no longer hidden from sight.
The Americans had also learned how to closely coordinate the tanks and
combat aircraft, which the Wehrmacht had been doing so successfully since
the Polish campaign. However, the American fighter-bombers were better
suited for providing close air support then the older German Stukas.
The superior enemy air forces made any movement during the daytime
impossible. The British rocket-equipped Typhoons were in special evidence.
They had incredible accuracy. They were even able to destroy the heavy
tanks. (Generalleutnant Freiherr von Lttwitz)
Oberleutnant Ebner, commander of the 8th Company, 902nd Regiment,
remembered:
The entire front began to stagger. I was suddenly located alone near
Quibou with my company when Oberstleutnant Welsch appeared unannounced and ordered me to construct a defensive line. For this purpose
he gave me several of the division's Panzer IVs. I believed this to be a
senseless order. It was clear that I and my few people - there were perhaps 25 men - could not hold off the Americans. A short time later,
after Welsch left me in his B-Krad, he was killed ... (perhaps by
artillery fire).
(Oberstleutnant Welsch had been temporarily buried in the hamlet
of "Le Foe" near Dangy, and is now resting in the German military
cemetery at La Cambe.)
At 1800 hours Oberstleutnant i.G. von Kluge, a son of the Feldmarschall, appeared at the Panzer Lehr Division command post, in
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order to be briefed on the situation and pass on instructions that the St.
Lo - Periers road had to be held. A powerful explosion at the nearby
Dangy ammunition dump ended the conversation.
Not far away, in Canisy, a battle for the railroad embankment began
between lead elements of Combat Command A and the Panthers of the
4th Company, 6th Panzer Regiment. While the Panthers were being suppressed, the American tanks were able to bypass. Leutnant Schfers
(4th Company, 6th Panzer Regiment) was killed. The Panzer Lehr command post had to hastily redeploy to Le Pont-Peint, six kilometers west
of Soulles. The American advance guard was deployed south of Canisy.
During the evening, one column advanced against St. Samson, the other
against Le Mesnil-Herman. Incomprehensibly, the Americans stopped
their advance at the fall of darkness.
In the rear of the broken-through forces, the Yellow Line along the
St. Lo - Coutances rail line between Canisy and Carantilly was occupied by hastily assembled groups of soldiers obtained from staffs and
supply units. "... their strength is so weak that a breakthrough is expected at any time ..." and "... division losses are so heavy that there is no
infantry or panzer strength to speak of ..." the division evening report
noted.
The only help that could be promised by the corps was the deployment of
the Panther battalion (strength: 14 Panthers) from the 2nd SS Panzer
Division. Army Group B ordered the XLVII Panzer Corps, with the 2nd and
116th Panzer Divisions, to reach the Torigny-Tessy area from the Caumont
area as quickly as possible in order to attack the penetrating enemy forces in
the flank. Their move had not yet taken place by 27 July.
During the night, isolated German forces in the area north of the St. Lo Coutances road broke out to the south. In the early morning, after an adventuresome march, hindered more by bomb craters than by the enemy, the
remnants of Battalion Bohm and five Panzer IVs made it to Quibou.
Additional groups followed.

The Retreat Begins

The 27th of July was a decisive breakthrough and breakout day. Although
still combat capable, the exhausted groups of Panzer Lehr were splintered.
They had lost cohesion and communications and no longer had any comprehension of the overall situation. Orders seldom reached them. They were far
outflanked in the east. Nevertheless, they offered the American infantry
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tenacious resistance.
Their desperate fighting could only gain time. The enemy rolled through
Canisy to the south. Since dawn, combat aircraft swarmed in the sky. There
was fighting on the Yellow Line.
During the previous night all Panzer Lehr elements incapable of combat
that could be contacted were moved into the Percy area. The lb command
post was, therefore, transferred to Montbray. During the past few hours the

Diagram 15:

The American Breakthrough to Avranches, 27 to 31 July 1944.

108

tank repair company, which was working in Cerisy-le-Salle and had

repaired approximately 30 damaged tanks, tried to avoid the enemy attack.
While the company was able to escape with its irreplaceable skilled personnel and its valuable equipment, it had to leave most of the damaged tanks on
the roads due to the lack of prime-movers. Only a few of these tanks were
able to reach Percy, where they were immediately committed.
CCA from the 2nd (US) Armored Division, which rolled through
Carantilly-Canisy to the south at midday of 27 July, was held up by
German resistance on the Yellow Line until dark. A focal point of the fighting was the village of Quibou. The tankers and panzergrenadiers, who had
broken through during the night and were completely exhausted, again lay
under the fire of combat aircraft and artillery that morning. Therefore, the
panzers could not fully occupy the assigned positions.
At 1100 hours tanks from the U.S. 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion conducted a frontal and bypassing attack with mounted infantry supported by a
field howitzer battalion. It is possible that American M4A3E2 assault tanks
(Jumbo) were committed here. With their stronger armor plating and the
Cullin Hedge-row Device (steel teeth for breaking through hedgerow banks)
they were practically invincible. Nevertheless, the fierce fighting was costly
to both sides.
The enemy penetrated into the village. In the confusion, several soldiers
lost their courage. Without any hope of withdrawing their panzers, they
blew them up. A Frenchman counted 17 destroyed tanks after the fighting.
At least four of them had to be Shermans, a few of them had been damaged
before the fighting started.
The next resistance was supposed to be offered along the Red Line in the
Seulles sector. The Panzer Lehr command post had been located there, near
Pont Brocard, since the previous evening. There was contact on the left with
the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division. The 352nd Infantry Division on the
right was approximately ten kilometers further to the east. The troops
required to occupy this line existed only on the command maps. The majority of them were splintered, dispersed and unorganized, cut off or still fighting on the Yellow Line.
At 1630 hours the tanks from the 82nd (US) Reconnaissance Battalion
captured Pont Brocard after a brief fight against weak defenders.
The Headquarters, Panzer Lehr Division was taken by surprise. The command bus was shot up and set afire along with all documents, even though
the significance was not realized at the time. The operations group had to
jump individually from the windows, leaving behind all personal property,
in order to escape capture.
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The division radio echelon (Funkstaffel) was located in an apple

orchard on a hill. The la command post was set up in a farmhouse in a
valley. Suddenly three men jumped out of the bottom windows. They
ran up the hill toward us. They knew where their radio echelon was.
One of them lost his field cap. Another still carried his map board and a
small briefcase in his hand. It was General Bayerlein, the la, Major
Kaufmann, and a third man. A bus caught fire next to the farmhouse. It
had to be the command bus. The General reached us, completely out of
breath. He asked: "Do you have something to drink?" We had a wickerbottle of cider in the radio station. Then they left.
We were unable to leave the apple orchard until later, after dark,
because the fighter-bombers were constantly attacking the roads. Then
tank crews arrived. They had blown up their panzers because they could
not make it through the attacking fighter-bombers. The fighter-bombers
flew constantly. Then they stopped firing, perhaps this was because they
ran out of ammunition. When we moved out onto the road they were
still flying, but they did not fire. A new squadron could not replace
them in the dark.
Later, General Bayerlein sent a radio message concerning the fighting. He was so exhausted that Major Kauffmann and the 0 1 ,
Hauptmann Hbner, were able to prevent his capture only with difficultyThis was an account given by Unteroffizier Blmer, from the division
radio station.
This radio message showed just how exhausted General Bayerlein really
was. He had despaired after days of his command being heavily battered:
1. After 49 days of fierce combat, the Panzer Lehr Division is finally annihilated.
2. The enemy is now rolling through all sectors, from St. Gilles to
the south. All calls for help have gone unanswered, because no one
believes how serious the situation is...
OB West immediately transmitted this report to the OKW Operations
Staff. Although Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge set out at once, the
American lead armored elements captured Notre-Dame-de-Cerisy at midnight, the falling darkness drove the aircraft from the skies.
On the far side of the great road, or moving undiscovered within the
American columns, many groups and individual vehicles were striving to
reestablish contact with friendly lines. Panzer Lehr was ordered to hold the
"Red Line" south of the Seulles, Moyon - Pont Brocard, with elements of
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the 275th Infantry Division, but these were only remnants lacking communications with each other or with higher authority. The attack conducted
with the subordinate Panther battalion from the 2nd SS Panzer Division, to
recapture Pont Brocard, was repulsed after a brief initial success.
The ordered construction of a new line of resistance further to the west,
from St. Ebremont-Dangy-Savigny, was to be initiated with an attack to the
west by XLVII Panzer Corps, which was released from Panzer Group West.
The attack was not conducted because the German command and control
network was destroyed and strong enemy forces had already broken through
the Villebaudon-St. Martin-de-Cenilly line to Hambye. The 130th ALA,
which was reinforced by several Panthers, was able to hold off the CCA,
2nd Armored Division attack from its line of resistance near Villebaudon
until evening. During the night before 29 July all of the remnants of the
Panzer Lehr Division took over security on the Percy hills. There was contact on the left with Battle Group Wisliceny from the 2nd SS Panzer
Division and on the right with the just-arrived 116th Panzer Division. The
XLVII Panzer Corps, to which Panzer Lehr was also subordinated, took
over between Vire and Percy.
In spite of its weakness, on 29 July Panzer Lehr reported a defensive success. The attack conducted by the 2nd (US) Armored Division, with a reinforced armored battalion, against Percy was repulsed, the enemy suffering
heavy casualties. Leutnant von Knebel (I Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment)
and his Panthers knocked out 13 Shermans. The enemy tanks had to retreat
to the foothills and request reinforcements. A German counterattack severed
the American lines of communications. Even the German artillery fire
enjoyed considerable success. The American battalion was withdrawn.
The thick Bocage terrain opened up to the south into gently rolling hill
country, which permitted off-road movement, observation and long-range
firing. At the same time, the enemy's fighter-bomber commitment weakened, because the breakthrough increased in breadth and depth.
Meanwhile, the division la command post, which, after losing all of its
office equipment on 27 July, could not issue written orders for two days,
was completely reequipped.
On 30 July the situation in the XLVII Panzer Corps area of operations
remained relatively unchanged. The remnants of Panzer Lehr, reinforced by
a battle group from the 2nd SS Panzer Division, held a line Percy - Le
Laurier to southwest of le Bignon. Here, other stragglers from the fighting
around Quibou and Dangy were able to withdraw to the west.
On 31 July the enemy was able to break through near Avranches. Now the
decisive commander of the 3rd (US) Army, General Patton, who was initial111

ly cautious, was able to change to a more rapid form of mobile warfare in

the Bretagne and in the open fields of France.
For almost two months the best equipped German panzer division was
pinned down in bocage terrain, essentially robbed of its mobility by Hitler's
senseless hold order. It bravely stood fast at the focal point of the Normandy
front against the enemy's breakthrough attacks, enduring unbelievable physical and emotional demands.
However, gradually the enormous enemy materiel and air commitment ate
away at its strength and it eventually gave way to the unceasing assaults
from the ground and air. It was severely battered, but it was not destroyed.
According to the status report from 1 August it had suffered personnel losses of 5,100 since the beginning of the invasion, heavy equipment losses of
61 Panzer Vs, 81 Panzer IVs, 21 Panzerjger IVs, 230 SPWs, 42 guns and
tonnage of about fifty percent, not including losses in infantry and heavy
weapons.
On the other hand, it received 2,846 predominantly inexperienced personnel replacements, but no corresponding supply of major equipment. Worse
was the loss of nerve, especially the complete despair of the commander,
who, since the Polish campaign, had always occupied a position of responsibility and had been committed with and trusted by Guderian and Rommel.
He was no longer up to dealing with the exhausting stress and needed some
rest or a combat success; however, the enemy did not allow this.
According to its reports, the division disappeared for a little while from the
situation maps and situation reports. Hitler's unreasonable demands were
appropriate for the number of full strength divisions, but not based on their
actual status and fighting power. Several of the division's battle groups,
which were resupplied by the lb, continued to fight as corps troops, temporarily under various corps commands. The combat incapable elements
were assembled under the command of Oberst Gerhardt, the commander of
the 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment, initially near Vire, then, after 8 August, in
the area around Montmirail, east of le Mans, where it was hoped the division would be refitted.
Recollections of July Part II
The relief of my tanks from the front, planned for 24 July, was postponed
out of regard for the panzergrenadiers, in order to reduce losses from
American artillery fire. The sound of tracked vehicles would always attract
artillery fire that would hit the infantry before they could take shelter in
their trenches.
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Although I agreed with the postponement, I also had the disquieting feeling that some danger was approaching. However, the morning passed as
usual. At 1200 hours an artillery barrage broke loose as I wrote in my command post near St. Gilles. Shortly thereafter, the air was suddenly filled
with large four-engined bombers, like swarms of flies. They circled around
us several times, so to us, they appeared to be numbered in the thousands. It
was oppressive. Something that none of us had ever experienced.
The screaming of the bombs was like a downpour and seemed to be endless. We made ourselves small and hid in our farmhouse. Our cows stuck
their thick heads through the empty window frames seeking cover, ostrichlike, while the fragments tore through their bellies until they collapsed. We
would have to do without whipped cream in the future!
My tanks in their front-line positions were spared from losses, and were
able to effortlessly repulse the subsequent enemy attack. The Wehrmacht
Report only noted that the enemy attacked with strong forces after a heavy
fire preparation and rolling air attacks, but they were repulsed after suffering heavy casualties.
After some hesitation, the Panther Battalion relieved us at night. On 25
July the bombings were continued by two and four-engined bombers. We
counted more than 1000 aircraft. We correctly assumed that the American
breakthrough was achieved.
On 23 July, when I congratulated General Bayerlein for receiving his
award (on 20 July) of the Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross,
he still thought that it was better to be here than near Caen, since there was
no fear of carpet bombing here. And now we had one! There was no trace
of our Luftwaffe. We only heard occasional enemy flak fire at night. The air
war had completely changed since 1940.
Before the bombings occurred, I drove to Oberst Gerhardt, my regimental
commander. I thoughtlessly wore my good black uniform. On the return trip
the road was constantly circled by fighter-bombers, making us dive into the
dirt like a pair of oversized rabbits.
We were alerted at 0040 hours on 26 July for the mission of blocking the
feared breakthrough on the road through St. Gilles. The bombs had turned
the town into rubble. Nevertheless, several roofs remained undamaged, as
could be still seen during a visit in 1989. There were still examples of the
old colored brick roofs. At dawn all of the panzers stood in their assigned
positions, approximately 1500 meters further to the rear as those from the
previous day.
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After considerable preparation by artillery and bombers, the Americans

launched their breakthrough attack, screened by the inevitable swarms of
fighter-bombers. I was assigned to Oberst Freiherr von Hauser's 901st
Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment, whose command post was located in the
basement of a stone house. In the morning it was surrounded by an apple
orchard, whose thick branches completely covered it from air observation.
To protect us from radio direction finding, all radio stations, including my
command panzer, were withdrawn 100 to 200 meters. The enormous enemy
fire cut down a mass of trees and tore up all telephone lines. By afternoon
only a few naked tree trunks were still standing. Branches and overturned
vehicles formed a confused entanglement. Every road to my panzers was
monitored by the murderous circling Thunderbolts. One had to play Russian
Roulette by trying to outwit the pilots while they rose back into the air after
descending to attack. It took an eternity to move along any road. The detonations continued unceasingly. All panzers were engaged in heavy fighting.
Then even radio communications were lost. My command panzer was discovered by a fighter-bomber and knocked out.
Fortunately, the crew was unharmed. Since there was nothing left to command, I gave the order to withdraw. I and my crew made our way on foot,
moving at some distance from the road, upon which we saw American tanks
with accompanying infantry. We were able to break through. Fortunately,
the fighter-bombers were not interested in us, so we made good progress
and reached my headquarters by evening. There waited the rest of my staff
and a General Staff officer, Oberstleutnant von Kluge, the son of the
Feldmarschall. My next objective was my supply companies. To my great
relief, during the course of the evening and the night panzer crews and individual stragglers gradually arrived, as I had hoped.
Nothing was known of the fate of the Panzer Repair Company in Carisyla-Salle. It became clear on the next day that they had been hit by the
American attack. Over 20 panzers had to be blown up. However, my efficient men were able to recover some panzers under their own power, and
also loaded trailers. When I reported this to General Bayerlein he blamed
me for quartering the Werkstatt Company so far to the west on the road to
Avranches. I did so because of my fear of a breakthrough in the direction of
Paris.
I gloated upon learning that the regimental staff had blown up all of its
panzers and also had to move on foot. However, I became even more angry
when Oberst Gerhardt demanded the detachment of two of my remaining
precious panzers to his staff.
Thanks to their inexperience in mobile warfare, the Americans halted on
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27 July on the St. Lo - Coutances rail line, in front of our "Yellow Line,"
thus allowing the backbone of Panzer Lehr, staffs, artillery and all of the
supply units, to escape. Had they advanced even their lead elements south
of the Soulles sector that evening, nothing would have been able to stop
them. Nevertheless, they appeared unexpectedly at 2130 hours in the neighborhood of my quarters, forcing us to hasten to St. Denis. The 901st Rgt.
was encircled for one night, but it was able to break out to the south on the
next day.
On 28 July the army mail also found its way to St. Denis. There I waited
for the trickle of arriving panzers and stragglers. Then I had to go to an
afternoon command briefing at the division headquarters. In light of the air
threat, my good dispatch rider Paus' sidecar motorcycle seemed to be most
suitable, since up to now motorcycles did not seem to interest the fighterbombers. The fighter-bombers swarmed like hornets in the clear sky, but we
rode along rather carelessly until, just before reaching a village, looking
back from my pillion seat, I noticed a pair of Thunderbolt fighter-bombers
descending to attack us.
It was too late to dismount. I could only shout something, like: "Go left!"
A transformer housing offered shelter there. Paus jerked the machine to the
left. I still believe that I saw the eyes of the pilot as he fired the on-board
weapons, before he zoomed above us. At such a moment seconds appear to
be hours. Our lives were in higher hands. Fireworks and smoke sizzled just
in front of us and to both sides. The rounds from the aircraft's heavy
machine-guns slammed into the plaster above us. Now and then I can still
smell that unbearable stench of TNT. But I heard no explosion. Apparently
the ear is slower than the eye and nose.
When the second fighter-bomber fired, we were already behind the housing. Contrary to our expectation, nothing had happened to us. The machine
was undamaged. We were given our lives back. We had a good guardian
angel. However, our hearts were pounding and threatening to explode and,
when a passing SS officer yelled loudly to me, I was so exhausted that I
silently allowed his harsh words to roll over me. The scolding was not
unfounded. Instead of us, a poor old woman was mortally wounded when
carelessly crossing the street. She was being mourned by her family.
I was supposed to assemble the battalion in Fresne - Poret (12 kilometers
south of Vire), about 50 kilometers to the rear. Personnel-wise we had gotten off lightly. We were capable of combat missions after we received new
panzers. I had to prevent my valuable panzer crews from being utilized as
infantrymen or turned over to other panzer units. The headquarters and sup115

ply companies were able to completely make up for those they had given
up.
As ordered, the main body of the division was assembled under the leadership of Oberst Gerhardt (Panzer Lehr Regiment regimental staff) in the
army rear area, first near La Fert - Mace, then south of Alencon, in order
to be "refitted." From this core, two battle groups were formed under
Oberstleutnant Freiherr von Hauser and Major von Fallois.
Thus ended the month of July. The last few days were the worst that I had
experienced during the war, perhaps with the exception of Vassilevka, 48
kilometers before Stalingrad, in December 1942.

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IV
WITHDRAWAL TO THE SEINE
11. Recollections of August 1944

While the Wehrmacht Report belittled the seriousness of the American

breakthrough, we eagerly listened to the British "Soldatensender Calais" in
order to learn the direction and development of the enemy attack from this
intelligence source. This was, for us, vital. How often did we, during the first
year of the war, surprise the unsuspecting enemy far behind the lines, when
he had not expected us there for some time. In mobile warfare, one must
anticipate similar actions by the enemy. How our situation had changed! For
weeks we had held out and hoped in vain to meet the enemy in open terrain
and inflict heavy losses upon him as a result of our great mobility and combat experience. Now we had the desired open terrain, but only the enemy
could exploit it with his fresh forces and his air force, just as we had in 1940
and 1941 with our ability to closely coordinate tanks and Stukas. From
behind cover we searched the clear skies desperately for our own fighters
and could not oppose the attackers with sufficient numbers of infantry, panzers or artillery.
We quickly realized that, in contrast to earlier broadcasts, the British radio
now tried to deceive us. They mentioned villages that we were still holding as
having already been captured and did not mention others that were already in
enemy hands, and then became a trap for the unsuspecting. The general ignorance and confusion was increased by rumors and the activities of terrorists. It
was claimed the division was to be immediately withdrawn far behind the
front and refitted with new equipment. In fact, on 2 August OB West issued
corresponding orders, but we were unaware of them. I was constantly being
ordered to withdraw the battalion in long jumps into the Alencon area.
Only one company under Leutnant Kues was left in the front-line. On 3
August, from south of Vire (Fresne-Poret), where the battalion was assembled, through La Chapelle - Moine (south of Flers), I received in Couptrain
(near Pen - Pail) the order to turn around and form a kampfgruppe consisting of my staff, my last panzer company and one panzergrenadier company. I
was to turn it over as a mobile attack reserve under command of
Oberstleutnant Freiherr von Hauser, whose own kampfgruppe of combat-capable remnants of the division came under the command of II Fallschirmjger
Corps. I was to take over from Major Kuhnow, who was then to reassemble
and reorganize the 902nd Rgt. in the refitting area near Alencon.
Meanwhile, the Americans pressed towards Vire from the north. I therefore
117

drove back to the front. On the evening of 3 August I took command of my

kampfgruppe in Sourdeval and redeployed my command post to Roullours
on the next day. The enemy increased pressure on either side of Vire; the
British in the east, the Americans in the west. That evening increased
artillery fire indicated an impending attack.
However, the 5th of August brought nothing new to us as the attack reserve.
The next day, General Bayerlein visited us. He was pleased to pass on an
order from OB West that he had influenced. Our division was to be removed
from the front for refitting on 12 August. During the evening, "Operation
Lttich," the attack ordered by Hitler from Mortain to the west, right up to the
sea, was supposed to begin. During the day, it remained relatively quiet in our
area. However, after a ground fire preparation the enemy attacked us from the
left and pushed back our Fallschirmjgers to the southern edge of the city.
On 7 August we were moved to the eastern edge of Vire as a screen. At
1400 hours we were able to repulse an enemy attack there. The artillery fire,
and possibly also fighter-bombers, preyed upon our weak forces. Because we
were supposed to withdraw freed-up forces to the rear, Battle Group von
Hauser gradually became top-heavy with regimental and battalion command
posts. A light field howitzer battery with two to three guns and a heavy battery with three guns would have two battery commanders, two battalion
staffs and a forward regimental command post - it was a laugh!
On 8 August our division staff was subordinated to the newly deployed
LXXXI Army Corps and redeployed to Alencon. This corps was supposed to
secure the long, almost unprotected southern flank of Army Group B. Battle
Group von Hauser remained with the II Fallschirmjger Corps. Our screen
elements were withdrawn to the south to l'Aubesnire. During the evening
we advanced up to the eastern edge of Vire, whose bombed-out ruins were
illuminated by guns and tracers, as well as individual fires. Street fighting
occurred, during which I captured two Englishmen, who were very relaxed
about their predicament. I did not get any rest until 0300 hours in the morning. On 8 August we heard that Le Mans had fallen and the enemy was continuing the advance to the north where our rear area elements were located.
On 9 August I found myself in the old quartering area near Le Fresne Poret, which still lay far behind the front-line, on our departure on 29 July.
Our half of the kampfgruppe secured near Maisoncelle in the afternoon, but
we again came under artillery fire. In the darkness, I summoned my officers
and non-commissioned officers to a situation briefing at my command post.
Everyone found a seat at a long table in the empty barn of a farmhouse.
When I bent forward to tip the ashes of my cigarette into a cup, the cup, to
my amazement, disintegrated. An artillery round had luckily detonated
above the loft, and not in the room where we were. A hail of fragments
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rained down upon us. It was a wonder no one was hurt. One fragment
slammed through the cup and saucer directly in front of my hand. Everyone
stared and breathed deeply. Even the man in the moon looked down in disbelief upon us through the holes in the roof. We again had reason to drink to
our health and no one was particularly upset, except my driver. He spent the
night in the brick fireplace.
The night was brief. At 0500 hours, we had to set out with other kampfgruppen, in order to eliminate the American penetration to the left of us. We
were able to attack and recapture Maisoncelles-la-Jourdan and Hill 232.
After this success, the commanders left unnecessarily in the forward areas
were permitted to return to their formations in the refitting area. Four damaged panzers were also sent to the east. Two days later, the entire
Kampfgruppe Hauser was supposed to follow.
We made the trip through Tinchebray - Flers - Sees to Mortagne-au-Perche
(about 120 kilometers) in an overcrowded Volkswagen with the adjutant, driver and signaller. We could initially see that the front was to the left and then
to the rear of us. As we drove on I indicated where, according to the map, we
left the range of the field artillery and then that of the long-range artillery.
We still had no experience of night fighters, so we felt relatively secure. In
the early morning we reached the battalion supply point. Our combat units
were supplied from there. This was where we hoped to get our first proper
sleep.
There I learned that early on 9 August General Bayerlein organized all of
the combat capable elements of the division in the refitting area into
Kampfgruppe Kuhnow and committed it to against the Americans advancing
from the south. This group also included a few of our panzers. The non-combatant elements were immediately ordered further to the east, into the area
around La Fert - Bernard and to Fontainebleau on 10 August.
So much for my sleep. In the afternoon someone woke me unceremoniously with the news that the enemy had advanced even closer. We already could
hear the sounds of fighting. We scratched the sand from our eyes and, with
great speed but some difficulty, drove further via Verneuil-Dreux to
Versailles, which was temporarily assigned to us as a quartering area. The
advance party had searched out splendid quarters for the staff. The trip was
depressing. Everywhere were the signs of flight of those agencies that had
been billeted here for years and had made themselves comfortable and
grown fat. But now they had left in a panic. In one fuel dump we requested
refueling, but we arrived too late. The fuel dump commander had ordered the
supplies blown up just before we arrived. He blew the dump shortly after. We
also went to a large rations dump nearby, where we figured we could take
some of the valuable goods with us, especially cigarettes and spirits, which
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could no longer be evacuated. The dense commander abruptly declined my

request. He would not relent until we made ourselves very clear. Later we
heard that he blew the dump into the air shortly after we departed.
After we quickly checked out our quarters we transformed ourselves from
extremely scruffy, front-line soldiers into exemplary panzer officers by taking a bath and putting on clean uniforms, we wanted to savor Paris for what
appeared to be the last time during the war. The streets of Paris were still
peaceful. As prearranged, I went to the bar of the Hotel Commodore, which I
had known years before, on Boulevard Haussmann with Ritschel, Mayer and
Landsberg. We had a good time. We hadn't been able to spend any money
for weeks. Now we paid the exorbitant prices for a menu and Champagne.
Later we danced. Under the circumstances, it was like dancing on a volcano.
I ran into my former regiment commander, von Oppeln-Bronikowski, who, in
the meantime, had been promoted to Generalmajor of the 21st Panzer
Division. He was loudly celebrating his award of the Oak Leaves to the
Knight's Cross - in his case it was completely pardonable.
On the next day I dined in the sunshine of the garden of the Coq Hardi in
Bougival, an exquisite luxury restaurant that remains as one of the finest of
the fine in my memory. There I saw Generaloberst Blaskowitz and his aidede-camp, Franz Prinz Biron, whom I knew well. He introduced me to the
Generaloberst, who listened with interest to my descriptions and impressions
of the recent fighting while he dined.
According to the latest news, we were supposed to be transferred into the
Lille area during the next few days for refitting, but first Panzer Lehr had to
be assembled here. The ordered withdrawal of Kampfgruppe von Hauser was
postponed and news was lacking from the division staff and Kampfgruppe
Kuhnow. The Falaise pocket was rearing its head. For a few days we could
savor the rest period.
In a large music room with a beautiful view of an unfortunately wilted, garden stood a valuable Steinway grand piano. Hauptmann Trumpa was an
accomplished piano player. Baurat Dr. Cursiefen found a violin and
Oberleutnant Meyer became the conductor. While playing the notes of
Beethoven's "To Elise," Reger's "Variations on a Theme by Mozart," and
reciting poetry by Goethe and others, the war vanished for hours. We recuperated with an evening of culture. Two years earlier, Oberst von
Hnersdorff had told me a story about a dinner of the army commanders in
Paris after the Western Campaign in 1940. One general gave an enthusiastic
speech and ended with the words, how wonderful it will be for us to see
Paris in peacetime. To which Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt, who was
the host, laconically replied: "Yes, but only as prisoners!" The future hung
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threateningly over us. What were we to expect?

At that time, Paris appeared like a confused ant hill. The Germans were
packing up to leave. The French, in their best clothes, waited for the
Americans on the streets. Allegedly the city had been without electricity and
water for days, but we have beautiful memories of this city.
In the months to come, more and more reports emerged about the arrest and
execution of officers and aristocrats. To some, with a conservative background, it appeared that in his blind hatred of the traditional, Hitler was actually helping the Allies to destroy Germany. In order to prevent just that, and
in order to achieve a bearable fate, Germany had to fight desperately both at
home and abroad. As long as the front-line stood up to the enemy the homefront would be able to survive the aerial bombing terror, deprivation and starvation. With this concept one was able to blame the Allies for the war, as
surreptitiously the following joke made the rounds at that time.
Scene: The final days of the war in Hitler's command post in the mountains
near Berchtesgaden! A smoke-blackened figure emerges from a bunker and
surrenders to the advancing Americans. Ripping his moustache from his
upper lip he reports: "Agent 033 reports, mission accomplished - Germany
destroyed!"
On 17 August I learned of the serious situation in Normandy from the army
headquarters. The situation had resulted from Hitler's demand for an offensive success on the western coast and his order to hold at any price.
Generalfeldmarschall Model had taken over as OB West. A great pocket near
Falaise was nearly closed. We were to be transferred to Laon. The only vague
hope remaining to us were the mythical "Miracle Weapons." But would they,
in fact, be decisive? What would happen if we lost their launch sites?
As ordered, I led the battalion, without panzers, but with confidence and
hope for new vehicles, through Melun - Meaux into the newly-assigned
assembly area, initially near Creil (north of Senlis), later on the Chemin des
Dames, between Laon and Soissons.
12. The Falaise Pocket
After the American breakthrough at Avranches, the British-Canadian forces
fighting the six German panzer divisions (2nd, 21st, 1st SS, 9th SS, 10th SS
and 12th SS) assembled south of Caen suffered nothing but setbacks and
losses. Field Marshal Montgomery then ordered the newly-formed 1st
Canadian Army to energetically pierce the German blocking position there
towards the south, with the objective of quickly gaining possession of
Falaise. Lieutenant General Simonds, the commander of II (Canadian)
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Corps, had begun detailed planning from the end of July for 8 August (in
1918 a lucky day for the Canadians, whose breakthrough at Amiens was a
"black day" for the German Army).
The mission was not an easy one. The attack had to be launched across a
carefully concealed defensive system in depth, which was covered by tank
and anti-tank guns with a longer range than that of the Shermans. Simonds
sought to achieve surprise by attacking at night, without an artillery preparation, and with a massive commitment of armor on an unprecedented scale.
His infantry was to overcome the defensive system in improvised armoured
vehicles, made from stripped-down "Priest" self-propelled howitzers. These
"Priests" were converted into "Kangaroos," each able to carry a rifle squad.
The flanks of the attack were to be protected by carpet bombing conducted
by Bomber Command. Simonds had three reinforced infantry and two
armored divisions with about 1000 tanks. The two armored divisions, the
2nd Canadian and the 1st Polish, were well trained, but had never been in
combat. They were guaranteed constant strong close air support.
The planning for Operation "Totalize" was conducted down to the smallest
detail. Nevertheless, neither the organization and composition of the formations, nor the equipment of the attacking forces, was sufficient for the high
requirements of such a massive operation. Never before had small armored
and infantry battle groups needed to coordinate so closely with artillery and
the Air Force. Instead of providing direct radio communications to Bomber
Command in London and to the close air support squadrons, the targets were
preplanned. This was an overtaxing of the system at the start of a mobile
warfare operation.
On 2 August Hitler ordered all of the panzer forces available in Normandy
to participate in Operation "Lttich," the attack from Mortain to the western
coast, "in order to cut off the lead enemy armored elements and throw them
into the sea." Field Marshal Montgomery was informed of the withdrawal of
the panzer divisions through ULTRA. However, in order to maintain the
secret of ULTRA, he did not disseminate this to the Canadians. In their intelligence report of 7 August they still took all the panzer divisions into
account. In fact, the German front was being held by only the 89th Infantry
Division, which had been formed early in 1944 in Norway and arrived in
France only a few days earlier. It consisted of older men, insufficiently
armed and without combat experience. It was only supported by strong flak
formations and the exhausted 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend,"
which, after unbroken commitment, was finally to be withdrawn from the
front-line. The panzer division had only 50 tanks and was reinforced by the
101 Heavy SS-Panzer Bn. with 13 Tigers. Hauptsturmfhrer Wittmann
belonged to this unit.
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Diagram 16: The Breakout from the Falaise Pocket from 16 to 20 August 1944.

