Introduction To Law: I. Fraternal Order of Utopia

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FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA
for tomorrow shall cast a myriad of mighty storms
that only those who with firm determination
and Utopian vision do survive
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
DEAN JUDD ROY
I.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
ADVOCATE : One who assists, defends or pleads for another. One who renders legal advice and aid, and pleads the cause of
another before a court or a tribunal; a counselor. A person learned in the law and duly admitted to practice, who assists his client
with advice, and pleads for him in open court. An assistant; adviser, a pleader of causes (Blacks Law Dictionary, 6 th Ed., 1990,
55)
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW : A person admitted to practice law in his respective state and authorized to perform both civil and
criminal legal functions for clients, including drafting of legal documents, giving legal advice, and representing such before
courts, administrative agencies, boards, etc. (Id., 128)
That class or persons who are, by license, officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence. (Philippine Law Dictionary, 3 rd Ed.,
(1988), 82, citing Cui v. Cui, 120 Phil 729)
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT : A private attorney authorized by another to act in his place and stead, either for some particular
purpose, as to do a particular action, or for the transaction of business in general, not necessarily of legal character. This
authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a letter of attorney, or more commonly a power of attorney
(Blacks Law Dictionary, supra., 129)
CONCURRING OPINION : A separate opinion delivered by one or more judges which agrees with the decision of the
majority of the court but offering own reasons for reaching that decision. (Id., 291)
COUNSEL (OR COUNSELOR) : An attorney; lawyer. A member of the legal profession who gives legal advice and handles
the legal affairs of a client, including if necessary, appearing on his or her behalf, in civil, criminal, or administrative actions and
proceedings. (Id., 348)
DISSENTING OPINION : A mere expression of the individual view of the dissenting justice from the conclusion held by the
majority of the court. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 279, citing Garcia v. Perez, 99 SCRA 635)
EASEMENT : An encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable property belonging to a
different owner (Civil Code, Art. 613)
A liberty, privilege, or advantage without profit which the owner of one parcel of land may have in the land of another. A service
which one estate owes to another. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 302)
A right or privilege in the (estate of an individual) for the advantage or convenience of the owner of another estate. Essentially, a
burden, a charge upon the servient estate. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Gurtiza v. Castro, 13 June 1985 and Ereneta
v. Mascunana, 23 April, 1963)
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER : An order is interlocutory when it does not terminate or finally dispose of the case, because it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra.,
citing People v. Hewald, 105 SCRA 1297)
An order made by to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the suit and generally collateral to
the issues formed by the pleadings and not connected with the final judgment (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing
Rodriguez v. Vera, 2 October, 1974)
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One that is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject in court by whom it was issued.
(Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Bairan v. Tan Siu Lay, 28 December, 1966)
An order is considered interlocutory if it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on
the merits of the case. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, citing De Guia v. Constantino, 10 February, 1981)
One which does not, of itself, definitely settle or conclude any of the rights of the parties to the action (Philippine Law
Dictionary, supra., citing Dais v. Garduno, 49 Phil 168)
One which is a determination on some incident or collateral matter that does not dispose of the merits of a controversy
(Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Sison v. Ocba, 7 March, 1986)
JUDICIAL POWER : Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Philippine
Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 1)
The authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the
courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights. (Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756)
LANDMARK DECISION : A decision of the Supreme Court that significantly changes existing law. (Blacks Law Dictionary,
supra., 879)
LAW : A large body of rules and regulations, based mainly on general principles of justice, fair play and convenience, which
have been worked out and promulgated by governmental bodies to regulate human activities and define what is and what is not
permissible conduct in various situations. (Kinyon, How to Study Law)
The term law is also used in a much broader sense to denote the whole process by which organized societythrough
governmental bodies and personnel (legislative, courts, administrative tribunals, law-enforcement agencies and officers, penal
and corrective institutions, etc.)attempts to establish and maintain peaceful and orderly relations between the people in that
society. (Id.)
Law is classified into (a) Natural Law which derives its force and authority from God and (b) Positive Law rule of action
freely established and promulgated by a competent authority for the benefit of the common good. (Id.)
The sources of law are (a) legislation, (b) Supreme Court decisions or judicial precedents, and (c) customs (Id.)
LAW OF THE CASE : A legal principle that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, such declaration
continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed
in other cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case.
The general rule is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the
concrete facts, not only prescribed the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but
they become and remain the law of the case in all after steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on
convenience, experience and reason. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 749)
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the courts. (21 CJS. 330)
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LAWYER : A person learned in the law; as an attorney, counsel, or solicitor; a person licensed to practice law. Any person who
prosecutes or defends causes in courts of record or other judicial tribunal, or whose business it is to give legal advice or
assistance in relation to any cause or matter whatever. (Blacks Law Dictionary, supra., 888)
LEADING CASE : Among the various cases that are argued and determined in the courts, some, from their important character
have demanded more than usual attention from the judges, and from this circumstance are frequently looked upon as having
settled or determined the law upon all point involved in such cases, and as guides for subsequent decisions, and from the
importance they thus acquire, are termed leading cases. (Id.)
A case, the decision of which establishes a principle. (Oxford Law Dictionary)
MUTATIS MUTANDIS : After making the necessary changes (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 613, citing US v. Ponte, 20
Phil 384)
OBITER DICTUM : A statement made in passing; a rule issued on a point not necessarily involved in the case (Philippine Law
Dictionary, supra., 643, citing Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil 588)
A remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally
and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Morales v. Paredes, 55 Phil
565)
An opinion uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to
collateral subjects.
The opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide.
An opinion of the court which does not embody its determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the
point, and is not the professed deliberate determination of the judge himself. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 643-644, citing
People v. Macadaeg, 91 Phil 413)
An opinion expressed by the court upon some question of law, which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it.
(Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 44, citing Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 120)
A [personal opinion of a judge] on a collateral question uttered by the way. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Gallegos
v. Philippine Racing Club, 25 July, 1980)
A mere incidental expression of the views of the court. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Jandug v. Cloribel, 54 OG
700)
A dictum which generally is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule may be followed if sufficiently
persuasive (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Lee v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 204)
RATIO DECIDENDI1 : The ground or reason of the decision. The point in a case which determines the judgment (Blacks Law
Dictionary, supra., 1262, citing Morales v. Paredes, 55 Phil 565)
The reasoning or principle upon which a case is based. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 787, citing US v. Pico, 18 Phil 390)
A clarification should be made at this point. A distinction exists between ratio decidendi and judgment in that the latter pronounces the disposition of
the case, while the former provides the basic reason for such determination. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Republic v. Cuevas, 11 November,
1975
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RES JUDICATA2 : A rule that as between the parties to the first judgment and their privies, it operates as a bar to a second
litigation but also as to all matters which might have been litigated therein, whereas in an action between then upon a different
cause it is a bar only as to matters actually litigated. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 821, citing Palanca Tanguinlay v.
Quiros, 10 Phil. 262)
A doctrine which precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by prior and final judgment.
(Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 821-22)
In its broad concept, the rule means that when a court of competent jurisdiction has determined, on its merits, a litigated cause,
the judgment entered, until reversed, is, forever and under all circumstances, final and conclusive as between the parties to the
suit and their privies, in respect to every fact which might properly be considered in reaching a judicial determination of the
controversy, and in respect to all points of law there adjudged as those points relate directly to the cause of action in litigation
and affect the fund or other subject matter then before the court. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 822, citing Viray v. Marinas,
49 SCRA 50)
The requisites for a judgment to be in res judicata are
(1) The judgment must be final and executory and not merely interlocutory;
(2) The judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties and nature of
the suit;
(3) The judgment must be on the merits, or at least have the effect of an adjudication on the merits; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, or causes of action, or, in
certain cases, reliefs prayed for.
It is not necessary that there is be absolute identity, it being sufficient that there is substantial identity of parties. (Philippine Law
Dictionary, supra, 823, citing De Guia v. Espiritu, 28 January, 1980)
STARE DECISIS : The doctrine that, when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same, regardless of
whether the parties and property are the same. (Blacks Law Dictionary, supra, 1406, citing Horne v. Moody, Tex. Civ. App.,
146 S.W. 2d. 505; Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 902, citing Government v. Jalandoni, 44 OG 1840)
State decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which
follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, citing
Prudential Bank and Trust Co. v. International Asian Co., 6 August, 1974)
STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE : Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. (Philippine Law
Dictionary, supra, citing Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 410)
Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, citing J.M. Tuason and Co.
v. Mariano, 85 SCRA 647)
At this juncture, it should be noted that Law of the Case does not have the finality of the doctrine of Res Judicata and applies only to the one case,
whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case.
A further distinction is that the doctrine of the law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its application. It relates entirely to
questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case. The doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is
applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in
the same action or general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding. (Philippine Law
Dictionary, supra., citing Comilang v. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 79)
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II.
ASSIGNED ARTICLES
EL PODER JUDICIAL EN FILIPINAS

Judicial Power in the Philippines: Its Governance, Structure and Independence
NARVASA, ANDRES
A. The Judiciary:
1. Courts during Spanish Regime
Prior to the arrival of the Spanish in the Philippines, there existed a baranggay system, ruled by chieftains who exercised all
powers of governance, including legislative, executive and judicial.
With the arrival of the Spanish, a central government was established with Legazpi as the first Governor. Empowered by
Royal Order of August 14, 1569, he administered civil and criminal justice, and heard and decided any suit, civil or criminal
in the region.
On 5 May, 1583, The REAL AUDENCIA was established as a dependency of Mexico. There was a President, 4 Oidores
(justices), a fiscal, an Aguacil Mayor, and a Teniente de Gran Canciller, with the First President being Governor Santiago de
Vera. The first session took place on 10 June, 1584. During these days, the executive and the judicial powers are one, with
the Governor-General, also the ex-oficio President of the Court, the Alcalde Mayor and Gobernadorcillo as Court of First
Instance Judge and Municipal Magistrate, respectively.
During the 2nd half of the 19th century, the Real Audencia was placed under the Consejo de Indios in Spain, which held
appellate jurisdiction over administrative matters and civil appeals more than 6,000 pesos but not criminal cases. It is also
during this time that there occurred first a separation of executive and judicial powers, inspired by Montesquies De lesprit
des loix (The Spirit of the Laws). The Consejo was abolished March 1834 and its jurisdiction assumed by Tribunal Supremo
de Espana e Indias.
In 1815, the Governor-General was replaced by a Chief Justice, and 7 Oidores. On 4 July, 1861the Real Audiencia was no
longer advisory board of the Governor-General, and functioned solely for the administration of justice. Audiencia Territorial
de Manila was divided into a Sala dela Civil and a Sala dela Criminal. Also, two other audiencias was established in Vigan
and Cebu, respectively. These other audiencias had one Chief Justice and two associate justices, they held appellate
jurisdiction over civil but not criminal cases. Aside from this, there existed special courts which includes, (1)
ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS, which held jurisdiction over priests, canonical laws, marriage and divorce, (2) TRIBUNAL
DE CONSULADO, which was directly under the Tribunal de Alzadas and held jurisdiction over mercantile and commercial
obligations and contracts, (3) MILITARY COURTS, and (4) CHINESE COURTS.
2. Courts under American Sovereignty
On 13 August, 1898, a military government was established under Maj. Gen. Wesley Merrit, by the powers of the President
of the United States as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. They maintained the civil powers of the Real
Audencia, but the criminal cases were handled by the Military Courts. On 30 January, 1899, civil jurisdiction was suspended
as well.
On 29 May 1899, M/Gen. Otis issued Gen. Order 20, which established the Audencia Territorial insofar as compatible with
the sovereignty of the United States, restoring both its criminal and civil functions. Cayetano Arellano was the first Chief
Justice. On 11 June, 1901, by virtue of Act No. 136, the Audencia was finally abolished and in its place was established the
Supreme Court, with one Chief Justice and 6 Associate Justices, holding practically the same jurisdiction as the Real
Audencia. This Act was finally affirmed by the Act of 01 July, 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill.
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In 1917, with the enactment of the Administrative Code, the judiciary was reorganized with the Supreme Court over the
Courts of First Instance (Courts of Superior Jurisdiction) and over the Peace Courts. There was one Chief Justice and eight
Associate Justices.
On 29 August, 1916, the Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act, the US Supreme Court held appellate jurisdiction over
the Philippine Supreme Court on matters involving constitutionality of any statutes, treaties, titles, and rights and privileges
of US citizens, plus claims of over $25,000.
The Tydings-Mcduffie Law of 24 March, 1934 espoused that the Philippine would have its own Constitution, a convention
being called for that purpose. On 14 May, 1935, the Commonwealth Constitution was drafter with the Supreme Court
established with one Chief Justice and 10 Associate Justices. On 31 December of that same year, the Court of Appeals was
established as the 2nd highest court of the land, composed of 11 members, (15 in the late 30s, 17 in 1942, and 69 presently,
though not filled up)
3. Courts during Japanese Occupation
During the Pacific War, Japan dominated the Philippines, and there really wasnt much change with the Judiciary in this
instance, only there were 5 members of the Supreme Court, one Chief Justice and four Associate Justices. This Supreme
Court first held session on 17 February 1942. The members were later increased to seven. The Court of Appeals first held
session 6 February 1942, and the Courts of First Instance, on 23 February 1942.
4. Courts under the Independent Republic
In 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted. With 11 members of the Supreme Court, sitting only en banc, the Court of
Appeals had 15 members which may sit in 5 divisions, then the Peace Courts was designated as Municipal Courts. There
was also established a Criminal Circuit Court by virtue of RA5179 enacted on 8 September 1967.
5. Courts under Martial Law
The Supreme Court membership was again increased to 15, and the proclamation of Martial Law vested the Supreme Court
with administrative supervision over all inferior tribunals.
On August 1980, BP129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 altered the name of the Court of
Appeals into the Intermediate Appellate Court and Courts of First Instance to Regional Trial Courts. Metropolitan Trial
Courts were established in metropolitan areas, as well as Metropolitan Trial Courts in Cities in cities not inside a
metropolitan area.
6. Under the Freedom Constitution and Beyond
On 28 February 1986, the Court of Appeals was reinstated. During this time, the present concept of judicial power was
concocted. The concept of judicial review over governmental acts was unheard of before this time. Now, the second
sentence of judicial power as provided in the Art. 8, Sec. 1 of the Constitution is one of the most important in the present
Constitution.
7. Special Courts and Administrative Tribunals or Quasi-Judicial Agencies
Quasi-judicial agencies are administrative agencies vested with limited adjudicatory power. Such includes Sharia Courts
exercising limited jurisdiction over cases involving the Muslim Code of Personal Laws.
(The present Integrated Judicial System can be viewed on Page 13 of the Article.)
B. Rules on Procedure.
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1. Laws of Spain: Made Applicable to the Philippines

Only those which came to have effect to the country, which were extended by royal decree. The chief codes and laws
made effective here in the Philippines included the Ley Provisional, Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure (1888), the
Penal Code, Family Law, Marriage Law.
Laws of limited application made effective here, included the mining law, and the notarial law, among others.
2. Effect of American Sovereignty.
The Spanish statute law was by the change of sovereignty, severed from Spanish jurisprudence and made effective in this
jurisdiction to the same extent as if Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines modeled upon those same Spanish
statutes.
All political laws were abrogated immediately, because of the change of sovereignty. All other laws, customs, and rights of
property incompatible with the American system were superseded.
During the time of Spanish occupation, at least from 1888 onwards, the Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal and Ley de
Enjuciamiento Civil were controlling as to the procedure of how the actions occurred in court. Prior to this, there was not a
systematic legal compilation of procedural laws, but only judicial decrees of the Real Audiencia, among others, that were
controlling.
In April 1900, General Orders 85, the Criminal Code of Procedure, modified or repealed the Ley de Enjudiciamiento
Criminal. In September 1901, Act No. 190 also known as the Code of Civil Procedure superseded the Ley de
Enjudiciamiento Civil. This shift altogether changed the former inquisitorial mode of litigation, to the present adversarial
mode of litigation.
The Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Law of 1916 otherwise respected the Judicial System already running in the
Philippines. However, it is important to note that this law allowed the appeal on any decision of the Philippine Supreme
Court to the Federal Supreme Court of the United States.
In July 1940, the Rules of Court was made effective. It superseded both Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure already
existing. It culled much of its content from both Codes that it superseded plus that of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Decisions of the Supreme Court among others.
3. The Independent Republic
On January 1964, the new Rules of Court took effect. The revision included provisions from the New Civil Code of 1950,
and took into consideration as well, proposals from various quarters as well as jurisprudence. From then on, the Rules of
Court has been revised numerous times including the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. The Judicial System (will be discussed in Constitutional Law I)
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
HARRIS, D.J.
For the world court to be able to apply any asserted rule of international law, it must be shown that it is the product of the of the
three law-creating processes, otherwise known as the direct or formal sources of international law. These are (1) treaties and
conventions, (2) customs, and (3) general principles of law. The secondary or indirect sources of international law are (1)
decisions of courts, and (2) writings of publicists. These are discussed in detail below:
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The power of the Court to decide a case ex aequeo et bono, that is to say, to ignore rules which are the product of any of the
above three primary sources and to substitute itself as a law-creating agency depends on the agreement of the parties to a dispute.
A formal source is that from which a rule of law derives its force and validity. The material sources, on the other hand, are those
from which it derived the matter, not the validity of the law. The material source supplies the substance of the rule to which the
formal source gives the force and nature of law.
1. Custom
A custom is defined as a practice, which has grown up between States and has come to be accepted as binding by the mere fact
of persistent usage over a long period of time. An example is the practice of granting immunities to foreign heads or States. One
of the defects of customary international law is the difficulty of determining when a practice can be considered to have heartened
into custom and thus acquired obligatory character. Another problem is its inability owing to its slow process of evolution to
adjust swiftly to moving developments.
COLOMBIA v. PERU
ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 266
FACTS: Haya dela Torre, a Peruvian, staged among with others, an unsuccessful rebellion in Peru in 1948 and was ordered
arrested. De la Torre was granted asylum by Colombia. Peru refuses to permit de la Torre out of the country. Colombia,
therefore institutes present action.
ISSUE: W/N COLOMBIA, AS A STATE GRANTING ASYLUM, MAY QUALIFY THE CONDITIONS OF THE
ASYLUM UNILATERALLY.
RULING: NO. The party, which relies on a custom, must prove that this custom is established in such a manner as it is binding
upon the other party. In this case, Colombia fails to prove that qualification for asylum can be had unilaterally and even if such
was proven, Colombia may not invoke the custom between Latin-American States as binding since Peru has refused to sign the
Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939 which defined the qualification of the offense in diplomatic asylum.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC of GERMANY v. DENMARK and NETHERLANDS
ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3
FACTS: Denmark and the Netherlands both propose the Equidistance-Special Circumstances Principle, while Germany
proposes the Doctrine of the Just and Equitable Share. Germany argues that using the principle proposed by both Denmark and
the Netherlands would result to a smaller share for the State in between the two States, in this case, Germany.
ISSUE: WHAT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARE APPLICABLE TO THE DELIMITATION OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELVES IN THE NORTH SEA.
RULING: Before a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general of international law, it might be that, even
without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention
might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected. The Geneva Convention to
which both believe to have settled the issue was deemed not to have settled the issue because the Convention on the Continental
Shelf of the Geneva Convention was never ratified, although practiced by the affected States. Therefore, the World Court, in this
instance, decided to rule not on which principle should be used, but instead came up with its own principle to guide the issue at
hand. It was held that:
(1) Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all the
relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts of the continental
shelf x x
(2) If in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, these are to
be divided between them in agreed proportions x x
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Dissent of Judge Lachs: The equidistance rule, have been accepted not only by those States which are parties to the Convention
on the Continental Shelf, but also by those which subsequently followed it in agreements, or in their legislation, or have
acquiesced in it when faced with legislative acts of other States affecting them. This can be viewed as evidence of a practice
widespread enough to satisfy the criteria for a general rule of law.
Dissent of Judge Sorensen: The court does not seem to have laid down strict requirements as to the duration of the usage or
practice which may be accepted as law. In particular, it does not seem to have drawn any conclusion in this respect from the
ordinary meaning of the word custom when used in other contexts. [I believe] as a result of a continuous process over a
quarter of a century, the rules embodied in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf have now attained the status of
generally accepted rules of international law.
2. Treaties
Not all treaties can be considered a direct source of international law. A treaty, to be considered a direct source of international
law, must be concluded by a sizable number of States. Even if originally agreed upon only by a few States, the treaty may
become binding upon the whole world if it is intended to lay down rules for observance by all and it is subsequently signed or
acceded to by other States.
Treaties are more of contractual obligations rather than a source of law. The Constitution provides that Congress should ratify
treaties before it can actually become law. This just means that a treaty is already a contractual obligation, but not a law, until it
has been ratified. In essence, the treaty may lead to a law, but is actually not yet a law.
3. General Principles of Law
The general principles of law are mostly derived from the law of nature and are observed by the majority of States because they
are believed to be good and just. Although no international convention was necessary to bring them into existence, the general
principles of law have nevertheless become universal in application because of the unilateral decision of a considerable number
of States to adopt and observe them in recognition of their intrinsic merit.
NETHERLANDS v. BELGIUM
PCIJ Reports, Series A/B, No. 70, pp. 76-77
The Netherlands claimed that Belgium had infringed a treaty obligation by building canals that altered the flow of water in the
River Meuse.
RULING: Hudson. He who seeks equity must do equity. The Netherlands lost the right to bring its claim because of similar
earlier conduct on its part.
4. Decisions of Courts
The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable in international law, and so the decision of a court in one case will have only
persuasive value in the decision of a subsequent case. The decision of the Court has no binding force between the parties and in
respect to that particular case.
5. Writings of Publicists
It must be a fair and unbiased representation of international law, and by an acknowledged authority in the field.
6. Discussion on Soft Law
Soft Law consists of written instruments that spell out rules of conduct that are not intended to be legally binding, so that they
are not subject to the law of treaties and do not generate them to become a custom.
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HOW TO STUDY LAW AND WRITE LAW EXAMINATIONS

