CHAVEZ VS.

NLRC
448 SCRA 478. January 17, 2005
FACTS
The respondent company, Supreme Packaging, Inc. engaged the services of the
petitioner, Pedro Chavez, as truck driver. The respondent company furnished the
petitioner with a truck. The petitioner expressed to respondent Alvin Lee, respondent
companys plant manager, his desire to avail himself of the benefits that the regular
employees were receiving such as overtime pay, nightshift differential pay, and 13th
month pay, among others. Although he promised to extend these benefits to the
petitioner, respondent Lee failed to actually do so. Petitioner filed a complaint for
regularization with the Regional Arbitration Branch. Before the case could be heard,
respondent company terminated the services of the petitioner.
Consequently, the petitioner filed an amended complaint against the respondents for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and non-payment of overtime pay, nightshift
differential pay, and 13th month pay, among others. The respondents, for their part,
denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the respondent
company and the petitioner. They averred that the petitioner was an independent
contractor as evidenced by the contract of service which he and the respondent
company entered into. The relationship of the respondent company and the petitioner
was
allegedly
governed
by
this
contract
of
service.
The respondents insisted that the petitioner had the sole control over the means and
methods by which his work was accomplished. He paid the wages of his helpers and
exercised control over them. As such, the petitioner was not entitled to regularization
because he was not an employee of the respondent company. The respondents,
likewise, maintained that they did not dismiss the petitioner. Rather, the severance of his
contractual relation with the respondent company was due to his violation of the terms
and conditions of their contract.
ISSUE:
whether or not there existed an employer-employee relationship between the respondent
company and the petitioner.
RULING:
Yes. There was an employer-employee relationship in the case at bar.
The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the employers power to control the employees conduct. All the four
elements are present in this case.
Of the four elements of the employer-employee relationship, the control test is the most
important. Although the respondents denied that they exercised control over the manner
and methods by which the petitioner accomplished his work, a careful review of the
records shows that the latter performed his work as truck driver under the respondents
supervision and control. Their right of control was manifested by the following attendant

circumstances:
1. The truck driven by the petitioner belonged to respondent company;
2. There was an express instruction from the respondents that the truck shall be used
exclusively
to
deliver
respondent
companys
goods;
3. Respondents directed the petitioner, after completion of each delivery, to park the
truck in either of two specific places only, to wit: at its office in Metro Manila at 2320
Osmea
Street,
Makati
City or
at
BEPZ,
Mariveles,
Bataan;
and
4. Respondents determined how, where and when the petitioner would perform his task
by issuing to him gate passes and routing slips.
These circumstances, to the Courts mind, prove that the respondents exercised control
over the means and methods by which the petitioner accomplished his work as truck
driver of the respondent company. The contract of service indubitably established the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the respondent company and
the petitioner. It bears stressing that the existence of an employer-employee relationship
cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract and providing therein that the
employee is an independent contractor when, as in this case, the facts clearly show
otherwise. Indeed, the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law
and not by what the parties say it should be.

Wack Wack Golf and Country club vs NLRC

GR No. 149793; April 15, 2005
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
A fire destroyed a large portion of the main clubhouse of the Wack Wack Golf and
Counrty Club (wack Wack)., including its kitchen. In view of the reconstruction of the
whole clubhouse complex, Wack Wack had to suspend the operations of the Food and
Beverages Department which required the suspension of 54 employees. The Wack
Wack Employees Union found the suspension arbitrary and constitutive of unionbusting, and went to strike.
The parties soon entered into an agreement and formulated a special separation
benefir/remittance privilege which contained, among other things, the following
provision:
4. All qualified employees who may have been separated from the service under the
above package shall be considered under a priority basis for employment by
concessionaires and/or contractors, and even by the Club upon full resumption of
operations, upon the recommendation of the UNION. The Club may even persuade an
employee-applicant for availment under the package to remain on his/her job, or be
assigned to another position.
Three employees, namely: Martina B. Cagasan, Carmencita F. Dominguez, and Crisanto
Baluyot, Sr. availed of the aforementioned privilege.

