Stephen Drew Chamberlain

March 9, 2015

Ms. Carol A. Crawford, Esquire

Investigative Counsel
State of Maryland
Commission on Judicial Disabilities
100 Community Place
Crownsville, MD 21032-2026
Re:

CJD 2014-140 Harris/Chamberlain

Dear Ms. Crawford,

Subsequent to the formal complaint I filed with the Commission in December 2014,
Judge Harris has committed additional violations of Md. Rule 16-813 while continuing to preside
over Case # 02-C-09-139690 in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court.
With all due respect, it will be very difficult to view many of these allegations in an
isolated fashion. Many of the allegations require the entire transcript to be read, in concert with
the transcript from the April 18, 2014 Merits Hearing, in order to understand the context of the
statements, determine how dishonest they are, and realize these are not errors of law but
willful decisions to not apply the law. The totality of the transcripts also provide a clear picture
of a judge who, in the face of overwhelming evidence, is unable or unwilling to admit to the
mistakes or has colluded with one party to fix a case to achieve a predetermined outcome.
Attached is a copy of the Official Transcript of the January 16, 2015 Recusal and
Contempt Hearing and the February 5, 2015 conclusion of the Contempt Hearing. I have
highlighted areas of the transcript to assist with finding the evidence which substantiates my
contentions. References to evidence will be made by pleading name, page number and
paragraph, while references to transcripts will be as follows: April 18, 2014 Merits Hearing (Apage number); January 16, 2015 Recusal and Contempt Hearing (J-page number); February 5,
2015 Contempt Hearing and Fee Issue (F-page number)

Lastly, I would ask the Commission not provide Judge Harris with the evidence of the
violations. His conduct in this case strongly suggests he will do nothing more than find excuses
to justify his conduct and continue to be dishonest. Asking for clarification as to questionable
conduct on his part without supplying the evidence will allow the Commission to see first hand
the dissembling and dishonesty of this Judge as he attempts to protect himself from discipline.

I am alleging the following:

1.

Judge Harris knowingly and willfully proceeded to hear a case which was facially

absent a controversy. The transcript from April 18, 2014 paints a clear picture of a Judge who is
well aware the only issue before him is moot and decides to proceed with the case. This cannot
be classified as an error of law. A review of the transcript shows a dialogue which indicates
Judge Harris is expecting a discussion about mootness and is prepared to dismiss it summarily.
(A-4)
Schaeffer:

But, Your Honor, a request for dismissal was filed by Mr. Brown on
Monday. It was responded to by me yesterday. I am - - I just got this
morning about one minute before you came on the bench a four page
document from Mr. Brown indicating that he wants the Court to ignore his
request. He alleged in the request for voluntary dismissal that the issue to
be tried today was moot. Now hes saying its - - I guess hes saying its
not moot and he asked you to ignore his request for dismissal.

The Court:

Are you withdrawing that request for dismissal?

Brown:

Yes, Your Honor.

The Court:

Okay. All right. So that puts us in a posture of back to the Merits. Whats
the issue?

This dialogue confirms that ex-parte communication between Mr. Brown and Judge
Harris must have occurred. Mr. Browns request that the Court ignore the request he made just 4
days earlier for Voluntary Dismissal was made in a Reply to Defendants Response to Plaintiffs
Request for Voluntary Dismissal and was filed in open court. How would Judge Harris even be
aware of its existence if there was no ex-parte communication? If Judge Harris had been given a
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courtesy copy prior to taking the bench, and had read what Mr. Brown was asking the Court to
ignore, he would have been aware that the request he ignore the explicit declaration of mootness
Mr. Brown made just 4 days prior provided no justifiable reason for doing so.
A Circuit Court judge who has 10 years of experience on the bench does not
unintentionally ignore questions of jurisdiction. Formal motions were filed by both parties
declaring the only issue before the Court as being moot, both parties formally asked for the case
to be dismissed, and then, a third motion being filed contemporaneously with the beginning of
the hearing asked the Court to ignore the Request for Voluntary Dismissal. In the face of this
jurisdictional controversy, Judge Harris demonstrates his pre-disposition to conduct the hearing
by asking not one question about the issue of mootness. The dialogue shows a pre-planned
decision to allow the withdrawal of the request for dismissal. Any competent judge knows that a
party cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court because they want to proceed with a case. Nor does
a competent judge believe that withdrawing a motion declaring a matter before the Court to be
moot would somehow un-moot the issue. The dialogue at the commencement of the April 18,
2014 Hearing provides evidence Judge Harris intended to conduct the hearing and intended to
prevent discussion on the matter. Judge Harris does not ask a single question about any of the
three motions (the Req. for Voluntary Dismissal (filed 4 days before trial), the Response (filed
the day before trial and hand delivered to Judge Harriss chambers (A-7)), nor the Reply to Def.
Response(filed in open court at the hearing), nor does he question the claim of mootness. For a
Judge with over 10 years on the bench to ignore this red flag (mootness/lack of subject matter
jurisdiction) infers either negligence or collusion. The following 12 pages of the transcript are
evidence this was not a good faith error in the law. (A-4-12)

Rules violated:
Rule 1.1. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
A judge shall comply with the law, including this Code of Judicial Conduct.
Rule 1.2. PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
(a) A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.
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(b) A judge shall avoid conduct that would create in reasonable minds a perception of
impropriety.
[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules, and this Code. The test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,
impartiality, and integrity is impaired.
Rule 2.5. COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION
(a) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently,
promptly, and without favoritism or nepotism.
[1] Competence in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities
of judicial office.
Rule 2.9. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
(a) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider
other communications made to the judge out of the presence of the parties or their
lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter . . .
(b) A judge shall not investigate adjudicative facts in a matter independently, and shall
consider only the evidence in the record and any facts that may properly be judicially
noticed.
2.

I filed a Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial on May 16, 2014, nearly 3

weeks before Judge Harris signed his June 5, 2014 Consent Order. This 12 page Motion
provided clear evidence, statutory support, and case law in support of the contention the Court
lacked jurisdiction on April 18, 2014 the oral agreement made during that hearing was coerced
and made under duress, and that I did not give my assent to it. Even personal correspondence Mr.
Brown sent directly to Judge Harris on April 28, 2014 explicitly informs Judge Harris that I did
not agree with the Order. (Exhibit ???) Furthermore, my Response and Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion to Dismiss Defendants Request for Declaration of Mistrial and Request for Scheduling
Expedited Merits Hearing, filed on May 28, 2014, also explicitly states I did not give my consent

and was under duress during the hearing. Despite this, the following dialogue took place on
January 16, 2015 (J-66):

Chamberlain: . . . Knowing three weeks in advance that I did not give my consent,
Your Honor decides to sign a consent order.
The Court:

I didnt know you didnt give your consent, sir.

Chamberlain: Your Honor, you - -

The Court:

It was submitted as a consent order. How would I know that?

