PALS Political Law Doctrinal Syllabus

Jurisprudence Political Law
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER
In the exercise of police power, the State can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility such as
SURNECO. Hence, the ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in
those rates. SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO) v. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, G.R. No. 183626, October 04, 2010
A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the
same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. ABRAHAM RIMANDO v.
NAGUILAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., et al., G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police
power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited,
regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking,
hence, payment of just compensation is not required. On the other hand, in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose
which necessitates the payment of just compensation therefor. MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC.
AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC. v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, G.R.
No. 175356, December 3, 2013
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the Ombudsmans
exercise of discretion, however, the Courts intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse
of the exercise of discretion is shown. ERDITO QUARTO v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN
SIMEON MARCELO, et al., G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011
The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public officials may not be sued for acts
done in the performance of their official functions or within the scope of their authority.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al. v. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC., G.R. No. 182358, February
20, 2013
The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be
sued, either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when a law so provides, while there is
implied consent when the State enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. This Court
explained that in order to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency entered into a
contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its governmental or
proprietary capacity. HEIRS OF DIOSDADO MENDOZA ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014
The DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of
its own and it enjoys immunity from suit. HEIRS OF DIOSDADO MENDOZA ET AL. v.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014
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SEPARATION OF POWERS
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in
character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character. TAWANG MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court
deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to
allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what
constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly
established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of
an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as
Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013
Where the Executive Department implements a relocation of government center, the same is valid
unless the implementation is contrary to law, morals, public law and public policy and the Court
cannot intervene in the legitimate exercise of power of the executive. The rationale is hinged on the
principle of separation of powers which ordains that each of the three great government branches
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officerin-Charge, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) v.
ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, OSMEA I. MONTAER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M. ALVAREZ,
NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B. PUSTA, ANNA MAE A. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S.
KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG W. MACMOD, FLORENCE S. TAYUAN, in their own
behalf and in behalf of the other officials and employees of DA-RFU XII, G.R. No. 179492, June
5, 2013
CHECKS AND BALANCES
Any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy
amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. RE: COA OPINION ON THE
COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE
RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31,
2012
VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

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The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. They cannot be made to do service when what
is involved is a criminal statute. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., v.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et.al., G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005 and its IRR are
constitutional. BUREAU OF (CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) v. HON.
MARGARITO B. TEVES, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 is valid and constitutional. HON.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, et al. v. REY SALAC, et al., G.R. No. 152642, November 13, 2012
A statute having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign
to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject. HENRY R. GIRON v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
188179, January 22, 2013
The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient
academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions, thus, the
requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. UNIVERSITY
OF THE EAST v. ANALIZA F. PEPANIO AND MARITI D. BUENO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23,
2013
The tests to determine if an ordinance is valid and constitutional are divided into the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was
passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving
inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and
the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).
As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the
population and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to
serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was,
therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose. With regard to procedural process
the clamping of the petitioners vehicles was within the exceptions dispensing with notice and
hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was
necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. VALENTINO L. LEGASPI v. CITY OF CEBU,
et al./BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No.
159692. December 10, 2013
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There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of property is
caused by the implementation of R.A. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the
new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and
marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory
measure. No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade
has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
The legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners
by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards as real property transactions are
susceptible to manipulation and corruption. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL
REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE, G.R. No. 197676; February 4, 2014
The petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the
case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is
unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course
will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. Thus, to justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one
that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP,
INC., v. JESSIE ROBREDO, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
The clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5 (1) and (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only,
but also for non-sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups:
(1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties
or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties
or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different
from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. While the major
political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political
parties, however, cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined
political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the
national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to
major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the
party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the
opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
The Supreme Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law." The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in
confusion and absurdity in the party- list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941, must now come to an end. The High Court is sworn to uphold
the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or
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political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not
include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, in this case the Supreme Court remanded the
present petitions to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by the Supreme
Court. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
POWERS OF CONGRESS
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for
all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives. WALDEN F. BELLO
AND LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 191998, December
07, 2010
The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority
to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father
which is not permissible. RENALD F. VILANDO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147, August 23, 2011
The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, must carry with
it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS
CORPORATION, et al. v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012
A person cannot file an action with the Supreme Court questioning the findings of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) except when it committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The abuse must, as contemplated by the law, be so gross that it amounts to evasion of duty. MARIA
LOURDES B. LOCSIN v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MONIQUE
YAZMIN MARIA Q. LAGDAMEO, G.R. No. 204123, March 19, 2013
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal was in no way estopped from subsequently
declaring that the integrity of the ballot boxes was not preserved opposed to its initial findings,
after it had the opportunity to exhaustively observe and examine in the course of the entire revision
proceedings the conditions of all the ballot boxes and their contents, including the ballots
themselves, the Minutes of Voting, Statements of Votes and Election Returns. LIWAYWAY
VINZONS-CHATO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E.
PANOTES, G.R. No. 204637, April 16, 2013
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Absent any of
the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the said contests. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
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Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the statutory public
office or position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position.
Flowing from the legislative power to create public offices is the power to abolish and modify them
to meet the demands of society; Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten the term of
existing statutory offices. When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officers
security of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or the shortening of his term.
Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made
in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent. THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR. v.
BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013
The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. The aim
of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis
for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of
registered voters therein. The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in
Camarines Sur, the current Third District, which brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a
population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007.
However, the wordings of R.A. 9716 indicate the intent of the lawmakers to create a single new
Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First District with Gainza and Milaor. As
to the current Third District, Section 3 (c) of R.A. 9716 used the word rename. Although the
qualifier without a change in its composition was not found in Section 3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d)
and (e), still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second,
while merely renaming the rest. ANGEL G. NAVAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON
B. JULIA, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014
LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER
The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, August 24, 2010
R.A. 9646 does not violate the one title-one subject rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the
Constitution. In Farinas v. Executive Secretary, the Court held it is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient to accomplish that
object. Aside from provisions establishing a regulatory system for the professionalization of the real
estate service sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to
their own properties. The inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the laws primary goal of
developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate
service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will
promote the growth of the real estate industry." REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL
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PDAF
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Legislators have been, in one
form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational aspects of budgeting,
including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the regulation
and release of funds , in violation of the separation of powers principle [The Court cites its Decision
on Guingona, Jr. v. Carague (Guingona, Jr., 1991)]. From the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional [The Court cites its Decision on Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (Abakada,
2008)]. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law.
The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29 (1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to; and
(b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items
of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget which subverts the
prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto.
As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire
P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may
or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a
mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e., scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control,
etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
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To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: [A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing
legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible
to taking undue advantage of their own office.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase as may be defined by law. In this respect, said provision does not, by and of
itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action.
The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of making equal the unequal (Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
113105, August 19, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the
fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the
same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who
do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
Considering that Local Development Councils are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no lawmaking authority except only when acting as a body.
Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As
it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
As for the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of P.D. 1869, as amended by P.D. 1993, indicates that
the Presidential Social Fund may be used to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority. Verily, the law does not supply a definition
of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too
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broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since similar to Section 8 of P.D. 910 it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.;
NEPOMUCENO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 209251,
November 19, 2013
DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through
accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function
pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its
constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to
legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing
more to do during the Budget Execution Stage.
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion
during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic
situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify
the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the
identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict
sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through
the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section
29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25 (5) must be made upon a
concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices.
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any
obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance
or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii)
from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to
vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized
from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus
enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services
approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased
appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of
the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per ZeroBased Budgeting findings." The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis
for the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings. The fact alone that the
appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as
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unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can
be generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been an
allotment or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority.
Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse
whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of
the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength, and underpins "all other
legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive
branches of government." Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for
the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to spend the money. Pertinently, when it
exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public
money should be spent.
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of
appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a
Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of
the government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting
expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization." To conform with the governing
principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a
PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated
funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for
another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SEMION C. AQUINO III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014
CYBERCRIME LAW
Section 4 (c) (3) Penalizing posts of unsolicited commercial communications or SPAM. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. Commercial speech though not accorded the
same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression; it is
nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob one of these rights without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Section 12 Authorizing the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time. If such would be
granted to law enforcement agencies it would curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for
official abuse. Section 12 is too broad and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal
boundaries and invading the right to privacy.
Informational Privacy which is the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters has two
aspects, specifically: (1) The right not to have private information disclosed; and (2) The right to
live freely without surveillance and intrusion.
Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology users and transmitting
communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed and
sending it through the postal service.
Another reason to strike down said provision is by reason that it allows collection and recording
traffic data with due cause. Section 12 does not bother to relate the collection of data to the
probable commission of a particular crime. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the
Constitution prohibits. Likewise it is bit descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be
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used. The authority given is too sweeping and lacks restraint which may only be used for Fishing
Expeditions and unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or worse to extortion
from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 19 Authorizing the DOJ to restrict or block access to suspected computer data. Computer
data produced by its author constitutes personal property regardless of where it is stored. The
provision grants the Government the power to seize and place the computer data under its control
and disposition without a warrant. The DOJ order cannot substitute
judicial search warrants.
Content of the computer data also constitutes speech which is entitled to protection. If an executive
officer could be granted such power to acquire data without warrants and declare that its content
violates the law that would make him the judge, jury and executioner all rolled in one.
Section 19 also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of
restrictions on speech: (1) dangerous tendency doctrine; (2) balancing of interest test; and (3) clear
and present danger rule.
It merely requires that the data be blocked if on its face it violate any provision of the cybercrime
law.
Section 4 (c) (4) penalizes libel in connection with Section 5 which penalizes aiding or abetting to
said felony. Section 4 (c) (4) is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the
post but void and unconstitutional with respect to other who simply receive the post and react to it.
With regard to the author of the post, Section 4 (c) (4) merely affirms that online defamation
constitutes similar means for committing libel as defined under the RPC.
The internet encourages a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. Facebook and Twitter were
given as examples and stated that the acts of liking, commenting, sharing or re-tweets, are not
outrightly considered to be aiding or abetting. Compared to the physical world such would be mere
expressions or reactions made regarding a specific post.
The terms aiding or abetting constitute a broad sweep that generates a chilling effect on those
who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicament awaits
internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues and democracy will be
threatened together with all liberties.
Charging offenders of violation of R.A. 10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel and likewise
with R.A. 9775 on Child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The acts defined in the
Cybercrime Law involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same with the
RPC and R.A. 9775. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R.
No. 203335. February 18, 2014
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
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The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by
this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. IN
THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
et al., G.R. No. 189155, September 07, 2010
The doctrine of state immunity should not be extended to the petitioner as the same is an agency of
the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead
involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the
exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v.
SPOUSES DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011
The president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZV. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al., G.R. No. 191805, 193160, November 15,
2011
POWERS
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. 58 is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency. JUDGE
ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MANUEL E. GAITE et al., G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency. The calling out of
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President, without need of congressional authority to exercise the
same. DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, et al. v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, et al., G.R. No. 190259,
June 7, 2011
The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated
legislative authority to reorganize his own office pursuant to Executive Order No (E.O.) 292.
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS-INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, et al., G.R. NO. 196425, JULY 24,
2012
Directives and orders issued by the President in the valid exercise of his power of control over the
executive department must be obeyed and implemented in good faith by all executive officials. Acts
performed in contravention of such directives merit invalidation. DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO, et
al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUDIT OFFICE,
G.R. No. 189774, September 18, 2012
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in
accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is
best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. It simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above
the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that
"administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
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contrary to the laws or the Constitution." NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO
ALMARIO, et al. v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the
President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not
yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. ALFREDO LIM, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015
The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or
the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions
are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter. There can be no question
that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this case,
approval of the Amendments to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA) by the DOTC
Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President. The same would be true even without
the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the
authority to approve contracts entered into by the Toll Regulatory Board. ANA THERESIA RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015
POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The power to appoint rests essentially on free choice. The appointing authority has the right to
decide who best fits the job from among those who meet the minimum requirements for it. As an
outsider, quite remote from the day-to-day problems of a government agency, no court of law can
presume to have the wisdom needed to make a better judgment respecting staff appointments.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND NATIONAL MARITIME
POLYTECHNIC (NMP) v. RUBEN Y. MACEDA, G.R. No. 185112, January 18, 2010
Prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. ARTURO DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL AND PRES. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
The prohibition against the President or Acting President to make appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G. R. No. 191002, April
20, 2010
POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
The Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power including
the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally- created Office of the Ombudsman. EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES et al., G.R. Nos. 196231, 196232 September 04, 2012
POWERS RELATIVE TO APPROPRIATION MEASURES
Page 13 of 100

The power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch includes such powers and functions
that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the
Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific
provisions in general appropriations laws. ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA et al. v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
JUDICIAL POWER
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under
Article VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the
adjudicative function of the Court. METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618,
June 7, 2011
The fact that the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) conducts public
consultations or hearings does not mean that it is performing quasi-judicial functions. SALVACION
VILLANUEVA, et al. v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, et al., G.R. No.
178347, February 25, 2013
The Constitutional mandate of the courts in our triangular system of government is clear, so that as
a necessary requisite of the exercise of judicial power there must be, with a few exceptions, an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution, not merely a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. As
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides, "judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The
limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned
to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., et al., G.R. No.
197942-43/G.R. No. 199528. March 26, 2014
The interpretation and application of laws have been assigned to the Judiciary under our system of
constitutional government. Indeed, defining and interpreting the laws are truly a judicial function.
Hence, the Court of Appeals (CA) could not be denied the authority to interpret the provisions of the
articles of incorporation and bylaws of Forest Hills, because such provisions, albeit in the nature of
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private laws, have an impact on the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties. FOREST
HILLS GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., v. GARDPRO, INC., G.R. No. 164686, October 22, 2014
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the
claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct. When the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, et al. v. MICHAEL ALFIO
PENNISI, G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010
The discretion to determine whether a case should be filed or not lies with the Ombudsman. Unless
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is shown, judicial review is
uncalled for as a policy of non-interference by the courts in the exercise of the Ombudsmans
constitutionally mandated powers. ANGELITA DE GUZMAN v. EMILIO A. GONZALEZ III, et al., G.R.
No. 158104, March 26, 2010
Unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere in the findings of probable cause determined by the
Ombudsman. ROBERTO B. KALALO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ
AND MARCELO L. AGUSTIN, G.R. No. 158189, April 23, 2010
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies - not unlawfully defies - the constitutional
directive. As intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not
separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
When the issues presented do not require the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of a body
but are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction should not be applied. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v.
SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, G.R. No. 187714, March 08, 2011
The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is
obviously not within the province of this Court. Such determination belongs to the Executive
branch. BARANGAY CAPTAIN BEDA TORRECAMPO v. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND
SEWERAGE SYSTEM, et al., G.R. No. 188296, May 30, 2011
Certiorari does not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary
settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted
Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion.
SPOUSES ANTONIO AND FE YUSAY v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
OF MANDALUYONG CITY, G.R. No. 156684, April 06, 2011
This Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of
a division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the
Page 15 of 100

commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO v.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DANTE O. TINGA, G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011
While as a rule, it is beyond the province of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties evidence all
over again in reviewing administrative decisions, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious
ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. ANTONIO T. REYES G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011
The power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues
in impeachment proceedings. CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA v. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES SITTING AS AN IMPEACHMENT COURT, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
Courts cannot certainly give primacy to matters of procedure over substance in a party-list groups
Constitution and By-Laws, especially after the general membership has spoken. SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ROMEO R. ROBJSO, PEDRO T. DABU, JR., LOPE E. FEBLE, NOEL T. TIAMPONG and
JOSE FLORO CRISOLOGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JONATHAN DE LA CRUZ, ED
VINCENT ALBANO and BENEDICT KATO, G.R. No. 203646, April 16, 2013
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsmans decision shall be final, executory, and
unappealable. But of course, the said principle is subject to the rule that decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still "subject to judicial review if
they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law,
or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature
as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings."
FREDERICK JAMES C. ORAlS v. DR. AMELIA C. ALMIRANTE, G.R. No. 181195, June 10, 2013
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible to judicial resolution. Petitioners who are real estate developers are entities directly
affected by the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice of real estate service without
first complying with the registration and licensing requirements for brokers and agents under R.A.
9646. The possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law is likewise
real. Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property owners, petitioners challenged
on constitutional grounds the laws implementation which respondents defended as a valid
legislation pursuant to police power. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL
Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases and
resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months from
the date they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN
MARCELO v. JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
78, PARANAQUE CITY, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838, March 12, 2014
What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of constitutionality is the fact that
this issue is not the lis mota of this case. Lis mota literally means the cause of the suit or action; it
is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption
of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our coequal branches of the government.