As ordered, shortly before midnight on 7 August the phalanx, consisting of

the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division on the right, reinforced by the 2nd
Canadian Armoured Brigade, and the 51st (Highland) Division on the left,
reinforced by the 33rd (British) Armoured Brigade, on either side of the
Caen - Falaise national road, crossed the departure line north of Tilly-laCampagne. They were packed tightly - bow to stern - four armored columns
with only two meters between tanks. Each column was led by a gapping
force with "Flail" mine clearing tanks. Electronic "direction finders" were
set up in every squadron commander's tank. Additionally, 40 mm anti-aircraft guns fired tracers on the outer flanks as direction markers. The
Kangaroos, with mounted infantry, followed right behind the tanks. Behind
them, searchlights provided "artificial moonlight" against the clouds.
Assumed enemy positions on the flanks of the attack were bombed before
the offensive. The tanks were to follow right behind a wall of artillery fire.
At first, all went well. There was no trace of the enemy:
"No sooner had the artillery fired than the columns were momentarily covered in a thick cloud of smoke. One could not see the tail light of
the guy in front of him ... (The vectoring beams failed like magnetic
compasses)... Three of the lead tanks got stuck in a bomb crater ... The
chaos was indescribable. Everyone was told to keep closed up and follow directly behind the lead, but it soon became clear that the blind were
leading the blind ... (Orientation was completely lost, even the national
road was crossed without anyone noticing). After an eternity, Major Reid
reported that he had found the railroad crossing assigned to us and fired
a Very flare, in order to mark the way for the others. Shortly after a number of tanks arrived, led by officers on foot ... Suddenly, there were two
flashes in quick succession, accompanied by showers of molten sparks,
as enemy bazookas, fired from behind the hut, hit two tanks ..."
Thus Lieutenant Colonel Jolly described the attack.
Before dawn the poor 89th Infantry Division was more or less eliminated
and the way to Falaise lay open to the enemy. However, instead of immediately continuing the attack, the Canadian formations were ordered to eliminate all remaining nests of resistance in their rear and await the planned
commitment of heavy bombers. This pause allowed "Panzer Meyer" to occupy the prepared positions north of Bretteville-le-Rabet and conduct a counterattack. When, suddenly, he saw hundreds of tanks from the two attacking
armored divisions in front of him and pathfinder aircraft in the sky, he immediately recognized the imminent threat of carpet bombing. His clever attack
broke the inexperienced enemy tankers into groups and dispersed them into
the target bombing area. The subsequent carpet bombing by hundreds of
American heavy bombers against the towns and farms north of Bretteville-le124

Rabet, with many bombs falling short, inflicted further losses on the
Canadians and Poles. Also, apparently through a breakdown in communication, the bombers recognized the yellow smoke as designating targets, not as
air recognition signals indicating Canadian troops. The more the Canadians
set off the yellow smoke canisters to mark their positions, the more they
were bombed, while not a single bomb fell on Kampfgruppe Meyer.
On that morning the Swords [to the Knight's Cross] winner SS Hauptsturmfhrer Wittmann was killed near Cintheaux.
The two Canadian armoured divisions extracted themselves from the confusion and continued the attack before evening. They were again stopped north
of Langannerie by 8.8 cm flak. Indeed, the Canadians did gain 10 to 11 kilometers on that day, but 20 kilometers to Falaise still lay in front of them and
German resistance stiffened. That evening, German staff officers arrived at a
battery of the 8th Werfer Brigade near Soignolles. They provide an indication of what hell the soldiers had experienced:
"They said that there was no reason for us to hold. Leutnant
Niemeyer was sorry for the infantrymen, but he couldn't let his battery
panic and lose control, even if summoned by a higher rank. He was able
to chase the group away under threat of force of arms and brought his
battery under control with the sharp order "Fire mission!" Dashing to
their guns the battery received two fire missions from the battalion. The
missions directed them to fire at the Canadians on the left as well as the
Poles on the right ..."
as Leutnant Niemeyer described his experience.
I SS Panzer Corps was able to hold the hills north of the Laizon [stream].
During the evening of 9 August a battle group from the 4th (Canadian)
Armored Division, under Lieutenant Colonel Worthington, received orders to
take Hill 195 west of the national road. Advancing in the dark through high
wheat fields, he lost his orientation and set up a hasty defense on Hill 141,
five kilometers further to the west, after suffering heavy casualties. He was
convinced that he had taken his objective. On 10 August, without radio communications and support, they were destroyed, except for a few survivors,
partially by their own troops and aircraft.
To the deep disappointment of Montgomery and the Canadians, not only
did "Totalize" fail, but so did the similar Operation "Tractable" on 14
August, as a result of the resistance of I SS Panzer Corps, which had no
more than 15 battle-worthy Pz IVs, five Panthers and 15 Tigers. This northern front was pushed back further toward Falaise.
Meanwhile, all German attempts to encircle or cut off the enemy in the
beachheads failed on 7 August, including Operation "Lttich," under the
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weight of the enemy's fighter-bombers. None of the 300 German fighters,

which took off on the morning of 7 August to support the lead attack elements, reached the combat area. They had all become involved in air combat
long before. Unconcerned about Hitler's order to continue the German attack
near Mortain until 10 August, Eisenhower decided to redirect General
Patton, who was storming to the east, from Le Mans to the north toward
Alencon, in order to envelop both German armies.
"Hitler did not fail to assist the enemy in their success. Indeed,
Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge had seen the danger coming for several
days ... He renewed his request to immediately initiate the withdrawal
behind the Seine, while, at the same time, pull back the divisions of
Army Group G from southwestern and southern France, in order to use
them in conjunction with Army Group B to build a defensive front up to
the Swiss border. When Hitler did not reply after several days, Kluge, on
his own responsibility, ordered the 5th Panzer Army to withdraw first to
the Orne, then behind the Touques, and the 7th Army to cover the
manoeuvre on the southern flank on a line Domfront-Alencon ...
When this decision was made, the enemy already had lead armoured
elements far to the north of Alencon and was active on his northern and
western fronts ...
... On 15 August Hitler turned down Kluge's request from the day
before, which would have permitted the two armies to withdraw from the
almost closed pocket. Kluge then ordered it on his own responsibility."
wrote General von Tippelskirch in his "History of the Second World War."
After his arrival in Fresnay (south of Alencon) on 9 August, in the LXXXI
Corps sector, General Bayerlein strived to get his Panzer Lehr Division refitted. However, his hope would not be fulfilled. Already on the previous day,
8 August, as the Americans approached and captured Le Mans, all combat
capable elements were withdrawn from the division assembly area and organized into a Panzer Lehr Division Kampfgruppe, with the mission of screening the area between Jublains-Conlie and delaying an enemy advance to the
north toward Alencon. The non-combatant units were moved to the east, initially into the area east of La Fert-Bernard. Later they were to be transferred to Versailles.
Already on 9 August the 80th (US) Division forced the Panzer Lehr
Division Kampfgruppe to give up the important Sill road intersection. On
10 August the enemy surprisingly turned from Le Mans to the north, outflanked the 9th Panzer Division and advanced the 5th (US) and 2nd (French)
Armored Divisions, followed by two infantry divisions, to within 25 kilometers of Alencon. American tanks entered Fresnay and forced the two division
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command posts to retreat hastily. While the corps command post was being
evacuated southeast of Alencon, it remained quiet in front of the Panzer Lehr
sector. Nevertheless, in order to shorten the front, the division withdrew
behind Merdereau stream.
On 11 August the enemy continued to advance to the north up to Mortagne
and Nogent-le-Rotrou and drive the supply troops, which were still located
around Alencon, into undisciplined flight to the north and east. There was
only reconnaissance activity to the front of Panzer Lehr. The newly deployed
331st Infantry Division was ordered to secure the line Gac - L'Aigle to the
south. It was subordinated to Kampfgruppe von Hauser, which was released
from commitment near Vire.
On 12 August the enemy attacked with strong forces along the entire front,
accompanied by rolling air strikes, in order to encircle the two German
armies. The 2nd (French) Armoured Division attacked through from
Alencon across and around the Ecouves forest toward Argentan, thereby
blocking the advance of the 5th (US) Armored Division further east via Sees
towards Argentan for hours. The Allied forces attacking to the north were
supposed to be cut off by an attack conducted by Panzergruppe Eberbach out
of the Carrouge area to the east. West of Mortre, the attack of the 116th
Panzer Division, reinforced by Battle Group Eltrich (commander 130th
Armored Engineer Battalion from Panzer Lehr), ran into enemy forces. After
suffering considerable losses, including Major Eltrich, they were able to
delay the American advance on Argentan enough so that the German forces
still located to the west were given some time. Battle Group Panzer Lehr
was withdrawn to Carrouges.
On 13 August the weight of the enemy attack and air activity increased in
the area south of Argentan. The threatened encirclement in the ever decreasing assembly area and the difficult supply situation forced the withdrawal of
the front-lines. There were gaps in the command and control and reporting
system. During the evening communications were lost between Panzer Lehr
staff and the LXXXI Army Corps. Since the main body of the division, which
had been scheduled for refitting, had already fled to the east and the enemy
pressure on the weak kampfgruppe securing near Carrouges was decreased,
General Bayerlein turned over his sector to the 708th Infantry Division, along
with his committed elements (henceforth Kampfgruppe Kuhnow). General
Bayerlein, his staff and supply elements marched to the east from Ecouch
through Habloville-Trun, in order to avoid the encirclement.
Luckily, on 14 August General Bradley halted all American movements, in
order to strengthen Field Marshal Montgomery's pressure east of the Orne to
the south, up to the Dives, and especially toward Falaise. Nevertheless, the
enemy attack was essentially stopped by the Germans' fierce fighting.
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On 15 August the 1st (Polish) Armored Division forced the crossing of the
Dives near Jort. Falaise fell on the following day. The 4th (Canadian)
Armored Division captured Trun on the 17th. While the German Fifth
Panzer Army tenaciously defended the northern front, without being able to
prevent penetrations, the mission of covering the rear of the pocket in the
west fell to the 7th Army. The stubborn Hitler still refused to make a clear
decision and order the immediate retreat through the "bottleneck" to the east,
as was urgently proposed by Kluge's chief of staff, General Blumentritt, in
his absence. In his search for a scapegoat to blame the disaster on, Hitler
replaced Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, whom he suspected of treason
and considered a traitor, by Generalfeldmarschall Model, who took command in the west on the evening of 17 August. Generalfeldmarschall von
Kluge voluntarily took his life on 19 August. In a farewell letter to Hitler, he
explained the failure in the west, for which he took full responsibility, and,
hoping that Model would master the situation, Kluge concluded:
"Should the new weapons, in which you place so much hope, especially those of the Air Force, not bring success, then, my Fhrer,make up
your mind to end the war. The German people have suffered so unspeakably that it is time to bring the horror to a close."
Hitler's revulsion to withdrawal of any type, which he acquired in Flanders
during the First World War, gave the Allies an opportunity to achieve a
"Stalingrad in the West." The fact that the Falaise pocket turned out to be only
a smaller German version of Dunkirk was thanks to Feldmarschall von Kluge.
Model's initial plan on 18 August, proved at once to be unworkable. He had
planned to establish a new front behind the Dives in a north-south direction
forward of the Seine and conduct a planned withdrawal to that line. There was
only one road still available for the retreat through the bottleneck and it was
under constant fighter-bomber attack. After the previous experience with
Allied carpet bombing, which inflicted almost as many Allied losses as
German, this type of bombing was not a factor. Meanwhile, the Americans
took up their advance to the north and made it to Chambois. The Poles were
committed against this village on 17 August. It was not until 18 August that
they captured Mount Ormel and Hill 262. The attack of II SS Panzer Corps
ordered from out of the Vimoutiers area against Trun, in order to open the
pocket, was delayed by the air situation, lost radio communications and the
lack of fuel.
The decisive breakout from the pocket was achieved during the night of 19
and morning of 20 August and was conducted by the combined forces of
XLVII Panzer Corps and II Fallschirmjger Corps. Attacking from the west,
mostly without weapons and ammunition, but with the help of II SS Panzer
Corps attacking from the east, they were able to overpower the Poles and
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Canadians on either side of Chambois. Fifteen hundred Poles and 80 tanks

without fuel were cut off on Mont Ormel. They were unable to transport
their wounded. A monument was erected at this location and a stamp was
issued in remembrance.
General Freiherr von Lttwitz described the breakthrough of his 2nd Panzer
Division near St. Lambert:
The breakout near St. Lambert was ordered for 19 August at 1900
hours. I ordered all panzers and armored vehicles in the lead, but, due to
the numerous destroyed vehicles laying about, night operations were
impossible. Thus, the first advance out of the Bailleul area did not occur
until 0400 hours. The morning of 20 August began with fog. Columns
from all of the encircled units streamed in the direction of St. Lambert.
Some of the columns had eight rows abreast. Ordered command and
control was no longer possible. Only the panzer battalion and elements
of the 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiment reached St. Lambert in good order.
At 0100 hours they reported that they had forced the breakthrough there
and were screening in the direction of Trun and Chambois. The artillery
was quiet until 0700 hours. Then however, a fire storm was set loose the
likes of which I had never before experienced. The direct fire by numerous enemy guns on the Dives forced a turn around and a local crisis. The
columns between St. Lambert and Aubry-en-Exmes were stopped and
shot up. New pillars of fire rose incessantly into the sky from fuel tanks.
Ammunition exploded, driverless horses rushed about, some severely
wounded. The crossing over the Dives bridge was particularly horrible.
There, dead men, destroyed vehicles and other equipment were dumped
into the Dives, forming a gruesome tangle.
On 20 August bad weather kept the fighter-bombers at a distance, but the
artillery and tank fire directed from the hills still complicated the breakout.
The self-sacrifice of the Fallschirmjgers under General Meindl played a
great role. The majority of weapons, vehicles and equipment was lost in the
pocket, but more than half of the German soldiers got out. Forty thousand
were lost, including 3,735 killed, who now rest in the beautiful German military cemetery at St. Desir, near Lisieux. Many panzer crews, who before or
during the more than five hour breakout lost their vehicles and could find no
others, were forced to alternately crawl and run up the long ridge under
enemy fire. Many were wounded, as was the commander of the 7th Army,
General Hausser.
We still have to report on the whereabouts of Battle Group Kuhnow, the
902nd Pzgdr Lehr Rgt. with one panzer company and a light field howitzer
battery, which was very weak from the start and became further decimated
during the days of fighting in the pocket. Its attachment to the 708th Infantry
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Division near Carrouges on 13 August was a problem, as their infantry radio

sets could not communicate with those in armoured units. Armoured signal
stations had to be deployed with the infantry. When they were lost, all communication went with them. During the retreat, Kampfgruppe Kuhnow
crossed the Orne on the rainy night before 17 August near Mesnil-Jean and
was then attached to the 12th SS Panzer Division. Air attacks, increasing
artillery and mortar fire, lack of supplies and broken radio communications
in the rapidly diminishing pocket complicated an ordered withdrawal and
played on the will of the troops to continue. Nevertheless, the corps order to
break out reached most of its subordinates. Oberleutnant Graf (commander
of the 5th Company, 902nd Regiment) described the events:
"During the evening my company drove past all types of destroyed
vehicles. It was a horrible sight; the end of two armies. We found a case
of Cointreau in an abandoned SPW. We immediately stowed it away.
It was still dark. The formations were ready to break out. As morning dawned, we started moving. It was an imposing sight; gradually rising terrain with an open field of fire. There were paddocks to the left.
The panzers advanced, followed on a wide front by SPWs, then numerous vehicles, artillery, trucks. The infantry marched on the side for security. Enemy tanks and anti-tank guns then opened fire against our panzers. An armored duel ensued. Nervously the column sought protection in
the hedges. Even I drove my SPW into an enclosure. Then we learned
that we were being fired upon from all sides. Where is the enemy? Who
is the enemy? Trucks were shot up and one became stuck in front of the
only exit. I ordered the SPW forward to push the truck aside.
On the battlefield everything was in confusion. While the tanks
cleared the way for other vehicles and the infantry established a breech,
many other vehicles tried to break out on their own ..."
It was five hours and many other critical situations later before Graf and the
main body of his regiment broke through. Indeed, unit integrity was often
lost during these horrible hours. However, after crossing the engineer bridge
over the Seine near Elbeuf, Kampfgruppe Kuhnow quickly reassembled.
Each vehicle was given a corresponding march order directing it to reporting
stations assigned by the army. Even stragglers were able to find their way
back to their companies, which had, during the difficult past days, reported
to other panzer formations and had to fight with them.

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Endless columns of British soldiers gather on the beach at Dunkirk under the protection of the RAF, waiting for the rescue ships.

Deployment of the II Bn., 11th Panzer Regiment on 27 May, 1940 against the Cassel mountain fortress, which already lay under artillery fire. Swastika flags on the rear decks of the
panzers served as air identification.
131

On 30 May, as we foiled the breakout of the Cassel defenders, I was filmed by a war correspondent. This photograph later
appeared on the Wochenschau and the film "Victory in the West."
132

Captured Russian KV lis (152mm howitzer) outfitted with German command cupolas were
scheduled to be used for the Malta landing.

View of Puys (1992) from the Freya radar positions. The Royal Regiment of Canada was
destroyed here.
133

German landing craft: Siebelfhre (propeller-driven Ferry-Barge).

Marinefhrprahm (Naval Ferry-Barge)

134

Oberst Scholze (next to Generaloberst Guderian) could be pleased with his regiment during a
training exercise in the summer of 1943.

A 150 mm Infantry gun on the chassis of a Czech tank 38(t) of 901 Panzer Grenadier
Regiment. It was known as the "Cricket".
135

A Mercedes Radio Car (Kfz 23) of 130 Signal Bn. of Panzer Lehr Division, with
roof antenna and its crew.

The 3rd (medium) Bn. 130 Panzer Lehr Rgt. was equipped with captured 155 mm Soviet
Cannon-Howitzers, Mk. 433/1. This gun was very effective with an increased range (16,500
m) but 30% heavier than the equivalent German field howitzer, and with a limited ammunition supply it was slowly being phased out.
136

AA defense of tanks was provided by their coaxial 7.92 mm MG on a tripod. During rail
transport side skirts were stored in front or underneath the tank, as they exceeded the maximum loading width.

During rail transport the trains were protected by the unit's AA guns. Here a quadruple
20 mm gun on a trailer.
137

Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein (1899 - 1963) commander of the Panzer Lehr Division.

138

Luneville, Feb. 1944. Sd Kfz 251 SPWs of 902 Panzergrenadier Regiment.

Dispatch Rider Platoon of 902 Panzergrenadier Regiment.

139

Panzer IV H crossing the Hungarian border, commanded by Ltn. von Landsberg-Velen.

Jerricans on the turret indicate a shortage of supply trucks

Hungary, April 1944. Bridge building with new equipment on one of the Danube's tributaries.
Crossing is a Panther Ausf. A with what looks to be a full compliment of external equipment.
140

Tank maintenance was decisive for maintaining fighting strength.

Here two fitters adjust the steering gear of a Mk. IV.

An 8-wheel SdKfz 232 Armored Car of Panzer Recon Btl.

130 of Panzer Lehr Division with its crew.
141

Each panzergrenadier regiment had some flame throwers, mounted in Sd Kfz 251/16
tracked armored personnel carriers.

142

The 8 x 8 armored car, PUMA, (Sd Kfz. 234/2), armed with a 50 mm gun L/60, (here a prototype) was a remarkable reconnaissance vehicle. 1st Sqn of ALA was equipped with them.

General Bayerlein inspects Panzer Workshop Company. On his right,

Leutnant Henke, his aide.
143

Longues Naval Coastal Battery, 1990.

A major landing on the Calvados coast was considered to be unlikely because it lacked any
operational supply harbors. The "artificial harbors" which were, in the meantime, developed
in England, solved that problem. Their existence had been hidden from German reconnaissance until approximately 23 June. Therefore, they were never targeted. Seen here is the remnants of the "Mulberry Harbor" at Arromanches (1979).
144

Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt, OB West.

145

General Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, C-in-C Panzergruppe West.

146

Generaloberst Dollmann,C-in-C 7th Army and Generaloberst von Salmuth, C-in-C 15th Army.
147

General of Waffen-SS Dietrich, C-in-C of I SS-Panzer Corps, visiting HQ Panzer Lehr

Division at Chateau Orbois.

The I SS-Panzer Corps commander, Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Sepp Dietrich, with escorting officers, visiting the headquarters of the Panzer Lehr Division with Generalleutnant
Bayerlein and his la, Major i.G. Kauffmann. SS Sturmbannfhrer Weiser is on the far left.
148

Hauptmann von Falkenhayn, CO of 8th Company, Panzer

Lehr Pz. Rgt.

Oberst Gerhardt, Cdr. Panzer Lehr Regiment.

149

The Panzer Lehr Division's two general staff officers, Major i.G. Kauffmann the la
and Major i.G. Werncke the lb.

CP of Panzer Lehr Division in a sunken road near Cheux on 8 June. General Bayerlein
(back to camera) talking to Major Kauffmann.
150

The C-in-C Panzergruppe West, later Fifth Panzer Army, General Freiherr Geyer
von Schweppenburg. In the background, Generalmajor of the Waffen-SS
Lammerding, CO of 2. SS-Panzer Division.

151

On 10 June, at 1600 hours, the forward-most Panther platoon from the I Battalion, 6th Panzer
Regiment arrived as a panzerjger kommando at the 3rd Company, 130th ALA near Abbaye
de Mondaye. Leutnant Gerstmann at far left (with field cap).
152

General of Waffen-SS Hausser reported arrival of his II SS-Panzer Corps to Field Marshal Rommel. Here Rommel
accompanies Hausser to his staff car showing a square flag (black-white red) of a corps commander and the grey
General's flag with a gold rim and the national marking.
153

Incapacitated panzers - a Mk. IV and a Tiger tank in Villers-Bocage.

Another day in Villers-Bocage. To the left is a destroyed Mk. IV (634), and on the right an
enemy Cromwell tank.
154

The bitterly contested Hill 112, scene of some of the most savage fighting of the Normandy Campaign.

155

Major Weincke, Division lb, examines a Cromwell tank.

Oberstleutnant Joachim Ritter von Poschinger.

156

General Hausser and

General Meindl, C-in-C
of II Parachute-Corps.

Three tank commanders of Heavy SS-Panzer Abteilung 102 (of II SS-Panzer-Corps) in front
of a Tiger tank. On the far left is Knight's Cross winner Will Fey.
157

Hill 112. The "Forest of the Half Trees" in the background

Monument to the 43rd British Wessex Division on Hill 112. They fought around the hill,
Chateau Fontaine, Eterville and Maltot for nineteen days.
158

The Canadian attack terrain from the German point of view. The Black Watch had to attack
out of the Orne valley from St. Martin-de-Fontenay, overcoming the reverse slope to the south
(left) toward Fontenay. On the horizon are (from right to left) Caen, Carpiquet airfield and
Hill 112 (far left).

The Troteval Ferme farmstead (1993), which was so hotly contested by the 1st SS Panzer
Division and the 2nd Canadian Division. The city of Caen is in the background.
159

Two squads of Panzer Grenadiers marching to combat.

160

A tank destroyer team with Panzerfausts preparing for commitment in a swimming

Volkswagen (Schwimmwagen) Type 166.
161

The chalk stonework of May-sur-Orne, the Kampfgruppe Sterz command post.

Destroyed Panthers from the 1st Company, 6th Panzer Regiment on the elevated road near Le
Desert on 11 July 1944.
162

Hauptmann Phillips, CO of 1 st Bn. 901. Panzergrenadier Rgt. On 11 July he had to surrender

at Le Desert.

163

Among the widely feared enemy anti-tank weapons in the west, against which we had no
counter, were the fighter-bombers Typhoon (British) and Thunderbolt P-47 (U.S.). They were
not only armed with on-board weapons (20 mm cannon, British) and (12.7 mm machinegun,
U.S.), but alternatively had available 450 kilograms of bombs, or eight 75 mm rockets with
anti-tank, high explosive warheads, which were very accurate and able to penetrate any armor
when fired in pairs.

This stamp (1990) showed (arrows) the route of the 1st Polish Armored Division under
General Maczek from Caen to the battle on Mont Ormel on 20 August 1944, under German
attack from all sides.
164

Road bridge from Pontobault across the Selune (south of Avranches). The American forces
broke into Bretagne and into the French countryside across this bridge. The attempt of the
100th Kampsgeschwader to destroy this bridge with radio guided bombs from Toulouse, 700
kilometers away, failed. However, thirty-six DO 217 bombers and their crews were lost trying
to destroy it.

Plaque on the chapel at Verrieres for the 2nd Canadian Division in Operation "Totalize'
on 8 August 1944.
165

HQ 902 Panzergrenadier Rgt next to its armored command vehicle. Behind the table Major Welsch (with Knight's Cross), the
regimental commander, at his right Hauptmann Boehm, CO 2nd Bn.
166

Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model (1891-1945), Commander

in Chief, Army Group B, 17.8.1944 - 5.9.1944.

Generalfeldmarschall Hans-Guenther von Kluge,

Commander in Chief West, 2.7.1944 - 16.8.1944.
167

View from Mont Ormel to the northwest toward the breakout area north of St. Lambert on 20
August. The hills in the background were occupied by the enemy.

Panzer IV, No. 602, was one of the very few tanks of Panzer Lehr Division to make it back to
the German border from Normandy (but not without taking a few hits!).
168

Leopold-Canal near Strobrugge seen from Moerhize. Soldiers of the 64th Infantry Division in
the pill-box on the left hand bank repulsed the Canadian attack.
169

Dragon's teeth of the West Wall.

170

The Leopold Canal.

At the beginning of October, the last panzer men returned from their commitment on the West
Wall with a captured American M8 armored reconnaissance vehicle.
171

Hauptmann Weiler, Commandant of Fort Driant from September to 30 October 1944.

172

View of the central fortifications (from the northwest), and below, a close-up view of Fort
Driant's fortified ditch.

173

View of Fort Driant's central fortifications from the east.

Fort Driant from the north. In the foreground on the right a gun from C Battery, in the background the Mance trench.

174

Fort Driant's C Battery (3 x 100 mm guns).

This bunker on the Maginot Line in Domfessel became a mouse trap for the staff of the I
Battalion, 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment.
175

In light of the constant air

threat, vehicles and, in particular, traces of tracked vehicles
had to be camouflaged during
redeployments.

Soon after their initial commitment at the Sarre one of the Panthers was hit by a rocket from a
Thunderbolt on the barrel near the muzzle.
176

Oberleutnant von Poschinger and his staff celebrate over shooting down one of the enemy
fighter-bombers.

The 60 ton combat bridge across the Our River near Gmnd.

177

A Jagdpanzer IV (Sd.Kfz. 162/1) of 130 Panzerjger Bn. This turretless tank destroyer on the
Mk. IV chassis mounted the same powerful 75mm L/70 gun as the Panther, with a combat
weight of only 24 tons. This earlier variant is armed with the 75mm L/48 gun.

A Jagdpanther (Sd.Kfz. 173) on the Panther chassis, armed with the high performance 88 mm L/71
gun as on the King Tiger, making this vehicle perhaps the finest tank destroyer of WW2.
178

General Bayerlein with Oberst Gerhardt. CO of Panzer Lehr Rgt. 130 (centre) during a meeting with CG LVIII Panzer Corps
General Walter Kruger (1892 - 1976) on 19 December at Longvilly.
179

Schtzenpanzerwagen (Sd.Kfz. 251) had been in short supply, merely equipping one instead
of four panzergrenadier battalions in Panzer Lehr Div. This is an engineer vehicle mounting
bridging equipment.

A burnt out Sherman and Schtzenpanzerwagen near the chapelle and railway station of
Neffe, in front of Bastogne.
180

This late model Panther G of Feldwebel Dette hit a German mine and was immobilized on 19
December 1944, at the western exit from Neffe.

The last Jagdpanzer IVs (Sd.Kfz. 162/1) of 130 Panzerjger Lehr Bn. were lost near Houffalize. These
are the IV/70 (A) interim development versions, manufactured by Alkett.

181

After the bombing of the

Panzer Werkstatt Co. at
Birresborn, panzer repairs
became even more difficult
than before. Therefore, this
Tatra tool vehicle became
most important to the maintenance of the II Bn., 130th
Panzer Lehr Rgt., and was
driven by Feldwebel Scheibe
until the surrender on
Oberbayern in May 1945.

Destroyed U.S. 90 mm anti-tank gun at the edge of Humain.

182

Oberleutnant Kues, commander of the 7th Company, Panzer Lehr Regiment, in front of his
Panzer IV, which in spite of the air threat, was laden with gasoline canisters.

At the capture of Wardin, U.S. infantry passes incapacitated Mk. IV tanks of 6th Company,
Panzer Lehr Rgt., attached to 901 Panzergrenadier Rgt.
183

Major von Fallois, CO of

130 Panzer Recon Bn.
(ALA) was awarded the
Knight's Cross for the outstanding performance of his
battalion in the Ardennes.

The farmyard south of Bastogne, where the German summons to surrender was handed to
Col. Harper, and where Lt. Henke received the famous answer "Nuts".
184

The author and his adjutant, Lt. Freiher von Landsberg-Velen in January 1945.
185

The author with his adjutant, Ltn. Meyer, and a guest behind his triangular (= battalion) CP pennant, white pink - white. In the lower portion the Schnburg shield.

186

Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Prinz von Schonburg-Waldenburg.

Generalleutnant Walther von Hnersdorff.

187

La Cambe German Military Cemetery.

Bayeux British Military Cemetery. Here German soldiers lie shoulder to shoulder with their
British counterparts.
188

The families of the fallen Oberstleutnant Prinz von Schonburg-Waldenburg, his trusted comrade Fssel and his communications officer, Leutnant Hermann, erected monument stones in
the Parfouru-sur-Odon (east of Villers-Bocage) town cemetery.

A total of 39,000 German dead rest in the Lommel/Limburg German Military Cemetery.

189

15,418 German soldiers who died in Alsace and Lorraine during the Second World War
buried in the Bad Niederbronn Military Cemetery.

6,785 German soldiers, the majority killed during the Battle of the Bulge, were laid to rest i
Recogne-Bastogne.
190

The grave cross of Hauptmann Fritz Lex, II Battalion, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment, at the
Sandweiler Military Cemetery.

Before the gates of the city of Luxembourg lie, next to each other, the German Sandweiler Military
Cemetery for 10,913 WW2 dead and the Hamm American Military Cemetery with 5,076 dead.
Among them, amid his soldiers from the 3rd (US) Army, also rests General Patton
191

The memorial stone of Panzer Lehr Division in the commemoration grove of the German
Armor School Munster.

A replica of the author's command tank in the Panzer-Museum at Munster, the present
German Armour School.
192

The author, Oberst Helmut Ritgen.

193

V
BEFORE THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE REICH
13. From Paris to the West Wall
After the Americans were able to batter the German Normandy armies in
the Falaise pocket, they crossed the Seine on both sides of Paris and pursued
them on a wide front to the Reich. On 20 August the enemy established a
bridgehead below Paris, near Mantes. Others followed on the next day above
Paris, near Montreau and, on 25 August, near Melun. Further to the south of
the Seine, they advanced and crossed the Yonne toward Sens - Troyes.
Hitler had long harbored suspicions about the Army's hated officer corps
and their concept of operations in the West. They had urged him to replace
his "tactical patchwork" with "elastic fencing" and operational freedom. Up
to 28 July, preparations for a withdrawal, in case of an enemy breakthrough,
were forbidden. An order from the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations
Staff to all commands to construct the "Somme-Marne-Sone Line"
remained in the planning stages due to the shortage of labor and was overcome by events after the enemy unexpectedly switched to mobile warfare.
On 20 August Hitler ordered the construction of the "Deutsche Westellung"
(Scheldt -West Wall-Mosel). Instead of facilitating an organized retreat to
these positions, he ordered the holding of Paris as being "of particular importance." However, this depended entirely on quickly gaining distance from the
enemy to win back freedom of operation and to lead back the remaining
forces..
Under these circumstances it was no longer possible to think of refitting the
Panzer Lehr in France. As were five other panzer divisions, it was supposed
to be deployed as a mobile attack reserve in the area between the Seine and
Somme and "simultaneously refitted."
On 23 August, Hitler again explicitly ordered "Paris must not fall into
enemy hands unless as a field of ruins." The next evening, the enemy drove
strong armoured forces from Versailles and Sevres across the Seine, up to the
center of the city and the Palais Luxembourg. In order to save the city's population and monuments, the Wehrmacht commander assigned to Paris by
Hitler, General von Choltitz, made arrangements with the resistance movement for a cease-fire. In his support, Panzer Lehr was ordered from the east
during the night before 25 August to fight its way into the center of the city.
A kampfgruppe under Hauptmann Hennecke was entrusted with this mis195

sion. He had available the refitted I SPW Battalion, 901st Rgt, which was
reinforced by a weak Panther company and a platoon of infantry guns. No
more could be committed on such short notice. Indeed, after 21 August three
"Schelle Abteilungen" - the 509th, 510th and 511th (essentially bicycle battalions) - were redeployed from the Netherlands, and were incorporated as
replacements into both panzergrenadier regiments. However, there was no
chance to merge them quickly with the exhausted troops.
On the early morning of 25 August, Kampfgruppe Hennecke reached the
area around the Gare du Nord [Paris North Railroad Station] via Le Bourget,
while the Americans occupied the eastern portion of the city and the French
the western. The closer the kampfgruppe approached the center of the city,
the more the streets were barricaded and the more difficult they were to traverse. The panzergrenadiers in open vehicles suffered heavy casualties due
to the fire from the buildings. Then General von Choltitz ordered the surrender of the city. Hauptmann Hennecke broke off the fruitless mission and
withdrew to Villeparisis.
There, on the following day, Kampfgruppe Hennecke was outflanked by the
French armored division, which marched into Paris and was reinforced by

Kampfgruppe Pz Lehr Div.

Kampfgruppe 902 (Kuhnow)

Diagram 17: Retreat of the Panzer Lehr Division from France, August 1944.
196

the Resistance (Maquis), encircled and had to force a costly breakthrough in

the direction of Villers Cotterts.
Dr. Hans Herrmann, troop surgeon for Battle Group Hennecke, wrote in his
diary:
"Yesterday was another difficult day for us. We were involved in
heavy street fighting in Paris, which meant a lot of work for me. Street
fighting is always the worst. We were fired upon from windows and we
could never see the enemy. So, yesterday, I stood on the running board
with a carbine under my arms, driving through the streets to treat the
wounded. The feeling was strange. One would hear a round whistle
through the air and not know from where it came.
Tonight I sat in the front of the vehicle next to my driver. I could not
sleep because we always anticipated American tanks to suddenly roll out
of the plain in front of us. Now Gaullists and Americans have entered
Paris with a jubilant reception from the population. We learned this yesterday from someone who had been able to escape from the Allied forces
in Paris yesterday. The German prisoners were abused, spat upon,
flogged and treated as they were in 1918, perhaps even worse ..."
In these days, a greater disaster than the June invasion went unnoticed at
the Western Front. This was the collapse of the Southern Front, which was
being kept secret. After the battering of Army Group South, Ukraine,
Rumania and Bulgaria fell into enemy hands and switched sides. Stalin
gained access to the Balkans prior to the Western Allies.
The initial assembly area assigned to Panzer Lehr near Senlis was quickly
shifted to Laon, then, on 23 August, further south to Provins. The main body
of the division arrived on 24 August. Only the 902nd Rgt. remained near
Soissons for unknown reasons, possibly in order to meet the stragglers from
other divisions that were still escaping from the Falaise pocket and use them
as replacements for the reorganization.
Before his staff drove to Meilleray (12 kilometers south of Montmirail) on
24 August, General Bayerlein turned over the command of the division to
Oberst Gerhardt in order to better heal his wounds at home and receive his
high award, the Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross.
The responsibility for the refitting of the exhausted panzer divisions was
taken over by General der Panzertruppen Stumpff, who could accomplish little due to the difficult personnel and equipment situation and the command
structure. The ordered subordination of the still weak 26th SS
197

Panzergrenadier Rgt. to Panzer Lehr was cancelled due to the objection of an

SS commander. Only 22 new Panzer IVs with crews arrived in Sezanne on
24 August. They were assigned to the 5th Company, Pz Lehr Rgt, but they
were not combat ready until 26 August, after technical problems were eliminated.
Meanwhile, on 24 August, the enemy had also advanced strong forces into
the Sens-Troyes area. In order to block an anticipated breakthrough to the
north, the 1st German Army could do no more than commit the 48th Infantry
Division and the remnants of Panzer Lehr.
The author's II Bn, 130th Pz Lehr Rgt, with approximately 22 new Panzer
IVs, but without infantry, was ordered to reach the Fontenay -Tresigny area
by the night of 26 August to be at the disposal of the division. The march
from Szanne to Couloumniers proceeded without event. Bad weather kept
the fighter-bombers away. At 2300 hours the battalion occupied, as ordered,
security positions in Couloumniers to the south and west, because
Fontenay-Tresigny had already been overrun by the enemy (VII (US)
Corps), which had forced the 1st Army headquarters to hastily evacuate.
Kampfgruppe Ritgen was ordered to establish contact with the headquarters,
48th Infantry Division in Rebais.
On 27 August from 0600 hours Kampfgruppe Ritgen repulsed an enemy
attack on Couloumniers, until at 1000 hrs permission was given for a withdrawal to La Fert-Gaucher. The attempt to establish contact with the headquarters, 48th Infantry Division in Rebais failed. Rebais was already occupied by the Americans. The division had withdrawn. The kampfgruppe's
march to La Fert-Gaucher was like a triumphal procession. Seldom was a
German column so passionately greeted by the French as on this march,
because they mistook us for Americans. Seldom, were those awaiting liberation so disappointed. On the way, the kampfgruppe was unexpectedly reinforced. A construction battalion marching on foot from the Atlantic Wall
mounted the tanks. An artillery battalion with one light and one heavy field
howitzer was also absorbed. It appeared that the kampfgruppe was moving
between the armoured wedges of the 1st and 3rd (US) Armies and, therefore,
was not seriously attacked. It successfully blocked Grand Morin against
enemy tanks from the south. Without communications to higher echelons, it
broke contact from the enemy at dark and reached the still intact Marne
bridge near Dormans in the early morning, via Viels-Maisons, bypassing
Montmirail to the northwest across enemy occupied territory. It reached and
crossed at dawn the Marne bridge which was intact. This was shortly before
the 7th (US) Armored Division tried to cross it. When the bridge was blown,
the lead American tank plunged into the water.
198

A withdrawal to the rear which is forced by the enemy is always difficult

and wears down the fighting morale of the forces much more than a voluntary one, which is planned and well executed. The German withdrawal from
France in 1944 resembled a round up, on a broad front by the highly mobile
Allied troops, of the exhausted German units which generally marched on
foot.
Nevertheless, along the great routes they repeatedly stood up, in order to
fight and delay their pursuers. For stragglers, small groups or single vehicles
it was like running the gauntlet through a hate-filled enemy country in an
uprising. If they were unable to resist firmly, they were mercilessly killed.
One saw horrible sights. But there were also exceptions, especially in the
countryside, where people often selflessly helped German stragglers.
The French guerillas - officially French Forces of the Interior (FFI) - commanded by Lt. General Pierre Knig, were increasingly being organized and
supported by Jedburgh Teams, each consisting of two officers (one British or
American, one French) and an enlisted communication expert. These teams
were trained in guerilla warfare and dropped in the German rear area. They
were controlled by the Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ), an AngloAmerican agency in London, under General Knig on General Eisenhower's
staff. As time went by and they gained experience, they developed into a real
threat for the German withdrawal.
Early on 27 August Feldmarschall Model, from his headquarters in
Margival, the former Fhrer Headquarters in the West, alerted the nearby
staff of the 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment and ordered the establishment of a bridgehead south of Chateau-Thierry without delay. Moreover, and
from then on, the regiment would be subordinated to the LVIII Panzer Corps,
while the rest of Panzer Lehr remained with the LXXX Corps. Again the
division was divided between two different corps; in fact, between two different armies, the 5th Panzer Army and the 1 st Army, which were operating
in different directions.
The regimental commander, Major Kuhnow, who was conducting a forward
reconnaissance, ran into lead American armored elements in front of
Chateau Thierry and was able to only commit a company against them near
Roucourt. It was quickly overrun and destroyed. The regiment following was
forced to take a time-consuming detour when the Aisne bridge in Soissons
was prematurely blown. Both battalions took up positions one behind the
other along the Ourqu on the rail line on both sides of Oulchy. They were
pinned on both sides by the enemy and could not withdraw during the daytime, due to the air activity. The young replacements, insufficiently trained
and without experience, were enveloped. Whoever could not withdraw dur199

ing the night (or did not want to?), was captured, including the entire 6th
Company. Hauptmann Mller and his vehicles from I Battalion tried unsuccessfully to merge with the American columns without being noticed. After
blowing up the vehicles, he ordered his soldiers to break out and reach
friendly lines on foot. After much effort and heavy casualties, Mller and his
last 12 men were captured by the French near Sedan, on 14 September after 18 days!
During the night, the remnants of the regiment crossed the Aisne east of
enemy occupied Soissons. On 28 August it was supposed to be committed to
delay the enemy near Breine and later, together with elements of the 9th
Panzer Division, east of the Soissons-Laon-Vervins road. On 30 August it
was presumably on the Serre near Montcornet.
On 31 August the kampfgruppe was supposed to prevent the American
armored forces from crossing the Oise near Hirson. The attempt failed, as
mentioned in the corps daily report. This was its last commitment in France.
On order of OB West, all of the units of Panzer Lehr were to be relieved
from the front for refitting. The 902nd Regiment crossed the German border
via Neufchteau-Arlon-Echternach, for refitting in Baden-Wrttemberg.
In the fast changing situations during retreats, it is difficult to maintain
cohesion of the unit. The formations became jumbled. Three Panzer IVs
from Kampfgruppe Kuhnow did not cross the Seine on the pontoon bridge
near Elbeuf until 22 August and had to have their damage repaired by a tank
workshop company near Laon. After that, the route back to their battalion in
the south was cut off. So they drove on their own to the east, in the direction
of Rethel, where they assumed their battalion to be. The division had issued
a standing march order to each armored vehicle, protecting them from being
requisitioned by other formations. Feldwebel Feuerpfeil (7th Company)
remembered:
We were attached to an SS unit and committed at a road as an outpost against enemy tanks expected there. I took a couple of soldiers and
reconnoitered forward on foot. Then I suddenly detected Americans
sneaking up. I cried out to my comrade: "Open fire!" but he was so
bewildered that he didn't fire. But the Americans were also taken by surprise and withdrew. We waited in our panzers for an hour, then strong
artillery fire forced us to redeploy. On the next day we were ordered to
guard a staff. Allegedly the enemy had captured the nearby village. At
1000 hrs a motorcycle approached from there. After a burst of fire from
our MG the driver fell, his comrade escaped into the bushes. Up to the
afternoon all was quiet, then I with two men sneaked forward to two
buildings. From there two Germans with two French girls met us. They
said that a few hours before Americans had been there and captured a
200

weapon cache. I collected some of the weapons lying around and

ordered the two soldiers to return with me. They hesitated and disappeared, then they probably deserted.
Passing bombed fighter airfields, we arrived at Rethel. There we
were able to refuel and were ordered to secure towards the west at a
nearby electric power station. On the right side of the road two AA guns
were in position, their prime-movers behind them. I asked their lieutenant, what he would do in case of an enemy attack. "I will fire a couple
of rounds and then get the hell out of here".
I bought two rabbits. A neighboring French family agreed to cook us
a scanty roast. As the sky cleared, fighter-bombers appeared over us.
Then there was flak fire, detonations and a pillar of smoke near the flak
position. The fighter-bombers then attacked us with their on-board
weapons. After making several passes at the panzers, I heard a round
enter the engine compartment. We tried to drive the panzer to cover, but
the engine seized after only 100 meters. Then there was more flak fire,
tank cannon, detonations and we saw the flak soldiers fleeing. The prime
movers were burning. One of them called: "We knocked out two tanks!"
We took the machinegun and removed the breech block from the main
armament. We didn't want to blow up the panzer because it would also
blow up the French house, where our roast had been prepared. From
within the reeds at the bank of the Aisne we heard the bells of Rethel
ringing (at 1300 hours, as the French flag was being raised). The French
were searching the banks, but they didn't find us. At dark, I led my four
men across the river, bypassing the burning tanks in Rethel. We travelled
by map and compass, through forests and a town, with our machine-gun
and machine-pistols at the ready. The flabbergasted French sat in front of
their doors, but they did not try anything risky. Finally, we reached our
own troops.
Meanwhile, all of the other elements of Panzer Lehr had crossed the Marne,
even though the bold lead American armored elements caused much confusion. The LXXX Corps (General der Infanterie Dr. Beyer) conducted the
defense on the Marne. Oberst Oehmichen stayed behind to organize the antitank defenses. He was "General der Panzerabwehr aller Waffen" from OKH.
He immediately seconded Battalion Ritgen.
Enemy crossing attempts were repulsed, but it was clear that the sector
could not be held for very long, since the enemy already occupied the northern bank on both flanks. On the evening of 28 August we withdrew, as
ordered, to the Jonchery - Chambrecy - Pourcy resistance line, which
encompassed Reims in a great bend and guaranteed contact with other ele201

ments of Panzer Lehr.