Chamberlain: Because you denied my motion for mistrial on the same day you signed
that order, and the motion for mistrial clearly lays out this entire thing.
May I ask Your Honor if you read the motion for declaration - -
The Court:

Yes, I read everything that comes across my desk.

Chamberlain: But Your Honor just said that he wasnt aware of this.
The Court:

Wasnt aware of what, sir?

Chamberlain: You werent aware of the 12 or 15 pages of misconduct, error, and duress
that I was under on April 18th.
The Court:

Sir, you havent - - take your time. I dont want you to miss anything.

The truth about one issue necessarily precludes the truth of the other. This dialogue
makes clear that either Judge Harris was dishonest about reading the Motion Requesting
Declaration of Mistrial which he denied on June 5, 2014, the same day he signed the Consent
Order against my will, and did not read Mr. Browns letter of April 28, 2014, which explicitly
stated I did not give my consent, or, he was aware of the lack of consent and claims of coercion
and duress and was dishonest about not knowing this before signing his June 5, 2014 Consent
Order. Furthermore, the dialogue indicates he was claiming not to be aware of the lack of consent
even after signing the order, which is evidence he never read the May 28, 2014 Response and
Opposition motion or the June 3, 2014 Motion to Dismiss, or, read those motions and was
dishonest with his claim that he ever was aware there was a lack of consent. If he had read those
5

motions, he would have indicated he became aware I did not give my consent after he had signed
the order. To do so, however, would be to admit to the truth of the matter: that I was under
duress during the hearing, made the oral agreement under duress, made it clearly known I did not
give my consent after the hearing numerous time yet Judge Harris unilaterally signed the
Consent Order on June 5, 2014 pretending he believed I gave my consent to it.

Rules Violated:
Rule 1.2. PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
(a) A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.
(b) A judge shall avoid conduct that would create in reasonable minds a perception of
impropriety.
[3] Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary. Because it is not
practicable to list all such conduct, the Rule is necessarily cast in general terms.
[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules, and this Code. The test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,
impartiality, and integrity is impaired.
Rule 2.2. IMPARTIALITY AND FAIRNESS
A judge shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office
impartially and fairly.
Rule 2.5. COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION
(a) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently,
promptly, and without favoritism or nepotism.

3.

The evidence is incontrovertible that Judge Harris was aware the issue before him

on April 18, 2014 was moot and not a justiciable issue. (See A-4-16; Motion Requesting

Declaration of Mistrial filed on 5/16/15) The number and variety of excuses and explanations as
to why he proceeded with the hearing on that day provides evidence of a significant problem.
While improbable, if Judge Harriss decision to proceed with the hearing was an error,
his denial of my Motion to Vacate the June 5, 2014 Order of October 6, 2014 (denied on October
21, 2015), the transcripts from the January 16, 2015 and February 5, 2015 Recusal Hearing and
Contempt Hearing demonstrate Judge Harriss determination not to correct that error. A Judge
who decides to deny due process rights to a citizen rather than admit an error is unacceptable.
It is more plausible Judge Harris was aware of the untenable position Mr. Brown had
maneuvered himself into and had agreed to help extract him from it. Mr. Brown had filed a
meritless action (a Complaint to Enforce without identifying a single contractual provision which
needed enforcement and a request for declaratory relief when his own pleading explicitly states
his understanding of the clear and unambiguous meaning of the sentence in question), sustained
that action for 7 months, filed a second equally frivolous action during the litigation (seeking
increase in child support for an an 18 year old), and finally had to ask for a Voluntary
Dismissal the week of the trial. (Mr. Brown understood he was vulnerable to sanctions by the
attorney grievance commission for his conduct.) However, once Judge Harris was assigned to
the case, Mr. Brown had another option: go forward with the hearing despite having declared it
moot, and force me into an oral agreement during the hearing. The transcripts reveals that this
was a coordinated plan. The evidence for this allegation is the frequency and variation of
excuses Judge Harris attempts to utilize to justify his clear disregard for the facts before him
when he proceeded to hear a moot case. Had this been an error, Judge Harris would simply
provide his reasoning for moving forward. Instead, he provides countless and vareid excuses for
his decision.
Examples:
(J-14-15)
Chamberlain: No, Your Honor, it is not. I agree. This is not about discretionary rulings.
Your Honor appears to have willfully ignored the law and conducted a
hearing in the face of clear evidence there was no justiciable issue before
the Court.
The Court:

When was this, sir?

Chamberlain: April 18th - -

The Court:

Okay

Chamberlain: - - 2014
The Court:

Now, just so the record is clear, it was on the docket that day as a
contested case. Mr. Schaeffer, your attorney, said hed prepare for that
case that day

(This is one of numerous times Judge Harris points to the fact that the hearing is on the
docket as being a contested issue. The comment about my attorney being prepared is
extremely disingenuous. Refer to A-12 for dialogue between Mr. Schaeffer and Judge
Harris when Mr. Schaeffer indicates we are not there to try a case because it is moot and
Judge Harris admonishes him as if he did not prepare. Mr. Schaeffer explained we were
in Court to argue for fees, that the case was moot. Judge Harris asked him if he had
prepared and he responded that he had. In the above dialogue he attempts to create a
record showing my attorney was prepared to try the case.)

(J-16)
The Court:

All right. Lets stop there, because I want to address these. If you
thought it was moot when you came into Court on April 18th, you
reversed that whole process by entering into a consent agreement, which
the parties do every day when theyre in court, so you rendered your own
motion moot because anything that transpired prior to that time, the
consent order fixed it.

(The consent order signed by Judge Harris, came from an oral agreement placed on the
record under duress. Much of that duress came from being forced to stand trial for an
issue that was clearly moot: declared to be by both parties and proven to be so. To
suggest that 4 hours into a hearing that is being held without subject matter jurisdiction I
rendered my own motion moot is as absurd as a prosecutor saying a confession is valid
and issues of torture to obtain it became moot once a prisoner signed it.)
(J-20)
After reading the transcript concerning the discussion of mootness on April 18, 2014,
where Judge Harris asks Mr. Brown if he is withdrawing his motion and Mr. Brown says
Yes, Your Honor. I am.
The Court:

So that ended the issue.

(This is an acknowledgement that Judge Harris does not understand the law or is
attempting to cover up his willful decision to proceed to hear a case without subject
matter jurisdiction. Withdrawing a motion in which a party explicitly declares the only
issue before the Court to be moot and requests dismissal, without a single sentence
explaining how the issue could have possibly become un-moot, and with the other
party declaring the issue moot, proving it to be moot, and arguing it is moot...this
demonstrates Judge Harris either believes a party can confer jurisdiction on the Court
because they decide they want to proceed with a hearing or is using that excuse for his
decision to proceed.)
(J-20-21)
Chamberlain: . . . but case law indicates that parties do not have any authority or ability
to consent to offer a court jurisdiction. The Circuit Court has no
jurisdiction if there is not justiciable controversy before it, and just
because someone wants to hear a case with no controversy, the Court has
no authority by law to do that.
The Court:

You waived that, sir, by entering into a consent agreement.