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC., v. JESSIE ROBREDO, G.R. No. 200903, July 22,
2014
Page 16 of 100

The petition did not comply with the requisites of judicial review as there was no actual case or
controversy. Petitioner's allegations show that he wants the Supreme Court to strike down the
proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court must act only within its
powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed bills
because a bill is not a law. The court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative
power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is
mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a
bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not
ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or
controversy that is ripe for this court's determination. IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME
COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF THE JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF AUTONOMY, UDK-15143; January 21, 2015
The following are the determinants of an issue having transcendental importance: (a) the character
of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (c) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising
the questions being raised. None of the determinants is present in this case. The events feared by
petitioner are merely speculative. IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF)
AND REDUCTION OF AUTONOMY, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE
The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the
executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are
quasi-legislative in nature. HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED et.al v. PRESIDENTIAL
AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its
effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the
operative fact doctrine may apply. The Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects
by applying the operative fact doctrine. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SEMION C.
AQUINO III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
MOOT & ACADEMIC
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered
to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is
moot, it becomes non-justiciable. ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO v. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO
ESTRADA AND COMELEC, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010
E.O. 883 and Career Executive Service Board Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force
and effect, the Court can no longer pass upon the issue of their constitutionality. ATTY. ELIAS
OMAR A. SANA v. CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD, G.R. No. 192926, November 15, 2011
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A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties
or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. JOEL P. QUIO, et al. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RITCHIE R. WAGAS, G.R. No. 197466, November 13, 2012
Retirement from the service during the pendency of an administrative case does not render the
case moot and academic. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MARCELINO A. DECHAVEZ, G.R. No.
176702, November 13, 2013
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. The Court, as a rule, will
decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case and proceed to dismiss it when the issues posed have
been mooted by supervening events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling from the Court no longer
has any practical value and, from this perspective, effectively ceases to be a justiciable controversy.
While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic" principle, these
exceptions relate only to situations where: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the
situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. BANKERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and PERRY L. PE v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 206794, November 26, 2013
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy. Thus,
in Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco we have ruled that "where the issue has become moot and academic,
there is no justiciable controversy, and adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however
intellectually challenging." HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 184496, December 2, 2013
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN AND ALBERT
LEE G. ANGELES v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
As stated in Francisco v. HRET, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally-imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the
existence of constitutionally-imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the
scrutiny and review of this court. In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the
right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD,
REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF
IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
APPOINTMENT TO THE JUDICIARY
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been signed by the
President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the
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appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the CA in connection with
Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by R.A. 8246. RE: SENIORITY AMONG THE FOUR (4)
MOST RECENT APPOINTMENTS TO THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS, A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010
The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any
inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, et al., G.R. NO. 202242, July
17, 2012
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to
be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the Framers were not keen on
adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the
exercise of its primary function to legislate. In the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a
unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major
branches of government. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature,
not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch
of government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress,
whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to
represent the entire Congress. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral fitness is
challenged. It follows then that the unanimity rule only comes into operation when the moral
character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially
unrelated to an applicants moral uprightness. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees.
The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial,
quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal
or administrative offense but to ascertain the fitness of an applicant vis--vis the requirements for
the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon by
Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most,
discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against him.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose to tread on his
view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge. FRANCIS H.
JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, G.R. No. 213181, August 19,
2014
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
THE COMMISSION OF AUDIT
POWERS
The Commission on Audit (COA) has been granted by the Constitution the authority to establish a
special audit group when a transaction warrants the formulation of the same and the authority to
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determine the scope of its audit and examination as well as the methods and techniques to be used
therefor. THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. COURT OF APPEALS and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 174788, April 11, 2013
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public funds, with enough latitude to determine, prevent
and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. The COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its
constitutional duty and the Court generally sustains its decisions in recognition of its expertise in
the laws it is entrusted to enforce.
On the issue whether the TESDA officials should refund the excess EME granted to them, the Court
applied the ruling in the case Casal v. COA where the Court held that the approving officials are
liable for the refund of the incentive award due to their patent disregard of the law of and the
directives of COA. Accordingly, the Director-General's blatant violation of the clear provisions of the
Constitution, the 2004- 2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. He is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for
himself. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA PULIDO TAN, COMMISSIONER JUANITO
G. ESPINO, JR. AND COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA, G.R. No. 204869. March 11, 2014
JURISDICTION
It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Commission of Audit, are
generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in
recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction. RUBEN REYNA AND
LLOYD SORIA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011
Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government
instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of
its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter. BOY SCOUTS
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMSSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is
the Commission on Audit which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities.
The scope of the COAs authority to take cognizance of claims is however circumscribed to mean
only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and
such other papers within reach of accounting officers. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013
Under Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA was vested with the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle the accounts of non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government. Complementing
this power is Section 29 (1) of the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial authority over nongovernmental entities required to pay levy or government share.
The Manila Export and Cultural Office (MECO) is not a government-owned and controlled
corporation or a government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted
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by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan. However,
despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
verification fees it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the consular fees it collects under Section 2
(6) of E.O. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its
collection of such verification fees and consular fees should be audited by the Commission of
Audit. Section 14 (1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit accounts of
nongovernmental entities required to pay ... or have government share but only with respect to
funds ... coming from or through the government. This provision of law perfectly fits the MECO.
DENNIS A.B. FUNA v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE AND COA, G.R. No. 193462,
February 4, 2014
The COA disallowed the payment of healthcare allowance of TESDA employees. COA is generally
accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine
and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is
sanctioned by law. Only in instances when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction shall the Court interfere.
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) v. THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JURISDICTION
Civil Service Commission (CSC) has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who
initiated the complaint. CSC likewise exercises concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of
Regents over administrative cases. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 176162, 178845, October 09, 2012
Where the law allows its Board of Directors to create its own staffing pattern, it may hire a person
even if the position being filled does not exist in the compensation and classification system of the
Civil Service Commission. The rules that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) formulates should
implement and be in harmony with the law it seeks to enforce. This is so since the CSC cannot
enforce civil service rules and regulations contrary to, and cannot override, the laws enacted by
Congress. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013
When a public school teacher is subject of an administrative action, concurrent jurisdiction exists in
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of
Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC). Hence, the body that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. ALBERTO
PAT-OG, SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013
ADDITIONAL, DOUBLE, OR INDIRECT COMPENSATION
There has been no change of any long-standing rule, thus, no redefinition of the term capital. The
terms capital stock subscribed or paid, capital stock, and capital were defined solely to
determine the basis for computing the supervision and regulation fees under Section 40 (e) and (f)
of the Public Service Act. HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B.
TEVES, G.R. No. 176579, October 09, 2012
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BILL OF RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS (RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY)
Due process, simply requires: (1) the right to notice of the institution of the proceedings that may
affect a persons legal right; (2) the right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; (3) the right to a tribunal so
constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent
jurisdiction; and (4) the right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial
evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.
MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) et al., G.R. Nos.
187958, 187961, and 187962, April 7, 2010
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR v.
APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A. APRESA, PEOPLES LAW ENFORCEMENT
BOARD (PLEB), G.R. No. 177878, April 7, 2010
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration. A.Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly
or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked. WINSTON F. GARCIA v. MARIO MOLINA AND ALBERT VELASCO,
G.R. No. 157383, August 10, 2010
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. RIMANDO GANNAPAO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, et al., G.R.
No. 180141, May 31, 2011
As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no
reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard. MONICO K.
IMPERIAL, JR. v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 191224, October 4,
2011
The forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that
violates or threatens the right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected
to forward and share intelligence regarding private army groups (PAGs) with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. MARYNETTE R.
GAMBOA v. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012
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Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due process was in fact
given several opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he
squanders these chances, then his cry for due process must fail. THE HEIRS OF JOLLY R. BUGARIN
v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174431, August 6, 2012
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity
for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. DR. FERNANDO A. MELENDRES M.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
THE LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES [LCP] v. PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION,
et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense.
What matters for due process purpose are notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which
the notice is given, and simply the opportunity to be heard. SPS. EUGENE C. GO AND ANGELITA
GO, AND MINOR EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO v. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, et al.,
G.R. No. 169391, October 10, 2012
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.
JOHN C. ARROYO, et al. v. ROSAL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC, G.R. No. 175155, October
22, 2012
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. PACIFICO C. VELASCO v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169253, February 20, 2013
A government officer subject of an administrative action cannot claim that his right to due process
was violated when he was made known of the charges against him and when he was able to file a
counter- affidavit to refute the allegations against him. In an administrative case, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ARLIC ALMOJUELA, G.R. No. 194368, April 2,
2013
The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this
administrative case. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support
of his defense. The law simply requires that the civil servant is informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him in a clear and concise manner to give the person a chance to answer the
allegations intelligently. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v.
ARIEL R. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to
be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long
as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due
Page 23 of 100

process. ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 195395,
September 10, 2013
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given
an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. RAY PETER O. VIVO v.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR), G.R. No. 187854, November
12, 2013
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The
victim is required under R.A. 9262 (or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004) not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses affidavits to
the petition. The grant of a Temporary Protection Order ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to
enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC
may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Further, the essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. RALPH P. TUA v. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, G.R. No. 170701,
January 22, 2014
In due process, the parameter required is the presence of an opportunity to be heard, as well as the
time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is
based. This was not properly afforded to Saint Louis University. Plenary contempt power must be
exercised judiciously and sparingly with highest self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the
same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retribution or vindication. It
should not be availed of unless necessary in the interest of justice. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC.,
ET AL. v. BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, ET AL., G.R. No. 162299; March 25, 2014
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard
through his motion for reconsideration. In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the
respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution.
Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents
availed of. On the respondents allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI
investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and informational
in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any
party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings
are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as
public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when
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requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible.
Since the NBIs findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the respondents
due process right could have taken place; the NBIs findings were still subject to the prosecutors
and the Secretary of Justices actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause. We
find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank were submitted by
the respondents for the consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary of
Justice during the preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity
to examine these signatures. RAY SHU v. JAIME DEE, ET AL., G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014
On the procedural grounds, the Court did not subscribe to the contention that petitioners right to
due process was violated after the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to
Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, the petitioner had ample
opportunity to refute the allegations contained in the Violation Report. The essence of due process
is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his case; what the law
abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. When the party
seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it
was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must
fail. NEIL E. SUYAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189644, July 2, 2014
It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable
valid purpose. Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
contract, in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of
respondents salary must be modified accordingly. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY,
INC., v. JOY C. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no
expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELECs infringement
upon petitioners property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their
fundamental right to speech. Respondents have not demonstrated that the present state interest
they seek to promote justifies the intrusion into petitioners property rights. Election laws and
regulations must be reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individuals right to exercise
property rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD,
REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF
IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
K & G Mining Corporation was not deprived of due process. So long as a party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there
was denial of due process. The question is not whether petitioner succeeded in defending its rights
and interests, but simply, whether it had the opportunity to present its side of the
controversy. Records show that the case took its regular course in lower tribunals. KGMC had the
opportunity to be heard, was so heard and actively participated, in the proceedings before the Panel
of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board. K & G MINING CORPORATION v. ACOJE MINING
CORPORATION, INC., G.R. No. 188364, February 11, 2015
A cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected
private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceeding conducted within the
bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that reason, the Philippine Military Academy is not
immune from the strictures of due process.
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The statement that a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order
for the Code and System to be implemented simply pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in
order to prove that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain
vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context of disciplinary
investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to
the cadets rights to privacy and to remain silent.
The minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process for
students in disciplinary cases are: (1) The students must be informed in writing of the nature and
the cause of any accusation against them; (2) They shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) They shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) The
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Proceedings may be
summary. Cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation. Only substantial evidence
is required, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted
to investigate a cadets honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial
proceeding. There is aversion to undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military
academy. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), G.R. No. 211362,
February 24, 2015
EQUAL PROTECTION
The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a
reasonable classification. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL, G.R.
No. 176006, March 26, 2010
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to
equal protection of the law. ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAA v. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010
E.O. 1, creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, is declared unconstitutional insofar as it
is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO v. THE
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 193036, December 07, 2010
The consolidation of cases to a DOJ Special Panel under DO No. 182 does not violate equal
protection of law and the right to speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution.
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R.
No. 188056, January 08, 2013
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The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of
contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. Section 47 of R.A. 8791 did not divest
juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for
the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135.
There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47
exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners
shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Further, the equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or
class privilege. Equal protection permits of reasonable classification. The difference in the
treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties
foreclosed whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption
period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is
deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable
mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING
CORPORATION v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, G.R. NO. 195540, MARCH 13, 2013
We note that the Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in
law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not prohibit discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws
clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
AMELIA AQUINO, RODOLFO TAGGUEG, JR., ADELAIDA HERNANDEZ and LEOPOLDO
BISCOCHO, JR. v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 181973, April 17, 2013
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws, for the following reasons:
(1) R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women
and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law; (2) The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The
distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children; (3) the classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members. The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the
safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262
applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE
HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court- Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, G.R. No. 179267,
June 25, 2013
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. In approving R.A. 9646, the
legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all
real estate service practitioners, including and more importantly, those real estate service
practitioners working for real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated
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transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses, and condominium
units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure
the health and safety of home and lot buyers. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL
This right does not require universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the same class. The Reproductive Health Law (RH
Law) does not discriminate the poor. Rather, the RH Law provides priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women and children by providing free medical care. JAMES
M. IMBONG, et al. v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within
the same class are treated alike, in terms of privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. It is a
guarantee against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. There can never be a justification for any form of government action
that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially
when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the
disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution
commands. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139,
August 5, 2014
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or
other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted
on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
BELEN MACARIOS, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be
in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. ELENITA
C. FAJARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011
A settled exception of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is that of an
arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. NGYIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG et al., G.R. No. 180452, January 10, 2011
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of workrelated misconduct. BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINODAVID, et al., G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
In a buy-bust operation, the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized, but
duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or
used in the commission of the crime. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGG C.
BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No. 184807, November 23, 2011
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and
privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby
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obtained. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO BELOCURA, G.R. No. 173474, August 29,
2012
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means
taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION AND HYMAN YAP v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
(PLOT), et al., G.R. Nos. 170217, 170694 December 10, 2012
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. DON DJOWEL SALES v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191023, February 6, 2013
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The elements must be complied strictly since if
the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted therefrom was likewise illegal. GEORGE
ANTIQUERA Y CODES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013
A general warrant is defined as "[a] search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person
to be arrested or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which
items to take. Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is
issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are
searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in
a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. The
warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid since it is incidental to a
lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as
a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in
hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before
their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any
irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. DONALD VASQUEZ, G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is therefore
a reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that
may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested and (2) evidence from being
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destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of
the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. MEDARIO CALANTIAO, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because [o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement
the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
Considering that the appellants warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and
seizure. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLIVER RENATO EDANO, G.R. No. 188133, July 7,
2014
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of the
aforequoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYMAN ENDAYA, G.R. No. 205741, July 23, 2014
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence
to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR COGAED, G.R. No.
200334, July 30, 2014
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also
inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any
of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police
officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive
his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the
accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a persons constitutional
right to privacy requires no less. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR COGAED, G.R. No.
200334, July 30, 2014
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
An individuals right to privacy under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access. The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers residence, therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private, including a business office. In
this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection
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and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Simply put, a person has a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in his property, whether he uses it as a business office or as a residence and that the
installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing his property or covering a significant
portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. SPOUSES BILL
AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 179736,
June 26, 2013
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an
independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world,
of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Considering that the default
setting for Facebook posts is Public, it can be surmised that the photographs in question were
viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to
the right to informational privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily bolster the petitioners
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting
still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following: (1) Facebook
allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share
in any conceivable way; (2) A good number of Facebook users befriend other users who are total
strangers; (3) The sheer number of Friends one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A
users Facebook friend can share the formers post, or tag others who are not Facebook friends
with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends. It is well to
emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details privacy to Friends is no assurance
that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the
content.
Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their
protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES v. ST. THERESAS
COLLEGE, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty
or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression
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of this video which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the
internet for public consumption he failed to explain the connection between such interest and
any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive
versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke,
alleging and eventually proving the nexus between ones privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account
certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. DR. JOY MARGATE LEE
v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for
contemptuous acts against the Court. However, mere criticism should be distinguished from insult.
MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMELEC, ET AL., G.R. No. 209185, February 25, 2014
The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such
a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their
ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence
of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair and
credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a right to reply.66 Given that
express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental Law itself has weighed in on
the balance to be struck between the freedom of the press and the right to reply. Accordingly, one is
not merely to see the equation as purely between the press and the right to reply. Instead, the
constitutionally-mandated desiderata of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections
would necessarily have to be factored in trying to see where the balance lies between press and the
demands of a right-to-reply. GMA NETWORK, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., G.R.
No. 205357, September 2, 2014
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not
candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law; (b)
reasonable; (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression; and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the
speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter
whether the speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal
message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy. Second, the present law
Section 3.3 of R.A. 9006 and Section 6 (c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 if applied to this
case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without
any relation to the distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain
distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence,
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would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political
consequences. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL
V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The exercise of the right to travel guaranteed by the Constitution is not absolute. Section 6, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such restriction
is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE
IGNACIO B. MACARINE, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law." HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v. ABELARDO R. DOMONDON, et al., G.R. No.
165036, July 5, 2010
The right to information allows the public to hold public officials accountable to the people and aids
them in engaging in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation. By itself, it does not extend to causing the award of the sale of
government assets in failed public biddings. Thus, assuming that a bidder, in a public bidding for
the sale of government assets, may access the records for the purpose of validating the indicative
price under the right to information, it does not follow that the said bidder is entitled to the award.
PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE v. STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT and/or
PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 200402, June 13, 2013
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they impinge upon
the individual employees right or freedom of association, is not to protect the union for the unions
sake. Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain protections to the certified
bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong and effective union presumably benefits
all employees in the bargaining unit since such a union would be in a better position to demand
improved benefits and conditions of work from the employer. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI
UNIBANK, G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010
RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The Reproductive Health Law (RH Law) does not violate the right to religious freedom when it
comes to mandatorily using taxpayers money to fund contraceptives and when it comes to
requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of marriage license, attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding, and infant nutrition. The State may pursue its
objectives without being dictated by the policies of a particular religion; otherwise, it would violate
the separation of State and Church.
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But the RH Law violates the right to religious freedom when it comes to compelling medical health
practitioners, health care providers, and hospitals to refer patients to other institutions even
though it is against their religious beliefs. It has been held that religious freedom yields to
compelling state interest. However, using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling
state interest to limit the free exercise of the conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger
to life or health of an individual in the perceived scenarios. JAMES M. IMBONG, et al. v. HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
The subject tarpaulins, on its face, do not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church."
That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin
regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech.
On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team
Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH Law. The position of the Catholic religion in
the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members
of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of
the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not
religious speech. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL
V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
EMINENT DOMAIN
Notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the
States intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the
opportunity to present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from
the agrarian law. HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE, NAMELY: JOSEFA DELESTE, et al. v. LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011
The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his property is now
required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against the allegations in the
complaint for eminent domain. CITY OF MANILA v. MELBA TAN TE, G.R. No. 169263, September
21, 2011
In expropriation cases, the trial court has the discretion to act based the commissioners report.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. SPS. TAN SONG BOK AND JOSEFINA S. TAN, et al., G.R. No. 191448,
November 16, 2011
Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, Hacienda Luisita Inc.
(HLI)s submitting its stock distribution program for approval is an acknowledgment on its part
that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC
approval which should be considered as the effective date of taking as it was only during this time
that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands. HACIENDA LUISITA,
INCORPORATED v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, et al., G.R. No. 171101, April
24, 2012
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There is nothing infirm in an agreement which impliedly waives the right of City of Manila to
present evidence that it was acquiring the subject lots by expropriation for a proper public purpose
since it may be assumed that the parties knew what they were doing and since such agreement
would facilitate early disposal of the case. CITY OF MANILA v. ALEGAR CORPORATION, et al., G.R.
No. 187604, June 25, 2012
The consequence of a finding of unjust and improper titling of the entire property by the Republic is
that the title over the excluded portion shall be returned or transferred back to the owners of the
lot, with damages. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. PAZ O. MONTALVAN, JOINED BY
HER HUSBAND, JESUS J. MONTALVAN, G.R. No. 190336, June 27, 2012
Sequestration is not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to his property
and vest the same in the sequestering agency, the Government or any other person, as these can be
done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by law. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI (THROUGH ITS EXECUTOR, MANUEL G. MONTECILLO),
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) et al., G.R. No. 183446, November 13, 2012
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential
damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner
suffers from impairment or decrease in value. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS (BPI), G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Taking of private
property without just compensation is a violation of a persons property right. In situations where
the government does not take the trouble of initiating an expropriation proceeding, the private
owner has the option to compel payment of the property taken, when justified. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH) v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014
JUST COMPENSATION
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their
behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010
Although the formula found in Section 17 of the CARL may be justly adopted in certain cases, it is by
no means the only formula that the court may adopt in determining just compensation. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FORTUNE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177511, June
29, 2010
The just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an
effective forbearance on the part of the State. Thus, the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum,
computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation was
paid. APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION, INC., v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010
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It is settled that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The Department of
Agrarian Reforms's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive
upon the landowner or any other interested party. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLENN Y.
ESCANDOR, et.al., G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010
It is a settled rule that the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal
criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner.
MOISESTINIO, JR. AND FRANCIS TINIO v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 160923,
January 24, 2011
Just compensation determined in accordance with R.A. 6657, and not P.D. 27 or E.O. 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full,
and ample. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAGIN FERRER, ATTY. RAFAEL VILLAROSA,
G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011
The Land Bank of the Philippines is not merely a nominal party in the determination of just
compensation but an indispensable participant in such proceedings. As such, LBP possessed the
legal personality to institute a petition for determination of just compensation. DAVAO FRUITS
CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181566, March 09, 2011
The proper determination of the same is a matter of transcendental importance. The determination
of just compensation goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of public
interest the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a
landowner to receive just compensation when the government exercises the power of eminent
domain in its agrarian reform program. APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION,
INC. v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 164195, April 05, 2011
The fair market value of the lot should be determined at the time when the parties signed the
compromise agreement and the same was approved because this is tantamount to EPZA impliedly
agreeing to paying the market value in 1993. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. ESTATE
OF SALUD JIMENEZ, et al., G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011
The Court has already categorically declared in that if the issue of just compensation is not settled
prior to the passage of the CARL, it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although
the property was acquired under P.D. 27. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JESUS S.
YUJUICO, et al., G.R. No. 18471, March 21, 2012
In the payment of just compensation, the payment of interest shall be made until full payment of the
amount adjudged as just compensation for the land. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
PERFECTO OBIAS, et al, G.R. No. 184406, March 14, 2012
Just compensation for private agricultural lands acquired by the government under the auspices of
P.D. 27 in relation to E.O. 228 should be computed in accordance with the method set forth under
R.A. 6657. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY OIC-SECRETARY JOSE
MARI B. PONCE, NOW BY SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN v. HEIRS OF ANGEL T.
DOMINGO, G.R. No. 188670, March 7, 2012
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC
acting as a special agrarian court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full
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consideration the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special agrarian
courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SALVADOR ENCINAS and JACOBA DELGADO,
G.R. No. 167735, April 18, 2012
The Department of Agrarian Reform, as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation
of the agrarian reform program and pursuant to its rule-making power under R.A. 6657, translated
the factors in Section 17 into a basic formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, and those found in
succeeding DAR administrative regulations. The application of these formulas is mandatory and
imposes upon the RTC-SACs the duty to apply, and not to disregard, them in determining just
compensation. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JUAN LOPEZ, et al, G.R. No.
171038, June 20, 2012
Evidently in a case where the conflict is exactly on just compensation, the agrarian reform process
has yet to be completed. Thus, the land shall be considered taken only upon payment of just
compensation because it would complete the agrarian reform process. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM v. MANOLOGODUCO, G.R. Nos. 174007, 181327, June 27, 2012
In appraising just compensation the courts must consider, in addition, all the facts regarding the
condition of the landholding and its surroundings, as well as the improvements and the capabilities
of the landholding. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VERONICA ATEGANABLE, G.R. No.
176692, June 27, 2012
When the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation due the landowner
has yet to be settled, such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded
under R.A. 6657. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMILIANO R. SANTIAGO, JR., G.R. No.
182209, October 03, 2012
Acquisition of the property under OLT or P.D. 27 does not necessarily mean that the determination
of just compensation thereof must be under the same decree. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SPS. ROKAYA AND SULAIMAN BONA, G.R. No. 180804, November 12, 2012
It is well-settled that, in expropriation of properties, the amount of just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking. HENRY L. SY v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY,
G.R. No. 202690, June 5, 2013
When a private property is taken for public use and there is a dispute as to the amount of just
compensation, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. Compensation
must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost
of expropriation. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and
DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS v. SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA
TECSON, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013
When the government takes property pursuant to P.D. 27, but does not pay the landowner his just
compensation until after R.A. 6657 has taken effect in 1998, it becomes more equitable to
determine just compensation using R.A. 6657 and not E.O. 228. Hence, the valuation of the GSP of
palay should be based on its value at the time it was ordered paid by the SAC. It is more equitable to
determine just compensation due the petitioners using values pursuant to the standard laid down
in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, considering that the tenant-beneficiaries have already benefited from the
land, while the landowners wait in vain to be paid. THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES DOMINGO TRIA AND
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CONSORCIA CAMANO TRIA v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. No. 170245, July 1, 2013
Where there is a dispute as to the amount of just compensation, the method to be used in the
determination of the value of the land must result to a fair and reasonable amount and must not
drastically reduce the said value. Just compensation refers to full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from the owner and to be "just," the compensation must be real, substantial, full and ample.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL O. GALLEGO, JR., JOSEPH L. GALLEGO and
CHRISTOPHER L. GALLEGO, G.R. No. 173226, July 29, 2013
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be a sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition.
The amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the
action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of
the time of the filing of the complaint.
Further, the Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily;
several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market
value of like properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But
before these factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by
documentary evidence. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 193936. December 11, 2013
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. To guide the RTC-SAC
in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken
into account to correctly determine just compensation. The law (under Section 49 of R.A. 6657)
likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 598 incorporating the laws listed factors in determining just compensation into a basic formula that
contains the details that take these factors into account. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, G.R. No. 172551. January 15, 2014
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. It must not be arrived at
arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors.
Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value of expropriated land taken
for national government infrastructure projects: (a) the classification and use for which the
property is suited; (b) the developmental costs for improving the land; (c) the value declared by the
owners; (d) the current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity; (e) the reasonable disturbance
compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the
value of the improvements thereon; (f) the size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal
valuation of the land; (g) the price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as
documentary evidence presented; and (h) such facts and events as to enable the affected property
owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those
required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible. In
this case, the trial court failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax
declarations, and current selling price supported by documentary evidence.
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Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate and cannot be the
sole basis of just compensation in expropriation cases. Various factors can come into play in the
valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. Among the factors to be considered in
arriving at the fair market value the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location,
and the tax declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. To be
just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v.
ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 192100. March 12, 2014
The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be
reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. An emancipation patent constitutes
the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee.
It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of
ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTORINO T. PERALTA, G.R. No. 182704, April 23, 2014
The clear intent of the Constitutional guarantee of just compensation, whether understood within
the terms of Article III, Section 9 or of Article XIII, Section 4, is to secure to any owner the "full and
fair equivalent" of the property taken. Regardless of whether the taking was pursued in the
"traditional" exercise of eminent domain or in its "revolutionary" exercise in the context of the
States agrarian reform program, just compensation has but one meaning and the State is obligated
to pay the "fair and full price of the property" even if the property is taken for social justice
purposes. Jurisprudence settles that the determination of just compensation is fundamentally a
function of the courts. Section 57 of R.A. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the States
agrarian reform program. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENECIO EUSEBIO, JR., G.R. No.
160143, July 2, 2014
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property
is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. In addition, the factors enumerated
under Section 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program are: (a) the acquisition cost of
the land; (b) the current value of like properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and
the income therefrom; (d) the owner's sworn valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment
made by government assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (h) the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally
considered. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA AND
RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014
The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the
regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative agencies. The SAC, therefore, must still
be able to reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the evaluation of the factors for just
compensation, which cannot be arbitrarily restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR, an
administrative agency. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA.
ROMANA AND RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014
The Regional Trial Court may impose interest on the just compensation award as may be warranted
by the circumstances of the case. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest
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in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the
landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall
be pegged at the rate of 12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30, 2013
only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the
landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in line with the amendment
introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, series of 2013. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v.
SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA AND RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290,
July 9, 2014
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. CAPT. WILFREDOROQUERO v. THE
CHANCELLOR OF UP MANILA, et al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010
The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations. CLARITA J.
CARBONEL v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 187689, September 07, 2010
An information elicited in violation of the rights of the accused or without a valid waiver thereof is
inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that interrogation is also inadmissible.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FEDERICO LUCERO, G.R. No. 188705, March 02, 2011
When custodial investigation is conducted in violation of Section 12 of Article III, only evidence on
confessions and admission of the accused as against himself is prohibited. HO WAI PANG v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 176229, October 19, 2011
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial
interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant manner. A written statement given by an employee during an administrative inquiry
conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in
the course of his employment, is not a statement given by a person under custodial investigation,
hence, not falling under the proscription provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
Where the Office of the Ombudsman fails to investigate a case in an expedient manner through its
own fault, the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases is deemed violated. Such
constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in
all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasijudicial. RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA v. SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191411; EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G.
AMUGOD v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R.
No. 191871, July 15, 2013
Speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases
pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FIRST DIVISION and THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ,
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ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO and ERNEST ESCALER, G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No. 189063.
December 11, 2013
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of speedy
disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve the appeal of petitioner does
not, by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right to the speedy disposition of his case.
After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, as the facts and
circumstances peculiar to the case must also be considered. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN
JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014
The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from
testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused.
The Court said: This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant
to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. JAIME D. DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 200748, July 23,
2014
The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be
waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. Ones right to the speedy disposition of
his case must therefore be asserted. Due to the failure of petitioner to assert this right, he is
considered to have waived it. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171,
June 3, 2014
This Court has emphasized that speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.
In determining whether the accuseds right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a)
duration of the delay (b) reason therefor (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would
not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all,
do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. While the Court recognizes the accuseds right to speedy trial and adheres to
a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. WILLIAM CO
v. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014
As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the term is statutorily defined in Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 9851, to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. JULIAN YUSAY CARAM v. ATTY. MARIJOY
D. SEGUI, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda
rights, which require that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain
silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to
talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned;
and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.
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The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the
statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel. The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins when
the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014
R.A. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law. This
means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of
their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez
is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he
may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police
station. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September
22, 2014
His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands.
This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the
accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE
FIELDAD, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014
[T]he fact that [the accused] was not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest
proceedings does not in any way affect his culpability. It has already been held that the infractions
of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during custodial investigation. Here, [the accuseds] conviction was based not on his alleged
uncounseled confession or admission but on the testimony of the prosecution witness. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. ABOLA BIO, G.R. No. 195850, February 16, 2015
There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not
indispensable. A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and
no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of
counsel is not an absolute requirement. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY V. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY (PMA), G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution are applied
only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. A person undergoing a normal audit
examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be
considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule. MARIERA DE CASTRO v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
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The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied
the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DANTE TAN, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010
As a rule, judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double
jeopardy. In order to come under the exceptional cases where a judgment of acquittal may be
reconsidered by the court, it is not enough that the party invoke the exceptions he must be able to
bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. ANTONIO LEJANO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864, January 18, 2011
Only the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), and not the private offended party, has the authority
to question the order granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case. And an acquittal by
virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in double
jeopardy. BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR v. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, GR No. 172777, October 19,
2011
Mistrial is the only exception to the well-settled principle that acquittal is immediately final and
cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. This Court was categorical in stating that a
re-examination of the evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of an
accused, which is what is protected by the rule against double jeopardy. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE CA, et al., G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another with a
different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is
not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense. ISABELO A. BRAZA v.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 1950, February 20, 2013
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the
CA is solely vested in the OSG. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It must be noted that the
private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as
the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and
immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its
review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on
the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus,
the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court but such may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. DENNIS T.
VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA, G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014
CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It
denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political rights
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subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political
community.14 The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to
participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and
the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014
NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION
It is not the registration of the act of election of Philippine citizenship, although a valid requirement
under Commonwealth Act No. 625, which will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is
only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. BALGAMELO CABILING MA,
et al. v. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., et al., G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010
Bare general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for
naturalization. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG, G.R. No. 175430, June 18,
2012
Where a foreigner seeking to be granted of Philippine citizenship does not follow the rule on the
period to file his petition, the action must be dismissed. The opportunity given to a foreigner to
become a citizen is a mere privilege and the absence of one requirement is fatal to the petition of
the foreigner. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI,
a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG, G.R. No. 197450, March 20, 2013
A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial naturalization
under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare
or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an
alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on
requirements required under CA 473. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUGAS, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially,
C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and receipt of evidence showing
that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the
competent court may order the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate and the registration
thereof in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, R.A. 9139 provides that aliens born and
residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by
filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may
approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization. In both cases, the petitioner shall take
an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation. DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF THE
Petitioners failure to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to his application for
naturalization. Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case. Differently stated, the inclusion of present and former places of residence in the petition is
a jurisdictional requirement, without which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect
which cannot be cured by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial. DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014
LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
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A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the right to
resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. 9225 provides that a person who intends to
practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice. IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO
PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO MUNESES, A.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012
Foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath. TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
et al., G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012
The act of using a foreign passport does not divest one of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired
by repatriation. However, by representing himself as a foreign citizen, he voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the
instant he represented himself as a foreign citizen by using his foreign passport.
Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of candidacy he
was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and foreign citizenship, he was
qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code will not apply. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16,
2013
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
MODES AND KINDS OF APPOINTMENT
A permanent appointment implies the holding of a civil service eligibility on the part of the
appointee, unless the position involved requires no such eligibility. Where the appointee does not
possess a civil service eligibility, the appointment is considered temporary. The subsequent
acquisition of the required eligibility will not make the temporary appointment regular or
permanent; a new appointment is needed. JUSTINA MANIEBO v. CA, G.R. No. 158708, August 10,
2010
When the position is not among those enumerated in Section 7, Chapter 2, Book V, Title 1 (Subtitle
A) of E.O. 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the appointment in
order to be valid does not require presidential appointment. MODESTO AGYAO, JR. v. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182591, January 18, 2011
R.A. 6975 is intended only to prevent the new appointee from serving beyond the term of office of
the original appointee. It does not prohibit the new appointee from serving less than the unexpired
portion of the term as in the case of a temporary appointment. HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL v.
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HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE NEW APPOINTEE VICE HEREIN
PETITIONER, et al., G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011
Section 1 (2), Article IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution and similar provisions do not peremptorily
prohibit the promotional appointment of a commissioner to chairman, provided the new
appointees tenure in both capacities does not exceed seven years in all. DENNIS A. B. FUNA, v. THE
CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
The language of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by
one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent
or temporary. DENNIS FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al., G.R.
No. 191644, February 19, 2013
A person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 may still be appointed in a
government position provided that it is a coterminous or primarily confidential position. The
tenure of a confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the
latters pleasure. The position of a General Manager (GM) in a water district is considered as a
confidential position due to the intimate relationship between the GM and the Board of Directors
(BOD) of the water district and the power of the BOD to terminate the services of the GM on the
ground of loss of confidence. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PILILLA WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No.
190147, March 5, 2013
DISABILITIES AND INHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
A reading of the conflict of interest rule reveals that the prohibition against NEA personnel from
participating in any question pertaining to a public service entity where he is directly or indirectly
interested has the purpose of preventing such personnel from exercising the power of his office for
personal pecuniary gain, which may cause grave damage and prejudice to public interest.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PEDRO
RAMOS, G.R. No. 149497, January 25, 2010
DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
There is a tremendous difference between the degree of responsibility, care, and trustworthiness
expected of a clerk or ordinary employee in the bureaucracy and that required of bank managers,
cashiers, finance officers, and other officials directly handling large sums of money and properties.
SALVADOR O. ECHANO, JR. v. LIBERTY TOLEDO, G.R. No. 173930, September 15, 2010
Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like
any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to
preserve the courts good name and standing. LOURDES CELAVITE-VIDAL v. NORAIDA A.
AGUAM, A.M. No.SCC-10- 13-P, June 26, 2012
Acts may constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service as long as they tarnish
the image and integrity of his/her public office. Where a professor in a state university directly sells
books to her students, the acts shall constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service taking into account that the said act is prohibited by the institution, her moral ascendancy
over her students, the book/compilation was overpriced, and that the students refusal to buy the
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book/compilation could result in their failure in the subject. DR. ZENAIDA P. PIA v. HON.
MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, FORMERLY ACTING
OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DR. OFELIA M. CARAGUE, FORMERLY PUP
PRESIDENT, DR. ROMAN R. UANNUG, FORMERLY DEAN, COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS, FINANCE
AND POLITICS (CEFP), NOW ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CEFP POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES (PUP), STA. MESA, MANILA, G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013
Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all
times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and
responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional
principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency. ATTY. VIRGILLO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN, A.M. No. P-12-3069,
January 20, 2014
Section 8 of R.A. 6713, requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of their SALN. In this relation, the same provision mandates full disclosure
of the concerned public official's (a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed
value and current fair market value, (b) personal property and acquisition cost, (c) all other assets
such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like,(d) liabilities, and(e) all
business interests and financial connections. ANGELITO R. MARQUEZ, ET AL. v. JUDGE VENANCIO
OVEJERA AND SHERIFF IV LOURDES COLLADO, A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014
While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees
whose sworn duty is to discharge their functions with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence,
accountability, and loyalty, the court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend
to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.
MICHAELINA RAMOS BALASBAS v. PATRICIA B. MONAYAO, G.R. No. 190524, February 17,
2014
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice
out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. GSIS AND
WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRES. & GEN. MANAGER OF GSIS v. DINNAH
VILLAVIZA, et al., G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010
Though respondent is a casual employee as contemplated under Rule III, Section 2(f) of the
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, she is entitled to due process
especially if they are to be removed for more serious causes or for causes other than that provided
under Civil Service Commission Form No. 001, to wit: (1) when their services are no longer needed;
(2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their
performance are below par. PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AND REYNALDO P. MARTIN v. MARIE JEAN C. LAPID, G.R. No. 191940, April 12,
2011
Rice subsidy is one of the benefits that will be granted to employees of GOCCs or GFIs only if they
are "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989. MANOLITO AGRA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No.
167807, December 6, 2011
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The only exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect compensation is
where the law allows him to receive extra compensation for services rendered in another position
which is an extension or is connected with his basic work. HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, et al. v.
JULITA ESPARTERO, et al., G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012
R.A. 6758 withdrew the authority of the NHA to grant additional incentive benefits to its project
personnel. Only those additional compensation benefits being received by incumbents before the
effectivity of R.A. 6758, which were not integrated into the standardized salary rates, shall continue
to be authorized. GENEROSO ABELLANOSA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the
discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with
malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result
from the performance of an official duty. Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the
contrary bears the burden to convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public
officers performance of his duties. Case law also exhorts that although a public officer is the final
approving authority and the employees who processed the transaction were directly under his
supervision, personal liability does not automatically attach to him but only upon those directly
responsible for the unlawful expenditures. ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, in her capacity as
then administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013
LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
In administrative cases, misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person
concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause; dishonesty, on the other hand, dishonesty has been defined as
intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice
any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion.
It is a well-settled rule that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees are dutybound to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and shall
remain accountable to the people. GERARDO Q. FERRERAS v. RUDY P. ECLIPSE, A.M. No. P-052085, January 20, 2010
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. TERESITA NARVASA v. BENJAMIN A.
SANCHEZ, JR., G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010
Acts which affect the performance of duties as an officer of the court and taints the judiciarys
integrity should be punished accordingly. ROLAND ERNEST MARIE JOSE SPELMANS v. JUDGE
GAYDIFREDO T. OCAMPO, A.M. No.MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010
Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation from the established norm, whether it be
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workrelated or not, amounts to misconduct. PRISCILLA HERNANDO v. JULIANA BENGSON, A.M.
No. P- 09-2686, March 10, 2010
Compensation and benefits of public officers are not intended purely for the personal benefit of
officers neither is payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose
requirement. That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and
employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other
than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. RAMON R. YAP v.
COMMISION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. ALAN A.
OLANDESCA, G.R. No. 171434, April 23, 2010
The failure to remit the funds in due time amounts to dishonesty and grave misconduct which are
both punishable with dismissal from service. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.
MARCELA V. SANTOS, A.M. No. P-06-2287, October 12, 2010
In order that the public officer may be held guilty of giving unwarranted advantage to another to
the prejudice of the government, it must be shown that the accused public officials did not rely on
the competence and good faith of his subordinates. ANTONIO Y. DE JESUS, SR., ANATOLIO A. ANG
and MARTINA S. APIGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 182539-40, February 21, 2011
Misrepresentation of qualifications, i.e., educational attainment and eligibility for government
service amounts to plain and simple dishonesty as it refers to the act of intentionally making a false
statement on any material fact in securing one's appointment. ANTONIO EXEQUIEL A.
MOMONGAN v PRIMITIVO A. SUMAYO, A.M. No. P-10-2767, April 12, 2011
The public officials personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made
in violation of law. TOMAS R. OSMEA, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS
CITY MAYOR OF CEBU CITY v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 188818 May 31, 2011
The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in
the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish
the peoples faith in the judiciary. ESPINA & MADARANG CO. & MAKAR AGRICULTURAL
COMMERCIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORP. (MAKAR) v. HON. CADER P. INDAR AL HAJ, A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2069, December 14, 2011
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to
take on their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a
breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. VICTORY M. FERNANDEZ v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 193983, March 14, 2012
An administrative offense constitutes misconduct when it has direct relation to, and is connected
with, the performance of the official duties of the one charged. Thus, misconduct refers to a
transgression of an established and definite rule of action, more specifically, some unlawful
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behavior or gross negligence by the public officer charged. PRISCILLA L. HERNANDO v. JULIANA
Y. BENGSON, LEGAL RESEARCHER, RTC, BRANCH 104, QUEZON CITY, A.M. No. P-09-2686
(Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 06- 2441-P), March 21, 2012
An officer or employee in the government shall be considered habitually absent only if he incurs
unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2/5 days monthly leave credit under the Civil
Service Rules for at least three months in a semester or at least three consecutive months during
the year. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MANUEL Z. ARAYA, JR., UTILITY
WORKER, MTCC, BRANCH 2, OZAMIS CITY, A.M. No.P-12-3053, (formerly A.M. No. 06-3-88MTCC)
Dismissal from the service, as a prescribed penalty imposed by Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as a first offense, underscores the
constitutional principle that public office is a public trust and only those who can live up to such
exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FLORENTINO VELOSO,
G.R. No. 196201, June 19, 2012
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services
in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA)
v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012
Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft warranting the penalty of
dismissal and cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service. OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR v. MA. IRISSA G. MUSNI, A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012
When an individual is found guilty of dishonesty, the corresponding penalty is dismissal from
employment or service. BAGONG KAPISANAN SA PUNTA TENEMENT, INC v. AZER E. DOLOT, et
al., G.R. NO. 179054, September 05, 2012
In case of dishonesty, the individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material fact,
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination,
registration, appointment, or promotion. Given the fact that respondent government officer was
able to successfully overcome the onus of demonstrating that he does not possess any unexplained
wealth and that the omissions (he did not disclose any business interest and/or financial
connection, but showed a steady increase of his net worth) in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALNs) did not betray any sense of bad faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on
his part considering that his SALNs actually disclose the extent of his and his wifes assets and
business interests, respondent is merely culpable of Simple Negligence instead of the more serious
charge of Dishonesty. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V,
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) G.R. No. 181598, March 6, 2013
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required
task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, gross neglect of
duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the
consequences, and in cases involving public officials, by flagrant and palpable breach of duty. It is
the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own
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property. Where a bank officer wilfully disregards the bank procedures, the act constitutes gross,
not a simple, neglect of duty. This is so since the banking business is one impressed with public
trust and a higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks compared to an ordinary business
enterprise in the handling of deposited funds; the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness
expected of their officials and employees is far greater than those imposed on ordinary officers and
employees in other enterprises. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTEMIO S. SAN JUAN, JR.,
G.R. No. 186279, April 2, 2013
When an elected official refuses to recognize a legitimate operation of a government agency and
wilfully intervenes to lead the said operation to failure, grave misconduct is committed. It is
characterized by a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules, which
must all be supported by substantial evidence. FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia
Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013
Where an officer or employee in the civil service incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the
allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit for at least three months in a semester or at least three
consecutive months during the year, his act constitutes habitual absenteeism. If it is the second
offense of the employee, the proper penalty is dismissal from service. Nonetheless, in several
administrative cases, the Court refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of
mitigating facts. The Court has considered the employees length of service, acknowledgment of his
or her infractions and feelings of remorse, advanced age, family circumstances and other
humanitarian and equitable considerations in determining the appropriate penalty. The Court also
ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by the
employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. JUDGE MA. MONINA S. MISAJON,
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Jose, Antique v. JERENCE P. HIPONIA, Clerk II, ELIZABETH B.
ESCANILLAS, Stenographer I, WILLIAM M. YGLESIAS, Process Server, and CONRADO A.
RAFOLS, JR., Utility Aide, all of the same court, A.M. No. P-08- 2439, June 25, 2013
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. A government employee who
is found guilty of grave misconduct may be dismissed from the service even upon the first offense.
ROLANDO GANZON v. FERNANDO ARLOS, G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute. It is well settled that
findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies are conclusive only when supported
by substantial evidence.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if
it involves additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only
simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. PRIMO C. MIRO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS,
CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I. MENDOZA, G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45, November
20, 2013
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There is no defense in receiving money from party-litigants. The act itself makes court employees
guilty of grave misconduct. Grave misconduct is a serious transgression of some established and
definite rule of action that tends to threaten the very existence of the system of administration of
justice an official or employee serves. It may manifest itself in corruption, or in other similar acts,
done with the clear intent to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of established rules.
Dishonesty has been defined as "the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." VILLAHERMOSA SR. v.
SARCIA, A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the
government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a
position in the judiciary. An administrative case for dishonesty against a court employee is
cognizable by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) pursuant to Section 6 Article VIII of the
Constitution. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. NENITA C. LONGOS, CLERK II, MUNICPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT, DEL CARMEN-NUMANCIA-SAN ISIDRO-SAN BENITO, SURIGAO DEL NORTE, A.M.
No. P-12-3070, March 11, 2014
In Blaquera v. Alcala, the Court no longer required the officials and employees of different
government departments and agencies to refund the productivity incentive bonus they received
because there was no indicia of bad faith and the disbursement was made in the honest belief that
the recipients deserved the amounts. But this was qualified in Casal v. COA, where SC held the
approving officials liable for the refund of the incentive award due to their patent disregard of the
issuances of the President and the directives of COA. There, the officials failure to observe the
issuances amounted to gross negligence, which is inconsistent with the presumption of good
faith. TESDA v. COA, G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014
The act of fraudulently securing ones appointment constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined
as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact, or practicing or attempting to
practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, appointment or registration. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION v. LONGOS, A.M. No. P-12-3070, March 11, 2014
Clerks of Courts perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues,
records, properties and premises. By failing to remit on time, she violated the trust reposed to her
as a disbursement officer. Delay in the remittance is a serious breach of duty, which carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from service. However, jurisprudence on administrative cases refrains
from imposing actual penalties if mitigating circumstances are present. Conditions such as length of
service, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations may alter the courts
decision. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. PEREZ, A.M. No. P-12-3074, March 17,
2014
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as frequent unauthorized absences from duty
during office hours. The word frequent connotes that the employees absent themselves from
duty more than once. Respondents two absences from his post, being without authority, can
already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty, which
adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
v. JOHNI GLENN D. RUNES, A.M. No. P-12-3055, March 26, 2014
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to
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give and have obeyed. It imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable
instructions of the employer. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY v. ARANDIA, G.R. No. 199549, April 7, 2014
Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. It is defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. A
misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule are present. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. Misconduct becomes grave
if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Section 52 (A) (3),
Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the
penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service. RUBY P. LAGOC v. MARIA ELENA
MALAGA, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL., G.R. No. 184890, July 9, 2014
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness. It is a malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the judiciary.
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal
from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must
also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officers official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failureto discharge
the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest in the former. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LAGADO v. CLERK II BRYAN LEONIDO,
A.M. No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014
Under Administrative Circular No. 14-2002, an officer or employee in the civil service shall be
considered habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days
monthly leave credit under the leave law for at least three (3) months in a semester or at least three
(3) consecutive months during the year. RE: REPORT OF JUDGE RODOLFO D. VAPOR ON THE
HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM OF FILIGRIN E. VELEZ, JR., PROCESS SERVER, A.M. No. P-14-3232,
August 12, 2014
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or
attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration,
appointment or registration. Dishonesty was understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. Respondents act of recommending approval
despite lack of certification from end-users does not constitute dishonesty. It is actually a form of
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons
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may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless persons
never fail to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence
when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
Misconduct is an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave
misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORENDO B. ARIAS, G.R.
