The F-35 JSF Program

The Cost, Safety, and Combat Effectiveness of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program
Matthew E. Avecilla
University of Central Florida
Dr. Guenzel
ENC 1102-0205
April 26, 2016

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Abstract

One of the best known modern military projects is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.
Born out of a few different programs In the 80s and early 90s, the F-35 JSF was intended to
replace older platforms in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps as a multirole fighter. The F-35
was intended to incorporate new technology making it safer and more effective. Selected based
on certain characteristics, like the need for a multirole platform that could accommodate STOVL
(short takeoff vertical landing) and VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing) engines that could be
used in multiple services at a relatively low cost (F-35 Lightning II n.d.). As Macias and Rosen
explained, F-35s were developed to dogfight, provide close air support, execute long-range
bombing attacks, and take off from and land on aircraft carriers all the while using the most
advanced stealth capabilities available (2016). However, the F-35 has faced wide criticism
centering on its cost, performance, and safety. While the cost of the F-35 program has
significantly exceeded an acceptable level, F-35s are relatively safe and effective given their
original purpose and the role they are supposed to fill.
Key words: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, multirole fighter, STOVL, VTOL, cost per
unit, Block 3F

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The Cost, Safety, and Combat Effectiveness of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program is at a pivotal point of transition; from project and
prototype to warplane in active duty. This is a good point to look at some of the programs
successes and failures. The F-35 has been criticized for its cost, safety issues, and inferior
performance. However, there is good and bad in everything, and it can be difficult to make
judgements without a thorough analysis of the F-35 itself.
Cost
Cost seems to be a point most people agree on. At a cost of 379 billion dollars for 2,457
planes and with an expected pentagon investment of around 1 billion dollars over the aircrafts
lifetime the program is costing double what was expected. In fact the helmet worn by pilots
alone costs almost half a million dollars (Cohen 2015). In fact, as Ryan Alexander quotes Senator
John McCain The Joint Strike Fighter is the most expensive weapons system in history
Certainly public opinion seems to be set against the cost of the F-35.It is worth noting that that
the cost of accusation has gone down recently, as a result of the inclusion of new engineering
companies in the program, such as Boing and British Aerospace. Measures such as these
decreased the projected cost of the first 2,457 panes from 391 billion dollars to 379 billion
dollars in 2015.

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As shown in

Figure 1. Taken from Daviess article in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2015) the chart
illustrates the general increase in the cost per unit over time, with a reversal in this trend in recent years.

Figure 1, the
cost per unit has increased significantly over the projects lifespan with a slight cost decrease in
the last few years. The cost per unit is the cost to purchase one aircraft, not including the cost to
develop or operate the aircraft (2015). However, these changes include an increase in the cost to
operate the aircraft over their lifetime. The projected lifetime cost increase is not because of the
quality or source of the aircraft components though, but rather the result of the JSF program life
being extended an extra five years from 55 to 60 (Seligman 2016). So while the cost of the F-35
program is obviously unacceptably high, what about the quality of the aircraft?
Pilot Safety

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Another major concern about the F-35 program is pilot safety. Opponents have portrayed
the F-35 as unnecessarily dangerous to fly. One object of concern is the software the F-35 uses.
Problems with the Logistics Information System, the brain of the F-35, are well documented. In
fact in the Block 3F software, which is supposed to be the final software needed for the F-35, the
software developers are actually finding problems faster than they can correct them (Macias and
Rosen 2016). The software problem is so significant that the Air Force is considering delaying
the F-35As initial operational capacity, or IOC, date (Gillian 2016). Another serious concern has
to do with the F-35s ejection seats. According to the Davenport in The Daily Mail lighter pilots
that weigh less than 136 pounds are at a high risk of injury when ejecting. The issue is so serious
that the Pentagon will not allow pilots weighing less than 136 pounds to fly F-35s (2015).
On the other hand, there is also plenty of evidence the F-35 is safe by fighter jet
standards. While the F-35s safety has often been called into question it seems that operating the
plane in accordance with Pentagon regulation should not cause undue risk to pilots. It also seems
clear that when safety issues are found they are being addressed. This can be seen in the ejection
mechanism changes and the possible delay of the F-35A IOC. The Marine Corps has called the
F-35 combat ready (Neuman 2015). In fact, the test pilot who flew an F-35 from Italy to Texas
in the first trans-Atlantic flight said as expected, the jet performed exceptionally well and
without any surprises (Hoyle 2015). This could indicate that reports of problems with the F-35
software are exaggerated, or dont significantly affect how the plane flies. In regards to the
ejection seat issue, Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan, in an official statement said, referencing a
news report on F-35 JSF ejection seats the report's calculation that pilots lighter than 136
pounds have a 25% chance of dying when ejecting, was misleading and that the probability of
any one pilot flying the F-35, ejecting and getting hurt is actually 1 in 50,000 (Gillian 2016).