Soon after, Wack Wack entered into a Management Contract with Business Staffing and
Management, Inc. (BSMI) whereby the latter will provide management services to Wack
Wack. Cagasan, Dominguez, and Baluyot, Sr. were among those hired by BMSI.
Wack Wack also engaged with several contractors which were assigned in various
operating functions of the club. Due to these various management service contracts,
BSMI undertook an organizational analysis and manpower evaluation. In the course of
the assessment, it was decided that the services of Cagasan, Domingues, and Baluyot,
Sr. were no longer needed. They were then dismissed from service. Later, these
employees individually filed an illegal dismissal complaint against Wack Wack before the
NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints of Cagasan and Domingues for lack of
cause of action. As to Baluyot, Sr., the Arbiter found that his dismissal was illegal. Upon
appeal by Cagasan and Dominguez, the NLRC decided in their favor. It held that BMSI
is only a labor-only contractor and hence, had nothing to do with the grievance of the
complainants. It ordered Wack Wack to reinstate Cagasan and Dominguez.
ISSUE:
WoN BSMI is a labor-only contractor.
HELD:
NO. An independent contractor is one who undertakes job contracting, i.e., a person
who: (a) carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his
own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free
from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with
the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and (b) has substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipments, machineries, work premises and
other materials which are necessary in the conduct of the business.
There is indubitable evidence showing that BSMI is an independent contractor, engaged
in the management of projects, business operations, functions, jobs and other kinds of
business ventures, and has sufficient capital and resources to undertake its principal
business. It had provided management services to various industrial and commercial
business establishments. Its Articles of Incorporation proves its sufficient capitalization.
In December 1993, Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma, in the case of In re Petition
for Certification Election Among the Regular Rank-and-File Employees Workers of
Byron-Jackson (BJ) Services International Incorporated, Federation of Free Workers
(FFW)-Byron Jackson Services Employees Chapter, recognized BSMI as an
independent contractor. As a legitimate job contractor, there can be no doubt as to the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the contractor and the
workers.

MANILA WATER COMPANY, INC., vs. PENA

G.R. No. 158255. July 8, 2004
Ynares-Santiago, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was contracted by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) to manage the water distribution system in the East Zone of Metro Manila.
Petitioner undertook to absorb former employees of the MWSS whose names and
positions were in the list furnished by the latter, while the employment of those not in the
list was terminated. Private respondents, notwithstanding their being contractual
collectors of the MWSS, were nevertheless engaged for their services without written
contract. Thereafter, on September 1, 1997, they signed a three-month contract to
perform collection services for eight branches of petitioner.
Before the end of the three-month contract, the 121 collectors were contracted to
collect charges for the Association Collectors Group, Inc. (ACGI). Only private
respondents herein remained with ACGI. Petitioner continued to transact with ACGI to
do its collection needs until February 8, 1999, when petitioner terminated its contract
with ACGI. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims
against petitioner, contending that they were petitioners employees. On the other hand,
petitioner asserts that private respondents were employees of ACGI, an independent
contractor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ACGI is Labor-only contracting and therefore, respondents are
employees of petitioner.
HELD:
YES. ACGI is Labor-Only contractor.
First, ACGI does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials, to qualify as an
independent contractor. While it has an authorized capital stock of P1,000,000.00, only
P62,500.00 is actually paid-in, which cannot be considered substantial capitalization.
Second, the work of the private respondents was directly related to the principal
business or operation of the petitioner. The collection of the charges therefore by private
respondents for the petitioner can only be categorized as clearly related to, and in the
pursuit of the petitioners business.
Lastly, ACGI did not carry on an independent business or undertake the
performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from
the control and supervision of its principal, petitioner. Prior to private respondents
alleged employment with ACGI, they were already working for petitioner, subject to its
rules and regulations in regard to the manner and method of performing their tasks. This
form of control and supervision never changed although they were already under the
seeming employ of ACGI.
In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship
for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is
considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the

employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed
by the principal employer. Since ACGI is only a labor-only contractor, the workers it
supplied should be considered as employees of the petitioner.
San Miguel Corporation vs. MAERC Integrated Services, Inc
G.R. No. 144672. July 10, 2003
Bellosillo, J.:
FACTS:
291 workers filed complaints against San Miguel Corporation and Maerc
Integrated Services, Inc. for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
service incentive leave pays and other labor standards benefits, and for separation pays
from 25 June to 24 October 1991. The complainants alleged that they were hired by
SMC through its agent or intermediary Maerc. They were paid on a per piece or pakiao
basis except for a few who worked as checkers and were paid on daily wage basis.
SMC denied liability for the claims and averred that the complainants were not its
employees but of MAERC. When the service contract was terminated, complainants
claimed that SMC stopped them from performing their jobs; that this was tantamount to
their being illegally dismissed by SMC who was their real employer; and, that MAERC
was merely made a tool or a shield by SMC to avoid its liability under the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MAERC is labor-only Contractor.
HELD:
YES. MAERC is labor-only contractor, hence, complainants are employees of
SMC.
In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship
for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is
considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the
employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed
by the principal employer. The principal employer therefore becomes solidarily liable with
the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees.
This distinction between job contractor and labor-only contractor, however, will
not discharge SMC from paying the separation benefits of the workers, inasmuch as
MAERC was shown to be a labor-only contractor; in which case, petitioner's liability is
that of a direct employer and thus solidarily liable with MAERC. Maerc Integrated
Services, Inc. is declared to be a labor-only contractor.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. BENAMIRA
G.R. No. 145271, July 14, 2005
Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS: Complainant-private respondents Rogelio Benamira and others were security