No. 188909, September 17, 2014
Sheriffs, being ranking officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with
great care and diligence. In serving and implementing writs, as well as processes and orders of the
court, they cannot afford to err without affecting adversely the proper dispensation of justice.
Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a
required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, Grave
Abuse of Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under
color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other
injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. SPS. SABIJON v. DE JUAN, A.M.
No. P-14-3281, January 28, 2015
The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that a public employees failure to pay just debts is a
ground for disciplinary action. Just debts are defined as (a) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or
(b) claims, the existence and justness of which, are admitted by the debtor. Willful failure to pay just
debts is a light offense with the corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first offense. Failure to
pay debts can indeed be considered, broadly speaking, as misconduct. However, when the
gravamen of the offense is unwillingness to pay a just obligation, the employee should be held guilty
for willful failure to pay just debt. MARY-ANN S. TORDILLA v. AMILANO, A.M. P-14-3241,
February 4, 2015
Allowing another person to take the examination in ones behalf is an act of dishonesty. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION v. JOVILYN DAWANG, A.M. No. P-15-3289, February 17, 2015
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
An employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving
the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not
yet been resolved or dismissed. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM AND WINSTON F. GARCIA v. ALBERT M. VELASCO AND MARIO I. MOLINA,
G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011
The issuance by the proper disciplining authority of an order of preventive suspension for 90 days
of a civil officer or employee pending investigation of her administrative case is authorized
provided that a formal charge is served to her and her charge involves dishonesty, oppression,
grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that she
is guilty of the charge as to warrant her removal from the service. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. ROSARIO S. MANALANGDEMIGILLO, G.R. No. 176343, September 18, 2012
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ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT AND BACK SALARIES
An illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum
period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement.
ISABEL GALANG v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 175276, May 31, 2011
Section 63 of the EPIRA as well as Section 5, Rule 33 of the IRR clearly state that the displaced or
separated personnel as a result of the privatization, if qualified, shall be given preference in the
hiring of the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. Clearly, the law only speaks of
preference and by no stretch of the imagination can the same amount to a legal right to the position.
Undoubtedly, not all the terminated employees will be re-hired by the selection committee.
ENRIQUE U. BETOY v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R.
Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011
A government officer or employees removal from office as a result of a bona fide reorganization is a
valid cause for that employees removal. CARLOS COTIANGCO, et al. v. THE PROVINCE OF
BILIRAN AND THE CA G.R. No. 157139, October 19, 2011
A government employee enjoys constitution protection that No officer or employee in the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. VICTOR R. REYES,
substituted by his heirs, CLARIBEL G. REYES, CLARISSA G. REYES, and CZARINA G. REYES v.
CA, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 167002, December 12, 2011
For a valid dismissal from the government service, the requirements of due process must be
complied with. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS and MIA
MANAHAN, G.R. No. 185668, December 13, 2011
Failure to adduce substantial evidence that the act was part of the fraudulent scheme amounting to
grave misconduct, dishonesty and reasonable violation of office rules and regulations presupposes
that the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service is not warranted. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, REPRESENTED BY ROBERT G. VERGARA v. HEIDI R. CHUA, G.R.
No. 202914, September 26, 2012
When there is reorganization conducted pursuant to an authority granted to the BOD of a
government-owned and controlled corporation, an officer reassigned to a new position cannot
claim that she was illegally removed from the previous one on the claim that the BOD has no
authority to conduct reorganization. The BOD of a government-owned and controlled corporation
may be granted by law the authority to effect reorganization therein. Thus, a reorganization
undertaken pursuant to a specific statutory authority by the Board of Directors of a governmentowned and government-controlled corporation is valid. ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANGDEMIGILLO v. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(TIDCORP) et al., G.R. No. 168613, G.R. No. 185571, & G.R. No. 185571, March 5, 2013
When a government officer is subject to an administrative action, there must be a formal charge
against him/her and an investigation to give him/her ample opportunity to be heard. A formal
charge issued prior to the imposition of administrative sanctions must conform to the requirements
set forth in Section 16, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. If
the purported formal charge does not contain the requirements set forth in Section 16, it cannot
be said that the employee concerned has been formally charged, rendering the dismissal from
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service invalid. A memorandum directing the person to explain within a given period of time does
not constitute as a formal charge. Such wanton disregard of the proper procedure in administrative
investigations under the civil service rules cannot be countenanced. For a valid dismissal from the
government service, the requirements of due process must be complied with. TERESITA L. SALVA
v. FLAVIANA M. VALLE, G.R. No. 193773, April 2, 2013
Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and [n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. Under Section
12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code, it is the Civil Service Commission that has the
power to [h]ear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA, G.R. No. 192074, June 10,
2014
OTHER MATTERS
Section 13 (3) of R.A. 7077 evidently has to do with the composition of the Retired Reserve Unit.
The provision in question does not prescribe the retirement age for reservists who are called into
active service in the regular armed forces. COL. JESUS G. CABARRUS, JR., PAF (RES.) v. HON.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, et al., G.R. No. 180966, June 13, 2012
Resignation implies an intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the
acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation
from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term (b) an act of
relinquishment and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In our jurisdiction, acceptance is
necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance,
resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted
by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the
appointment of the successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is
accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal
Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignations acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The
incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless
he had been duly notified therefor. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA,
G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014
During the pendency of the present administrative matter, respondent Sahi suffered a stroke and
resigned from office in January 2011. Her claim for separation benefits and accrued leave credits
though cannot be processed and released for lack of requirements. Nonetheless, respondent Sahis
resignation does not render this case moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative
liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction. PRESIDING JUDGE JUAN
GABRIEL HIZON ALANO v. PADMA LATIP SAHI, ET AL., A.M. No. P-11-3020, June 25, 2014
P.D. 626, as amended, defines compensable sickness as any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.
Based on this definition, we ruled that for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be
compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation with the conditions set
therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the
working conditions.
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The new employee compensation program now directs that all covered employers throughout the
country be required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust
fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. If diseases not intended by the law
to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the trust fund would be
endangered. In this sense, compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the
need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their
families look up to for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. GSIS v.
JOSE CAPACITE, G.R. No. 199780, September 24, 2014
NPC employees who were separated from the service because of the reorganization of the electric
power industry and who received their separation pay under the EPIRA Law are still entitled to
receive loyalty awards under the CSC Memorandum Circular.
We declared that the receipt of retirement benefits does not bar the retiree from receiving
separation pay. Separation pay is a statutory right designed to provide the employee with the
wherewithal during the period that he/she is looking for another employment. On the other hand,
retirement benefits are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life,
lessening the burden of worrying about his financial support, and are a form of reward for his
loyalty and service to the employer. A separation pay is given during one's employable years, while
retirement benefits are given during one's unemployable years. Hence, they are not mutually
exclusive.
Thus, it is clear that a separation pay at the time of the reorganization of the NPC and retirement
benefits at the appropriate future time are two separate and distinct entitlements.
Thus, not unless the loyalty award was considered in the computation of the separation pay, the
same should not be withdrawn from the employees enumerated in the ND. NATIONAL
TRANSMISSION CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 204800, October 14, 2014
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also
be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by
which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for
all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings
by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Assuming that
Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding,
and effective. REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU v. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. 204964,
October 15, 2014
THE CIVIL SERVICE
For an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to security of tenure,
she/he must pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other
requirements prescribed by the CES Board, and be appointed to a CES rank by the President. PEZA
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND LILIA DE LIMA v. GLORIA MERCADO, G.R. No. 172144, March 9,
2010
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Our Constitution, in using the expressions all workers and no officer or employee, puts no
distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means that both
probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy
security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be
dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION (CSC) v. GREGORIO MAGNAYE, JR., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010
Reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of good faith
lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith.
VIRGINIA BAUTISTA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
The CES covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Assistant Department
Manager II does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under
the CES. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, G.R. No. 185766, November 23, 2010
Good faith is actually a question of intention and can be ascertained not from a persons own
protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.
CESAR S. DUMDUMA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182606, December 4, 2011
Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is clear that length of
service may be considered either as mitigating or aggravating depending on the circumstances of
the case. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. AURORA M. CLAVE, G.R. Nos. 194665, 194645, March
6, 2012
The mandatory order in the program of devolution under R.A. 7160 connotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The only instance that the LGU concerned
may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable,
meaning, it would result to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be
retained by the national government. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DR. AGNES QUIDA P. YU,
G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012
Where another person takes the civil service examination on behalf of another, the said act
constitutes dishonesty which is punishable by dismissal from service. The said public officer or
government employees length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The CSCs discovery of
the perfidy in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is
civil service eligible in her Personal Data Sheet when she had been already found guilty of an
administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking
clemency tell that she has not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court
employee. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Danao City, A.M. No. P-08-2531, April 11, 2013
When a government employee undisputedly lacked CES eligibility, he did not hold his managerial
position, within the coverage of the CES, in a permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in
that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the
appointing authority. One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his
employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to
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show that the termination is for cause. EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S. CARLOS, G.R.
No. 194994, April 16, 2013
The Civil Service Law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts constitute
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court defined such an offense in Ito v.
De Vera as acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the
administration of justice. In Government Service Insurance System v. Mayordomo, the Court further
declared that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
need not be related to or connected with the public officers official functions. As long as the
questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty
may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES v. AUGUSTO
J. FELICIDARIO, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013
Section 26, Chapter 5, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 lists the personnel
actions that may be taken in the government service, namely: (1) appointment through
certification; (2) promotion; (3) transfer; (4) reinstatement; (5) reemployment; (6) detail; and (7)
reassignment. Reassignment should not be confused with a transfer.
Reassignment has been defined as movement of an employee from one organizational unit to
another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or
salary. Under Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 (Revised Omnibus Rules
on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions) it includes reassignment in the enumeration of
personnel movements that do not require the issuance of a new appointment (but shall
nevertheless require an office order from a duly authorized officer). It is presumed to be regular
and made in the interest of public service unless proven otherwise or if it constitutes constructive
dismissal.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC has the power and function to prescribe,
amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and other pertinent laws. The reassignment of a government employee which is undoubtedly a
personnel and Civil Service matter to be properly addressed in accordance with the rules and
guidelines prescribed by the CSC. MARICHU G. EJERA v. BEAU HENRY L. MERTO AND ERWIN
VERGARA, G.R. No. 163109, January 27, 2014
The CSC has the power and the authority to amend the Civil Service Rules whenever it deems the
amendment necessary. The insinuation of petitioner that this change was made for the sole purpose
of hurting his appeal is a mere product of his imagination. The CSC is under no obligation to review
all the cases before it and, on the basis thereof, decide whether or not to amend its internal rules.
We note, though, that the authority of the CSC to amend the rules does not give it the authority to
apply the new provision retroactively. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM, G.R. No.
189171, June 3, 2014
Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be the
central personnel agency of the Government. In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that
a public office is a public trust, the Commission was tasked with the duty to set standards and to
enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil
servants. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA, G.R. No. 192074, June
10, 2014
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ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the
accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the employees income or other
sources of income and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other
sources of income, does he become susceptible to dishonesty. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.
NIETO A. RACHO, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011
While Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds the SALN of a subordinate
incomplete or not in the proper form such head of office must call the subordinates attention to
such omission and give him the chance to rectify the same, and such procedure is an internal office
matter. Whether or not the head of office has taken such step with respect to a particular
subordinate cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter. LIBERATO M.
CARABEO v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 190580-81, February 21, 2011
Failure to disclose a spouses business interests and financial connections in the SALN constitutes
simple negligence. PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT v. SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, G.R. No. 176058, March 23, 2011
Cessation from office of a public official by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal
of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render
said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the public official had
ceased in office during the pendency of his case. A public officials resignation does not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR v. DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, A.M. No. P-13-3105, September 11, 2013
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending
authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee. By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1)
persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the
appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for
appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official
by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is
intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the
efficiency of its personnel. Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that
we must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. To rule that the
prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will
render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En Banc, which is a body created
by fiction of law, can never have relatives to speak of. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MARICELLE
M. CORTES, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all
times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and
responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render
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inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust and must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696,
June 2, 2014
The Court said that the rules do not provide a definition of, or enumeration of the acts constituting,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It refers to acts or omissions that violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the peoples faith in the
Judiciary. If an employees questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office,
he is liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. EFREN T. UY, ET AL. v. JUDGE
ALAN L. FLORES, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332, June 25, 2014
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice because they are tasked to execute
final judgments of the courts, which would otherwise become empty victories for the prevailing
party, if left unenforced. As agents of the law, sheriffs are mandated to uphold the majesty of the
law, as embodied in the decision, without unnecessary delay to prevent injury or damage to the
winning party. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up" the sheriffs implementation of the
writ. Once the writ is placed in their hands, sheriffs are duty-bound to proceed and see to it that the
execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
We have consistently held that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. All court personnel should be reminded that they have no business getting
personally involved in matters directly emanating from court proceedings, unless expressly so
provided by law. The reason is that, the image of the courts of justice is reflected in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of even its minor employees. It is the imperative duty of everyone involved in
the dispensation ofjustice, to maintain the courts integrity and standing as true temples of justice
and to avoid any impression or impropriety, misdeed or negligence. HOLASCA v. PAGUNSAN, A.M.
No, P-14-3198, July 23, 2014.
The Republic cannot simply rely on the presumption that the PCGG has acted pursuant to law and
based on prima facie evidence, for the same will undermine the basic constitutional principle that
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people. Indeed, sequestration
is an extraordinary and harsh remedy. As such, it should be confined to its lawful parameters and
exercised with due regard to the requirements of fairness, due process, and justice. While the Court
acknowledges the Government's admirable efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth allegedly taken by
the corporations, it cannot, however, choose to turn a blind eye to the demands of the law, justice,
and fairness. PALM AVENUE HOLDING v. PCGG, G.R. no. 173082, August 6, 2014
Time and again, this Court has pronounced that any act which falls short of the exacting standards
for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall
not be countenanced. Public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all imes be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. RE:
REPORT OF JUDGE RODOLFO, ON THE HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM OF FILIGRIN VELEZ, A.M. No.
P-14-3232, August 12, 2014
It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it
had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public
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accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.
As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts
towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the
public. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LAGADO v. CLERK II BRYAN LEONIDO, A.M. No. P-14-3222,
August 12, 2014
Complete reliance on signatures is a ministerial function but respondent, as Assistant Director of
BOE under DPWH, does not exercise purely ministerial duties. His duties entail review and
evaluation of documents presented before him for recommending approval. He cannot simply
recommend approval of documents without determining compliance with existing law, rules and
regulations of the Department.
According to the Court, all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter negotiations. However,
the Court went on to state that "there should be other grounds than mere signature or approval
appearing on the voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction" or dismissal in this case.
There exists a ground other than the signatures appearing on the emergency purchase/repair
documents that should have prodded respondent to conduct a more than cursory examination of
the documents. The absence of a certification and signature of the end-user which would justify the
emergency repair and/or purchase is glaring. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORENDO B.
ARIAS, G.R. No. 188909, September 17, 2014
All official travels abroad of heads of financial institutions, such as the DBP officials herein, are
subject to prior approval of the President, regardless of the duration of the subject travel.
When government officials are found to have clearly committed an outright violation and disregard
of the law, We will not hesitate in ordering the refund of incentive awards and allowances for while
the acts of public officials in the performance of their duties are presumed to be done in good faith,
the presumption may be contradicted and overcome by evidence showing bad faith or gross
negligence. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COA, G.R. No. 202733, September
30, 2014
Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged
with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the
power to destroy. A public office is created either by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of
law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the
same legislature that brought it into existence.
The Court cannot agree to petitioners supposition that there should be automatic absorption of all
ATO employees to the CAAP. Indeed, there is no such thing as a vested interest in a public office, let
alone an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
Public office is not property but a public trust or agency. While their right to due process may be
relied upon by public officials to protect their security of tenure which, in a limited sense, is
analogous to property, such fundamental right to security of tenure cannot be invoked against a
valid abolition of office effected by the legislature itself.
A careful perusal of Section 86 of R.A. 9497 reveals that the transfer of ATO personnel, unless they
opted to retire from the service, to the CAAP implies the application of the hold-over principle.
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There being no express, much less implied prohibition of the application of the hold-over principle
in R.A. 9497 per se, such proviso in the latters IRR does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION (CAAP-EU)
v. CAAP, G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014
OMBUDSMAN
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Sangguniang Bayan over administrative cases
against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. ROLSON RODRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010
The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an
exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd. Corollary, the power of
the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory
but actually mandatory. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PEDRO DELIJERO, JR, G.R. No. 172635,
October 20, 2010
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Consequently, a decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL S. SAMANIEGO, G.R. No. 175573, October 05, 2010
The Ombudsman, in dismissing a complaint carries the duty of explaining the basis for his action;
he must determine that the complainant had failed to establish probable cause. PRESIDENTIAL AD
HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS THRU THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, et al.,
G.R. No. 148269, November 22, 2010
When a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of the
Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, an appeal may be made
to the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and the
implementation of the decision follows as a matter of course. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CA
and DINAH C. BARRIGA, G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011
The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by
the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated
September 15, 2003. ROQUE C. FACURA and EDUARDO F. TUASON v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 166495,
February 16, 2011
In administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt or
preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.