KINYON, STANLEY
I.
How to Study Law
A. Tools of the Profession

The student needs certain tools in order to survive in law school. Books, both casebooks and textbooks, comprise him primary
tools. The student will also need writing materials in going about his trade. The student is also advised to get his own law
dictionary. The author notes that law students usually have difficulty in comprehending legal terms. This is because Law has
virtually built a language on its own.
It would also be helpful to the student if he acquaints himself with the other law books found in the library. This way, he will not
have to go through all of them when the need arises.
B. Object of Law Study
Law is a large body of rules and regulations, based mainly on general principles of justice, fair play and convenience, which
have been worked out and promulgated by governmental bodies to regulate human activities and define what is and what is not
permissible conduct in various situations.
The term law is also used in a much broader sense to denote the whole process by which organized society, through
governmental bodies and personnel attempts to apply these rules and regulations and thereby establish and maintain peaceful and
orderly relations between the people in that society.
The study of law should be viewed within the context of the legal system as a whole. Studying law is not just about learningor
memorizinglegal rules and court cases. The student must learn how to take a particular problem or controversy, accurately
classify it as it would be classified by a legal tribunal, discover and apply to it the rules and principles generally applied to
controversies in that class, and, so far as possible, draw the same conclusions and arrive at the same solution as the legal tribunal
would. The studenttheoretically, at leastwill be able not only to handle his own affairs but also to advise others as regards
the problems that they face everyday.
C. Studying under the Case Method or Case System
The Case System is based on the idea that the best way to study law is to study the actual court decision in various types of
cases and to derive from them, by inductive reasoning, an understanding of the main files of classification in the law and the
general rules and principles applicable in those fields.
Cases are published reports of controversies, which have come before the courts, including the courts decision and its reasons
for its decision. These reports usually deal with the decisions and opinions of appellate courts. Trial courts decisions are not
ordinarily recorded in printed volumes of public distribution.
Casebooks are made up principally are made up principally of selected cases taken from these reports and arranged according
to the type of controversy or subject matter in the case.
D. Reading Cases
In reading cases, the student should first know what to look for. This is achieved by knowing the basic parts of a case, which are
the following: (1) a brief statement of the kind of controversy involved. This is usually accompanied by an explanation of how
the case got to this particular court; whether it started there, or, it is a matter on appealas it usually ishow and why it
happened to get there whether plaintiff or defendant appealed, and just to what action of the lower court the appealing is
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objecting; (2) a statement of the facts of the controversywho the parties were, what they did, what happened to them, who
brought the action and what he wanted; (3) a statement of the question or questions the court is called upon to decidethe
various issues (either of law or fact) which must be settled before a decision on the controversy can be reached; (4) the
arguments on the issuesa discussion of the pros and cons; and (5) the general conclusion and, ultimately, the courts decision.
The student is expected to read the cases systematically so as to be able to have an intelligent grasp of the case. The following
steps will be helpful in facilitating the reading process: (1) get a clear picture of the controversy involvedget all the facts and
issues straight; (2) analyze them; (3) read the courts conclusions and the arguments behind them; (4) jot down or mark
important points that might be encountered; and (5) study the notes the author or annotator has appended to the case (if there are
any).
E. Briefing Cases
Briefing a case simply means making a brief summary or abstract of the case in the students own words. Briefing cases serves
two purposes. First, and most important, it makes the student read the case more thoroughly and carefully. Second, it gives the
student a permanent condensed written record of each case.
There are three (3) cardinal rules in making good briefs. First, one should not try to brief the case as it is read through the first
time. Second, the brief should be written in the students own words. Third, the brief should be organized and concise, without
sacrificing substance.
As far as this third rule is concerned, a good logical order for a brief is as follows: FACTSISSUESDECISION
REASONS.
F. ClassworkTaking Notes
Some points that the student should remember in taking notes: First, do not try to write down everything that is said in class.
Second, if a case is being discussed, write down its name and then stop and listen to what is being said about it. Third, when the
discussion has proceeded to a point where a conclusion has been reached or a rule developed, get it clearly in mind and then
write a concise, accurate statement of it. Fourth, when going from one problem to the next, indicate the transition, if possible.
G. Review
1. Day-to-day Review
The object and purpose of day-to-day review is quite apparent from its name. It is primarily a device for nailing down or
clinching the material being studies as the student goes along. One good tip is that the student should review each course just
before he reads the next days assignment in that course.
2. Periodic Review
The object and purpose of periodic review is to get a broad mental picture of the main divisions in each course and, ultimately,
of the whole course and the whole field of law.
H. Outline
An outline gives the student a tangible picture of the organization of the course. It also compels the student to do the reviewing
more thoroughly, carefully and systematically.
II.
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A. Historical Background
The introduction of the case method came with the publication in 1871 by Dean Christopher Langdell of his casebook on
contracts. He asserted that law was a science, the materials of which were the cases. He wanted to make legal education more
realistic and less abstract. Thus, the study of different particular cases which, more or less, depict the actual scenario to be
tackled by the lawyers-to-be.
B. Justification
The case method of instruction serves as training for the student as regards the development of his critical faculties. This method
puts emphasis on analysis and reasoning rather than on a correct conclusion.
C. Conduct of Classes
The student is asked to state the facts and holdings of the case or cases assigned by the professor. This serves two (2) purposes:
(1) to provide a common basis for class discussionthe case itself and (2) to expose the student to a critique of his accuracy and
understanding in reporting the case. In conduct of classes employing the case method, hypothetical cases are posed by the
professor, calculated to test the scope of the rule that the student has derived from his study of the opinion.
D. Reviewing
Reviewing gives the student a much more comprehensive and systematized vision of the course.
LANGUAGE MASTERY AND LEGAL TRAINING