guards stationed at the head office of petitioner Manila Electric Company. They were
under People's Security, Inc. (PSI). When the contract between Meralco and PSI
terminated, Benamira and seven others filed a complaint for unpaid monetary benefits
against PSI and Meralco.
While the case was ongoing, Meralco entered into another agreement with respondent
company Armed Security & Detective Agency, Inc., (ASDAI), who absorbed Benamira
and others.
Later on, the Labor Arbiter ruled in the complaint in favor of the former PSI security
guards. Less than a month later, the individual respondents filed another complaint for
unpaid monetary benefits, this time against ASDAI and Meralco.
For a third time, Meralco entered into a security service agreement with Advance Forces
Security & Investigation Services, Inc. (AFSISI) which terminated the agreement with
ASDAI. To this, Benamira and others impleaded AFSISI in their complaint, but later on,
AFSISI was found not liable.
In respondent's complaint, they allege, on one hand, that Meralco and ASDAI never paid
their overtime pay and premium pays. Benamira was no longer given any work
assignment, while the rest, even if absorbed, were not given any either. All of them
allege dismissal from service without just cause. On the other, petitioner Meralco denied
liability on the ground of lack of employer-employee relationship with individual
respondents.
The Labor Arbiter held ASDAI and Meralco liable to pay the monetary claims of
individual respondents. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the LA's
decision. The Court of Appeals vacated the NLRC ruling by declaring Meralco as the
direct employer of the respondents after applying the four-fold test.
Meralco now insists that ASDAI and AFSISI are not labor-only contractors because they
are well-equipped and capitalized and that security guards are not necessary in their
nature of business, which is electricity distribution. Hence, the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not ASDAI is a labor-only contractor.
2. Whether or not Meralco is an indirect employer.

HELD: 1. The Court ruled in the negative. ASDAI is an independent contractor; hence,
the respondent's employers. Under the security service agreement, it was ASDAI which
hired and discharged the security guards; assigned them to MERALCO; provided
uniform, firearms and ammunition, among others; paid them salaries; and, disciplined,
supervised, and replaced them. Service-oriented enterprises, such security services
business, generally follows the "customer/client is always right" rule and, thus, must

satisfy the interests, conform to the needs, and cater to the reasonable impositions of its
clients.

ASDAI is not a labor-only contractor. The independent contracting is present if the

following conditions are met: (a) the contractor carries on an independent business and
undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according
to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or
principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the result
thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in the
conduct of his business. Given the above distinction and the provisions of the security
service agreements entered into by petitioner with ASDAI and AFSISI, the Court ruled
that ASDAI and AFSISI were engaged in job contracting.

2. The Court ruled in the affirmative. When Meralco contracted for security services with
ASDAI as the security agency that hired individual respondents to work for Meralco,
petitioner became an indirect employer of individual respondents pursuant to Article 107
of the Labor Code. Hence, it is jointly and severally liable to pay under Arts. 106 and
109. However, the solidary liability of Meralco with that of ASDAI does not preclude the
application of Article 1217 of the Civil Code on the right of reimbursement from his codebtor by the one who paid.
Zialcita, et al. v. Philippine Air Lines
Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977
FACTS:
Complainant Zialcita, an international flight stewardess of Philippine Airlines (PAL), was
discharged from the service on account of her marriage. PAL invoked its policy
stipulating that flight attendants will be automatically separated from employment in the
event they subsequently get married, which was alleged to be in conformity with Article
132 (d) of the Labor Code which allows the employer to determine appropriate minimum
age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as
those of flight attendants and the like.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PALs said policy is valid.
HELD:
No. Article 132 [now 130] enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will
ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by
regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for
termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is

precisely the factor that militates against the policy of PAL. The standards have not yet
been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor
issued any regulation affecting flight attendants. It is logical to presume that, in the
absence of said standards or regulations which are yet to be established, the policy of
respondent PAL against marriage is patently illegal.
OLYMPIA GUALBERTO vs. MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL CORP.
23 CAR 528 June 28, 1978
FACTS:
The company employed plaintiff Olympia Gualberto as a dentist in 1971 while
she was still single. She married Roberto, another employee (electrical engineer) of the
company, in 1972. The company informed her that she was regarded to have resigned
her office, invoking the firms policy that stipulated that female employees were regarded
to automatically terminate their employment the moment they got married. Olympia filed
a claim for compensation.
The Court of Appeals not only upheld her claim for damages but also awarded
exemplary damages, and held, inter alia: No employer may require female applicants for
jobs to enter into pre-employment arrangements that they would be dismissed once they
get married and afterwards expect the Courts to sustain such an agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer may terminate an employee by reason of marriage.
HELD:
No.
The Court made references to the Civil Code, the Woman and Child Labor Act and the
1935 Constitution of the Philippines. In light of this the Court further stated: The
agreement which the appellants want this Court to sustain on appeal is an example of
discriminatory chauvinism. Acts which deny equal employment opportunities to women
because of their sex are inherently odious and must be struck down.
**Pandagdag. The following is cited from another case Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company vs NLRC (G.R. No. 118978)
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm
to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the
moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further
claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that
her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the
employer as an example of discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal
employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court

struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code,
Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Case No. 4
DELFIN G. VILLARAMA vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
GOLDEN DONUTS, INC.
G.R. No. 106341 September 2, 1994
Ponente: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Delfin Villarama was employed by private respondent GOLDEN
DONUTS, INC., as its Materials Manager. Villarama was charged with sexual
harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerk-typist assigned in his department. The
humiliating experience compelled her to resign from work.This prompted Mr. Leopoldo
Prieto, President of Golden Donuts, Inc., to call Villarama to a meeting, where Villarama
agreed to tender his resignation. Golden Donuts moved swiftly to separate petitioner - it
approved petitioner's application for leave of absence with pay and issued an inter-office
memorandum advising all concerned that Villarama was no longer connected with the
company. Later on, however Villarama reneged on the agreement. Still, Golden Donuts
terminated Villarama prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. The
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of Villarama holding that due process was not
observed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was valid cause to terminate petitioner.
HELD:
Yes. Loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial
employee. It can be proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at
bench.
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics.
He failed to live up to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his
moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate,
he provides justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the
right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from over sexed
superiors.
To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the
employment of managerial employees on the ground of lack of trust and confidence.

Libres vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123737, May 28, 1999

Bellosillo, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position
with National Steel Corporation (NSC). He received a Notice of Investigation from
Assistant VP Isidro F. Hynson Jr., his immediate superior, requesting him to submit a
written explanation relative to the charge of sexual harassment made by Susan D.
Capiral, Hynsons secretary, allegedly committed by Libres. The notice also warned him
that failure to file his written explanation would be construed as a waiver of his right to be
heard. Petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him
and offering to submit himself for clarificatory interrogation. Hynson conducted an
internal investigation to which both parties ventilated their sides and the report was
submitted to the Management Evaluation Committee (MEC). MEC concluded that
petitioners acts clearly constituted sexual harassment as charged and recommended
petitioners suspension for thirty (30) days without pay.
Libres filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unjust discrimination against
respondent NSC on ground that MEC failed to grant him audience despite his offer to
answer clarificatory questions, and that he was denied due process since his request for
personal was denied by MEC.
Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan however ruled that due process was properly
observed and that there was a positive finding of sexual harassment to justify petitioners
suspension. Hence the present petition wherein Libres primarily disputes the failure of
the NLRC to apply RA No. 7877,in determining whether he actually committed sexual
harassment. He asserts that his acts did not fall within the definition and criteria of
sexual harassment as laid down in Sec. 3 of the law.
ISSUE: WHETHER LIBRES WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS
RULING: YES, Libres was accorded due process.
With respect to the issue of not applying RA 7877, the Court emphasized that said law
was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act complained of. It was still
being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioners case was decided by the
Labor Arbiter. As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided,
or except in a criminal case when their application will favor the accused. Hence, the
Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual
harassment as it is generally understood by the public. Faced with the same
predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter.
On the question of due process- Requirements were sufficiently complied with. Due
process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial
type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.

It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the
charge of sexual harassment as well as advising him to submit a written explanation
regarding the matter; that he submitted his written explanation to his superior. The VP
further allowed him to air his grievance in a private session where he was given more
than adequate opportunity to explain his side and air his grievances.
Personal confrontation was not necessary. As held in Homeowners v NLRC (1996),
litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers,
memoranda or oral arguments.
Petition is denied.
Domingo vs Rayala
GR No. 155831; February 18, 2008
Ponente: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a complaint for
sexual harassment against NLRC Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala before DOLE Secretary
Bienvenido Laguesma. According to Domingo, Rayala was [h]olding and squeezing
Domingos shoulders; running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear; having
inappropriate conversations with her; giving her money allegedly for school expenses
with a promise of future privileges; and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones.
The complaint was then referred to the Office of the President (OP), Rayala being a
presidential appointee. The OP ordered Sec. Laguesma to create a committee to
investigate the allegations in the complaint. Thereafter, Sec. Laguesma issued an
administrative order creating a Committee on Decorum and Investigation in accordance
with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The Committee
found Rayala guilty as charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum
penalty provided under the administrative order, which it erroneously stated as
suspension for six (6) months (the correct penalty being 6months and 1 day). Upon
receipt of the decision of the Committee, the OP ordered instead the dismissal of Rayala
from service.
Thus, Rayala appealed. The Court of Appeals likewise found him guilty of sexual
harassment and imposed the penalty of dismissal for violation of RA 6713, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Rayala filed a motion
for reconsideration. The CA modified the penalty to suspension from service for a
maximum of one year.
Hence this petition separately filed by Rayala and Domingo. Rayala insists that acts do
not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that
there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her
continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.
ISSUE:
WoN Rayala is guilty of sexual harassment.

HELD:
YES.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the
wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. This
rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The CA correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined solely on the
basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not
the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA
7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a
"demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for
Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee,
the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last
incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.