(Again, filing formal pleadings with the Court declaring mootness, and 12 pages of
transcript testimony arguing the issue was moot, was not a waiver of jurisdiction after
Judge Harris determined he was going to press forward and hear the moot case.)
(A-28)
Chamberlain: To preserve time, I will tell you that Mr. Brown talks for a number of
pages and says absolutely nothing. He does not tell the Court in any way
why its moot, why its not moot, why its justiciable, why we go forward.
The Court:

So at that minute, you knew it was a contested case.

(This is grasping at straws that the issue was still contested when it was clear that it is
not. Again, the law is clear that whenever there appears to be a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction the case shall be dismissed. Just because an attorney attempts to retract an
explicit confession of mootness does not make the mootness of the issue go away.)
Chamberlain: My attorney was telling me its a mistrial already.
The Court:

Well, Your Honor attorney also, if you read that transcript further, I
believe I ask Mr. Schaeffer whether he was prepared on that day to go
ahead with the case, and he said, Yes, Ive been preparing as if it were
contested. So where is the prejudice to your case?

Chamberlain: Well, I - -
9

The Court:

Your attorney was ready. Im not getting your point.

(Reference A-12 again. Mr. Schaeffer never even intimates he is wanting to go ahead
with the case. He aggressively attempts to get Judge Harris to understand that the issue
before him is moot and cannot be tried. Mr Schaeffers response that he prepared was in
response to Judge Harriss incredulousness that he was NOT there to try the case. That is
because we were there to ask for legal fees because the matter had been sustained 4
months after becoming moot. Judge Harriss attempt in the January hearing to make it
seem like my attorney was ready, willing, and able to go forward is an overt attempt to
cover himself for proceeding with the hearing on April 18th.)
(J-29)
Chamberlain: Well, I - - Your Honor, I believe that the law says that anything that
emanates from a hearing that a court holds with no jurisdiction is null and
void.
The Court:

There was clear jurisdiction, sir. The minute Mr. Brown said there was no
agreement, the case was assigned to me to resolve, so thats a bogus
argument.

(This is another excuse. A trial judge with 10 years experience knows that he is not given
jurisdiction because a lawyer withdraws a motion declaring mootness, and that he had
been assigned to hear a contested case that day.)
(J-30)
The Court:

But the issue - - the restricted issue of whether or not the case was either
settled and moot or viable for a court decision, youve just answered the
question. It was a viable issue to be decided that day. Thats the reason it
was assigned to me to make a decision, so youve - - already proven my
point.

(This demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the law, or incompetence, because it

shows Judge Harris believes that because it is assigned to him that day, it is viable,
even when the evidence clearly shows that on that day, he did not have a justiciable issue
before him.)
(J-32)
The Court:

The minute Mr. Brown said it was not moot, it was still a viable issue.
Its my job to decide that case.

(This could not be more incorrect and is a clear indication that Judge Harris has colluded
with Mr. Brown to conduct the hearing. The transcript actually has Mr. Brown again
10

confirming it is moot: I called Mr. Schaeffer on Monday and I said, Kevin, hes been
accepted to college . . .and Im upset about this because - - we made a motion to dismiss
this thing for now for moot and I told Mr. Schaeffer, well file in September when we
know how much tuition is so we can do it all at one time. (A-15) The transcript is
absolutely devoid of a single sentence by Mr. Brown of even trying to explain how the
issue that was moot has now become live. My attorney has filed a formal pleading
acknowledging the issue was moot, and is on record for 12 pages explaining it to Judge
Harris. Declaring, in January, that the issue was viable just because he allowed Mr.
Brown to withdraw his Request for Voluntary Dismissal is another unjustified excuse.)
(J-40)
The Court:

Well, thats the point of that hearing. It was to get clarification on what
everybodys rights and obligations were.

(This is another justification by Judge Harris for moving forward with the hearing. Both
parties had declared the issue moot. There were no rights and obligations to be
determined on April 18, 2014.)
(J-81)
The Court:

When I was told that the motion to dismiss was withdrawn, I was
reinvested with jurisdiction to hear the case, because thats what I thought
was going to occur when I took the bench that day. The case was not
settled. It was not moot. And what really reinforces that more was, after
we started the case, it was settled by agreement.

(The issue was moot, it was clearly explained to Judge Harris, and his insistence he can
confer jurisdiction on the Court without statutory authority is indicative he does not
understand the law or willfully acted under the color of law to intentionally hear a case
without a controversy. Secondly, again Judge Harris references that fact that that day
he had jurisdiction because that was what he thought was going to occur when he took
the bench. Then straight denials of fact. Now, since an oral agreement was forced out of
me because the hearing took place and numerous other judicial errors and judicial
overreach occurred, he believes that he was reinvested with jurisdiction.)
(F-15)
Chamberlain: Circuit Courts must abide by the decisions of the appellate courts, and
Im trying to - -
The Court:

I agree we do. We are always subject to - -

Chamberlain: And so when Your Honor says he signed a blue note saying that I
gave my consent, it is a very valid defense that none of that matters if the
Court had no authority to even convene the hearing.
11

The Court:

Well, I think weve already discussed that in great detail. The authority
was it was in front of me on that date on the docket. I certainly - - and no
trial judge wants to interfere if a contested case is settled. Your case was
settled. It was in front of me properly, I made a proper decision on it, and I
just dont think youre grasping that simple concept.

(Judge Harriss statement again demonstrates that he believes because a docket entry says
there will be a hearing, that he has jurisdiction over the matter, regardless of if it is
proven to be moot. Stating that he did not want to get interfere if a case is settled is
simply bizarre as the oral agreement was coerced from me 3 hours into the hearing.)
(F-16-31)
This dialogue is too lengthy to re-type here, and reading this portion of the transcript in
its entirety is critical to understanding the extent to which Judge Harris is willing to go to justify
his actions. He again says it was before him on the docket for a contested hearing. He again
argues that the oral agreement placed on the record gave him jurisdiction. He incorrectly states
that Mr. Browns motion was withdrawn because the matter was settled. He goes on to say that
even if he did not have jurisdiction, it was waived by you and your attorney. As an
accommodation to you and your attorney, Mr. Brown and his client, I accepted a consent
agreement. He states that the Court didnt grant itself jurisdiction but rather You all came in
front of me . . . and wanted to confirm a consent agreement. Judge Harris then says It became
live . . . Then again, justifies acting without authority by saying Youre missing the obvious. It
became relevant again because the matter that was on my docket that day was resolved by a
consent agreement. Having to endure a trial without a controversy, and after numerous judicial
errors and overreach, and after a 20 minute in chambers discussion after which my attorney
abdicated his defense of me, I was coerced into placing an oral agreement on the record. While
under duress, which is clearly laid out in the Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial, Judge
Harris, in February, still says: Because you dont want to accept this fact. Your attorney and
you, you were questioned, you were voir dired and the voluntariness of that agreement. You said,
yes, that was your agreement. That made it relevant. That gave me jurisdiction, and thats the
bottom line.