The 5th (US) Division hit the new resistance line at midday on 29 August.
After a brief fight the weak German forces withdrew to the suburbs of Reims
and the northern bank of the Aisne-Marne canal. The enemy attacked unexpectedly at 2300 hours and entered the village of Beine. After some confusion, the panzers withdrew to the Suippes sector near Warmeriville. Reims
was lost. Oberst Oehmichen was captured. In the morning numerous remnants of a variety of German units came under command of the author. After
enemy tanks advanced on both sides of Warmeriville and threatened to outflank it, Group Ritgen received permission to fight its way through to
Vouziers. The closely pursuing enemy was slowed down by hastily erected
tree barricades which were covered by direct tank fire.
During the afternoon of 30 August Battle Group Ritgen formed a bridgehead at Vouziers. Shortly after it had been evacuated by the 1st Army headquarters. After interning all male residents in a hall, the population of
Vouziers remained relatively quiet until the town was evacuated. This was a
sign that the Maquisards respected decisiveness.
At the same time, elements of Panzer Lehr secured the flight of the noncombatants to the east on the Aire between St. Jubin to Varennes. Further to
the south, the enemy broke through the Argonne near Clermont-en-Argonne
and opened the way to Verdun.
On 31 August at 0800 hours the enemy attacked the Vouziers bridgehead.
As American observers climbed the mast of a windmill on a hill in front of
the city, it was torn to pieces by a 38 cm shell from a German Sturmtiger.
This Sturmtiger had been transferred to the west on Hitler's special order, to
assist in destroying Paris.
Kampfgruppe Ritgen was ordered to evacuate Vouziers at noon and withdrew into the Argonne. The route through the rugged forest offered a gruesome picture of atrocities of the Maquis against individual vehicles. The
division's forces were reorganized in Buzancy. All fighting elements formed
Kampfgruppe Hauser. All the rest were withdrawn to an assembly area east
of Thionville for refitting. A planned attack by Kampfgruppe von Hauser to
the south to recapture the defile east of St. Menehould had to be cancelled
due to the lack of forces and supplies. The kampfgruppe blocked the roads
leading to the east between Vouziers and Baulny, until it could withdraw
over the Maas in the Avioth area (north of Montmedy) on 2 September. From
there, it transferred into the Menuchenet-Bouillon area on 5 September.
The 1st German Army had been unable to hold the Somme-Marne line,
owing to the shortage of forces and supplies as well as to the refusal of the
now mobilized French population to collaborate and support Germany any202

more. Thus a withdrawal behind the Moselle was necessary. Beginning 1

September all non-fighting troops and installations started to withdraw to the
north-east. Meanwhile General Patton changed the direction of Third Army
from the North-east to the East.
On 31 August tanks and cavalry units had crossed the Meuse at Verdun,
trying to reach the Moselle. The support elements of Panzer Lehr Division
had been ordered to reach an assembly area initially at Briey, then after
crossing the Moselle at Thionville further to the east. In the Armistice
Agreement between France and Germany of 1940 the departments of
Alsace-Lorrain had been re-incorporated to Germany, but this had never
been acknowledged by France. The population at the border was mixed, but
generally more French-minded. Before crossing into German territory on his
was from Buzancy via Briey to Thionville, the author stopped his car with
his companions at a restaurant to enjoy a last lunch in France. Here, apparently no one was aware that Verdun had been captured by the Americans two
days before. The guests of the restaurant looked very uneasy, when we
ordered a meal.
Suddenly a gentleman approached our table, bowed and greeted us in
French: "My compliments to the German Army! I feel more reason now than
ever before to claim this during your misfortune!" We were utterly surprised
and moved by these kind and unexpected words, more so as they were said
in public in front of French people. So we felt at ease and almost in peace
near Germany. Hazy weather kept the sky clear of aircraft.
Back on our route we had to overtake an endless column of all kinds of
vehicles, cars, trucks, fighting vehicles, etc, all going in one direction - east,
no oncoming traffic. All of a sudden the column beneath us came to a standstill and then some vehicles sped towards the front passing us. An odd sight
in war, somebody hurrying up towards the front-line! Then I noticed a group
of officers in the ditch looking south with their glasses. I learned that some
time ago a few American armoured cars had crashed into and fired on the
column from the South. They had disappeared towards Thionville and might
return any moment. Major Derfflinger, the commander of transport services
of Panzer Lehr, had been hit and was mortally wounded.
In the column were three of my tanks on their way to the workshop for
repair. In the first one I advanced to Hayange, a mining town en route to
Thionville, in order to hunt the American armoured cars. The streets were
already decorated with French and red flags. In the large marketplace to the
right a huge crowd had gathered, celebrating their liberation. Obviously they
were shocked when we cleared the place, by a burst of fire above their heads,
in an unbelievably short time. After a short distance, at a street junction we
203

came to a deserted German Police Station, its windows nicely decorated with
flower boxes.
Here I hoped to catch the armour patrol in an ambush. The flower boxes put
across the street with a large sign: "Achtung, Minen!" (attention, mines)
would stop any armor. Upon arrival, the enemy would be knocked out by
two of my tanks, concealed between the houses. A foolproof plan, - but ...
Within minutes the first armored car arrived around the corner. Noticing
our foliage barrier, it stopped and immediately reversed. Fortunately for it,
through a misfire from the first tank it made a narrow escape. This armored
car patrol of 3rd (US) Cavalry Group had nearly succeeded in clearing the
Lorrain industrial area of Germans.
Continuing our advance we soon arrived at Thionville. Not a soul in the
streets. On the marketplace suddenly two German generals and a German
female clerk appeared from two houses, more than glad to be rescued again.
One had been appointed Field area commander of Verdun, unaware that it
was in American hands. On arrival at Thionville, they had been threatened
by some people, but luckily had managed to escape into a house upon arrival
of the American patrol. We took them across the Moselle bridge, which was
guarded by some engineers. I attached my three panzers to the engineers for
the time being.
During the next few days the German defense in this sector stabilized with
the arrival of new forces and the exhaustion of the Americans, due to a shortage of gasoline and supplies. The Moselle sector from north of Thionville to
south of Metz was commanded by General Sinnhuber (LXXXII Corps) of
the First Army. In spite of the shortage of forces. Hitler insisted on holding a
bridgehead west of Thionville. It was defended by the remnants of the 48th
Infantry Division, which had acted as a covering force of the First Army during its retreat from the Seine. Now it was being relieved by the arrival of
some units of the new 559th Volksgrenadier Division, primarily at Briey.
Short of anti-tank weapons, we were happy when General Sinnhuber
attached three Mk IV tanks to the Moselle bridge with the mission of relieving elements of the 48th Infantry Division being attacked at Briey. Tank driver Reinhold Schneider of tank 602 remembered:
"Led by the commander of the infantry company in Volkswagen
amphibious cars (presumably of the Recon Battalion) we proceeded to
Briey on 7 September at 0100 hrs. A few kilometers before the last village in front of Briey we paused for a short meeting of tank and platoon
commanders. Then we advanced towards Briey. My tank, without its
radio set, in the centre. As the Americans had not noticed us, they were
quite surprised when we shelled them. Again and again my commander
204

ordered me to ram the enemy howitzers with their prime-movers against

the wall behind them. Near the town center the lead tank warned us of
approaching enemy tanks, so we turned around to go back.
After a while the enemy tanks fired at us from the left. We were in a
sunken road and battled against about 15 tanks, some of which were
knocked out by us. I then felt a hard knock within our tank. When my
blood-stained commander collapsed onto me, I knew we were hit. I
asked on the intercom, what has happened? No answer - deadly silence.
As my engine was still running I drove on in cover of the sunken road to
the village where the last commanders meeting had taken place. My
hatch was blocked, so I dismounted through the emergency exit. Two
men climbed into the turret and evacuated the wounded loader, while
under enemy tank fire. My commander and gunner had been killed.
When our escorting men ran away, I remounted the tank and drove back
along an embankment until my tank was hit again, in the engine compartment. Shortly afterward it caught fire.
Outside I noticed the two men who had rescued my loader, still on
the turret. We then reached Tionville on foot. There we reported to a
Colonel and I, together with some other tankers, was returned to my
company at Asperg."
This was the end of tank No. 602, one of the tanks that the regiment had
been issued in February at Verdun. It had seen Hungary and was damaged by
shellfire on 11 June near Tilly, where Lt. Finsterwalder had died in it. After
its repair it had been fighting in the bocage near Tilly and near St. Lo,
despite several mechanical deficiencies. It finally crossed the Seine, Marne
and the Meuse. Its long life was due to the performance of its crew, the
maintenance squads and the tank workshop company, as frequent fractures
of the brittle carbon-hardened steel were unavoidable and the maintainability
of the Mk IV was less than ideal.
On 2 September an armored reconnaissance element from the 3rd (US)
Cavalry Group, after a bold advance of 100 kilometers, electrified the French
in Thionville and terrorized the fleeing German columns. The attempt to
ambush the Americans with damaged panzers (II Battalion, 130 Regiment)
in Hayange failed.
On 8 September Battle Group von Hauser formed the extreme right flank of
the 1st Army under the LXXX Corps (General der Infanterie Dr. Beyer). It
maintained contact on the left with the Battle Group 5th Fallschirmjger
Division - old comrades from the battle of St. Lo. To the right, a gap yawned
to the 7th Army. The enemy attacked through the gap. An immediately
ordered counterattack was insufficient to restore the situation, despite the
205

unit's bravery. For his successful commitment on 7 September near Palisuel,

Hauptmann Fink, the commander of I Battalion, 901st Pzgdr Lehr Rgt, was
awarded the Army Honour Roll clasp.
During the night the Kampfgruppe was withdrawn to Neufchateau. As a
result of the move, the exhausted troops got little relief.
During the next three days, Kampfgruppe von Hauser withdrew from delay
position to delay position in a planned retrograde action to the West Wall. On
the Attert near Redange and on the Alzette near Mersch, the energetically
pursuing enemy caused considerable physical and emotional problems for
the exhausted panzergrenadiers. On 11 September the enemy crossed the
railroad bridge in Mersch, which was not destroyed by order of Hitler.
During the 17 day retreat considerable elements of Panzer Lehr, which had
just before been resupplied near Senlis, were destroyed. Uncertainty of the
situation had become the rule, due to the shortage of means of reconnaissance and communications networks.
Meanwhile, the enemy, who was pursuing on a wide front, was able to cut
off and destroy individual units. Hitler's procrastination and concern over the
infantry divisions retiring on foot prevented the Germans from gaining sufficient distance from the enemy to allow for the construction of more barriers.
In spite of this, the soldiers maintained their trust in their commanders and
their faith in the West Wall.

Diagram 18: K a m p f g r u p p e von Hauser at the West Wall.

206

14. Kampfgruppe von Hauser at the West Wall

The American pursuit of the weak remnants of the German forces in the
West now threatened the territory of the Reich itself. The troops and the
homeland hoped that the West Wall would rectify the situation by breaking
the enemy's momentum. It was not generally known that the West Wall was
robbed of its weapons and equipment in favor of the Atlantic Wall and, in
spite of all warnings from OB West, it was not manned by a covering force.
Wire entanglements and mines had been removed. The armored hatches of
the pill boxes were replaced by primitive woodwork. Lanes were blown
through the dragon's teeth obstacles and the fields of fire were thoroughly
overgrown.
The weapons emplacements - constructed in 1939 for 37 mm anti-tank
guns and MG 34, were too small for the present weapons, the 75 mm antitank guns and MG 42. The concrete thickness was insufficient to protect
against modern bombs, and finally, AAA stands were completely lacking.
The arriving units from the retreat had to furnish their positions in the West
Wall within 24 hours, without having time to acquaint themselves with the
location and equipment. They were only strong enough to occupy every fifth
position.
Under the circumstances, it was understood that, after arriving, Battle
Group von Hauser had to take over a section of the West Wall, instead of
being relieved for refitting. It remained under command of the LXXX Corps
on the right flank of Army Group B. Its sector extended from the corps
boundary near Roth (2 miles south of Vianden) along the Our and Sauer to
Bollendorf, altogether a width of 12 miles.. The right neighbor was the 2nd
Panzer Division, the left the 5th Fallschirmjger Division. Battle Group von
Hauser consisted of;
Headquarters and I Battalion, 901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
(one rifle company),
5th Company, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment, Hauptmann Lex (12
Panzer IVs and Vs),
one company from the 130th Armored Engineer Battalion,
elements of the 130th ALA
one company of anti-tank guns from the 130th Panzerjger Lehr
Battalion,
In addition, arriving on 14 September
207

Alarm Battalion Trier (approximately 200 stragglers),

Alarm Battery Trier (four 105 mm light field howitzers).
Contrary to expectations, the opposing V (US) Corps did not utilize the
opportunity to breach the Westwall before its manning by German troops.
Apparently on 14 September the Americans wanted to make up for this
omission by launching an attack along three axes of advance within a
width of 30 miles. To the south, at Wallendorf, the reinforced CCR of 5th
(US) Armored Division advanced with the mission of seizing the high
ground of Mettendorf and then Bitburg.
Exploiting the incompletely destroyed Sauer bridge and an artillery preparation, they captured Wallendorf and overcame the steep eastern bank of the
river against brave resistance from Alarm Battalion Trier. The enemy had hit
the weakest position on the front, the Alarm Battalion. It lacked heavy
infantry weapons and artillery support and the Alarm Battery was commanded by a reserve airforce signals officer. With the exception of one non-commissioned officer and three gunners, it consisted of soldiers from other than
the artillery branch and suffered from the lack of fire control equipment and
ammunition.
Oberstleutnant von Hauser immediately assembled all available forces for a
counterstroke, but the tank company, reinforced by engineers, was short of
fuel and suffered heavy losses on the morning of 15 September, when trying
to hinder the enemy from crossing the Gay stream by an attack from
Krutchten. Employing flame-thrower tanks, the continually reinforced
Americans systematically advanced against the pill-boxes near Biesdorf,
some of which were firmly held by their crews for days. Biesdorf itself fell
on the night of 15 September. Moving from Niederseggen the American
Armored Team quickly captured Hill 407 south of Mettendorf and reached
the Pruem valley near Wettlingen and Bettingen.
The Americans north flank was screened by strong outposts, with their
southeast flank, close to the edge of the huge forest of Nussbaumer Hardt, by
patrols. Crossing the Pruem River the American armored spearheads encountered the fire of the AA defense of Bitburg. A barrage of airbursts from
88mm guns caused considerable losses among the American infantry, who
were withdrawn to the west bank.
General Beyer reported:
Having reached the Pruem valley the enemy had breached the West Wall,
only nine km away from Bitburg, which controlled the high ground governing the Bitburg decline and traffic junction, and thus was capable of exploit208

ing the tactical breakthrough operationally. There were no available German

forces east of Bitburg.
"The news that an American armored division had breached the
West Wall at the first attempt hit us like a bomb burst" (General Westphal, C
of S, C-in-C West). Commands and troops regarded it a miracle that the
American thrust was neither continued, supported, nor widened. The
German ring around the American bridgehead was "thin like a paper collar"
and the shortage of forces and fuel allowed nothing but "pin pricks" against
the enemy in the penetration bulge.
General Gerow, CG V (US) Corps, on 16 September ordered the discontinuation of the offensive and a defense of the bridgehead. General
Eisenhower's orders and the strained supply situation left him no other
choice.
Meanwhile the kampfgruppe of Panzer Lehr proved that it was still capable
of fighting. On 16 September, repeatedly attacking in the vicinity of
Niedersgegen, it succeeded in delaying the construction of a new bridge
across the Sauer River. As the American artillery was unable to follow, the
forward units at the Pruem were left without artillery support. On 17
September strong patrols attacked the eastern American strongpoints. Hazy
weather kept the sky clear of Allied aircraft and favored the defense.
Gradually fresh units for the "Sperriegel Pruem", a blocking force, were
provided and a counterattack was planned. Several task forces would launch
a concentric attack, among them the 2nd Panzer Division, 108th Panzer
Brigade and Kampfgruppe von Hauser. They would be supported by the
Pruem blocking force (two weak infantry regiments) from Schankweiler
towards Stockigt. Finally, from the south flank via Biesdorf the 19th
Volksgrenadier Division would roll up the West Wall.
The attack on 19 September was a failure, as some units did not arrive in
time. All partial attacks were repulsed. The only success of the day was
achieved by the armor of Panzer Lehr. Advancing from the Schankweiler
area, it captured the Stockigt area and knocked out a few enemy tanks.
(General Beyer)
The failure of 19 September imparted two conclusions: The enemy was
vulnerable to concentrated artillery fire and had weak positions near
Stockigt. Therefore, the attack was ordered repeated on 20 September, with a
few changes. The groups attacking on the flanks were to be supported by
stronger artillery than before. The 108th Panzer Brigade was moved into the
wide bend around the penetration area, into the forest east of Stockigt. From
there, it was to capture the dominant Freilingerhhe in the early morning.
The panzer group from Panzer Lehr was attached to it. Oberstleutnant von
209

Hauser proposed committing close combat tank destroyer teams of four to

five volunteers armed with panzerfusten against recognized American outposts. They were able to destroy several enemy tanks during the evening of
20 September. When vehicle noises in the enemy area indicated a withdrawal, before dawn Oberstleutnant von Hauser led the infantry of the Sperriegel
across the Pruem River between Bettingen and Wellingen in an attack. The
Enz ground was won against little resistance before dawn on either side of
Enzen.
The only panzer attack began late on the morning of 20 September; delayed
by traffic jams. Under the cover of a thick morning fog, the attack quickly
gained ground. In the early afternoon Freilingerhhe was in friendly hands.
The American division commander had, meanwhile, withdrawn the badly
battered CCR armored group and replaced it with the fresh CCB to defend a
smaller bridgehead around the village of Wallendorf. On 21 September this
bridgehead was attacked on converging axes supported by all available
artillery. At night, the enemy yielded to the pressure and withdrew all forces
to the western bank of the Sauer after blowing both bridges.
On 22 September the penetration was eliminated and the West Wall was
solidly in German hands. Although the enemy's behavior at that time could
not be explained, his withdrawal from the Reich was seen as a great success.
The Wehrmacht Communique of 23 September announced:
At the Eifel front, in a counterattack our forces regained ground at
the West Wall which had been temporarily lost, and eliminated the remnants of the enemy bridgehead across the Sauer, northwest of
Echternach. The 5th (US) Armored Division suffered heavy casualties
and lost over 40 tanks and armored vehicles.
Kampfgruppe von Hauser from Panzer Lehr played an essential role in this
success. For its commitment, Oberstleutnant von Hauser was awarded the
Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross.
It was now quiet on the Eifel front. At the beginning of October the kampfgruppe was rewarded with the long-awaited hour of withdrawal and re-incorporation into the division. The relieved elements had to leave all of their
major equipment - panzers, etc. - to reinforce the 2nd Panzer Division.
In a farewell address, General Beyer praised their effort:
"Leaving the corps area of operations with a good unit is also its
excellent commander, Oberstleutnant Freiherr von Hauser, whose clear
tactical perception, unlimited energy and exemplary personal commit210

ment was the primary reason for the successful elimination of the
Wallendorf penetration."
15. Fighting Around the Scheldt Estuary
Only a few of the thousands who visit the vacation paradise of Zeeland
every year know of the enormous efforts made by German soldiers, who fulfilled their duty to the people and the Fatherland in Flanders and on the
Scheldt.
While British and American authors stress Allied successes during the
Second World War and minimize the failures, the Wehrmacht and its efforts
are being increasingly ostracized in Germany. Even the dead are being forgotten. Who now visits the large German military cemetery from the Second
World War in Lommel, near Hechtel (south of Eindhoven), with almost
40,000 dead? A revision of history is urgently needed at this time. As Moltke
noted, as time passes, it becomes more difficult to correct the errors and
myths made in the description of historical events.

Coastal Gun Batteries

Flooded Areas
Ghent Blocking Position
Breskens Pocket 21 Sept.

211

In 1944 hopes were awakened (by Gbbels) with the whispers and mysteries surrounding the "secret miracle weapons." Indeed, the inventions were
astounding - jet aircraft, rockets, electronics, etc. However, none of these
could alter the outcome of the war. The real "miracle weapon" was the
German infantry. They made super-human efforts during these times of
emergency. No matter that they were burned out, no matter that they lacked
weapons, ammunition and equipment, no matter that they were hungry, without a chance to catch their breath, physically and emotionally exhausted,
They did their duty and amazed their enemies.
Retreat from France
At the end of August 1944 the burned-out German armies withdrew fighting in front of the cautiously pursuing Allies into the assigned "German
Weststellung", a defensive line running from the Scheldt to the Vosges. This
retreat in the north was conducted according to the old principle, "Whoever
wants to leave had better leave fast." The Allies, who were inexperienced in
mobile warfare, misinterpreted the retreat as flight and came to incorrect
conclusions, as in one report:
The German Western Army is no longer a cohesive fighting force,
but a number of fleeing battle groups ... It is unlikely that organized
resistance under the leadership of the OKW will last past 1 December...
it can even collapse beforehand ...
(SHAEF, beginning of September, 1944)
The Allies saw the opportunity for a quick, final victory. On 4 September,
when the 2nd (British) Army in a bold attack captured Antwerp with its
almost undamaged harbour, and almost cut off the 15th German Army, it
appeared that the way to the Rhein, to the industrial Ruhr region and to
Berlin lay open. However, Field Marshal Montgomery overlooked a couple
of key considerations - as did Rommel on the Egyptian border. Montgomery
failed to take into consideration both the difficulty of supplying his attack
forces and the German combat spirit..
Meanwhile, the majority of the 15th Army's infantry divisions, which
marched on foot accompanying horse-drawn vehicles, increased the distance
from their motorized pursuers. The First Canadian Army's priority was to
clear the coast with its harbours and fortifications. This time-consuming mission allowed their enemy to get away. Thus, for example, the 711th Infantry
Division, which was initially committed on 6 June against the British air
212

landings, was able to reach the "Ghentriegel" (Ghent Block - Zeebrgge Ghent Canal to south of Ghent - Schelde to Antwerp) after a 20 day retreat
of more than 600 km. This was achieved under debilitating conditions. They
were short of rations and equipment, under a heavy physical and emotional
burden, constantly hunted by fighter-bombers, tanks and artillery; and yet
they never panicked.
Eisenhower and Montgomery had underestimated the difficulty of supplying their armies from Cherbourg, across France, with almost all of the railway communications destroyed. They overlooked the importance of
Antwerp, to which Admiral Ramsay, the Supreme Commander's Naval
Commander-in-Chief, had addressed in a telegram to SHAEF and
Montgomery's 21st Army Group on 6 September:
"It is essential to open the Antwerp port quickly. The enemy must be
prevented from mining and blocking the Scheldt. Furthermore, it will be
necessary for the coastal batteries to be captured before an approach
channel to the river route can be established, otherwise, the harbour will
not be useable for some time."
However, Montgomery's wishful thinking took the upper hand.
Unlike the Allies, the German leadership immediately recognized the
importance of Antwerp harbor for the Allies. As the 15th Army and its six
divisions found their retreat through Leuwen blocked, it was ordered to safeguard the Ghentriegel to:
- establish a bridgehead to protect the Breskens coastal batteries;
- ferry across the southern Scheldt from this bridgehead; and
- hold the island of Walcheren and from there commit strong forces
to establish a defensive front along the Albert canal.
On 6 September, while the Allies were still celebrating in Antwerp and had
not yet established a bridgehead across the Albert canal nor conducted air
reconnaissance, the LXXXVIII Army Corps was able to construct a thin
defensive front on the Albert canal east of Antwerp and blow the bridges. On
the previous day, aside from the coastal artillery, there had been one single
infantry battalion available to defend the Scheldt estuary and Walcheren
from enemy attack, as the 70th Infantry Division was temporarily committed
from Walcheren to the Ghentriegel.
Between 4 and 8 September, under the technical supervision of the Naval
Ferry Staff, 9,900 men were ferried across the five km stretch from Breskens
to Flushing. The operations were commanded by the headquarters of dis213

banded divisions, that of Generalleutnant Schwalbe (344th Infantry Division)

at Breskens, and Generalleutnant Hoecker (17th Luftwaffe Field Division) at
Terneuzen. Engineers and naval units organized every means of crossing
imaginable, including ferries, barges, skiffs and any other vessels, capable of
being towed by the few sea-going tugboats available. Working day and night,
under heavy air attack at the harbor installations and aboard ship (one fully
laden hospital ship was sunk) - and in spite of the weather, a total of 28,000
men with their corresponding equipment were sent across the estuary from
Terneuzen and Doel in just 11 days, after which the operation had to be cancelled due to the approach of the enemy. By 23 September, the 15th Army
could proudly report that a total of 82,000 men, 530 guns, 4600 vehicles,
4000 horses and equipment had been ferried across the Scheldt. That was far
more than anyone expected.
The German Forces
The extended defense of the Scheldt estuary was primarily conducted by
the LXVII Army Corps (commanded by General der Infanterie Sponheimer)
with the 64th, 70th, 245th and 711th Infantry Divisions and strong coastal
artillery support from batteries on either side of the Scheldt. On 14 October
the 64th and 70th Infantry Divisions were directly subordinated to the 15th
Army. The latter were "bodenstandiger" (static) infantry divisions assigned
to coastal defense. These divisions had very limited mobility and consisted
of older personnel with little experience and a low level of training. They had
fewer vehicles, mobile artillery, communications and supply services than
did normal infantry divisions.
The 64th Infantry Division (commanded by Generalleutnant Eberding) was
initially established on 26 June 1944 in Wahn near Cologne. It was sent to
Flanders in August and, although was filled with veteran soldiers from
destroyed eastern divisions, it was by no means an elite division. In spite of
this, the Canadians later christened it "the best infantry division we have
met"!
The 70th Infantry Division (commanded by Generalleutnant Daser) was
also established in June 1944, out of elements of the 165th Infantry Division,
to protect southern Holland. Ninety percent of its soldiers had dyspepsia.
Therefore, it received special diet rations and was nicknamed the "Stomach"
or "White Bread" Division. At the beginning of September it was transferred
into the Ghentriegel, with the exception of one battalion left behind on
Walcheren Island. After Ghent had to be abandoned to the 7th British
Armored Division, the 70th Infantry Division returned to Walcheren, "in
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order to hold the island against attack from sea and land to the very last
man."
The backbone of the Scheldt defense was formed by the 203rd Marine
Artillery Abteilung (Battalion) (M.A.A.), commanded by Korvettenkapitn
Hopmann, located south of the Scheldt, and the 202nd M.A.A. on
Walcheren. Both of these had several concrete-emplaced (for all-round
defense) coastal batteries with 105 mm and 280 mm guns, several coastal
batteries with 105mm to 280mm guns and several coastal flak batteries. The
fire of the 203rd M.A.A., including its 203mm rail gun battery, was directed
by the sector fire control near near Cadzand. To be able to fire in a 360
degree arc at targets on the ground, the guns had to be taken out of their
bunkers and deployed in hastily-constructed concrete emplacements.
Later on, M.A.A. soldiers reconstructed Cadzand harbour, which had previously been demolished after the fall of Breskens. The urgently-needed
ammunition was brought in through Cadzand, and the wounded were evacuated through there to the mainland. The batteries were finally lost when they
were demolished as the enemy was attacking. There were numerous bombing missions conducted against the batteries, but few scored direct hits. The
commitment of the naval batteries was exemplary.
The Enemy
Temporarily, the Western Allies splintered their forces because of
Eisenhower's policy of "broad front objectives." Montgomery's "Bridge Too
Far" at Arnhem failed. It was difficult for the Allies to decide which operational objective took priority. Jealousy and unclear orders delayed the preparation of the forces for an attack against the Scheldt estuary for more than
four weeks, even though Eisenhower, as had Hitler before him, recognized
the importance of the port of Antwerp. Despite this, it was not until 9
October that he unmistakably announced that "all operations must come to
a standstill, otherwise we will be unable to initiate operations in Antwerp
until mid-November." Thus, the most important missions were: for the
Allies, the opening of the Scheldt estuary; for OB West, the blocking of the
Scheldt estuary.
On 15 September, II Canadian Corps, commanded by LtGen Simonds, was
ordered to break the German resistance on the Scheldt. This meant three separate operations:
- eliminate the Breskens bridgehead south of the Scheldt;
- block and capture South Beveland to the north;
- capture the island of Walcheren in an amphibious operation.
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In favour of directing their attack toward Nijmegen, the Allies dropped the
thrust towards Moerdijk bridge, across the Waal. OB West feared such an
attack, as this would presage the destruction of all German forces further to
the west.
Breskens - Southern Scheldt Bridgehead
The terrain in the Breskens bridgehead was mainly polder, (flat, reclaimed
marshland below sea level) except for the embankments built for the road
and canal. Besides the many trenches and smaller canals, the area was crisscrossed by four larger canals, which could not be crossed by vehicles:
The Ghent Canal, running east-west, tied Zeebrgge with Ghent via
Brugge. The soon-to-be-evacuated Ghentriegel was along its course;
The Terneuzen Canal, running from Terneuzen south to Ghent;
The Leopold Canal, running from Zeebrgge to the Isabella-polder; for
the first 25 km it parallelled the Canal de Derivation de la Lys. The Leopold
was the southern front of the German bridgehead; and
The Abwasser Canal (Canal de Derivation de la Lys), which drained the
Belgian industrial area, and was also called the "Stinkkanal" by the Flemish.
Near Strobrugge it turned to the southeast toward Ghent and Lys.
During the Second Century, the Romans built a fortified camp in this region
to secure against the "Germani." However, this region was determined
"gnralement impropre aux operations militaire (generally unsuited for military operations)." It could easily be flooded by opening the locks and
sluices, which was in fact ordered by OKW in order to assist the defense.
On 6 September preparations commenced to defend the future Breskens
bridgehead by evacuating the western foreground (Zeebrgge) and ordering
the initial flooding. As during a retreat, many installations, weapons and
much ammunition were blown without plan, instead of being evacuated.
On the evening of 8 September the Canadian "Argyll & Sutherland
Highlanders" Battalion (4th Canadian Armored Division) tried to overcome
the Ghent Canal (five km south of the Leopold Canal) in a coup-de-main
near Moerbrgge on the boundary between the 245th and 711th Infantry
Divisions. They suffered heavy casualties as a result of German defensive
fire and could not establish a stable bridgehead until 10 September.
The ordered German withdrawal to the Leopold canal was only made possible by a counterattack. The 64th Infantry Division received its baptism of
fire as it occupied positions on the Leopold canal between the flooded area
south of Sluis and the Braakman inlet (just west of Terneuzen).
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During the night 13 to 14 September, the Canadian Algonquin Regiment

conducted the first enemy attack across the Leopold Canal in the area of
Moerkerke. A small bridgehead was initially expanded with the help of
strong artillery support, but it was eliminated after a counterattack by the
64th Infantry Division supported by organic artillery and marine fire. This
encouraged the fledgling 64th Division. East of the Terneuzen Canal, the 1st
Polish Armored Division (on the left flank of the 4th (Canadian) Armored
Division) systematically compressed the bridgehead with superior firepower, until the harbour of Terneuzen was also lost on 21 September.
Then, on 6 October, more than four weeks after the fall of Antwerp, it
became quiet. As the autumn rains fell and turned the polder into a morass,
the 3rd (Canadian) Infantry Division (which was previously tied up near
Calais) launched a surprise attack on a wide front near Strobrugge with the
support of artillery and flame-throwers. The flame-throwers scorched the far
side of the canal bank until the infantry crossed the 30 meter-wide obstacle
in assault boats and established a small bridgehead. The grenadiers threw
elements of the enemy back with prepared defensive fire from all weapons,
including concentrated fire from the coastal artillery.
The combat diary of the Regina Rifles noted a total loss of 533 men. "The
Germans there were so vulgar as to throw our hand-grenades back at us,"
complained one Canadian commander.
On 9 and 10 October the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade embarked in
"Buffalo" LVT's (Landing Vehicle Tracked) from Terneuzen and landed near
Hoofplaat, in the rear of the defenders. By 13 October the Canadians had
succeeded in linking up both of their bridgeheads. Because the strength of
the 64th Infantry Division had evaporated, a plan to reinforce by a paradrop
was considered but then discarded. On 10 October OB West ordered the
Breskens bridgehead held until the last man. Nevertheless, Generalleutnant
Eberding had to withdraw his front gradually under pressure until reaching a
line Oostburg-Sluis-Leopold Canal on 19 October.
Two days later, the fresh 157th Brigade, of the 52nd (Lowland) Division,
captured the city and harbours of Breskens with the aid of enormous air support. Then the enemy withdrew his tanks and flame-throwers and conducted
the battle only with infantry, bombers and artillery. It was ten days after
Breskens fell before the Canadians could capture Knokke, the center of
resistance.
On 1 November Generalleutnant Eberding's division headquarters and several batteries near Cadzand signed off. The debated evacuation of the last
elements of the 64th Infantry Division was no longer possible, and the last
German resistance ended on 4 November.
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South Beveland
South Beveland was assigned to the 2nd (Canadian) Infantry Division. On
17 September they relieved the British east of Antwerp. The 2nd (Canadian)
Division would attack north and then west towards Walcheren, while the 4th
(Canadian) Armored Division on the right flank would push north to attack
Bergen op Zoom across the Albert canal. The weak forces of the LXVII
Army Corps opposed them with the 346th, 711th and 719th Infantry
Divisions and defended the northern suburbs of Antwerp until the end of the
month. Further to the east, the front was pushed back to the northeast in the
direction of s'Hertogenbosch. There the terrain consisted mostly of heaths
and sandy plains interspersed with clumps of woods and brush.
The fighting began on 8 October around the Beveland isthmus, near
Woensdrecht and its embankments, and increased in ferocity against bitter
resistance. To relieve the struggling infantry, on 17 October, the
Fallschirmjger Regiment von Heydte, and, two days later the 85th Infantry
Division from Bergen op Zoom, were deployed "in order to clear the south
Beveland isthmus and hold it open." In vain! After initial success, the
defenders and their artillery positions were covered with bombs and artillery
fire, day and night. They had to withdraw to the north, and the land connection to Walcheren and the 70th Infantry Division was lost on 23 October.
The continuation of the attack across the isthmus had to be conducted by
the Canadian infantry without the support of tanks, many of which had been
shot up. On 26 October the attack had to be stopped, as the Canadian
infantry was completely exhausted. Their situation had been compounded by
the critical shortage of adequately-trained reinforcements.
Only on 28 October, after the 156th Infantry Brigade, 52nd (Lowland)
Division was landed from Terneuzen on the southeastern tip of southern
Beveland, in the rear of the Beveland Canal, could it be taken. Goes fell on
the following day, and on 30 October the 70th Infantry Division evacuated
the isthmus except for a small bridgehead, east of Arnemuiden. There were
also enemy penetrations on 31 October. On that day, OB West reported:
"Enemy attacks against the pass itself were repulsed. The causeway
to Walcheren was severed by a 25 meter wide and 10 meter deep crater."
The battle for South Beveland was at an end.

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Walcheren Island
Even with the occupation of South Beveland and the southern Scheldt, the
Scheldt estuary was still not passable. There was still fighting on Walcheren
Island with its strong coastal batteries. An air landing, which was initially
considered, was excluded because of the unsuitable terrain and strong flak,
which had shot down 40 aircraft by 22 September. Instead, LtGen Simonds
planned to open the dyke by bombing and turn the island, most of which lay
below sea level, into an atoll, - making it difficult to defend and easily captured from the sea.
After General Eisenhower had granted permission for Operation Infatuate,
preparatory bombings (a total of 2,600 tons of HE bombs) were conducted
on 3, 7, 11 and 17 October against the centuries-old dykes near Westkapelle,
Flushing and Veere to flood the island to the upper plain in the north and
around Middelburg. In spite of previous warnings from air-dropped pamphlets and radio announcements, the local population suffered 125 killed
during the first attack. Bomber Command attacked the coastal batteries with
about 6020 tons of bombs.
On 1 November, while the fighting in Festung Scheldt Slid was coming to
an end, 550 men from the British 4th Commando Group (followed later by
the 155th Infantry Brigade) landed from Breskens on the harbour jetty in the
fishing town of Flushing. They entered the town supported by irregulars. The
last guns there were ordered destroyed after firing all of their ammunition.
A short time after the landing in Flushing a flotilla of 181 ships, including
the battleship "Warspite" with its 15-inch guns, appeared before
Westkapelle. In spite of a barrage of gunfire conducted by the ships and 300
guns of all types of artillery from positions around Breskens against the
coastal batteries, the attacking Royal Marines (4th Special Service Brigade)
ran into heavy resistance. The fighting raged all morning and after suffering
heavy casualties, the Marines were ordered to withdraw. Then the page
turned. On the next day the attack made progress. On 3 November
Generalleutnant Daser surrendered in Middelburg, which was surrounded on
three sides. The Domburg Battery (5th Battery, 202nd) was the last to give
up on 8 November. The conquest of the island cost the Allies 7,700 men; the
landing operation 26 ships.
Both banks of the 130 km-long harbour exit from Antwerp were in Allied
hands. Now began the tedious minesweeping operations, which was hampered by attacks from small German combat craft. It lasted for weeks, until
the first coastal ships were able to unload on 26 November, the first Liberty
convoy on 28 November - 86 days after the fall of the city.
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Reflections
The durable German resistance on the Scheldt estuary came as a surprise to
the Allies and thwarted their plans for a quick end of the war in the west.
Although the leadership of the Allied High Command missed an opportunity
in the Scheldt to cut off and destroy the 15th German Army, it in no way
diminishes the glory and the great efforts of the newly-created infantry divisions that were committed there.
The Germans were not only able to occupy the Breskens bridgehead and
Walcheren, to evacuate the 15th Army and to prevent the Allies from bringing the harbour of Antwerp into operation, they were also able to furnish and
arm the German Westellung and rebuild the German Army. This made it possible to keep the area of the Reich, in particular to the East, free of the
enemy for a longer period.
This exemplary trial of the infantry, under similar conditions to those experienced by German soldiers in the battles of Flanders during the First World
War, proved again the worth of the German military education and training
based on the principles of discipline and mutual confidence. They resulted in
steadfast camaraderie in the fighting for the homeland, for the people and the
Fatherland - not for Hitler.