Case No. 7
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. VS CASTANEDA
G.R. NOS. 169295-96, NOVEMBER 20, 2006
PUNO, J.:
Facts:
Erlinda started working as a company cook for Remington, a corporation engaged in a
trading business. Erlinda worked six days a week as early as 6 am and would end at
5:30 pm , or even later after most of the employees had left the company premises. She
continuously worked at Remington until she was prevented from reporting work when
Remington transferred to a new site. Erlinda believed she was illegally dismissed. For
this, she filed a complaint against Remington. Remington denied that Erlinda was
dismissed illegally. Remington argued that Erlinda was a domestic helper not a regular
employer. The labor dismissed the complaint and ruled that respondent a domestic
helper under the personal service of Tan.
Issue:
W/N Erlinda is the petitioners domestic helper
Held:
No. The Court upheld the ruling of the NLRC that respondent was a regular employee of

the petitioner since the former worked at the companys premises and catered not only
to the personal comfort and enjoyment of Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of
employees of the latter. The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family
of the employer in the home of said employer. xxx In the case at bar, the petitioner itself
admits in its position paper that respondent worked at the company premises and her
duty was to cook and prepare its employees lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as
well as the nature of respondents work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of
Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of petitioners employees, makes her fall squarely
within the definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex
Mining case. That she works within the company premises, and that she does not cater
exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence
of the petitioners right of control over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.

CASE NO. 8
CHUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 125837, OCTOBER 6, 2004
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the SSS for SSS coverage and contributions against
petitioner Chua, the owner of Prime Mover Construction Development. They claim that
they were all regular employees of the petitioner in his construction business. Private
respondents further alleged that petitioner did not report them to the SS for compulsory
coverage in flagrant violation of the Social Security Act. They also claim that they were
assigned by petitioner in his various construction projects.
ISSUE:
W/N private respondents are regular employees of the petitioner thus, entitled to SSS
benefits
HELD:
Yes. The Social Security Act was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable
to the needs of the laborers throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. It provides for compulsory
coverage of all employees not over sixty years of age and their employers. xxx Wellsettled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, is
premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship xxx There is no dispute
that private respondents were employees of petitioner. xxx There rule is in accord with
the Courts ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp.vs. SSS to the effect that all employees,
regardless of tenure, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS, except those
classes of employees contemplated in Section 8 (j) of the Social Security Act.

Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. Social Security System

G.R. No. L-20088; January 22, 1966
Bengzon, J.P., J.
FACTS:
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (Lusteveco), a domestic corporation with principal office
in Manila, is engaged in the business of stevedoring, lightering and towering in the cities
of Iloilo and Bacolod under the trade name of Visayan Stevedore Transportation
Company. It owns, maintains and operates towboats, barges and a drydock. It carried in
its payrolls temporary employees. The Consolidated Union of the Philippines, Trade
Union of Central Philippines, Union de Marinos de Iloilo, Vistranco Employees
Association and Lustevo requested the Social Security Commission for the exemption of
the aforementioned temporary employees from compulsory coverage of the Social
Security Act (R.A. 1161) on the ground that they "work only intermittently and are not in a
position to maintain membership in the Social Security System long enough to be fully
entitled to the law's sickness, disability, death and retirement benefits". However, the
Social Security Commission denied the request.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said temporary and casual employees come within the compulsory
coverage of the Social Security Act.
HELD:
Yes. It is not entirely correct to say that the employees in question cannot possibly be
entitled to social security benefits by reason of their temporary employment. From the
moment an employee is reported for membership, he is entitled to death and disability
benefits pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 1161, as amended. The number of
monthly contributions mentioned in said section is not a prerequisite to the enjoyment of
death or disability benefits but is merely a basis in determining the amount of benefit to
be paid. In the case of sickness and retirement benefits, an employee member may
enjoy said benefits provided he accumulates to his credit twelve and one-hundred twenty
months contributions, respectively. It is not an impossibility for the employees in question
to reach the minimum number of monthly contributions simply because their employment
is temporary and intermittent. For nowhere in the law is it required that the monthly
contributions be in the same amount, consecutive or derived from the same employer.
The coverage in the Social Security System of the employees in question, temporary
though their employment may be, is in line with the declared policy of Congress to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable
to the needs of the laborers throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. Adherence to such policy
would strongly militate in favor of the coverage of such temporary employees for, more
than their brothers who are regularly and permanently employed, they are exposed to
the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. More often than not, they are
hapless and defenseless victims of these hazards. Social justice demands that "they
who have less in life should be given more in law".