MEHLER, IRVING
Quinovit neque id quod sentit exprimit perinde est ac sinesciret
He who knows but cannot express what he knows is as if he were ignorant.
The perennial problem faced by legal educators is the inability of law students to use the English languageboth the spoken and
written wordproperly and effectively.
1. The Law Schools Burden
The law school has the burden of addressing this handicap by setting up courses dealing with the rudiments of the English
language within the required law school curriculum. Language is a lawyers principle stock in trade, one can only learn from
ideas and he can only deal with them through the medium of language. The burden exists because of a language deficiency
barrier.
2. Areas in Need of More Effective Communication Training
A lawyer is a professional in versatility. The importance of a lawyer is to express himself clearly and cogently, both orally and
in writing. The penultimate and ultimate end of all law is the quest and attainment of justicehuman justices.
Human justice oftentimes has a penumbral and elusive quality. There may be additional hidden elements working beneath the
surface of a factual situation not entirely exposed to ordinary probing and humanly infinite powers of discernment. We may be
able to sense these unknown elements intuitively, but we are unable to express them due to the lack of language mastery in its
broadest sense. Due to this inability, the goal we seek is not attained.
Greater emphasis on expanded language techniques and mastery in the following areas of legal communication:
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a. Interviewing
This area is important because of the fact that a case begins when it is brought into a lawyers office and the lawyer has to make
the initial decision of what to do about it and how to prod the inert wheels of justice into movement. When the case has found
that way into the office there is less sterile pedantry, an act of making a tedious show of dull learning, about what is or is not the
law and a more serious quest for whatever can aid the lawyer to cope with his problems. The inadequacies in the lawyers grasp
of the language may invite failure in his duty to represent his client competently. The direct or subtle nuances of the interview
can well make or break its final outcome.
The failure of a lawyer to competently represent his client is often due to: (a) dulled linguistic habits, (b) inadequate command,
and (c) unskilled use of language in relation to the problem at hand. Language habits have too much dulled our living potentials,
have blocked our awareness too much of what we are and what we are about. Conducting a skillful interview involves both the
psychological and neuro-psychiatric aspects, or the conscious and unconscious respectively, of the psyche.
b. Counseling
The lawyer may be viewed as an omniscient, all-knowing and infinitely wise adviser of human beings concerning their
multifarious every day social and economic problems. The problems that lawyers encounter as counselors-at-law are primarily
problems not of law but of human relations.
Being an effective counselor involves (a) solid grounding in the law, (b) a psychological insight, and most importantly, (c) a
mastery of language and techniques to assure the merging and proper application of law and insight to the problem at hand.
Words are the indispensable tools of the lawyers craft.
Judge Vanderbilt enumerates the elements of the basic ingredients always present in the work of the counselor and advocate: (a)
assembling and marshaling or facts, (b) application thereto of the principles of law dealing with human nature in a wide variety,
giving consideration to the economic, political, and social environment of each transaction coming up for consideration, (c)
reasoning back and forth with respect to all four of these types of material, and (d) use of understandable and convincing
English, both oral and written.
c. Advocacy
The primary task of the advocate is to persuade the court of tribunal to his view of the law and the facts of his clients cause.
The adversary system of jurisprudence purports that (a) it is the duty of the lawyer as advocate to convince the court of the
justice and fairness which preponderate in his clients favor, (b) he must induce the court to believe something so that it will act
in accordance to with he believes, and (c) he must influence by argument, advice, entreaty and expostulation.
The function of an advocate is not to ascertain the truth, but to present from one side of the case all that be usefully and properly
said in order, that when compared with what is presented from the other side of the case, the tribunal may distinguish from what
side the truth really lies.
The facile and persuasive command of English is where the advocacy will likely be successful.
d. Negotiation
Like advocacy, negotiation requires persuasion, possibly in a gentle and more delicate form. A firm grasp of the language
provides the arsenal needed.
The process of adjustment of existing differences, with a view to the establishment of a mutually more desirable legal relation by
means of barter and compromise of legal rights and duties of economic, psychological, social and other interests.
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This, therefore, involves personal skills and insights as well as, personal behavior in terms of poise, assurance and mobility, and
that these must be conveyed by the proper voice and manner.
e. Drafting
Drafting is the most important and major part of a lawyers professional activity. One appellate court said that the greater, more
responsible and delicate part of a lawyers work is in drafting of instruments, creating trusts, formulating contracts and drawing
wills and negotiations. All require legal knowledge and power of adaptation of the highest order.
Legal draftsmanship is basically concerned with words and/or language technique. In drafting documents, one needs to state the
facts accurately and communicate ideas precisely.
In conclusion, language should be taught with equal parity with the other legal subjects in law school.
III.
ASSIGNED CASES:
CARINO V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 96681. DECEMBER 2, 1991
FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers went on mass concerted actions to highlight their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of public authorities (DECS) to act upon grievances which had been repeatedly brought to its attention. The Education
Secretary issued an order directing them to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal, and directing DECS officials to
initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. The mass actions continued,
hence the teachers were administratively charged, preventively suspended and temporarily replaced.
Later, the respondent teachers filed their worn statements with the CHR, complaining that they were dismissed without
notice and cause. DECS prayed for the dismissal of the case stating as grounds therefor, that the complaint states no cause of
action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CHR MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF CASES INVOLVING THE REVIEW OR
MODIFICATION OF A DECISION OR ORDER ISSUED BY A COURT OF JUSTICE OR GOVERNMENT AGENCY
EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner, stating that the CHR had no such power, and that the
Fundamental Law did not mean for it to be another court or quasi-judicial agency, or even duplicate or take over the functions of
the latter. The most that it can do is to investigate, that is, to receive evidence and make findings of fact regarding human rights
violations. Having merely the power to investigate, it cannot and should not adjudicate or try and resolve the merits of the case.
Whether or not the Education Secretary committed errors, such may be determined by himself, then by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually by the Supreme Court.
FRANSISCO, JR. VS. NAMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC.
FACTS:
This is the case of the Davide Impeachment. Eighteen petitions were filed all in all which culminated to this case. On
June 2, 2003, a first impeachment complaint was filed against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide and 7 other associate justices of
the SC for culpable violation of the Constitution, Betrayal of public trust and other high crimes by Joseph Estrada as endorsed
by Reps Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen. Such complaint was later on referred to the House Committed on Justice, which
dismissed the complaint ruling that it was sufficient in form but insufficient in substance. Later, a second impeachment
complaint was filed against Chief Justice Davide, endorsed by Reps. Teodoro and Funtabella and signed by at least one-third of
all the members of the House of Representatives.
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Meanwhile, Section 3(5) of Article 11 of the Constitution bars a second impeachment complaint against an impeachable
officer (Justices of SC, Members of Constitutional Commissions, President, VP, Ombudsman), while Sections 16 and 17 of the
internal rules of the House of Representatives bars a second impeachment complaint only when there is a proper initiation of the
complaint, in this case, when the House Committee on Justice has declares that the complaint is sufficient in substance
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 16 AND 17 OF THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ARE VALID?
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT IS BARRED UNDER THE SECTION 3(5) OF
ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
RULING:
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House of Impeachment Rules are unconstitutional for being incoherent with Section 3 of
Article 11 of the Constitution. According to the Commissioner Bernas (Fr. Bernas) of the 1987 Constitutional Commission,
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. Hence, the SC held that it is very clear that the framers of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution intended initiation to start with the filing of the complaint and not when the House Committee on Justice
declares the complaint to be sufficient in substance. Because of this, when the first impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide, Jr. was filed on June 2, 2003, that complaint is considered to be initiated, even though it was dismissed on Oct.
22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Being so, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide, Jr. is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
AGUIRRE, ET AL. V. AGUIRRE
15 AUGUST 1974
FACTS: Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin died leaving 500 hectares of unsurveyed land. These lands have a total of 3,000
fruit bearing coconut trees. The children of Leoncia and Luis Aguirre continued to receive the produce from the coconut lands
valued at 1,000 pesos per year. However, in 1955, Felipe Aguirre, Dominador Aguirre, Caridad Aguirre and Socorro Aguirre
proposed to divide the 1/6 share of the children of Leoncia and Luis, saying the same will be given to Cristeta Lamahang. The
spouses Leoncia and Luis did not agree to the proposed division.
Because of this, Felipe, Dominador, Caridad and Socorro did not give the 1/6 share to the children of Leoncia and Luis.
Consequently, Leoncia and Luis consulted a lawyer. The lawyer caused a complaint of partition and damages to be filed in the
Court of First Instance in Batangas.
For the trial, the lawyer charged the plaintiffs P5,000 as attorneys fees. Moreover, the P500 paid to the expert witness for his
time and photostatic materials.
The trial court rendered judgment for petitioners but made an award of damages equal to P5,000 for attorneys fees, P1000 as
actual damages, P2,000 as moral damages, P1,000 as exemplary damages, and P500 as the fee of the expert witness. .
The petitioners then raised the case to the Court of Appeals claiming that what was awarded was short of what they are entitled
under the law. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court, the petitioners then raised the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES WAS
MERELY P1,000.00
W/N THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO INTEREST FROM 1955 UP TO THE DATE OF THE JUDGMENT.
W/N THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN ADJUSTMENT IN THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BECAUSE
OF THE CHANGE IN THE PESO-DOLLAR RATE.
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RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court observed that the Court of Appeals ruled that the actual damages suffered by the petitioners amounted
to 1,000 yearly since 1955. However, the Court of Appeals simply said that the actual damages amounted to 1,000. This is
ambiguous because the 1,000 constitutes the yearly damages. The Court of Appeals did not rule on the total amount of actual
damages or the total number of years within which to apply the 1,000 pesos yearly damages considering that the damage
occurred for several years.
Although jurisprudence3 says that the dispositive4 part of the decision controls irrespective of what might appear in the opinion
part of the decision, a construction of the Court of Appeals judgment shows that the Court of Appeals really meant that the
damages suffered by the petitioners amounted to P1,000 yearly since 1955. Any argument to the contrary would be flimsy and
purely technical. Consequently, such a view would sacrifice substantial justice over technicalities.
However, the Supreme Court mentioned that such a simple case does not have to reach the Supreme Court. A simple motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals would have corrected the error. Nevertheless, delays in the administration of justice
could be avoided if greater care were taken in the drafting of the dispositive portions of decisions which in truth constitute the
very essence thereof.
YES. Petitioners also assign as error the failure of the Court of Appeals to sentence defendants to pay them interests and costs.
The Supreme Court, again found merit in this contention. They are entitled to interest at the legal rate from the date of the
judgment of the trial court, (Sec. 8, Rule 51., Civil Code) and to costs (Sec. 1, Rule 142, Civil Code).
NO. Anent the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to corresponding adjustment of the amounts granted to them as a result
of the rise in the rate of dollar exchange of the peso, the Supreme Court was of the considered opinion that the facts extant in the
Court of Appeals was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court, with the modification that the amount of actual damages
awarded petitioners should be P1,000 annually from 1955 and the respondents shall pay interest on all the amounts adjudged
against them at the legal rate from the date of the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court also adjudged the respondents
liable for the costs incurred in the course of the trial.
PEOPLE v. MALMSTEDT
19 JUNE 1991
FACTS: Police officers set up a checkpoint after receiving reports that a foreigner from Sagada was transporting prohibited
drugs. After a few hours, the bus carrying the accused was stopped. The police officers noticed a bulge on the waist of
Malmstedt and asked for his passport. When the accused failed to comply, the police officer asked him to bring out what was
bulging on his waist. The bulge turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. When the accused was asked to alight from the bus
he got his two bags which contained a teddy bear each. It was only thereafter that the accused produced his passport.
The accused was then brought to the police headquarters where the teddy bears were cut up and found to contain hashish.
ISSUE: W/N THE SEARCH WAS VALID.
RULING: YES. The search was incidental to a lawful arrest where a crime was actually being committed. Under the
circumstances of the case, there was probable cause for the NARCOM officers to believe that the accused was then and there
committing a crime. The receipt of information that a foreigner coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and
the failure of the accused to produce his passport gave rise to probable cause.
Dissenting Opinion. Narvasa. The search is illegal because the law requires that there first be a legal arrest before a search of the
body and the belongings of the accused may licitly be made. In this case, it was in fact the illegal possession that retroactively
established probable cause.
3
4
JURISPRUDENCE: case law or the body decisions promulgated by the Supreme Court.
DISPOSITIVE: basically, the final decision in a case, it is found at the end, and normally starts with wherefore..
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CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYEH, INC. V. CITY OF HEILAEAH
508 US 520
FACTS: Petitioner church and its congregates practice the Santeria religion, which employed animal sacrifice as one of its
principal forms of devotion. The animals were killed by cutting their carotid arteries, and were cooked and eaten following all
the Santeria rituals except healing and death rites. After the church leased land in respondent city and announced plans to
establish a house of worship and other facilities there, the city council held an emergency public session and passed among
others Resolution 87-66, which noted residents concern over religious practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,
and declared the citys commitment to prohibiting such practices. Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated the Florida animal
cruelty laws, broadly punished whoever . . . unnecessarily or cruelly . . . killed animals. It has been interpreted to reach
killings for religious reasons. More ordinances were passed defining sacrifice, prohibiting animal sacrifices and limiting
slaughter of animals to slaughterhouses.
ISSUE: W/N THE ORDINANCES VIOLATED THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
HELD: YES. The Court reversed the lower courts decision, concluding that the laws in question were enacted contrary to the
free exercise principles, thus void. The Court noted that under the Free Exercise Clause, laws that burden religious practice do
not have to be justified by a compelling governmental interest if they are (1) neutral and (2) of general applicability.
The text and operation of the laws in question demonstrate that they were not neutral, but had as their object the suppression of
Santerias central element: animal sacrifice. Moreover, they were gerrymandered with care to disallow the Santerian practices,
but to allow almost all other animal killings. They also suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their
stated ends.
The laws pursue the city governments interests only against the conduct motivated by religious belief, and thereby violate the
requirement that laws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability. Some ordinances were found by the Court to
be underinclusive with regard to the citys interest in preventing cruelty to animals since they were drafted with care to forbid
few animal killings, those occasioned by religious sacrifice, while other types of animal killings were not prohibited. They were
also considered underinclusive with regard to the citys public health interests in preventing the disposal of animal carcasses in
open public places and the consumption of uninspected meat since the laws do not address non-religious conduct.
The Smith Standard, that is, that laws must be narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted governmental interests, was not met
by the laws in question. They were underinclusive in various respects because the objectives were not pursued with parallel nonreligious conduct, which could have burdened religion to a far lesser degree. Thus, the interests given cannot be considered
compelling.
DOUGHERTY V. EVANGELISTA
24 NOVEMBER 1906
FACTS: The defendant borrowed 2,000 pesos from the Roman Catholic bishop of the diocese of Nueva Segovia, for which he
gave a receipt, not mentioning the bishop but stating that the money was from the funds of the Confradia de las Animas of the
Cathedral of Vigan, and providing that it should be repaid with 6% interest. At the expiration of a year, the first installment of
interest not being paid, the defendant signed a document acknowledging the further advance to him by the bishop of the amount
thereof, 120 pesos to be added to the pre-existing loan from the funds of the confradia. He now contests the right of the plaintiff,
as the Roman Catholic bishop of the diocese, to recover the money loaned by his predecessor in office, claiming that the
administration of the funds of confradia does not rest with the bishop. Judgment was rendered upon default of the defendant to
serve his answer after his demurrer had been overruled.
ISSUE:
W/N THE PRESENT BISHOP CAN RECOVER THE MONEY LOANED.
W/N EVIDENCE SHOULD BE RECEIVED AS TO THE VALUE IN PHILIPPINE MONEY OF THE CURRENCY
LOANED.
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RULING:
YES. In the case of Barlin v. Ramirez, the bishop held the finds as the administrator of the confradia. His functions as
administrator passed to his successor.
STARE DECISIS. In view of the decision in Gaspar v. Molina, the Court concluded that it would be futile to determine
whether Sec. 3 of Act No. 1045 applies to a contract not in terms expressly providing for payment in any particular kind of
currency.
HELVERING v. HALLOCK
309 US 106
Before stating the facts of the case, it would be helpful if the cases discussed by the Supreme Courtwhich served as the
springboard in analyzing the cases at benchbe tackled first. The first case was Klein v. US; in this case, the decedent conveyed
property to his wife, made a settlement wherein certain conditions were set. Among the conditions was a provision, which states
that if the wife dies first, the property would revert back to the grantor-settlorthe decedent. On the other hand, if the grantor
dies first, the wife gets the property. The taxpayer in that case claimed that the decedent merely reserved a possibility of
reverter. In other words, the conveyance should not be considered as included in the taxable estate. The Supreme Court in that
case held otherwise. It ruled that the death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended event, which effected the
transmission from the dear to the living, thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and justifying the tax imposed. The next cases
were the St. Louis Trust Cases (Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., and Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co.), which had substantially the
same circumstances as those obtaining in Klein v. US. On the strength of the Klein case, the Commissioner included the
conveyed interests in the taxable estates because in all three situations, the result and effect were the same. The event, which
gave to the beneficiaries a dominion over property, which they did not previously have, was the donors death. The Supreme
Court ruled for the taxpayer and against the Commissioner. The St. Louis Trust cases involved varying forms of words in the
creation of the settlements. These cases were thus excluded from the applicability of the Klein doctrine.
Four members of the Court in that case saw no difference, reiterating the argument that the operative event was still the death of
the donor, thus making the trust property taxable. The majority, on the other hand, claimed that the grantor had a mere
possibility of reverter. And all that the grantors death amounted to was the rendering of the said reverter into an utter
impossibility.
FACTS: The first case (Helvering v. Hallock) involved a separation agreement which created a trust, the income of which was
given to the wife of the deceased. Again, the conditions set in the agreement are similar to those given in the aforecited cases. If
the wife dies first, the trust fund is to be delivered back to the husband. If, on the other hand, the husband dies first, payment and
delivery is to be made to the husbands son and daughter. The husband died and was survived by his divorce wifethe life
beneficiary. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trust instrument had conveyed the whole interest of the decedent,
leaving him nothing except a mere possibility of reverter.
The second case (Rothensies v. Huston) involved an ante-nuptial agreement wherein the deceased conveyed property in trust, the
income to be paid to his prospective wife during her life. The conditions were that if the said prospective wife were to die ahead
of the settlor, the principal and the accumulated income should be delivered to the settlor. If the marriage should subsist and the
settlor dies first, the principal and the accumulated income shall go to the wife. The wife outlived her husband. The Circuit Court
of Appeals deemed Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co. controlling against the inclusion of the trust property in the gross estate.
The last case (Bryant v. Helvering), the settlor provided for the payment of the trust income to his wife during her lifetime and
upon her death to the settlor himself, if he should survive her. The wife survived the husband. The Board of Tax Appeals
allowed the Commissioner to include in the decedents gross estate only the value of a vested reversionary interest which,
according to the Board, the grantor had reserved to himself. (This decision could be considered as partly favorable to the
Commissioner). The taxpayer appealed, but the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the Boards determination.
ISSUE:
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W/N TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY INTER VIVOS5, MADE IN TRUST, ARE WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1926, IN OTHER WORDS, W/N THE TRANSFERRED PROPERTY SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE GROSS ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FOR TAXATION PURPOSES
TAKING NOTE OF THE DISTINCTIONS PURPORTEDLY ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE KLEIN AND ST.
LOUIS TRUST CASES, W/N THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS COMPELS THE SUPREME COURT TO
ACCEPT THE SAID DISTINCTIONS
W/N WANT OF SPECIFIC CONGRESSIONAL REPUDIATION OF THE ST. LOUIS TRUST CASES
PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM RE-EXAMINING ITS OWN DOCTRINES
RULING: YES. The Court upheld the doctrine espoused in the Klein case, which rejected formal distinctions with regard to the
law on real property. The statute seeks to tax even transfers inter vivos that are too much akin to testamentary dispositions.
NO. It is a recognized principle that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in
law, and is rooted in the psychological need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves
collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.
NO. To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative
unrealities. Congress may not have had its attention directed to an undesirable decision; and there is no indication that as to the
St. Louis Trust cases that id had. Moreover, the Court has, from the very beginning, rejected a doctrine of disability at selfcorrection.
J. M. TUASON v. MARIANO
23 OCTOBER 1978
FACTS: Manuela and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, wherein they
prayed that they be declared the owners of a certain parcel of land. They claimed that the land was acquired by their father by
Spanish title.
The Aquials alleged that J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon the land. They further alleged that the land in
question had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735, and was registered in the names of the petitioners
Tuason. The Aquials also claimed that the TCT were issued to defendants J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc., University of the
Philippines and the National Waterworks and Sewerage System (NAWASA).
The Aquials prayed that OCT NO. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land
registration proceedings. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The lower court denied the motion.
ISSUE: W/N OCT NO.735 AND THE TITLES DERIVED THEREFROM CAN BE QUESTION AT THIS LATE
HOUR BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
RULING: NO. The Court noted that the supposed irregularities in the land registration proceedings were the same issues raised
in the civil cases decided by Judge Eulogio Mencias. In those case, Judge Mencias ruled that OCT NO.735 was invalid. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, that decision was reveresed, and the validity of OCT NO.735 was once more upheld.
The Court underscored the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere. The holding of the courts that OCT NO.735
is valid should no longer be open to attack.
INTER VIVOS: Within the lifetime
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EBRALINAG v. DIVISION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
1 MARCH 1993
FACTS: The petitioners are composed of elementary and high school student from various public and private schools in Cebu
and are represented by their parents. These students, members of the Jehovahs witness religion, were expelled from their
respective schools for their refusal to participate in the flag ceremony. The respondents actions were in compliance with
Republic Act No. 1256 and Department Order No. 8 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, requiring participation
in the flag ceremony.
The members of the Jehovahs Witness religion believe that the flag is an image or idol, and that the flag ceremony was a form
of worship. Therefore, to participate in the flag ceremony would be contrary to their religious beliefs.
The same issue was raised in the precedent case, Gerona v. Secretary of Education, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
expulsion of the Jehovahs Witnesses from their schools for non-compliance with the law is not a violation of religious freedom,
explaining that the flag is only a symbol of national sovereignty.
The petitioners stressed that although they do not take part in the flag ceremony, they do not engage in any disruptive behavior
that may offend their countrymen who do participate.
ISSUE: W/N THE STUDENTS WERE VALIDLY EXPELLED.
RULING: NO. The Court re-examined the Gerona case and ruled that compelling one to take part in the flag ceremony would
undermine ones constitutional rights, specifically the Free Exercise Clause. The Court likewise explained the twofold aspect of
religious freedom, namely (1) the absolute freedom to believe as long as such is limited within the realm of thought, and (2) the
freedom to act on ones belief, which may be regulated. It underscored the rule that the only justification for restraint is the
existence of clear and present danger, both grave and imminent, which is of serious evil to public interest.
In the present case, the Court held that the Jehovahs Witnesses non-participation in the flag ceremony in no way poses a clear
and present danger to society. Therefore, restraint on the part of the government would be unjustified. Moreover, the petitioners
right to quality education, as granted by the 1987 Constitution, was likewise violated by effecting the expulsion of the students.
JOHNSON v. TEXAS
509 US 350
FACTS: The petitioner, then nineteen (19) years of age, and his companion, Amanda Miles, robbed Allsups convenience store
after having killed the only employee present during that time, Jack Huddleston. A few weeks after, the petitioner was arrested
of a subsequent robbery and attempted murder of a store clerk in Colorado City. He confessed to the murder of Jack Huddleston
and the robbery of Allsups. He was tried and convicted for capital murder.
After the jury determined that the petitioner was guilty of capital murder, a separate punishment phase of the proceedings was
conducted in which the petitioners sentence was determined. Pursuant to the Texas capital sentencing statute then in effect, the
trial court instructed the jury that it was to answer (2) special issues: (1) Was the conduct of the defendant committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result? and, (2) Is there a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society?
A unanimous jury answered the two issues in the affirmative, and the trial court sentenced the petitioner to death, as required by
law. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Five days after the state court ruling,
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh. A motion for rehearing was filed by the petitioner arguing that the
special issues did not allow for adequate consideration of his youth. Citing Penry, the petitioner claimed that a separate
instruction should have been given that would have allowed the jury to consider petitioners age as a mitigating factor.
ISSUE: W/N PENRY COULD APPLIED TO THE PRESENT CASE.
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RULING: NO. The Texas law under which the petitioner was sentenced has been the principal concern of previous decisions.
The Court noted that the Texas system satisfied the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments concerning the
consideration of mitigating evidence. In Penry, the condemned prisoner had presented mitigating evidence of his mental
retardation and childhood abuse. The Court, in that case, ruled that the jury instruction were too limited for the appropriate
consideration of this mitigating evidence. The Court noted that the evidence in that case suggested Penrys mental retardation
rendered him unable to learn from his mistakes. As a consequence, the Court decided that the mitigating evidence was relevant
to the second special issuethat of future dangerousnessonly as an aggravating factor because it suggests a yes answer to
the question of whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society. The Court concluded that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penrys
mental retardation and childhood abuse by declining to impose the death penalty.
But unlike in the case of Penry, the present case shows that there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have found
itself foreclosed from considering the relevant aspects of the petitioners youth. The Court held that as long as the mitigating
evidence is within the effective reach of the sentencer, the requirements of the Eighth Amendment are satisfied.
The Court likewise held that, notwithstanding the fact that the case of Penry remains to be the law, the evidence of the
petitioners youth nonetheless falls outside Penrys ambit. Unlike Penrys mental retardation which rendered him unable to learn
from his mistakes, the ill effects of youth are subject to change and, as a result, are readily comprehended as a mitigating factor
in consideration of the second special issue.
MORALES V. PAREDES
29 OCTOBER 1930
FACTS: The Gavinos applied for the registration of a parcel of land. The application was granted and a decision to that effect
was rendered. Baltazar Morales now claims to be the owner of the land, but he was not advised of the registration proceedings
and was not informed therof until nearly three months have passed.
Morales moved for a reconsideration of the decision which approved the application of the Gavinos. Pending resolution of his
motion for reconsideration, Morales brought the present action to the Supreme Court praying that the aforementioned decision
be set aside and that a new trial be granted.
ISSUE: W/N MORALES COULD BE GRANTED RELIEF CONSIDERING HIS COURSE OF ACTION.
RULING: NO. The proper remedy is to petition for a review under the Land Registration Act. The plaintiff contends that such
review cannot be had until the final decree has been issued, as indicated in the case of Plurad v. Alcaide.
The Court held that such a contention runs counter to the view it adopted in the case of Rivera v. Moran. There, the Court held
that although the wording of Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on grounds
of fraud must be filed within one year after entry of the decree, such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and that
what it means would have been better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented before the expiration of one
year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for
requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud.
Moreover, the indication made in the case of Plurad v. Alcaide that there can be no review until the final decree has been issued
is only an obiter dictum and was not voted upon by the Court; the determination of the case rested on other grounds and the
dictum was not taken into consideration by the Court as a whole. A dictum not necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of
an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such.
DELTA MOTORS CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS
24 JULY 1997
FACTS: The State Investment House, Inc. won a case for a sum of money against Delta Motors. However, Delta Motors was
dissolved and was taken over by the Philippine National Bank. A writ of execution was issued, but it was contested by Delta
Motors because it was not properly served on them. Delta then filed for a Notice of Appeal which was dismissed, and then
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subsequently an Omnibus Motion to assail the validity of the writ of execution. In the Resolution denying the Omnibus Motion,
the Court of Appeals made an obiter dictum which State Investment House, Inc. prayed to be deleted. The obiter in this instance
being pending receipt of the final copy of the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N OBITER SHOULD BE DELETED.
RULING: An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a
cause, by the way, that is incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not
binding as precedent.
It touches upon a matter not raised by petitioner expressly in its petition assailing the dismissal of its notice of appeal. It was not
a prerequisite in his disposing of the aforementioned issue. An obiter is not necessary to the decision of the case before it and
cannot be considered binding for the purpose of established precedent.
VITA UY LEE v. COURT OF APPEALS
28 NOVEMBER 1975
FACTS: Ignacio Simeon obtained a parcel of land in 1935. When he and his wife died, a deed of extrajudicial partition of their
properties was executed by their heirs Deogracias and Emiliano. Deogracias was granted Lot No. 1 while Emiliano got Lot No.
2. However, the certificate covering the said lots could not be found, and was therefore described simply as Homestead No.
82945. On 30 January 1957, Emiliano agreed to sell his land to Vita Uy Lee. Lees husband, Henry, asked for a copy of the
extrajudicial partition executed in 1947, and a certification that the original certificate of title of the said lots could not be found.
Eventually, Emiliano Simeon executed a deed of sale of Lot No. 2 in favor of Henry and Vita Uy Lee. The day after the sale,
Vita Uy Lee filed for her own application for free patent over Lot No. 2 with the Bureau of Lands, but was denied. The Lees
sought registration of the lots under their names, and was acted upon by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. However, before the
final decree could be issued, the court discovered that the property was already patented and therefore decided to set aside its
prior decision.
Emiliano and Deogracias Simeon were granted a substitute owners duplicate copy of their properties since they have lost their
copies during the early period of the American liberation. Lees lawyer prepared a document affirming the sale of Lot No. 2 to
Vita Uy Lee. Thus, the Original Certificate of Title #732 was renamed Transfer Certificate of Title #57272. Later the same day,
the certificate was renamed TCT#57279, in the name of Vita Uy Lee, subject to the provisions of the Public Land Act.
Emiliano Simeon eventually changed his mind and decided to repurchase the land he had lost to Vita Uy Lee, which, according
to CA141, he had the right to do so. On 14 June 1960, Simeon sent a letter of demand to Vita Uy Lee, telling her that he desired
to repurchase the land, requesting her to respond within 5 days upon receipt of the letter. No response was received. On 3
Novermber 1960, another letter was given to Lee, but again she did not respond. A third letter, dated 24 June, 1961 reiterated the
demand, warning her to respond within 5 days, or else the case will be brought to court. Although Lee did not respond, the
lawyer of Simeon failed to take any court action. Thus, he decided to terminate his lawyers services and obtain a new lawyer.
On 2 May 1962, the new lawyer wrote a letter stating Simeons intention to repurchase the land. Lee broke her silence but
argued that Simeon no longer possessed the right to repurchase the land since the 5-year period had already elapsed.
The issue was brought to court, which ruled in favor or Simeon. The Lees were ordered to resell the property. They eventually
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the CA, affirmed the lower court.
The Lees contend that it is not sufficient for the vendor to inform the vendee that the former intends to redeem the property
sold. The vendor must also, at the same time offer to pay the price. Moreover, they argue that the 5-year period had already
elapsed. Thus the vendor no longer had the right to redeem the property sold.
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On the other hand, the Simeons (and the CA) contend that the first three letters of demand to repurchase were sent to Vita Uy
Lee before the lapse of the 5-year period. These letters have preserved the right of the Simeons to repurchase the property. They
likewise argue that since Vita had not answered any of the letters, the tender of payment was rendered unnecessary.
ISSUE: W/N THE LETTERS SENT HAVE PRESERVED THE RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.
RULING: NO. The letters which were given within the 5-year period did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. It was
necessary for the vendor to offer payment for the property. According to the Court, Lees silence was justified since there no
offer of payment. The 5-year period had already elapsed. The action was taken only on 25 June, 1965, eight years after the deed
of sale was executed.
GERONA, ET. AL. VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET. AL.
AUGUST 12, 1959
FACTS: In 1955, the Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8, which presents the rules and regulations for
conducting the compulsory daily flag ceremony in all educational institutions (all public and private schools). The petitioners
children (Gerona), attended the Buenavista Community School in Masbate. Being members of Jehovahs Witness, the
petitioners children refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the
requirement of Department Order No. 8. They deem that the flag ceremony is against their belief that they should only pay
tribute to the Jehovah God and not to the state. As a result, the children were expelled for failing to comply with the school
requirements. The petitioners wrote to the Secretary of Education, praying for the reinstatement of their children and for their
exemption from the flag ceremony routine. The Secretary of Education did not grant these requests. The petitioners then
proceeded to court, asserting that Department Order No. 8 is invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 8 (THE REQUIRED PARTICIPATION IN THE FLAG
CEREMONY) VIOLATES THE PETITIONERS RIGHTS (SPECIFICALLY, THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
RELIGIOUS BELIEF).
RULING: NO. The flag ceremony has absolutely nothing to do with religion. It is not an imposition of state-worship. It is a
non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all citizens regardless of their faith. The flag ceremony aims to develop civic
values of patriotism, unity and love of country in school children. An individual may not excuse himself from the laws of the
state on the grounds of his personal belief because in effect, this would permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. The
rules of the state are there to act as reins on the exercise of religious beliefs so that all citizens could live in harmony.
The expulsion of the children from school is not even a form of punishment. For refusing to pay homage to the flag, they merely
lost the benefits of public education. They refused to acknowledge the authority of the state; the same state that makes it possible
for them to study in Buenavista Community School. The children simply forfeited their right to attend public schools.
In addition, exempting the petitioners children from the flag ceremony would only disrupt school discipline and demoralize the
rest of the school population.
Separate Opinion: Justice Barrera concurs that there is no clear offense to the Constitution because the only thing that the
petitioners suffer is the inability to continue studying in a public school. The petitioners were not forced to stay and participate
in the flag ceremony and they were not threatened with sanctions.
HOLY SEE V. ROSARIO
1 DECEMBER 1994
FACTS: Msgr. Domingo Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of the Holy See and the Philippine Realty Corporation, agreed to sell to Ramon
Licup, three (3) parcels of land (Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D) on the condition that earnest money of P100,000 be paid to sellers, and
sellers clear said lots of occupying squatters. Earnest money was paid. Licup then assigned the property rights to Starbright Sales
Enterprises. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money in full as squatters refused to vacate the lots.
Starbright Sales Enterprises then found out that Msgr. Cirilos resold the lots to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation without their notice. The Title of the lots were already registered to Tropicana. Starbright demanded for the
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annulment of the Deed of Sale between Msgr. Cirilos and PRC, and between Tropicana, reconveyance of the lots, specific
performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owner of the lots, plus damages.
The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the complaint. Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 denied the motion of petition,
as well as the motion for reconsideration, finding that the Holy See shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into the
business contract in question.
A motion for intervention was filed by the Department of Foreign Affairs claiming the diplomatic immunity of the Holy See.
ISSUE: W/N THE HOLY SEE ENJOYS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
RULING: YES. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving State, necessary for the
creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
The Holy See claimed it acquired said lots for the site of its mission. Starbright Sales failed to dispute this claim. In Art. 31(a) of
the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over
any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on
behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more
reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
It is also the duty of the court to accept the claim of the DFA that the embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic
mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities
of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country, so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the
countrys foreign relations.
Starbright Sales is not left without legal remedy for a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign. It may ask
its own government to espouse its cause through diplomatic channels as stated under both Public International Law and
Transnational Law.
SEC. OF JUSTICE V. LANTION
17 OCTOBER 2000
FACTS: On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and
other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged with
election-related crimes including election contributions in name of another and fraud.
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1,
1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers.
ISSUE: W/N THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT WERE VIOLATED.
RULING: NO. Although there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage,
it is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.
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The evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which
are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation
of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement. In
essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had
occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments,
there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the
right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with
copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample
time to evaluate said documents.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V. QUISUMBING
1 JUNE 2000
FACTS: The International School, pursuant to PD732 hires both local and foreign employees, as its faculty. The School grants
foreign-hires certain benefits including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes among others. Besides this, foreign-hires
are paid a salary rate 25%more than the local-hires. The School justifies this because of the dislocation factor and the limited
tenure. Therefore, the compensation scheme is only to attract foreign-hires to enable the school to be competitive
internationally.
During the negotiations for the new collective bargaining agreement, the union International School Alliance of Educators
(ISAE) contested the difference in salary rates. This, plus the issue on whether the foreign-hires and the local-hires be included
in one bargaining unit, resulted in a collective bargaining deadlock.
Petitioner filed a notice of strike. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board failing to settle the issue, the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over the matter. The Secretary of DOLE upheld the justification of the
private respondent because the foreign-hires are hired to deal with the different cultures and nationalities within the student
population. Stating that, the point of hiring being a valid classification, the raising of the Equal Protection Clause would have to
fall.
ISSUE:
W/N THE DISPARITY IN SALARY IS JUSTIFIED.
W/N THE FOREIGN-HIRES SHOULD NOT BELONG TO THE SAME BARGAINING UNIT.
RULING: NO. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. The employer in this case has failed to discharge this
burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more effectively than local hires. Both groups have similar
functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The school cannot invoke the need to
entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal
work for equal pay.
While we recognize the need of the school to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice
of the local hires. For the same reason, the dislocation factor and the limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates. Such being adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by localhires.
YES. A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining
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unit are (1) the will of the employees, (2) compensation and working conditions, (3) prior collective bargaining history, and (4)
similarity of employment status.
It does not appear that the foreign-hires intend to be grouped with the local-hires, also, the collective bargaining history in the
School show that these groups were always treated separately. Compensation and working conditions considering the foreignhires limited tenure, and their grant of specific benefits related to their status as foreign-hires. Therefore, to include foreign-hires
in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION ET AL. VS GARAMENDI
JUNE 23, 2003
FACTS:
The petitioner (AIA) challenged the HVIRA (Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act) statute of the state of California because
this law required the insurers doing business in California to disclose all
policies sold by them or their related company between 1920 1945 or their state license will be revoked.
Meanwhile there has been a previous agreement between the US and Germany through the executive department (or president)
of the following:
a.
In case a German company was sued on a holocaust era claim, the US government would do the following
1.
Submit a statement that it would be in the country's foreign interest for the German Foundation Agreement to be the
exclusive forum and remedy for such claims.
2.
try to get state and local governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive mechanism.
b.
For insurance claims in particular, both countries agreed that the German foundation would work with the ICHEIC
(International Commision on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims)
ISSUE:
W/N THE HVIRA IS A VALID STATUTE OR LAW AND THAT THE
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE US AND GERMANY PREEMPTS HVIRA
RULING: The court ruled in favor of AIA stating that preemption turns not on the wisdom of the National government's policy
but to see if there is conflict between that and the state's policy. In this case there is clear conflict between HVIRA and the
executive agreements and the HVIRA law compromises the president's capacity to speak for the nation with one voice in dealing
with other governments to resolve claims arising out of WWII.
ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
JUNE 17, 1993
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ulep saw an advertisements of Legal Clinic, Inc. which he deemed as unethical, demeaning of the law profession,
and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
2. Respondent claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of legal support services through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SERVICES OFFERED BY RESPONDENT, THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. AS
ADVERTISED BY IT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW AND IN EITHER CASE, WHETHER THE SAME CAN
PROPERLY BE THE SUBJECT OF THE ADVERTISEMENTS HEREIN COMPLAINED OF.
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE PRACTICE OF LAW?
RULING:
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member
of the Philippine Bar, he is reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in the
proceeding will be dealt with more severely
The Court Restrain and Enjoin the Legal Clinic, Inc. from issuing or causing the publication and dissemination of any
advertisement in any from
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Ratio: (the Supreme Court asked the following to give their opinion of the matter)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services.
When the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of the law, there can be no choice
but to prohibit such a business
Philippine Bar Association:
the practice o flaw is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court
Philippine Lawyers Association:
1. the Legal clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. such practice is unauthorized
3. the advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral
4. the Hon. Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic
U.P. Women Lawyers Circle:
Lawyers are prohibited under the present code of Professional Responsibility from advertising
Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines:
In the case of In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar.
Federacion Internacional De Abogadas:
The person is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
1. the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem
2. the services performed are not customarily considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole
3. no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information
Code of Professional Responsibility states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08- a lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear
to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity
The representation and advising of a particular person in a particular situation is the essential of legal practice
The Legal Clinic is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
Blacks definition of the practice of law:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is no limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident of actions and special proceedings, conveyacing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
IN RE: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES
7 AUGUST 1957
This case prescribes the strict qualifications for remaining in the practice of law.
FACTS: Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery, and under Sec. 1 of Rule 128, of the
Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of his profession.
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In his written explanation, he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of the Supreme Court considering that he has 6 children to
support, the eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years old, who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be
taken against him. It was merely due to an error of judgment, which he honestly and sincerely deplores.
ISSUE: W/N ATTY. DE LOS ANGELES SHOULD BE DISBARRED.
RULING: YES. Under Sec. 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as
attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The reason behind the rule being that the continued possession
of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the result
that the loss of such qualifications justifies his disbarment. And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude,
this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of Atty. De los Angeles, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by
Sec. 25 of Rule 127.
NEILSON AND CO. v. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.
28 DECEMBER 1968
FACTS: On 30 January, 1937, the appellant Nielson entered into an agreement with the appellee Lepanto whereby, the former
would operate and manage the latters mines and mill for a period of five years, with a management fee of P2,000/month, and
10% share in the net profits. In the latter part of 1941, the parties agreed to renew the contract for another period of five years,
but the Pacific War broke out in December of 1941. In January of 1942, the operation of the mining properties was disrupted on
account of the war. In February of 1942, the mill and mines were destroyed upon orders of the United States Army, to prevent
their utilization by the invading Japanese Army. The Japanese forces thereafter occupied the mining properties, operated the
mines during the continuance of the war, and were ousted from the mining properties only in August of 1945.
Thereafter, Lepanto had the mining properties undergo reconstruction, which was completed in 1948. There was a disagreement
between Nielson and Lepanto as to the status of their contract which, as renewed, expired in 1947. Under the terms thereof, the
management contract shall remain in suspense in case a fortuitous event or force majeure6, such as a war or civil commotion,
adversely affects the work of mining and milling.
Both Nielson and Lepanto confirmedtacitly, at leastthat the contract was suspended on account of the war. The
disagreement was regarding the effect of said suspension. Neilson was of the belief that the contract was extended for such time
of the period of suspension. Lepanto, on the other hand, contended that the suspension did not have the effect of extending the
life of the contract. Thus, according to Lepanto, the contract should expire in 1947, as originally agreed upon, notwithstanding
the suspension.
ISSUES:
W/N THE MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN EXTENDED AS A RESULT OF THE WAR.
W/N THE RULE OF STARE DECISIS SHOULD BE APPLIED
W/N NIELSONS ACTION WAS BARRED BY LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.
RULING:
YES. In the construction and interpretation of a document, the intention of the parties must be sought. The Supreme Court ruled
that such intent was made manifest during the special meeting of the Board of Directors of Lepantoas evidenced by the
minutes of the meetingwherein it was intimated that there was a provision in the contract that the war had the effect of
suspending the agreement and that the effect of such suspension was that the agreement would have to be extended.
FORTUITOUS EVENT: Events that are unforeseeable or if foreseeable, is inevitable that affects the capacity of one to perform his obligation., Civil Code,
Art. 1174.
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NO. Lepanto cited three cases previously decided by the Supreme Court, 7 wherein it was held that the war does not have the
effect of extending the term of a contract. The rule of stare decisis is inapplicable. It cannot be invoked where there is no analogy
between the material facts of the decision or decisions relied upon and those of the intstant case. In all of the three cases cited by
Lepanto, there was no evidence at all regarding the intention of the parties to extend the contract in the event that it is suspended
by force majeure or fortuitous event. On the other hand, in the case at bar, the intent of the parties regarding such extension is
manifest in the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the contracting parties, as was previously discussed.
NO. In a previous case, the Supreme Court enumerated the elements of laches as follows:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in the ascertaining the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which bases
his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
The Supreme Court held that only the first element was present. As regards, the second element, the Court held that the delay or
Neilson was justified. Nielson claimed his right to the extension of the contract, by reason of which negotiations had taken place
for the settlement of the claim. It was only later that the claim was denied. Thus, the delay. The third element was likewise
wanting. It cannot be said that Lepanto did not know that Nielson would assert its rights on which it based its suit. The evidence
shows that Neilson had been claiming for some time its rights under the contract. Neither is the fourth element present, for if
there has been some delay in bringing the case to court, it was mainly due to attempts at arbitration and negotiation made by both
parties.
There was no prescription either. The Court held that Lepanto erred in claiming that the prescriptive period to be considered was
four years. The correct period was ten years.
STOGNER VS. CALIFORNIA
JUNE 26, 2003
FACTS: California has brought a criminal prosecution after expiration of the time periods set forth in previously applicable
statutes of limitations. A new law was created that permits resurrection of otherwise time-barred criminal prosecutions, and was
itself enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had expired. Provided that a victim has reported an allegation of abuse to the
police and there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victims allegations and the prosecution
has begun within one year of the victims report.
Thus, the law authorizes prosecution for criminal acts committed many years beforehand where the original limitations period
has expired as long as prosecution begins within a year of a victims first complaint to the police.
In 1998, petitioner Marion Stogner was charged with sex-related child abuse committed decades earlier between 1955 and 1973.
During the time the crime has been committed, the statute of limitations governing prosecutions had set forth a 3-year limitations
period. And that period had run 22 years or more before the present prosecution was brought.
Stogner moved for the complaints dismissal arguing that the Federal Constitutions Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of a
previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed that it was unconstitutional. However, the California Court of Appeal
reversed citing a recent contrary decision by the California Supreme Court (People vs. Frazer).
Stogner then moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that his prosecution is unconstitutional under both the Ex Post Facto
Clause and the Due Process Clause, Amendment 14. Trial court denied Stogners motion, and the Court of Appeal upheld that
denial. He was granted certiorari to consider Stogners constitutional claims. The two Ex Post Facto Clauses of the constitution
prohibit the federal government and the states from enacting laws with certain retroactive effects. Stogner was granted certiorari
to consider his constitutional claims8.
7
These cases are: Victoria Planters Asso. V. Victoria Milling Co., Rosario S. Vda. de Lacson, et al., v. Abelardo G. Diaz, and Lo Ching y So Young Choung
Co. v. Court of Appeals
8
Certiorari - A writ issue to annul or modify the proceedings, as the law requires of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, who has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Californias new statute forbidden by the Constitutions Ex Post Facto laws?
RULING: Yes. The Constitutions two Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibit the Federal Government and the States from enacting
laws with certain retroactive effects. The law at issue created criminal prosecutions that the passage of time had previously
barred. It was also enacted after prior limitations periods for Stogners alleged offenses had expired.
Three major reasons support this. First, the court long ago pointed out that the Clause protects liberty by preventing
governments from enacting statutes with manifestly unjust and oppressive retroactive effects. A constitution that permits such
an extension, by allowing legislatures to pick and choose when to act retroactively, risks both arbitrary and potentially vindictive
legislation, and erosion of the separation of powers.
Second, the kind of stature at issue falls exactly within the categorical descriptions of ex post facto laws set forth by Justice
Chase more than 200 years ago in Calder v. Bull supra. Chase divided the ex post facto laws into four categories.
1. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal;
and punishes such action. MAKING CRIMINAL, A NONCRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. INFLICTING A
PUNISHMENT UPON A PERSON NOT SUBJECT TO THAT PUNISHMENT
3. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. AGGRAVATING THE PUNISHMENT
4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
In relation to the second category, Californias new statute therefore aggravated Stogners alleged crime, or made it greater
than it was, when committed, in the sense that, and to the extent that, it inflicted punishment for past criminal conduct that,
when the new law was enacted, did not trigger any such liability. An act condoned by the expiration of the statute of
limitations is no longer a punishable offense. 9
Third, numerous legislators, courts, and commentators have long believed it well settled that the ex post facto clause forbids
resurrection of time-barred prosecution. Extension of existing limitations periods is not ex post facto provided, so long as,
because, if the prior limitations periods have not expired, that it suggests a presumption that revival of time-barred criminal
cases is not allowed.
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
SEPTEMBER 29 1989
FACTS: This is a petition which seeks the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional. The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of
responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. The
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N CHECKPOINTS CONSTITUTE UNREASONABLE SEARCH, THUS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
RULING: NO. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
9
H. Black American Constitutional Law
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True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
VALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA
overturned 1989 Valmonte case
24 MAY 1990
FACTS: Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of
checkpoints.
ISSUE: W/N CHECKPOINTS ARE WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND THEREFORE, VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION
RULING: It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at
all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional
circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are
in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the
situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
The routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without interruption", but it
cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required
to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and
the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search.
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped
and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and seizures accompanying
warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter.
Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by the military
manning the checkpoints.
Doctrine: It is not the police action per se which is impermissible and which should be prohibited but the procedure used or
methods which offend even hardened sensibilities.
COLUMBIA PICTURES v. COURT OF APPEALS
28 AUGUST 1996
FACTS: The complainants lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video
establishments in Metro Manila, including the private respondent Sunshine Home Video, Inc.
An application for search warrant was undertaken by NBI Senior Agent Lauro Reyes, whose affidavits and depositions were
taken. These were corroborated by two other witnesses. The search warrant sought for was duly issued. A search was conducted
by the NBI agents and, in the course of the search, they found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion
pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by the complainants, and machines, equipment, television sets, paraphernalia,
materials and accessories.
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A Motion to Lift Search Warrant was filed, but was later denied. Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration of the Order of
denial was filed. The court granted the said motion and justified it on the ground that the master tapes of the copyrighted films,
from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, were never presented.
This case eventually reached the Court of Appeals, which sustained the Order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration
of the petitioners was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
W/N PETITIONERS HAD THE LOCUS STANDI10 TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION IN PHILIPPINE COURTS.
W/N THE RULING IN 20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS MAY BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY TO THE PRESENT CASETHAT FOR THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES
INVOLVING VIDEOGRAMS, THE PRODUCTION OF THE MASTER TAPES FOR COMPARISON WITH THE
ALLEGEDLY PIRATED COPIES IS NECESSARY.
RULING:
NO. It ruled that any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in Philippine courts upon
any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. And even if the
foreign corporation concerned is without a license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no
capacity to bring an action in Philippine courts. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines.
It was noted by the Court that no general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes doing or
engaging in or transacting business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances.
The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or
enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. There was no
showing that, under existing statutory or case law, petitioners were doing, transacting, engaging in, or carrying on business in the
Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from Philippine courts. No evidence has been
offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to
conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
NO. The Court discussed the nature of judicial decisions by citing certain provisions of the Civil Code. Art. 4 provides that
(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Art. 8 of the same Code declares that (j)udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. As
regards Art. 8 of the Civil Code, the Court was quick to clarify that jurisprudence cannot be considered as an independent source
of law; it cannot create law. While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part
of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not law. Judicial decisions, though not law, are nonetheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are not part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Moreover, the Court said that, citing the case of People v. Jabinal, an interpretation upon a law by the Court constitutes a part
of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. But when a doctrine of the court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
The Court also explained what could be called the principle of prospective application. Citing the case of Spouses Benzoan v.
Court of Appeals, the Court said that the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested
or impairs the obligations of contracts and hence, unconstitutional. The same consideration underlies the Courts rulings giving
only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new
law but consists merely of construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one.
10
LOCUS STANDI: Proper standing in front of the Court
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The Court found merit in the petitioners contention that it was absurd to apply the formulation enunciated in the 20th Century
Fox ruling as regards the finding of probable cause, when such formulation was yet nonexistent. The 20th Century Fox case
which was promulgated on August 19, 1988could not have been considered by the lower court when it issued Search Warrant
87-053 in December of 1987, months before the promulgation of the 20th Century Fox ruling.
The formulation enunciated in the 20th Century Fox case should, at most, be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in
determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between
the master tape and the pirated copies. The Court held that the said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible
requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of
their parturition. Otherwise, a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the
reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
NBI Senior Agent Lauro Reyes, who filed an application for a search warrant, did testify on matters within his personal
knowledge based on the complaint filed by the petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of the private
respondents video rental shop. Moreover, Reyes testimony was corroborated by other witnesses for the prosecution. The Court
held that they displayed none of the ambivalence and uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This
categorical forthrightness in their statements, among others, was what initially and correctly convinced that trial court to make a
finding of the existence of probable cause.
It would be incorrect to suggest that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films is
always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Such auxiliary procedure does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary
evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence.
It is an established principleas enshrined in the 1987 Constitutionthat a showing of probable cause is a condition sine qua
non11 for the issuance of a search warrant. But it was observed by the Court that the term probable cause is exceedingly
difficult to define with any degree of precision. There is, in other words, no exact test in determining probable cause. In
Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
It was likewise noted by the Court that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to define probable cause,
obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the courts discretion within the particular facts of each case. A restriction of
the exercise of discretion by a judge adding a particular requirementthe presentation of master tapeswould serve no purpose
but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a courts prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of determining
probable cause to a mere ministerial or mechanical function.
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
19 AUGUST 1988
FACTS: The petitioner sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct searches and seizures in
connection with the latters anti-film piracy campaign. In its letter-complaint, the petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets
all over Metro Manila were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films, in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. These
applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Eventually, the desired search warrants were
issued.
11
SINE QUA NON: Indispensable requirement
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But acting on a Motion to Lift Search Warrants, the lower court issued an order lifting the warrants issued earlier. The petitioner
thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari likewise
filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N THE SEARCH WARRANTS WERE PROPERLY LIFTER BY THE JUDGE FOR WANT OF
PROBABLE CAUSE.
RULING: YES. Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provide that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause. This
constitutional guarantee is a time-honored precept, which circumscribes governmental action with regard to the procurement of a
search warrant.
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, the Court had occasion to define probable cause for a valid search as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It was likewise held by the Court
that this constitutional provision demands no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified in order to convince the judge, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the questioned search warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it acted
on the application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its
witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. The lower court ruled that there
was no probable cause that the private respondents violated PD No. 49. As found by the lower court, the NBI agents who acted
as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the
offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance
of the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were
pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his
testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application.
It was thus ruled that the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly
copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The court
cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of copyright infringement is the similarity or at least the substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the
copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased
evidence of the videotapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is unauthorized reproduction of the former. This
linkage of the copyrighted films to the probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve
as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Moreover, the Court ruled that the questioned warrants were in the nature of general warrants, against citing the case of Burgos,
Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, wherein the search warrants in question were declared void by the Supreme Court. The articles
described in the search warrantstelevision sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, and tape cleaners are articles which can be
found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out of video tapes
ANDERSONS GROUP V. COURT OF APPEALS
21 JANUARY 1997
FACTS: Private respondent Denate entered into an agency agreement with petitioner as its commission agent for the sale of
wines and liquors in Davao City, the three Davao provinces, and North Cotabato. Respondent filed in RTC of Davao City a
complaint against petitioners for not granting him his duly-earned commissions amounting to P882,107.95. A month later,
petitioner filed in the RTC of Kalookan City, a complaint alleging that private respondent owe it, P1,618,467.98 after deducting
commissions and remittances.
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Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint in Kalookan for there was already an action between the same
parties, for the same cause of action, in Davao City. Petitioner opposed such motion alleging that the RTC in Davao did not
acquire jurisdiction over the matter. The RTC dismissed the Motion stating that it had already acquired jurisdiction over the
matter because it had sent its summons earlier by 3 months than those that the RTC in Davao sent. Private respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court, the Court of Appeals however, set aside that decision.
ISSUE: W/N THE ACTION IN KALOOKAN BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUNDS OF LIS PENDENS.
RULING: YES. Lis pendens as a ground for dismissal of an action refers to that situation where another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action. To constitute lis pendens, it must appear that the parties in the two actions
are the same and there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought. Any judgment which may be rendered on
the other would amount res judicata on the other.
In the case at bar, the parties in the case in Davao and Kalookan are the same, suing each other for sums of money which arose
from a contract of agency. The relief prayed for and rights asserted are also the same. Res judicata would lie on the other case.
The Court also held that jurisdiction is acquired upon filing of the complaint, therefore the RTC in Davao City has acquired
jurisdiction, regardless if it was more lax in sending out its summons.
Litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. If a suit is pending, another one of the same matter is
deemed unnecessary and vexatious. It must be emphasized that litis pendentia does not require that the later case yield to the
earlier, the criterion used in determining which case should be abated is which is the more appropriate action.
In this case, the case is about sums of money collected in and around Davao City. Following the above criterion, the action in
Davao City should be sustained.
ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS
14 MAY 1997
FACTS: Sometime in 1971, the Islamic leaders of all Muslim major tribal groups in the Philippinesheaded by Dean Cesar
Adib Majulorganized and incorporated the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), the primary purpose of which is to
establish an Islamic Center in Quezon City for the construction of a Mosque (prayer place), Madrasah (Arabic School), and other
religious infrastructures, so as to facilitate the effective practice of the Islamic faith in the area.
In the same year, the Libyan government donated money to the IDP to purchase land at Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, to
be used as a Center for the Islamic populace. The land was covered by two (2) Certificates of Title, both registered in name of
IDP.
Again, in the same year, and pursuant to its Articles of Incorporation, the IDP formed its Board of Trustees, with former Senator
Mamintal Tamano being one of the members thereof. After the purchase of the Culiat property in 1972, Martial Law was
declared by then President Ferdinand Marcos, and so most of the members of the IDP Board of Trustees flew to the Middle East
to escape political persecution.
It was after this that two (2) Muslim groups emergedthe Carpizo group, headed by Engineer Farouk Carpizo, and the Abbas
Group, headed by Mrs. Zorayda Tamano and Atty. Firdaussi Abbasboth claiming to be the legitimate IDP. In a suit the ensued
between these groups, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) declared, thus
First, the elections of both the Carpizo Group and the Abbas Group are null and void for being violative of the
Articles of Incorporation of the IDP;
Second, corollary to the first, the Approved By-Laws that was certified to the SEC by the Abbas Group should
likewise be declared null and void, considering the fact that their election was, in itself, null and void;
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Third, before any election to the Board of Trustees may be conducted, there must be an approved by-laws that
would govern the internal government of the IDP, including the conduct of elections;
Fourth, the members of the IDP itself should prepare and adopt the by-laws for submission to the SEC. This is in
view of the fact that neither the Carpizo group nor the Abbas group is a legitimate representative of the IDP.
Logically, neither of them could submit an approved set of by-laws, let alone adopt the same.
Neither group was able to comply with the pertinent directive of the SEC, and so no valid election of the members of the Board
of Trustees of the IDP was ever conducted. The Carpizo group attempted to submit a set of by-laws, but the SEC found that
those who prepared and adopted the said by-laws were not bona fide members of the IDP, with the exception of Carpizo himself
and a certain Atty. Musib Buat.
This notwithstanding, the Carpizo group caused to be signed a Board resolution, purportedly by the IDP, authorizing the sale of
the two (2) parcels of land in Culiat to the private respondent Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), which sale was evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
a. The first case
On 31 May 1991, the petitioner hereinthe 1971 IDP Board of Trusteesheaded by former Senator Mamintal Tamano (the
Tamano group), filed a petition before the SEC seeking to declare the Deed of Absolute Sale signed betweeen the Carpizo group
and the INC as null and void, since the Carpizo group was not the legitimate Board of Trustees of the IDP.
b. The second case.
Meanwhile, INC filed an action for specific performance with damages against the Carpizo group before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City to compel the said group to clear the property of squatters and to deliver complete and full physical
possession thereof to INC. In the same case, INC filed a motion to compel a certain Mrs. Leticia P. Ligon to produce and
surrender the Register of Deeds of Quezon City the owners duplicate copy of the titles covering the parcels of land in question.
It was alleged that the parcels of land in question were mortgaged to Mrs. Ligon by two (2) person who, in turn, claimed to have
acted in behalf of the Carpizo group.
The Tamano group on the other hand, sought to intervene in this case, arguing among others, that
A case was filed with the SEC by the said Tamano group against the Carpizo group contesting the sale of the
land in question;
The Tamano group has a legal interest in the instant case; and
The said Tamano group is the duly constituted body which can lawfully and legally represent the IDP.
Meanwhile, the INC opposed this motion of the Tamano group on the ground that the issue being raised is an intra-corporate
dispute, which falls under the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Judge Celia Lipana-Reyes ruled on this case, thus
First, insofar as the motion of intervention of the Tamano group was concerned, she denied the said motion on
the ground that (1) the said Group lacked juridical personality and (2) the issues being raised by the Group were
intra-corporate in nature. Therefore, jurisdiction was with the SEC;
Second, insofar as the main case was concerned, she rendered a partial judgment ordering the Carpizo group to
comply with its obligation under the Deed of Sale of (1) clearing the lots in question of squatters, and of (2)
delivering the actual physical possession thereof to INC;
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Third, she issued an Order declaring INC as the rightful owner of the parcels of land in question;
Fourth, in the same Order aforementioned, she directed Mrs. Ligon to produce and/or surrender to INC the
owners copy of the titles to the land in question; and
Fifth, she amended the above mentioned Order and directed Mrs. Ligon to deliver the titles to the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, instead of INC.
c. Back to the first case
Meanwhileand this is where you guys are probably going to get fuckin vexedthe SEC rendered its Decision in the first
case, where it declared, thus
First, the by-laws submitted by the Carpizo group was unauthorized; therefore, null and void;
Second, the sale of the two (2) parcels of land in question was also null and void;
Third, the election of the Board of Directors of the IDP from 1986 to 1991 was likewise null and void; and
Fourth, the acceptance of the members of the Carpizo groupexcept Carpizo himself and Buatas members of
the IDP was also null and void.
This time, it was the INC that filed its own Motion for Intervention, but this was denied by the SEC, specifically because the
case decided by it had already become final and executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom.
INC went to the Court of Appeals vie special civil action for certiorari. Eventually, the Court of Appeals granted this petition to
INC, and declared the sale of the parcels of land to be valid.
Because of this, the Tamano group filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
d. Back to the second case
It should be recalled that Mrs. Ligon also filed her own petition for review, questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals in
the second case (Ligon v. Court of Appeals). The Supreme Court in that case ultimately decided to (1) deny the petition of Mrs.
Ligon and (2) affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
W/N THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LIGON V. COURT OF APPEALS
CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATE INSOFAR AS THE PRESENT PETITIONTHE WHICH WAS FILED BY
THE TAMANO GROUP QUESTIONING THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, DECLARING THE
SALE OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION TO BE VALID;
W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THAT PORTION
OF THE DECISION OF THE SEC WHICH DECLARED THE SALE IN QUESTION TO BE NULL AND VOID.
RULING: NO. The requisites for res judicata to apply simply do not obtain in the present case.
The Court discussed the dual aspect of res judicatai.e., bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment.
a. Bar by prior judgment
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There is bar by prior judgment when between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case where such
judgment was invoked, there is identity of (1) parties, (2) subject matter, and (3) cause of action. Where all these are present, the
judgment on the merits rendered in the first case would constitute an absolute bar to the subsequent action.
b. Conclusiveness of judgment
Where, between the first case wherein the judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment was invoked, there
is only identity of parties, but there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, but only as
those matters actually and directly contoverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein.
c. No bar by prior judgment in this case.
There is no bar by prior judgment in this case. Why? Because it is only with respect to the subject matter is there an identity
between the second caseLigon v. Court of Appeals.and the present petitionwhich is actually an off-shoot of the first case.
In the second case, the Tamano group merely participated therein as an intervenor. It was never originally a principal party
thereto. Intervention is not an independent action, but is merely collateral, accessory, or ancillary to the principal action. It is just
an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties.
The present case still involves the Tamano group, this time as a principal party, being the petitioner herein. Although it is true
that the second case was entitled Iglesia ni Cristo, plaintiff v. Islamic Directorate of the Philippines, Defendant, the IDP
cannot be considered a formal party thereto for the simple reason that it was not duly represented by a legitimate Board of
Trustees in that case. It should be noted that the second case was an action in personam12. Therefore, the second case did not
become final and executory insofar as the true IDP is concerned for the reason that it lacked legitimate representation, and was
thus effectively deprived of its day in court. Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciuntmatters adjudged in a
cause do not prejudice those who were not parties to it.
Moreover, the causes of action in the two cases are different. The cause of action in the second case is the surrender of the
owners duplicate copy of the titles to the parcels of land in question. On the other hand, the present case concerns the validity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale.
d. No case of conclusiveness of judgment
The primary issue in the present case is the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale. On the other hand, the primary issue in the
second case is thisWho between Mrs. Ligon and the INC has the better right of possession over the owners duplicate copy of
the titles? In the latter case, it would not be improbable that the validity of the sale in question might be passed upon. But even if
this happens, it should be noted that any mention in the second case as the said validity of the sale in question would only be
incidental to the resolution of the primary issue thereof. The Supreme Court ruled that to rule otherwise would cause grave and
irreparable injustice to IDP, which never gave its consent to the sale. It never had a legitimate Board of Trustees.
e. Justice over technicality
In any case, while it is true that the principle of res judicata is a fundamental component of the Philippine judicial system, it
should be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.
YES. The authority of the SEC to pass upon the issue as to who among the different contending groups is the legitimate Board
of Trustees is beyond question, as this is a matter falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC.
The sale in question is really null and void. Art. 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the essential requisites of a contract, to
wit(1) consent of the contracting parties, (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the
obligation which is established. It should be noted that all these requisites must be present to constitute a valid contract.
12
IN PERSONAM: binding only to the parties thereto.
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In the present case, IDP never gave its consent, there being no legitimate Board of Trustees. Moreover, the Carpizo group failed
to comply with Sec. 40 of the Corporation Code pertaining to the disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the
corporation. The provision requires (1) the majority vote of the legitimate Board of Trustees and (2) the vote of at least 2/3 of the
members of the corporation, for the sale to be valid.
The INC is trifling with the Courts. In the present case, INC questions the authority of the SEC to nullify the sale, on the ground
that this matter is allegedly outside its jurisdiction, not being an intra-corporate dispute. However, it should be recalled that,
initiallyi.e., in the second casethe INC opposed the Motion for Intervention of the Tamano Group precisely on the ground
that the issue is intra-corporate in nature. Moreover, the Court noted that the INC bought the questioned property from the
Carpizo group without even seeing the owners duplicate copy of the titles covering the property. The property is a large piece of
real estate in Quezon City worth millions. And, under the Torrens system of registration, the minimum requirement for one to be
a buyer for value is that the buyer at least sees the owners duplicate copy of the title and relies upon the same.
VILLANUEVA V. COURT OF APPEALS
28 JANUARY 1998
FACTS: There were three (3) brothersthe petitioner (Baltazar), Romeo and Gaudencio. Romeo died single and intestate 13 and
left behind a parcel of land situated at Proj. 6, Quezon City. At the time of the death of Romeo, his heirs were his two brothers
and their mother, Victoria. Victoria executed an extrajudicial 14 settlement of the estate of her deceased son, wherein she waived
her right over the Proj. 6 property in favor of Gaudencio, her other son. This extrajudicial settlement, however, was not
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City because the same was subsequently revoked and set aside by
Victoria for failure to reflect certain conditions as well as her true intention. Eventually, Gaudencio himself dies, and his wife
Grace requested her counsel to prepare a new document of extrajudicial settlement which was signed by her and her son,
Gaudencio, Jr., Victoria signed this document. Under this document, Victoria was adjudicating the Proj. 6 property in favor of
the petitioner and Gaudencio, Jr. on the one hand, and Grace on the other. The sharing was on a fifty-fifty basis. It should be
noted that was Grace who was entrusted with the registration of the said document with the Register of Deeds, being a resident
of Quezon City.
It appears that the petitioner leased the property in question to a certain Lapitan. The latter, however, received a notice of
termination of lease and demand to vacate the property from Grace and her counsel. It was because of these antecedent facts that
the petitioner filed a case for reconveyance of the property with damages.
Unfortunately, both the petitioner and his counsel failed to appear the scheduled pre-trial and the trial proper, and so the court
dismissed the complaint for lack of interest to pursue the case. The petitioner filed a motion for reconisderation but the same was
denied for lack of merit.
Subsequently, however, the petitioner filed another complaintthis time, for annulment of title and damages. Included as
defendants were Ma. Pas. O Villanueva and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case, on the ground that the cause of action of the petitioner is barred by
prior judgment. The Regional Trial Court concerned denied the motion to dismiss, despite its acknowledgment that there really
was a ground to have the case dismissed. It reasoned out, thus
First, the court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, would not disregard the fundamental principle that the
rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid or technical sense, since they are designed to help secure
justice, not to override the same.
Second, corollary to the first, the party litigants have not been afforded the amplest opportunity to present their
cases freed from the constraints of technicalities and stringent application of the rules, and
13
14
INTESTATE: Without a will

