No. 15-1710 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS. FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Plaintiff-Appellant PAUL F. HARRIS, JR., Circuit Court Judge for Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in his individual capacity, Defendant-Appellee ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND. (Civil Action No. JFM-15-1476) PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Pro Se LitigantTABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ......-.0 000.0005 STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 35(b) ....-. BACKGROUND... 622-2... 002s eee ARGUMENT... 002. eee 1. IL. Mm. THE GENERAL RULE OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE . THE DISTRICT COURT’S CLASSIFICATION OF THIS COMPLAINT AS A “DOMESTIC RELATIONS” CASE HAS NOLEGAL FOUNDATION. ...........- THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY LAW... . CONCLUSION .........205 RELIEF REQUESTED. . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . Page ili u 3 14TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus, 286 Md. 324 (1979)... 0... Bell v. Hood, 327 US. 678 (1946)... occ ee eee Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 526 A. 2d 598, 609 (Md. 1987) . . Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335. 351 (1872). . Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, NC, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996)... 22... Bruce v. Riddle, 63) F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980)......... Butz v. Economou, 438 U. 8. 478 (1978) Chu By Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985). 00.0.2 ee (Cleavinger,w Saxman, 474 151193 (1985) eee Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 (1996)... 2.2.0.6 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). . Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)... . De Sole v. United States, 947 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir.1991). 0. District of Columbia Cowrt of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. $. 462 (1983)... . Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)... . . Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608) Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 227-229 (1988) . . Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 8.Ct. $94, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). . . Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) . . . 2 an 9Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994)... 2. eee 8 King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1992)... 0... ee 1 Mylan Lab., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 & n. 4 (4th Cir.1993). 2... 2 Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. 8. 661, 666-667 (1974). . . 12 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 US. 1, 107 (1987)... ee 9 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. 8. 547 (1967)... 0. i Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1987). 0... eee eee 1 Raftery v. Scott, 156 F.2d 335, 343 (4th Cit. 1985)... 0... 6 Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir.1989) ..2 Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12,297 (1977)... . « 5 Richmond, F & P. RR. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir.1993).. . . 2 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 US. 413 (1923)... 2... 2,5, 8,9, 10 Stevenson v. Lanham, 736 A.2d 363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)... 2.20... 00. 5 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 356-357, 360 (1978)... eee The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U. 8. 22,25 (1913)... 2.2... 10 Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983)... 0.2.0... eee 13 Verizon Ma. Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002). 8 Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F. 2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982)... .....00.004 6 Statutes & Rules 28US.C.§ 1331... #3 32900000005000005 ++ 27,8112BUSC.§ 1332.0 eee au 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a) (3) Annotations Allison B. Jones, “The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Really Mean To Be Inextricably Intertwined”, DUKE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 56:643, (2006)... eee eee eee 9 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., “Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?”, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999)........ 9PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 35 (b) AND FOURTH CIRCUIT LOCAL RULE 40 (b) Rehearing en banc is warranted because this Court’s per curium affirmation of the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of Appellant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint contravenes decades of uniform and settled decisions of the 4th Circuit, and those of the United States Supreme Court, The panel in this case affirmed the sua sponte dismissal of the complaint for the “reasons stated by the district court.” Those reasons were two-fold: (1) that the judge in this case “enjoys absolute immunity”, and (2) that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve a “domestic relations” case. ‘An exhaustive and unbroken string of decisions in this court, and the United States Supreme Court, explicitly provide for exceptions to the general rule that judges enjoy absolute immunity. Forrester v, White, 484 U. S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v, Saxner, 474 U. S. 193 (1985); Dennis v, Sparks, 449 U. S. 24 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Stump v, Sparkman, 435 U. 8. 349 (1978); Pierson v, Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Bradley v, Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872); King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1992); Pressly v, Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1987); Chu By Chu v, Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir, 1985); Bruce v, Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980). The complaint filed withthe district court alleged, with clarity and specificity, that absolute immunity did not apply under the circumstances of this case as it falls within one of the settled exceptions to the general rule. Additionally, classification of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against a judicial officer cannot be construed as “domestic relations” case. ‘The Appellant is a resident of Colorado. The complaint alleges the deprivation, under the color of law, of constitutional rights by a judge, acting in his individual capacity, who is a resident of Maryland. The district court clearly had jurisdiction to hear this 42 US.C. § 1983 complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and 28 U.S.C § 1343 (a) (3). Specifically, the district court's application of the Rooker- Feldman derived “inextricably intertwined” doctrine is inappropriate in this case Lastly, affirmation of the sua sponte dismissal is not in accordance with substantial and settled law. ‘The appellant has a right to present his case, have the evidence considered and obtain a decision rendered on the merits. As the complaint provided credible and substantial evidence supporting the allegations presented, summary dismissal was an error of law. Brooks v, City of Winston-Salem, NC, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996); Mylan Lab.. Inc. v, Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 & n. 4 (4th Cir.1993); Richmond, F. & P. RR. v, Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir.1993); Revene v, Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir.1989); Haines v, Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Bd.2d 652 (1972); Conley v. Gibson, 355 USS. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957),The panel’s affirmation of the district court’s sua sponte dismissal defies decades of precedent set by this circuit, every other circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. As such, an rehearing en banc is necessary to maintain the uniformity of unwavering and settled decisions regarding exceptions to absolute judicial immunity and the litmus test which must be used to justify a sua sponte dismissal of a complaint. BACKGROUND Appellant (Plaintiff below) sued Appellee Paul F. Harris, Jr. (Defendant below) for actions in his individual capacity as a judge on the Anne Arundel County, Maryland, Circuit Court. The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint sought money damages for injuries sustained due to alleged violations of civil rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, federal law and Maryland state law when the Judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the complaint, sua sponte, reasoning that the judge “enjoys absolute judicial immunity” and that it had no jurisdiction to hear a “domestic relations” case. (Exhibit A). An appeal was timely filed with this court. A panel “affirm[ed] for the reasons stated by the district court” and found “no reversible error.” (Exhibit B). ARGUMENT 1. THE GENERAL RULE OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.The district court clearly indicated dismissal was required because the judge “enjoys absolute immunity.” A cursory review of the doctrine of judicial immunity, however, reveals there are two well settled exceptions to the general rule affording judges absolute judicial immunity. The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending, to the earliest days of common law. See Floyd v, Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608). The Supreme Court accepted the rule of judicial immunity in Bradley vy. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), however this case and others make clear that immunity can be overcome by two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i. e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 227-229 (1988); Stump vy, Sparkman. 435 U.S. 360 (1978). Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 356-357 (1978); Bradley vy, Fisher, 13 Wall., at 351 (1872). The Bradley Court provided a clear distinction between acting in “excess of jurisdiction” and acting in “the clear absence of jurisdiction”: “A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of Jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.”‘The instant complaint clearly outlined facts which showed the only issue before the circuit court was moot, the judge was aware of these facts, and yet proceeded to act “in the clear absence of jurisdiction.” (Circuit courts in Maryland have no jurisdiction to hear moot cases. See Stevenson v. Lanham, 736 A.2d 363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 (1996); Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 526, A.2d 598, 609 (Md. 1987); Attorney General_v, Anne Arundel County Sch. Bus Contractors Ass’n, 286, Md. 324 (1979); Reyes v, Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12, 297 (1977). The district court, and this court’s panel, apparently overlooked Paragraph 23 of Mr. Chamberlain’s complaint which left no room to Suggest the general rule concerning judicial immunity was applicable to this case: “Judicial immunity, under the circumstances of this case as will be proven at trial, is not applicable. Judicial acts taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not protected acts.” I THE DISTRICT COURT’S CLASSIFICATION OF THIS COMPLAINT AS A “DOMESTIC RELATIONS” CASE HAS NO LEGAL FOUNDATION. The second justification the district court provided for its summary dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint was that “the merits of the decisions made regarding the. . divorce proceedings are “inextricably intertwined” with every claim asserted in the complaint” and “such review by this court is not permitted.” The Rooker-Feldman derived “inextricably intertwined” argument utilized by the 5district court to reach this conclusion, however, has no applicability to this complaint. The complaint filed was a complaint between Stephen D. Chamberlain, a citizen of Colorado, and Paul F, Harris, a Circuit Court Judge (acting in his individual capacity) who is a resident of Maryland. The complaint specifically alleged that Judge Harris acted under the color of law, in the clear absence of jurisdiction, and deprived Mr. Chamberlain of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Mr. Chamberlain sought monetary damages for these actions. This case cannot be classified as a “domestic relations” case. The district court cited Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 1985), summarizing that “domestic relations exceptions to federal courts’ jurisdiction based on idea that state has a stronger more direct interest.” While the state may indeed have a stronger interest in a domestic relations case, the state clearly does not have a stronger interest in the violation of federal statutes and the United States Constitution than does a federal court. This is a case which singularly seeks the enforcement of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is inarguable that federal questions and the vindication of federal rights can be brought before a federal tribunal. ‘The district court also pointed to Wasserman v, Wasserman, 671 F. 2d 832 (th Cir, 1982). Wasserman has no applicability to the instant case as this case doesnot involve using diversity jurisdiction to“. . . grant divorces, determine alimony or