MANUEL P. VALENCIA, G.R. No. 183890, April 13, 2011
The decision of the Ombudsman of in finding probable cause is reviewable by the Court when there
is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE
ON BEHEST LOANS, REPRESENTED BY MAGDANGAL B. ELMA v. HONORABLE ANIANO A.
DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011
The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but
is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense
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charged. THERON LACSON v. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., G.R. Nos. 165399,
165475, 165404 and 165489, May 30, 2011
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsmans power to impose these penalties, on the
allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected
by this Court. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO, G.R. No. 165132, March
07, 2012
The Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. That
should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its
outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not
preliminary investigation should be conducted. JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MA.
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, et al., G.R. No. 189161, March 21, 2012
The power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory. ERNESTO A. FAJARDO v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012
In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty to
justify affirmative findings. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. RODRIGO MAPOY, et al., G.R. No.
197299, February 13, 2013
The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory, and an appeal therefrom
does not stop the decision from being executory. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. SAMSON G. DE
LEON, G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.
Consequently, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower
than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other
investigative agencies.
The Ombudsman also has the power to impose administrative sanctions. Section 15 of R.A. 6770
reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority. This provision covers the entire range of administrative
activities attendant to administrative adjudication, including, among others, the authority to receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure,
summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension
public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty
imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily,
impose the corresponding penalty. These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman
the power to directly impose administrative sanctions; its power is not merely recommendatory.
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The maintenance of peace and order in the community is a general function undertaken by the
punong barangay. It is a task expressly conferred to the punong barangay under Section 389 (b) (3)
of R.A. 7160. The peace and order function of the punong barangay must also be related to his
function of assisting local executive officials (i.e., the city mayor), under Section 389 (b), Chapter III
of the Local Government Code. Local executive officials have the power to employ and deploy police
for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes and the arrest of criminal
offenders. However, police authority is superior to the punong barangays authority in a situation
where the maintenance of peace and order has metamorphosed into crime prevention and the
arrest of criminal offenders. FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACTFINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R.
No. 173121, April 3, 2013
The Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the protector of the people against the inept,
abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.
Its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770 vesting
disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
By constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one
who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include
investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department. What is true for the
Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of
that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL./ WENDELL BARERAS-SULIT v.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET AL., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014
The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman does not end with a recommendation
to punish. Further, clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14-A was issued, the OMBimposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases were already immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ
v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN REPRESENTED BY HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, ET AL., G.R.
No. 197307, February 26, 2014
The long standing policy of the Court is noninterference in the powers given by no less than the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. Except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial
powers on complaints filed against erring public officials and employees. Its findings of fact are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Generally, in reviewing administrative decisions, it is
beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to
the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the parties
evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of
justice would thereby result. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014
The Ombudsman is constitutionally authorized to promulgate its own rules of procedure. This is
fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,"
which empower the Ombudsman to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions, and duties" and to accordingly amend or modify its rules as
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the interest of justice may require. As such, the CA cannot stay the execution of decisions rendered
by the said office when the rules the latter so promulgates categorically and specifically warrant
their enforcement, else the OMBs rule-making authority be unduly encroached and the
constitutional and statutory provisions providing the same be disregarded. THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. ALEX M. VALENCERINA, G.R. No. 178343, July 14, 2014
The Court reiterates its policy of noninterference with the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
except in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion... The Constitution and R.A. 6770 endowed the
Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory
powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the
determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed
or not is basically its call. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service. While the
Ombudsmans findings as to whether probable cause exists are generally not reviewable by this
Court, where there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the Ombudsmans act cannot escape
judicial scrutiny under the Courts own constitutional power and duty to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. ROMEO R. ARAULLO v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 194157, July 30, 2014
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute illegal and unjust acts of those who
are in the public service emanates from no less than the 1987 Constitution. Section 12 of Article XI
states: Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof. As mandated by the 1987 Constitution, The Ombudsman Act was enacted in line with
the states policy of maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service and take effective
measures against graft and corruption. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties: ... Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. EDITA
S. BUENO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 191712, September 17, 2014.
Although the tenor of the text in Section 13 (3), Article XI of the Constitution merely indicates a
recommendatory function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest
the Ombudsman power beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to R.A. 6770
or the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative
penalties against errant public servants. The current Ombudsman is intended to play a more active
role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by
public officers and employees. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PRUDENCIO QUIMBO, G.R. No.
173277, February 25, 2015
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IMPEACHMENT
The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
Sequestration is simply a provisional remedy. It is an extraordinary measure intended to prevent
the destruction, concealment or dissipation of sequestered properties, and thereby to conserve and
preserve them, pending the judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the
property was in truth ill-gotten. YKR CORPORATION AND HEIRS OF LUISA YULO v.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 162079, March 18, 2010
The PCGG has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the
situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It
can even agree, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation, which
cannot be later withdrawn without mutual consent. JESUS DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No.
180564, June 22, 2010
PCGG may not delegate to its representatives and subordinates its authority to sequester and any
such delegation is invalid and ineffective. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH DIVISION) AND IMELDA R. MARCOS, G.R. No. 155832, December 07, 2010
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order
and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper
court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial
action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after
such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the
issuance thereof. PALM AVENUE HOLDING v. PCGG, G.R. no. 173082, August 6, 2014
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. JOEPHIL C.
BIEN v. PEDRO B. BO, G.R. No. 179333. August 3, 2010
The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the
expenditure of public funds unless an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in
the contract and certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been
appropriated by law and such funds are available are attached to the contract. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL RAILWAYS v KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., G.R. No. 182967,
April 06, 2011
Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the
primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The right is guaranteed
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by the Constitution itself and does not need legislative enactment. The statutory affirmation of the
requirement serves merely to enhance the fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is
essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative
proceedings.
Equally significant is the principle that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors
of its officials or agents. Hence, whatever irregularity had attended the issuance of the temporary
permits in this case does not render correct what appears to be erroneous procedure. GMA
NETWORK, Inc. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112,
February 26, 2014
The implementing rules and regulations embodied in this circular, whose validity is undisputed by
the parties, partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in
the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a
competent court. GMA NETWORK, INC. v. CENTRAL CATV, INC., G.R. No. 176694, July 18, 2014.
Well-established is the rule that administrative issuances such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly
promulgated pursuant to the rule-making power granted by statute have the force and effect of
law. Being an issuance in compliance with an executive edict, the NEDA JV Guidelines, therefore, has
the same binding effect as if it were issued by the President himself. As such, no agency or
instrumentality covered by the JV Guidelines can validly stray from the mandatory procedures set
forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or not. SM LAND, INC., v. BASES
CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014
We are very much aware of the time-honored rule that the government cannot be estopped by the
mistakes or errors of its agents. Suffice it to state, however, that this precept is not absolute. As
jurisprudence teaches, this rule on estoppel cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice. SM LAND,
INC., v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13,
2014
There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not
indispensable. A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and
no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of
counsel is not an absolute requirement.
With respect to military academy disciplinary proceedings, the right to representation by counsel is
generally not recorded by US courts as a fundamental requirement of due process. This is in view of
the policy of treading lightly on the military domain, with regard for their own power and authority
to conduct their own affairs within the broad confines of the law. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN
JEFF P. CUDIA v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, G.R. No.
211362, February 24, 2015
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of filing/ docket fees. It can no
longer invoke R.A. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by P.D. 938, as its basis for exemption from the
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payment of legal fees. IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM
PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010
The structure of the Philippine National Red Cross is sui generis being neither strictly private nor
public in nature. DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD J. GORDON, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED
CROSS, G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a
law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within
the confines of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but
merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the
law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY THE BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS (NOW FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION) v.
DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. AND TERRAMEDIC, INC., G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014
GMA must be reminded that the National Telecommunications Commission, insofar as the
regulation of the telecommunications industry is concerned, has exclusive jurisdiction to "establish
and prescribe rules, regulations, standards and specifications in all cases related to the issued
Certificate of Public Convenience and administer and enforce the same." As such, and considering
further its expertise on the matter, its interpretation of the rules and regulations it itself
promulgates are traditionally accorded by the Court with great weight and respect. The NTC, being
the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and
technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives, is in
the best position to interpret its own rules, regulations and guidelines. The Court has consistently
yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own
rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. GMA NETWORK, INC. v. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112, February 26, 2014
The FDA has been deputized by R.A. 3720 to accept applications for registration of pharmaceuticals
and grant or reject such applications. The said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health,
upon the recommendation of the FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the
registration of pharmaceutical products.
It is A.O. 67, an administrative regulation issued by the Secretary of Health in accordance with his
rule-making power under R.A. 3720, which required that certain pharmaceutical products undergo
BA/BE testing prior to the issuance of CPR, contrary to respondents assertion that it was Circular
Nos. 1 and 8 that required such tests.
Circular Nos. 1 and 8 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a)
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain
existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of
certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of R.A. 3720 depends. The only purpose of these
circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67,
including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, pursuant to R.A. 3720. Therefore, the FDA
has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive
rights of the parties that they seek to govern as they are not administrative regulations in the first
place, no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity. BUREAU AND
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION v. DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC., G.R. No. 190837,
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March 5, 2014
There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justices power of review over the actions of his
subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in the Secretary
of Justices authority of supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him,
subject only to specified guidelines. Chapter 7, Section 38, paragraph 1 of E.O. 292, defines the
administrative relationship that is supervision and control: Unless otherwise expressly stated in
the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative
relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows: ... Supervision and control shall include
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Unless
a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular
agencies, the word control shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v. TEOFULO NANO ALAON, G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014
For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relation between
the parties. [I]n order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to
establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land (3) that
there is consent between the parties to the relationship (4) that the purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee. CHARLES BUMAGAT, ET AL. v. REGALADO ARRIBAY, G.R. No.
194818, June 9, 2014
The power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed or revoked only by the
legislature. Moreover, this plenary power of taxation cannot be delegated by Congress to any other
branch of government or private persons, unless its delegation is authorized by the Constitution
itself. Hence, the discretion to ascertain the following (a) basis, amount, or rate of tax; (b) person
or property that is subject to tax; (c) exemptions and exclusions from tax; and (d) manner of
collecting the tax may not be delegated away by Congress.
However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement and
administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like the
Secretary of Finance in this case.
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule
and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and
many technical fields of governmental functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is
coupled by the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon
present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and
the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details or to make
explicit what is general, which otherwise cannot all be incorporated in the provision of the
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law. Such rules and regulations, when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by law, "deserve to be given weight and respect by the
courts in view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their specific
expertise in their respective fields." To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the scope of
statutory authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be
germane to the object and purpose of the law; (2) not contradict, but conform to, the standards the
law prescribes; and (3) be issued for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions
of our tax laws. LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY v. CA, G.R. No. 125346, November
11, 2014
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and
functions expressly set forth in P.D. 1986. ELISEO SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA LAGUARDIA, et
al., G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010
Administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative
authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs,
because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. LUIS LOKIN v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22,
2010
By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has authority to issue
building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it,
whether on public or private lands. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v. JOSEPH
CARANTES, ROSE CARANTES, AND ALL OTHER HEIRS OF MAXIMINOCARANTES, G.R. No.
18127, June 23, 2010
The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, GLENDA A. VARGAS, et al. v.
DANES B. SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010
By explicit provision of law, the Toll Regulatory Board was given the power to grant administrative
franchise for toll facility projects. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. AND JOSE MA. O. HIZON v. TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, et al., G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010
When the question involves the validity of a resolution issued by petitioner, it is the National
Electric Authority, pursuant to its power of supervision, which has the authority to conduct
investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations with
respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., et
al. v. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012
As a separate juridical personality from the government, UP cannot evade execution, and its funds
may be subject to garnishment or levy. This notwithstanding, before execution may be had, a claim
for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA. LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND
WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185918, April 18,
2012
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It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894
have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to
construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit
or TOC. By explicit provision of law, the TRB was given the power to grant administrative franchise
for toll facility projects. RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TRB, G.R. No. 181293, February 23,
2015
JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW
Administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to support the
conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed (or have not
been performed). HON. PRIMO C. MIRO v. REYNALDO M. DOSONO, G.R. No. 170697, April 30,
2010
Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a finding of
liability. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. RODOLFO ZALDARRIAGA, G.R. No. 175349, June 22,
2010
With regard to pollution-related matters, an administrative recourse to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB) must first be made before filing the complaint with the regular courts. SHELL
PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V. v. EFREN JALOS, et al., G.R. No. 179918, September 08, 2010
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 provides that
administrative offenses are classified into grave, less grave and light, depending on the gravity of
the nature of the act complained of. The less grave offenses of simple neglect of duty and of simple
misconduct carry the penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for
the first offense. AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. PORTIA DIESTA, BRANCH
CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 236, PASIG CITY AND LUZ SANTOSTACLA, CLERK III, SAME COURT, A.M. No. P-05-1970 (Formerly A.M.OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1962-P),
May 30, 2011
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The
thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 191427,
May 30, 2011
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, it is provided that administrative investigations
shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. The weight of evidence required in administrative
investigations is substantial evidence. SHERYLL C. DELA CRUZ, COMPLAINANT v. PAMELA P.
MALUNAO, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, BAYOMBONG, NUEVA VIZCAYA,
A.M. No. P-11-3019, March 20, 2012
The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the
court of its jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in
administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to
erase the offense that may have been committed against the public service. The subsequent
desistance by the complainant does not free the public officer from liability, as the purpose of an
administrative proceeding is to protect the public service based on the time-honored principle that
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a public office is a public trust. CARLITO C. ENCINAS v. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR. and PO1
JOEL S. CAUBANG, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits
exceptions. One exception which is relevant to the case is where no administrative review is
provided by law. The case falls squarely under the aforementioned exception since the law per se
provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is
covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more
than 30 days. MARK JAMES S. MAGLALANG v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its incumbent chairman, EFRAIM GENUINO, G.R.
No. 190566, December 11, 2013
In an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is
measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty
to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.
Because administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to support the
conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed (or have not
been performed), reasonable doubt does not ipso facto result in exoneration unlike in criminal
proceedings where guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS
v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014
As established by the facts, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and to adduce his
evidence. This opportunity was enough for one to comply with the requirements of due process in
an administrative case. The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in
an administrative investigation, as long as the parties are heard and given the opportunity to
adduce their respective sets of evidence.
As defined in the landmark case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (1940), all that is needed
to support an administrative finding of fact is substantial evidence, which is defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
evidence presented in the present case is more than enough to support the conclusion reached.
Where the findings of fact of a quasi-judicial body are supported by substantial evidence, these
findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN
JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014
The procedure for appeals to the Office of the President is governed by A.O. No. 18, Series of 1987.
Section 1 thereof provides: Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the
President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from we interpreted the above provision
and declared that a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to
the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of
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appeal. EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 192957, September
29, 2014
ELECTION LAW
CANDIDACY
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is
without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the
Certification. VICTORINO B. ALDABA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R No. 188078,
January 25, 2010
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. LUIS A. ASISTIO v. HON. THELMA
CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from
the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the Section 6(8)
of R.A. 7941 provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS
BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.190529, April 29, 2010
R.A. 7941, the Party-List System Act, covers all youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats. A nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. MILAGROS AMORES v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND EMMANUEL VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 189600,
June 29, 2010
Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends
to return to and to remain his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it,
is immaterial. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010
Nowhere in the Section 40 of the Local Government Code will one find defective certificate of
candidacy as a ground for disqualifying a candidate. Nor does it specify that a defective notarization
is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. SERGIO G. AMORA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011
Filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative while holding a judicial post
constitutes grave misconduct with a penalty of dismissal from service. ASHARY M. ALAUYA v.
JUDGE CASAN ALI L. LIMBONA, A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011
The three-term limitation made under R.A. 9164 has no retroactive application. CONSTANCIO F.