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16. Fighting Around Metz and Fort Driant

In September 1944 the violent American pursuit of the exhausted German
remnant formations came to a halt in front of stiffening resistance approaching the Reich border. This halt was forced despite the Allies' almost total air
superiority, unimpeded supply by sea, and considerable help from the
Soviets, who tied up two-thirds of the German divisions. The Allies were
unable to deploy railroad material and technicians to repair the French rail
network, which was destroyed by their own bombs, in order to move their
supplies, especially fuel. Road and air transport was insufficient. The shortages forced a new decision.
A quick fix would have been to attack immediately to the Rhine with concentrated armored forces on one or two axes, in order to prevent the enemy
from withdrawing. And then the advance would have continued to the Ruhr
and Berlin. Instead, the Allied commander, General Eisenhower, stuck to the
original plan. After a pause, he resumed the offensive with all available
armies on a "broad front" to destroy the German forces West of the Rhine.
This severe lack of leadership resulted in postponing the almost assured final
victory for some time in the future. This was to Stalin's advantage and cost
the sacrifice of much German and American blood, as well as our cities.
Contrary to all military doctrine the Americans again placed their main
effort in the same place where they had failed in September - near Metz, the
door to the Saare region, as well as near Aachen and the Ruhr area. In this
book only the battle of Metz will be examined more closely.
The old French fortress of Vauban, Metz, with its fortification system, such
as Fort Plappeville and Saint Quentin, was reinforced by the Germans after
1900 with a second cordon of "Feston" (Fr. groupe fortifie) set up to eight
miles forward due to the increased firepower and range of artillery. It was
called "the most fortified garrison town of Germany." The Festen comprised
groups of fortifications, superbly integrated into the terrain, combining
infantry and artillery defensive systems, bombardment-proof shelters and
supply depots. The Feste "Kronprinz", renamed Fort Driant in 1920, formed
the southwestern corner-stone of the outer fortified belt of Metz and dominated both banks of the Moselle, as well as Mance ravine from Gravelotte to
Ars-sur- Moselle and the Gorze ravine to Corny, from the difficult to traverse
ridge-line. The fort, with an approximate 1000 meter-wide front oriented to
the southwest, was located on a 360 meter-high hill and was only approachable along the winding supply road that ran through the thickly forested and
rocky slope of Ars-sur-Moselle. Two 15 cm and two 10 cm batteries, each
with three guns, within the fort and the 10 cm "Mosel Battery" outside of the
fort to the south, also with three guns, provided the main fire-power. Fire
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could also be directed from other forts (see photographs).

The armored cupolas for the observation posts, machinegun emplacements
and guns stuck out from the subterranean installations with their five barracks, each housing 200 to 500 men, and depots. The center of the fortification was surrounded by deep trenches that were extended 200 to 300 meters
on both sides of the fortification front. A 20 meter-wide wire obstacle surrounded the entire fort.
Fort Driant did not stand alone. It was covered by batteries from Forts
Jeanne d'Arc (formerly Feste Kaiserin), Lorrain, Guise and the ancient Fort
FORT DRIANT

Kaserne

Citadel
X
Gun Batteries
MG Positions
Concrete Blockhouses
Hidden Entrenchments
Firing Positions
Armored Observation Turrets
Connecting Tunnels
Bunkers

MOSELLE
BATTERY

Barbed-Wire Entanglements

Diagram 20: Fort Driant.

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Plappeville (Alvensleben). In general, all of these fortifications were neglected by the French in favor of the Maginot Line and, during the Second World
War, disassembled by the Germans to construct the Atlantic Wall and to provide air protection for the Rhein and Ruhr industrial area.
Only Fort Driant could be refitted and manned quickly by the officer candidate school with guns from the fortress museum - some manufactured in
1903 and 1904 - and with French ammunition, to become combat-ready
before the Americans advanced. Hauptmann Weiler, a Company Commander
in the Fahnenjunker School, was appointed Commandant of the Fort.
The Allied advance through France resulted in the OKW order on 20
August for the "Construction of the German Western Positions," with antitank obstacles and a deeply echeloned defensive system. The "Moselle line"
(Diedenhofen-Thionville) - Metz line belonged to this defensive system.
The 462nd Infantry Division, under Generalleutnant Walther Krause was
charged with the defense of Metz. It was hastily thrown together from garrison troops and stragglers coming from France. The defense was set up as
follows:
VI Infantry Fahnenjunker School (cadre and 1800 fahnenjunkers with an
infantry gun company), called Kampfgruppe von Siegroth, at the
Amanvillers-Fort Driant-Ars-sur-Moselle sector,
1010th Security Regiment, the St. Privat-Fort Canrobert positions,
SS Unterfhrer School (a non-commissioned officers school) and
Waffen SS Communications School with training troops (= a regiment),
the northern sector from the banks of the Moselle-Maizieres-les-Metz.
All fortification troops and flak units were subordinated to the division, but
it still lacked all kinds of support, especially supply units.
On 6 September, as the Americans approached the main German combat
line, west of Metz, from Verdun, to their surprise, they ran into bitter resistance from Battle Group von Siegroth. General Patton's 3rd (US) Army
attack on the Saar broke against the exemplary bravery and self-sacrifice of
the fahnenjunkers, who were promoted to leutnant during the fighting. The
commitment of the fahnenjunkers from Metz was rewarded by mention in
the 24 September Wehrmacht Communique and the awarding of a cuff title:
"Metz 1944." This tenacious defense also made a deep impression on the
Americans, who had never run into such resistance now that they had to do
without close air support because of supply shortages and bad weather. After
a combat pause, the attack was supposed to be continued through the Pfalz to
the Rhein. First, however, Metz had to either fall or be screened, otherwise
fire from the forts would frustrate American attempts to either capture Metz
from the south or bypass it. Because of the fire from the forts, on 7
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September the bridgehead established near Corny had to be given up. A

combat bridge was damaged and a ferry sunk. Fort Driant was a festering
wound in the American front that had to be removed before the offensive
was continued.
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
Heeresstab (I) Nr. 1835/44
Ref: Awarding of a Cuff Title "Metz 1944"
1) In remembrance of the glorious defense of Fortress Metz against a
numerically and materially superior enemy by Battle Group von Siegroth
(Metz Kriegsschule with subordinate troops from all branches of the
Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS) the Fhrer has ordered the creation of a cuff
title with the inscription
"Metz 1944"
2) The designation will be a combat designation consisting of a black
sleeve stripe with silver inscription "Metz 1944" and silver border.
3) According to the Fhrer's decision, the cuff title will be awarded as follows:
As a combat designation for all members of Battle Group von
Siegroth, who actively participated in the fighting around Fortress Metz,
as a tradition badge for all officers, civil servants, NCOs and men
from the VI Metz Infantry Fahnenjunker School, now Meseritz (training
and cadre personnel, as well as trainees) while they are attending the
school.
signature
During the time period from 5 to 17 September, after all American attempts
to advance against Fort Driant had failed, General Patton ordered his XX
Corps to take the fort, as soon as sufficient close air support was available.
The Americans knew little about the lay-out of the fort; they had no maps
with the exception of a 1:200,000 Michelin route map. Air photography
showed no more than the outline of the fortifications and trenches.
On 25 September the Fahnenjunker School (Kampfgruppe von Siegroth)
was transferred to the Eastern border of the Reich. Hauptmann Weiler and
his men were left behind in the fort. The gaps in the 462nd Division, which
had in the meantime been upgraded to a Volksgrenadier Division, were filled
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Schlacht um Metz
Groups of Fortifications
Single Forts

Diagram 21: Battle of Metz.

225

with over-age and poorly-trained troops from fortress battalions, sick battalions and the like, known in the slang of the Wehrmacht as "Halb-Soldaten".
The elderly Generalleutnant Lbbe took over command of the division on 18
September, and was soon to be relieved on 14 Nov. by the younger
Generalleutnant Kittel.
In ignorance, the 5th (US) Division began its first attack on 27 September
under clear skies, committing the 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment
after a preparation conducted by fighter-bombers with 1000 pound highexplosive bombs, napalm and on-board weapons, as well as two barrages by
American artillery from eight batteries of 105 mm to 240 mm caliber. There
was no apparent effect on the installation. Under the protection of artificial
smoke, two infantry companies, supported by 90 mm tank destroyers,
attacked the southern wall of the fort, but they stalled against the unexpected
wire obstacles in withering defensive fire. The tank destroyers were unable
to approach the well-camouflaged gun ports. At 1800 hours the attacking
elements, after losing 18 men, withdrew to their departure positions.
The new attack was better prepared. After a detailed search in Paris, Verdun
and Nancy, the Americans were able to find hidden in Lyon the 1940
detailed ground plan of the fortifications. They now studied the details of the
installation. The division commander, General Irwin, thinking of his troops,
proposed a siege. However, he had to follow the army's orders. He ordered
new equipment deployed, tank dozers and vipers (long lines of explosives for
blowing lanes through wire and mine obstacles). All of the corps artillery
was supposed to support his attack. However, already on the eve of the
attack, it was obvious that in contrast to the forts of Lttich and Longy in
1914, which completely collapsed under the fire from 42 cm mortars, even
modern artillery would have little effect on this steel and concrete. Eight
observed hits by 203 mm shells (weight about 130 kilograms) on an armored
turret had little effect.
On the day of the attack, 3 October, bad weather frustrated the Air Force's
planned carpet bombing. After an enormous fire preparation by all of the
corps and division artillery, including rocket launchers, the 2nd Bn, 11th
Infantry Rgt, reinforced by an additional company, engineers and tanks,
launched a new attack under the protection offered by fog, at 1200 hours.
The tank dozers broke down prematurely. It proved difficult without them.
They were only able to cross the fortification trenches at one location. After
that, they were able to blow a lane through the wire obstacle. The left company stalled in defensive fire on the north. The right company, only with a lot
of luck, made it inside of the fort with four tanks, but they could not break
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the resistance of the defenders, who unexpectedly appeared from their shelters. The accompanying flame-throwers did not function, or were quickly
eliminated. Likewise, the blowing of casemates also failed.
At night the reserve company entered the breach in the southwest with
tanks, but strong defensive fire and quickly reacting troops completely dispersed the Americans in the fort. Four Sherman tanks were destroyed with
panzerfaust. Even the fresh infantry companies were unable to expand the
penetration into the fort. After the first 24 hours, there were already one hundred men lost. Finally several soldiers reached the large steel gate at the neck
of the central fortifications. However, they were unable to place any explosives because of a steel grill.
The second night also saw little progress. Every man clung to the cover he
had found. The completely exhausted Americans were unable to reorganize
and were constantly kept busy by the combat experienced Germans. In the
early morning of 5 October the neighboring German forts placed Feste
Driant under fire. This had a murderous effect. In the afternoon the
Americans inside the fort had melted down to less than one hundred men.
Then the battalion S 3 sent a message to the rear:
"The situation is critical! A couple more barrages and another counterattack and we are sunk. We have no men, our equipment is shot and
we just can't go. The troops in G Co are done, they are just there what's
left of them. Enemy has infiltrated and pinned down what is here. We
cannot advance nor can K Co, B Co is in the same shape I'm in. We cannot delay any longer on replacement. We may be able to hold till dark
but if anything happens this afternoon I can make no predictions. The
enemy artillery is butchering troops until we have nothing left to hold
with. We cannot get out to get our wounded and there is a hell of a lot of
dead and missing. There is only one answer the way things stand. First
either to withdraw and saturate it with heavy bombers or reinforce with a
hell of a strong force ... All our charges have been useless against these
reinforced concrete walls. The few leaders are trying to keep what is left
intact and that's all they can do ... The troops are just not sufficiently
trained and what is more they have no training in even basic infantry
skills. If we want this damned fort let's get the stuff required to take it
and then go. Right now you haven't got it."
During the evening an angry General Patton exclaimed: "No attack by my
army will fail, even if it takes the last man from the XX Corps!"
During the night before 6 October the exhausted companies in the fort were
replaced by the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry Regiment. The Germans, who
were also exhausted, likewise were relieved, but the relief was difficult.
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Many had to be carried down from the fort on stretchers.

The OKW announced in the 7 October Wehrmacht Communique:
The defenders of Fort Driant on the Moselle repulsed a strong
enemy attack.
Under the personal leadership of the deputy division commander, General
Warnock, the US battle group set out on 7 October to first drive the Germans
out of the southeastern portion of the fort, then force a breach into the main
tunnel system. At 1400 hours, four hours after the start of the attack, a rifle
company had worked its way 200 meters forward and captured three pillboxes. Then the murderous cross fire from the southern casement and the
Moselle Battery nailed them to the ground, which was hard and difficult to
entrench in.
At 1615 hours a German counterattack cut off the company commander
and his forward platoons. They were lost. Whoever was able, made their way
back to the departure positions.
One platoon forced its way into the tunnel up to a steel gate. After they
ignited explosives, their advance was blocked. They were unable to proceed
without cutting torches, which did not arrive until nighttime. The tunnel door
was cut down and the junk pieces laid on the floor of the tunnel - troublesome for the troops in the confines of the tunnel However, now they were at
the armored doorway to the southern casement. Scraping sounds coming
from behind the door indicated that the enemy was preparing countercharges. So, they hastily fused a 30 kilogram charge to the door. The resulting carbon monoxide made the trenches uninhabitable for hours. Standard
issue gas masks were tried but they failed to protect the wearer.
After a long time, they saw that the explosives had blown only a small hole
in the door. It had to be repeated. However, the Germans blew their end first.
The Americans suffered killed and wounded. They had to evacuate the
trenches. Their attack had failed.
General Warnock deployed fresh troops, but the poisonous air in the trenches choked the soldiers, while German sharpshooters fired outside. The
resumption of the attack, ordered for the night before the 9th of October, had
to be postponed, while the situation inside of the fort would not allow for
any reorganization of the confused troops. German counterattacks during the
night and the fire from machinegun nests completed the rout of the
Americans.
A successful German counterattack out of the fort on 12 October caught 70
American prisoners under the command of a Captain Slaughter. The
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Americans evacuated the fort on 13 October. In all, the battle of Driant had
cost them 64 killed, 547 wounded and missing, including 21 officers. It was
the first defeat for Patton's army.
On 17 October the German OKW announced:
For several weeks the enemy has been conducting individual attacks
against the flanks of the Metz bridgehead with little success. After an
enemy penetration, Fort Driant on the Moselle, southwest of the city, is
again completely in our hands ...
A supplement to the communique of 19 October stated that "in the successful combat for Fort Driant Hauptmann Weiler, together with Leutnants
Woesner and Hohmann, have distinguished themselves by exemplary bravery. With their raiders they encircled strong enemy forces in the casemates of
the fort and destroyed them."
Hauptmann Weiler was awarded the Knight's Cross. He was relieved from
the fort on 30 October, and the name of his successor remains unknown.
The American combat pause also allowed for the relief of the German elements, especially the schools, by fresh formations from the 462nd Division,
which was "promoted" to the status of a Volksgrenadier division. On 8
November General Kittel relieved the wounded General Krause. The positions between Fort Jeanne d'Arc and Fort Driant were taken over by the
1217th Grenadier Regiment. Fort Driant was resupplied and took a deep
breath for the start of the major attack against Metz on 8 November. Hitler
declared Metz to be a "festen platz that is to be held to the last man."
This final battle in snow and rain led to the encirclement and then capitulation of Festung Metz on 22 November. The Wehrmacht Communique on 24
November noted: "In the Metz area, the defenders continue to hold several
fortified installations against heavy enemy attack." And, on 30 November,
OKW reported that some fortifications were still offering brave resistance.
Then silence. Communications were lost. Forts St. Quentin and Plappeville
surrendered on 6 and 7 December. Fort Driant gave up on 8 December to the
5th (US) Division, which had cut its teeth on this bulwark. Fifty-nine officers
and 1516 NCOs and men were taken prisoner from these forts. The last fort
to fall was Feste Jeanne d'Arc on 13 December, more than three months
after the start of the attack!
In exemplary military tradition, the brave defenders of Fort Driant and
other fortifications did their duty. They tied up a good American division and
prevented it from the attacks on the Saare. Their example and sacrifice carried weight. Without hope for relief or recognition, in ignorance and burning
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concern for the fate of their homeland and their loved-ones, they stood in
constant readiness in the passes, in the cold, damp rooms, for days, without
relief, and withstood the unbelievable test of their physical and emotional
strength. How could they maintain their trust and sense of responsibility for
so long in these cramped combat conditions, instead of fleeing with their
wounds and illnesses to the security and relative comfort of captivity?
They were soldiers!
17. On the Saare Front
Panzer Lehr Division Counterattack
The weak defensive position of Army Group G (General Balck) on the
southern wing of the Westfront was threatened by two offensives at the same
time in November 1944. The 7th (US) Army was advancing from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Upper Rhine and the 3rd (US) Army was advancing from Normandy to the Palatinate. On 21 November forces from the 7th
Army reached Sarrebourg and, two days later, Strassburg. Advance detachments from both armies reached Bettborn (6 kilometers south of Fntrange)
on 22 November and linked up.
The German 1st Army was thrown back to the Saare, although some elements were still fighting on the western bank. Stormy weather helped the
weak, poorly equipped and completely exhausted German divisions hold
their positions. The Americans had to do without their usual close air support
because of the constant bad weather. They suffered from a fuel shortage.
Movement of all types of their vehicles was considerably complicated by
roads that were easily defended by mines and obstacles, and by the constant
rain which flooded the terrain.
A serious situation emerged in northern Alsace due to the advance of
enemy forces. It was so serious that OB West feared the destruction of its
southern wing and had to alert Panzer Lehr against strict orders from the
OKW.
Panzer Lehr was, in the meantime, refitted, as well as the personnel and
equipment situation in the Reich would then allow. It was then transferred
into Hunsrck. The panzer regiment was reduced from two battalions to one,
with four tank companies, for a total of 34 Panthers and 34 Panzer IVs.
Twenty-one Jagdpanzer IVs were still missing. Of the previous four armored
(APC) panzergrenadier battalions, there were only three, mechanized with
Steyr trucks and Raupenschlepper Ost fully tracked vehicles. From the only
remaining SPW battalion - I Bn, 901st Rgt - the 1st Company had to be left
behind, in order to await additional equipment and graduation of the ongoing
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unterfhrer training course, which was so urgently needed.

The alert order reached the division on 21 November at 1500 hours. After
the OKW approved its commitment with the 1st Army, the division was supposed to reach the Saare - Alben area in order to be able to attack into the
flanks of the American forces, which broke through to Strassburg on 23
November, and destroy them.
The march commenced in darkness along two march routes. It was to be
halted during the daytime due to the air threat. The weakness of the training
and the new equipment became evident during this movement.
Twelve of the 34 new Panthers broke down because of minor problems and
also from engine and transmission damage.

ATTACK: by Pz Lehr Div.

ATTACK: by U.S. Divisions

Diagram 22: Fighting Around Sarre-Union, 23 - 30 November, 1944.

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During the evening, the division headquarters near Sarreguemines received

an order from the Army Group G commander:
The fate of the Alsace depends on an early attack with concentrated
forces and a ruthless drive to the assigned objective.
I expect that all members of the division and the subordinate elements will give their all to achieve this objective. All officers, unteroffiziers and men are to be made aware of this [order] before the attack.
signed Balck
General der Panzertruppen
In order to conserve the equipment, the march during the second night was
continued at reduced speed and with greater caution. The march objective,
Sarre-Union, was reached by elements of the division on the afternoon of 23
November. A damaged bridge had halted the panzergrenadiers and fuel vehicles so that the attack could only be initiated with half strength and little fuel.
As ordered, at 1600 hours, two battle groups attacked to the south, side by
side, in order to reach the first objective, the line Rauwiller-Schalbach,
- right: Battle Group von Poschinger (902nd Rgt) toward
Baerendorf-Rauwiller,
- left: Battle Group von Hauser (901st Rgt) with Panzerkampfgruppe Ritgen (II Bn, Panzer Lehr Rgt and I Battalion, 901st
Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment toward Eywiller-Hirschland.
Because of time pressures, the attack had to be conducted from the march,
committing the elements as they arrived. The only thing known of the enemy
was that armored forces were rolling through Saarburg to the east and reconnaissance elements were probing Sarre-Union. What was not known was that
a new US corps had arrived on the Saare front on the flank and the extent of
the weakness of the 361 VG Div., which was holding there.
A Company from the 106th Cavalry Group (armored cavalry regiment) had
the mission of securing the northern flank of the XV (US) Corps. At midday
it occupied Weyer and prepared for the traditional turkey dinner on
Thanksgiving Day, an important American holiday, when the German panzer
attack threw them back to the south. By nightfall, Eywiller and Eschwiller
were taken by the Germans against light resistance.
Kampfgruppe von Poschinger attacked at 2000 hours and captured Postroff
and Baerendorf. The supply vehicles had to catch up in order to continue the
attack, but General Balck demanded an immediate resumption:
The Panzer Lehr Division attack will be conducted without pause,
even during the night.
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The advance will be directed at Haselbourg and contact will be

established with the German forces located near Pflazbourg.
signed Balck
In spite of almost empty fuel tanks, the battle groups resumed the attack at
2300 hours. In the meantime, the enemy had reinforced and heavily mined
Hirschland. The town was captured in the early morning and cleared. The
attack stalled in front of Weyer before tank and artillery fire. The terrain and
weather conditions are illustrated by a report from Leutnant Heinrich (8th
Battery, 130th Armored Artillery Regiment):
We moved to Eywiller. During this extraordinarily rainy night, we
had a big surprise. We had occupied firing positions near a stream during
the evening and took up relatively dry quarters in a house. When I was
wakened in the early morning, the guns were standing deep in water.
Fortunately, our prime-movers were able to tow all four guns out.
The Kampfgruppe von Poschinger advance guard, which was reinforced by
a Panzer IV company (6th Co, 130th Pz Lehr Rgt) (the II Bn, 902 Rgt was
the advance guard), reached the edge of Rauwiller on 24 November at 0400
hours. There it received infantry fire. Oberleutnant Graf, commander of the 7
Co, 902 Rgt, wrote on 27 November 1944:
Our panzer company advanced on the road. I was on the left side of
the road with my company, reinforced by Oberfeldwebel Wagner's platoon from the 6th Company. The other companies were on the right side
of the road. In spite of artillery and mortar fire, we were able to work our
way to within 50 meters of the edge of the town. Right in the middle of
our attack the enemy fire increased to barrage intensity. Our panzers
returned fire. Then there was nothing left for us to do - we had to assault
in order to save ourselves from destruction. The town was assaulted and
the first houses occupied ... The Americans were so surprised that they
gave it up without a fight. As morning dawned, the battalion took 200
prisoners, 30 trucks and three anti-tank guns. Among the prisoners were
14 officers.
The fighting was continuously flaring up. Several houses were still
occupied by the enemy. We also suffered losses. No one could go out
onto the street without the threat of being hit. In the afternoon I wanted
to put things to rest. I worked my way with a squad to the intersection;
using the houses for protection, I wasn't noticed by the enemy. From the
last houses we placed the opposing enemy forces under fire and drove
them out with hand-grenades...
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The prisoners were immediately sent to the rear, but they were again liberated in Baerendorf.
On the supposition that there was no threat coming from the west, because
the 361st Volksgrenadier Division would prevent a crossing of the Saare, the
Panzer Lehr Division did not pay any attention to its flank. Nevertheless,
Combat Command B from the 4th (US) Armored Division crossed the Saare
on that morning in two places (Gosselming and Fntrange). The northern
group - Task Force Churchill - took the 1st Battery, 130th Armored Artillery
Regiment, which was redeploying, by surprise from the hills west of Postroff
and destroyed it. All six guns, half of the fire-power of I Bn, 130th Armored
Artillery Rgt, were lost.
Further to the south. Task Force Jaques overcame the resistance of the
volksgrenadiers near Kirrberg, after a brief fight, and advanced from there
toward Baerendorf into the flank of Kampfgruppe von Poschinger. Under the
cover of fire from their tanks, the American infantry waded through the cold
stream west of the town and took I Bn, 902nd Rgt by surprise as it awaited
supplies and further orders in Baerendorf. Before the commander could
organize an all-round defense, the Americans were already fighting in the
town. The battalion staff was able to flee into the coal cellar of a school,
where they had to pass the day in darkness, because the enemy had occupied
the school above them. The fire-fight between individual companies cost
both sides heavy casualties. For most of the young, insufficiently trained
panzergrenadiers, this was their baptism of fire.
While it was dark, the Americans again withdrew from Baerendorf, without
destroying or taking away their captured vehicles. The battalion staff, which
was already listed as missing, was able to get back to the division headquarters in Postroff with their own vehicles, and reorganize the battalion.
In the afternoon, an attempt to regain Hirschland and Baerendorf failed due
to the lack of combat experience of the young soldiers and the shortage of
gasoline.
The fighting around Rauwiller continued without pause all day, but, at 2200
hours, II Bn, 902nd Rgt was ordered to withdraw through Hirschland to
Postroff. Hauptmann Bohm, the Battalion Commander, was later awarded
the Honour Roll clasp for the fighting around Rauwiller.
The division order for 25 November took the new situation into account.
The attack to the south on Schalbach was to be continued by the panzerkampfgruppe, Kampfgruppe von Poschinger went over to the defense in the
west.
The attack on Schalbach, which was planned as a night attack, did not
begin until 1000 hours, because assembly was delayed by the difficulty of
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the terrain and supply. While overcoming the unprotected slope north of the
town, the attackers were hit with a withering defensive fire from two artillery
battalions and a heavy tank destroyer battalion that had been deployed on the
previous day. German artillery could not suppress the enemy. The panzergrenadiers were separated from the panzers, several panzers were knocked
and the author was wounded. The attack had to be suspended.
The newly-deployed American 90 mm tank destroyers inflicted heavy
losses. Feldwebel Dette remembered:
"We received a hit on the right side of our Panther. The track flew
off and the driving wheel was damaged. I must give high praise to our
maintenance squad. They wanted to immediately repair the damage, but
they had to give up because we were under heavy fire. However, the
panzer could be towed away.
This fire also mortally wounded the radio operator of the company
commander's tank. However, the driver, Unteroffizier Willi Schack,
although also wounded, was able to place the vehicle in reverse and find
the gas pedal. So, the vehicle rolled backwards for some time into cover,
then the crew was able to escape ..."
The strong 4th (US) Armored Division forced both kampfgruppen from
Panzer Lehr onto the defensive. The division counterattack, which was started with such hope and motivation, failed against the superiority of the
enemy. The division reorganized for the defense along the WolfskirchenEywiller-Durstel road during the night before 26 November.
Army Reserve
On the Saare front. The 1st Army was in crisis due to the double American
offensive. The length of its front had doubled without it essentially being
reinforced with the required forces. Until the arrival of anticipated large formations, Panzer Lehr was attached to the 1st Army as its only reserve. On 26
November it was ordered to screen the forming of a new defensive line from
Sarre-Union to Wingen. The 401 Volks Artillery Corps was placed under its
command.
During the morning, the 4th (US) Armored Division probed the division's
security with four combat elements side by side. However, they were all
repulsed, even though all of the panzers had been withdrawn from the front.
The construction of the new defenses in the 1st Army area continued on 27
November. In the north, west of Forbach, the enemy caused a problem with
several penetrations. This situation forced a withdrawal to a shorter line in
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the approaches of the Saarhohenstellung (Saare Heights Position) of the

West Wall.
Panzer Lehr was ordered to deploy a special assault group behind the
threatened sector. Fortunately, reinforcements from the 1st Co, 901st Rgt,
under Oberleutnant Monz, recently arrived with a total of 29 SPWs and they
were deployed to Bous (south of Saarlouis) to the XIII SS Corps.
On the day before, Panzer Lehr had to send the 130th ALA into the area
east of Nordvogesen. After giving up these two groups, General Balck
ordered Panzer Lehr to assemble in the Sarre-Union area as army group
reserve. They could only be committed after receiving explicit approval from
the army group. Therefore, until 3 December, Panzer Lehr was divided into
three kampfgruppen that operated independently from each other. Their
flanks were separated by over 80 kilometers. The force and fuel situation in
the 1st Army area of operations left no other choice. In light of the greater
mobility of the superior enemy forces on land and in the air, time-consuming, wide-ranging deployments with heavy fuel consumption were prohibitive.
While the 1st Army formations occupied their new positions south of SarreUnion-Mackwiller-Tieffenbach-Wingen on 27 November (25th
Panzergrenadier Division on the right, 361st Volksgrenadier Division on the
left in the mountains), Panzer Lehr had to secure between Diedendorf and
Durstel as rear guard.
Kampfgruppe von Poschinger was supposed to hold Wolfskirchen until 27
November at 1700 hours, in order to give the 25th Panzergrenadier Division
time to set up its positions. The town was incorporated into an all-round
defense by the 7th Co, 902nd Rgt under Oberleutnant Graf and, with the help
of strong artillery, heavy mortars and anti-tank support, it was held as
planned against all enemy attacks conducted with the support of tanks and
fighter-bombers, although 17 men were lost.
Even Kampfgruppe von Hauser was able to delay the attack by CCA from
the 4th (US) Armored Division against Gungwiller and Durstel until dark.
The enemy was led by Lieutenant Colonel Abrams. The new American M-l
battle tank is named after this officer who later became US Army Chief of
Staff.
During the evening the 1st Army reported: "The enemy achieved only a
small penetration after losing 38 tanks."
This defensive success was ascribed to the 130th Panzerjger Lehr Bn. Two
days after the deployment of Panzer Lehr from Hunsrck, the long-touted 21
new Panzerjger IVs, with the 75 mm cannon L/70, arrived by rail in
Kirchberg/Hunsrck. A few hours after unloading and a brief technical
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examination, the combat elements of the battalion marched, initially without

its supply units, through Kirn-Lauterecken- Zweibrcken to its division.
Since combat readiness was immediately required, adjustments and initial
firing was conducted during a march halt in the Glan valley on the edge of
the Baumholder Troop Training Area. The successful commitment, in spite
of the lack of training on the new weapon system, was the result of special
effort.
By 30 November the enemy tried to gain favorable departure positions
southeast of Sarre-Union for an attack against the city. On 1 December, as a
clear sky facilitated the commitment of fighter-bombers in close air support,
two American divisions (4th Armored and 26th Infantry) attacked from two
directions against the city. As the situation became critical, II Bn, 130th Pz
Lehr Rgt was committed from Butten in order to prevent the loss of Hill 318
near Mackwiller. H.M. Cole in his "The Lorraine Campaign" wrote:
"CCB found the going slow on the narrow, muddy roads and became
involved in a succession of skirmishes which intensified in violence as
the Americans neared Hill 318. Additional tanks and armored infantry
from CCA were brought into action in the CCB zone, but the tanks
mired down. About noon Company A of the 8th Tank Battalion beat off
a detachment of tanks from the Panzer Lehr and the armored infantry
seized the hill. But the affray had been costly. The attackers suffered 88
casualties, including two battalion commanders ..."
The hill exchanged hands after a nighttime counterattack. However, it had
to be given up again at dawn, when the enemy bypassed it on both sides. On
1 December the Americans temporarily penetrated to Sarre-Union, but later
withdrew in order to capture the southern portion of the town and Hill 252 in
front of Domfessel on the next day, as a basis for further advance to the east.
Again the panzer battalion had to attack with companies at various locations
in order to iron out the situation. Company Kozub was subordinated to the
11th Panzer Division for a counterattack from Oermingen to Sarre-Union.
Further to the east Kampfgruppe von Poschinger, with 15 panzers, broke out
of the forest southwest of Voellerdingen and captured that town.
During the evening, I Bn, 902nd Rgt was ordered to hold the area gained
around Voellerdingen-Domfessel against all enemy attacks, in order to prevent an enemy breakthrough across the Eichel to the east. In the neighboring
sector, Kampfgruppe von Hauser held the old main combat line near
Volksberg and Ratzwiller in see-saw fighting.
On the evening of 3 December Army Group G ordered that the Panzer Lehr
Division be completely withdrawn from action by the fall of darkness of 4
December and transferred to OB West for immediate refitting. The serious
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objections voiced by all division commanders to the 1st Army had no effect
on this order.
On 4 December another critical situation faced Kampfgruppe von
Poschinger near Domfessel. I Bn, 902nd Rgt, which had established an allround defense, was broken through due to a flanking attack with strong
artillery support. It was divided into several groups, which were encircled.
When the battalion command post, which was located in a bunker from the
Maginot line, was persuaded to surrender by the use hand-grenades, the
commander capitulated. With him, 140 men went into captivity.
Sarre-Union was also captured by the enemy. The II Bn, 902nd Rgt had to
block near Lorentzen. On the urging of General Bayerlein, the army group
gave its permission to withdraw the front. Nevertheless, Kampfgruppe von
Hauser still had to hold Ratzwiller until dark. In spite of the confusion, all of
Panzer Lehr formations were withdrawn that night. According to a report
from XIII SS Corps, the forward elements had already arrived in the
Pirmasens-Hombourg area early on 5 December. In spite of the shortage of
fuel, the division reached the Eifel by road march, perhaps because the railroads were overloaded and more easily reconnoitered by the enemy than a
road march by small groups at night. Only the tracked elements were transferred by rail.
The railroad loading up was placed in question on 6 December by an
enemy breakthrough toward Singling. The panzer battalion was ordered to
combat readiness. Nevertheless, the 4th (US) Armored Division stopped its
advance because it was completely exhausted. Thus, the railroad transport
could be conducted as ordered on 7 December.
We must still report on the kampfgruppen that were assigned to the other
corps.
Armored Eingreifgruppe (Special Assault Group) Monz
As ordered, Oberleutnant Monz and his 29 SPWs reported to XIII SS Corps
in Bous on the morning of 28 November. The corps commander had expected panzers for the counterattack and was disappointed to see only panzergrenadiers. The corps anticipated an enemy attack from the west and southwest against Felsberg and Saarlouis. Indeed, the regiments of the combat
inexperienced and exhausted 347th Volksgrenadier Division were still committed in the Felsberg-Altforweiler area.
They were, however, only inadequately armed and without anti-tank
defenses. Oberleutnant Monz was ordered to hold the Sauberg (Hill 377) and
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the main road intersection in Felsberg.

During their deployment through Vlklingen, the panzergrenadiers had to
render assistance to the people in the nearby Koll valley by evacuating them
in their wheeled vehicles. At midday they quartered on the western bank of
the Saar, near Picard. They sought contact with the defending elements, conducted a terrain reconnaissance and committed combat reconnaissance to the
west. The result was discouraging. There were no German soldiers, no headquarters to be seen far and wide, with the exception of remnant elements
from a regimental headquarters in Felsberg, which had neither contact with
its subordinate units nor any conception of the situation. The Sauberg,
Villing and Ittersdorf were still free of enemy forces. Many stragglers were
moving in the direction of Wadgassen.
Bad weather kept the enemy fighter-bombers away. The panzergrenadiers
were able to rest in Picard.
New combat reconnaissance on 29 November discovered enemy tanks in
Schreckling and infantry with heavy weapons in Berwiller and in Berus. An
anti-tank gun was discovered at the Altforweiler church. Americans were
taking a break on the eastern edge of Dren. Oberleutnant Monz ordered his
platoons to dismount on the western slope of the Sauberg and entrench. The
SPWs were placed on the reverse slope to provide air defense. "Picked-up
stragglers were to dig positions to relieve the still mobile platoons."
Oberleutnant Monz remembered:

Diagram 23: Eingreifgruppe Monz Near Saarlouis.