12

It should be clear to any reasonable, detached third party that there is no legal basis for
Judge Harriss decision to conduct the hearing on April 18, 2014, and his reasoning as to why he
was justified in presiding over this hearing. Judge Harris understood the issue was moot at the
time, and this matrix of excuses is evidence he is either unwilling or unable to admit this, or
more probably, that he intentionally conducted the hearing for the purpose of mitigating Mr.
Browns exposure to numerous and egregious violations of the Maryland Lawyers Code of
Professional Conduct.

(F-26)
Chamberlain: And, Your Honor, what was live at that point in your mind? Im just curious.
What was live? What was contested?

The Court:

When Mr. Schaeffer and Mr. Brown informed me that even though the matter
that was on my docket that day was really moot, or dismissed, they presented me
with a consent agreement that all parties and all attorneys agree to, so that hearing
on that date in April was bifurcated. There were two totally separate things that
happened in my courtroom. The one that entered you and bound you to a consent
order is the one you want to totally ignore. You keep going back to phase one,
which you waived for all intents and purposes by entering into the consent
agreement. Its crystal clear in my mind, sir.

(These comments are evidence of further efforts to obscure the obvious, or worse, show mental
impairment. To now freely admit, or make a mistake by admitting, that both parties informed
him the issue was really moot is incredible. The record from the hearing, as well as numerous
pleadings filed with the Court after the hearing, clearly provide evidence of coercion and duress
to obtain the oral agreement on April 18th. To claim the oral agreement was bifurcated from
the duress is to bifurcate evidence and fact from reality.)

(F-40)

13

The Court:

Just for the record, and I have - - which I think I cited - - the hearing sheet from
the April 18th, 2014 hearing, where you were represented by Kevin Schaeffer,
your former wife was represented by Mr. Sam Brown, and that matter was on the
docket that day for a complaint to enforce settlement agreement and/or consent
agreement dated August 31st of 2011. That matter was not heard that day,
because after some discussions and a meeting in chambers, when I told the
parties to go out if you need to start the hearing on that issue, Im more than
available, I had nothing else on my docket that day - - you made an issue over the
fact that I probably shouldnt have even heard the case that day - - we resolved
that issue. Mr. Brown gave your client the impression that he was withdrawing
that motion that day, but he reinstated it that day. Mr. Schaeffer made a good
argument as to why due process did not allow him an opportunity to adequately
prepare for that hearing, but that subsequently became moot when I was advised
that the parties had reached a consent agreement.

(That matter was not heard that day... ? Was Judge Harris on the bench or not during the
recorded and transcribed 3-4 hour hearing? After some discussions . . .? Judge Harris
interrupted a hearing after a number of hours, after direct examination, in the middle of crossexamination, and he says I told the parties to go out if you need to start the hearing on that
issue? Mr. Brown gave the impression he was withdrawing a motion but reinstating it? Judge
Harriss effort to convolute the facts is obvious. Mr. Brown did not give an impression of
withdrawing a motion. Judge Harris asked him if he was and he said Yes . Mr. Brown did not
attempt to reinstate any motion. What Judge Harris allowed was the withdrawal of a declaration
of mootness and the reinstatement of a live controversy with no justification. My attorney did
not argue for 12 pages of the transcript that he had a due process issue with regard to being
prepared. He argued vociferously that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a moot case, proved
it was a moot case, and Mr. Brown offered not a single sentence Judge Harris can rely on for
making the decision to move forward without jurisdiction.

14

This soliloquy by Judge Harris indicates he is either mentally impaired, or again, doing
anything he can to avoid having to admit he either intentionally tried a moot case, or made a
significant error based on the clear evidence. The clarity with which the mootness issue was
presented gives more credence to the theory that Judge Harris willfully acted under the color of
law to hear the moot case.)

Rules violated:
Rule 1.1. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
A judge shall comply with the law, including this Code of Judicial Conduct.
Rule 1.2. PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
(a) A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.
(b) A judge shall avoid conduct that would create in reasonable minds a perception of
impropriety.
[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules, and this Code. The test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,
impartiality, and integrity is impaired.
Rule 2.5. COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION
(a) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently,
promptly, and without favoritism or nepotism.
(b) A judge shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of
court business.
(c) A judge shall not willfully fail to comply with administrative rules or reasonable
directives of a judge with supervisory authority.
[1] Competence in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities
of judicial office.
Rule 2.9. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
15

(a) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider
other communications made to the judge out of the presence of the parties or their
lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter . . .
(c) A judge shall not investigate adjudicative facts in a matter independently, and shall
consider only the evidence in the record and any facts that may properly be judicially
noticed.
4.

Judge Harris has intentionally withheld ruling on motions until he can deny them

en masse just prior to closing the case. (See outstanding motions denied en masse when case
first closed June 2014) The following motions and responsive pleadings were confirmed by the
Clerk of Court to be residing with Judge Harris:

10/23/2014

Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Response and Opposition to

Motion to Vacate Order and Dismiss Plaintiffs Petition for Contempt, and
for Sanctions

11/13/2014

Defendants Motion to Revise Denial of Defendants Motion to Vacate

Order and Dismiss Plaintiffs Petition for Contempt and Request for
Hearing

12/03/2014

Motion for Specific Assignment and Request for Expedited Ruling

Pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535(b)

12/09/2014

Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Compendium

12/17/2014

Motion to Bifurcate Hearing on Recusal From Hearing for Contempt

Not ruling on the Motion for Specific Assignment or the Motion to Bifurcate the two
hearings caused them to be moot. These were not moot issues until Judge Harris elected not to
rule on them based on their merits, or recuse himself from ruling on them and allowing another
Judge in the Circuit to rule on them. Judge Harriss inaction resulted in his mooting the issue
himself.

16

During the January 16, 2015 Recusal and Contempt Hearing, Judge Harris We have a
bunch of motions we have to deal with first at the commencement of the hearing. (A-5) He then
fails to address a single one of them.
After the hearing, I called and spoke with both a supervisor in the Clerks office and a
supervisor in case management about the disposition of the outstanding motions. Both indicated
they were with Judge Harris.
At the commencement of the February 5, 2015 hearing, Judge Harris stated (F-4):
All right. Just to bring us all up to date, this case was called on January 16th, and we
ran out of time, quite frankly. We made a ruling. I denied the recusal request. I think I
denied most of the motions, and we were in the process of - - we took testimony and we
were in the process of closing arguments.

The dialogue continued (F-4):

Chamberlain: Well, Your Honor, before we get started, just a preliminary issue. There are still
some outstanding motions.
Court:

I got them, but theyve all - - theyre all moot in light of my ruling. They came in
- -

Chamberlain: The motion for - -

Court:

They came in recently, and I looked at them, and I think in light of my ruling that
it kind of rehashed things that you had raised earlier, so - -

Chamberlain: I was specifically thinking about the October 23rd motion to strike their response
for lack of merit and for sanctions for - -
Court:

All right.