support obligations or decide child custody rights.” Subject matter jurisdiction for this complaint is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331: Federal question - The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, Additionally, subject matter jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a) (3) : Civil rights and elective franchise - (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. The district court's re-classification of this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a “domestic relations” matter must be rejected. Nothing in the complaint is “intertwined”, either “inextricably” or even tangentially to the merits of the underlying action. See District of bia Court of Appeals v. an, 460 U. S. 462 (1983). The complaint is not about a domestic issue, nor does it seek review of the merits of any decision in the state court. This is a federal question, brought forward as a result of alleged constitutional violations by a state actor acting under the color of law. Nei x Ln S.C. hav re in sstatutory rights. Furthermore, the district court's “inextricably intertwined” reasoning does not comport with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and cannot be used as a basis for denial of jurisdiction over the complaint. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments . . .” Verizon Md. Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002). “Rooker-Feldman bars a losing party in state court ‘from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Industries Corp. 544 U.S. 280 (2005) quoting Johnson v, De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) (underline added). In other words, the doctrine is based on the principle of federalism, particularly the statutory rule that lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judgments. Notably, the Supreme Court has only applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine twice: first in Rooker v, Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and sixty years later in Feldman, Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). Recently, in Exxon Mobile, the Supreme Court provided clarifying,guidance to the doctrine, restricting Rooker-Feldman to the narrow ground of the Rooker and Feldman cases, both of which involved federal plaintiffs calling upon district courts to “overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” The unanimous Court specified four requirements for invocation of the doctrine: 1) the case must be brought by a state court loser; 2) the injury alleged must be caused by the state court judgment; 3) the judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced; and 4) the case must invite the district court review and rejection of that judgment. (Allison B. Jones, “The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Really Mean To Be Inextricably Intertwined’, DUKE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 56:643, (2006) referencing Exxon Mobile and Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005). The “inextricably interwined” inquiry was borne from a footnote in the Feldman case. In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 (1987), Justice ‘Marshall expanded on the point by stating: “a federal claim is inextricably intertwined . . . if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” The “inextricably intertwined” inquiry, employed to determine Rooker- Feldman doctrine applicability, has regularly, and wrongly, been used by the lower courts to deny federal jurisdiction. (See Thomas D. Rowe, Jt., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999)The complaint dismissed by the district court in this case did not assert injuries caused by the state court judgment. The alleged injuries were sustained by the judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction by hearing a case which was facially devoid of a controversy and for which he had no authority to preside over. Secondly, the complaint cannot be read, nor can it be inferred, to “invite the district court review and rejection” of the state-court judgment. As two of the four requirements for invoking “Rooker-Feldman” are not met in this case, the district court’s application of the doctrine and use of the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry was an error. Seeking a remedy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights, for which the district court has jurisdiction, is wholly separate from an attempt to seek review of a state-court judgment, which has not been requested of the district court in this complaint. Legal reasoning that the claims in this complaint are “inextricably intertwined” with the merits of the state court decisions is flawed. Jurisdiction is the authority conferred by Congress to adjudicate a given type of case. The Fair v, Kohler Die Co., 228 U. $. 22, 25 (1913). Here, §§ 1331 and 1343 (3) unquestionably authorize federal courts to adjudicate all civil actions arising under the constitution, and to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights. It is also plain that the complaint formally and explicitly alleged such a deprivation. The district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was an error. 10Ul. THE DISTRICT COURT’S SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY LAW. Though not clearly stipulated, the district court reasoned that sua sponte dismissal was appropriate based on either a lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(1) or failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As supported above, the district court clearly had jurisdiction to preside over this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. District court jurisdiction, as clearly laid out in the complaint, is provided by three statutes:, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1332, and § 1343 (a) (3). The complaint is a civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, the parties are citizens of different states, and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00. ‘The complaint was filed to “redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Furthermore, the district court could not determine that the complaint failed to state claim for which relief could be granted without first assuming jurisdiction to make that determination. It is a question of law whether a complaint adequately States a cause of action for which relief could be granted. The determination of "such a question must be based on the merits, and not determined sua sponte without affording the Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on the matter. See Bell v, Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)!. It is settled that a court should consider all clearly articulated and supported allegations as true, and view a complaint in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Furthermore, dismissal should not be granted unless it is facially apparent the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support his claim and entitle him to relief. De Sole v, United States, 947 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir.1991). It also cannot be said that the complaint before the district court was "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme] Court or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the merits." Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 666-667 (1974). (Citations omitted.) The opposite was true of this complaint, Substantial initial evidence was clearly provided in support of the allegations made, the allegations were plausible, and they were directly in line with this Court’s precedents and those of the United States Supreme Court. The averments in this case fall squarely within one of the settled exceptions to judicial "Jurisdiction . .. is not defeated . .. by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” 2immunity. The facts laid out in the complaint are sufficient to warrant the opportunity to present the merits of the case before a fair tribunal for adjudication. The most clear and comprehensive rules for dismissing a complaint sua sponte was articulated by the 6th Circuit in Tingler v, Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983): Under our supervisory power, we hold that a district court faced with a complaint which it believes may be subject to dismissal must: (1) allow service of the complaint upon the defendant; (2) notify all parties of its intent to dismiss the complaint; (3) give the plaintiff a chance to either amend his complaint or respond to the reasons stated by the district court in its notice of intended sua sponte dismissal; (4) give the defendant a chance to respond or file an answer or motions; and (5) if the claim is dismissed, state its reasons for the dismissal. The district court reliance on either Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) as justification for its sua sponte dismissal of this complaint must be viewed as erroneous and cannot be reconciled with settled law. CONCLUSION A rehearing en banc is warranted to reverse the per curium decision by the panel in this case to maintain the uniform and settled decisions in this circuit, and the United States Supreme Court, regarding the exceptions to absolute judicial immunity and the requirements which must be met prior to entering a sua sponte dismissal of a complaint. 18RELIEF REQUESTED ‘The Appellant hereby respectfully requests this Court reverse the per curium decision entered by a panel of this Court on October 19, 2015, vacate the United States District Court for the District of Maryland’s Order of June 8, 2015 dismissing the Appellant’s complaint, remand the case to that Court for further proceedings, and for the recovery of the docketing fee and cost of printing and reproducing the brief pursuant to Local Rule 39 (c). Sez 40 — Stephen D. Chamberlain Pro Se Litigant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on 30 October, 2015, a copy of the foregoing Petition For Rehearing En Banc was sent via FEDEX, postage prepaid, to The Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr., Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, 8 Church Circle, Annapolis, MD 21404, Defendant / Appellee. DBerana Stephen D. Chamberlain 4~ IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Plaintis * v . Civil Action No. JFM-15-1476 PAULF. HARRIS, JR. . Defendant Self-represented plaintiff Stephen D. Chamberlain, « resident of Castle Pines, Colorado, filed this fee-paid case, seeking money damages from the Honorable Paul F, Harris, Jr, a judge in the Cireuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Hartis, ho is sued in his individual capacity, violated plaintiff's civil rights in connection with divorce proceedings commenced against plaintiff’ ECF No. 1 The defendant is sued for decisions made in the context of his role as a judge, and the claims against him must be dismissed as he enjoys absolute immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S, 219, 226- 27 (1988) ("If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits."), Further, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the case, ‘Domestic relations cases may not be heard in this court? See Reffery v. Scort, 756 F. 2d 335, 343 (Ath Cir, 1985) (domestic relations exception to federal courts’ jurisdiction based on idea that state has « stronger more direct interest); Wasserman v, Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th * See Judith C. Chamberiain ve. Stephen D. Chamberain, Case No. 02009139690, filed March 26, 2009, ileasesenrch cours sate rchinguivSe ‘Acctss to the Maryland electronic docket is limited; however, ic appears ike cae is ongoing * The court notes that if pint is aggrieved by the Creuit Cours decision appellate review say be aveiable, EXHIBIT A‘Gis. 1982) (diversity jurisdiction does not include power to grant divorces, determine alimony or Support obligations, or decide child custody rights). The merits of the decisions made regarding the Chamberlain’ divorce proveedings are inextricably intertwined in every claim asserted in the ‘complaint; such review by this court is not permitted Accordingly, it is thisegeday of 4 2015, by the United States District Court forthe Distit of Maryland, hereby ORDERED the 1, The complaint 1S DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction; 2. ‘The Clerk SHALL PROVIDE a copy of this order to plaintiff and 3. ‘The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case, J Frederick Mot Uniged States Distriot JudgeFILED: October 19, 2015 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1710 (1:15-ev-01476-JFM) — STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Plaintiff - Appellant v PAUL F. HARRIS, JR. Defendant - Appellee ——_—___ JUDGMENT ee In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41, /s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK EXHIBIT BAppeal: 15-1710 Doe: 6 Filed: 1/19/2015 Pg: 2 of 2 PER CURIAM: Stephen D. Chamberlain appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2012) complaint. we eet meelewed: (thes recog) eed tant reversible error, Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district Cours: Ghamberlain v. Harris, No. 1:15-ev-01476-JM (D. wa. fled June 8, 2015; entered gune 9, 2015). We dispense with Creat argument because the facts and legal contentions are gee, | olecerted (int thet aecant ye this court and Srgument would not aid the decisional process. APETRMED