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"I led two platoons (one with mortars and on-board cannon) in an
attack around Altforweiler, where an anti-tank gun failed to fire and a
squad of overrun infantry surrendered. In light of the lack of resistance, I
continued on to Berus, where we ran into dispersed infantrymen, who
ran from the houses and tried to withdraw on foot and in vehicles. Our
considerable fire-power was brought to bear. At that time, I estimated the
enemy to be no larger than a company. We had to tow two SPWs and
suffered several killed and wounded during the return trip back to the
rest of the company. We remained camouflaged on the road west of
Felsberg."
On that 29 November the 95th (US) Division continued its attack against
Saarlouis with two regiments. The 1st Bn, 378th Inf Rgt captured Merten,
the 2nd Bn crossed the unoccupied Saare hill positions and captured Berus,
where it was immediately hit by a counterattack conducted by Group Monz:
"After a bitter engagement in which the battalion lost heavily and
became much disorganized, it fell back towards Merten, reorganizing
during the night behind cover offered by a group of farm buildings."
(Cole).
This according to an American general's staff work.
After passing a quiet night in Felsberg, only outposts were left on the
Sauberg. In the morning, when strong sounds of fighting were heard in the
north, Monz attacked the apparently weakly occupied Dren. Under the protective fire of all available 75 mm KwKs and mortars, the right platoon
advanced dismounted from Oberfelsberg to the north, while the left platoon
in Ittersdorf reported an enemy tank column rolling from Schreckling without accompanying infantry. The attack was immediately broken off. All vehicles were ordered back to Felsberg and the prepared trenches were occupied
on the Sauberg. One of the two tank destroyer squads were left on the edge
of the road. The element was formed by NCO candidates.
After withdrawing the drivers and co-drivers of the combat and supply
vehicles to Picard, along with the dead and wounded, the company commander still had 50-60 men available on the vast crest of the hill. Apparently they
were the only German soldiers within a radius of several kilometers - without artillery and long-range anti-tank weapons. Fortunately, overcast skies
kept the fighter-bombers away, but everywhere there were enemy infantry
with supporting tanks advancing to the east. In the afternoon enemy infantry
(377th Inf Rgt) diverted from St. Barbara toward Felsberg.
Then, two infantry battalions (378th Inf Rgt) with tanks approached the
Sauberg from the west and southwest on a broad front. The tank fire inflicted
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losses. The tanks remained outside of panzerfaust range. A radio call for
help to the corps went unanswered. In the afternoon, when additional
infantry climbed from the south and the north, Felsberg was taken and the
company commander had to evacuate the Sauberg, withdrawing to the eastern edge of Felsberg. There, the rear guard - "a particularly stubborn knot
from the assault group" - was able to stop the further advance of the 377th
(US) Inf Rgt. After darkness fell, the Americans stopped their advance. The
group held the eastern edge of Unterfelsberg through the night, with security
in Picard and Lisdorf.
The will to fight of the young soldiers under good leadership was astounding. An "ofenrohr" was set up on the left of the railroad embankment in
Felsberg by an "alte Hase," a machine-gun on the right, manned by a young
rookie. After a Sherman tank was hit, the commander jumped into the trench
next to the rookie and slapped him on the shoulder. Confidently, he said:
"after the third one we'll take a cigarette break."
With clearing skies on 1 December came the bombers. They bombed
Saarlouis, Fraulautern and the Saare bridge in Ensdorf. Subsequently, the
95th (US) Division began its attack against Saarlouis and the Saare crossings. Saarlouis was defended by the remnants of three exhausted infantry
divisions, some still on the western bank, the main body on the edge of the
city in the West Wall bunkers and to the east. After 1500 hours Group Monz
was allowed to withdraw under cover of ground fog from the eastern edge of
Felsberg into positions on the northern edge of Lisdorf. There, machine-guns
and mortars were emplaced, all ofenrohrs were lost trying to provide antitank defense. In order to deceive the enemy of the German weakness, two
motorcycles with side-cars drove up and down the lines, firing at various
positions.
During the night before 2 December the army group ordered the evacuation
of the western bank of the Saare north of Saarlouis, due to troop and ammunition shortages. Oberleutnant Monz did not learn of this because he had lost
radio communications with corps. The company secured Lisdorf until early 3
December. They did not evacuate their positions until the corps ordered them
to do so, when the Americans were already approaching the bridge. The
company was ordered to immediately return to Panzer Lehr through
S aarbrcken-Habkirchen.
After reporting back to Oberst von Hauser in Butten on 4 December, the
severely decimated 1st Co. was immediately re-committed near Volksberg.
Nevertheless, a messenger on foot brought the order to withdraw and assemble on the early morning of 5 December. In the afternoon, the company
marched through Pirmasens-Kaub to Cochem/Moselle.
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130th Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion in Alsace

The advance of the 7th (US) Army to Strassburg had torn a frightful gap
between Nordvogesen and Strassburg. It had to quickly be closed, if the
enemy forces were to be cut off. On 26 November the 1st Army wanted to
construct a defensive line between Wingen-Pfaffenhoffen-Bischwiller. In
addition, two divisions rolled out of the Netherlands.
While the 361st Volksgrenadier Division defended the mountain sector
west of Ingwiller, the enemy reconnoitered the unprotected area to the east,
out of the Bouxwiller area with combat and reconnaissance tanks advancing
to the north toward Offwiller and from Pfaffenhoffen toward Uttenhoffen.
"We must anticipate the possibility of a mobile enemy attack in this area,"
the 1 st Army reported on 26 November.
On that day, the corps level command "Hheres Kommando Vogesen"
(LXXXIX Army Corps after 29 November) ordered Panzer Lehr to dispatch
the 130th ALA into the area east of the Nordvogesen. They were to secure to
the south along the Moder between Ingwiller and Schweighouse (approximately a 22 kilometer front) until the 245th Infantry Division arrived. At the
same time the first three platoons of the 245th Infantry Division arrived,
including the division staff, but no combat elements.
On 27 November the 130th ALA reported its command post was located in
Uhrwiller, with security in Pfaffenhoffen and on the Uhrwiller-Hagenau
road. The first infantry and artillery formations of the 245th Infantry
Division to arrive on 27 November were also ordered to Pfaffenhoffen.
Reconnaissance conducted on 27 November established that Ringeldorf and
Obermorden were both occupied by the enemy.
The 245th Infantry Division was a static division with only two infantry
regiments, weak artillery consisting of captured guns and few supply elements. It was created in the summer of 1943 and severely battered as part of
the 15th Army during the fighting withdrawal to Germany. Meanwhile, it
was only strengthened with poorly trained Luftwaffe and naval personnel.
On the enemy side, the 45th (US) Division had the mission of first reaching
the Mertzwiller-Rothbach line with its three regiments, maintaining contact
on the left with the 100th Division attacking in the mountains.
On 28 November the enemy broke through on both sides of Ingwiller, several kilometers toward Rothbach. On the other hand, the American attempt
to cross the Moder near Pfaffenhoffen and take the town failed.
The 130th ALA, with its weak forces, could initially only conduct a delaying battle against the attacking enemy, with its armor and artillery support.
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They still underestimated the enemy strength. Between Ingwiller and

Obermodern they attacked with not two, as reported, but five infantry battalions with an armored battalion. They were attacking to the north. The superior enemy forces could only be stopped with mines, obstacles and demolitions. On 29 November the enemy resumed his attack from a line southern
edge of Rothbach-Bischholtz-Mulhausen-Zutzendorf, but, after ten platoons from the 245th Infantry Division had arrived, the German resistance
stiffened. The infantry and artillery took up positions near and east of
Pfaffenhoffen. Before dawn a German barrage was conducted against enemy
combat reconnaissance advancing from Mulhausen. The combat report of the
45th (US) (the Fighting Forty-fifth) Division reads:
"Then the enemy struck back with an attempt to infiltrate behind the
2nd Bn. lines, but this move was quickly halted. Company B fought off
an attack by the enemy trying to enter Muhlhausen from the north and
took a great many prisoners ..."
On the German side, unfortunately, only the Army Group G combat diary
contains the usual brief reports without any reference to acts of bravery.
Nevertheless, Leutnants Diesslin and von Zitzewitz were awarded Honor
Roll Clasps for their commitment near Mulhausen at that time. Leutnant

Diagram 24: 130th Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion in Alsace.

243

Diesslin reported that, on 29 November, he was ordered by Major von

Fallois to conduct a general reconnaissance into the BischholtzMulhausen-Uhrwiller area in order to capture prisoners and gather information on the organization and intent of the enemy forces that had established
themselves there on the previous day.
For this mission he had his cannon platoon (three gun APCs with short-barreled 7.5 cm cannon) and two to three makeshift 75 mm self-propelled antitank guns mounted on one ton prime-movers, two combat engineer squads
and the armored car platoon from the battalion under Leutnant von
Zitzewitz. His combat report, which was confirmed by other members of the
130th ALA, disagrees with that of the Americans:
"We advanced from the Gumbrechtshoffen road in the direction of
Mulhausen and were met by infantry fire. Our cannon broke the defense
and we drove into the American main combat line. They gave up after a
brief fight. This had an enormous chain reaction. Approximately 100
Americans came toward us from a distance of 300 to 400 meters. They
threw down their weapons and allowed us to take them back to our lines.
While were were withdrawing, American artillery began firing ..."
The 45th (US) Division reported three other German counterattacks on that
day. Nevertheless, the German front line had to be withdrawn to the northern
edge of Offwiller - northern edge of Uhrwiller - western and southern edge
of Pfaffenhoffen that evening.
On 30 November the 245th Infantry Division had almost entirely arrived.
Correspondingly, German resistance stiffened. Temporarily, the 130th ALA
remained the backbone and fire-power of the defense. They suffered heavy
casualties near Zinswiller.
December brought cold and wet weather. Therefore, the enemy's terrain
gains were limited. Nevertheless, on 3 December they captured
Gundershoffen and, therefore, penetrated into the new German defensive line
behind Zinsel stream.
On 5 December the 130th ALA withdrew, as ordered, from the front, in
order to march to the north. Behind them, the enemy occupied the hills north
and southwest of Oberbronn on that day.
Therefore, the entire Panzer Lehr Division was on its way to new missions
and new trials. Only a few days were allowed for rest, taking on new personnel and new weapons, and reorganization. There were insufficient unterfhrer replacements. Nowhere near what was required to replace those who
had been lost on the invasion front and the losses suffered during the recent
heavy fighting, which had particularly denuded the ranks of the panzergrenadiers. The number of artillery and flak guns corresponded to only a
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PANZER LEHR COUNTERATTACK

23-25 November 1944

106th Cav Gp Positions, 23 November

Axis of Pz Lehr Advance, 23-25 November
Axis of CCB, 4th Armd Div. Attack, 24-25 Nov.

Diagram 25: The Panzer Lehr Counterattack of 23-25 November, 1944.

245

third of what was required. A majority of the panzers and wheeled vehicles
were immobilized due to the lack of spare parts. Nevertheless, the morale of
the troops remained good. General Bayerlein evaluated them as conditionally
qualified for attack operations.

246

VI
The Battle Of The Bulge

18. Introduction to the Ardennes Offensive

As enemy pressure in the West decreased after October, Hitler believed that
there was still a chance to realize a more propitious end to the war by conducting an offensive operation. He was suffering from Parkinson's disease
and was slowly sinking into senility. More and more he lived in a dream
world, which could not stand up to reality. Having never travelled abroad and
gained international experience, he calculated the faults of his enemies and
overestimated the significance of small quarrels he became aware of between
the Americans and British.
His politics had completely isolated the Reich from the rest of the world. In
1940 there was still some sympathy in some countries for the construction of
a united western Europe through an arrangement with France. This was gambled away by his lust for power, his idiotic racial politics and the shortage of
elites in civilian positions. His poorly qualified political assistants had only
stepped on toes and engendered hate for Germany.
In spite of all of this, internal politics in the Reich had not collapsed.
Through cleverly organized propaganda, run centrally by Gbbels, and
police terror, the patriotism of the people was maintained. In order to keep
the people's displeasure at a minimum, Hitler mobilized the manpower
potential of Germany far later than did the Soviet Union and England. It
wasn't until 20 July 1944 that Gbbels announced "total mobilization."
Through the devotion of the people and extreme rationalization, another 18
divisions and ten panzer brigades were created in the summer of 1944, even
though the air war had an enormous effect on the production of armaments.
Because of the loss of the occupied regions and the defection of almost all of
the allies, the previously limited raw materials were strangled even further.
Lost were the Finnish nickel mines, the Hungarian and French bauxite
stores, the Lorraine and Swedish iron ore, the Yugoslavian copper stores.
Supplies of steel, manganese, chrome, tungsten, molybdenum disappeared.
Ball-bearings even stopped arriving from Sweden. The air attacks concentrated on the communications networks and the supplies of power and fuel,
which were almost all used up. On the other hand, food supplies - the
German Achilles heel during the First World War - were relatively sufficient.
The war was hopelessly lost. The Allies had destroyed any basis for political negotiation. They desired the destruction of the Reich. In September
1944 the Morgenthau Plan was announced, which foresaw the enslavement
of all Germans. "Germany must perish!" it said. Since January 1943 they had
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demanded "unconditional surrender" and refused to support any German

resistance movement. Thus, the Allies indirectly supported Hitler's madness,
to fight to the bitter end.
The Reich became a besieged fortress whose frontiers were shrinking.
Indeed, in September, even after the defection of Rumania, Bulgaria and
Hungary, it had been possible to form a new front in the east between the
Carpathians and the Baltic Sea. The Eastern Army had lost 1.2 million men
from July to November 1944 and now faced a five-fold Soviet superiority
with one hundred large armored formations. The front in Italy, between La
Spazia and Rimini, was relatively stable. In the West it ran from the Scheldt
along the West Wall up to the gates of Burgundy. There stood 60 combat
capable Allied divisions against 55 physically, emotionally and materially
battered remnant German divisions. The German formations were at the end
of their strength and their hope.
The air space was dominated by our enemies. Decisive was the numerical
and qualitative superiority of the strategic and tactical air forces of our western enemy, opposed by the outdated German concepts of air warfare and the
fuel shortage. Our Luftwaffe could neither secure the air defense of the
Reich, nor support the Army with air reconnaissance, screening of the combat area, or close air support.
Hitler's last hope to avoid defeat was based on exploiting existing differences between the Allies. A military success separating the US Army and
British armed forces, he hoped, would create the prerequisite conditions for a
political end to the war.
Obsessed with maintaining the offense and undervaluing the loss of the
"decisive land battles in the West," (Normandy) Hitler believed a surprise
counteroffensive through the Ardennes toward Antwerp could encircle and
destroy the British 21st Army Group with the 1st and 9th (US) Armies. The
enemy air forces would be kept away because of the bad weather.
The critical factor for the success of the operation was surprise. The slogan
was: "Forward, look neither right nor left, across the Meuse to Antwerp!"
Three armies were committed under Army Group B, Generalfeldmarschall
Model:
Attack forces:
6th Panzer Army (right) - Generaloberst der Waffen SS Dietrich, had the
mission of advancing across the Meuse on either side of Lttich in order to
gain the Albert Canal. Forces: four SS panzer divisions and five other divisions, - 4 Volksgrenadier and 1 Parachute.
5th Army - General der Panzertruppen von Manteuffel, had the mission of
breaking through the enemy positions on the Our, then attacking across the
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Meuse between Huy and Givet in order to then screen the flanks and rear of
the 6th Panzer Army against enemy attempts from the west, on a general line
Brussels-Dinant. Forces: three panzer divisions, four other divisions (Volksgrenadier).
7th Army - Was to force a crossing of the Our and Sauer on either side of
Echternach in order to then secure the panzer army's attack against enemy
forces coming from the south. Forces: no panzers, four other divisions, - 1
Parachute and 3 Volksgrenadier.
Army Group reserve: one volksgrenadier division.
OKW Reserves: two panzer divisions, five other divisions.
one panzer brigade, one panzergrenadier brigade.
Total German strength: 28 large formations.
Enemy forces:
21st (British) Army Group: five armored divisions,
eight infantry divisions
9th (US) Army:
two armored divisions,
four infantry divisions
three armored divisions,
1st (US) Army:
11 infantry divisions
one armored division,
USAREUR Reserves:
four airborne divisions
Total strength:
40 divisions.
The apparent equality between these forces was false. Wars are won, in the
long run, by the side that is stronger in numbers and equipment. Today, it is
generally accepted that a three-fold superiority is required for a successful
attack. In this case, the German forces were inferior from top to bottom. The
temporary superiority in the penetration area would quickly vanish because
the Americans were able to deploy one division after the other, due to their
their great mobility.
The disposition of these forces was also wrong. The main effort of the
operation should have been in the center, but it lay to the right, because the
SS divisions were supposed to earn the laurels. However, the infantry divisions committed there ran into a simultaneous American attack and were
unable to break through. The 7th Army, which was charged with flank protection on the left, had no panzers or assault guns. Because of the shortage of
forces, other American frontal sectors could not be pinned. The Americans
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were able to transfer their armored forces to the Ardennes unhindered.

While all of the Allied divisions were completely motorized, all of the
German infantry and volksgrenadier divisions relied on horse-power, each
division had 5000 horses.
Two special operations failed: The 150th Panzer Brigade - Otto Skorzeny was supposed to capture the Meuse bridges and throw the Americans into
confusion. Airborne Operation Stsser - Oberstleutnant Freiherr von der
Heydte - was supposed to capture the Eifel passes.
Major Formations in the 5th Panzer Army
Area of Operations by 24 December
5th Panzer Army:
18th Volksgrenadier Division
Created in 1944, immobile division
Status: 100% personnel, 90% equipment, 0 panzers
Suitability for attack: limited
62nd Volksgrenadier Division
Created 1944, immobile division
Status: 100% personnel, 90% equipment, 0 panzers
Suitability for attack: limited
26th Volksgrenadier Division
Created in 1944, immobile division
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 0 panzers
Suitability for attack: limited
Panzer Lehr Division
Created in 1944, arrived 11 December from the Saare front
Status: 70% personnel, 75% equipment, 39/40 panzers
Suitability for attack: limited
116th Panzer Division
Created in 1944, arrived 13 December from Aachen front
Status: 90% personnel, 70% equipment, 58/43 panzers
Suitability for attack: limited
Fhrer Begleit Brigade
OKW Wachtruppe, arrived 14 December from Heeres Reserve
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Status: 100% Personnel, 100% equipment, 0 panzers

Suitability for attack: full
560th Volksgrenadier Division
Created in 1944, arrived 15 December from Denmark
Status: 66% personnel, 80% equipment, 0 panzers
Suitability for attack: no
2nd Panzer Division
Arrived 15 December from Heeres Reserve
Status: 80% personnel, 50% equipment, 51/48 panzers
Suitability for attack: limited
Created in 1943, arrived 24 December from Heeres reserve
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 0 panzers
Suitability for attack: full
9th Panzer Division
Arrived 24 December from the Aachen front
Status: ? personnel, ? equipment, 50/28 panzers
Suitability for attack: limited
US Divisions:
106th Infantry Division
Immobile division
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 54 tanks
Suitability for attack: inexperienced
28th Infantry Division
Immobile division from the Aachen front
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 54 tanks
Suitability for attack: exhausted
4th Infantry Division
Immobile division from the Aachen front
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 54 tanks
Suitability for attack: full
3rd Armored Division
Arrived 18 December from 1st (US) Army
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Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, approx. 80 tanks

Suitability for attack: full
7th Armored Division
Arrived 17 December from 9th (US) Army
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, approx. 180 tanks
Suitability for attack: full
9th Armored Division
Arrived 16 December from 9th (US) Army
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, approx. 150 tanks
Suitability for attack: full
10th Armored Division
Arrived 17 December from 3rd (US) Army
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, approx. 150 tanks
Suitability for attack: full
82nd Airborne Division
Arrived 19 December from Reserve
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 0 tanks
Suitability for attack: full
101st Airborne Division
Arrived 19 December from Reserve
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 0 tanks
Suitability for attack: full
84th Infantry Division
Arrived 21 December from Reserve
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 54 tanks
Suitability for attack: full
4th Armored Division
Arrived 24 December from 3rd (US) Army
Status: 100% personnel, 100% equipment, 180 tanks
Suitability for attack: full
Correlation of armored forces (minus assault guns): 357 to 986
= 1:3
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Air Situation: The previous German defeat in France was ascribed, for the
most part, to the technical and numerical superiority of the enemy tactical air
forces. The prime prerequisite for a German offensive success was, therefore, maintaining a favorable air situation over the combat area for an
extended period of time. The German Luftwaffe had to protect the German
deployment and, later, the supply of the Army, against bombing attacks in
the rear area and prevent the enemy's tactical air forces from providing close
air support to its own forces. Otherwise, it had to prevent the deployment of
Allied operational reserves by blocking the interior (interdiction) or, at least,
delay their deployment and make it more difficult.
Operation "Bodenplatte" was planned as a surprise Luftwaffe attack operation targeting 15 enemy airfields. Because of the lack of training and insufficient navigational equipment, the German aircraft could only conduct the
attacks if they visually acquired the target. The weather did not allow for this
until 1 January 1945. By then, the enemy had already destroyed so many of
the 1800 aircraft assigned to the offensive that only 1035 could take off for
the attack. Indeed, they achieved surprise. However, not only the enemy, but
the German squadrons also suffered bitter losses, some from German flak,
who had not been advised of the attack beforehand.
The Allied strategic bomber formations were able to fly their missions
regardless of weather. From 16 December they changed the rear Army area
and the cities on the Rhein and in the Ruhr into a wasteland, apparently without facing any competition from the Luftwaffe, although they must have suffered considerable losses from German flak.
After the period of bad weather ended, the attacking formations no longer
saw any traces of their own Luftwaffe, but they saw a lot of the enemy's.
German air reconnaissance did not make it through to clarify the situation
for attackers, such as Group Peiper, as the US Air Force did for its ground
elements. (Group Peiper from the 1st SS-Panzer Division [6th Panzer Army]
achieved a deep breakthrough toward Stavelot, but was cut off and
destroyed.)
Transportation Situation: The Ardennes was considered impassable until
1940, when the Wehrmacht was able to overcome it in good weather, under
the protection of the Luftwaffe, against a weak enemy with horse-drawn
equipment and relatively defenseless. Now, exhausted formations lacking
sufficient supply were supposed to break through a tenaciously defending,
highly mobile and well equipped enemy, in difficult terrain, in winter, under
an air threat. Movement off the few poor, often winding roads, through the
heavily forested and hilly terrain, was impossible. Therefore, any resistance
on the roads and in the passes could not be bypassed in vehicles, but only on
foot. The occupation of the transportation hubs of St. Vith and Bastogne
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would improve the transport situation. However, experienced engineers

equipped with modern road construction equipment and civilian road
builders were not available. German combat bridging equipment was not
developed sufficiently during the war to carry the increased weight of
armored fighting vehicles. The construction of temporary bridges depended
upon water and bank conditions and was time-consuming. The lack of air
and ground reconnaissance was felt by the attacking elements when they
realized that the approaches to the bridges on the far side of the Our were
destroyed and blocked during the German retreat in September and left in
that condition. There were no easy remedies. After a time-consuming halt,
all three panzer divisions from the 5th Army had to be directed across the
bridge near Dasburg. The result was a long traffic jam that proved to be in
the enemy's favor.
The fuel situation was critical from top to bottom. The units were promised
five fuel consumption units (each unit equalled 100km, or 60 miles), three
with the vehicles and an additional two on the supply columns. They did not
receive them. Fuel consumption on the difficult Eifel roads at night, in low
gear, exceeded all expectations. For reasons of security, the large army fuel
dumps were located on the Rhein. The long way there and back led through
the road-poor Eifel. Due to the air threat, the trip had to be made at night
without lights. On the other hand, the constantly supplied American armored
divisions could drive over large stretches almost without enemy intervention,
and at night with lights. They could also do so quickly. For example, the 4th
Armored Division marched from Thionville to Bastogne on 17 December, a
distance of more than 120 kilometers on good roads.
Camouflage and deception: The Ardennes offensive was a textbook example of maintaining secrecy. The circle of officials with knowledge of the
operation was kept to a minimum. Lapses of secrecy were threatened with
death. Orders were not permitted to be carried on aircraft or the normal post.
They could only be carried by officers. Transmission by electronic means radio and telephone - was forbidden. False orders - assembly for a counterattack, simulation of a 25th Army, by radio deception and written orders
bearing the cover-name "Wacht am Rhein" (Watch on the Rhine) - added to
the enemy's surprise. Movement was conducted behind the front at night and
a lot of noise was made. Firing artillery was forbidden. In order to eliminate
betrayal by defectors, ethnic Germans from abroad were posted from the
participating formations.
Nevertheless, the Allies subsequently stated that they did not heed many of
the indicators. However, the Allies had pictured an enemy situation that was
incorrect. They believed that the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of any
large-scale effort and believed any offensive through the wintry Ardennes
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completely impossible. A deception of their refined reconnaissance system

was not even taken into consideration.
The locations of the Army Headquarters from participating German army
commands was hidden from the Allies. Thus, surprise was a special advantage for the Germans.
The strict secrecy, however, also brought with it some disadvantages, since
the participating units would not be able to conduct prior reconnaissance of
their attack terrain, not even the bridges and their entrances and exits. They
would be held up by unexpected obstacles, where speed might be required.
The beginning of the offensive on 16 December achieved total surprise on
the outposts of the enemy along the entire front.
The 6th Panzer Army ran into the simultaneous American attack out of the
Ruhr reservoir and stalled. Only Group Peiper from the 1st SS Panzer
Division was able to break through in the direction of Stavelot. This would
be the only tactical success.
Only the 5th Panzer Army will be considered in the following:
Initially, it was important to cross the Our at four locations. This was
impossible at the blown bridging site near Ouren, however crossings were
achieved at Dasburg and Gemnd. Vehicles were able to cross these combat
bridges in the afternoon. Actually, only the Dasburg bridge remained
passable, so all three panzer divisions from the 5th Panzer Army crossed the
Our over one bridge, one after the other.
Bridge building in the 7th Army area took even longer.
The enemy facing the 5th Panzer Army, the VIII (US) Corps with three
infantry divisions and one-third of an armored division, had failed to both
issue orders in case of an enemy attack, and to reconnoitre and prepare rallying positions. Therefore, bridges and passes could not be destroyed. Thus, it
was easier to say: "Hold at all costs!" The units were encircled in their villages, out of ammunition and having to operate without knowing what the
situation was on their flanks. Their losses were correspondingly heavy.
On the other hand, the higher commands reacted quickly and effectively.
Already on the afternoon of 16 December General Bradley, the commander
of the US army group, ordered the deployment of two armored divisions to
the VIII Corps. On the following day, General Eisenhower turned over his
reserve, the XVIII Airborne Corps with both airborne divisions, 82nd and
101st. The army and corps, however, divided these highly mobile forces into
small battle groups for the defense, instead of committing them to a counterattack as planned. Thus, the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions were almost
effortlessly wiped out and almost nothing was heard from the integral
armored battalions in the infantry divisions.
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These high command reserves were able to hold the two transport hubs, St.
Vith and Bastogne. St. Vith, which lay in a valley pocket and was almost surrounded, was ultimately evacuated. Field Marshal Montgomery agreed with
the proposal of his concerned 7th Armored Division commander and suspended the hold order from the corps commander. Otherwise, this American
armored division would have been completely destroyed.
Bastogne, on the other hand, defied all attacks. As long as our 7th Army
secured the flank of the 5th Panzer Army to the south, encircled Bastogne
could have little effect on the attack across the Meuse. That was the operational objective, not the capture of Bastogne.
While the 5th Panzer Army continued to push to the Meuse, only limited by
the fuel shortage, Hitler ordered Bastogne be taken. This, in fact, marked the
end of the operation! OB West reported on 24 December that the offensive
had reached its climax. It had to be broken off since the German forces were
urgently needed in the east in order to block the anticipated Soviet offensive.
Instead, an operationally senseless battle flared up around Bastogne.
However, the Allies were as much to blame as was Hitler. Realizing the difficult German supply situation, they could have achieved a less-costly success and, once and for all, destroyed both German panzer armies, if they had
allowed the attackers to reach or cross the Meuse, where they would have
become immobile. They also could have built an enormous pocket by conducting an outflanking operation north and south of Dasburg. Instead, they
tried to throw Army Group B back by attacking it frontally.
The German attack formations, which were forced onto the defensive,
defended bravely and successfully for about fourteen days, favored by the
difficult terrain, the cold, the snow and their extensive winter and nighttime
combat experience. During the following planned withdrawal, they lost a
great deal of their equipment due to the shortage of fuel and terrain conditions, not because of enemy pressure. Unfortunately, these German losses, in
contrast to those suffered by the Allies, were irreplaceable. General
Wagener, the Chief of Staff for the 5th Panzer Army, assessed the fighting
with the words: "The Germans lost the Ardennes offensive, the Allies did not
win it!"
In spite of all the failures, the commanders on both sides saw the Ardennes
offensive as an immortal monument to the best German military tradition
during the Second World War.
19. Forward to the Meuse
The Ardennes offensive would be the only time that the Allied leadership
would be forced onto the defensive in the West.
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After its unexpected relief from the fierce and costly fighting in the 1st
Army area of operations on the Saar front on 5 December, Panzer Lehr
assembled in the Cochem an der Mosel area, after a seven-day, strenuous
night march conducted in small groups. It received the required personnel
and material replacements - approximately 600 panzergrenadiers, panzers,
guns and vehicles. This improved the equipment situation, but the units had
no time to incorporate the personnel replacements and check the equipment.
Superficially, the combat strength of the division, with a total of 63 Panzer
IVs and Vs, as well as 15 Panzerjger IVs, appeared to be favourable when
compared to other divisions. However, the panzer regiment still had no more
than one mixed panzer battalion instead of two. Instead of I (Panther)
Battalion, which was fighting in Hungary, it was promised the 559th Heavy
Panzerjger Battalion, equipped with Jagdpanthers - a weaker replacement
for the offensive. It did not arrive until after Christmas. The 243rd Assault
Gun Brigade, which was also promised to the division, never did show up.
Apparently, it had, in the meantime, received other orders. The Panzerjger
Lehr Battalion was only able to commit two companies with Jagdpanzer IVs.
Its anti-tank gun company fought with the unarmored 75 mm anti-tank gun.
The 130th ALA was relatively well replenished with equipment.
The great gaps in the ranks of the panzergrenadiers were numerically filled
with replacements - some splendid, but retrained cavalrymen from
Mecklenburg and very young recruits, still capable of enthusiasm, as well as
older, discontented Luftwaffe soldiers. There was a great shortage of NCOs.
Nevertheless, it had been possible to reconstitute 1st Bn 902, - which had
been destroyed - in Domfessel on 4 December by combining the two battalion supply companies into one regimental supply company. Only one battalion, the I Bn, 901st Rgt, remained equipped with armored SPWs, even if the
1st Company had only 16 SPWs instead of 22. The three other battalions
were partially motorized with unarmored Steyr personnel carriers and
Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO). In general, the panzergrenadiers lacked their
earlier fire-power, because they possessed neither gun APCs nor heavy
infantry guns. Moreover, the considerable lack of training also could not be
overlooked.
The 130th Armored Artillery Regiment was "armored" only in name. After
loosing its guns in Lorraine, I Battalion had to hand over what was left over
to the other two battalions. The regiment now consisted of only a light battalion (4th, 5th, 6th Batteries) and III (heavy field howitzer) Battalion with two
batteries. The supply troops were in even worse shape.
On 13 December the commanders first learned of the upcoming attack. On
15 December the units were read the daily order of Feldmarschall von
Rundstedt and Feldmarschall Model. They listened with deep anxiety.
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Soldiers of the West Front! Your great hour has arrived!

Large attacking armies have started against the Anglo-Americans. I
do not have to tell you any more than that. You feel it yourself: WE
GAMBLE EVERYTHING! You carry with you the holy obligation to
give everything to achieve beyond human possibilities for your
Fatherland and our Fhrer!
Der Oberbefehlshaber West
signed von Rundstedt
Generalfeldmarschall
During the offensive, Panzer Lehr Division had the mission of assaulting to
and across the Meuse sector Givel-Dinant on the southern flank of the 5th
Panzer Army, as part of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps (General der
Panzertruppen Freiherr von Lttwitz), together with the 2nd Panzer and 26th
Volksgrenadier Divisions. For the attack, the corps ordered the division:
- to initially support the 26th Volksgrenadier Division with elements to
establish bridgeheads across the Our near Gemnd and across the Clerf
River near Drauffeld,
- then be prepared to attack out of the bridgeheads toward Bastogne and
later to the Meuse near Dinant. Bastogne should be taken by coup de main;
in case of strong enemy resistance, it is to be bypassed to the south and then
taken by the 26th Volksgrenadier Division.
The terrain into which the Panzer Lehr Division attacked and would later
defend alternated sharply between deep-winding mountain valleys and longstretching elevated plains covered by large forests. The deployment through
the curving, steep and narrow mountain roads of the Eifel, even in dry
weather, had already made high demands on the drivers and vehicles. The
American front line ran along mountain road N 7 directly behind the deep,
rugged valley of the swollen Our. From this valley, only a few narrow roads
ran along the slope in serpentine. They were not passable for panzers.
Skyline Drive offered the defender favourable possibilities for observation
and fire. The valleys located behind the Clerf River and Wiltz were flatter
and easier to cross. To the west closed forest-rich hill country that rose to the
Moselle and Meuse watershed near Bastogne and then played out into a long
depression, suitable for panzers, up to the Meuse. This depression was broken by the flat valleys of the Ourthe, L'Homme and Lesse, wide rivers presenting difficult obstacles. The terrain and, therefore, the good roads ran
from northeast to southwest, there were no good east-west roads.
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The remaining roads and trails were narrow and unsuitable for heavy traffic. For the movement of panzer formations and their supply, it was very
important that the large road intersections - in the Panzer Lehr Division sector Bastogne - be occupied.
The enemy in defensive positions was the 28th (US) Infantry Division, a
National Guard Division originating from Pennsylvania with the nickname
Keystone. It had already met the Panzer Lehr Division near Percy and
Kampfgruppe von Hauser at the West Wall. After suffering heavy casualties
in the Hrtgenwald, it was transferred to this apparently "quiet" frontal sector for refitting. It was reinforced by Combat Command A from the 9th (US)
Armored Division, and an additional tank battalion.
The Panzer Lehr Division was organized as follows for the attack:
Advance Guard:
Commander: commander of the 130th ALA
Troops: 130th ALA
8th Co, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment (15 Pz IVs)
3rd Co, 130th Panzerjger Lehr Battalion
4th Battery, 130th Armored Artillery Regiment
(four light field howitzers)
One armored engineer company
901st Kampfgruppe Commander: commander of the 901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
Troops: 901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
6th Co, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment (Pz IVs)
II Bn, 130th Armored Artillery Regiment
902nd Kampfgruppe Commander: commander of the 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
Troops: 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
II Bn, 130th Panzer Lehr Regt
(two Panther companies)
- Division Reserve