EXTRAJUDICIAL: Out of court
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Third, it would be more in keeping with justice to afford the parties the opportunity to lay their respective claims
and defenses before the court in a full blown litigation.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a supplemental complaint. The trial court admitted this complaint and gave him the private
respondents to file a consolidated answer. Instead, the latter filed a motion to dismiss, again, because of res judicata and forum
shopping. This motion was denied by the trial court.
The respondents brought the case before the Court of Appeals, which upheld the ground for dismissal, but urged the private
respondents to elevate the case before the Supreme Court, which is the only one that has the power to suspend the rules. Thus,
this petition.
ISSUE: W/N RES JUDICATA APPLIES.
RULING: YES. It should be noted that both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found that res judicata applies
in the instant case.
The order of the dismissal of the first case became final. This dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. A party,
by varying the form or action or by bringing forward in a second case additional parties or arguments, cannot escape the effects
of the principle of res judicata, when the facts remain the same at least where such new parties or matter could have been
impleaded in the prior action.
In the present case, the cause of action of the petitioner stemmed from his claim of co-ownership over the subject property with
the ultimate relief consisting of recovering the subject property from the private respondentswhich claim is the same as
reconveyance, which was the cause of action in the first case. The same evidence would have been presented to sustain both
actions. Unfortunately, the petitioner has lost his cause under the principle of res judicata. The dismissal of the first action on the
ground of failure to prosecute, which was unqualified, amounted to an adjudication on the merits already.
SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE CO., v. ALABAMA
23 MARCH 1999
FACTS: An Alabama statute requires corporations doing business in the State to pay franchise taxes on the firms capital. In
computing for the taxes, the domestic firms base their such on the par value of the firm stocks, and may set such value way
below its book or market value. Foreign firms do no hold the same privilege, and they have to pay taxes based on the actual
capital it employs into the State with no leeway to control its tax base.
Reynolds Metals Company sued the State tax authorities, stating that such tax computation discriminated foreign companies in
violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The State court rejected the claims stating that such taxes are offset by
a different tax burden shouldered by domestic firms.
Subsequently, South Central Bell Telephone Company and other foreign corporations went to trial, asserting similar Commerce
and Equal Protection Clause, although in different tax years. The trial court agreed that the Alabama franchise tax discriminates
against foreign firms but dismissed the case as barred by res judicata in light of the Reynolds Metals decision. The State
Supreme Court affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THE PRESENT CASE.
RULING: NO. The requisites for res judicata to attach are:
The judgment must be final and executory and not merely interlocutory;
The judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties and nature of
the suit;
The judgment must be on the merits, or at least have the effect of an adjudication on the merits; and
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There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, or causes of action, or, in
certain cases, reliefs prayed for.
In this case, the petitioners South Central Bell are strangers to the previous case of Reynolds Metals, because it involves
different plaintiffs and different tax years. The identity of parties in this instance is not met, therefore, res judicata cannot attach.
PEOPLE V. PINUILA
30 MAY 1958
FACTS: Barge No. 560 of the Visayan Stevedoring Co. was anchored some distance from the mouth of the Victorias River.
Bonifacio del Cano and Buenaventura Dideroy, members of the crew, were sleeping inside the cabin. Dideroy was suddenly and
violently attacked by men armed with stout wooden clubs, resulting in a fracture of his skull and other injuries to his body,
which caused his death hours later. Del Cano, who witnessed the attack on Dideroy, reported the incident to the person in charge
of the barge, who, in turn, notified the authorities. An investigation was subsequently conducted, which led to the arrest of
defendant Bignay, Pinuila and Diaz, who were charged with murder.
After the Government rested its case (after having presented evidence), counsel for the accused filed a motion for dismissal on
the ground that jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance was not duly established. The trial court sustained the motion for
dismissal, claiming that its jurisdiction had not been duly established. This order of dismissal was appealed by the Government
to the Supreme Court, over the objection of the defense which invoked the principle of double jeopardy. But the Supreme Court,
in a decision promulgated on 28 March 1952, found that the jurisdiction of the trial court had been proven, and that the appeal
did not involve double jeopardy, and so remanded the case for further proceedings.
In the course of the discussion of the case, Chief Justice Paras raised the question of double jeopardy and claimed that the
appellant has once been placed in jeopardy and, therefore should be acquitted. It was argued that the decision of the Supreme
Court on the appeal of the Government from the order of dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was based on the case of
People v. Salico, which held that an appeal by the Government from an order of dismissal was based on and prompted by a
motion to dismiss filed by the accused himself, did not place him in jeopardy, and that the doctrine laid down in Salico has
recently been overruled by the Supreme Court itself in more than one case.
ISSUE: W/N THE NEW DOCTRINE OVERRULING SALICO COULD AND SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE
PRESENT CASE.
RULING: NO. The decision of the Court on the appeal by the Government from the order of dismissal has long become final
and conclusive and has become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy. But, even so, it
may not be disturbed and modified anymore.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be
the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (21 CJS. 330)
SOLID MANILA CORP. v. BIO HONG TRADING, CO.
8 APRIL 1991
FACTS: The petitioner owned a parcel of land located within the vicinity of another parcel of land, owned by the private
respondent. The title of the private respondent came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, they reserved an easement of
way, which had been converted into a private alley. This was subsequently expropriated by the City Government. As a result
thereof, an annotation was appended to the private respondents title providing, among others, that the alley shall not be closed
and that it shall be allowed unhampered use by the public.
It was claimed that the use, maintenance, and upkeep of the said alley had been undertaken by the petitioner ever since, until the
private respondent constructed steel gates, which blocked the alley. Because of this, the petitioner commenced suit. As a result
thereof, the lower court ordered the respondent to open the said steel gates. The private respondent filed a motion to lift this
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order. Thereafter, the petitioner moved for a summary judgment, which was granted. The private respondent appealed this order
to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the private respondent corporation itself went to the Regional Trial Court and moved for the cancellation of the
annotation in question, which was granted by the court. Thus, the petitioner instituted CA. SP No. 13421 of the respondent Court
of Appeals, which ordered the restoration of the annotation, without prejudice to the final outcome of the private respondents
own appeal. Eventually, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the lower court, which granted summary judgment and held
that the easement was indeed extinguished because of the merger.
ISSUE:
W/N THERE WAS A VALID MERGER THAT WOULD EXTINGUISH THE EASEMENT
W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT WHICH HAD RENDERED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RULING: NO. The Court held that, according to the Civil Code, a merger exists when the ownership of the dominant and
servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Thus, a merger requires full ownership of both estates. The Court held that
the servitude in question was a personal servitude, i.e., one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but
rather, for the benefit of the general public. A merger presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship.
But in a personal servitude, there is no owner of a dominant tenement to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons
without a dominant estate. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the publicif that is possibleno genuine merger
would take place as to terminate a personal easement.
YES. The summary judgment was proper because there is a provision in the Rules of Court which states that summary
judgments are proper where there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and the facts appear undisputed based
on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits.
Moreover, the Court held that the Court of Appeals itself had rendered judgment, in its CA GR No. 13421, in which it nullified
the cancellation of the easement annotated at the back of the private respondents certificate of title ordered by the lower court.
This judgment of the Court of Appeals was, in fact, affirmed by the Supreme Court itself, and this is the law of the case
between the parties.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs. PBC, INC.
Primacy of human rights over property rights
5 JUNE 1973
FACTS: The officers and members of the PBMEO, a legitimate union in PBM, informed the latter of their proposed mass
demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the
first shift as well as those in the regular second and third shifts.
PBM called a meeting the following day. It informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution emphasizing, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. So, PBM warned PBMEO that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, particularly
the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who should fail to report for work the following morning would
be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.
The workers proceeded with the demonstration despite the warnings. PBM filed with the CIR a charge against petitioners and
other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a violation of R.A. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) and of the CBA
providing for No Strike and No Lockout.
PBMEO claimed that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration, that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not
directed against the respondent firm.
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ISSUES: W/N BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH ARE GIVEN PRIORITY OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS.
HELD: YES. Human rights are given priority over property rights.
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the
sovereign people. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose - that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive - would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil, which the State has the right to prevent.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property
and property rights can be lost through prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute
when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed.
ECHEGARAY V. SEC. OF JUSTICE
19 JANUARY 1999
FACTS: The case involves the petitioner, Leo Echegaray, the first person meted out with the Death Penalty under Republic Act
No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) and Republic Act No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law)
In a previous case, the Supreme Court already upheld the constitutionality of both laws, and the discussion in such case was
made final and executory.
On 28 December 1998, the petitioner filed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on several grounds, among
which is the expression of certain lawmakers to seek a review of the Death Penalty Law, thus, in order to facilitate such move,
the TRO should be imposed to accommodate the recess in Congress. The Supreme Court granted the TRO.
The respondents now filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court. They contend that:
The Decision in this case having become final and executory, is execution enters the exclusive ambit of the
authority of the executive authority;
The issuance of the TRO creates a dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is
always a possibility that Congress may repeal the law;
Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the Death Penalty Bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be
raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by [the] Honorable
Supreme Court had in all probability been debated upon;
Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past,
the Supreme Court in issuring the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review; and
At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of
the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law repealing the imposition of death
penalty on heinous crimes;
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Rocos resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
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ISSUE:
W/N THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IS VALID.
RULING: YES. The respondent is invoking the rule that final judgment can no longer be altered in accord with the principle
that it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation. However, the Court
in this instance is not changing even a comma of the final Decision
The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By finality of the judgment, what the
court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose
of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. After the judgment has become final, facts
and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
The particulars of the execution itself are under the absolute control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power
over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty or to pardon. The power to control the execution of
a decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. Supervening events may change the circumstances of the parties and compel the
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.
First, the constitutional provision which is the source of the pardoning power of the President cannot be interpreted as denying
the power of the courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. An accused who has been convicted by
final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.
The power of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
Second, the Supreme Court in this case saw that when petitioner filed for the issuance of a TRO, there was a new Congress,
different from that which passed the Death Penalty Law. The Supreme Court hardly had time to verify the grounds relied upon
by the petitioner for the issuance of the TRO, since his execution was set up at 3:00PM. Moreover, verification was practically
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the majority members of the Supreme Court did not rush
into judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of the petitioner.
The TRO issued by the Supreme Court has produced its desired result, and it is beyond doubt now that Congress will repeal or
amend the Death Penalty Law. In light of this, the TRO issued by the Supreme Court was eventually lifted as it has already
served its legal and humanitarian purpose. The Supreme Court thereafter ordered the RTC to set anew the date for execution of
the petitioner, Leo Echegaray.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
On the line in this case is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, alleges that he is the President on leave
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.
FACTS: The facts in the case discuss the events which led to the filing of this case, from the coming out of Chavit Singson, to
EDSA II and the departure of President Estrade from Malacanang.
ISSUES:
W/N THE CASE AT BAR INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION;
W/N THE PETITIONER RESIGNED AS PRESIDENT;
W/N PETITIONER ENJOYS IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. ASSUMING HE ENJOYS IMMUNITY, THE EXTENT
OF SUCH IMMUNITY; AND
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W/N THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONER ESTRADE SHOULD BE ENJOINED DUE TO PREJUDICIAL