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This figure is calculated based on how uncommon ejecting is. Ejecting is considered extremely
dangerous for all jet pilots, and is only ever done in situations where there is no alternative.
Nevertheless, ways of reducing risk to pilots while ejecting are being considered. These include
delaying the parachutes to reduce impact on pilots, designing panels to immobilize pilots heads
during ejection, and reducing the weight of the helmet pilots wear. The fabric panel and helmet
change should be introduced by the end of 2016 and the parachute modification some time in
2017 (Drew 2015). While safety concerns are certainly noteworthy, it would not seem they
should indicate the F-35 program is a failure. However, safety is not the only point of contention
critics have with the F-35 program.
Effectiveness and Efficiency
Questions are also often raised about how effective of a warplane the F-35 will make.
Critics argue that the F-35 cant hold its own in combat against similar aircraft in development,
in existence, and even against the aircraft it is supposed to replace. One critique is that the
Eurofighter Typhoon, a warplane developed overseas, is at least equal in ability to the F-35.
Critics argue that in performance metrics like trans-sonic acceleration and angle of attack, planes
like the Typhoon can outperform the F-35. This means that in combat, the F-35 would be at a
disadvantage when confronting hostile aircraft (Cenciotti 2013). In fact the Military even admits
that the F-35 cant dogfight, or fight close range engagements with other fighter aircraft (Axe
2015). This point is clearly indicated by the results of early exercises in which an F-16, one of
the aircraft that the F-35 is intended to replace, achieved a simulated kill against a prototype F35. The F-16 pilot, in a review, noted that the F-35 underperformed the F-16 in maneuverability
(Sweetman 2016).

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Proponents of the program are quick to point out that the F-35 was never intended to be a
dominant dogfighter, but rather was designed with stealth in mind (Cohen 2015). When
complete, the F-35 is intended to not need to dogfight, but rather use its advanced sensors to
detect and engage enemy aircraft while using stealth technology to avoid detection itself (Axe
2015). As Lockheed Martin, the F-35s manufacturer explains, the aircraft was designed with an
emphasis on electronic warfare, such as jammers and active electronically scanned array (AESA)
radars. Lockheed Martin argues that as technology progresses, these are more helpful to fighter
pilots than speed and maneuverability (Electronic Warfare n.d.). This is evidenced by Green Flag
exercise results. Green flag is a military simulation that pits aircraft against one another. In these
exercises the F-35 scored perfectly in survivability, meaning none suffered a simulated shoot
down. These exercises are also more recent than the ones at which the F-16 was victorious
(Butler 2015).
Perhaps the best support for the F-35s effectiveness comes from looking at its origins.
First of all it is capable of integrating a VTOL and STOVL engine, unlike the Typhoon or F-16.
The only other aircraft to incorporate VTOL engines effectively, the Harrier, cant perform as
well as an F-35 in most areas (Cenciotti 2013). Second of all it isnt an air superiority fighter, but
rather a multirole fighter that can attack ground targets as well. An example of this can be seen in
the F-35 wing design. Designed to be able to able to enter the slow flight necessary to attack
ground targets as well as to perform the high-speed maneuvers meant for air-to-air combat, the
wing design compromises for being good in both these areas instead of exceptional in one or the
other (Conan 2013). For comparison, the A-10, one of the planes the F-35 would replace, is
considered wildly successful. However, in terms of air to air effectiveness the A-10 is very
incapable; the design is focused solely ground attack roles (A-10 Thunderbolt II 2015). It is

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meant to work with other aircraft like the F-22, not to fight alone. In its system the F-35 fills a
specific niche, one that it was built for (Conan 2013). So, while the F-35 may not be the best
dogfighter, it can do a variety of things well, and when needed can be supported by other, more
specialized aircraft. The ability to rapidly respond from runways, carriers, amphibious vessels,
and launch pads to a wide variety of different threats is what makes the F-35 an effective
multirole fighter.
While the F-35 may not be the best dogfighter it is still an excellent aircraft. It is capable
of doing its job well and can be used in many different ways. This is what makes the F-35 an
effective warplane. While there are definitely performance issues with the F-35, the good seems
to outweigh the bad. While the cost is too high, the F-35 is still a viable aircraft for military use.
The F-35 does have its drawbacks; It is expensive and it could be safer. However it is not any
less safe than any other plane. Furthermore it incorporates todays technologies to make it a
better plane. It may not be the fastest but it can get its job done, doing everything it was meant to
well. While somewhat mismanaged in terms of cost the F-35 JSF is a good aircraft, just possibly
not as good as it could have been.

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