#10
Sta. Rita vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119891; August 21,1995
Ponente: Feliciano, J.
Facts:
Petitioner St. rita, the President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc, was
charged in the RTC with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161,otherwise known as the
Social Security Law.It was alleged that Sta. Rita refused to remit the Social Security
System contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees Compensation for its covered
employees.Sta. Rita moved to dismiss the case to which the RTC granted.It ruled that
the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the DOLE and SSS extending the
coverage of Social Security, Medical Care and Employment Compensation laws to
Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels was null and void as it was entered into by
the Administrator of the SSS without the sanction of the Commission and approval of the
President of the Philippines, in contravention of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as
amended.
The People filed in the CA for the reinstatement of the criminal case and the respondent
court granted the petition.On the other hand,petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the
Filipino seafarers recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on board foreign vessels
outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8
(j) (5) thereof.
Issues:
1.WON the Memorandum of Agreement between DOLE and SSS is valid.
2. WON the seafarers are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No.1161 under
Section 8 (j)(5)
Held:
1. YES.Respondent appellate court correctly upheld the validity of the
Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the DOLE and the SSS.The
Memorandum of Agreement is not a rule or regulation enacted by the Commission in the
exercise of the latter's quasi-legislative authority Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161,
as amended, which reads as follows:To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the
approval of the President, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions and purposes of this Act.The Memorandum is not subject to the approval
of the President.What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the
understanding between the SSS on the one hand and the DOLE on the other hand that
the latter would include among the provisions of the Standard Contract of Employment

required in case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing for coverage of the

Filipino seafarer by the SSS.
2. NO.Section 8 (j) (5) simply defines the term "employment" and does not in any
way relate to the scope of coverage of the Social Security System.That coverage is,
upon the other hand, set out in Section 9 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended, which defines
the scope of SSS coverage in the following terms:Fillpinos recruited in the Philippines
by foreign employers for employment abroad may be covered by the SSS on a voluntary
basis.Moreover, the extension of the coverage of the Social Security System to Filipino
seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the contract of employment signed by
employer and seafarer; that same contract binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita
Company, who is solidarily liable with the foreign shipowners/employers.
11. HINOGUIN vs ECC and GSIS
G.R. No. 84307
April 17, 1989
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review against the Decision of the ECC which affirmed the GSIS in
denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's
son, Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin.
Sgt. Hinoguin started military service in 1974 until at the time of his death on August 7, 1985.
On August 1, he and 2 members, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog, of his Detachment in Nueva
Ecija sought permission to go on an overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya to settle an
important matter. They arrived at Nueva Viscaya on the same day, had lunch at Alibuyog's
home, and proceeded to consume alcohol from 4pm to 7pm. Until then, they left to return to
their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle cab to their place of destination,
Hinoguin was sitting with Clavo inside the Cab while Alibuyog sat at the seat behind the
driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Alibuyog dismounted, holding his M-16 rifle in
his right hand, and not noticing the safety lever was on semi automatic. He accidentally
touched the trigger, firing a single shot and hitting Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the
left lower abdomen. The Sergeant was rushed to a hospital for treatment and later on
transferred to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City where he died on August 7.
In March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits, claiming that the death of
his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This was denied by the GSIS on
the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a solder
at the time of his death. It stated that under the law, death resulting form injury is considered
compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. In the case beforehand, Sgt.
Hinoguin was merely on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot
by his companion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Sgt. Hinoguin is compensable
HELD:
Yes.

Article 167(k) of the Labor Code defines a compensable injury as any harmful change in the
human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. The
Amended Implementing Rules elaborated on the provision stating to include those injuries
sustained elsewhere when the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer. As a soldier on active duty status, a work place cannot be referred to as if he were
a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is
stationed. Aritao, Nueva. Viscaya was not where he was stationed, and it appears to us that
they have secured lawful permission to be at a place cannot be very different, legally
speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officers. The
three were in an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. Further, they were
not on vacation leave and were required or authorized to carry firearms.
In regard to whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he sustained
the gunshot wound, it is to be noted that a soldier is on active duty status on 24 hours a day.
He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week,
except, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, the work-connected character of the injury
and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an
overnight pass and therefore did not effectively cease performing "official functions." Indeed,
it appears that a soldier should be presumed on official duty unless he is shown to have
clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily.
12. NITURA vs ECC and GSIS
G.R. No. 89217
September 4, 1991
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorary against the Decision of ECC which affirmed the
GSIS in denying the claim of death benefits on account of the death of her son, Pfc. Regino
Nitura.
Pfc. Nitura started his military service on October 5 1978 until at the time of his death on
March 3 1986. In the evening of March 2, 1986, he was instructed to go to Brgy. San Jose,
Dipolog City to check on several personnel of the Command who were then attending a
dance party. On his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging
wooden bridge. His head hit the stony portion of the ground and he died due to hemorrhage
due to the severe concussion of the brain due to accidental fall.
Petitioner Juanita Nitura filed to claim for death benefits but was denied on the ground that
the resulting death must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment. Such has not been satisfied in this case. Further, ECC reasoned out that the
deceased was not at his place of work nor was he performing his official function as member
of the Philippine Army when the incident occurred. Additionally, he acted with notorious
negligence, for although he was already intoxicated, he still proceeded to attend the dance
party at a nearby barrio with full knowledge that it would be dangers to cross the hanging
bridge in the dark.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Pfc. Nitura is compensable
HELD:
Yes.
While his Battalion Commander attested to the fact that the deceased was instructed to
check on several personnel of the command then attending the dance party, he failed to
state in his affidavit the reason why the deceased was given such instruction. Such is fatal as
it cannot be determined if the instruction was indeed official and had something to do with his
duties as a soldier.
In light of the facts and in resolving this issue, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor
of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis
in the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives
meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law embodied in Article 4 of the
New Labor Code.
To justify compensability, the concept of a work place cannot be literally applied to a soldier
in active duty status as if he were a clerk in a particular fixed office. A soldier must go where
his company is stationed. Although he was in another place at the time of his death than
where he should be stationed, he was carrying out a directive from his superior which
necessitates the passing of a hanging bridge connecting the two places. As held in the
Hinoguin case, a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be
very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their
commanding officer.
With regard to the contention that the deceased acted with notorious negligence for
intoxicated at the time, it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness to show that
said person was extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as much several
bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still remain sober and unnafected. Thus,
intoxication does not necessarily incapacitate the employee from following his occupation. It
must be shown that intoxication was the proximate cause of death.