PUBLICITY.
RULING: NO. Private respondent stresses that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power, that she has
already taken her oath as the President, that she has exercised her powers as President, and that she has been recognized by
foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket that the courts cannot enter.
The US case of Baker v. Carr spelled out what a political question isprominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due to coordinate branches of government, or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments in question.
In the Philippine setting, the leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco, where the court held that political questions refer to those
question which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
In fact, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review.
Respondents reliance on cases involving the Aquino administration is not applicable here. The former was revolutionary in
character. In contrast, the oath of President Arroyo was under the 1987 Constitution. EDSA I presented a political question,
while EDSA II involves legal questions.
YES. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office
of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. The issue is whether Estrada was considered
resigned. Resignation is not an abstraction. It is a factual question. There must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. Resignation does not need a formal requirement. Consequently, whether the petitioner
resigned has to be determined by his acts and omission before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using the totality
test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter
revise the decision of both Houses of Congresses recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Clearly, such
question is a political one and is addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat.
NO. The principle of non-liability does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the President, that he
may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean tyranny. This
does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but
must submit in silence. On the contrary it means, that the President may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequence of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. Public policy forbids it. The President may be held
liable when he acts in the case so plainly outside of his power and authority. In such case, he acts not as the President but as a
private individual.
The Court also rejected the argument that Estrada cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. Since the impeachment court was held to be functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
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With regard to the scope of immunity, the cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. In no sense can the crimes of
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
NO. The claim that petitioner was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity cannot be sustained. The right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of the
accused to a fair trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and has not discharged the burden.
SELL V. U.S.
JUNE 16, 2003
FACTS: Dr. Charles Sell, once a practicing dentist, is charged criminally for attempted murder and fraud. Sell is suffering of
mental illnesses. He saw a leopard ride a bus. He claims that a gold tooth filling contaminated by "communists". He told cops to
shoot him.
Sell is charged for fraud for submitting false insurance claims for payment ( soon after which charged with 56 counts of mail
fraud, 6 counts medical fraud, and 1 count money laundering; with suspision of being under a psychotic spell)
Sell is charged for attempted murder for attacking/getting back on the FBI agent who arrested him and a witness on the fraud
cases, after being released on bail. Being under psychotic spells and out of control, the Magistrate of the lower court ordered Sell
to undergo "antipsychotic medication"
On the grounds that
the medication is to help Sell stand trial for the serious chrages against him
Sell is tagged as being "dangerous", a danger to himself and to the others in the Medical Center and thus MUST be
forced to undergo medication.
Sell refused to undertake medication but the Magistrate ordered the Medical Center to put Sell under "forced" medication,
making the process against Sell's will
Sell charged the Magistrate and the Medical Center for violating his right to not to undergo medication
Sell's appeal went up to the District Court. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate's decision to force medicate Sell to put
him into proper trial. However, District Court went against the Magistrate's decision to label Sell as dangerous to put him under
medication
ISSUES:
SHOULD SELL UNDERGO FORCED MEDICATION?
IS IT A VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS?
HOW BEING "DANGEROUS" IS CRITICAL TO BEING FORCED INTO MEDICATION?
IF NOT LABELED AS "DANGEROUS", WHY SHOULD SELL STILL UNDERGO MEDICATION?
RULING:
SC affirms the decision to undergo forced medication under jurisprudence (Washington v. Harper; Riggins v. Nevada).
1. The court must find that important governmental interest is at stake. (To put a person under trial for serious offenses)
2. Forced Medication must indeed help the court to pursue state interests and help the defendant to undergo trial.
3. Other alternatives are ineffective
4. The drug is medically appropriate.
Affirmed, Sell is not "dangerous" and will still undergo forced medication to stand trial
However, the case is still appealable.
Since Sell is deemed not to be dangerous, the solid ground in which the Magistrate used to put Sell under forced medication, the
reason to put Sell under forced medication is now lacking. Dangerous was also labelled on the defendants of jurisprudence.
CRUZAN V. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Right to refuse artificial life support
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FACTS: Nancy Cruzan was a victim of an automobile accident who was paralyzed into a vegetative state. The hospital
employees refused w/o court approval, to honor the request of Cruzans parents, to terminate her artificial nutrition and
hydration, since it would result in death.
A State Trial Court authorized the termination, finding that a person in Cruzans condition has a fundamental right under the
State and Federal Constituents to direct or refuse the withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures. In addition, Cruzans
expression to a former housemate that she would not continue her life if sick or injured, unless she could live at least halfway
normally suggested that she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration.
The State Supreme Court reversed. While recognizing a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of
informed consent, the court questioned its applicability in this case. The Court then decided that the State Living Will statute
embodied a state policy strongly favoring the preservation of life, and that Cruzans statement to her housemate were unreliable
for the purpose of determining her intent. It rejected the argument that her parents were entitled to order the termination of her
medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of a Living Will statute
or clear and convincing evidence of the patients wishes.
ISSUE: W/N THE REQUIREMENT OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN WITHDRAWAL OF LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT AN INFRINGEMENT OF A PERSONS LIBERTY.
RULING: NO. The US Constitution does not forbid the state to require that evidence of an incompetents wishes as to the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
A competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment. Missouri has
recognized that under certain circumstances, a surrogate may act for the patient in electing to withdraw hydration and nutrition
and thus cause death. It has also established a procedural safeguard to assure that the surrogates action conform as best as it may
to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent.
Missouri has a general interest in the protection and preservation of human life. It may legitimately seek to safeguard the
personal element of an individuals choice between life and death. The State is also entitled to guard against potential abuses by
surrogates. The State Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error in concluding that the evidence adduced at trial did not
amount to clear and convincing proof of Cruzans desire to have her life support withdrawn.
The Due process clause does not require a State to accept the substitute judgement of close family members in the absence of
substantial proof that their views reflect the patients. However, for the same reason that it may require clear and convincing
evidence of the patients wishes, it may also choose to defer only those wishes rather than confide the decisions to close family
members.
THE SCHIAVO CASE:
THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THERESA MARIE SCHIAVO (TERRI). INCAPACITATED.
FACTS:
Terri was married to petitioner, Michael Schiavo, on November 10, 1984. They were engaged a year prior to their marriage and
have been dating for two years. Terris parents Robert and Marie Schindler have generally maintained amicable relationship with
Michael prior to February 14, 1993 when their relations severed due to monetary issues.
On February 25, 1990, Terri suffered cardiac arrest due to imbalance of potassium in her system. Since then, Terri never
regained consciousness and remained in comatose state. She is being nourished and hydrated via a feeding tube and by this
Petition her husband seeks authority to withdraw such life support.
In 1992, Michael Schiavo won a settlement against Terris physician prior to her cardiac arrest, receiving $300,000 as regards
his loss of consortium claim and the guardianship of Terri of $700,000 as regards her damages. Monies were actually received
February 1993.
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On February 14, 1993, amicable relationship between husband and parents was severed. Such severance was predicated on
money and the fact that Mr. Schiavo was unwilling to equally divide his loss of consortium award with the parents. Money
overshadows the entire case and creates potential of conflict of interest for both sides.
There is a Conflict of Interest existing between the husband and the parents:
The husband is claiming that if Terri died while still married to him, hell definitely be the heir to the estate. The parents are
hoping for Michael to divorce Terri and be appointed as guardians and become heirs at law.
By all accounts, Mr. Schaivo has his wifes best interest at heart, pursuing the best medical care for his wife. Mr. and Mrs.
Schindler however think otherwise and filed an action to have him removed as guardian based on numerous unsupported
allegations which the Guardian Ad Litem denied.
ISSUE:
Should the Petition for Authorization to Discontinue Articficial Life Support of Michael Schiavo, guardian of Terri
Schiavo, an incapacitated person, be granted?
ruling: Court ruled in favour of petitioner.
2 Considerations:
1. Terris oral declarations.
2. Terris incapacity.
Court finds beyond reasonable doubt that Terri is in a persistent vegetative state per specific testimony of Dr. James Barnhill and
corroborated by Dr. Vincent Gambone. Medical evidence conclusively established that she has no hope of ever regaining
consciousness and without the feeding tube she will die in 7-14 days. Medical opinions are supported by CAT scans. Chances of
recovery are slim since she has suffered severe brain damage.
Court applied the law set forth in In re: Guardianship of Estelle M. Browning* (wherein a will was made prior to her incapacity)
to the facts of Schiavo case. Court must decide whether or not there is clear and convincing evidence that Terri made oral
declaration which would support what her surrogate (Petitioner) now wishes to do. Court previously found that the second part
of that test i.e. the patient does not have a reasonable probability of recovering competency is without a doubt satisfied by the
evidence.
Statements which Terri made which do support the relief sought by petitioner includes statements to him prompted by her
grandmother being in intensive care that if she was ever a burden she would not want to live like that.
The court specifically finds that these statements are Terris oral declarations concerning her intentions as to what she would
want done under the present circumstances and the testimony regarding such oral declarations is reliable, creditable, and rises to
the level of clear and convincing evidence to this court.
Guardian Ad Litem appointed to prosecute/defend a suit on behalf of a party incapacitated by infancy or otherwise.
In the case of Estelle Browning, she had a living will and the issue was essentially whether or not an incapacitated person
possessed the same right of privacy to withhold or withdraw life supporting medical treatment as did a competent person.
CLINTON v. JONES
27 MAY 1997
FACTS: Respondent sued to recover damages from petitioner, the current President of the United States, alleging, inter alia 15,
that while he was Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made abhorrent sexual advances to her, and that her rejection of those
advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the time. It is perfectly clear that the alleged
misconduct of petitioner was unrelated to any of his official duties as President of the US and, indeed, occurred before he was
elected to that office. In response to the complaint, petitioner promptly advised the District Court that he intended to file a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of Presidential immunity. The Court of Appeals explained that the President, like all other
government officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all other members of our society that he could find no case in
which any public official ever has been granted any immunity from suit for his unofficial acts.
15
INTER ALIA: among other things
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ISSUES:
W/N THE PRESIDENT ENJOYS TEMPORARY IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL DAMAGES LITIGATION ARISING
OUT OF EVENTS THAT OCCURRED BEFORE HE TOOK OFFICE; AND
W/N THE DISTRICT COURTS DECISION TO STAY THE TRIAL UNTIL AFTER PETITIONER LEAVES
OFFICE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
RULING: NO. Because of the Presidents broad responsibilities, we recognized that immunity from damages claims arising out
of official acts extending to the outer perimeter of his authority. But we never suggested that the President, or any other
official, have an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in official capacity. Immunities are grounded in the
nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.
Petitioner contends that the nature of the office calls for the application of the separation of powers doctrine. 16 However, it does
not follow that allowing this action to proceed would violate the separation of powers principles. Of course, the lines between
the powers of the three branches are not always neatly defined. But in this case there is no suggestion that the judiciary is being
asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as executive.
YES. The stay should not be ground. Such a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatever of the respondents interest
in bringing the case to trial. Delaying the trial would increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence,
including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts of the possible death of a party. Furthermore, the proponent who
wishes the stay of the trial must bear the burden of establishing its need. Such was not achieved in this case.
LAWRENCE AND GARNER V. TEXAS
JUNE 26, 2003
FACTS:
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered petitioner Lawrences apartment
and saw him and another adult man, petitioner Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and
convicted of deviate sexual intercourse or sodomy, in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment17 based on a previous case, Bowers v. Hardwick.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS OF LAWRENCE AND GARNER VIOLATE THEIR RIGHT TO LIBERTY OR
RIGHT TO ENJOY THEIR FULL POTENTIAL OR CAPACITY?
RULING:
The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the
Due Process Clause18. The right to liberty means, the right to enjoy his or her full potential or capacity with limited government
intervention. Intervention can only be possible when due process is satisfied. Due process is satisfied when the law is reasonable.
In the present case, the Texas statute seeks to prevent the consensual sexual relations between homosexual persons. Since such
relationship is within the purview of liberty protected by the Constitution, the government cannot intervene without a reasonable
law. And since the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the individuals personal
and private life, such law has to be declared unconstitutional.
16
SEPARATION OF POWERS: That system of government where one enacts the law (legislative), the other enforces the law (executive) and the last one
interprets the law (judiciary).
17
Same as Section 1 of Bill of Rights: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
18
Due process simply means reasonableness of the law
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BARNES V. GLEN THEATER, INC.
501 US 560
FACTS: The Kitty Kat Lounge desires to present totally nude dancing. Indiana statutes require that dancers wear pasties and
a g-string. The dancers also wish to dance nude because they believe they would make more money. Glen Theater, Inc. supplies
adult entertainment through written and printed materials, movie showings, and live entertainment at an enclosed bookstore.
The dancers in the bookstore dance nude or semi-nude. The 2 companies sued to enjoin the enforcement of the Indiana public
indecency statute. They claim that the statute violated the First Amendment because nude dancing was expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment.
ISSUE: W/N NUDE DANCING IS A FORM OF EXPRESSION PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RULING: The Indiana statutory requirement that the dancers in the establishments involved must wear pasties and a g-string
does not violate the First Amendment. This Court has held that when speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms. The Court used the OBrien test: a government regulation is sufficiently justified if:
It is within the constitutional power of the Government,
It furthers an important or substantial government interest,
Governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and
The incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
The Court found that Indianas public indecency statute is justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity.
Applying OBrien:
The traditional police power of the State is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety and morals.
The statute reflected moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places.
The public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality
What Indiana prohibited was not dancing as a communicative element but simply its being done in the nude.
Indianas requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a g-string is modest and the bare minimum necessary to
achieve the States purpose.
FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND
380 US 51 (1965)
FACTS: Freedman exhibited the film Revenge at Daybreak at his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the picture to the
State Board of Censors as required by Sec. 2 of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute. Appellant argues that the statute
constitutes an invalid prior restraint because it presents a danger of unduly suppressing protected expression. The state concedes
that the picture does not violate the statutory standards and would have received a license if properly submitted. Appellant was
consequently convicted for violating Sec. 2 of said statute.
ISSUE: W/N THE STATUTE IN ITS ENTIRETY UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMPAIR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.
HELD: YES. Non-criminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity
only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of
proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. Second, while the State may require advance submission
of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a
manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censors determination whether a film constitutes a protected expression
because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression
only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. Third, the procedure must also
assure a prompt final judicial decision to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.
Since the Maryland scheme fails to provide adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression, it is
tantamount to an invalid previous restraint.
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NEAR v. MINNESOTA
238 U.S. 697 (1931)
FACTS: A Minnesota law declares as public nuisance a malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical. It provides for the abatement of public nuisances and further states that any person engaged in the business of
producing, publishing, or giving away of such periodicals shall be enjoined from further engaging in such business. It therefore
prohibits any further issues of the periodical declares as public nuisance. Near, a publisher of a newspaper which was declared
as a public nuisance assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: W/N THE LAW VIOLATED FREEDOM OF SPEECH.
RULING: YES. A consequence of publishing malicious of defamatory article is to put the publisher under effective censorship
and the renewal of the publication would constitute a contempt and that the judgment would lay a permanent restraint upon the
publisher.
By suppressing publication and punishing as contempt further publication, this is censorship or prior restraint. The chief
purpose of this liberty is to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The liberty is especially cherished for the immunity it
afforded from prior restraints of the publication censured of public officers and charges of official misconduct.
In effect, what the publisher would do is to play safe and make sure that the article is not of character that will subject it to
contempt.
PEOPLE v. CAYAT
6 MAY 1939
FACTS: Cayat, a native of Baguio was convicted of violation of Act No. 1639 (Sec. 2 and 3):
"SEC. 2.
It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a nonChristian tribe within the meaning of Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of
any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one
hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any
provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found
unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.
"SEC. 3.
Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall,
upon conviction thereon, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos
or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court."
ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: NO. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable:
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. That it is
germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and
among the non-Christian tribes. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class.
It applies to a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture.
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DOCTRINE: Equal protection of the laws does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not
The Power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal
protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid ground for
classification.
PEOPLE V. MARTI
In conflict with Zulueta case
193 SCRA 57
FACTS: Appellant asked a forwarder to ship four packages abroad. Before delivering them to the Bureau of Posts, the
forwarder inspected the packages and discovered that they contained marijuana leaves. He reported the matter to the NBI and
brought a sample for examination. Agents of the NBI went to the office of the forwarder. The forwarder took out the marijuana
leaves and turned them over to the agents of the NBI. Appellant argued that the marijuana leaves should not have been admitted
in evidence, as they had been illegally seized.
ISSUE: W/N THE EVIDENCE WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED.
RULING: NO. The evidence was discovered and obtained by a private person acting in a private capacity without intervention
of the authorities. The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was intended to be a restraint upon
the government and its agents and not upon private individuals. Since the marijuana leaves came into the possession of the
government without its violation of the right of the appellant against unreasonable searches and seizures, they are admissible in
evidence. The mere presence of the agents of the NBI did not convert the search effected by the forwarder into a warrantless
search in violation of the Constitution.
ZULUETA V. CA
253 SCRA 669
Documents proving infidelity obtained by wife w/o consent of unfaithful husband inadmissible as evidence
FACTS: Petitioner Zulueta is the wife of private respondent. She entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor, with her mother,
driver and the respondent's secretary and forcibly opened the drawers of her husband, obtaining 157 documents including
correspondence between her husband and his paramours, greeting cards, diaries. The documents were used as evidence in a legal
separation case and disqualification from the practice of medicine suit she filed against her husband.
ISSUE: W/N THE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HER HUSBAND
RULING: NO. The constitutional protection on the privacy of communication and correspondence is no less applicable simply
because the wife is the party to the case. The only exception to the prohibition is "if there is lawful order from the court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."
The intimacies between husband and wife does not imply that one can go around breaking drawers to procure evidence of
marital infidelity. A person by contracting marriage, does not shed his or her integrity or right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection should be available to him or her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between spouses by making it privileged. It is mandated by law that neither
spouse may testify against the other without the latter's consent, neither may anyone be examined without the consent of the
other as regards correspondence between them. But there is a difference between the freedom of communication and compulsion
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for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that the spouses owe
one another.
GOESART V. CLEARY
Regulation of liquor, immoral traffic; women bartenders
335 US 464
FACTS: A law was passed prohibiting females to be licensed as bartenders, unless they be the wives or daughters of the
proprietor of the bar.
ISSUE: W/N THE LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
RULING: NO. The US SC held that the law is valid because its purpose is to prevent social problems by preventing prostitutes
from masquerading as bartenders. If the father or husband is the owner, there is greater certainty that the bartender is not a
prostitute. The US Constitution does not require situations that are different in the fact or in opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same. Gender is a valid classification.
OSULLIVAN V. BOERCKEL
07 JUNE 1999
This case discussed the rule on exhaustion of remedies which means that a lower court must be allowed to act on the claims of
a petitioner before higher courts may act on it. Since this is a US case, they have a different justice system where each state has
its own Appellate and Supreme Courts. Aside from this, they have a federal district court, a Court of Appeals for a district, and
finally the US Supreme Court.
FACTS: In 1977, respondent Darren Boerckel was tried in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Illinois for the rape,
burglary and aggravated battery of an 87-year old woman. The jury convicted on all three charges, and he was sentenced to serve
20 to 69 years imprisonment on the rape charge, and shorter terms on the other two charges.
Boerckel appealed his convictions to the Appellate Court of Illinois, he argued among other things, that his confession should
have been suppressed because the confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest, because the confession was coerced, and because
he had not knowingly and intelligently waives his rights. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected Boerckels claims and affirmed
his convictions and sentences. Boerckel next filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. In this petition, he
raised only 3 issues. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for leave to appeal. In 1994, Boerckel filed a petition for
habeas corpus19 in the US District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The petition asked for relief on the 6 grounds. The
District Court found that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted his 1 st, 2nd and 3rd claims by failing to include them in his petition
for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 7 th Circuit considered 1 question, namely, whether Boerckel had procedurally defaulted
the first 3 claims in his habeas corpus petition by failing to raise those claims in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals reversed and concluded that Boerckel was not required to present his claims in a petition
for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
ISSUE: W/N BOERCKEL HAD PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED THE FIRST 3 CLAIMS IN HIS HABEAS CORPUS
PETITION BY FAILING TO RAISE THOSE CLAIMS IN HIS PETITION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT.
RULING: YES. Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in a
state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents
those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. Illinois law provides for a 2-tiered appellate review process. Criminal
defendants are tried in the local circuit courts, then most criminal appeals are heard first by an intermediate appellate court, the
19
HABEAS CORPUS: produce the body
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Appellate Court of Illinois. A party may petition for leave to appeal a decision by the Appellate Court to the Illinois Supreme
Court but whether such petition will be granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
Boerckels amended federal habeas petition raised 3 claims that he had not included in his petition for leave to appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court. The law requires only that state prisoners give state courts a fair opportunity to act on their claims. State
courts, like federal courts, are obliged to enforce federal law. Comity this dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued
confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this
claim and provide any necessary relief. This rule of comity reduces friction between the state and the federal court systems by
avoiding the unseemliness of a federal district courts overturning a state court conviction without the state courts having had
an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation in the first instance.
Here, Illinois established normal appellate review procedure is a 2-tiered system. Comity, in these circumstances, dictates that
Boerckel use the States established appellate review procedures before he presents his claims to a federal court. By requiri ng
state prisoners to give the Illinois Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve constitutional errors in the first instance, the rule we
announce today serves the comity interests the drive the exhaustion doctrine.
We acknowledge that the rule we announce today has the potential to increase the number of filings in state Supreme Courts. In
this regard, we note that nothing in our decision today requires the exhaustion of any specific state remedy when a State has
provided that the remedy is unavailable. In fact, the law directs federal courts to consider whether a habeas petitioner has the
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. There is no dispute that this State
court remedya petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Courtis no longer available to Boerckel, the time for filing
such petition has long past.
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION OF OREGON V. SMITH
494 US 872
FACTS: Respondents Smith and Black were fired by a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote, a
hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church. The State of Oregon denied their
applications for unemployment compensation under a state law disqualifying employees discharged for work-related
misconduct. Holding that the denials violated respondents First Amendment free exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals
reversed. The State Supreme Court affirmed, but this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for determination whether
sacramental peyote use is proscribed by the States controlled substance law, which makes it a felony to knowingly or
intentionally possess the drug. Pending that determination, the Court refused to decide whether such use is protected by the
Constitution. On remand, the State Supreme Court held that sacramental peyote use violated, and was excepted from, the statelaw prohibition, but concluded that the prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause.
ISSUE: W/N THE PROHIBITION OF SACRAMENTAL USE OF PEYOTE IS VIOLATIVE OF THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE.
RULING: NO. Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise of religion" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban
the performance of or abstention from physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids or requires the performance of an act that his religious
belief requires or forbids if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to
those who engage in the specified act for non-religious reasons.
Respondents' claim for a religious exemption from the Oregon law cannot be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in the
line of cases following, whereby governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a
"compelling governmental interest." That test was developed in a context - unemployment compensation eligibility rules - that
lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. The test is inapplicable to an
across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct. A holding to the contrary would create an extraordinary
right to ignore generally applicable laws that are not supported by "compelling governmental interest" on the basis of religious
belief. Nor could such a right be limited to situations in which the conduct prohibited is "central" to the individual's religion,
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since that would enmesh judges in an impermissible inquiry into the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith. Thus,
although it is constitutionally permissible to exempt sacramental peyote use from the operation of drug laws, it is not
constitutionally required.
WEBB V. DE LEON
Influence of media; impartiality of judges
23 AUGUST 1995
FACTS: A letter-complaint was filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against Hubert Webb and seven (7) others
with the Department of Justice (DOJ), in connection with the rape and murder of Carmela Vizconde, her mother Estrellita and
sister Anne Marie. During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented several sworn statements of witnesses, among them
Jessica Alfaro, Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, the latter two being the former housemaids of the Webb family. Before filing
his counter-affidavit, Webb filed with the DOJ panel a Motion for Production of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to
produce the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and stay of Hubert
Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;
Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D.;
Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7, 1991);
Photographs of fingerprints lifted from Vizconde residence taken during the investigation;
Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;
List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated September 2,
1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;
Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other than the
May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police agencies;
transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by Superintendent
Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;
The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their respective
positions and duties;
Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.
Further, Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the imputed crime against him because he
was in the United States when the alleged crime took place. Nevertheless, the DOJ found probable cause against Webb and the
other accused. The accused filed petitions for certiorari, petition and mandamus with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY DENIED PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive
an accused of his due process right to a fair trial. In Martelino v. Alejandro, it was held that to prove that prejudicial publicity
indeed violated the due process right to a fair trial, there must be an allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not only an allegation that they might possibly be influenced by the publicity. In the case at bar, there is nothing in
the records that would prove that the tone and content of the publicity fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ
panel.
The DOJ panel is composed of the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors, their long experience in
criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity.
OSMENA v. COMELEC
31 MARCH 1998
FACTS: The petitioners were candidates for public office. Petitioner Emilio M.R. Osmena was a candidate for President of the
Philippines, while petitioner Pablo Garcia was incumbent governor of Cebu province, seeking reelection. They sought the
reexamination of the validity of Sec. 11(b) of RA6646, also known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass
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media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the events that have transcribed after the ruling of the Supreme Court
in the case of National Press Club v. Commission on Elections (207 SCRA 1) have called into question the validity of the very
premises of that decision.
ISSUES:
W/N THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF NPC V. COMELEC SHOULD
BE ABANDONED;
W/N THE QUESTIONED PROVISION OF THE NATURE OF A POLITICAL AD BAN;
W/N THE QUESTIONED PROVISION MANDATES THE ABSOLUTE EQUALITY OF ALL CANDIDATES
REGARDLESS OF FINANCIAL STATUS;
W/N THE REFORMS SOUGHT TO BE EFFECTED THROUGH THE QUESTIONED PROVISION HAVE BEEN
INEFFECTUAL; AND
W/N THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY LAW ON SPEECH ARE JUSTIFIED.
RULING: NO. It affirmed the questioned decision by ultimately citing the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
The petitioners did not present any empirical data to beef up their contention. The latter claimed that the experience in the last
five years since the decision in the aforementioned case has shown the undesirable effects of the law because the ban on
political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor
candidate[s] by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort
to other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills. The Court noted that the petitioners were
unable to show the experience and the subsequent events that they claim to invalidate the major premise of the questioned
decision.
The petitioners seek a re-argument of an issue already settled in the previous case. The issue sought to be raised by the
petitioners in the present case is the constitutionality of the questioned provisioni.e. Sec. 11(b) of RA 6646which issue was
already ruled upon by the Court in the questioned case of NPC v. COMELEC. Moreover, some of the arguments posited by the
petitioners have already been considered and rejected in the case aforementioned.
The petitioners do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the law. They do not complain that they
have, in any way, been disadvantaged as a result of the ban on media advertising. The Court was tacitly pointing out that the
petitioners are actually moneyed candidates who have the financial ability to sustain a long, drawn-out campaign, using means
other than the mass media to communicate with the voters.
The court summed up its resolution of this particular case by pointing out that the petitioners merely seek the holding of an
academic exercise, and the adjudication of a case.
NO. The term political ad ban is actually a misnomer. The Court said that even if the questioned provision prohibits the sale or
donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it nonetheless mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate
to the candidates space and time in the media. There is however, no suppression of political ads, but only a regulation of the time
and manner of advertising.
The law does not concern itself with the message or content of the political ad, but with ensuring media equality between
candidates with deep pockets, on the one hand and those with less resources, on the other. Given the fact that print space and
air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or
legitimate government interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC.
Any restriction on speech would only be incidental, and it would not be more than necessary to achieve the purpose of the law in
question, which is to promote equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction of
speech, as pointed out in the previously decided case, is limitedboth as to time and as to scope.
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The Court summed up its disposition of this particular issue by ruling that the State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain
period as well as campaigning within a certain place. Unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the mass media skews the
political process and subverts democratic self-government. What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates
because of the views expressed in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason.
NO. The Constitution speaks of equality of opportunity, not indiscriminate, absolute equality. In deciding the case of NPC v.
COMELEC, the Court there meant equalizing media access.
The Court ruled that the US case of Buckley v. Valeo (424 US 1) finds no application in this jurisdiction. In sum, the said case
held that government restriction on the speech of some individuals in order to enhance the relative voice of the others is actually
alien to the First Amendment, which was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people. Government restriction of the sort mentioned in the US case is subsumed under the Philippine Constitution as an
animating principle thereof. One instance of this is the principle of one person, one vote.
As regards the fourth issue, the Court again reiterated its observation that this contention of the petitioners is merely an
allegation, a factual assertion without any empirical basis to support it. The Court, we believe, could not have answered
categorically in the negative. It would have made a sweeping statement if it did so. It would inevitably bear the brunt of proving,
through hard facts, that the law is, in fact, efficacious. So, instead it merely harped on the failure of the petitioners to prove its
contention with empirical data.
Moreover, the Court dismissed this argument of the petitioners as non sequitur. Assuming that rich candidates can spend for
parades, rallies, motorcades, airplanes and the like in order to campaign, while poor candidates can only afford political ads, the
gap between the two will not necessarily be reduced by allowing unlimited mass media advertising because rich candidates can
spend for other propaganda in addition to mass media advertising.
Also, the petitioners are attacking the adequacy or necessity of the lawwhich should be addressed to Congress, not to the
Court. Well-settled is the rule that the choice of remedies for an admitted social malady requiring government action belongs to
Congress. The remedy prescribed by it, unless clearly shown to be repugnant to fundamental law, must be respected.
Lastly, the Court said that the validity of a law cannot be made to depend on the faithful compliance of those charged with its
enforcement, but by appropriate constitutional provisions. In other words, the Court was saying that there is a clear dichotomy
between the policy of the law, on the one hand and its eventual implementation, on the other.
YES. The restrictions on speech provided for under Sec. 11 of RA6646 are content-neutralthat is, the said restrictions are not
imposed because of the content of the speech. The Court cited City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (466 US 789), which held
that [a content neutral] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government,
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
The Court took time to examine the clear and present danger test invoked by Justice Panganiban in his dissent, in that media
ads do not partake of the real substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the
[cardinal right of the people] to choose their means of expression and of access to information. The Court noted that the clear
and present danger test is not a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems.
IN RE: RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA PLUNDER TRIAL
29 JUNE 2001
FACTS: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP) sent a request letter to the Supreme Court
for media coverage of the Plunder Cases of Former President Joseph Estrada in the Sandiganbayan. Less than a month later,
Cesar Sarino sent a second letter to Chief Justice Davide for a similar request later followed suit by Senator Renato Cayetano
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and Atty. Ricardo Romulo. Twelve days later, Hernando Perez, Secretary of the Department of Justice filed a petition to allow
Radio and Television Coverage of the Court Hearings on the Plunder and Other Criminal Cases of Joseph Estrada alleging
that:
The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of his family,
his cohorts, and therefore it cannot be overemphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public
concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern, as in the
instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and television coverage of the
concomitant court proceedings.
Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime
of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation to railroad the instant
criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Estrada.
In effect, the petition is asking for a re-examination of the resolution of the Court on this matter, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read: The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion
regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the
question squarely.
ISSUE: W/N TELEVISION AND RADIO COVERAGE OF THE PLUNDER CASES BE ALLOWED.
RULING: NO. In Estes v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant. The court said that (1) [If there was television
coverage,] witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of court
influences which might affect their testimony. Also, (2) telecasting increases the trial judges responsibility to avoid actual
prejudice to the defendant. (3) For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public
exposure and distracts him for the effective presentation of his defense. And (4) the television camera is a powerful weapon
which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public.
The right of the press or the right of the people to information does not prescribe that television cameras be installed in the
courtroom. These rights may be satisfied by different less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means.
In criminal cases, life is at stake, therefore, the due process rights of the accused shall take precedence over the rights of the
people to information. Although the accused has a right to a public trial, the exercise of such right is his to make, because it is his
life and liberty on the balance.
A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available sears, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial processes, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free
to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
Also, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its resolution, as the court quoted: Live television and radio coverage can negate
the rule on exclusion of witness during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial, at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life
and liberty of the accused, but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio
coverage could allow the hooting throng to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the
verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular, and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the
ends of justice but will only pander to the desire of the publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
The court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of
any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore
expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
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NB. Also read the separate opinions, both concurring and dissenting.
KEENAN V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LA COUNTY
FACTS:
In 1963, Barry Keenan and company abducted Frank Sinatra, Jr. and asked the legendary Frank Sinatra to pay a ransom for his
sons release. Keenan and company were caught, tried, and convicted. In late January, 1998, it was reported that Columbia
Pictures brought the rights to Snatching Sinatra (a movie about the abduction) for 1.5 million USD. Frank Jr. invoked Civil Code
section 2225(b) (1), more popularly known as Californias Son of Sam Law. It prevents a convicted felon or a profiteer from
exploiting the felons crimes for financial gain while victims of the crimes go uncompensated.
Frank Jr. demands that Columbia Pictures withhold from the kidnappers and their representatives any money due from the movie
rights. The trial court issued an injunction, prohibiting Columbia from paying Keenan and company. Keenan petitioned for the
court to dissolve the injunction. He had no success in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 2225(B) (1) VIOLATES THE FIRST
AMENDMENT.
HELD: YES. The Son of Sam Law violates the First Amendment of the US Constitution (freedom of speech). Jurisprudence
also dictates that a similar law in the State of New York was found unconstitutional (refer to Simon and Schuster, Inc. v
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.). The decision to reverse the CA ruling was unanimous in this case.
Additional ratio from the concurring opinion of Brown, J: In a nut shell, can you say to Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, and
Saint Augustine that they cannot write their autobiographies because of their past criminal convictions?
AYER PRODUCTIONS V. CAPULONG
29 AUGUST 1988
FACTS: McElroy and petitioner Ayer Productions envisioned to produce a docu-drama regarding the EDSA Revolution entitled
The Four-Day Revolution. The script by David Williamson (of Gallipoli), included fictional characters who were used to trace
the events of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. The proposed film was green-lighted by the MTRCB, as well as other governmental
agencies, including Gen. Fidel Ramos.
The petitioners also contacted Juan Ponce Enrile to acquire his permission for the use of his name in the film, he being a key
player in the 1986 EDSA Revolution. He denied the petitioners the permission, stating that: He would not and will not approve
of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any
cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation x x
The petitioners complied with the demands of private respondent and his name and character was deleted from the movie script,
the petitioners then proceeded to film the motion picture.
Private respondent then filed a Complaint requesting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the RTC of Makati, seeking to enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie. The private respondent allege that the
filming, without his consent and over his objection, of the mini-series constitutes a violation of right to privacy. The trial court
granted the TRO and set hearing.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the film would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his
family and that the Preliminary Injunction is a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Trial Court issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner then raised the issue to the Supreme Court on certiorari with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Restraining Order. Thus, the present complaint.
ISSUE:
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W/N THE FILM IS COVERED BY PETITIONERS RIGHT OF FREE EXPRESSION.