130th Panzerjger Lehr Battalion

Division Begleit Company
259

The Advance Detachment, initially attached to the 26th Volksgrenadier

Division, was to establish the bridgeheads across the Our and Clerf Rivers
and then advance as quickly as possible to Bastogne, capture the city in a
raid and then advance on Dinant.
Kampfgruppen 901 and 902 were supposed to follow the Advance
Detachment across the bridge at Gemnd and then continue the attack
through Bastogne.
130th Armored Artillery Regiment was supposed to initially take up positions, after 14 December, east of the Our so that it could support the attack of
the 26th Division by firing on identified enemy strong points. Then, on
order, follow Panzer Lehr.
The 130th Armored Engineer Battalion had to build two 60 ton combat
bridges over the Irsenbach, one kilometer north of Gemnd, and across the
Our. Later, on order, it was to follow the division.
On 16 December the Panzer Lehr Division was located in the Waxweiler Mauel-Rollersdorf-Krautscheid area, ready to advance as soon as the
bridgeheads were established. No commitment of Panzer Lehr combat units
was foreseen before the bridgeheads were established.
On 16 December 1944 at 0530 hours, in the early dawn of a cold and wet
winter morning, the XLVII Panzer Corps attacked the American company
strong points along the mountain roads. Before the 45 minute fire preparation, which was conducted by all of the corps artillery, the grenadiers crossed
the Our and took the enemy by surprise, who, in spite of this, offered unexpectedly tenacious and effective resistance. But, by midnight, the 2nd Panzer
Division was able to capture the strong point at Marnach and, therefore, open
the deployment route to Clervaux. The grenadiers also climbed the hills west
of Gemnd and captured Wahlhausen, but they could not cross the high
ground, which was blocked by heavy fire coming from Hosingen and
Holzthum. Effective artillery and mortar fire was also directed against the
attackers from these towns. Meanwhile, the engineers built bridges over the
Our near Dasburg and Gemnd, unmolested by the enemy. It took more time
than expected because of the difficult terrain, water and bank obstacles.
While the first panzer from the 2nd Panzer Division rolled across the bridge
near Dasburg at 1600 hours, the heavy weapons were having problems crossing to the other side in Gemnd. Thick obstacles and two enormous trenches
on either side of Eisenbach blocked any vehicle traffic on the steep road to
Hosingen. The engineers, unprepared for this situation, could not clear the
way quickly enough without dozers.
The route from the bridging site up to the village of Wahlhausen was wearisome. The tracked vehicles from the armored reconnaissance advanced with
260

difficulty on the steep and muddy forests trails. Stuck and abandoned motorvehicles, interspersed among horse-drawn ammunition wagons, blocked the
roads. Enemy fire blanketed the forest and exacted considerable loss and
congestion ...
Thus Generalmajor Kokott placed the blame for the delays.
The engineers could only slowly pave the way for the wheeled vehicles.
The lead company - 3rd Company, 130th ALA reinforced by a Panzer IV
platoon - had to constantly stop, so they did not reach enemy-occupied
Wahlhausen until dawn was breaking. The lead panzer, commanded by
Unteroffizier Wippich, destroyed two American reconnaissance tanks, then
in the twilight nothing more was seen. The rest was a job for the infantry.
The lack of training in the young soldiers became evident. A flare was fired
prematurely next to the panzer, which was illuminated in the bright light. A
high-explosive round from an enemy tank cost Unteroffizier Wippich an
arm. The attack came to a standstill.
The objective for 16 December in the XLVII Panzer Corps area of operations was not achieved, but the Our sector was in German hands, two 60 ton
bridges spanned the river and additional forces were rolling over it to the
western bank.
On 17 December the units of Panzer Lehr set in march to the Our. Rain protected them from air attack. Because of traffic problems near Gemnd,
Kampfgruppe 902 was diverted across the Dasburg bridge. They reported a
refueling stop near Marnach at 1830 hours. Reconnaissance elements committed to Hosingen reported enemy there. The village did not fall until the
next day. Based on the unfounded report that the 14th Fallschirmjger
Regiment had captured the Clerf River crossing south of Kautenbach and,
therefore, opened another route for the continuation of the advance to the
Meuse, the corps ordered the advance detachment not to advance, as
planned, through Drauffel, but through Kautenbach. The 39th Fusilier
Regiment was already committed there. However, the tenacious resistance in
Holzthum could only be broken that evening with the help of the von Fallois
advance guard. Because the exhausted volksgrenadiers could not open the
way through Consthum for the advance detachment, General Bayerlein committed Kampfgruppe von Hauser instead of the advance guard. That night,
volksgrenadiers advanced through the forest and reached the outskirts of
Drauffeld, with its undamaged Clerf bridge. That was where the advance
guard was able to attack out of the bridgehead to the west, reinforced by the
26th Reconnaissance Battalion and followed by Kampfgruppe von
Poschinger on 18 December at 0900 hours; more than a 24 hour delay.
As could be expected, the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was only able to
261

achieve the penetration into the enemy defensive positions in the difficult terrain with the help of Panzer Lehr. However, this preyed upon the limited
strength of Panzer Lehr. It was splintered and over- extended for the continuation of the advance.
Artillery and mortar fire harassed and delayed the climb out of the Clerf
valley. The lead elements received fire in front of Erpeldange. In the meantime, Kampfgruppe 901 was fighting around Consthum, which could not be
cleared until the afternoon. The continuation of the attack in the direction of
Wiltz failed, when the 5th Fallschirmjger Division was unable to support it
from the southeast.
Meanwhile, Kampfgruppe 902 captured Eschweiler by advancing on the
serpentine road. The breakout of the defenders failed in front of the guns of
the panzers from the Advance Detachment near Erpeldange. Eight armored
personnel carriers and four tank destroyers were captured. Kampfgruppe 902
reached Derenbach before the advance guard, in spite of being held up by a
road block three kilometers in front of the village.
The advance guard was stopped first by the enemy, who did not evacuate
Erpeldange and the northern bank of the Wiltz until 1600 hours.
Kampfgruppe 902 had to let them bypass in Derenbach. The advance guard
(II Bn, 130th Panzer Lehr Rgt), in the meantime, pressed to the west during
the night. An impressive show to the right held their attention. Resounding
gunfire, muzzle flashes, tracers and reflections from fires illuminated the low
cloud cover. Tank gunfire indicated the fighting of the 3rd Panzer Regiment
against Task Force Harper near Allerborn.
At 1900 hours they reached Nieder-Wampach without enemy interference.
The tanks had to refuel. Unfortunately, the fuel they brought was only sufficient to fill the panzers half-way. Meanwhile, the corps order for 19
December arrived. Panzer Lehr was supposed to advance across the
Mageret-Wardin line from the east toward Bastogne and, if possible on the
same day, through it to the west. On its right, the 26th Volksgrenadier
Division was supposed to attack through the Bois Jaques with the objective
of penetrating into Bastogne from the north. Generalleutnant Bayerlein then
had to decide on the subsequent march route.
The Corps had been previously warned about using the small field trails
through Benonchamps-Mageret during a thaw and advised to use the better
road through Bras. Reconnaissance results and resident interrogation indicated that the route through Benonchamps, however, appeared passable. It was
the shortest route and the enemy would never expect them to use it. Surprise
favored this point of view. However, the panzer tracks turned the field trails,
that were flooded by the thaw and continuing rain, into mud within a short
262

period of time. Wheeled vehicles, even the panzergrenadier Steyr trucks,

became stuck. Next to and within the columns were grenadiers with horsedrawn ammunition wagons. There was no progress.
Later, in 1977, before his death. General von Manteuffel criticized General
Bayerlein for the un-energetic and delaying command of his division.
He Stated:
"Here he (Bayerlein) has absolutely failed. He was 6 km northeast of
Bastogne. These cases happened in Russia daily or monthly. He should have
ordered his panzergrenadiers to dismount and go on foot. He would have
made it in two hours."
In the 1970's when I was on liaison staff in Washington, General McAuliffe
told me, on three different occasions, that when the first groups of XXVII
Panzer Corps arrived, he had no chance to defend Bastogne. The American
paratroopers had not yet arrived.
Thus, the panzers reached Mageret at midnight without panzergrenadiers.
American vehicles were travelling on the road to Longvilly, otherwise, it
appeared that the town was free of enemy forces. After blocking the exits
from the town, a house-to-house search revealed a few Americans, while an
American first aid station was secured for the treatment of all wounded.
According to statements made by residents, "an American column of 40
tanks, guns and many other vehicles" drove towards Longvilly two hours
earlier. In fact, that was Task Force Cherry, consisting of light armor, reconnaissance and engineers reinforced by an armor and motorized infantry company from the 10th (US) Armored Division. Contact was imminent!
According to information from the corps, an airborne division was supposed
to be on its way to Bastogne. Indeed, the mission of Panzer Lehr demanded
speed, but also sufficient strength. At the time, there were only two weak
panzer companies available, without either panzergrenadiers, who were still
stuck in the mud, or artillery. The division commander decided to postpone
the attack on Bastogne until 0530 hours in order to allow the panzergrenadiers to catch up.
On 19 December, shortly before 0600 hours, the advance guard ran into the
enemy in a thick fog at Neffe. Two enemy tanks were destroyed at the
chapel. Several wheeled vehicles were captured with their engines running.
The lead panzer hit a mine at the railroad station, a second was damaged.
Therefore, the road was blocked for the following panzers. The side of the
stream-bed to the north of the road was mined, the south was blocked by the
steep railroad embankment. Hauptmann Lex, the commander of the advance
guard, searched for engineers to clear a lane through the mines, but that took
time. Meanwhile, the panzergrenadiers were supposed to search the town
263

and castle of Neffe for Americans. The innocent young soldiers allowed
themselves to be deceived by the residents and found nothing in the basements. They reported the town and castle of Neffe enemy-free at 0800 hours,
a grave mistake.
Shortly before the continuation of the attack on Bastogne, the fog lifted and
allowed for observation into the city. An endless column of infantry - the
501st Airborne Regiment - was approaching. After receiving fire, they at
once deployed for an attack towards Neffe. A short time later, the town lay
under mortar fire. The raid on Bastogne had failed.
In light of the enemy's strength and the German weakness - the newly created I Bn, 902nd Rgt lacked combat experience and the panzers fuel, the
artillery still lagged far behind - Oberstleutnant von Poschinger ordered a
postponement until a second battalion (Bohm) arrived. It was supposed to
quickly advance through Neffe to the town of Mont on the enemy's flank. At
1000 hours, when the 5th and 6th Companies approached the castle of Neffe,
which had been reported to be free of enemy forces, in route-march, they
were met by heavy machine-gun fire, which inflicted considerable loss and a
great amount of confusion on the combat inexperienced young panzergrenadiers. The 5th Company commander, Oberleutnant Pauletto, and another officer were immediately killed. Oberleutnant Graf, the 7th Company
commander, reported:
"No sooner had I approached the gate to the castle park, when we
received murderous machine-gun fire. The castle was occupied. Many
were killed, many others wounded. I was lucky and was able to seek
shelter behind a 60 cm thick tree. A sharpshooter had me in his sights,
any movement resulted in a shot. Our panzers arrived and opened fire. It
had no effect. While the 6th Company set up on the edge of the park, the
5th and the 7th Companies were supposed to attack the castle from two
sides. It was fruitless. The attack had to be suspended and, by evening,
the castle was still occupied by the enemy. By shouting I was finally able
to resume command of my company. A stream was our rescue. Jumping
into the ice-cold water protected us from enemy fire ..."
By holding out until dark, the American castle defenders frustrated the
German attack against Mont, which was then occupied by the enemy. At
1000 hours strong American artillery joined in, while the Germans weren't
ready to fire until after noon. By midday, the enemy had also occupied
Bizory and isolated the 26th Reconnaissance Battalion from Battle Group
902 and threatened to outflank it on both sides.
At thewithdrawing
same time, from
enemyLongvilly.
tanks approached
the eastern
exit commander
from Mageret
while
Oberleutnant
Ebner, the
of
264

the 8th Co, 902nd Rgt, reported:

"My lead platoon was the anti-tank platoon, fortunately for me. As
we approached the eastern entrance to Mageret we saw an American column advancing from the east - we could recognize four to six tanks. I
ordered my three anti-tank guns into position. The middle anti-tank gun
caught the lead tank, the crew bailed out. The other tanks withdrew.
Shortly after that, Hauptmann Lex arrived in his Jeep. He asked me for
some fuel for his panzers, which had run out of gas somewhere near
Neffe. We loaded the back seat of his Jeep with containers of gasoline.
In spite of the enemy fire, he made it back to his panzers. Shortly after
that, General Bayerlein appeared. He ordered me to construct a defensive line in Mageret with the leaderless volksgrenadiers, who were in the
immediate area. He expected an attack from Longvilly ..."
The strong armored forces that forced their way into Longvilly - elements
of the 9th and 10th (US) Armored Divisions - posed as much of a threat to
the planned attack by the 26th Volksgrenadier Division against Foy and
Bizory with their 77th and 78th Regiments, as for the right flank of Panzer
Lehr. Independent of each other, the commander of the 77th Regiment,
Generalleutnant Bayerlein and the corps commander decided to attack
Longvilly. Oberst von Hauser was to attack north from Benonchamps.
General Freiherr von Lttwitz stopped the 78th Regiment, which was
advancing on Bizory in order to divert it to Longvilly. In this manner, it had
lost so much time that the enemy caught up to it in Bizory.
Before all of these measures could take effect, the commander of the
Panzerjger Lehr Battalion, Hauptmann Bethke, whose panzerjgers formed
the division reserve, attacked from Ober-Wampach on his own initiative.
Exploiting the favorable terrain, he brought his tank destroyers unnoticed
into position right in front of Longvilly. The enemy, who was moving unconcerned in column, was so surprised and thrown into such confusion by the
unexpected heavy gun fire, that they ceased all resistance after making a
fruitless attempt to break out. The panzerjgers were supported by the fire of
a 2nd Panzer Division artillery battalion. Generalleutnant Bayerlein:
"At 1400 hours the forests were combed and the panzerjgers had
great success as they put a great number of U.S. tanks and armored vehicles between Arlincourt and Longvilly out of commission and completed
the encirclement of the U.S. forces from the west, in cooperation with
elements of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division. They played an important
part in their destruction."
Twenty-three
combat tanks,
armoredhands.
howitzers,
30 jeepsappeared
and 25 utterly
trucks
fell,
mostly undamaged,
into 15German
The enemy
265

worn down.
Kampfgruppe von Fallois was committed against Wardin-Marvie in order
to advance on Bastogne from the south and avoid being outflanked from
there. At 1300 hours the reconnaissance entered Wardin from the east with
panzer and artillery support, at the same time as the 1st Company, 501st
Airborne Regiment entered from the other side. A fierce fight ensued. The
paratroopers had to be attacked house by house. By evening they had lost
four officers and 45 men killed; only 83 men from the company returned to
Bastogne. However, the forces from the Armored Reconnaissance Lehr
Battalion were so exhausted that they couldn't attack the weakly-occupied
Marvie at that time.
In the early morning the over-tired General Bayerlein was wounded by a
shell fragment. He was well-treated at the American Mageret first aid station, which had been captured, and soon returned somewhat recovered.
In the afternoon the corps commander, General Freiherr von Lttwitz,
appeared at the Panzer Lehr command post in Nieder-Wampach. He exuded
optimism, even though Bastogne had not fallen and the troops, who had been
committed for more than 72 hours, were at the end of their strength.
On the northern flank, the 2nd Panzer Division advanced impetuously to
the west. They were ready, if need be, to capture Bastogne. The 26th
Volksgrenadier Division, in the middle, attacked Foy and Bizory. On the left
flank closed the Panzer Lehr Division. Their left neighbor, the 5th
Fallschirmjger Division, reported capturing Wiltz. When deciding about
how to continue the operation, the corps faced the dilemma of choosing in
favour of a rapid advance to the Meuse over the capture of Bastogne, or conduct another costly attack against Bastogne. The skeptical General Bayerlein
emphatically drew attention to the importance of Bastogne and the strength
of the fresh enemy airborne division there. In such difficult road and terrain
conditions, the occupation of the traffic hub was indispensable for any further
operations. If the enemy continued to occupy the town, it would become a
boil on the flesh of the corps, especially because of the concern over flank
protection to the south if the recently refitted 5th Fallschirmjger Division
failed in its will to fight. On the other hand, the corps commander noted that
they had already lost more time than could be justified in light of the agility
of the enemy command. The enemy had already moved faster than expected,
deploying strong reserves, one armored and two airborne divisions. One had
to anticipate a further strengthening of enemy resistance, not only in
Bastogne, but also behind the Meuse. The forces of the corps were ill-suited
for an urban fight in and around Bastogne. As long as the southern flank was
secure, Bastogne, as well as St. Vith further to the north, would have to fall
266

into their hands like a ripe fruit.

General Freiherr von Lttwitz decided to follow the order of the Army
Command:
"which regarded the concept of the offensive endangered if all forces
of the corps cease to advance to the west in order to capture Bastogne
..." (Manteuffel).
On 20 December the corps ordered:
- the 2nd Panzer Division will capture Noville and immediately
advance to the west,
- the 26th Volksgrenadier Division will continue the attack from
positions achieved on 19 December and, after reaching the NovilleBastogne road, will penetrate into Bastogne from the north,
- the Panzer Lehr Division will attack from the east, from positions
achieved on 19 December, to capture Bastogne. If enemy resistance
proves too strong for the division, then it will ... pin [the enemy in
Bastogne] ... and attack with the main body to the west.
Mindful of the great dilemma, General Bayerlein ordered Kampfgruppe
902, to make another attempt with a night attack that same night to capture
Bastogne, with the support of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division.
Two kampfgruppen were to attack at 1900 hours: On the right, I Bn, 902
Rgt reinforced by a panzer company and the 5th Co, 902 Rgt, along the road;
on the left, II Bn, 902 Rgt (-), without tanks, from Neffe Castle towards
Monts, which was to be taken by assault.
Fire support was supposed to be provided by artillery, a nebelwerfer battalion and heavy infantry weapons:
First barrage on Monts,
Second barrage on the hills in front of Bastogne,
Third barrage on the great square in Bastogne.
Oberleutnant Graf, commander of the 7th Company, 902nd Regiment,
remembered:
"We set out punctually from Neffe Castle. We marched as quietly as
possibly along the roadside ditch. The road was like a field trail. Panzers
were getting bogged down. Now and then something clattered, cooking
utensils, a gas mask, announcing our approach to the Americans. Flares
illuminated the night. We had to hastily take cover ... Then we were 100
meters in front of Monts. Still nothing stirred. My light mortars took up
267

position. The companies deployed for the attack. We found ourselves in

an open field as the enemy covered us with fire from well-protected
positions. The men in the open field were mercilessly cut down by the
fire. We returned the fire, but had to retreat to the roadside ditch. Our
wounded lay in the field in front of us. There were loud calls for medics.
Tracers continued to rise into the sky. When we set out to remove the
wounded, the enemy ceased fire momentarily. Because we had trouble
withdrawing with 20 wounded, we did not reach Neffe Castle until 0100
hours. The surgeon had all he could handle in his first aid station."
The attack on the right also failed. No sooner were the panzer motors
turned on then enemy artillery was fired on them, as Gefreite Gann
described:
"Our engineers couldn't even remove the mines that were laid for
our own security. We drove into a blocking fire. The grenadiers and engineers suffered heavy casualties. Feldwebel Dette drove in the lead. A
mine tore off his track. There were heavy losses. Leutnant Wendorff
called us back ..."
At the same time, the fighting around Wardin, further to the south, raged
with the 130th ALA at its focus. It was relieved during the night by
Kampfgruppe 901. In the morning a reinforced panzergrenadier company
was able to penetrate into Marvie. However, it was thrown out by a counterattack after loosing several panzers.
Panzer Lehr was reorganized for the continuation of the attack on Bastogne.
Kampfgruppe 902 remained in its former attack axis on the northern edge of
the Neffe stream bridge 800 meters southeast of Monts. Adjacent to the left,
Kampfgruppe 901 relieved Kampfgruppe von Fallois with the mission of initially capturing Marvie. The reconnaissance elements were to be held by the
division until further notice. The artillery regiment, reinforced by the 311th
Heeres Flak Battalion, was supposed to support the attack with observed fire
and barrages on Bastogne from positions near Benonchamps.
In spite of the failure, the corps commander remained confident. In the
morning he ordered the 26th Volksgrenadier Division to commit the 39th
Regiment, not, as planned, into northern Bastogne, but along with all other
available elements of the division immediately through Wardin - Remoifosse
to bypass Bastogne to the south, "in order to block the enemy forces breaking out to the southwest or the west." Panzer Lehr was to attack with its main
effort directed at Marvie. The 77th and 78th Regiments, the latter reinforced
by the Panzerjger Lehr Battalion (-), were attached to it. They were supposed to attack to the west at 1100 hours and not become involved in the
confusion. Generalmajor Kokott was "surprised by this change in the situa268

tion, which ran counter to his impression of the enemy situation. He proposed, instead, to relieve the Panzer Lehr Division in the Neffe area with the
39th Fusilier Regiment, thereby allowing the mobile forces to bypass and
attack from the southwest. The proposal was turned down because the relief
would take too long. The objective would be achieved more quickly if the
39th Rgt were diverted in the new direction."
As a result of poor communication between the Corps Command post (still
located east of the Our) and subordinate divisions, the Corps Order for the
Bastogne operation was confusing and difficult to understand. It was issued
based on individual, sometimes conflicting, reports and the diverging
impressions of the corps commander and his chief of staff, Oberst i.G. von
Bernstorff derived from their visits to the front before telephone communications were established. The objective, the Meuse near Dinant, had been easy
to reach during the violent assault in 1940. Now, due to the difficult fuel situation and superior enemy forces, rapid and decisive action was even more
important. But the exhausted troops of 1944 were not up to the level of those
in 1940.
The Allies had constantly-updated information on the German situation
from their sophisticated intelligence systems, especially Ultra. The German
soldier deserves recognition, being capable of such effort after being so battered. The Panzer Lehr mission for 21 December was to attack with its main
body across the Ourthe to the Meuse, and to detach Kampfgruppe von
Hauser, which was fighting in the southeast of Bastogne, to the 26th
Volksgrenadier Division. They were to complete the encirclement of
Bastogne and capture it.
While 2nd Panzer Division captured the Ourthe bridge near Orthwuville
further to the north, the stronger one of Panzer Lehr Division's kampfgruppen, von Poschinger (902nd) had to wait for 24 hours for its relief near Neffe
by volksgrenadiers and then for fuel. Therefore, only Kampfgruppe von
Fallois (ALA), reinforced by 8th Company Panzer Lehr Regiment and 130th
Panzer Engineer Battalion, could immediately take up the advance to the
west. They initially followed the 26th Reconnaissance Battalion up to
Hompr, then turned to the west and reached the area around Tillet, where
they severed the supply road of VIII (US) Corps and captured 60 to 80 trucks
loaded with American Christmas mail and packages. Against light resistance, during which two armored cars were lost, they were able to encircle
the 58th (US) Field Artillery Battalion that night and repulse their breakout
attempts.
On 22 December the advance towards St. Hubert was continued, but
delayed as the direct route via Pirompr was reportedly blocked by some cut
269

down trees. Major von Fallois chose the route further to the north via the
Ourthe bridge at Amberloup, which was captured intact without any losses.
In this moment the outposts at the eastern edge of Amberloup seized and
searched four civilians approaching from the east. Finding arms with them,
they were brought to the platoon commander, a young 2nd Lieutenant, who
immediately prepared to execute them as guerillas.
This was the scene of a story, which an "Anonymous WWII Veteran"
reported to President Reagan, 38 years later (1982):
"Our division, the 101st Airborne, was encircled but holding
Bastogne. I was a battalion intelligence and reconnaissance officer. Early
in the morning on December 22, 1944, three of my men and I went on a
mission behind German positions southwest of Bastogne. Four hours
later we were captured ... They were from the foreward element of the
famed Panzer Lehr Division ... Immediately after we were captured, a
German lieutenant ordered his men to take us into the woods. We were
stripped of our weapons and personal effects. The lieutenant became
furious when he discovered that besides my carbine I had a German officer's pistol. He kept demanding to know where and how I had obtained
it. Understandably he refused to accept the explanation that I had found
it. Finally he concluded that I had killed a German officer and taken the

Diagram 26: The Ardennes Front on 24 December 1944.

270

side arm from his dead body. Thus he ordered our execution. We were
ordered to face the other way, raise our arms over our heads, and to pray.
A German soldier manning a machine-gun mounted on a halftrack, rotated and cocked the weapon. Fortunately my German is very bad.
Meaning to say in German "Don't shoot!", I said something else; specifically "Don't shit!" All the Germans standing around in the forest and
within ear shot, broke out in huge guffaws. The resounding belly laughs
must have attracted the attention of that battalion's commanding officer.
He discovered the unlawful intended summary execution and sent a messenger to the still-furious lieutenant, ordering that our personal effects be
returned to us and that we be sent up front to him and his staff for "interrogation".
From having used the same ploy in Normandy to save a captured young
German paratrooper from summary execution, I anticipated that the
questioning would just be a facade. And indeed that's all it was. Several
German officers were standing in a small meadow at the side of the road
... The commander smiled at us, waving at a captain to question me. The
captain asked me in English, where we came from, the name of our organization and the nature of our mission. I quickly replied that he knew
that my men and I would only give our ranks, names and serial numbers.
A conversation with the commander followed ..."
While these events were confirmed by the since retired Oberst von Fallois,
the report was followed by a touching but imagined story of an unknown
American hero on the west bank of the Ourthe, who succeeded in delaying
the German advance for six hours before he was killed. This is contrary to
several statements that the lead tanks crossed the Ourthe at Amperloup without resistance.
As a matter of course Major von Fallois prevented the unlawful presumed
execution of the Americans, although they had violated the Hague
Convention of 1907 by wearing civilian clothes and keeping their arms hidden, so that they could not be distinguished from a distance as soldiers. They
in any case could only be executed after a court-martial. Major von Fallois
acted correctly to treat and evacuate the Americans to the rear as Prisoners of
War.
On 22 December the rest of the Panzer Lehr Division - minus
Kampfgruppe 901 - broke out, with St. Hubert as the day's objective. At
1200 hours the lead company of Kampfgruppe von Poschinger crossed the
Bastogne-Arlon road near Hompr. Hatrival was reached in a rapid advance
against only weak resistance and the attack continued from there to St.
Hubert by dark. The enemy consisted only of armored reconnaissance ele271

ments and weak security, as already explained, near Remichampagne and

Morhet. In spite of partly cloudy skies and clear visibility, the column was
not attacked from the air. The fuel situation was a greater cause for concern.
The first panzer ran out of gas west of Moircy and had to be refueled from
reserve jerry cans, which the panzergrenadiers carried on their Steyr transports. Thus, St. Hubert was reached in the false hope that gasoline could be
captured there. They only found empty jerry cans. The command post was
set up in the Hotel de l'Abbaye. It was established on the following day that
they had to take the unusual route into the town because it had been the only
approach that had not been blocked.
At this point, an episode that took place during the next few days must be
related. According to the army, the American defenders along a long high
ridge known as Schnee Eifel gave up after receiving a demand for surrender.
General Freiherr von Lttwitz, with the army's permission, ordered a negotiator to Bastogne. He did not want to pass up this opportunity, although he
was skeptical as to whether it would succeed. A truck drove to the American
outpost on the Remoifosse Bastogne road under a white flag. A major, presumably from the corps staff, and Leutnant Henke, the O 3 of the Panzer
Lehr Division, were taken to the G 3 of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment,
where they transmitted the surrender demand. The demand stated that the
"American commandant of the encircled city of Bastogne" was urged "to
surrender honorably, otherwise the US troops would be destroyed by an
artillery Corps and six heavy AA battalions." The demand - a bluff without
any basis in fact - was delivered to Brigadier General McAuliffe. His curt
reply read:
To the German Commander:
"Nuts!"
The American Commander
Taking his leave, Leutnant Henke wished Colonel Harper good luck. He
replied: "Go to Hell!"
The release of this episode to the world press gave the defenders of
Bastogne ("the battered bastards of the bastion of Bastogne") and their relief
troops considerable encouragement.

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Kampfgruppe 901 Before Bastogne

Kampfgruppe 901 - the 901st Pzgdr Lehr Rgt, 6th Co, Panzer Lehr Rgt and
3rd Co, 130th Panzerjger Lehr Bn - was attached to the 26th Volksgrenadier
Division effective from 22 December to 6 January, for the battle of Bastogne.
Its sector stretched initially from the stream bridge southeast of Mont,
through Marvie up to the field trail that ran from Salvacourt to Bastogne.
On 22 December the left neighbor, the 39th Rgt, was supposed to attack
Bastogne. Kampfgruppe 901 was ordered to join this attack at Villeraux.
They supported the Fusiliers with an armored group, which attacked out of
the area south of Remoifosse against the Hazy forest. Assenois was cleared
that evening, while Benonchamps was captured and the encirclement tightened.
On that day Oberst von Hauser looked to the south with concern, because
the security screen provided by the 5th Fallschirmjger Division was thin
and the enemy was aggressive. While Panzer Lehr advanced through the
intersection three kilometers northwest of Remichampagne, an American
reconnaissance element fired at and set several vehicles afire, until our panzers were able to get rid of them. In spite of the minor success of the past few
days, the 26th Division stuck with attack plans for 23 December. Battle
Group 901 was ordered:
901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment will hold and improve its
positions during the day and make all necessary preparations for a night
attack with the objective of capturing Marvie and breaking through to
the southeastern edge of Bastogne. Starting time: 1700 hours.
The lateness of the time was due to the fighter-bombers and to take advantage of a pinning attack in the north, which was not possible any earlier. All
day the situation in the south remained critical. Near Hompr, the 26th
Division command post, young fallschirmjgers appeared greatly agitated.
They reported that the enemy had captured Chaumont and enemy tanks were
on their way to Hompr. Transport vehicles rushed blindly through the town
to the north. Generalmajor Kokott confiscated "four heavy panzers" - probably Panthers from II Bn, Panzer Lehr Rgt - which were returning to the front
from undergoing maintenance. Along with hastily thrown-together elements
of the 26th Division, he formed a battle group that attacked toward Grandrue
and Remichampagne. With the support of assault guns, they were able to
throw the enemy back, after knocking out 11 Shermans (CCB 4th (US)
Armored Division) and construct a new position.
On that day, fresh snow had fallen. Somewhat later, I Bn, 901st Pzgdr Lehr
Rgt attacked Marvie from the south. II Battalion attacked along the main
273

road (N 4) from Remoifosse to the north. Weak elements probed on either

side of the Bras-Bastogne road to pin the enemy.
Generalmajor Kokott remembered:
"Well-supported by artillery and accompanied by panzers, the attack
made progress from the very beginning. Prisoners were taken, enemy
defensive nests assaulted, the hills south of Marvie captured. The enemy
fought bitterly, even when he was outflanked and cut off. The enemy
was strong and inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers during night
combat. In spite of this, he could not hold. The 901st entered Marvie.
The other groups also advanced - to the northwest and along the road
approaching Bastogne. At 2200 hours the 901st reported that the attack
had stalled in front of reinforced enemy resistance and that there were no
longer any reserves available to continue any attack promising success."
When this report reached the division, an army order had already arrived:
"26th Division will prepare for a major attack against Bastogne on
25 December. The 15th Panzergrenadier Division will be attached."
THE ENCIRCLEMENT
OF BASTOGNE
US Front 19-23. 12/44

Diagram 27: The encirclement of Bastogne.

274

Because of this order and the heavy losses, the attack was ordered suspended. The fighting in Marvie did not diminish until the early morning. The
town had almost completely fallen into German hands. Brigadier General
McAuliffe had sacrificed his last reserves, which could barely hold at the
edge of town.
On 24 December it was important for Kampfgruppe von Hauser to hold the
achieved positions and take a breather before the major attack. In addition,
the main road to the south was supposed to be secured by panzers and effectively blocked by mines and obstacles. The major attack began on 25
December. The anxiously awaited arrival of the 15th Panzergrenadier
Division proved disappointing as it turned out to be only a kampfgruppe with
one and a half panzergrenadier battalions and 20 panzers. In spite of the
bravest of commitment and sacrifice, almost all of the panzers were lost during the attack. Battle Group 901 reported:
One assault group - approximately a company in the strength of 20
to 30 men - had fought their way through to the road fork at the southern
entrance to Bastogne. There, they were cut off and destroyed. The regiment did not have sufficient strength to reinforce the assault group. The
few attacking elements came under heavy enemy fire and were as good
as destroyed.
During the evening of that day it was clear that, without the deployment of
considerable forces, Bastogne could not be captured and the relief attack
from the south could not be parried. For the next day, the mission of the
901st Rgt had two objectives: to hold and reinforce on either side of the main
road leading to the south. From the clearing skies, bands of fighter-bombers,
just like at Normandy, fixed all movement on the German side. The enemy
attacked through to Bastogne with tanks and infantry, west of the main road.
The encirclement was broken. On the next day the 4th (US) Armored
Division, reinforced by the 26th (US) Division, attacked on a wide front and
pushed the cold and exhausted panzergrenadiers back to the northeast.
During the next few days, all of the terrain west of the main road and
Remoifosse was lost.
On the evening of 29 December command in the sector south of Wiltz was
turned over to the XXXIX Panzer Corps - General der Panzertruppen
Decker. Battle Group von Hauser was attached to the 167th Volksgrenadier
Division, which, during the past few nights, had been marching from unloading points on the Rhein. The corps - which also had a battle group from the
1st SS Panzer Division (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) - was ordered to attack
through Lutrebois on 30 December, in order to block the main road and deny
Bastogne supplies. The Panzer IVs of Kampfgruppe von Hauser were to sup275

port the attack of the volksgrenadiers south of the Bras - Bastogne road.
After initial success, the XXXIX Panzer Corps attack also collapsed.
Hauser's panzer company was badly mauled.
On 2 January the enemy went over to the offensive on a wide front near and
south of Neffe. They temporarily penetrated into Wardin, Neffe and Mageret
and were able to hold for 24 hours. During a snow storm on 3 January, which
kept the enemy air force from the skies and prevented observed artillery fire,
the 26th and 167th Volksgrenadier Divisions, in cooperation with
Kampfgruppe 901, counterattacked and pushed the Americans back, almost
to their departure positions. By 6 January, no major combat operations
occurred in the Kampfgruppe 901 sector. During the evening of that day, the
regiment, which in the meantime had shriveled to a combat strength of a few
officers and one hundred men, as well as five Panzer IVs, received orders to
return to Panzer Lehr, after being relieved. It arrived on 8 January, after two
night marches.
As a countermeasure against presumed German attempts to sabotage the
American rear area and conduct commando operations in Allied uniforms,
General Eisenhower issued orders similar to Hitler's during the Eastern
Campaign:
Punishable by death:
1. anyone who conducts acts of sabotage against combat equipment
and Allied installations,
2. anyone who impersonates Allied soldiers in uniform,
3. anyone who offers support to the enemy's armed forces (The
Wehrmacht) in order to protect them from being captured.
This order was not only directed against effective "spies and saboteurs," for
example "Operation Greif" (Skorzeny), but also doomed unassuming
Germans who were taken prisoner in captured American jeeps and warm
winter jackets, etc. Even Hauptmann Lex and two officers from the 130th Pz
Lehr Rgt were captured in a jeep during an ambush south of Bastogne on 30
December. According to their grave-stone inscriptions in Sandweiler, they
died on 2 January. Possibly they were shot "as spies."
20. Turning Point and Withdrawal
The two kampfgruppen from Panzer Lehr had to await fuel until the early
afternoon of 23 December. Only then could they resume their attack to the
Meuse through Rochefort.
Kampfgruppe von Fallois marched through Fourrieres; Kampfgruppe von
276

Poschinger through Grupont - Wavreilles. After encountering no resistance

at Grupont, where American engineers from the 84th Division left Christmas
greetings instead of mines, the lead company reached the hills south of
Rochefort by the fall of darkness. Combat reconnaissance reported the town
to be enemy free, but there was a road-block at the entrance formed by one
jeep. The fire of the lead panzer unleashed a hail of fire against the kampfgruppe from numerous weapons in the town and from the hills near
Hammerenne. The defenders of the town, the 3rd Bn, 335th (US) Infantry
Rgt, which had arrived the previous evening, offered the German attackers
considerable resistance from the houses and gardens. Tracers set fires that
illuminated the comings and goings of the battle. Penetration into the town
did not occur until a reinforced panzer company bypassed from the east.
Nevertheless, elements of the brave defenders still held out until the morning
of 24 December. House after house, basement after basement had to be
searched and cleared. Feldwebel Eigig (5th Co, 902nd Rgt) was liberated
from a basement together with an American squad that had dragged him in
there several hours before.
At 0930 hours the defenders received orders to withdraw to the west after
blowing the bridge in the north of the town. Several wounded Americans
were still being taken out of the ice-cold L'Homme that morning. They were
afraid they would be shot by the Germans and were taken aback by the
humane handling, dry underwear, medical treatment, etc, they received. The
blowing of the bridge prevented the immediate pursuit of the withdrawing
defenders. A bridgehead was established. From it, an armored reconnaissance company, which had, in the meantime, also reached Rochefort, set out
for Ciergnon with the mission of securing the Lesse sector.
Several kilometers further to the north, a kampfgruppe from the 2nd Panzer
Division was engaged in a screening operation more or less without fuel and
ammunition. Since the previous day, the Armored Reconnaissance Lehr
Battalion had been conducting an armed reconnaissance to the west and
southwest. Han-sur-Lesse appeared to be enemy-free, as was Tellin. They
only ran into enemy armored car patrols from the British 6th Airborne
Division in Bure.
"On 16 December I was committed with Oberfeldwebel Keichel.
Two reconnaissance elements were advanced as "Schweinereisphtrupps," that is, to create unrest in the rear of the enemy forces
opposing us. We could not, as planned, cross the Our into the enemy's
rear area. After the capture of Rochefort we believed we would get some
time to rest. We decorated a Christmas tree and wanted to celebrate
Christmas eve with captured American Christmas packages. However,
that was not to be. Our mission, to reconnoiter west of the Lomme to
277

Ciergnon up to the Meuse, was the worst reconnaissance operation I was

on during the entire war. We came within a hair's breadth of shooting 15
German stragglers from the 2nd Panzer Division, who suddenly
appeared in front of our guns in the darkness near Ciergnon.
Oberfeldwebel Keichel had just ordered "open fire!" but the gunner hesitated as he had heard German voices. Then I had to go forward and I saw
trembling soldiers on the road, because they had heard the order "open
fire!" During our return, the battalion was shot up by strong artillery fire
between Rochefort and Boissonville.
Thus Otto Hennig remembered his commander, Oberfeldwebel Keichel,
who was awarded the Knight's Cross for his efforts, especially those in the
Ardennes. Shortly before the surrender of the Ruhr pocket in mid-April
1945, Keichel was killed.
Another armored car patrol reconnoitered to Libramont on 23 December. It
found the town occupied by the enemy and returned on 25 December, after
losing one reconnaissance vehicle. However, there were indications of
increasing enemy pressure on the left flank at many other locations. The
311th Heeres Flak Battalion defended near Moircy and near Remagne, each
with an 88mm battery. The 130th Armored Engineer Bn defended near
Veesqueville and Hatrival.
Feldwebel Scheibe from the maintenance section of II Battalion, 130th
Panzer Lehr Regiment, described how Christmas was celebrated at that time
in the field, in the Ardennes:
"We were in Neuheilenbach. The vehicles were sheltered and
repaired. Mail, packages and groceries were passed out. Thus, at 2000
hours we were sitting together in the machinery truck. A small pine tree
decorated with candles and pieces of wire added to the atmosphere.
Everyone was thinking of home and family. Minutes of peace were used
to forget the war. Only the harassment fire from American artillery
brought us back to reality.
The time was passed eating, drinking and talking. Then someone
said: "The school has been shot-up, but there is a piano there!" My comrade, Rauer, was able to play the piano, even without notes and in the
dark. Even though singing was not our strength, everyone wanted to go
to the schoolhouse with us. Everybody was touched as Paul Rauer
played "Silent Night." Everyone sang and, after we finished several
Christmas songs, we finished with "Deutschland, Deutschland uber
alles!"
There must be something more - tradition, homeland - to bind the
278

youth of that time with today.

Our left neighbor, the 5th Fallschirmjger Division, reported heavy defensive fighting south of Remichampagne, Cobreville, Burnon and Martelange.
The 4th (US) Armored Division was attacking in that sector to relieve
Bastogne. Panzer Lehr's advance and supply route was being threatened. At
the same time, on the afternoon of 24 December, the German units at
Rochefort were preparing to celebrate a splendid (although subdued)
Christmas eve, in preparation for reaching the Meuse on the next day. The
joy over the achieved success and over the special rations and groceries knew
no bounds.
Clearer skies unleashed enemy aircraft. Fewer were apparent in Rochefort
than near the forward-deployed elements of the 2nd Panzer Division near
Celles, and their attached supply elements. At the same time, they were
attacked by concentrations of American and British tanks. The 2nd Panzer
Division deployment route was severed near Humain and Buissonville.
Panzer Lehr's Christmas parties were suddenly ended by the order to open
the severed road near Humain and Buissonville, because the offensive would
stall without this line of communication. The assembly of the kampfgruppen
in Rochefort was hampered by enemy artillery. It was during this fire that the
author was wounded. Around midnight, Kampfgruppe von Poschinger
attacked Humain, Kampfgruppe von Fallois advanced toward Buissonville.
The former drove the tanks from the 24th Cavalry Squadron (reconnaissance
battalion) out of Humain. The latter found Havrenne free of enemy forces,
but stalled before Buissonville, stopped by their old acquaintance from
Normandy, CCA from the 2nd (US) Armored Division. The Americans
claimed that a German officer in an American uniform paved the way to
Boissonville, that he ordered several Shermans guarding the bridge to return
to their units. This claim is not correct. American attempts to recapture
Humain, initially by the 4th Cavalry Group, then by a tank squadron supported by strong artillery preparation, failed.
Feldwebel Feuerpfeil had little to celebrate on Christmas 1944:
"We didn't celebrate Christmas eve! At 2000 hours we were ordered
to attack. We were supposed to help the encircled 2nd Panzer Division.
Then I was ordered: "Feuerpfeil, take the lead!" I replied: "I don't know
where to go!" "I'll direct you by radio!" So we set out in the direction of
Humain-Buissonville. After driving several kilometers, I saw a dark silhouette and opened fire. The panzers behind me deployed and also
opened fire. At dawn we discovered a shot-up armored car and destroyed
anti-tank guns on the edge of Humain."
279

During the night before 26 December a battle group from the 9th Panzer
Division arrived to relieve us at Humain. In the early morning our reconnaissance battalion was allowed to return to Rochefort.
On 26 December the kampfgruppe from the 9th, as well as one from the
2nd Panzer Division, hastened to help the encircled troops near Celles and
Foy - Notre Dame. The German attacks were repulsed by tanks, artillery and
fighter-bombers. The withdrawal of the immobile kampfgruppen near Celles
was ordered too late. Only by abandoning all of their equipment were 600
men able to reach friendly lines in Rochefort the following night. Because of
the lack of sufficient forces, the Panzer Division had been unable to help its
sister division, as it was employed piecemeal around Bastogne.
"The offensive had run its course and failed to achieve the desired effect,"
General Freiherr von Lttwitz summed up the situation. The enemy's successful relief of Bastogne has already been mentioned. It cost the Panzer
Lehr Division its former supply route. From then on, all German forces west
of Bastogne had to be supplied over a single road, on which fighter-bombers
concentrated and pinned every movement in flying weather. During the night
and later when there was snow and ice, the road was unable to cope with the
traffic.
In the Panzer Lehr status report from 1 January, the division reported losses
of 2465 men, and an additional 1475 wounded and sick that remained with
their units within the period of eight weeks. The combat strength of the
panzergrenadiers sunk rapidly and the NCO shortage was compounded by
the status of training, which was evaluated as insufficient. The artillery regiment still had 20 guns, but it was impossible to move them without the loan
of 12 prime movers and a truck tonnage of 21 tons detached from the 15th
Nebelwerfer Bde. The supply situation was critical. Only 43 percent of the
tonnage capacity was road worthy. Therefore, only 50 percent of the services
were mobile. The bombing of Birresborn at Christmas reduced the capacity
of the tank workshop to 75 percent. This caused a great shortage of spare
parts complicated by the poor transport situation. Nevertheless, the morale of
the troops remained positive and they were aggressive, although they were
physically exhausted from unbroken commitment under difficult combat and
weather conditions.
Defense on the Southwestern Flank of the German Bulge
The enemy had the initiative once again. The XLVII Panzer Corps went
over to the defense and organized its defensive alignment for 27 December:
- right: 9th Panzer Division in the Charneux-Hargimont-Abbaye de
St. Remy sector,
280

- center: 2nd Panzer Division in Rochefort Bridgehead and in the

Lesse sector up to Tellin,
- left: Panzer Lehr Division in the Mirwart - Rondu sector.
The reordering of the division lasted until the evening of 27 December.
From the next day onwards, the enemy kept up constant pressure, harassed
supply with artillery and fighter-bombers and joined in the ground fighting
with continuous rolling sorties. In spite of this, the front was held, except for
small portions of terrain, until the start of the general retreat on 10 January.
In the Panzer Lehr sector, the Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion,
after assembling its forces near Wavreville, first blocked the Lesse sector by
destroying bridges, laying mines and constructing obstacles. On 28
December it set up behind the L'Homme with strong points in Mirwart and
Arville, which were reinforced by panzers and anti-tank guns. To the left, in
the center of the division sector, the engineers first built obstacles in Arville,
Hatrival and Vesqueville and then mined the stream area. Behind that lay
Kampfgruppe von Poschinger, command post in St. Hubert, with Battalion
Bohm (II Bn, 902nd Rgt), 130th Armored Engineer Bn and 559th Heavy
Panzerjger Bn. Kampfgruppe Neumann, consisting of the I Bn, 902nd
Pzgdr Lehr Rgt and two Panther companies, defended in the MoircyRoute: Panzer Lehr Division
Route: 2. Panzer Division
Allied Attacks

Diagram 28: Attack against and fighting around Rochefort

281

Remagne sector on the far left.