Chamberlain: Okay. Yes

Court:

We already - -

Chamberlain: Yes, Your Honor. If its - -

Court:

Thats already been decided by my decisions - -

Chamberlain: Okay. Yes, Your Honor.

17

Court:

- - and, you know, at the end of today, there will be a final ruling on everything.

Chamberlain: Yes, Your Honor.

Court:

So why dont you finish with your closing argument?

The fact is that Judge Harris never made a final ruling on everything. He is on record
during the January Hearing admitting we have a bunch of motions we have to deal with first.
He then is on record the February Hearing acknowledging that he had the outstanding motions,
had determined theyre all moot, then when challenged specifically about a motion involving
attorney misconduct and a request for sanctions, he says there will be a final ruling on
everything at the end of the day.
As of March 9th, 2015, more than 50 days after Judge Harris admitting he had motions to
address, and more than a month after he stated that he had ruled on the various motions, none
have been docketed nor sent to myself. The reason is because Judge Harris has NOT ruled on
these motions. If he ruled on the motions, they would be docketed. Judge Harris did not want to
make a ruling on the merits of the Motion for Specific Assignment or the Motion to Bifurcate the
Hearings because he did not want his colleagues on the bench to be aware of his conduct and
decision making. He bias toward opposing counsel is clearly transparent when he failed to rule
on the Motion for Sanctions, supplemented with a Reply in support of sanctions filed November
5, 2014, which provided incontrovertible evidence of attorney misconduct. Despite Judge Harris
being aware of evidence opposing counsel lied, not once, but twice in filed pleadings, he failed
to take any corrective action.

Rules violated:
Rule 1.1. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
A judge shall comply with the law, including this Code of Judicial Conduct.
Rule 1.2. PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
(a) A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.

18

(b) A judge shall avoid conduct that would create in reasonable minds a perception of
impropriety.
[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules, and this Code. The test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,
impartiality, and integrity is impaired.
Rule 2.5. COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION
(a) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently,
promptly, and without favoritism or nepotism.
(b) A judge shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of
court business.
(c) A judge shall not willfully fail to comply with administrative rules or reasonable
directives of a judge with supervisory authority.
[1] Competence in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities
of judicial office.
Rule 2.15. RESPONDING TO JUDICIAL AND LAWYER MISCONDUCT
(a) A judge shall take or initiate appropriate corrective measures with respect to the
unprofessional conduct of another judge or a lawyer.
5.

Judge Harris has made numerous, blatantly dishonest statements on the record.

These are in direct violation of the Preamble of the Judicial Code of Conduct, as well as various
rules. If not made intentionally, they seriously question whether Judge Harris is suffering from a
yet to be diagnosed mental impairment. While not exclusive, the more significant dishonest
statements or statements indicating mental disability follow:

(J-63 and J-77)

Court:

motion to recuse. Im hearing it because I know its an issue with

you and I want

to resolve that before we go any further.

19

Under the Surratt case, which is 320 Md., and particularlyat Page 467, A
recusal motion must be made by a party - - and, again, I dont know that we even
have a recusal motion formally filed. There were some letters to Judge Hackner
where the issue of recusal was mentioned, so as an accomodation to Mr.
Chamberlain, we accepted that as his motion for recusal.

(These statements provide evidence Judge Harris is delusional. The Motion to Recuse was filed
on November 13, 2014. Furthermore, Judge Harriss own Order dated December 8, 2014 states:
Upon review of the Defendants Motion for Recusal and Request for hearing . . . (Exhibit ?)
Judge Harris was aware their was Motion for Recusal filed and signed an Order stating he had
reviewed it. Stating he did not have a Motion to Recuse before him was a blatant lie.)

(A-61)
Chamberlain: If you felt that the order was unlawful, you would have vacated the order and
wed be done. You would have realized that, hey, he made a case. Its moot. I shouldnt have
done it. Its unlawful. Vacate the Order.
Court:

Sir, this is getting very monotonous. You consented to that order.

(I was coerced into making an oral agreement on the record on April 18, 2014. There are dozens
of declaratory statements made in formal pleadings, and in correspondence between Mr. Brown
and Judge Harris, that explicitly state I did not willfully give my consent to the oral agreement.
Judge Harris modified the draft sent to him by Mr. Brown and unilaterally signed it on the same
day he declares he read and then denied my Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial which
lays out the judicial errors, duress, lack of jurisdiction, and lack of consent. It is a direct lie to
state that I gave my consent to his Order. Within 3 days of being recognized by the Court (ie, as
soon as was possible) I declared my lack of consent. There was no time gap between when I was
forced into making the oral agreement and when I was able to formally plead the truth of the
matter for the record.)

20

(A-66)
Previously covered dialogue about consent shows blatant dishonesty. Judge Harris is
incredulous when he asks I didnt know you didnt give your consent, sir. He then states I
read everything that comes across my desk when asked if he read the Motion for Declaration of
Mistrial. He either is lying that he read the Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial and
denied that motion without reading it, or, he read the motion which clearly and explicitly states I
did not willfully consent to the oral agreement and ignored that information as he signed the
Consent Order on the very same day. Both statements cannot be true.

(A-69-70)
Court:

Let me summarize again. You had an attorney. The attorney was advising you of

everything that occurred that day. You agreed on the record to certain terms. A consent order was
subsequently sent to me for my signature. You did not object to one thing that was placed on the
record that day. So whats your point?

(First, a consent order was sent to Judge Harris but he did not sign it. He modified the terms then
unilaterally made it an order without the consent of the parties. Secondly, a review of the three
pertinent motions, the Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial, the Response and Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss that request for a mistrial, and the Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint, all provide serious and substantial evidence which contradicts that I did not object
to one thing that was placed on the record that day.)

(A-135)
Court:

I take every one of my decisions seriously, and I dont make decisions until the
evidence is concluded.

(Read pages F-49-50. Judge Harris refused to hear any evidence I was prepared to offer on the
issue of fees, started discussing awarding of fees under the family law section after having
explicitly stated himself this is a pure contract action, and threatened to call the Sheriff if I

21

opened my mouth again in an effort to be heard on the matter. Keep in mind this was an award
requiring me to pay the other partys fees when I was defending myself against charges of
Contempt. Read the defense. The Appellate Court will determine whether this was an abuse of
discretion or not, but he refused to hear evidence concerning why fees should not be awarded
and why any consideration of awarding fees based on the family law section would be an error of
law in this case.)

(Let me also mention how inappropriate, and evidence of his predisposition to award fees in this
case, something that is only done in extraordinary cases, when he said Just remember one thing.
Her bill is running. as I was attempting to present my defense to the contempt charges and it
appeared we would not have enough time to complete the hearing. (J-167)

(A-140)
Court:

Well, let me stop you. Its very tough for one reason. You have 30 days to
challenge the validity of an order. We have two rules that allow that. You availed
yourself to neither of those.