W/N THE FILM VIOLATED RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
RULING: YES. The Court, citing Gonzales v. Katigbak stated that Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. x x This freedom is available to both locally-owned and
foreign-owned motion picture companies. The circumstance that this production is a commercial activity is not a disqualification
for availing the said freedom, media, as the medium to disseminate information, being sustained by its commercial aspect.
NO. Our law does not expressly provide for a right to privacy, only jurisprudence provides for such. However, like most rights,
it is not an absolute one, and is liable to governmental intrusion for the right reasons. Specifically, the right of privacy can be
intruded if that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from his or to be published from him constitute
matters of public character. The right to privacy only protects from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the
private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
In Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, the Court held that being a public figure does not ipso facto destroy a public figures right to
privacy. The right to invade the right to privacy does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter
how public a figure he or she may be. In that case, it was admitted that the producer included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
As differentiated from the cited case, the case was filed after the film was completed, therefore it was not a prior restraint on the
right to free expression. As against in the case at bar, the respondent filed the complaint while the film is in production. Measure
of prior restraint are invalid from the beginning as provided in the Constitution, this is without prejudice to subsequent
punishment if such expression does not abide by our laws. The judge shouldve stayed, because the clear and present danger may
not be invoked for the film has yet to be completed.
The subject matter of the film is clearly of public concern, being the depiction of the bloodless 1986 EDSA Revolution, thus it
must be regarded as having passed into the public domain as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by
any form of media. The synopsis of the film does not in anyway relate to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile
unlike in Lagunzad. The extent of the intrusion of the present film therefore is limited to the role he played on the historical
event, to make the filming an accurate account of the events.
A public figure defined as a person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character has become a public personage, or a
celebrity. Also included in such list are fugitives or convicts. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent, their
right of privacy, this is because, they have consented to it for entering the public realm, their personalities and affairs had
become public, and that the press has the duty to inform the public regarding matters of public concern.
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA
4 FEBRUARY 1992
FACTS: The Narcotics Regional Unit in Legaspi City, headed by CIC Taduran conducted a buy-bust operation to apprehend
drug traffickers upon a tip from a confidential informer. Taduran met Segovia, one of the accused, who introduced him to the
alleged seller of marijuana, accused Rodrigueza. Upon agreeing on the price to be paid, Rodrigueza boarded a tricycle operated
by Luceras and left. He returned with a plastic package allegedly containing marijuana.
Thereafter, Taduran returned to their headquarters to prepare his report. Although without warrants of arrest, the suspects were
apprehended later that evening. Likewise, a raid was conducted on the residence of Rodruiguezas father, without a search
warrant.
The accused Rodrigueza tested positive for the presence of the ultraviolet powder, with which the bills (used in the operation)
were treated. Rodrigueza and his co-accused gave alibis as their respective defenses. Moreover, they alleged that they were
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maltreated while in the custody of the authorities, and that they were made to hold the powder-treated bills so as to be implicated
in the alleged sale of marijuana.
The lower court ruled against Rodrigueza finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. 2 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. His two co-accused were acquitted.
ISSUE: W/N THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE VIOLATED, THUS WARRANTING
THE REVERSAL OF THE LOWER COURTS DECISION.
RULING: YES. The Court ruled that the supposed buy-bust operation failed to meet the requirement of legitimacy because it
was unable to apprehend the malefactor in flagrante delicto20. In addition, the sworn statement of Rodrigueza was taken in
violation of his constitutional right to competent and independent counsel. Although he waived his right to counsel, such waiver
should be made in the presence of counsel. As such, the confession obtained was inadmissible as evidence in court.
Furthermore, the evidence obtained from the raid in the residence of Rodriguezas father was done without an authorized search
warrant, although the NARCOM agents claimed that surveillance had been done for quite some time. Hence, there was no
excuse for the absence of the needed search warrant.
The prosecution was unable to present the corpus delicti21 of the crime, which should be proved with certainty and
conclusiveness. Instead, they presented only the confiscated articles from the residence of Rodriguezas father. Moreover, the
serious flaws and discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were deemed fatal to the prosecutions case. It
was ruled that the prosecution should rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
LLORENTE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
3 OCTOBER 1991
This case discussed Art. 19 of the Civil Code. Even if an may be considered legal in all respects, it may still be the subject of a
civil case under Art. 19 if the act was not done with justice and good faith.
FACTS: Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA, a public corporation. As a result of a massive reorganization in 1981,
hundreds of PCA employees resigned. Among them were Mr. Curio, Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, and Mrs. Javier. They were all
required to apply for PCA clearances in support of their gratuity benefits. The conditions of the clearance provided that the
clearance shall be signed by the PCA officers concerned only when there is no item appearing under PENDING
ACCOUNTABILITY.
After the clearance was signed by the PCA officers concerned, it was approved by Atty. Llorente. Notwithstanding the
condition, the clearances of Mrs. Perez and Mr. Azucena were favorable acted upon even if the clearances showed they had
pending accountabilities to the GSIS and the UCPB. Thereafter, the vouchers for their gratuity benefits were approved by Atty.
Llorente.
20
21
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO: Caught red-handed