Fire control for the entire division sector was the responsibility of the 130th
Artillery Rgt, comprised of two battalions of Volks-Artillery-Corps with a
21cm Howitzer Battery. The 311th Flak Bn participated in it also.
During the next two weeks, the enemy was satisfied with conducting local
reconnaissance in the Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion sector. Here
the 6th British Airborne Division was in action, reinforced by the 39th
Armored Brigade. Peter Elstob described the atmosphere of the fighting:
"Once a British ambulance drove to the front in order to treat the
many wounded laying in the snow and a German panzer from the Panzer
Lehr Division pulled up next to it. "This time you can take your wounded with you. Tommy," the tank commander said to the ambulance driver
in English, "but don't come back, it's not safe here!"
Kampfgruppe von Poschinger's sector was attacked incessantly by the
enemy after 28 December. In spite of this, the weakly defended positions
were held until the planned retreat on 11 January. All enemy attacks were
repulsed and a great number of enemy tanks were destroyed. All enemy
attempts to outflank the forests on either side of Hatrival and west of
Vesqueville toward St. Hubert failed.
Kampfgruppe Neumann's primary mission was to prevent an enemy breakthrough to cut the St. Hubert-Morhet road. This was the focus of the
defense. The 28th Cavalry Squadron had already pushed the outposts at
Freux and Rondu back toward Moircy and Remagne on 28 December.
On 30 December new enemy forces appeared, the VIII (US) Corps Battle
Group with Combat Command A of 11th Armored Division and the 87th
Infantry Division. They assembled via Rondu in front of Remagne and via
Freux in front of Moircy. Kampfgruppe Neumann prepared a hot welcome
for them both, as described by Cole in the History of the U.S. Army in
World War II:
"In any case, the 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion leading the march
as Task Force White, had just come onto the crest of the ridge beyond
Rondu when, as the men on the receiving end vividly recall; "All hell
broke loose". The two tanks at the point of the column were hit in one,
two order. The armored infantry took a hundred casualties in thirty minutes while digging madly in the frozen ground ...
It was mid-afternoon, German high velocity guns were sweeping the
ridge, and there was no room for maneuver: the Ourthe lay to the west
and the Bois des Haies de Magery spread to the east, separating CCA
and CCB."
282

In order to be able to commit strong forces from the 11th Armored

Division, they had to regroup. Therefore, VIII (US) Corps shifted the boundary line between the divisions. Remagne fell to the 87th Division. The elements of the 11th Armored Division withdrew from Remagne at night.
The writer Peter Elstob described the fighting around Moircy:
"In order to support the 87th (US) Infantry Division attack, VIII
Corps massed all available batteries against the Panzer Lehr Division,
but these elite troops - one of the best units in the Ardennes - held their
positions, even though they had only a few panzers and suffered from an
ammunition shortage. They were even able to throw the American
infantry back. The 345th American Infantry Regiment lost so many
killed and wounded that it had to be withdrawn."
The efficient German fire control in the sector is still remembered by
Robert C. Reed, and American veteran:
"I was a Private First Class in an anti-tank platoon in Headquarters
Company, 3rd Bn, 345th Rgt. My division was a late-comer to the war in
Europe. It first saw action in Metz in December 1944. It arrived in
Belgium at the end of the month.
Our squad had just moved from the town of Bras-Haut and set up its
57mm gun at the edge of the woods overlooking Vesqueville. It was
January 4. We were ordered to fire at the church steeple which was
thought to be an observation post. Artillery fire was being directed at one
of the rifle companies preventing its further advance. We fired 10
rounds. We may or may not have hit our target, but we disclosed our
position. Consequently we ourselves were shelled and two men died. A
third man was wounded and he recalled recently that it was a 50mm
mortar shell that did the damage."
The defense had also cost Kampfgruppe Neumann considerable losses. On
31 December it received permission to evacuate Moircy, but it held fast to
the St. Hubert-Morhet road.
In the west, the enemy pushed the front back to the general line CherneuxHargimont-Wavreille-Bure-Mirwart. Rochefort was given up. Even the
major attack by XXXIX Panzer Corps on the corridor to Bastogne failed.
Hitler now realized that any further attacks against Bastogne, with the forces
available, promised little success.
On 31 December Remagne fell. There were no forces available for a counterattack. The 345th (US) Infantry Regiment was relieved by its sister regi283

ment, the 347th (US) Infantry Regiment. However, it still suffered casualties
during the relief from German mines, which were uncovered from the snow
by vehicle traffic.
New Year's morning first brought snow mixed with rain, then snow, then a
dry, bitter cold. In spite of this, the 347th US Infantry Regiment resumed its
attack with the objective of severing the Morhet-St. Hubert road and capturing Amberloup. The Americans fought their way forward through deep snow
drifts. Reconnaissance elements infiltrated north of Remagne across the road
into the thick forest, followed by a battalion with supporting tanks. During
the daytime, Kampfgruppe Neumann could only harass them with infantry
and directed artillery fire. In the evening, after the fighter-bombers disappeared, the few panzers attacked and pushed the Americans back to
Remagne. Meanwhile, another battalion, 3rd Bn, 347th Rgt, attacked out of
Moircy to the North. At midday Jenneville was captured, where the 347th
Infantry Regiment's sister regiment had been so bloodied just two days
before. Advances were made against the Pironpr intersection. It was
defended by six Panthers and only 30 men, mostly crews of disabled
panzers. The panzers stood in carefully prepared positions with wide fields
of fire, unrecognizable from the road, because they were hidden behind the
wood piles of a sawmill. As the enemy left Jenneville, the German defensive

Counterattack Pz Lehr Div.

U.S. Attacks

Diagram 29: Defense on the Southwestern Flank of the German Frontal Salient.
284

fire increased and the Panthers from Pironpr joined in the fighting. The
American attack came to a halt.
On 2 January the Americans prepared to attack with two battalions across
the road to the north. They cut into the Pironpr hornet nest, which held until
11 January, in spite of numerous, almost daily, attacks. The Americans
advanced through the forest on the right and left. Kampfgruppe Neumann
could not prevent the loss of Gerimonts. Bonnerue fell on the other flank,
even though four Shermans were destroyed by the panzers of Pironpr. For
the time being the 87th Division could report that the St. Hubert-Morhet
road was severed. This success was only temporary. On the next day
Bonnerue was again in German hands. The hotly contested town exchanged
occupiers several times on 8 and 9 January, when panzergrenadiers from the
901st Rgt counterattacked after they had been relieved from the Bastogne
area on 9 January. Conducting prepared fire during the night, the artillery
regiment was able to provide essential support for the recapture of Bonnerue.
The massive barrage helped capture 80 prisoners in contrast with the loss of
only a few German attackers.
On the evening of 2 January a wide, threatening gap had yawned between
the two American attack groups. The third battalion was supposed to clear
out Prionpr and the surrounding forest. Against this threat to the cornerstone of the defense, Generalleutnant Bayerlein committed Kampfgruppe
von Poschinger. Its counterattack brought the desired breathing space and
recaptured Bonnerue, as already described. However, in the long run the
enemy could not be prevented from infiltrating into the forest. On the next
day the engineers had to be committed as infantry, against standing orders.
Extensive and fierce forest fighting began against the numerically superior
and well-equipped enemy. In the course of the fighting, the enemy advance
was halted along the general line one kilometer north of the St. HubertBastogne road until the general retreat commenced on 11 January.
Even though the German artillery suffered from an ammunition shortage
due to the extraordinary transportation difficulties, it functioned well in the
defense. In the search for ammunition, a store of American 105 mm rounds
was uncovered in the forest. A portion was ruined from dampness, but many
of the rounds were still usable. Oberst Dr. Bartenwerfer reported:
"Thus, for as long as these shells that had been captured by our division lasted, we were able to return them to the Americans with our guns.
The observed fire worked well, even if the ballistics were somewhat off.
After two to three days, the Americans radioed us and asked whether we
were firing gas shells, since it seemed so to them. We replied in the negative with a clear conscience."
285

On 3 January the thermometer fell during a snow storm. The roads were
obscured, aircraft were driven from the skies and observed artillery was
impossible. On that day, the Allies attacked from the north and northwest
with the 1st American Army, from the south with the 3rd American Army, in
order to cut off the German frontal salient on a line Houffalize-Bastogne.
The anticipated major attack in the Panzer Lehr area did not occur, for the
time being. The fight against the cold, ice and snow was more serious.
The strong enemy pressure along the entire bulge, initially near Rochefort,
which was evacuated on 30 December, and the withdrawal of the 6th Panzer
Army for the Hungarian front, forced Hitler to give in to the urging of the leadership and approve the withdrawal of the German frontal salient. The
American attack indicated an encirclement and destruction of the German
forces in the West, if countermeasures were not taken immediately. First the
weather caused a delay. On 4 and on 7 January snow storms raged. The
American tanks slipped off of the icy roads and blocked the infantry for hours.
The American artillery was hindered by poor visibility and by the forests.
Initially Panzer Lehr still had to hold the western tip of the frontal salient. It
wasn't until 8 January that Hitler approved the withdrawal to the line
Dochamps-Longchamps. Operation "Veilchen" (Violet) was to begin with
the movement of the right neighbours, the 9th and 2nd Panzer Divisions,
and, during the following night, St. Hubert was to be evacuated. On grounds
no longer discernible, perhaps because of the lack of fuel and the traffic
jams on the only withdrawal route, the evacuation of St. Hubert was postponed for 24 hours.
St. Hubert was evacuated during the night of 11 - 12 January. Shortly
thereafter, reconnaissance elements from the 6th British Airborne Division
and the 87th (US) Division linked up. Elstob wrote: "Since the separation
caused by the German offensive, it was the first contact between the 21 st and
12th Allied Army Groups." A reconnaissance element from the 2nd French
Paratroop Regiment also participated in the re-occupation of St. Hubert.
The enemy only cautiously pursued the German withdrawal. As before, they
had to do without their air forces. The obstacles and mines placed by the engineers could not be quickly removed in the cold and from the icy roads, especially since the artillery harassed the removal efforts, wherever they could be
observed. Thus, the division was able to repulse all enemy advances, even
when the English bypassed the strong points on the Champion intersection
and penetrated into the towns behind it. Most unpleasant was the incessant
harrassing fire against villages, intersections and passes.
During the night before 13 January the withdrawal was continued as
planned. After the 2nd and then the 9th Panzer Divisions were withdrawn,
286

Panzer Lehr formed the right flank of XLVII Panzer Corps. The right neighbor, the exhausted 116th Panzer Division, was north of the Ourthe and had
suffered heavy casualties in difficult, but successful fighting against III (US)
Corps in the north and against XXX British Corps to the south of the Ourthe.
During the daytime, Panzer Lehr was able to hold out against all attacks by
the 51st British Highland Division, even though the Scots took Lavaux. After
withdrawing further, Panzer Lehr received orders on the evening of 13
January to direct a battle group to secure the flank with the right neighbor,
north of the Ourthe. The assigned Kampfgruppe von Poschinger penetrated
into Nadrin during the night, without being able to make contact in the dark
with the units of the 116th Panzer Division. Kampfgruppe von Hauser withdrew to a line Thimont - Cens, south of the Ourthe. Reconnaissance elements
from the 87th (US) Division reached the Ourthe on the same day.
As 14 January dawned, the panzergrenadiers north of the Ourthe experienced not only frontal attacks from the north by superior enemy forces (1st
Battalion, 334th (US) Infantry Regiment), but also from the south. Nadrin
and Filly were captured during the afternoon. Suffering heavy casualties, the
panzergrenadiers were still able to mine the roads and, at the last moment,
blow the Ourthe bridge. However, this also blocked the withdrawal route for
many German soldiers. Only a few were able to wade through the icy river.
The few fords were blocked by vehicle wrecks. Many panzergrenadiers were
captured. South of the river, the weakly defended Warempage fell into the
hands of the Scots and Nisramont had to be given up.
GERMAN FRONT
on
on
on
on
on
on

11
12
13
14
15
16

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945

Diagram 30: Retreat from the Ardennes.

287

During this fighting, an almost unbroken snake of vehicles of all types,

panzers and guns from various formations, wound its way through the hilly,
icy roads to the east. Fortunately, bad weather kept the enemy aircraft at a
distance, even though all available flak stood ready to defend the passes.
Details were actively spreading sand and all available officers directed traffic. They were charged with clearing the road when vehicles slipped or otherwise broke down. Only seldom could damaged panzers be towed away.
Frequently the final drives broke; then the panzer was unable to steer or
brake. Armored recovery vehicles or 18 ton prime-movers - two in front and
one behind the damaged panzer - were required for such an operation. Due
to the traffic and fuel situation, this practice was seldom justified, but tried
again and again. The recovery squads unselfishly performed miracles.
The line Achouffe-Bonnerue-Mabompr was reached, as ordered, on 15
January. The situation in the north had worsened.
The more the combat strength decreased during the costly fighting, the
more difficult it was for the remaining elements to maintain continuity and
contact with each other in the unsurveyable terrain. Enemy pressure in the
north and south and the effects of destructive artillery fire became more
noticeable. The two panzer divisions (Panzer Lehr and 116th) first felt the
effects of the newest electronic proximity fuses, which unleashed a rain of
fragments from above. The attempt by the 116th Panzer Division to establish
a bridgehead around Houffalize, along with other battle groups, including the
Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion, failed. However, the fall of the city
was delayed until many columns caught up and the bridge was blown.
In the south, near Mabompr, there was still contact with the 26th
Volksgrenadier Division. It held the line up to Noville. In the morning a battle group from the 11th (US) Armored Division conducted a surprise attack
on either side of the Bertogne-Houffalize road up to Mabompr. It placed
the panzergrenadiers from the 901st Rgt, who were holding the icy stream
there, in a difficult situation. The road bridge was blown on time and the
enemy tanks were prevented from crossing the stream, but enemy pressure
forced the panzergrenadiers to dodge to the north. In the afternoon the
enemy occupied the forest northeast of Mabompr. In order to avoid being
outflanked, Kampfgruppe von Hauser had to withdraw to the hills south of
Houffalize. A counterattack by the 26th Division again threw the enemy
from Mabompr, even if the last six Jagdpanthers from the 559th Heavy
Panzerjger Battalion had to be sacrificed.
On the morning of 16 January the 2nd (US) Armored Division occupied
Houffalize.
Shortly before, the lead elements of the 11th Armored Division from the
288

3rd American Army, advancing from the south, linked up with the 2nd
Armored Division from the 1st Army, advancing from the north, near
Chouffe. The trap was snapped shut, but it was empty. It was thanks to the
enemy's systematic advance and the weather that the formation of a pocket
around German forces was avoided.
Panzer Lehr had fulfilled its mission during the evacuation of the frontal
salient and had avoided the encirclement and destruction. The considerable
sacrifice of personnel and equipment had torn irreplaceable gaps within the
unit structure. The elements were extremely exhausted.
On 16 January Panzer Lehr held a position east of Houffalize. At the same
time, it was to prepare a rallying position along a line Cetturu-Tavigny.
Enemy pressure had decreased, tanks did not probe near Cetturu until 18
January. The outposts broke contact and fell back to the rallying position.
A fearful snow storm on 19 January stalled all combat operations with the
Nachtruppe

7.Armee

German Front Line 18 Jan.

Rearguards Pz Lehr Div.
U.S. Advance
German Front 28 Jan.

Diagram 31: 7th Army Rear Guard.

289

exception of artillery activity. The withdrawal up to the rail line west of the
Luxembourg forest was not hindered by the enemy. During the night before
20 January the rear guard elements from the Panzer Lehr Division reached
the new line of resistance near Biwisch-Asselborn and were rallied by the
15th Panzergrenadier Division and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division.
Rear Guard in the Sector of Seventh Army
After the German frontal salient west of Houffalize was compressed, the
3rd US Army attacked from the south in order to collapse the German
bridgehead west of the Our. On 18 January two divisions conducted a surprise crossing of the weakly defended Sauer below Diekirch and advanced to
the north. The advance of the 5th (US) Infantry Division along the hill road
posed a danger to LIII Army Corps, threatening to cut off its three divisions
in the Wiltz area.
As a countermeasure, the 7th Army deployed a volksgrenadier division on
the hill road. Feldmarschall Model intervened. On 19 January he ordered
first a kampfgruppe, later the entire Panzer Lehr Division - as far as these
remnants could be called a division - and finally the XLVII Panzer Corps'
2nd Panzer Division transferred into the 7th Army sector. The XLVII Panzer
Corps was to set up a blocking position west of Vianden, in order to secure
the retreat of LIII Corps from the Ardennes across the Our to the West Wall.
The heavy snow storm on 19 January delayed movement on both sides, but
also prevented any air activity. Kampfgruppe 902, reinforced by a panzer
company (8th Co, 130th Rgt) and II Bn, 130th Armored Artillery Regiment,
plowed its way through the snow drifts toward Hoscheid, which formed the
fulcrum of the withdrawal and, therefore, had to remain in German hands.
On the morning of 20 January Kampfgruppe von Poschinger occupied its
assigned positions southwest and south of Hoscheid. The 9th Volksgrenadier
Division was adjacent on the right. In the meantime, the LIII Corps began its
withdrawal. The bridging sites near Gemnde and Vianden had, meanwhile,
come into enemy artillery range. Enemy fire hindered the retreat of the
closely-packed columns over the icy and curving bridge entrances and exits
in the deeply-cut Our valley.
On 21 January the 5th US Division attacked near Hoscheid after a strong
artillery preparation. Kampfgruppe von Poschinger could only repulse the
attack with great effort. On the next day, the skies cleared and brought flying
weather with hundreds of fighter-bombers, similar to those days in
Normandy. Indeed, Kampfgruppe von Hauser was inserted to the right, but,
290

due to the air and artillery activity, could not prevent the loss of Hoscheid on
25 January. Now they had to hold the bridgehead on the western bank of the
Our until all equipment was withdrawn. Gradually, the kampfgruppen were
pushed back to Wahlhausen. Meanwhile, the divisions of the LIII Corps,
which had been attacking from the west since 23 January, fled across the
Clerf and Our. On 26 January Panzer Lehr rear guard also received permission to evacuate the western bank of the Our. Again Panzer Lehr could look
with pride on its contribution in preventing the encirclement of German divisions west of the Our.
The result of the battle of the Ardennes was a great success for the Allies,
even though General Eisenhower had to delay his planned offensive to the
Rhein for approximately six weeks.
"The decisive Allied success lay in the fact that Germany no longer
had any operational reserves after the Ardennes offensive." (Jung)
These operational reserves were also missing in the east, as the Soviets
began their offensive. It led to the loss of all territory east of the Oder. The
gambler Hitler had lost on his throw of the dice!

THE LAST EFFORT

WHY did the counter-offensive have to be launched?
(1) Because German reserves of manpower and materiel had systematically been decimated in the battle between Emmerich and Basel.
(2) Because the German fuel reserves were almost exhausted. Stores had
to be captured.
(3) Because Himmler saw that the German people more and more
resisted forced evacuation and do not want to be displaced.
WHY did the counter-offensive have to fail?
(1) Because Rundstedt had neither enough tanks, nor aircraft, nor guns
to carry out a first-rate plan.
(2) Because, besides the elite units, half-trained grenadiers had to be
committed.
(3) Because the SS-leadership has failed. Manteuffel did his share. He
trusted in the SS-Panzer Divisions. But Sepp Dietrich failed.
(4) Because the V-1 and V-2 have failed as replacements for artillery and
the Luftwaffe.
291

(5) Because the Allies on every day can count on 6000 combat aircraft
for close air support of their forces.
WHY must the soldier decide for himself?
Because, after this last effort, even recognized by the enemy as excellent,
the German military leadership has proved to the world and the German
soldier that further fighting would be senseless.
This British leaflet was dropped on the troops as part of a psychological operations campaign. In it even the British paid tribute to the German soldier. He loyally performed his duty
to the bitter end

ANNEX A:
THE OPPOSING ARMED FORCES ENGAGED ON THE
WESTFRONT 1944
COMMAND ORGANIZATION
While the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower (through a
combined staff), had command and control of all armed expeditionary
forces, including those of the Allied Navies and the two Tactical Air Forces,
Hitler, as Supreme German Commander, stuck to the principle of separation
of powers. The position and authority of the OB West remained fragmentary.
German air and naval forces remained under control of their high commands.
ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES
Army Groups = Headquarters + Armies + Army Group reserves
(Heeresgruppen = (Oberkommando + Armeen + Heerstruppen)
Armies
= Headquarters + several Corps + Army troops
(Armeen
= Armeeoberkommando + Korps + Armeetruppen)
Corps
= Headquarters + several Divisions + Corps troops
Armee Korps (AK)
or PanzerKorps = Generalkommando + Divisionen + Korpstruppen
Divisions
= Smallest formation composed of all arms and logistics,
capable of command & control of a combined arms battle
Infantry Division
Usually simply called "Division" (motorized)
292

(Infanterie Division
Infanterie Division (bo)*
Volksgrenadier Division
Panzergrenadier Division
Armored Division (US) or
Armored Division (BR/CDN)
(Panzer Division)
Airborne Division
(Fallschirmjger Division)

> these division types

> on foot or horse> drawn
= Motorized infantry division with some
armored elements.

*bo = Bodenstaendig (static). Organized for coastal defence, with reduced strength, mobility
and logistical support.

The Allied divisions were organized into brigades (Combat Commands)

that could be subordinated to other divisions depending on the mission and
situation. With similar mobility and compatible communications equipment,
the operation of various weapons systems could easily be integrated under a
single command. In the Wehrmacht, the panzer and infantry formations did
not have the same radio equipment, and therefore could not communicate.
Battle Groups (Kampfgruppen) formed a battalion strength and above (in
the U.S. Army called Task Forces), and mixed companies of tanks and
infantry (Teams) seldom fought without strong artillery support. The Allied
artillery was in general much stronger and more modern than the German
artillery.
Allied sub-units were, in contrast to the system numbers used by the
German Army, identified by letters, i.e. 1st Battalion contained A through D
Companies (or Squadrons); 2nd Battalion E through H, etc.
The Allies did not usually supply their infantry with armored fighting vehicles and transports. Therefore, they were very susceptible to fire and suffered
corresponding losses.

293

MILITARY LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES

The leadership principles of the German Army were again confirmed in the
West during 1944. The fighting power of the German Army rested upon discipline and trust, and upon the former self-evident sense of duty to the homeland and country. "Trust is the basis of obedience" was stated in the "Duties
of the German Soldier". Everybody who trusted his superior knew that he
would not demand the unnecessary, the impossible or the illegal. In every
endeavour, the officer had to set the example for his men and be the leader
and instructor in every subject.
German command technique - Auftragstaktik - permitted the subordinate
to accomplish his mission as he saw it within the overall mission. With this
freedom, his desire for initiative was aroused and his awe of the mission
were taken from him. Furthermore, along with the responsibility for success,
the welfare for the forces entrusted to him was imposed on him.
Nevertheless, he was given the greatest amount of freedom of decision in the
course of his mission. Even a poor decision was better than none at all. This
principle was one of the main reasons for the German successes in mobile
warfare, even under the severest of stress.
Command and control of the Allied forces were directed more at ensuring
the economy of their own forces and the wearing down and destruction of
the enemy, while suffering as few friendly casualties as possible. This not
only requires precise planning but also strict obedience and dependability of
the individual. It set more limits on the individual's decision-making than we
Germans would like. Therefore, at lower echelons, favourable opportunities
were often missed.
The Allies attached much importance to reconnaissance. They had achieved
the breaking of the German codes and the interception of German signals
through Ultra. They were also masters of the art of disguising their intentions
and deceiving the enemy.
The Allies, as sea-faring nations, placed greater emphasis on logistics than
did the Germans. The formations and their materiel not only had to be shifted to commitment but then also maintained. High-technology brought with it
new problems. Each new item of equipment created a surplus of work,
spares and transportation requirement during its lifecycle, in order to maintain its operability. Reliability and availability were more important than
maximum performance.

294

AIR WARFARE
At the outbreak of the war the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) looked quite
different than the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The Luftwaffe, under strict
command of the old fighter pilot Goring, was formed and trained primarily
as a tactical close support weapon for the army in mobile campaigns against
limited forces, such as those in Poland in 1939. The limited availability of
raw materials and production capabilities of Germany in turn limited combat
formations to close and medium range. An offensive strategic Luftwaffe with
heavy long-range bombers was never developed. Additional missions of the
Luftwaffe were also ground defence against air-strikes by Flak (AA) artillery
- at the end of the war the majority of 5,000 AA batteries - and air signal
and warning formations.
The Luftwaffe was not at all prepared for a war against England. Its initial
numerical and technological superiority, e.g. the fighter Me-109 among others, disappeared faster than expected, when Hitler failed to appreciate the
decisive importance of air superiority for ground operations. After the lost
battle for England he temporarily stopped new equipment development.
Later in the war new weapons were developed, specifically the "revenge
weapons" - the V-1, V-2 and the first jet bomber the Arado 234
"Blitzbomber". Thus the brave German pilots had to fly until the end of the
war those 1939 models, which had been overtaken several times by the enormous development potential of the Allies. The Luftwaffe was almost no help
on the Western Front in 1944.
By 1935 England had already divided the RAF into several major commands and prepared for war against Germany. The mission of ground
defence fell to the Army. Bomber Command developed heavy four-engined
long-range bombers for an air offensive against military targets and residential areas in Germany, in accord with the US Air Force. Fighter Command
took over air defence of Great Britain. Its early development of radar with
warning and fighter direction networks provided it with a great advantage
over the Luftwaffe. From Fighter Command later grew the Tactical Air
Forces attached to the Allied Army Groups. These Tactical Air Forces had
the mission of achieving air superiority above the battle area (offensive
counter air), interdiction of rear areas and, wherever possible, provision of
close air support. Their backbone was the fighter-bomber.

295

Table 1: German Tank and Anti-Tank Guns and Ammunition

AMMUNITION

GUN
Model
KwK 40 L748

KwK 42 L/70

KwK 36 L/56

KwK 43 LV71

Armour Penetration
(at 30 obliquity)
500m
1000m

Muzzle
Velocity
(m/sec)

100m

PzGr39AP

790

106

96

75

HEAT

450

100

Pak 40

75

PzGr40

990

Pz V

75

PzGr39AP

PzJ 40

75

Pz VI

1800m

Date in
Service

85

66

1942

100

100

100

1943

143

120

97

77

never

925

138

128

110

100

1943

PzGr40/42

1120

194

174

150

127

never

88

PzGr39AP

773

120

112

100

88

1942

Flak 36/37

88

PzGr40

930

171

156

138

123

never

Tiger II

88

PzGr39AP

1000

203

187

165

137

July 1944

JPanther

88

PzGr39AP

1000

203

187

165

137

June 1944

Used In

Calibre
(mm)

Projectile

Pz IV

75

PzJ 38t

For defeating enemy tanks with heavier armour, more powerful Kinetic Energy (KE) rounds with higher muzzle velocities for better penetration were required. Instead of increasing calibres, which would have rendered existing tanks and ammunition obsolete, Germany increased muzzle velocity by increasing the barrel lengths of guns wherever possible. Barrel length was measured in calibres, i e. from L/40 to U70 for the 75mm tank gun (KwK - Kampfwagenkanone). All German tank guns were capable of firing High
Explosive (HE) rounds against soft targets. A round with increased KE was the PzGr 40, similar to the British Armour Piercing Composite Rigid (APCR) or American HyperVelocity Armour Piercing (HVAP) rounds. The lack of Tungsten restricted its use on the Western Front. KwK 40/L48 could also fire a High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) round,
using a shaped charge with chemical energy.
Pak = Panzerabwehrkanone (towed anti-tank gun)
Flak = Fliegerabwehrkanone (anti-aircraft gun)

297

Table 2: British and American Tank and Anti-Tank Guns and Ammunition
GUN
Model

Used In

AMMUNITION
Calibre
(mm)

Projectile

Muzzle
Velocity
(m/sec)

100m

Armour Penetration
(at 30 obliquity)
500m
1000m

1800m

Date in
Service

BRITISH
75mm Mk V

Cromwell IV

75

APCB M61

625

74

68

60

47

1942?

6-pdr Mk V

AT Gun

57

APBC M86

904

93

87

80

67

1942?

APDS

1158

143

131

117

92

Sept 1944

17-pdr Mk II

AT Gun

76.2

APCBC Mk.8

884

149

140

130

110

Aug 1942

Firefly

76.2

APDS

1204

221

208

192

160

Sept 1944

57mm M1

AT Gun

57

APC M86

822

81

64

50

1941

75mm M3

M4

75

APBC M61

625

74

68

60

47

1942?

3-Inch

TD M10

76.2

APC M62

793

109

99

89

73

Jun 1942

76mm M1A1

TD M18

76

APC M62

793

109

99

89

73

Nov 1944

76mm M1A1

M4A3

76

APC M62

793

109

99

89

73

Nov 1944

90mm M3

TD M36

90

APC M82

807

140

129

122

114

Nov 1944

AMERICAN

AP = Armour Piercing
APC = Armour Piercing, Capped
APCBC = Armour Piercing, Capped, Ballistically Capped

APDS = Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot

TD = Tank Destroyer
AT = Anti-Tank

298

Table 3: German Tanks and Tank Destroyers

Model

Combat
Weight (t)

Armour (mm)
Front Side

Gun Caliber
and Length 1

Max Engine
BHP/RPM

Engine Make

HP to Weight
Ratio (tonnes)

Pz IV H/J

25

80

30

75/48

300 / 3000

Maybach

12.0

JPz IV

23

80

40

75/48

300 / 3000

Maybach

13.0

JPz IV2

24

80

40

75/70

300 / 3000

Maybach

12.5

Pz V/G (Panther)

44.8

80

50

75/70

700 / 3000

Maybach

15.4

Pz VI E (Tiger)

56.9

100

80

88/56

700 / 3000

Maybach

12.3

JPanther

45.4

80

60

88/71

700 / 3000

Maybach

15.4

' Barrel length measured relative to calibre of gun, i.e. a gun of 75mm whose barrel is 48 calibers would be
3.6 meters in length.
2

Follow-on variant armed with 75mm PaK42 L/70.

299

Table 4: British and American Tanks and Tank Destroyers

Model

Combat
W e i g h t (t)

Armour (mm)
Front Side

Gun Caliber
and Length'

Engine
BHP/RPM

Engine
Make

HP to Weight
Ratio (tonnes)

BRITISH*
Firefly2

33

76

51

76.2/58

370 / 2400

Chrysler

11.2

Cromwell

28

75

63

75/40

600 / 2550

Rolls-Royce

21.5

Sherman M4A3

31

76

51

75/40

450 / 2600

Ford

14.0

Sherman M4A3E2

38

150

100

75/40

450 / 2600

Ford

11.8

TD M10A1

29

51 3

253

76/53

375/2100

G.M.

11.5

T D M 1 8 Hellcat

18

13

13

76/53

400 / 2400

Continental

22.2

TD M36

28

51 3

90/53

450 / 2600

Ford

15.9

AMERICAN

1
2

38

Barrel length measured relative to caliber of gun, i.e. a gun 7 5 m m whose barrel is 40 calibers would be 3,0 meters in length.
T h e Firefly w a s a n a d a p t a t i o n o f t h e U . S . M 4 A 4 S h e r m a n t a n k f i t t e d w i t h a B r i t i s h 7 6 . 2 m m ( 1 7 - p o u n d e r ) g u n . S p a c e for s t o r i n g t h e
larger ammunition was f o u n d by eliminating the hull m a c h i n e g u n n e r position. In N o r m a n d y the Firefly w a s the only tank w h o s e round could
penetrate the G e r m a n Panther and Tiger tanks of that time, but there were only e n o u g h Fireflies available to equip 2 5 % of British
Armoured Regiments.
Some Tank Destroyers were re-worked and armor thickness may vary. Maximum thickness is shown.

* NOTE: British and Canadian units used the M4A1, M4A2 (Canadians) and M4A4 variants of the M4 Sherman.

300

Table 5: Light Anti-Tank Weapons

Model

Projectile
Diameter
Weight
(mm)
(kg)

Gross
Weight
(kg)

Effective Range
(meters)

Remarks

GERMAN
Panzerfaust

130

3.2

4.1

30 - 50

recoilless, throw-away weapon

Ofenrohr

88

3.2

9.3

100 - 150

rocket launcher

BRITISH
PIAT: (Projector, Infantry,
Anti-Tank)

100

1.1

15.7

30 - 50

spring-loaded; could not fire

below the horizontal

60

2.8

60 - 80

rocket launcher

AMERICAN
Bazooka

301

Table 6: Divisional Artillery Guns and Howitzers

Model

Caliber
(mm)t

Projectile Weight

(kg)

Range
(m)

Rate of Fire
(rounds per min.)

Gun Weight

L.F.H. 18

105

14.8

10,600

4-6

2,040

S.F.H. 18

150

43.5

13,325

5,512

S.F.H. (r)

152

46-48

16,500

7,128

87.6

11.3

12,250

1,800

Pack Howitzer

75

6.4

8,700

1,340

105mm Howitzer

105

15

11,100

2,250

155mm Howitzer

155

43

16,100

5,700

(kg)

GERMAN

BRITISH
25-Pounder
AMERICAN

302

Table 7: Mortars
Model

Calibre
(mm)

Projectile
Weight (kg)

Range
(m)

Rate of Fire
(rpm)

Used In

Remarks

GERMAN
m . G r a n a t w e r f e r 34 1

80

3.5

2,400

15

Infantry C o y s

s. G r a n a t w e r f e r 42 1

120

12.2

6,150

15

Infantry Bns

le. Inf G u n 18

75

5.45

3,550

4 - 6

Infantry Bns

s. Inf G u n 3 3

150

38

4,700

2 - 3

I n f a n t r y & PG R e g t s

N e b e l w e r f e r 41 1

150

34

6,700

3 6 p e r bty 2

Werfer Bns

6 barrels

7,850

bty 2

Werfer Bns

5 barrels

Nebelwerfer

42 1

210

112

36 per

r e p l a c e d I.Inf G u n i n 4 4

BRITISH
2-Inch Mortar

50

450

10

3-Inch Mortar

76

4.5

2,500

10

4.2-Inch Mortar

106

4,430

81

3.2

3,000

18

1,800

battlefield illumination

3,750

battlefield illumination

AMERICAN
8 1 m m Mor M1
6 0 m m Mor M19

60

4.1-Inch Mor M2

106

' The numbers behind the designations of the German mortars indicate the initial year of production. Mortars were developed for trench warfare, infantry
guns for pinpointing covered targets; m. designated "medium" and s. "heavy." As a new arm, separate from artillery, the light-weight, multi-barrelled rocket
launchers, or Nebelwefers,firing sudden concentrations of HE or smoke (nebel), were extremely effective against the Allies, who nicknamed them
"Moaning Minnies."
Nebelwerfer batteries could fire a salvo in about 10 seconds. A six-barrelled Nebelwerfer 41 could be reloaded in less than a minute; the heavier, fivebarreled Nebelwerfer 42 in about two and a half minutes

303

304

EPILOGUE
During the Battle of the Bulge the last remaining German operational
reserves were lost. Only exhausted and severely strained forces were left to
conduct the final battle inside the Reich on widely-stretched fronts. This battle ended, after several dreadful months, on 8 May 1945, when the
Wehrmacht unconditionally surrendered.
The last Wehrmacht communique read:
"Faithful to his oath by exerting all his vigour for his people, the German
soldier has achieved great results, forever unforgettable. The homeland has
supported him up to the end with all its strength and the greatest sacrifices.
This brilliant feat of front and homeland will be recognized in the end in a
fair judgement of history."
Today, the 12 years under Hitler are commonly regarded as a period of
German crimes. However, the Allies demanded Germany's "Unconditional
Surrender", with threats filled with hatred to destroy Germany politically,
economically and culturally, and convert it into an agricultural country
(Morgenthau Plan of 1944). These demands enraged all Germans and made
them determined to hold out at all costs. It destroyed all of the efforts of the
German Resistance, thwarted any chance for partial surrender and thus
lengthened the war. Unfortunately, during this unrestrained struggle for the
life and death of the German Reich, crimes, atrocities and murders were
committed and charged against our people.
The sacrifice of over four million German soldiers killed in action and
another five hundred thousand civilians killed by enemy action and bombing,
has more than atoned for these misdeeds. Their blood has washed away the
crimes committed by Hitler's henchmen, without even a memorial to commemorate their deeds. For our soldiers we may claim that taken for granted
by soldiers throughout the world, namely utter pride in their sacrifices, their
bravery, comradeship and their super-human efforts.
With the Unconditional Surrender of the Wehrmacht, the weapons on all
fronts were silenced. The final say passed over to the politicians to reestablish the peace so ardently desired by all sides.
"VE-Day", 8 May 1945, was no "Day of Liberation" for we Germans!
Indeed, the Allies had declared expulsion a crime against humanity (London,
8 August 1945). Nevertheless, after the Wehrmacht had surrendered, about
three million German civilians suffered death during flight, expulsion, or
from outright crimes, sometimes under horrible circumstances. Contrary to
international law, after the war, about 1.6 million German Prisoners of War
305

starved to death. Thus, the German war losses, including soldiers and civilians, during and after the war, total about ten million.
All of them lost their lives for their country.
Official post-war losses registered to 1984 with the Federal Agency for Statistics
(Statistisches Bundesamt) total 4,777,000. This figure is rising (now approximately
5,000,000) as a result of data available with the partial opening of Russian archives in
Moscow.