(For Judge Harris to have ruled on a Motion for Declaration of Mistrial which clearly laid out
numerous reasons his June 5, 2014 Consent Order was not valid, and then state that I did not
avail myself to either one two rules is evidence of mental impairment. Not only did he deny this
motion, he also denied a Motion to Vacate the order as being unlawful. The basis for this request
for relief was clearly stipulated as lack of subject matter jurisdiction equalled mistake as
defined by Maryland case law and the Court had revisory power at any time due to mistake
pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535(b) and Courts and Judicial Proceedings Rule 6-408. Judge Harris
denied not one, but two motions which specifically challenged the validity and lawfulness of his
order yet directly lies by stating I did not challenge it.)

(F-3)
Court:

I think I denied most of the motions...

22

(Upon investigating the matter, there is no question that not only were those motions not denied
at the time he made this statement, but they still have not been ruled on.)

(F-25)
Court:

Its the only point, sir. You keep arguing mootness when you brought the issue
before me to sign off on a consent agreement in which Mr. Schaeffer voir dired
you, you entered into it freely and voluntarily, you were asked that question, now
youre raising issues of mootness, jurisdiction, duress, where theres no proof of
any of that.

(It is more than disingenuous to state that we brought the settlement to him. I was forced to
stand trial when it was patently clear that there was no controversy. The evidence is voluminous
that I did not enter into the oral agreement freely. I was NOT asked the question of whether I did
this voluntarily. Judge Harris himself declared that to be so. (A-90) And it was not now that
issues of mootness, jurisdiction, and duress were being raised. They had been ignored by Judge
Harris to cover up his intentional decision to proceed on April 18, 2014 without having statutory
authority to do so.)

(F-39-40)
Court:

Just for the record, and I have - - which I think I cited - - the hearing sheet from
the April 18th, 2014 hearing, where you were represented by Kevin Schaeffer,
you former wife was represented by Mr. Sam Brown, and that matter was on the
docket that day for a complaint to enforce settlement agreement and/or consent
agreement dated August 31st of 2011.
That matter was not heard that day, because after some discussions and a
meeting in chambers, when I told the parties to go out if you need to start the
hearing on that issue, Im more than available, I had nothing else on my docket
that day - - you made an issue over the fact that I probably shouldnt have even

23

heard the case that day - - we resolved the issue. Mr. Brown gave your client the
impression he was withdrawing that motion that day, but then he reinstated it that
day. Mr. Schaeffer made a good argument as to why due process did not allow
him an opportunity to adequately prepare for that hearing, but that subsequently
became moot when I was advised that the parties had reached a consent
agreement.

(This soliloquy alone is adequate to prove the confusion, inability to reason, corruption, or gross
negligence.
That matter WAS heard that day. There are 99 pages of transcription covering numerous
procedural arguments, testimony, and cross-examination. THAT was in open court on the
record.
After some discussions ??? The hearing commenced, and was abruptly halted by Judge
Harris as my counsel was cross-examining the Plaintiff and proving substantial perjury.
After a meeting in chambers Judge Harris told the parties to go out if you need to start the
hearing on that issue ??? Start the hearing? This is an overt attempt to pretend the
agreement came before he proceeded with a hearing without jurisdiction.
Withdrawing motions and then reinstating them. This patently did not happen. Judge
Harris allowed the withdrawal of a motion without a verbal request. Mr. Browns request
in his real-time Reply to our response to his Request for Voluntary dismissal asked the
Court to ignore his request for voluntary dismissal.
Mr. Schaeffer never made a due process argument about not having adequate time to
prepare. This was a red herring directly set up by Judge Harris himself (See A-12)

This part of the transcript demonstrates Judge Harriss willingness to grasp at straws in
explaining how the events transpired.)

(J-80)

24

Court:

What the court watches out for in a lot of these cases, a recusal should never be a
means to be abused as a trial strategy to get some judge off a case, so I dont
know why, Mr. Chamberlain, youre at all concerned about me hearing this case,
but you obviously are.

(This statement is beyond explanation. Refer to Motion for Declaration of Mistrial, Motion to
Dismiss Complaint to Enforce, Motion for Recusal, Motion to Bifurcate, etc. Also, see personal
letter to Judge Hackner (Exhibit ???) which must have been discussed with Judge Harris.)

(J-87)
Court:

Do you recall appearing before this court on April 18th of 2014?

Chamberlain: Yes, I do.

Court:

Okay. And do you recall that, after a partial hearing was conducted, a consent
agreement was placed on the record?

(This statement on January 16, 2014 is in direct conflict with his statement on February 5, 2014.
(see F-39-40))

(J-132-133)
Court:

- - right now, as we sit here, that consent order is a valid order - - because youve
done nothing to set it aside.

(You cannot make this up. Judge Harris himself has denied relief to declare a mistrial for
numerous errors documented with evidence, as well as a motion to vacate his order as being
unlawful. When a Judge tells a citizen that they have done nothing to set (an order) aside but
that Judge has single-handedly denied the citizen every avenue of relief requested, this
commission had evidence of mental impairment, corruption, or gross negligence.)

(F-42)

25

Court:

In any event, your argument today, you cited cases that you thought were
relevant. They werent. None of those cases are relevant on the jurisdiction, the
mootness of the issue, theyre - - none of those apply.

(The record shows the cases and Rules cited as:

MCJP 1-501

(F-9)

Md. Rule 2-324 (b)

(F-9)

MCJP 3-409 (a) (1)

(F-9)

United States v. United Mine - - (interrupted) (J-139)

United Mine Workers v. America 1947 (F-160)
Reyes v. Prince Georges County (F-164) (F-10) (F-11-12)
Lord v. Veazie 1850 (F-166)
Hatt v. Anderson (F-11) (F-13)
Post v. Bregman (F-11) (F-13-14)
Hammond v. Lancaster (F-23)
Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Assn. (F-23)
Boyds Civic Association v. Montgomery County Council (F-24)
Coburn v. Coburn (F-24)
Stevenson v. Lanham (F-27) (F-28)
Please read the quotes in the record from these cases regarding mootness and jurisdiction
on the annotated pages. Any judge who would claim that, after this evidence and case citations
were provided to him, and pertinent parts read to him, None of those cases are relevant . . . and
. . . non of those apply. was either mentally impaired during the hearing or was electing to
disregard it, making it a blatantly dishonest statement.)
(J-60)
Court:

Sir, if its a consent order - - and I need to state this for the record - - consent
orders, unless they were under duress,cannot even be appealed from. So when I - denied your request to reconsider without anything further than just you simply
saying, Vacate that order, I made the correct legal decision.

26

(Read the Motion to Vacate Order. It is disturbingly dishonest to state there was no supporting
legal reasoning, law, or case law fully supporting the motion.)
(F-48)
Court:

Theres been no evidence, even a scintilla of evidence, that thats not a valid
order. I couldnt find you in contempt if that order was invalid, so I find it to be a
valid order.