BELARMINO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Facts: Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education
Culture and Sports assigned at the Burucan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate
for 11 years. On January 14, 1982, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of
pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. She complained of
abdominal pain and stomach cramps but she continued reporting for work because there
was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, she went into labor and prematurely
delivered a baby girl at home. Her abdominal pain persisted even after delivery. When
she was brought to the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from
septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina .After she was

discharged from the hospital, she died three days thereafter. The GSIS denied the claim
on the ground that septicemia post partum, the cause of death is an occupational
disease and neither was there any showing that the ailment was contracted by reason of
her employment. On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, latter also
denied the claim affirming the denial of the claim by GSIS.
Issue: Whether or not the cause death of Mrs. Belarmino is work-related and therefore
compensable.
Held: The court ruled that the death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is
compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment
contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs.
Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of
recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her
pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about
her premature delivery which caused the development of postpartum septicemia which
resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate cause that set in motion an
unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. The right to compensation extends to
disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from
a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of
the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable
to claimants own negligence or misconduct. Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury
that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the
medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature
delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death are compensable

LAZO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Facts: Salvador Lazo is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines. His shift
is usually from 2:00 PM to 10:00 PM. On June 18, 1986, the security guard who was to
relieve him failed to arrive. Lazo rendered overtime duty up to 5:00AM the following day.
With the permission from his superior, Lazo left early in order to take home his sack of
rice. On his way home, the jeepney that he was riding on turned turtle due to
theslipperyroad. Lazo sustained injuries and for which he seeks compensation. The
GSIS denied the claim on the ground that Lazo was not at his place of work when the
incident occurred. This denial of claim was affirmed by ECC.
Issue: Whether or not the injuries sustained by Lazo due to the vehicular accident on his
way home from work should be construed as arising out of or in the course of
employment and thus compensable.
Held: The court ruled that employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but
a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the
place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employers premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in
practical effect a part of the employers premises, the injury is one arising out of and in
the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee
was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. It can be seen that petitioner
left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the
reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to

leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated
from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance
before reaching or after leaving the employers premises. While the presumption of
compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act may
have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of
the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. This kind of interpretation
gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in
Article 4 of the Labor Code. The policy then is to extend the applicability of the Labor
Code to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.

16. ZAIDA G. RARO vs. ECC

G.R. No. L-58445; April 27, 1989
GUTIERREZ, JR., J
FACTS: The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk
by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office.
About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches
coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she
sought medical treatment in Manila.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain
tumor.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation
Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.
Petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because
the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state
that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable
because the law says so.
ISSUE: Whether or not brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during
employment is compensable under the present compensation laws
HELD: NO. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly
induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation or cigarette smoke over a long
period for lung cancer, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of
contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing the illness was
caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are
inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is
endangered.

[PS: hindi nakarecover si raro kasi walang proof na nipresent kasi nagrely lang siya sa
presumption of compensation if no proof is given.]