306

ANNEX B

EXEMPLARY SOLDIERS
Obedience is the basis of the Wehrmacht, trust the basis of obedience.
Military leadership rests on responsibility, superior efficiency and indefatigable welfare.
Self-assured but modest, upright and faithful, god-fearing and truthful, discrete and incorruptible, the soldier will be an example of manly strength for
the people. Only accomplishments justify pride.
Greatest reward and highest happiness the soldier will find in the conviction of cheerfully accomplished duty. Character and performance determine
his career and value.
Guiding principles of the Allgemeinen Pflichten des deutschen Soldaten
(Universal Duties of the German Soldier), on 25 May 1934, which were
formulated by Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg.
The more elsewhere the pursuit of luxury and good living are spreading,
the more seriously is an officer obliged never to forget that it is not material
wealth that has won him and will keep him his highly respected position in
the state and society.
From the Royal Decree by Kaiser Wilhelm of 2 May 1874 (Allerhchste
Verordung ber Ehrengerichte) for the courts of honour of officers in the
Prussian Army.
To act decisively remains the first requisite in war. Everyone, from the
highest commander to the youngest soldier must continually bear in mind,
that negligence and omission incriminate him more than making mistakes in
the choice of means.
From field manual HDv 300 "Truppenfhrung" (Operations, Part I, or 17
October 1933, No. 15, para 2.

307

Generalleutnant Walther von

Hnersdorff
On 1 July 1942 Oberst i.G. von Hnersdorff was appointed commander
11th Panzer Regiment. He was a striking and extraordinarily impressive personality, full of gallantry and stirring initiative.
Born in Cairo in 1898, of noble birth in appearance and warm-heartedness,
he joined the Hussar Regiment von Schill No. 4 as an ensign in 1915 and
served during World War I and subsequent Volunteer Corps battles as a 2nd
Lieutenant.
After the war he was posted to the 11th (Prussian) Cavalry Regiment, in
1925 promoted to Lieutenant and appointed regimental adjutant. His extraordinary abilities were recognized early. He passed the General Staff Training
with ease from 1930 to 1933. The young Rittmeister was posted as general
staff officer (Captain) to the inspectorate of motorized (fighting) troops in
the ministry of Reichswehr. In word and behaviour von Hnersdorff
appeared sometimes to lead a free life but this ease of his manners was coupled with a deep solemnity of his traditional ideals as an officer. He demanded much from himself and the men trusted him implicitly.
The hussar rider became the ardent advocate of the panzer branch. Through
his uncorruptible judgement he realized that the engine and technology
would replace the horse, but that the cavalry spirit must not only be one with
the horse, as it is likely inherent to the panzer spirit: daring, decisiveness and
speed, chivalry.
With his strong persuasive power and eloquence he always pleaded the idea
that panzers would be the decisive arm in future land battles. In all of his
assignments, in the Command of Panzer Troops under General Lutze and
Colonel Guderian (1934-1936), as commander of the armoured car squadron
of the 4th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, as 1st GSO of the 1st Panzer
Division (1938) and II Army Corps (1939) and as Chief of Staff of the later
Third Panzer Army (Generaloberst Hoth), he planted his old cavalry spirit
into his new field of activity. Whether in war or peace, he seldom failed to
motivate men. Characteristically for him was that he received hitherto
unheard praise from the C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von Fritsch
during his final review at Munsterlager, who expressively thanked him for
planning this ground-breaking first demonstration and field exercise of a
panzer division in August 1935.
Although this general staff officer initially considered his posting to the
troops as a setback, as commander of 11th Panzer Regiment he soon became
deeply rooted in his regiment, which was inspired by its commander's esprit.
As outstanding as his logical thought in strategy and tactics, he led his regiment instinctively in open combat from Kotelnikovo to within 30 miles of
308

Stalingrad. His actions there, always leading his troops, have been described
frequently.
When the old division commander departed, it was clear that only Colonel
von Hnersdorff could succeed him. Dressed in the black panzer uniform,
always with a cheerful word, he led his 6th Panzer Division in an exemplary
manner, dashing and cool, in his command tank. When on 8 July 1943, during Operation Citadel, northeast of Belgorod, he had broken through a tenaciously defended anti-tank position with his division, which trusted him
blindly, death tore him from a soldier's life not yet accomplished. He did not
witness the award of the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross and his promotion
to Generalleutnant. He died on 17 July 1943 of his wounds. With his death
also ended considerations to appoint him as chief of staff of a C-in-C East
under Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein.
At all times General von Hnersdorff was both a fanatical enemy and
despiser of national socialism. He made no secret of his feelings. He was
completely open and fearless and he judged each man by the same human
standard of value; be it a subordinate, officer of equal rank or superior. No
one was spared his often biting wit or his hard criticisms, but never forgetting military obedience. In his command post always on display was a picture, showing a flock of sheep following a ram with the caption: "FHQ"
(Fhrerhauptquartier).
General von Hnersdorff, in best tradition tied to the great values of
Prussian soldiership, but unbound by the spirit of the times, was far ahead of
his age and still has a lot to teach today; he continues to live in the memory
of all who knew him. German panzer troops simply owe him a great deal.
Leutnant Colonel Wilhelm Prinz von Schnburg-Waldenburg
Born on 3 April 1913 in Guteborn, and killed in action on 11 June 1944
near Vendes.
Prinz Wilhelm descended from an old dynasty, subject to the emperor only.
He attended school at Dresden, then the Secondary School of
Ritterschaftliches Internat at Bautzen, where he passed the final examination.
He was no exemplary student. His interests lay primarily in hunting, not in
school.
In April 1933 he joined the 12th Cavalry Regiment in Dresden as an
ensign. He was commissioned as 2nd lieutenant on 20 April 1935 and came
to Kamenz in the autumn of 1935 with detachments of his regiment, which
formed I Bn, 3rd Panzer Regiment. A year later he became the battalion
309

adjutant. The Prinz participated with his regiment in the march into Austria
during 1938, where it was garrisoned at Moedling, for several happy months.
With the detachments of his regiment in autumn 1938, Prinz Eilhelm was
charged with the command of 1st Company, 31st Panzer Regiment, which he
commanded until August 1941. With the 5th Panzer Division he went to the
field in Poland in 1939. Subsequently, on 27 September 1939 he married
Elizabeth Prinzessin zu Stollberg-Roia, then 17 years old. Soon after, at the
end of November, his division was relocated into the Rhineland. During the
French Campaign, after the tank battle of Flavion, on 15 May, he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class, and a short while later, on 12 June, 1st Class.
One of his tank commanders, later Lt.Col. Noekel, wrote of these times:
"The Prinz has always been an example of courage, bravery and decency. While reporting to him as ensign of the reserve, he gave me the following wise advice, which I adhered to to this very day: Be a soldier, a
comrade and a gentleman!"
After returning from France, and before the birth of his son, the 31st
Panzer Regiment was relocated to the Bescides. After January 1941 the regiment went as advisors to Rumania. In March, during the advance to
Bulgaria, the Prince was promoted to captain. The situation in the Balkans
remained strained. On 31st March 1941 the 5th Panzer Division invaded
southern Serbia, broke through the border positions and struck through
Albania towards the Greek border, which was crossed on 16 April. On 24
April the Prinz heroically stormed the pass of Thermopylae, well known
from ancient history.
In the after-action-report it was stated:
The 1 st Company, 31 st Panzer Regiment broke through the initial battery
positions and suppressed the secondary battery positions, so that the
enemy fled the positions during darkness, after suffering heavy casualties and prisoners... The daring commitment of the panzer company
resulted in the loss of 12 of the 18 committed panzers. Of the 70 officers,
non-commissioned officers and men, the company lost seven killed and
22 wounded.
When Prinz Schnburg was awarded the Knight's Cross for this action, he
went to visit the severely wounded and told them: "I wear this Cross for all
of you!"
From September 1941 to June 1942 the Prinz received a new and interesting assignment as commander of the 1st Company, Panzer Lehr Regiment at
Wnsdorf. As such, he was evaluated: "Excellent, solid and unassuming
character. Command personality, very good company commander, very
smart and capable. Proven in war."
310

After a short time in the Fhrer Reserve, on 1 September 1942 he was

named commander of II Battalion 39th Panzer Regiment in the 17th Panzer
Division, which was committed near Briansk on the Eastern Front. With the
forces that were supposed to relieve the encircled Stalingrad, Panzer
Battalion Schnburg attacked at the head of the division and reached the
Myshkova sector on 16 December 1942. However, in spite of the bravery
and sacrifice, the relief of Stalingrad failed and the superior enemy forces
slowly pushed the exhausted Germans back. The Prinz and his few tanks
were almost in constant commitment. Often "Panzer Battalion Schnburg"
received the most impossible "Fhrer Orders," directly from Hitler, as was
his style. "The man has no feelings," the Prinz wrote home, deeply
depressed. Indeed, he did not lose his nerve and composure, but he had no
further illusions about the war. At the end of February 1943, during
Manstein's counter-offensive, the Prinz - a Major since 1 February - reached
Petrovskaya on the Donets, again at the head of his division. Because of his
inexhaustible concern for the well-being of his men, he met with an accident
several days later during a visit to the wounded.
After a brief stay in the hospital, Prinz Schnburg was named commander
of I Battalion, Panzer Lehr Regiment, Wnsdorf, on 1 April 1943. Very soon
the panzer battalion was infected with his spirit and proudly wore his coat of
arms as its tactical marking. On 3 April 1943 his second son, Prinz WolfChristoph, was born. In August the Panzer Lehr Regiment was transferred to
Fallingbostel. The Prinz believed that this was a measure taken by the internal regime to insure that no "reactionary factions" remained in the vicinity of
Berlin. In Fallingbostel, under more field-like conditions, the panzer battalion grew even closer to its ever cheerful, highly respected commander.
When the Panzer Lehr Division was created, the Prinz was supposed to be
sent back home as a tactical instructor. His departure from Verdun was moving. The troops, to whom he had given his heart, were inconsolable over the
loss of their beloved commander. However, at his request, the transfer was
cancelled. During the next few months, he prepared his newly equipped battalion for the invasion.
On 9 June 1944 the Prinz led his battalion in the attack for the first time.
However, it had to be broken off at the start on order. Prinz Schnburg was
deeply impressed by the enemy's strength and skill. On 11 June he was
ordered to conduct a counter-attack in the bocage, unsuitable for tanks. He
expressed his strong reservations against it, in vain. Shortly before the attack,
a stray fragment mortally wounded his orderly Fssel. Fssel was his old and
trusted manservant, who had attended him for years. "I have lost my best
friend," he said upon mounting his tank. "A soldier's death, however, is the
best!" His turret received a heavy anti-tank gun hit near Vendes and ended
311

his noble soldier's career. Leutnant Herrmann, the communications officer,

was killed with Prinz Schnburg. "There is no reason why in the life of a soldier," the Prinz always said.
During the next evening, the commander, Prinz von Schnburg, his communications officer and his orderly were buried together near the village
church of Parfouru sur Oden. He still rests there today. During the burial, the
British fired heavy naval artillery, it sounded like a salute.
The Prinz never experienced his promotion to Oberstleutnant.
Generalmajor Georg Scholze
Born: 21 August 1897 in Lbau/Silesia.
Died: 23 April 1945 in Berlin
Georg Scholze was born to a land-owner in Lbau/Silesia. In 1914 he volunteered for duty in the Jger Battalion von Neumann (1st Silesian) Nr. 5 in
Hirschberg, which fought in the west as part of the 6th Cavalry Division.
Leutnant (since 1915) Scholze proved himself as an infantry officer before
Verdun, where he was awarded the Iron Cross Second and First Class. After
the end of the war he left the Army.
Scholze then passed his school-leaving examinations and studied agriculture. In 1923 this passionate soldier hired on as a clerk with Grenzschutz
Ost. In 1926 he was married. He fathered five children. Only the oldest son
survived the war, also becoming an officer and retiring from the Bundeswehr
as an Oberst.
On 1 October 1934 Scholze was reactivated as a Hauptmann and assigned
to the 9th Infantry Regiment in Potsdam as a company commander. This regiment furthered the tradition of the Prussian guards regiment. From 1938 to
the start of the war he was charged with personnel matters of NCOs and men
in the staff of II Corps..
In October 1939 Major Scholze was appointed commander of II
(Motorized) Battalion of the Infantry Lehr Regiment in Dberitz and then
promoted to Oberstleutnant on 1 June 1940. Shortly before, he and his battalion were sent to France as part of the motorized 900th Infantry Regiment,
an ad-hoc formation. It participated in the advance and pursuit south of the
Loire as part of Panzer Group Kleist, but returned in August.
His battle experience gained in the west was put to good use by the competent officer in training his battalion before the beginning of the Russian
Campaign. In June 1941 Oberstleutnant Scholze led his battalion as part of
312

the 900 (Motorized) Lehr Brigade through Vilnius-Vitebsk-Kalinin to north

of Moscow. Even during the following retreat in bitter cold to Ghask and
into the subsequent defensive positions he was able to build on the trust of
his men. He was awarded the German Cross in Gold on 24 December 1941.
After returning, Scholze was named commander of the Infantry Lehr
Regiment and promoted to Oberst on 1 April 1942.
On 19 December 1942 the fully motorized 901st Lehr Regiment, which
was formed from several different training elements, was called up and committed to the crisis on the southeastern portion of the Eastern Front. The regiment was quickly thrown into the Ukraine and, under the leadership of
Oberst Scholze, played an essential role in the defense of Streltsovka and
later Starobelsk. As part of the 19th Panzer Division, the regiment effectively
delayed the Soviet advance to the Donets. Oberst Scholze was awarded the
Knight's Cross on 17 February 1943 for the successful command of his regiment.
After returning home, Generaloberst Guderian entrusted the proven tutor
and instructor with the mission of reorganizing his regiment as the first
German Panzergrenadier Regiment to be equipped with armoured personnel
carriers and heavy weapons - proof of the respect with which he was held. In
summer 1943 he demonstrated his work in several exercises at the
Panzertruppen school.
After the surrender of Italy, the regiment was transferred to the Balkans as
a quick reaction force. At first, it participated in the clearing of Istria, later it
was entrusted with securing the German lines of communications to the
Aegean through Dalmatia and Bosnia. All missions were accomplished in
hard fighting against partisans.
In mid-January 1944 Oberst Scholze led his regiment to France as part of
the Panzer Lehr Division and reorganized it in Nancy into the 901st
Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment according to "Structure 44."
Thoroughly instilled with the spirit of its austere, but adored "Father
Scholze," the regiment fulfilled all expectations during the fierce fighting in
Normandy, under his brave and exemplary leadership. During his transfer on
19 July, he was only able to bid farewell in writing to his regiment, which
was still committed:
"... The history of the regiment, no matter the name we bore, has
always been glorious. Wherever it was sent, it has done its duty. Its
excellent battalion commanders and company commanders, platoon and
squad leaders and their men have exceeded themselves with courage,
valor and high performance. It was an honorable, pleasant and always
easy mission to command this regiment and to face anybody with it.
313

Many have died or were seriously wounded for the regiment, I thank
them in silence. To those comrades, officers, clerks, non-commissioned
officers and men still living I extend my hand in thanks for the efforts
you have made and will make in the future."
After a short appointment in the German Rumanian Military Mission
(AGrp F), Scholze took command of the (Hamburg) 20th Panzergrenadier
Division on 1 January 1945. The division fought its way from the Baranov
bridgehead through Lodz and Sagan back to the Oder, where its remnants
had to defend Berlin. Its commander was promoted to Generalmajor on 20
April 1945.
With the imminent fall of the Reich and the loss of his wife and four sons
during the bombing of Potsdam, his world collapsed. He voluntarily took his
own life in Berlin.
One of his earlier officers wrote:
"The members of his old regiment remember him as an exemplary
commander. The name "Father Scholze" indicates his untiring concern
for and camaraderie with members of all ranks. The Prussian virtues of
duty and preparedness were ingrained within him. His strict demeanor
never broke down, even in the most difficult situations. He never had any
illusions during the invasion fighting, but he still demanded every ounce
of commitment and military bearing from himself and the regiment..."
Oberstleutnant Joachim Ritter Von Poschinger
Born: 20 June 1913 in Frankfurt am Main
Killed in action: 5 April 1945 at Silbach/Sauerland
Joachim, a descendant of a knightly soldier's family, grew up in his parents' house in Berg at Lake Starnberg until he passed his examinations from
the Pasing Gymnasium and then, on 1 April 1933, joined the 17th Cavalry
Regiment in Bamberg as a fahnenjunker (ensign). After completing military
training in Dresden, he was commissioned as 2nd Leutnant on 1 April 1935
and assigned to the 2nd Schtzen Regiment in Meiningen. The motivated
and concerned platoon leader quickly surpassed those from his year group
and, at the beginning of 1937, became battalion adjutant. He was gifted mentally and physically, and also successfully competed in motor races - even
internationally.
After the march into Austria, in April 1938, his 2nd Panzer Division was
transferred there, while the 2nd Schtzen Regiment went to Vienna. There he
quickly met his wife, Sophie Grfin Seyssel d'Aix, whom he, now an
314

Oberleutnant, married at the age of 25, at that time considered the minimum
wedding age for professional officers.
As commander of the 10th (heavy) Company he proved himself during the
Polish Campaign. Immediately after the start of the Western Campaign in
1940, he attracted his brigade commander's attention and was quickly
appointed brigade adjutant. On 30 May 1940 he received the Iron Cross First
Class and was destined for promotion by the end of the year. On 1 January
1941 he was promoted to Hauptmann. The Balkan Campaign led the 2nd
Panzer Division to Athens and, after refitting at home, it was sent to southern
France as an occupation unit. There, in summer 1941, the framework for the
new 22nd Panzer Division had to be laid. Hauptmann von Poschinger
became its division adjutant (today G-l).
When the young division was completely outfitted with an SPW schtzen
battalion, Poschinger became its commander, since he was the only one with
the necessary experience to quickly train the young SPW companies in combat. In February 1942 the 22nd Panzer Division was hastily transferred to the
Eastern Front and, just as hastily, committed in the Crimea. After initial failures, the young formation quickly solidified. The exemplary battalion commander, with his solid character and irreproachable demeanor, became an
example for his troops; concerned, strong, but fair. On 1 August 1942 he was
awarded the German Cross in Gold and, on 15 February 1943, he was promoted to Major because of his extraordinary bravery in the face of the
enemy.
Shortly after that, he was wounded repeatedly, until finally he sustained a
serious head wound. After his convalescence, he became the head of the
panzergrenadiers courses at the panzer troop school until March 1944.
However, the excellent front-line officer and experienced instructor of panzergrenadiers hated theory. While he was serving as commander of the panzergrenadier training battalion at Weimar, which was considered the senior
school for new combat tactics, both mounted and unmounted, the war situation forced the school to be disbanded in the summer of 1944.
On 2 October 1944 Poschinger took command of the refitted 902nd
Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment, which, on paper, was supposed to be fully
armored. In fact, it was only motorized, because the enormous SPW losses
suffered in the west could not be replaced. Within a short period of time,
after working hard at training, he was able to gain the attention and complete
trust of his officers, non-commissioned officers and men. The regiment,
which was previously in complete disorder, was solidified and instilled with
a new spirit. The regiment displayed its new spirit at the end of November
during bitter fighting on the Saare, which led to heavy casualties, the loss of
315

the headquarters and considerable elements of I Battalion. The commander,

promoted to Oberstleutnant on 1 December 1944, was able within 12 days to
reorganize his regiment. It distinguished itself during the offensive and
defensive phases of the Battle of the Bulge. For this effort, he was awarded
the Knight's Cross. During the clever attack up to and through Rochefort and
the subsequent tenacious defense at the extreme tip of the German frontal
salient before St. Hubert, in the ice and snow, in bitter cold, against a manytimes superior enemy force, the regiment surpassed all expectations until the
planned retreat on 16 January 1945. Then I Battalion was again cut off. In
spite of this, the regiment was able to prevent the threatened enemy penetration near Hoscheid just a week later.
As OB West reserve, the Panzer Lehr Division was thrown, almost without
pause, from crisis point to crisis point on the Western Front during the last
months of the war, until its decimated remnants undertook a last, fruitless
breakout attempt from the Ruhr pocket near Winterberg on Easter Sunday,
1945. Shortly thereafter, on 5 April, near Silbach, an artillery strike ended an
exemplary soldier's life. The regiment, that was stamped with his spirit,
remained intact until the bitter end and the survivors still honor the memory
of their last commander today as a gentleman from head to toe.

316

Annex C

Military Cemeteries
"I do not speak to the delusion that the dead are costly for the enemy. I
speak to the fact that it is inescapable for all time that one must defend what
he loves. Even with his life."
(Pericles for the fallen of the Peleponnesian War, 432 BC)

From ancient times until today, all peoples have honored the dead. They
built monuments, especially if they died for the living.
Only in Germany of today the published opinion thinks differently. During
celebrations on the Day of National Mourning and the inauguration of new
memorials the fallen and the civilian sacrifices for Germany that stand as a
reminder and example for future generations, are covered up and pushed into
the background by the shame and guilt for the victims of tyranny, those murdered by Hitler's regime. Mourning however does not harmonize with shame
and guilt. For Germany's reputation in the world they should be divided from
each other, as they are in all the other countries.
It is different in the military cemeteries! The many dead from the 1944
Western Front rest together in military cemeteries in the French, Belgian,
Luxembourg, Netherlands and German soil, cared for by the Volksbund
Deutsche Kriegsgraberfrsorge and the "Commonwealth War Graves
Commission" in Great Britain. Both keep alive the memory of the war's
dead. On the Western Front in 1944/1945 died:
German
82,000 soldiers
American
120,000 soldiers
British/Canadian
50,000 soldiers
French
13,000 soldiers
National distinctions are noticeable in the layout of the military cemeteries.
The German graves, with their dark-colored stone or crosses, often under big
trees, compel one to silence in awe of the devotion and sacrifice of the dead.
The radiating white rows of stone in the Allied cemeteries, most dominated
by a powerful cross, remind one of the pride and victory of their soldiers. All
of the military cemeteries succeed in honoring their dead. They are an
admonishment for peace and reconciliation.
Buried in the lovely landscape of Normandy are a total of approximately
80,000 German dead in six large military cemeteries. The largest of these is
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La Cambe, west of Bayeux. In several British military cemeteries, as in

Bayeux and Tilly-sur-Seulles, British and Germans rest shoulder to shoulder.
In all, more than 24,000 British, Canadians and Poles lay around Caen in
worthy cemeteries.
Those Americans not returned home were buried in large cemeteries in St.
Laurent-sur-Mer and St. James.

318

GLOSSARY
AAA
Abn
Abt
Adjutant
AGp
ALA
AOK
armd
Bailey Bridge
bazooka
Begleit Coy

Bn
bodenstaendig
BR
Buffalo
CCA, B or R
CDN
C-in-C
CG
CO
COBRA
coy
COS
CP
div
Ehrenblattspange
"88"

anti-aircraft artillery
airborne
abteilung (equivalent to battalion in panzer units and
other mobile arms)
in battalions and regiments, the assistant to the Commander
(SI to S4 functions performed by one person); in divisions
and higher echelons, the G1
Army Group
130th Panzeraufklarungslehrabteilung
Army Command
armoured or armored
portable steel bridge
American 2.36-inch rocket launcher
independent infantry coy, reinforced with heavy weapons
such as AAA or anti-tank guns, placed at the disposal of the
Combat Group of a panzer division. Its mission was to
accompany and secure the division staff, and was often the
last reserve of the Group
Battalion
static, units dependent on local installations and transport
British
a tracked amphibious assault vehicle capable of carrying 30
soldiers
Combat Command of an armoured division, usually containing one-third to one-half of the division's strength. R denotes
reserve.
Canadian
Commander-in-Chief
Commanding General
Commanding Officer
American breakout operation
company
Chief of Staff
Command Post
division
Honour Roll clasp
German 88mm high-velocity dual-purpose anti-aircraft and
anti-tank gun
French
319

FA
FHQ
Fla
Flail

field artillery
Fhrerhauptquartier
Flugabwehr (anti-aircraft defence)
British tank with heavy chains on a revolving drum, used for
land mine clearance
Flak
anti-aircraft gun
FM
Field Marshal
FSJ Div
Fallschirmjger
(Airborne) Division
Funklenkkompanie A panzer coy with remote-controlled charge carriers with
1000 lb explosives or detonating liquid
G1
General Staff Officer Personnel
G2
General Staff Officer Intelligence
G3
General Staff Officer Operations
G4
General Staff Officer Logistics
Gren
Grenadier (infantryman on foot)
half-track
combination wheeled and tracked armoured troop carrier
HE
high explosive
HQ
headquarters
HKB
Army Coastal Battery
HGr
Heeresgruppe (Army Group)
Hiwi
volunteer auxiliaries (mostly Russians)
Hvy
heavy
I, II, etc.
Roman numerals used to identify Corps, or battalions within
a regiment
ID
infantry division (non-static)
ID (bo)
Infantry division (bodenstandiger, or static)
la
1st General Staff Officer at Division level or higher
(equivalent of G3 today)
lb
2nd General Staff Officer at Division level or higher
(responsible for supply; equivalent of G4 today)
Ic
3rd General Staff Officer at Division level or higher
(responsible for intelligence; equivalent of G2 today)
Jabo
jagdbomber (fighter-bomber)
Jagdpanther
turretless 88mm tank destroyer on a Panther chassis
Jagdpanzer IV
turretless 75mm (L-71) tank destroyer on a Pz IV chassis
Kampfgruppe
combined arms task force of variable size
KTB
Kriegstagebuch (war diary)
Landser
soldiers
Lw
Luftwaffe
Mot
motorized (not horse-drawn or armoured)
320

MAA
Marine-Fahr-Prahm
MG
M-4
MFP
Nebelwerfer
OB
OB West
ofenrohr
OKH
OKW

O1
02

O3
OP
Pak
Panther
Panzer Corps
Pz
Pz IV
Pzgren
Pzjg
Panzerfaust
Rgt
RTR
Schtzen Rgt
Seekampfgruppe
SP
Siebelfhre
SPW
Stuka
SS

Marine-Artillerieabteilung (naval artillery battalion)

naval landing barge
machine-gun
American medium tank ("Sherman")
Marine-Fhrprahm (naval tank landing craft)
German multi-barrelled rocket launcher, nicknamed
"Moaning Minnie"
Oberbefehlshaber (Commander of an Army or above)
Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief West
anti-tank rocket launcher
Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command)
Oberkommando des Wehrmacht (High Command of the
Armed Forces)
1st Orderly Officer, assistant to the la
2nd Orderly Officer, assistant to the lb
3rd Orderly Officer, assistant to the Ic
observation post
Panzerabwehrkanone (towed anti-tank gun)
German tank (Mark V) with a 75mm L/70 high-velocity gun
motorized Corps Headquarters capable of command and
control of armoured formations
panzer (armoured unit with tanks or armoured fighting
vehicles)
German medium tank (Mark IV) with a 75mm L/48 gun
Panzergrenadier (armoured infantry, often motorized only)
Panzerjger (self-propelled anti-tank gun or a unit of antitank artillery)
hand-held, single shot anti-tank weapon utilizing a shaped
charge warhead
regiment or regimental
Royal Tank Regiment (British)
Rifle Regiment
Combined naval/army landing force
self-propelled
German landing craft, driven by aircraft propeller/engines
Schutzenpanzerwagen (armoured infantry half-track carrier)
Sturzkampfflugzeug, or dive b o m b e r

Schutzstaffel (Elite Guard). The Waffen-SS formations were

the military arm of Hitler's party. The Waffen-SS were
soldiers and formations under army control but recruited and
trained by Himmler's organization. Not to be confused with
321

Tagesbefehl
TD
Tiger
TOTALIZE
V-1
V-2
VAK
VGD
Volksgrenadier
V-Kp
VK 1601
VK 1801
werkstatt
werfer
WFSt
zbV

police units and guards of concentration camps.

Daily Order (for non-operational matters)
tank destroyer
German heavy tank armed with an 88mm gun. Organized
into heavy tank battalions. Tigers were assigned to Armies
or Panzer Corps
Canadian Army attack towards Falaise 8-11 August 1944
Vergeltungswaffe 1 (flying bomb or cruise missile)
Vergeltungswaffe 2 (supersonic missile)
Volksartilleriekorps (three to six field artillery battalions of
varying calibres from 105-210mm)
Volksgrenadier Division (certain infantry divisions formed
later in 1944)
Grenadier (infantry soldier) of a VGD
Versorgungskompanie (supply company)
experimental tank Mk II with add-on armour and fitted with
a 20mm gun
experimental tank Mk I with add-on armour and fitted with
7.9mm twin machine-guns
maintenance company
see Nebelwerfer
Wehrmachtfhrungstab (Armed Forces Operations Staff)
zur besonderen Verwendung (for special missions)

322

KNIGHT'S CROSS BEARERS

of Panzer Lehr Division 1944
Bayerlein, Fritz
GenLt and CG Panzer Lehr Division

KC
OL
Sw
KC
OL
KC

26 Dec 41
06 July 43
26 July 44
25 Jan 43
28 Oct 44
17 Dec 42

Hauser, Freiherr von, Paul

Oberst and CO 901 PzgrenLehrRgt
Barth, Joachim
Major and CO 130 PzjgLehrAbt
Brandt, Walter
KC 18 July 44
Major and CO 130 PzPiBtl
Brasche, Rudi
KC 09 Nov 42
Feldwebel 901 PzgrenLehrRgt
Eltrich, Herbert
KC 09 Dec 43
Major and CO 130 PzPiBtl
Fallois, von, Gerd
KC 29 Jan 45
Major and CO 130 PzAufklLehrAbt
Gerhardt, Rudolf
KC 22 Sep 41
Oberst and CO 130 PzLehrRgt
Gutmann, Joachim
KC 18 Sept 42
Oberst and CO 902 PzgrenLehrRgt
Keichel, Otto
KC 18 Jan 45
Oberfeldwebel 130 PzAufklLehrAbt
Philipps, Karl
KC 07 Apr 44
Hauptm. and CO 2nd Bn 901 PzgrenLehrRgt
Poschinger, Ritter von, Joachim
KC 25 Jan 45
Oberstltl and CO 902 PzgrenLehrRgt
Schnburg-Waldenburg, Prinz von, Wilhelm KC 18 May 41
Oberstltl and CO 2nd Bn 130 PzLehrRgt
Scholze, Georg
KC 17 Feb 43
Oberst and CO 901 PzgrenLehrRgt
Schulz-Merkel, Dr. Hans-Joachim
KC 23 Dec 43
Oberstabsarzt and Div Surgeon
323

Uthe, Konrad
Major and CO 2nd Bn 901 PzgrenLehrRgt
Wagner, Werner
Hauptm. and O.C., 130 PzjgLehrAbt
Welsch, Willi
Oberstltl and CO 902 PzgrenLehrRgt
Legend:
KC = Knight's Cross
OL = Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross
SW = Swords to Oakleaves of Knight's Cross

324

KC 12 Aug 44
KC 14 Apr 45
KC 29 Sep 41

TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS

Allied Armies
Officers
General of the Army (US)
Field Marshal (BR)
General
Lieutenant General

German Army
Offiziere
Generalfeldmarschall
Generaloberst
General der Infanterie
Artillerie
Kavallerie
Panzertruppen

Major General
Brigadier General (US)
Brigadier (BR)

Generalmajor
Oberst
Oberstleutnant
Major
Hauptmann
Oberleutnant
Leutnant

Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Captain
First Lieutenant
Second Lieutenant
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS
Warrant Officer
Sergeant Major
Master Sergeant

(NCO) UNTEROFFIZIERE
Stabsfeldwebel
Hauptfeldwebel
Oberfeldwebel
Feldwebel
Stabsunteroffizier

Staff Sergeant
Sergeant (US)
Corporal (BR)

Unteroffizier

OTHER RANKS
Corporal (US)
Private 1st Class (US)
Lance Corporal (BR)
Private

MANNSCHAFTEN (Landser)
Obergefreiter
Gefreiter
Schtze
Grenadier, Volksgrenadier
Panzergrenadier, Panzerschtze
Kanonier
Pionier

325

NAME AND TROOP ROSTER

(Ranks abbreviated)
Abrams, LTC
Balck, G
Bartel, OTL
Bartenwerfer, OTL
Bayerlein, GL
Bernstorff, Graf, 0
Bethke, QL
Bethke, H
Dr. Beyer, G
Biron, Prz
Blaskowitz, GO
Blmer
Blumentritt, G
Bhn, H
Borrekott, Fw
Bradley, G
Cavallero, FM
Choltitz, v.G
Churchill, LTC
Cursiefen
Darius, M
Daser, GL
Derfflinger, M
Dette. Fw
Dextraze, M
Diesslin, L
Eberbach. G
Eberding,
Ebner, OL
Esebeck, Frhr, O
Eidig. Fw
Eltrich, M
Emmert
Fallois, v. M
Feuerpfeil, Fw
Fink, H
Finsterwalder, L
Foulkes, GL
Fssel,

Gann
Geyr von
Schweppenburg, Frh, G
Gerhardt, 0
Glyczynski, v., L
Goller,
Gort, Lord, G
Graf, OL
Griffin, M
Guderian, GO
Gutmann, O
Haase, GL
Harper, GL
Hauser, v., 0
Hausser, G
Heinrich, L
Heintz. O
Henke, OL
Hennecke, H
Hennig
Herrmann, L
Dr. Herrmann,
Heydte, v.d., 0
Hopmann
Hbner, H
Hnersdorff. v., O
Kauffmann, OTL
Keichel. Fw
Keitel, GFM
Kempf, G
Keelring, GFM
Kluge, v., GFM
Kluge, v., OTL
Knebel, v.. L
Kohler
Knig, G
Kokott, GM
Koll, O
Kozub. L
Krause, GL
Kreipe. GM
Kues, L

Kuhnow, M

Rundstedt, v., GFM

Lex
Lttwitz, Frh, G
Luxenburger, 0

Sander, L
Schacht, L
Schack, GL
Schfers,
Scheibe, Fw
Siegroth, v., 0
Simonds, GL
SchnburgWaldenburg, Prz, M
Scholze, 0
Schulz-Balluff, L
Schwalbe, GL
Skorzeny
Speidel, GM
Stauffenberg, Graf, O
Sterz
Sthr
Sltmann

Maa
Maczek, GL
Manteuffel, v., G
Marcks, G
Markowski, M
Marschalck von
Bachtenbrock, Frh, H
McAuliffe, GM
McNair, G
Meyer (Panzermeyer), 0
Meyer, OL
Model, GFM
Montgomery, FM
Monz, H
Mller. H
Neumann, OL
Niemeyer, Ol
Oehmichen, 0
Oppeln-Bronokowski,
v., GM
Patton, G
Pauletto, L
Peiper, O
Philipps
Poschinger, Titter
v., OTL
Prien, L
Ramsay, Adm
Rauch, O
Ravenstein, v., 0
Reid,
Ritschel. H
Roberts. GM
Rommel, GFM

326

Trettner
Trumpa
Uthe
Wagener, GM
Warnock, GM
Welsch, Otl
Werner. L
Werncke, M
Williamson, LTC
Wippich,
Wisliceny. Otl
Wittmann, H
Zeisler. M
Zitzewitz, v., L
Zwierczynski, M

TROOPS

Deutsch - Heer

(Divisions and higher - without commanders)

Waffen-SS

1. SS-Panzerdivision
2. SS-Panzerdivision
9. SS-Panzerdivision
10. SS-Panzerdivision
12. SS-Panzerdivision
17. SS-Panzergrenadier Division

2. Panzerdivision
6. Panzerdivision
9. Panzerdivision
11. Panzerdivision
21. Panzerdivision
116. Panzerdivision
PanzerLehrDivision
Fhrergrenadierdi vision
15. PanzergrenadierDivision
19. Volksgrenadier Division
25. PanzgrenadierDivision
26. Volksgrenadier Division
48. (bo) Infantry Division
64. (bo) Infantry Division
70. (bo) Infantry Division
85. Infantry Division
89. Infantry Division
167. Volksgrenadier Division
245. (bo) Infantry Division
271. (bo) Infantry Division
272. (bo) Infantry Division
275 Infantry Division
277. Infantry Division
302. (bo) Infantry Division
331. (bo) Infantry Division
344. (bo) Infantry Division
346. (bo) Infantry Division
347. (bo) Infantry Division
352. Infantry Division/VGD
361. Infantry Division/VGD
462. Infantry Division
708. (bo) Infantry Division
711. (bo) Infantry Division
712 (bo) Infantry Division
716. (bo) Infantry Division
719. (bo) Infantry Division
Werferbrigade 7
Werferbrigade 8

British Army

7. Armoured Division
11. Armoured Division
6. Airborne Division
43. Division
49. Division
50. Division
51. Division

Canadian Army

2. Armoured Division
4. Armoured Division
2. Infantry Division
4. Infantry Division
1. Polish Armoured Division

French Army

2. French Armoured Division

U.S. Army

2. Armored Division
3. Armored Division
4. Armored Division
5. Armored Division
7. Armored Division
9. Armored Division
10. Armored Division
11. Armored Division
4. Infantry Division
5. Infantry Division
9. Infantry Division
28. Infantry Division
30. Infantry Division
45. Infantry Division
80. Infantry Division
84. Infantry Division
87. Infantry Division
95. Infantry Division
100. Infantry Division
106. Infantry Division
82. Airborne Division
101. Airborne Division

Luftwaffe

3. Fallschirmjgerdivision
5. Fallschirmjgerdivision
17. LW-Feld-Division
Kampfgeschwader 100

Kriegsmarine

Marine-Artl.Abt. (M.A.A.) 203

327