CORPUS DELICTI: Body of the crime
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All PCA officers also signed the clearance of Mrs. Javier. The clearance of Mr. Curio likewise favorably passed all officers
concerned. However, when the clearance of Mr. Curio was submitted to Atty. Llorente for approval, he refused to approve it
(even if he approved the clearances of Mrs. Perez and Mr. Azucena who were in same situation as Mr. Curio). To justify the
stand, Atty. Llorente invoked the condition of the clearance which he said was very stringent and could not be interpreted in any
other way.
Between December 1981 and December 1986, Mr. Curio failed to get gainful employment, as a result, his family literally went
hungry. At that time, he was only about 45 years old and still competitive in the job market.
On 10 December 1986, an information for a criminal complaint for violation of Sec. 3(c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act was filed against Llorente in the Sandiganbayan. The information alleged that Llorente took advantage of his position,
through evident bad faith, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully refuse to issue a certificate of clearance to Mr. Curio.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Llorente for lack of evidence that he acted in bad faith. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan ordered
Llorente, in spite of his acqquital to pay P90, 000 in damages. According to the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was guilty
nonetheless of abuse of right, under Art. 19 of the Civil Code, and as a public offender he was liable for damages suffered by the
offended party under Art. 27 of the Civil Code.
Llorente claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in ordering him to pay damages in spite of his acquittal.
ISSUE: W/N LLORENTE SHOULD BE LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES INSPITE OF HIS ACQUITTAL.
RULING: YES. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judgment of the court shall include, even in the case of
acquittal, a finding of civil liability of the accused. Unless, there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.22 The rule is based on the provisions of substantive law which provides that if acquittal proceeds from
reasonable doubt, a civil action may still continue.
In the case at bar, although Llorente did not act with evident bad faith, he acted with bad faith nonetheless, for which he should
be liable for damages. Moreover, although the act of Llorente was legal, this does not mean that his act was done in good faith.
For emphasis, he had no valid reason to go legal all of a sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared all three
employees who, as the Sandiganbayan found, were all similarly circumstanced in that they all had pending obligations when,
their clearances were filed for consideration, warranting similar official action.
The Supreme Court is convinced that Llorente had unjustly discriminated against Mr. Curio. It is no defense either that he was,
after all, complying merely with legal procedure since, as we indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the three other
retiring employees. There can be no legal conclusion that he was acting unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio.
In essence, Art. 19 of the Civil Code under which the petitioner was made to pay damages, together with Art. 27, that the
performance of duty be done with justice and good faith.
PEOPLE v. ECHEGARAY
25 JUNE 1996
22
An example of a showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise does not exist is a finding that the act was an accident; if it is an accident,
then the accused cant be liable criminally and civilly.
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FACTS: Leo Echegaray was found guilty of raping his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and without her
consent, to her damage and prejudice on or about the month of April 1994
ISSUE: W/N ECHEGARAY IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
RULING: Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the re-imposition of the death penalty, requires a thorough and
judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating
evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution
must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense."
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has no motive to testify
against the accused. The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as to the circumstances of the
rape must be given weight, for testimony of young and immature rape victims are credible. No woman especially one of tender
age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose
herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.
Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate
victim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also he taken into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the
announced concern in the fundamental law for such institution. There is all the more reason then for the rigorous application of
the penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in
civilization, the disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation, much more so in view of what currently
appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness
At any rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss
where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed
lover of Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term
"common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and
influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it
inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of death.
IV.
REFERENCE CASES (Old Intro to Law cases not in 2005 case list)
TUPAS V. CA
Overview of substantive and procedural due process
6 FEBRUARY 1991
FACTS: In its resolution dated October 12, 1989, the Court denied the petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
for failure to show that the respondent court committed reversible error in its resolution dated May 31, 1989. The petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration on November 23, 1989.
The record shows that the petitioners received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on April 3, 1989,
and that the motion for reconsideration thereof was filed on April 17, 1989, or fourteen days later. The order of May 3, 1989,
denying the motion was received by the petitioners' counsel on May 9, 1989. Instead of filing the petition for review with the
Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on
May 23, 1989, or 14 days later.
ISSUE: W/N THE PETITIONERS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS IN THIS CASE.
RULING: NO. The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the final judgment or order of a
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a
petition for review in accordance with Section 22 of BP no. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court through
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a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules. The reason for extending the period for the filing of a
record on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. If a motion for reconsideration
is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for
review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of appeals for extension of time to file such petition for
review.
The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within the remaining period, which he should have known was only
one day. Neither did he move for an extension that would have been granted as a matter of course. The petition for review being
indisputably late, he could not thereafter ask that it be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which can be filed within a reasonable time. This remedy cannot be employed as a substitute for a lost appeal. 3 It follows that
for having themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners cannot now plaintively claim that they have been denied due
process.
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial
and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or,
as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of
the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute
between the parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the
source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
STATE PROSECUTORS V. MURO
236 SCRA 505
FACTS: In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance
of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim.
Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members
of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the
penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the
President of the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the
arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
ISSUE: W/N THE PROSECUTION WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

