Commission to Study DOD reform

Praise and Reflection

I want to thank Sen. McCain for championing the issue of DOD reform. There is no
doubt in my mind that every member of this Committee is concerned about the ability for the
Department to adapt and remain successful in todays security environment. I am also concerned
with the appearance that the Department is mired in duplicative processes and complicated
organizational designs. Many of the witnesses at several of our hearings attested to this, but they
also said the following:
o Jim Thomas (Center for Strategic Budgetary Analysis, CSBA) in front of SASC
on 11/10/15: All of these ideas would require detailed analysis to fully
understand their strengths and avoid outcomes that might inadvertently leave us
worse off.
o James Locher (SASC Staff Director during original Goldwater Nichols) in front
of SASC on 11/10/15: pinpointing problems was the committees sole focus for
eighteen months. As part of this thorough process, the committee staff produced a
645-page staff study with detailed analyses of each problem area.a hasty
reform without a deep appreciation for the origins of the behaviors that
currently limit Pentagon effectiveness would be a mistake.
o Hon. David Walker (former Comptroller General) in front of SASC on
11/17/15:there needs to be a fundamental review and reassessment of the current
organizational structure and personnel practices.
o Hon. Michele Flournoy (Fmr. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) in front of
SASC on 12/8/15: It is imperative that we think through the second and third
order effects of any changes proposedgreat care should be taken to hear the
full range of views and consider the unintended consequences.
Process
I have the utmost respect for the Committee staff and believe they have attempted to
address the challenges they perceive at the Department. However, the responsibility lies with us
to take the vote. What study proposed this path? What outside agency has reviewed our
proposal and offered additional views? What concerns have our military or civilian leaders
raised?
My understanding of Goldwater-Nichols was that it encompassed a nearly 5-year process
between the Packard Commission and subsequent Armed Services Committee exhaustive
investigative work. Only then were Senators asked to vote on DOD reform. In the absence of
such a study, with less than a week to review these extensive reforms, without the ability to ask
for input from outside stakeholders due to the embargoed nature of the mark, I just dont know
enough to know whether these changes are the right ones or not, but lingering questions remain
unanswered. Should the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs be required to consult with and seek the
advice of the other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? I would fully support that
recommendation with regards to future reforms being socialized within this committee.

Last year the proposal was to reduce Headquarters 30% over 4 years. In conference, we
settled upon 25%. And this year, there is an effort to dramatically broaden these cuts by
expanding definitions within Title 10. What is the right number?
I understand there is a movement to bring back a new Under-Secretary for Research and
Engineering. Which SASC hearing covered the design as proposed in the mark? My
understanding is that this position existed until the 1980s. Do we have any details on why it
went away?
There is a proposal to reduce the number of General Officers by 25%. Why 25%? Why
not 10% or 40%. Last year we capped the pay of General Officers, this year we reduce their
ranks by an arbitrary number. Combining these two, I am not sure we are cultivating the next
Eisenhower, Halsey, Abrams or Dunford. And again, the embargoed status prevents us from
getting any outside opinion or expert analysis on this proposal before we vote. I am not
challenging the concept of reform, but I do challenge the process that led us to this point. And
we can fix this by putting in an appropriate process to make sure we are making the right
reforms.
Previous Demands
We made significant reforms, as recent as last year we inserted our Services back into
many Acquisition decisions. We have charged the Department with hiring top talent to drive
innovation. Many of the members of this committee, to include myself, have demanded a more
comprehensive military strategy. Additionally, we have encouraged greater outreach with many
of our Allies and Partners and expanded our Counter-ISIL campaign to a greater expanse of the
globe.
Our requests are not hollow or zero sum. People are required to assist Service
Secretaries with their new found acquisition responsibilities. People develop more
comprehensive doctrines, and offset strategies. Hiring top-talent means just that. What will our
re-organization do to the Department while it is in the midst of a two-front Cold War, and
expanding conflict in the middle-East? How do you get top talent if each Spring we hastily cut
and re-organize? Many of us watched some of our best acquisition professionals and workers
walk out the door when the government shut down over the budget crisis. What will the impact
be of these cuts? Is there any incentive to come work for the Department?
We have all agreed that the U.S. must lead around the world. What will the appearance
be when Generals once assigned to various joint commands begin to disappear? What message
does it send when we take the US military commander in Afghanistan and downgrade the
position from a 4 star to a 3 star billet? What message does it send if we reduce regional
commandseliminating AFRICOM for example at a time when terrorist attacks are killing more
people in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the Middle East or Europe? I dont know the answers to
these questions and I submit that most of us dont. And if we dont, we should get the answers
before we vote for these reforms.
Closing

As I said earlier, I fully support the Chairmans initiative to reform the Department. I
know he has reached a comfort level with these proposals and in time, I may be able to accept
most or all of them. But I am mindful of the warnings of the witnesses we invited to testify
about these reforms. Each of us must develop a sense of confidence that we understand the
consequences of these reforms. We each have independent oversight responsibility and we
should take that responsibility seriously and I dont believe that voting following a few days of
in-office review of an embargoed product fulfils that responsibility.
On that note, I have an amendment which strikes the most far reaching provisions and
instead empowers a Commission, similar to the Packer Commission that developed the concepts
ultimately adopted in Goldwater-Nichols reform. I propose to strike the provisions:
o Re-defining the roles and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Combatant Commanders
o Repeal of the requirement for Annual National Security Strategy
o Repeal of the Quadrennial Defense Review and creation of a New Defense
Strategy Document
o Reduction of personnel in OSD, and military service headquarters
o Limitation on the number of Senior Executive Service employees
o Creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
o Reduction and re-distribution of the number of General and Flag Officers
I also propose a McCain Commission to study and provide recommendations to reform
the following:
o Structure and Organization of DOD, Office of Secretary of Defense, Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff all service headquarters.
o The responsibilities and authorities of both geographic and functional combatant
commands.
o Organization, Responsibility and Interaction of Combatant Commands,
Subordinate Commands to include Joint Task Forces with the Joint Staff and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. This will include identifying overlap and
redundancy in this design.
o The responsibilities and authorities of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
o The development and structure of the Defense Budget
o Development and promulgation of Strategy Documents.
o Professional Education requirements for both military and civilian leaders.
o Cost-management and business practices
o Interaction between the Department of Defense and Private Industry.
o Interaction between the Department of Defense and the Interagency
I am committed to achieving the reform that the Chairman has proposed and have
ensured that this Commission will study every area of reform that is currently being proposed.
In conclusion, lets think about our people. If you are a smart young acquisition professional, or
cybersecurity analyst, or a talented student contemplating a military career, or a mid-career
officer deciding whether to stick with the military, you have options for your career. And heres

what you seein 2013, we furloughed DOD employees and then shut the government down for
2 weeks. Last year, we directed the DOD to reduce headquarters staff, broadly defined, by 25%.
This year, we are proposing a number of other potentially significant reductions to personnel and
other far-reaching changes, all without the careful study that was used in the last major Pentagon
reform. And what will we do next year? I just worry that, if were not careful, we send a
message that talented folks might be better off taking other career paths than serving in the
greatest military in the world.