(The evidence presented in motions denied by Judge Harris, and in the January 16, 2014 and
February 5, 2015 hearings is overwhelming, substantial and would be persuasive to an unbiased
judge. Interesting, Judge Harris slips when he explains the order is valid because he found me in
contempt. This is more than a clue that he had predetermined to put the cart before the horse.
He would find me in contempt of not obeying his order, therefore he would rule the order to be
valid despite the evidence presented.)

(J-21)
Court:

If thats correct, if you truly believed you were coerced into entering into that
agreement, theres a procedure. You could have asked to set that order aside.
There were lots of things that could have been done.

(There were procedures followed a things done. I filed a Motion for Declaration of Mistrial.
This motion laid out the legal arguments and provided evidence of the numerous judicial errors
and duress present on April 18, 2014. Judge Harris denied this motion. There was my Response
and Opposition to the Plaintiffs efforts to get my request for a mistrial dismissed. I filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint to Enforce and Request for Declaratory Judgment after I
understood the law required that anything which emanates from a hearing held without subject
matter jurisdiction is null and void. That Motion was ignored. Then, I filed a Motion to Vacate
the Order which provided substantial law and case citations proving the Court did not have
jurisdiction over the matter before it, the Order was unlawful, void, and should be vacated.
Judge Harris denied this motion. His statement above indicates he is unaware of all these efforts
27

to use the legally available procedures to obtain relief from his unlawful order. Or, he is fully
aware he is denying all relief and simply creating a record to give the appearance that I have not
asked for relief.

(J-22-23)
Judge Harris admits during this dialogue that he had another agenda on April 18, 2014 other than
what was before him. This dialogue is important. It begins with a summary that there was no
case to begin with, that it was not justiciable on the day of the hearing and then Judge Harris
says: Sir, that is not the issue today. Youre wasting your time, actually. Thats - - that was not
the issue that we have to decide today, nor was it really the issue on April 18th. There could be
not more clarity about what the issues are and yet Judge Harris says what is being discussed is a
waste of time. This dialogue took place during the recusal hearing, but is focused on the
legitimacy of his order which came from an oral agreement made during the April 18, 2014
hearing. The issue is all about jurisdiction, following the law, an allegation that Judge Harris
willfully elected not to comply with the law and subject me to a trial when there was no live
controversy, duress due to judicial errors and overreach, and allegations of favoritism or bias. If
it is not about these issues, what is Judge Harris talking about? What is the issue in his mind?

Rules violated:
C. PREAMBLE
C-101 -- An independent, fair, competent, and impartial judiciary composed of men and
women of integrity who will interpret and apply the law that governs our society is
indispensable to our system of justice. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in
preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained
in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and
honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in
the legal system.
C-102 -- Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid both
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives.
They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public
confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.

28

Rule 1.1. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW

A judge shall comply with the law, including this Code of Judicial Conduct.
Rule 1.2. PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
(a) A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.
(b) A judge shall avoid conduct that would create in reasonable minds a perception of
impropriety.
[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules, and this Code. The test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,
impartiality, and integrity is impaired.
Rule 2.5. COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION
(a) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently,
promptly, and without favoritism or nepotism.
[1] Competence in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities
of judicial office.

6.

Judge Harris consistently demonstrated his lack of understanding about basic law.

Some examples follow:

(J-21)
Judge Harris states a consent waived the courts lack of jurisdiction. No citizen or judge can
waive the courts lack of jurisdiction. Anything that emanates from a hearing held without
jurisdiction is null and void.

(J-21)
29

Judge Harris states there are procedures to follow if I believed I was under duress. I inform him
that he denied my motion to vacate that order. He states: Well, that was filed a long time after
the revisory power of that court, if Im not mistaken, but go ahead. This is evidence that Judge
Harris does not understand the for issues of fraud, mistake or irregularity the Court has
revisory power at any time. Again, mistake is for acting without jurisdiction, which is a large
part of how I came to be under duress that day.

(J-29)
Judge Harris states his belief that if a party retracts a statement that the only issue before the
court is moot, when the other party has replied and explicitly concurred that it was moot, proved
it was moot in open court, then argued about it for 30 minutes, that the Court again had clear
jurisdiction. No party can confer jurisdiction on a court. Judge Harris also is completely
mistaken when he states his belief that because a case is assigned to him for resolution, that gives
him the authority to proceed.)

(J-29)
After I ask Is the Circuit Court authorized or have the authority by law to hear a case with no
justiciable controversy - - hear a moot case? Judge Harris states: It depends on the
circumstances. The Circuit Court clearly does not have any statutory authority in this regard.
Only the appellate courts in the state of Maryland have been given that authority under a few
limited exceptions. This could not be more clearly laid out in the law and supported by decades
of case law. I am alleging that Judge Harris is absolutely aware of this and yet again attempts to
shield himself from discipline as if he believes there are exceptions for him as a Circuit Court
Judge. If he is not aware of the limits to his jurisdiction, he is grossly negligent in understanding
and executing his duties as a judge.

(J-30-32)
Judge Harris shows his utter confusion about jurisdiction when he states the reason it was
assigned to him to make a decision was because it was a viable issue. Yes, that is why a hearing

30

was scheduled. But Judge Harris fails to grasp that if the case is moot at the time of the hearing,
as the evidence overwhelming shows, he does not have jurisdiction to continue. When Judge
Harris declares The minute Mr. Brown said it was not moot, it was still a viable issue. Its my
job to decided that case it demonstrates his lack of understanding of mootness, the limits of his
jurisdiction, and the fact a party cannot confer jurisdiction on the court.)

(J-81)
When I was told that the motion to dismiss was withdrawn, I was reinvested with jurisdiction to
hear the case, because thats what I thought was going to occur when I took the bench that day.
This statement demonstrates that Judge Harris is unaware that once a motion is replied to, the
court must grant permission for it to be withdrawn. Judge Harris allowed this, but seems
confused when he says he was told that the motion was withdrawn. Again, our Response filed
the day before trial and hand delivered to Judge Harriss chambers explicitly states the issue is
moot and the transcript shows definitively that the issue was moot. The other party did not offer
a single sentence explaining how it could be un-moot after declaring it moot 3 days earlier.
Judge Harriss comment that he was reinvested with jurisdiction indicates he does not
understand a party cannot confer jurisdiction on the court.

(J-82)
Judge Harris declares, emphatically, that there is absolutely no reason to recuse from the case.
Please see issues concerning recusal below.

(J-140)
Judge Harris states he is familiar with the revisory power of the court. Yet he claims I never
availed myself to either of the rules that allow a party to challenge an order. But he himself
denied both of those challenges to the validity of his order. He either read and willfully ignored
the law, legal reasoning and case citations support those motions he denied, or he is mentally
impaired and does not believe the Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial, the Motion to
Dismiss, and the Motion to Vacate Order were challenges to his order.