RULING: NO. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially affected
the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered
after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in
the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double
jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate
what we have heretofore declared.
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of
dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . .
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Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus,
the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that
right is void for lack of jurisdiction. . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or an answer to the petition
for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in her defense. This serves to further
underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is
a prominent public figure with a record of influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how
said dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
NOV. 19, 2001
FACTS: On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659 or the Anti-Plunder Law; (b) Crim.
Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of
The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085)
against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable
cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that
the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition
to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July
2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
ISSUE: W/N RA 7080, AS AMENDED BY RA 7659 OR THE ANTI-PLUNDER LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING VAGUE
RULING: NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
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This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized
an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court
ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a
statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently,
there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris.
The task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts
and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of
the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to
overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be
aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
CHURCHILL V. RAFFERTY
Regulation of billboards
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FACTS: Act No. 2339 empowered the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the
sight. The plaintiffs, owners of certain parcels of lands in Rizal upon which certain billboards were erected, admitted in an
agreed statement of facts, that the billboards are offensive.
ISSUE: W/N THE LAW IS CONSTITUTIONAL
RULING: YES. The police power relates to the public health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare of the community. The
act is constitutional since the billboards are the source of annoyance and irritation to the public and interfere with the proper
enjoyment of outdoor life by the general public, which is their right.
Unsightly advertisements that are offensive to the sight are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public, and thus fall
within the scope of police power. However, police power cannot interfere with private property rights for purely aesthetic
purposes. Since the real and sole value of the billboards is its proximity to the public thoroughfares, the regulation of billboards
is not so much the regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of the street and other public thoroughfares.
US V. TORIBIO
Carabao slaughter; public interest
15 PHIL 85
FACTS: Luis Toribio slaughtered his carabao. He was charged for violation of Act No. 1147. The act seeks to regulate the
slaughter of large cattle to preserve work animals needed for agriculture shortage of such animals was largely due to a disease
that practically eradicated the carabao supply. He contends that requiring him to obtain a permit for the slaughter of otherwise
useless cattle is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N THE LAW IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
RULING: YES. The purpose of the ordinance was to regulate the threatened population of these animals because of its
indispensability as a farm worker. The court found that it is within the public interest to regulate the killing of such animal. It
therefore satisfies the requirement of substantive due process absent any arbitrariness and because it is related to public interest.
ICHONG V. HERNANDEZ
Right not extended to aliens
31 MAY 1957
FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business. This Act has a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade.
ISSUE: W/N RA NO. 1180 DENIES TO ALIEN RESIDENTS THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
RULING: NO. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.
The objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient
grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. This is the prerogative of the law-making power.
Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it
cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature
acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed
by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the
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enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, through which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated.
VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
Equal protection available to aliens admitted to the Phil.
86 SCRA 270
FACTS: The City of Manila enacted an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or from engaging in any occupation
or business, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the mayor and paying
the fee of fifty pesos. Respondents challenged the validity of the ordinance for being violative of due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution and of the rule of uniformity in taxation. The mayor argued that the ordinance was not a
tax measure but a regulatory measure.
ISSUE: W/N THE LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
RULING: YES. Requiring the payment of fifty pesos as fee makes the ordinance a tax measure not a regulatory measure. If it
were a regulatory measure, there is no logic in exacting the payment of fifty pesos from aliens who have already secured a
clearance for employment. Fee is unreasonable, because it is excessive and it fails to consider substantial differences in the
situation of the aliens required to pay it. The same amount is collected from every alien, whether he is casual or permanent, parttime or full-time, a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.
GUAZON v. DE VILLA
181 SCRA 623
FACTS: Petitioners, are all residents of Metro Manila. They come to seek relief now, seeking to prohibition with preliminary
injunction to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings"
or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human
rights abuses.
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as their Memorandum after the petition was
given due course.
ISSUE: W/N THE SATURATION DRIVES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.
RULING: YES. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which would
bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the
name of security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government
cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose
spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit
strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing features.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the
transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the
duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where the petitioners do not complain that
they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the
prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference should bring together the heads of
the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to
devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
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NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. US
403 US 713 (1971)
FACTS: The US seeks to enjoin the NY Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study
entitled History of US Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy
ISSUE: W/N ENJOINING SUCH PUBLISHMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD. NO. Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. The Government thus carries the burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.
In this case, the Government had not met that burden.
Concurring Opinions:
Justice Black & Douglas: The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Governments power to censor the press
was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. To argue that the President has inherent
power to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the 1st Amendment and destroy the fundamental
liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make secure.
Justice Brennan: The First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or
conjecture that untoward consequences may result. Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an even kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea
can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclusions be sufficient: for if the
Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon which that aid is sought
to scrutiny by the judiciary. Unless and until the Government has clearly made out its case, the 1st Amendment commands that
no injunction may issue.
Justice Stewart & White: It is the constitutional duty of the Executiveas a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter
of law as the courts know lawthrough the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the
confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense.
DissentingJustice Harlan, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger: The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success
must often depend on secrecy. Also, the judiciary may not properly redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on
the national security. The very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.
HUSTLER MAGAZINE CASE V. FALWELL

Case filed by popular US reverend
485 US 46
FACTS: Jimmy Falwell, a nationally known minister and commentator on politics and public affairs, filed an action for libel
against Hustler Magazine after am advertisement parody depicted him in Hustlers November issue as having engaged in a
drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.
ISSUE: W/N THE AWARD OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM IS VALID
RULING: NO. Public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reason of publications of caricature without showing, in addition, that the publication contains false statements which was made
with actual malice. Outrageousness in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness, which would
impose liability based on jurors tastes or views. Respondent could not recover damages since he is a public figure and the ad
parody could not have been a statement of facts.
THE CHILLING EFFECT - a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an
undoubted chilling effect on speech relating to public figures that does have contitutional value.
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MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
The right to return to ones country
177 SCRA 668
FACTS: Due to events like the Manila Hotel coup in 1986, the taking over of the GMA, the plot of the Marcoses to return from
Hawaii via a Lebanese arms dealer, and Gringos coup attempts, Pres. Aquino, in the light of national security refused to allow
the return of the remains of former President Marcos to the Philippines. The Marcos family invoked that the refusal is violative
of Sec. 6 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N THE REFUSAL IS A VIOLATION OF SEC. 6 OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
HELD: NO. It was a valid refusal.
The right to leave the country and the right to return to ones country are separate and distinct rights. The Right to return
to ones country is not guaranteed under the Bill of Rights.
The constitutional guarantees are not absolute and inflexible. It must be adjusted to the requirements of equally
important public interest.
The Right to return to ones country enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
rights, i.e. against being arbitrarily deprived thereof.
The refusal is within the residual powers of President Aquino. This is in line with the governments objective to maintain peace.
To determine the danger posed to the national security of Marcos return is a political question which can only answered by the
Executive. It therefore is a question of state interest of general welfare versus the exercise of a right.
MARCOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN
The right to travel abroad for medical reasons
247 SCRA 127
FACTS: Imelda Marcos was charged with different counts of violations of the Anti-Graft and Corruption practices Act, and was
convicted. She filed a motion to travel abroad, specifically to China, for health examinations which she claims to be a life
threatening medical situation. The recommended tests are said to be unavailable in the Philippines. The motion was supported by
medical report prepared by her physician.
The court invited an amicus curae to conduct an investigation of the situation. The court denied the petitioners motion on the
ground that the necessity of the accused to undertake a trip abroad for diagnosis and treatment has not been established.
ISSUE: W/N HER RIGHT TO TRAVEL WAS VIOLATED.
RULING: NO. The right to travel is not absolute. Since Mrs. Marcos is facing charges, her right to travel may be validly
impaired by the courts.
A persons right to travel is subject to usual constraint imposed by the bery necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In
such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts
discretion.
MIRANDA VS ARIZONA
384 US 436
FACTS: Case 1. An 18-year old girl was kidnapped and forcibly raped near Phoenix, Arizona. Later, Miranda was arrested at
his home and was taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaint witness. Miranda was taken to the
interrogation room and was questioned by 2 police officers. Miranda was not informed of his right to counsel. A written
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confession was later signed by him. On the top portion of the paper was a typewritten paragraph stating that the confession was
made voluntarily without threats or promise of immunity.
Case 2. Vignera was picked up by the New York Police in connection with the robbery of a dress shop three (3) days earlier.
Upon questioning, Vignera orally admitted to the robbery but there was no showing that he had been appraised of his rights.
Case 3. Westover was arrested in Kansas City as a suspect in 2 robberies. Westover was also wanted in an offense in
California. He was then placed under interrogation which lasted for almost three (3) days. Thereafter, he signed confessions
prepared by the agents.
Case 4. Stewart was arrested in his home for endorsing dividend checks from one of a string of robberies. At the time of his
arrest, his home was searched with his permission. Days thereafter, he was subject to interrogation on nine (9) different
occasions. All the while, he was confined and isolated by the investigators except for the first one where he was confronted by
the witness. Thereafter, he was admitted to the commission of the crime.
ISSUE: DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
RULING: Custodial Investigation is defined as the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of action in any significant way.
Procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self-incrimination include:
Prior to questioning:
The person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent;
That any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him.
He has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
Defendant may waive effectuation of the above rights provided, it be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
There can be no questioning if the defendant indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking.
The police may not question him if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated.
The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of
the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.
Incommunicado Interrogation is defined as a police-denominated form of investigation where only the interrogator and the
accused are in the room which results in self-incriminating statements without warnings of constitutional rights.
The person arrested must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent: 1) to make him
aware of the rights he has; 2) because it is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere; 3) to show the individual that his interrogations are prepared to recognize his privilege, should he choose to exercise
it.
There is a need for the warning that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court: 1) to make him aware of
the privilege; 2) to make him aware of the consequences of the foregoing privilege; and 3) to make the individual accurately
aware of a phase in the adversary system.
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The right to counsel is indispensable: 1) to assure that the individuals right to choose between silence and speech remains
unfiltered throughout the interrogation process. This comprehends the right to consult prior to the questioning and the presence
of counsel during any questioning if defendant desires; and 2) to serve significant subsidiary functions (to mitigate the dangers
of untrustworthiness; to reduce the likelihood of coercion, or if exercised, the lawyer may testify the same in court; and to help
guarantee that the accused gives fully accurate statements to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the
prosecution in court.
Awareness brings about the assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Not all confessions through
interrogation are inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and
voluntarily without any compelling influences is admissible.
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APPENDIX
Notes by Paolo Abarquez:
Introduction to law
Course and Discussion Guide
Dean Jose M. Roy
I. The courts and jurisprudence
What are courts? An organ of the government, belonging to the judicial department, whose function is the application of the laws to
controversies brought before it and the public administration of justice. Simply a body organized for the administration of justice. (Blacks Law
Dictionary, 6th edition)
What is Judicial Power? Judicial power, according to Section of Article 8 of the Philippine Constitution, includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Is the power of the court inherent or traditional? How did the notion of judicial power come to this country?
Are decisions law? Yes. According to Article 8 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. However, only the decisions of the Supreme Court are treated as
such, the decisions of the lower courts have not in practice been considered as law because these cases are not largely reported or published.
Parts of a case? The usual parts of the case are:
1) Case Title indicates the nature of the case (e.g. people v. echegaray crim case; republic v. tan case v. govt; etc.)
2) Body the body usually contains the following:
a. Facts the history of how the controversy came to be;
b. Issues questions that the court needs to resolve;
c. Arguments the discussion of differing views of the adverse parties;
d. Ruling the answers to the issues or questions that needs to be resolved;
e. Dispositive the instructions of the court in lieu of its ruling
3) Procedural Antecedents standards that needs to be followed for the higher court to acquire jurisdiction of the case
Dispositive Portion that portion of the case where the order of the court is stated or the conclusion of the case. In Philippine cases, it usually
begins with the word Wherefore.
Separate Opinions the portion of the case where a member of the court would state his reasons and legal basis for not agreeing with the
main opinion. Usually, stated after the main opinion.
Stare Decisis is also known as the doctrine of precedent, simply, that past judicial decisions are generally binding for the disposition of
factually similar present controversies.
Obiter Dictum is language in a decision that is not necessary to the decision. In common parlance, it is what you call a by the way. Since it
is not the Ratio Decidendi or the principle of law which the case has been decided on (opposite of Obiter Dictum), the Obiter Dictum cannot be
binding on future cases, but it might be persuasive.
Leading Case among the various cases that are argued and determined in the courts, some, from their important character, have demanded
more than usual attention from the judges, and from this circumstance are frequently looked upon as having settled or determined the law
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upon all points involved in such cases, and as guides for subsequent decisions, and from the importance they thus acquire are familiarly
termed leading cases.
Landmark Case a case where the Supreme Court rendered a decision that significantly changes existing law.
History of Courts
II. What is Law?
What are the sources of law?
a. custom
b.
What is custom? Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. However, the courts take no judicial notice of custom, and must be proved as fact according to the rules of
evidence to be considered by the courts.
What is Jus Cogens?
Treaties - A compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare. A treaty is not only a law but also a
contract between two nations and must, if possible, be so construed as to give full force and effect to all its parts.
General Principles of Law Municipal Law That which pertains solely to the citizens and inhabitants of a state, and is thus distinguished from international law. In its
more common and narrower connotation however it means those laws which pertain to towns, cities and villages and their local government.
International Law Those laws governing the legal relations between nations. Rules and principles of general application dealing with the
conduct of nations and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons,
whether natural or juridical.
Art II Section 2 of the Philippine constitution The Philippines renounces war as a instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.
III. Judges and Lawyers
What are judges? An officer so named in his commission, who presides in some court; a public officer, appointed to preside and to
administer the law in a court of justice; the chief member of a court, and charged with the control of proceedings and the decision of questions
of law or discretion; a public officer who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority.
Lawyers a person learned in the law; as an attorney, counsel, or solicitor; a person licensed to practice law.
Counsel an attorney or counselor. Advice and assistance given by one person to another in regard to a legal matter, proposed line of
conduct, claim or contention.
attorneys
IV. Modern Judicial Function and Policy
Prospectivity as a general rule, laws are prospective in nature and are not retroactive. The New Civil Code of the Philippines provides under
Article 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
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Ex post facto laws laws which are retroactive in nature. Ex Post Facto laws are explicitly prohibited by the constitution under Section 22 of
the Bill of Rights which states that, No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. The following are ex post facto laws:
1) Law which makes a crime punishable, when it was not punishable at the time it was committed;
2) Law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater or graver than when it was committed;
3) Law which provides for greater punishment to a crime than that annexed to it at the time of commission;
4) Law which alters the legal rules on evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at time of the commission
of the offense in order to convict defendant;
5) Assumes to regulate civil rights only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
6) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, like double jeopardy, or amnesty
Res Judicata This is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of
action. Simply, a thing or matter settled by judgment or that has already been decided.
Law of the case designates the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case to the court below
for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in
the same case where the facts remain the same.
Courts of Equity A court which has jurisdiction in equity, which administers justice and decides controversies in accordance with the rules,
principles, and precedents of equity, and which follows the forms and procedure of chancery; as distinguished from a court having the
jurisdiction, rules, principles, and practice of the law. In the Philippines, our courts are both courts of equity and courts of law.
Tips for Intro to Law by Anthony S. Tan:

1. Buy a law dictionary. Read it. Bring it. Take note of the words you come across when reading the cases.
2. Read the originals. Digests serve only as a guide and works best when the original case is read, either before or after.
3. Read digests when you cant understand the originals, or you dont have time to finish it.
4. Try retelling the case after reading it. (Facts, Issues, Held)
5. Take down notes.
6. Going to study groups to study is not advisable. It would just be a case of a blind person leading another blind person.
You have the embodiments of excellence as your brods. Go ask them.
7. Going to study groups to study is advisable when you have really studied in your own time. Go find a friend. The
more, the many-er. Having a good group of friends is really advisable.
8. Recite with confidence. Never slouch. Never put your hands in you pockets.
9. Be in class ahead of time (at least 30 minutes, I think)
10. Asking questions to Dean Roy is not advisable. Getting into a disagreement with him is suicide.
11. Never let a bad recitation discourage you. There are lots more to come, be sure to redeem yourself. Chances are, you
would be called once, or not at all, some even 3 times.
12. Get some decent sleep.
13. EXCELLENCE
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Introduction To Law: I. Fraternal Order of Utopia

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I.

EL PODER JUDICIAL EN FILIPINAS

1. Laws of Spain: Made Applicable to the Philippines

ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 266

ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3

PCIJ Reports, Series A/B, No. 70, pp. 76-77

HOW TO STUDY LAW AND WRITE LAW EXAMINATIONS

How to Study Law

A. Tools of the Profession

Case Method of Instruction

LANGUAGE MASTERY AND LEGAL TRAINING

CARINO V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 96681. DECEMBER 2, 1991

CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYEH, INC. V. CITY OF HEILAEAH

INTER VIVOS: Within the lifetime

EBRALINAG v. DIVISION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

AUGUST 12, 1959

JUNE 23, 2003

JUNE 17, 1993

JUNE 26, 2003

H. Black American Constitutional Law

LOCUS STANDI: Proper standing in front of the Court

SINE QUA NON: Indispensable requirement

IN PERSONAM: binding only to the parties thereto.

INTESTATE: Without a will

W/N THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONER ESTRADE SHOULD BE ENJOINED DUE TO PREJUDICIAL

JUNE 16, 2003

INTER ALIA: among other things

JUNE 26, 2003

BARNES V. GLEN THEATER, INC.

238 U.S. 697 (1931)

HABEAS CORPUS: produce the body

EMPLOYMENT DIVISION OF OREGON V. SMITH

W/N THE FILM IS COVERED BY PETITIONERS RIGHT OF FREE EXPRESSION.

IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO: Caught red-handed

STATE PROSECUTORS V. MURO

236 SCRA 505

ISSUE: W/N THE PROSECUTION WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

NOV. 19, 2001

181 SCRA 623

NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. US

403 US 713 (1971)

HUSTLER MAGAZINE CASE V. FALWELL

177 SCRA 668

247 SCRA 127

Tips for Intro to Law by Anthony S. Tan:

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