MENDOZA v. SENEN C. FAMILARA AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 191017,
November 15, 2011
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with residency requirement
since the question of residence is a question of intention. Notwithstanding, jurisprudence has laid
down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
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once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but
one domicile at a time. ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND DAN ERASMO, SR., G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes. Hence, the second placer candidate is deemed to have garnered the highest
number of votes and is entitled to hold the corresponding elective position. EFREN RACEL ARATEA
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTELA D. ANTIPOLO, G.R. No. 195229, October 09, 2012
Existence of a valid certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution,
hence a declaration of a candidates disqualification which rendered his COC invalid cannot be
properly substituted MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
RODERICK A. ALCALA , G.R. No. 196804, October 09, 2012
A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
Hence, if a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the
election, all votes for that candidate are stray votes. DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND AGAPITO J. CARDINO, G.R. No. 193237, October 09, 2012
A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time, otherwise the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 193314, February 26,
2013
The existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly
substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled or denied due course, the candidate cannot be validly
substituted. SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
AND LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
A candidate whose COC is cancelled or denied cannot be substituted by another on the ground that
the former was merely disqualified. In case of disqualification, there can be substitution because a
candidates disqualification does not automatically result to the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy. However, when the certificate of candidacy of a person is denied or is cancelled,
substitution cannot be had because the effect of cancellation is as if there is no candidate at all.
SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY
MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
The law (Section 8 of R.A. 7941) expressly requires the submission of a list containing at least five
qualified nominees. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the
cancellation of its registration. The requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is primarily
a statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups and the submission of this list is
part of a registered partys continuing compliance with the law to maintain its registration. A partylist groups previous registration with the COMELEC confers no vested right to the maintenance of
its registration. In order to maintain a party in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove
not only its continued possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its
compliance with the basic requirements of the law. COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT
PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 207026, August 6,
2013
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Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future
performance. There is no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking
registration under the party-list system still need to comply with the track record requirement.
Nowhere in R.A. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit
evidence to show their track record as a group. ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code reveals that false representation in the contents of the COC
must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refers to eligibility or qualification for
elective office, whereas, false representation must consist of deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would render a candidate ineligible. Here, the respondents
nickname is not a qualification for a public office which affects his eligibility. VILLAFUERTE v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014
Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run
for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run;
if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the
election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her
citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this
classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the COC. Aside from the
requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his COC "that he is eligible for said office." A
candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible
because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he
states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the
candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under
Section 78.
A cancelled COC is void cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether
a certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial, because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void. We then found that since the winning mayoralty candidate's
certificate of candidacy was void, he was never a candidate at all and all his votes were considered
stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified candidate, who actually
garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor. MAYOR HAYUDINI v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014
The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws for the candidates' residency
in the political unit they seek to represent has never been intended to be an empty formalistic
condition; it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s]
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community" from seeking elective offices in that
community.
The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a
week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
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The fact that Osmea has no registered property under his name does not belie his actual residence
in Toledo City because property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates
for local election. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a
friend or relative. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of
permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the
residency requirement.
To successfully challenge a winning candidates qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that
our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. The reason for such liberality stems
from the recognition that laws governing election contests must be construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
We wish to remind that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material
misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements
before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. Where
a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and
criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as
expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials,
on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so
hold that we cannot choose the electorates will. LINA JALOVER v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209286,
September 23, 2014
NUISANCE CANDIDATE
It is a well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation
of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public
interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people
is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing
uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations,
final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy
filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to
put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and
delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held
and the votes counted and canvassed. CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON, G.R. No.
189034, January 11, 2010
The votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where
such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, are not stray but
must be counted in favor of the latter. CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy
may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motu
propio or upon a verified petition of an interested party," "subject to an opportunity to be heard."
COMELEC's power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the
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candidate's opportunity to be heard. In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. The clarificatory hearing was an ineffective opportunity to be heard, since COMELEC declared
Timbol a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run
for office. COMELEC had already issued the resolutions when Timbol appeared before Election
Officer Valencia in the clarificatory hearing. JOSEPH TIMBOL v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004,
February 24, 2015
CAMPAIGN
When the printed election propaganda was published, there arises a presumption that there was
written acceptance by petitioner of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. ALVIN B. GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
TOMAS R. OSMEA, G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010
REMEDIES AND JURISDICTION IN ELECTION LAW
The ruling in Divinagracia v. COMELEC stressed that if the appellants had already paid the amount
of P1,000 to the lower courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required to
pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days
from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay
the P3,200 within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed. Divinagracia,
however, contained the following final caveat: that for notice of appeal filed after the promulgation
(July 27, 2009) of this decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the
two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable. MATEO R. NOLLEN, JR. v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONSAND SUSANA M. CABALLES, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010
The general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each
candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. However, this rule
applies only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the day of
elections until revision. BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all the courts,
that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed, to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by merely technical objections.
PEDRO MANZA et al. v. EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, et al., G. R. No. 42181, March 15, 2010
If the Court were to tabulate the results reflected in the ERs, it would, in effect, convert itself into a
board of canvassers. This would entail a function which, obviously, this Court, in a petition for
certiorari, cannot perform. JESUS TYPOCO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No.
186359, March 5, 2010
The period for filing a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy based on false
representation is covered by Rule 23 and not Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 3
of Rule 25 allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the last day for filing of COCs but not
later than the date of proclamation is merely a procedural rule that cannot supersede Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et
al., G.R. No. 192856, March 08, 2011
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A petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a candidate from entering an electoral race. Both
remedies prescribe distinct periods to file the corresponding petition, on which the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Elections over the case is dependent. ALFAIS T. MUNDER v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ATTY. TAGO R. SARIP, G.R. No. 194076, October 19, 2011
The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two different appeal
fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal, and the other to
be paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of
appeal. BIENVENIDO WILLIAM D. LLOREN v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROGELIO
PUA, JR., G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012
When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should
be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612,
January 22, 2013
An opposition to a petition for registration of a party-list is not a condition precedent to the filing of
a complaint for cancellation of the same. ANTONIO D. DAYAO, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
193643 and 193704, January 29, 2013
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the contents of the
COC must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material
misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to qualifications for elective office
(residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualifications necessary to run for local elective office
as provided in the Local Government Code) coupled with a showing that there was an intent to
deceive the electorate. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTA v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No.
206698, February 25, 2014
ELECTION PROTEST
Decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of
the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and
recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other
equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested
elective office, of the case.
In election protest cases, disruption of public service is an element that has been weighed and
factored in and cannot per se be a basis to deny execution pending appeal. JESUS M. CALO v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 185222, January 19, 2010
A one-day delay in filing a Preliminary Conference Brief, does not justify the outright dismissal of an
electoral protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the
rules on the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable. SALVADOR D.
VIOLAGO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOAN V. ALARILLA, G.R. No. 194143,
October 4, 2011
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities. Its purpose is to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of
the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. CONGRESSWOMAN LUCY MARIE TORRESPage 79 of 100

GOMEZ v. EUFROCINO C. CODILLA, JR. AND HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, G. R. No. 195191, March 20, 2012
The winning elected official in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve
the unexpired portion of the term. MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 201716, January 08, 2013
Picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots
that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of
R.A. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out
by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.
The ballot images in the compact flash (CF) cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the
functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an
election protest. Both are original documents and carry the same evidentiary weight as official
physical ballot. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013
Where the party received, through his counsel, notices from the COMELEC of an examination
requested by the opposing party and filed a motion for reconsideration against the same
examination; he cannot claim that his right to due process was violated. In administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013
COMELEC
The discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the
assailed decision, order or resolution, or the COMELEC en banc, as the case may be not to the
Presiding Commissioner. MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
ARTEMIO BALAG, G.R. Nos. 189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010
The COMELEC is mandated to make the source codes for the AES technologies it selected for
implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG and all other interested
political parties or groups for independent review. CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN
GOVERNANCE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010
Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution and
the Rules of Court provide, in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, however, the Courts
constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a
specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B.
MITRA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
FESTO R. GALANG, JR. v. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO and NICASIO M. RAMOS, G.R. No.
192793, February 22, 2011
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The COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of a party-list and not the HRET as although it is the party-list organization that is
voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House
of Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the
House of Representatives over which the HRET has jurisdiction over. ABC (ALLIANCE FOR
BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIRMAN, JAMES
MARTY LIM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., G.R. No. 193256,
March 22, 2011
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2 (5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of B.P. 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the
elections is purely administrative in character. This process does not entail any determination of
administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration.
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190793, June 19,
2012
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET. ROMEO M. JOLOSJOS, JR. v. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND DAN ERASMO, SR., G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012
The COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well established.
This singular power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the
COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), et al., G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012
In correcting the erroneous entry, the COMELEC need not order the opening of the ballot box for
the purpose of recounting the votes of the candidates affected if the correction sought is such that it
can be made without the need of opening the ballot box. ANTONIO P. CERON v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTION GRACE P. VALDEZ, et al., G.R. No. 199084, September 11, 2012
There is no impediment for the COMELEC and the DOJ to create the Joint Committee and FactFinding Team for the purpose of conducting a thorough investigation of the alleged massive
electoral fraud and the manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 national elections
relating in particular to the presidential and senatorial elections. Neither does the creation of the
said Committee violate the constitutional rights of an individual. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al., G.R. No. 199085, September 18, 2012
Cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which
the COMELEC in division should first decide. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process
to the candidate. KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM v. COMELEC and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, G.R. No.
192289, January 08, 2013
The express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election protests carries with it the grant of
all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and efficient exercise of the power
expressly granted. Verily, the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred by the constitution to the
COMELEC to settle said election protests includes the authority to order a technical examination of
relevant election paraphernalia, election returns and ballots in order to determine whether fraud
and irregularities attended the canvass of the votes. GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI AND VICEPage 81 of 100

GOVERNOR RUBY M. SAHALI, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 201796, January 15,
2013
A protesting candidate cannot file a petition with the Supreme Court when the COMELEC decision is
equally divided and a rehearing is not conducted; otherwise the petition shall be considered
premature and shall be dismissed. When the COMELEC En Banc is equally divided in an opinion and
the necessary majority cannot be had, there shall be a rehearing. To break the legal stalemate in
case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the COMELEC en banc, Section 6, Rule 18
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are given the opportunity
anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the
COMELEC en banc of the merit of their case. It is provided also that when the Commission en banc
is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard,
and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. MAMERTO T.
SEVILLA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RENATO R. SO, G.R. No. 203833, March 19,
2013
The COMELEC has authority to effect the re-clustering of precincts when the act shall prevent
failure of elections and promote free, orderly, and honest elections. Unless they are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with the actions of the COMELEC.
SALIC DUMARPA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013
Where another person takes the civil service examination on behalf of another, the act constitutes
dishonesty which is punishable by dismissal from service. The public officers or government
employees length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The CSCs discovery of the perfidy
in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service
eligible in her Personal Data Sheet when she had been already found guilty of an administrative
charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell that she
has not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION v. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao
City, A.M. No. P-08-2531, April 11, 2013
The COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. It is the COMELECs duty to cancel motu proprio the Certificate of Candidacy
of a candidate who is clearly disqualified under the law to run for public office, notwithstanding the
absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. ROMEO
G. JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR,
ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L.
LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, G.R. No. 205033, June
18, 2013
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the
COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list
organization. Hence, the due process violation was committed when a party-list group was not
apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of the said
party-list group in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations
qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, said party-list group
was not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity
to adequately explain their side regarding the term- sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence,
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accordingly, in support of their position. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its
Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. Nos. 206844-45; COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent
Representative in the House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206982, July 23, 2013
Under the present law (Section 43 of R.A. 9369), the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses. With this, where there is Joint Panel created to investigate over an
alleged commission of election fraud and is granted a concurrent jurisdiction with the COMELEC
over the offense, the accused cannot claim that the constitution of the Joint Committee is invalid for
violating the mandate of the COMELEC. Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the
COMELEC and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the
resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be
approved by the COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. With more reason,
therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
COMELECs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., G.R. No. 199082; BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. v. HON. LEILA DE
LIMA, et al., G.R. No. 199085; GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
et al., G.R. No. 199118, July 23, 2013
Factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when
there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be
applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution
itself on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is
not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. The COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws,
rules or regulations relating to elections. ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(ANAD) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" refers to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. WIGBERTO R. TAADA, JR. v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS ANGELINA D. TAN, AND ALVIN JOHN S. TAADA, G.R. Nos. 207199-200,
October 22, 2013
The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. The COMELEC has
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. It is thus not novel for the
Supreme Court to uphold the COMELECs broad power or authority to fix other dates for a
plebiscite to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al., G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013
Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and
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administer all laws and regulations relative to conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall. The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuing free,
orderly and honest elections.
Furthermore, Section 5 of Omnibus Election Code provided for the power of the COMELEC to set the
elections to another date for any serious cause. In the case herein, the tight time frame of the
enactment, signing into law and effectivity of R.A. 10360, coupled with the subsequent conduct of
May 2013 National and Local elections, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the
creation of province of Davao Occidental.
In the exercise of its powers to protect the integrity of elections, COMELEC should not and must not
be straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to resolve election disputes.
The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or
plebiscites. CAGAS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous COMELEC
resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements. This essentially consists
in computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of broadcast
communications compared to the past where it was done on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes
immediately obvious that there was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within
which candidates and political parties would be able to campaign through the air. The question is
accordingly whether this is within the power of the COMELEC to do or not. The Court holds that it is
not within the power of the COMELEC to do so.
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to
enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations or reasonable basis. It
could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in
so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must
be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the
rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past.
If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
While stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable, there is no demand that the
NTC slavishly follow precedent. However, we think it essential, for the sake of clarity and
intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action,
that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous
standards should no longer apply or should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order
to sufficiently establish a decision as having rational basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking
thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement and
accountability which elevates administrative rules to the level of respectability and acceptability.
Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and rational basis for
any changes in those rules by which they are supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical
departure from the previous ones.
The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be
based on the totality (aggregate) of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator
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Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed that it
should be on a per station basis.
It is therefore ineluctable to conclude that Congress intended to provide a more expansive and
liberal means by which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other stake holders in the
periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies
and platforms of governance, and for the electorate to be given a chance to know better the
personalities behind the candidates. In this regard, the media is also given a very important part in
that undertaking of providing the means by which the political exercise becomes an interactive
process. All of these would be undermined and frustrated with the kind of regulation that the
respondent came up with. GMA NETWORK v. COMELEC, G.R. 205357, September 2, 2014
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and
detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as any personnel movement from one government
agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a
government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment; while detail as
defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to
another without the issuance of an appointment. Having acquired technical and legal
meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as such. ELSIE S. CAUSING v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
199139, September 9, 2014
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and
thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.
VICTORINO ALDABA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R No. 188078, March 15, 2010
The constitutional provision draws plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a
province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city
must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. SENATOR
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent
municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress but measured on the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a). Indeed,
substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) et
al. v. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al., G.R. Nos. 176951, February 15, 2011
A province may be created without complying with Section 461 of the LGC requiring contiguous
territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F.
BERNAL, AND RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No.
180050, April 12, 2011
Page 85 of 100

In computing the quorum in of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, its entire membership must be taken
into account including that of the City Vice Mayor as presiding officer. LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL AND THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL v. ATTY. REX G. ROJO, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012
Section 444 (b) (1) (vi) of the LGC requires that, while the authorization of the municipal mayor
need not be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which the said local executive is authorized
to enter into must be made pursuant to a law or ordinance. When the said obligation was approved
through a mere resolution, it shall not confer any right to a person. The distinction between
ordinances and resolutions is well-perceived. While ordinances are laws and possess a general and
permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no
rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution states: No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Section 453 of the
LGC, meanwhile, states: It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized
within 30 days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately
preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein.
While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution we
nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration
of boundaries. As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily
entails a change in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the
phrase "boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and
bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the
demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the LGUs exercise of corporate power
ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be
within the ambit of the constitutional provision.
The changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial that there is a necessity for the
plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in the
constitutional provision, conversions result in material changes in the economic and political rights
of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a
city, we held that the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally
apply to conversions as well. AURELIO M. UMALI V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014
Section 16 and 76 of the Local Government Code do not confer authority upon any local
government unit to create a separate or supplementary retirement benefit plan. Such a type of
retirement benefit plan must first be granted to the local government by law before a local
government can use it. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 199439,
April 22, 2014
PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY
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A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal boards and councils, as to include
the power to accordingly reclassify the lands within the zones, would be in accord with the avowed
legislative intent behind the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, which was to increase the autonomy of
local governments. BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC. v. E. M. RAMOS
AND SONS, INC., G.R. No. 131481, March 16, 2011
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State.
Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like
following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the
structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources
among the different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution
in the hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to
the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of
the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources. Further, the DENR Secretary has the power to review and, therefore,
decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Governor as recommended by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, is a quasi-judicial
function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the
contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON.
ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner citys issuance of E.O. 40, series
of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial step for its organization development
masterplan. Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize.
The text of the ordinance indicates its purpose of encouraging employees, especially those who are
unproductive due to health reasons, to avail of the program even before they reach the compulsory
retirement age. Section 6 provides for a form of severance pay to those who availed of GenSan
SERVES, which was executed in good faith.
The use of the term "retirement" in Section 6 is misleading in determining the nature of the benefits
it provides. Labels are not determinative of substantive content. It is the purpose behind these
incentives, as read from the text of the ordinance and as inferred from the effect of the ordinance as
applied, which must govern.
The benefits provided in Section 6 serve its purpose of inducing petitioner citys employees, who
are unproductive due to health reasons, to retire early. Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan
SERVES were only given to a select few the sickly and unproductive due to health reasons.
Certainly, this negates the position that the benefits provide for supplementary retirement benefits
that augment existing retirement laws. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v. COA, G.R. No. 199439, April
22, 2014
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The prior approval of the concerned Sanggunian requirement is an attribute of the autonomy
granted to and enjoyed by the LGUs under the Constitution. However, R.A. 7227 provided the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) the broad powers to accept any local or foreign investment,
business, or enterprise. The Court finds that the implementation of the subject project (power plant
in Subic, Zambales) does not need prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required by
Section 27 of the Local Government Code, because the SBMAs decision to approve the project
prevails over the objections of the sangguanians of the LGUs, by virtue of the provisions and powers
granted by R.A. 7227. HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE v. HON. TEODORO A. CASIO, G.R. No.
207257, February 3, 2015
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A fifth-class municipality like Midsalip is not absolutely prohibited from adopting a salary schedule
equivalent to that of a special city or a first-class province, provided, that it complies with the
provision of R.A. 7160. PAULINO M. ALECHA AND PRECIOSO M. TAPITAN v. ELMER BEN V.
PASION et al., G.R. No. 164506, January 19, 2010
Although Section 152 (c) of the Local Government Code requires a barangay clearance for any
activity within its jurisdiction, such clearance cannot be denied when the activity is in a permissible
zone, otherwise such denial is illegal. The same provision allows the city or municipality to which
the barangay unit belongs to issue the required license or building permit despite the withholding
of the barangay clearance. GREENHILLS EAST ASSOCIATION, INC. v. E. GANZON, INC., G.R. No.
169741, January 20, 2010
R.A. 7160 requires that where the head of the office or department requesting the requisition sits in
a dual capacity, the participation of a Sanggunian member (elected from among the members of the
Sanggunian) is necessary. ROLANDO SISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170339,
March 9, 2010
Being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not
have to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing. THE LEARNING CHILD,
INC., et al. v. AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, et al., G.R. Nos. 134269, 134440,
144518, July 7, 2010
Under the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior
authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract in behalf of the
municipality. MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TIWI v. ANTONIO B.
BETITO, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the grant of
additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits does not need the
approval of the President to be valid. THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. THE
COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et.al, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010
The Revised Charter of Quezon City expressly provided that the city government had the power to
regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner
of constructing and repairing them. The MMDA does not have the power to declare a thing a
nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. EMILIO
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GANCAYCO v. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the
maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and
approval of local government units for the projects described therein. BORACAY FOUNDATION,
INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY GOV. CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, et al., G.R.
No. 196870, June 26, 2012
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on
the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike
that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on
behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. ARNOLD D. VICENCIO v.
HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012
A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President,
and an exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. Neither is the provincial
governor authorized to convene a local civilian group or an organization of private citizens as it is
proscribed pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force and under Section 24 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution. JAMAR M. KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, et al.,
G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012
While the Local Government Code charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities
that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing
for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, the Local Government Code
provides an exception in cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et
al., G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012
In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with all the
requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government unit
where his business is situated. The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall
be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T. ANTONIO, et al. v.
JOSEPH LASAM LARA, G.R. No. 188500. July 24, 2013
An ordinance is deemed approved upon failure of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to declare the same
invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. RAMONITO O.
ACAAC, et al. v. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, et al., G.R. No. 187378, September 30, 2013
The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order under R.A. 9262 by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and
to "maintain public order in the barangay. TUA v. HON. MANGROBANG, G.R. No. 170701,
January 22, 2014
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The Constitution and the Local Government Code grants Local Government Units the power to
create its own sources of revenue even if not provided in the NIRC or the LGC, so long as such are
not oppressive and confiscatory.
If the generation of revenue was the primary purpose and regulation was merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also
obtained does not make the imposition a tax. If the main purpose of the ordinance is to regulate
certain construction activities of the identified special projects, which included cell sites or
telecommunications towers, the fees (charges fixed by law or Ordinance for the regulation or
inspection of a business or activity) imposed in the said ordinance are primarily regulatory in
nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. MUNICIPALITY OF
MALVAR, BATANGAS, G.R. No.204429, February 18, 2014
The power of the cities and municipalities, such as the Municipality of Calamba, to adopt zoning
ordinances or regulations converting lands into non-agricultural cannot be denied. In Buklod ng
Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (2011), this Court recognized said
power in the following manner: Section 3 of R.A. 2264, otherwise known at the Local Autonomy Act,
empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance.
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure
within the intendment or ambit of the word regulation under the provision. As a matter of fact the
same section declares that the power exists any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG v. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No.
200491, June 9, 2014
Under R.A. 7160, local government units, such as the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, are vested
with the power to reclassify lands. However, an ordinance is required in order to reclassify
agricultural lands, and such may only be passed after the conduct of public hearings.
The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98. Given the
foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution was ineffectual for that purpose. A resolution was a
mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body on a specific matter that was
temporary in nature, and differed from an ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and
possessed a general and permanent character. HOLY TRINITY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014
LOCAL OFFICIALS
The law does not intend to place local government officials in the difficult position of having to
choose between disobeying a reassignment order or keeping an allowance. Thus, absent a legal
basis for its discontinuance, a government official who has been reassigned is still entitled to
receive RATA. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT v. OLIVIA LEONES, G.R. No.
169726, March 18, 2010
Where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly
secure the services of private counsel. ROMEO A. GONTANG v. ENGR. CECILIA ALAYAN, G.R. No.
191691, January16, 2013
On the matter of counsels representation for the government, the Administrative Code is not the
only law that delves on the issue. Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits the lawyers
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who are authorized to represent them in court actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local
government units legal officer. Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers
and functions of a local government units legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who
may represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on
the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable to local government units,
the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a
general law on the subject matter. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL v. THE
HONORABLE CA, G.R. No. 199027, June 9, 2014
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
The Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 R.A. 8762 is valid and constitutional. While Section 19,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of
Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. Neither does the lessening of restraint on the
foreigners' right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, amounts to a denial of
the Filipinos' right to property and to due process of law. REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S.
ESPINA, et al. v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), et al., G.R. No.
143855, September 21, 2010
Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR's franchise is subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. 9377. Hence, the
provision in Section 1 of R.A. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. 8424 by withdrawing the
exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR's
transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) et al., G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011
The sale of government-owned Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to a foreign corporation
is not prohibited but only Filipino citizens and corporations 60% of whose capital is owned by
Filipinos may be granted water rights. INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC., et al. v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM), et al., G.R. No. 192088, October 09,
2012
GMA cannot rely on the temporary permits to justify its continued operation on an expired
Provisional Authority (P.A.). As the NTC itself discloses, a temporary permit is not intended to be a
substitute for a PA which must be constantly renewed despite the issuance of a temporary permit.
A P.A. refers to an authority given to an entity qualified to operate a public utility for a limited
period during the pendency of its application for, or before the issuance of its Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC). It has a general scope because it is akin to a provisional CPC in that it gives a
public utility provider power to operate as such and be bound by the laws and rules governing
public utilities, pending the issuance of its actual CPC.
On the other hand, a temporary permit is a document containing the call sign, authorized power,
frequency/channel, class station, hours of operation, points of communication and equipment
particulars granted to an authorized public utility. Its scope is more specific than a P.A. because it
contains details and specifications under which a public utility should operate pursuant to a
previously updated P.A.
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As may be gleaned from the NTCs statement, the operational validity of a temporary permit flows
only from "a previously updated P.A." This means that there should be an effective P.A. before a
temporary permit is issued. The latter is a specific issuance which proceeds from a pre-requisite PA.
GMA NETWORK, INC. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112,
February 26, 2014
The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain for land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved. And the applicant bears the burden to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRISANTO S.
RANESES, G.R. No. 189970, June 9, 2014
This Court has had a few occasions to rule that a franchise from Congress is not required before
each and every public utility may operate. Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise
for the operation of a public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue
authorizations and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public utilities. In the instant case,
there is no law that states that a legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities.
"Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to
authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally
recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated
agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to
agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that
privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a
legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature. RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TRB, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015
BALANCE AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right of citizens to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
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transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that
not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental
rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus: Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16,
2014
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
A government contract is essentially similar to a private contract contemplated under the Civil
Code. The legal requisites of consent of the contracting parties, an object certain which is the
subject matter, and cause or consideration of the obligation must likewise concur. Otherwise, there
is no government contract to speak of. SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al. v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 170530. July 5, 2010
Competitive bidding is an essential element of a public bidding. It has been held in a long line of
cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void and the party
to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. PHILIPPINE SPORTS COMMISSION, et al. v. DEAR
JOHN SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 183260. July 4, 2012
A mere operator, under an operating agreement, cannot file a Mineral Product Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) application in its name without a sufficient and valid authorization from its principal or
from the holders of the mining claims and interests included therein. DIZON COPPER SILVER
MINES, INC. v. DR. LUIS D. DIZON, G.R. No. 183573, July 18, 2012
Price escalation is expressly allowed under Presidential Decree 1594, which law allows price
escalation in all contracts involving government projects including contracts entered into by
government entities and instrumentalities and Government Owned or Controlled Corporations
(GOCCs). PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY v. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 188866, October 19, 2011
Competitive selection involves a selection process based on transparent criteria, which should not
constrain or limit competition, and is open to participation by any interested and qualified private
entity. Selection by negotiated agreements or negotiated projects, on the other hand, comes about
as an end result of an unsolicited proposal from a private sector proponent, or if the government
has failed to identify an eligible private sector partner for a desired activity after subjecting the
same to a competitive selection.
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Relevant to the case at bar is the selection modality by negotiated agreement arising from the
submission and acceptance of an unsolicited proposal, known as the Swiss Challenge method, in
esse a hybrid mechanism between the direct negotiation approach and the competitive bidding
route. With the availability of the Swiss Challenge method for utilization by those in the private
sector, PSEs have studied, formulated, and submitted numerous suo moto or unsolicited proposals
with the ultimate goal of assisting the public sector in elevating the countrys place in the global
economy, as in the case herein. SM LAND, INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014
Needless to say, allowing government agencies to retract their commitments to the project
proponents will essentially render inutile the incentives offered to and have accrued in favor of the
private sector entity. Without securing these rights, the business community will be wary when it
comes to forging contracts with the government. Simply put, the failure of the government to abide
by the rules it itself set would have detrimental effects on the private sectors confidence that the
government will comply with its statutory and contractual obligations to the letter. SM LAND,
INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13,
2014
PUBLIC FUNDS
Coco-levy funds are public funds as these funds are affected by public interest: to provide means for
the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry. PETITIONERORGANIZATIONS, NAMELY: PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT
MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR) et
al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al., G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012
Section 2 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and/or
fiduciary funds nor part of the general funds of the national government of P.D. 755 contravenes the
provisions of the Constitution. PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC.
(COCOFED), et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 04,
2012
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. A
violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment. However, the refund
of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the
Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient. BRENDA
L. NAZARETH v. COMMISSIONERS of the COMMISSION on AUDIT, G.R. No. 188635, January29,
2013
TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established under the TESDA Act of 1994. Under the
Act, the TESDA budget is included in the annual GAA; hence, the TESDP Fund, being sourced from
the Treasury, are funds belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands of
public officials. The Constitution provides, No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. In this case, TESDA failed to point out the law
specifically authorizing it to grant additional reimbursement for Extraordinary and Miscellaneous
Expenses from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit requirement in the Constitution. TESDA v.
COA, G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014
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The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is
a sui generis private entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial
relations with the people in Taiwan. However, despite its nongovernmental character, the MECO
handles government funds in the form of the verification fees it collects on behalf of the DOLE and
the consular fees it collects under Section 2 (6) of E.O. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the
accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such verification fees and consular fees
should be audited by the COA. Section 14 (1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA
to audit accounts of nongovernmental entities required to pay or have government share but
only with respect to funds ... coming from or through the government. This provision of law
perfectly fits the MECO. DENNIS FUNA v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE AND THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 193462, February 04, 2014
EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
The constitutional mandate to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at
all levels is directed to the State and not to the school. THE PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
(PTA) OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, et al. v. THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND
TRUST CO., G.R. No. 176518. March 2, 2010
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of age and development-appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that
will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the
petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance
on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be
"primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing
the youth and their important role in nation building. Considering that Section 14 provides not only
for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen
pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's
rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and
that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4 (t) of the RH Law itself provides for the
teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes
among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
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supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education
program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious
beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH
Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it. JAMES M. IMBONG, et al. v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
et al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987 [T]he four
essential freedoms of a university [are]: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may
teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. An
educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient
for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to
attain them, free from outside coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public
welfare which would call for some restraint. Indeed, academic freedom has never been meant to be
an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An
equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil
Code, that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The schools power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and
that the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival. In this regard, the Court has always recognized
the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel,
on students who violate disciplinary rules.
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act
done by the student prior thereto.
As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor
Code and the Honor System in particular.
The minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process for
students in disciplinary cases are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
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Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The PMA Honor Code
explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadets honor
violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. There is aversion to undue
judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN
JEFF P. CUDIA v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), G.R.
NO. 211362, February 24, 2015
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The State is the sole judge to decide whether to prosecute claims on behalf of an individual. It
retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. ISABELITA C.
VINUYA, et al. v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, G.R. No.
162230, April 28, 2010
Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH between the IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral component of the
Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the Philippines as a subject of international
law possessed of a treaty-making capacity, and the IBRD, which, as an international lending
institution organized by world governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of
repayment by the borrowing sovereign state, is likewise regarded a subject of international law and
possessed of the capacity to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states. Being similar to
a treaty but without requiring legislative concurrence, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH following
the definition given in the Bayan Muna case is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by
international law. Owing to this classification, the Government of the Philippines is therefore
obligated to observe its terms and conditions under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental
maxim of international law that requires the parties to keep their agreement in good faith. It bears
pointing out that the pacta sunt servanda rule has become part of the law of the land through the
incorporation clause found under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which
states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations." LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R.
No. 193796, July 2, 2014
The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the
Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners claim against the Government of Japan is left to
the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere
with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department.
Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction,
to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. ISABELITA C. VINUYA v. THE
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, G.R. No. 162230, August 12,
2014
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its
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foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is,
under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment
against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit
must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
We also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from
the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an
immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without the formers consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which
distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial, and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the Tubataha Reefs Natural
Park (TRNP) was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that
the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation
of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Article 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases
where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latters internal waters and the territorial sea.
Under Article 31, [t]he flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to
the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other
rules of international law.
We fully concur with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that
the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear international responsibility under Article 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively
supporting the countrys efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its
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obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs,
unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to
protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues
impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the
VFA. It is settled that [t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political departments of the government, and
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision. PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014
TREATIES
National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the
prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or
to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US,
under our national criminal justice system or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the
secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO AND
BLAS F. OPLE, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011
The international law of the sea is generally defined as a body of treaty rules and customary norms
governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with
respect to the uses of the oceans.
The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at
Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November
16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare
clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the
worlds marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law.
The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones
of the sea which are: (1) internal waters; (2) territorial sea; (3) contiguous zone; (4) exclusive
economic zone; and (5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over
foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends
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to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT
SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting
the Philippines to promote common security interests between the US and the Philippines in the
region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines
the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering
that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine
waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under
the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of
the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is
to be filed separately: The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not
preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions. PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT
SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014
TREATMENT OF ALIENS
In deportation proceedings, there is no due process violation when the summary deportation
proceedings were held and when the Summary Deportation Order was issued. In addition, the
actual designation of the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the offense was
clearly alleged in the Charge Sheet and sufficient enough to inform the alien of the specific ground
for his deportation.
Summary deportation shall be observed in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying
or expiration of his passport, including those aliens with cancelled passport. In such cases, a fullblown deportation hearing is not necessary. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION v. JUNG KEUN PARK, G.R. No. 159835, January 21,
2010
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