31

(J-172)
. . . that youre contesting the contempt because the consent order from June of 14 is an invalid
order, that ship has sailed. Its presumed valid. I heard no evidence to the contrary. This
statement is evidence that Judge Harris still is unwilling to accept the the revisory power of the
court with regard to mistake, defined in Maryland law as not having jurisdiction, can be raised
at any time. Judge Harriss declaration that he has heard no evidence to the contrary indicates
someone without the mental capacity to hear evidence and apply the law, or, someone who is
willfully ignoring the clear evidence and not complying with the law.

(F-15)
The authority was it was in front of me on that date on the docket. It simply cannot be that
Judge Harris believes that because a contested case is scheduled, that he has the authority to hear
it even if it is declared moot (by both parties!) at the time of the hearing. This is cover for
knowingly proceeding without a live controversy and without authority to do so.

(F-16)
It was contested. It was on the docket for a contested hearing on the issue of enforcement of the
agreement. Same excuse. Because it was on the docket as a contested case, I had the authority
to proceed.

(F-18-19)
This exchange clearly shows Judge Harris believes we can confer jurisdiction on the Court. He
admits what the plan was: proceed without jurisdiction . . . coerce a settlement agreement . . .
then say that because an oral agreement was placed on the record, it makes the jurisdiction
argument go away. This is akin to saying that it is acceptable to withhold the reading of Miranda
rights then say that doesnt matter because you got a confession. Or saying its okay to lock a
suspect up and torture him, but say that doesnt matter because he signed a confession. You

32

cannot try a citizen in a court of law when the court has no jurisdiction, then say it doesnt matter
when that mistake and other egregious judicial errors lead to a coerced oral agreement.

(F-20-21)
This exchange again demonstrates Judge Harris lack of understanding about jurisdiction. Of
course an individual can waive personal jurisdiction, as my attorney unfortunately did when he
answered their complaint in Maryland when I am a resident of Colorado. But a party cannot
waive or confer jurisdiction on the court. Jurisdiction is statutorily given. It does not extend to
moot cases. Even if BOTH parties said they wanted to proceed on April 18, 2014, the evidence
before the Court prohibited hearing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

(F-24)
But it was not moot, because you all entered into an agreement after all that happened. This
statement again provides evidence Judge Harris has no concept that the Court does not have the
authority to hear moot cases. Whether the oral agreement is void, or voidable, as determined by
the Court of Special Appeals, is irrelevant to the facts and evidence at the time the hearing
commenced proving the only issue before the Court was moot.

(F-26-27)
You keep going back to phase one, which you waived for all intents and purposes by entering
into the consent agreement. Its crystal clear in my mind. This admission, that Judge Harris
believes he can act under the color of law, without authority, because in the end an oral
agreement was placed (coerced) on the record is critical in showing his lack of understanding of
the law, or his willful intent to ignore it.

(F-29)
This passage again confirms Judge Harris belief that he can hear a moot case, but when he
obtains a settlement after proceeding, it somehow makes the mootness go away.

33

(F-39)
Mr. Chamberlain, there are several theories on which I can award counsel fees - - one is under
1-341, the other is under various sections of the Family Law Code . . . Judge Harris explicitly
acknowledged this was a straight contract case. (J-6) This was about a declaratory relief action
regarding a single sentence in a contract provision concerning college applications. There were
no minors involved. No alimony or child support involved. Yet Judge Harris demonstrates his
lack of understanding of the law with regard to awarding of fees. First, it is an extraordinary
remedy he applied despite the substantial defense presented to the charges of contempt. Second,
the only request for fees made by the opposing party was based on Md. Rule 1-341. Lastly,
Judge Harriss statement he could award fees based on the Family Law Code in this case
demonstrates his lack of understanding of the law.
(F-42)
Previously mentioned dialogue indicating that Judge Harris does not believe the cases cited
support or are relevant to questions of jurisdiction.

(A-43)
Court:

Your presented no evidence on duress.

(The record reflects my understanding of the difference between void and voidable orders.
(F-70-71) I understand the a voidable order must be obeyed until overturned by the higher
court. My defense was clearly stated that the order was void, and unlawful, and therefore I could
not be held in contempt for disobeying it. That is why the record shows law and case citations
proving a lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to mootness. No evidence needed to be
presented to prove duress, nor would any evidence have helped prove the order was void,
therefore proving duress in the contempt hearing would not have been a valid defense. Judge
Harriss focus on the fact that no evidence was presented proving duress demonstrates he is
either attempting to confuse the situation or is mentally unable to grasp the basic tenets of law
with regard to void, voidable, lawful versus unlawful orders, as they relate to holding someone in
contempt of court.)

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7.

Judge Harris was required by Md. Rule 16-813 Rule 2.11 to disqualify himself. I

readily concede that just because a Judge makes an error, that alone does not disqualify himself
from ruling on a related matter. For example, if a judge authorizes a search warrant, he is not
disqualified from ruling on whether the evidence obtained through that search warrant might be
inadmissible due to a defect in the search warrant. But this case is different. It has gone past two
steps and is not into the third. This judge decided he could act outside of his statutorily
prescribed jurisdictional limits. Then, he signed an order which has been alleged to be unlawful,
and void, because he acted outside his jurisdictional limits. Then, he denied the request that his
order be vacated because it was unlawful, and therefore, void by law. And THEN, he will not
recuse himself and determines that he will sit and judge whether someone should be held in
contempt for disobeying that order when the declared defense to the charges, before the hearing,
are that the order is unlawful and contempt cannot be brought for disobedience to an unlawful
order. There could not be a more classic case of the need for one judge to step aside and have
another judge review the issue than in this situation.
Judge Harris has demonstrated over many months that he has more than a de minimus
interest in this case. Please read my Motion to Vacate Order and Dismiss Plaintiffs Petition for
Contempt on October 6, 2014. Judge Harris denied this motion. By doing so, he has indicated
he has read the motion and disagrees with the legal support for it. In other words, he has
declared that his order is lawful and he will not vacate it. When a petition for contempt was
filed, a 30

Recusal

Time

First few sentences: ex-parte comm or decided without evidence / shows the decision was
predetermined

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Conclusion: Totality of evidence, from the denial of motions fully supported with legal merit and
case citations, to the failure to rule on other motions in a timely manner causing them to become
moot, to the substantial evidence of a failure to comply with clear law when it is discussed and
explained at length prior to his legal decisions,
C. PREAMBLE

C-101 -- An independent, fair, competent, and impartial judiciary composed of men and women
of integrity who will interpret and apply the law that governs our society is indispensable to our
system of justice. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice
and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges,
individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and
strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.

C-102 -- Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid both
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives. They
should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their
independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.

Rule 2.5. COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION

(a) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently, promptly,
and without favoritism or nepotism.

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[1] Competence in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities of
judicial office.

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