17. CARMEN SANTOS vs. ECC

G.R. No. 89222; April 7, 1993.
Nocon, J.
FACTS: Francisco Santos was employed as welder at the Philippine Navy and its Naval
Shipyard in 1955. He spent the last 32 years of his life in the government service, the
first year as a welder helper and the last two years as shipyard assistant.
In 1986, Francisco was admitted at the Naval Station Hospital in Cavite City, on
complaint that he was having epigastric pain and been vomiting blood 2 days prior. His
case was diagnosed as bleeding Peptic Ulcer disease (PUD), cholelithiasis and diabetes
mellitus. In 1987, he died, the cause of which was liver cirrhosis.
Carmen A. Santos filed a claim for the death benefit of her husband, Francisco. .
However the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denied the claim on the
ground that upon proofs and evidence submitted, Francisco's ailment cannot be
considered an occupational disease.
On appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), the Commission
affirmed the denial of the GSIS on petitioner's claim relying on the fact that the diagnosis
on Francisco's illness did not specify the type of cirrhosis which caused his death.
Nevertheless, the Commission took cognizant of the fact that the deceased employee
did not have a previous history of alcoholism, hepatitis or a previous history of biliary
condition which could give a clue to the nature of cirrhosis he had.
ISSUE: Whether or not liver cirrhosis is compensable
HELD: YES. For sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable,
the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions
set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. Cirrhosis of the liver is not listed as an occupational
disease.
As a welder, Francisco was exposed to heat, gas fumes and chemical substances
coming from the burning electrodes caused by welding. Generally, the metal burned is
iron. These vaporized metals are inhaled by the welder in the process and significantly in
this case, Francisco had to do welding jobs within enclosed compartments.
Research shows that ingestion or inhalation of small amounts of iron over a number of
years may lead to siderosis. Acute poisoning brings about circulatory collapse which
may occur rapidly or be delayed to 48 hours with liver failure. These are industrial
hazards to which Francisco was exposed. And in the long course of time, 32 years at

that, his continuous exposure to burned electrodes and chemicals emitted therefrom
would likely cause poisoning and malfunction of the liver.

18. NEMERIA V EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GSIS

GR No. L-57889; October 28, 1987
Paras, J.
Facts:
Rosario Nemaria was appointed classroom teacher in November 1948, first in the
poblacion of Badian, Cebu and later transferred to municipality of Ronda, Cebu. From
September 8-25, 1978, Nemaria was confined at the Southern Islands Hospital, Cebu
City, for on and off severe abdominal pains, anorexia, weight loss and jaundice,
indicative of the cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast. These
ailments did not respond to medications and she died on October 16, 1978 at the age of
58. The service record of the decedent shows that she rendered government service for
about thirty years. Alleging that the cause of his wifes death was due to her
employment, filed with GSIS a claim for death benefits under PD 626 but GSIS denied
the claim, which was affirmed by ECC.
Issue:
W/N Rosario Nemarias death is compensable under PD 626?
Held:
Yes. The decedent, a public school teacher assigned in a municipality several kilometres
away from the provincial capital, rendered her services for more or less 29 years. The
possibility would not be remote, that she suffered impaired nutrition and while working in
a farflung rural area where foodstuffs are not closely examined before being eaten, it is
not too far-fetched to consider that she was exposed to hepatic carcinogens which
reportedly were ingested therein.
Corollary thereto, it is undisputed that the deceased was in good health when she
entered the government service, otherwise, she would not have been accepted for
insurance purposes by the GSIS. The conclusion is therefore inevitable, that the
decedents ailments developed during her employment while working under conditions
which predisposed her thereto.
The Labor Code is clear that it does not only confine compensable diseases to those
enumerated therein as occupational. It also contemplates illness caused by employment
where the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions thereof.
The Court has ruled that the cancer of the liver though not an occupational disease, may
be deemed work-connected. Moreover, in Abana v Quisumbing, the Court held that
under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in thr growth
development or acceleration of the claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits
provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed even in a small degree.
Thus the measurement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment
or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where
the cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, not duty to prove the link exists. For
certainly, the law cannot demand impossibility.

19. MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. & SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD. V
NLRC
GR No. 94167; January 21, 1991
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services,
Inc. (MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard
the M/V Harmony I for a period of one year. He reported for duty aboard the vessel on
July 13, 1987.
On January 16, 1988 at about 3pm, while the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona
Pier, Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from the shore leave visibly
drunk. He went to the messhall and took a fire axe and challenged thise eating therein.
He was pacified by his shipmates who led him to his cabin. However, later he went out of
his cabin and proceeded to the messhall. He became violent. He smashed and threw a
cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating. Ero touched his
head and notice blood. This infuriated Ero which led to a fight between the two. After the
shipmates broke the fight, Sentina was taken to the hospital where he passed away on
January 17, 1968. Ero was arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus.
Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the POEA for the payment
of death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with
damages.
Issue:
Is the employer exempted from liability in a case of an employee who ran amuck or who
in a state of intoxication provoked a fight as a result of which he was killed?
Held:
Yes. The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not
automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as
well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and
seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and the
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability to pay
death benefits.
When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or wilful act on his own life,
and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No doubt a
case of suicide is covered by this provision.
By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran
amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the
latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the
seaman, the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a
deliberate and wilful act on his own life directly attributable to him. First he challenged
everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the messhall picked up and
broke a cap and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus sprovoked, the oiler
fought back. The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and
thus is not compensable.

Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino

G.R. No. L-43674
June 30, 1987
Facts:
On December 22, 1971, the vessel M/S Rajah owned by petitioner sank near Sabtan
Island, Batanes. Rolando G. Lim, a licensed second mate, was on board of the vessel.
His parents sued petitioner on the ground that Rolando's death was due to the
negligence of petitioner. In defense, petitioner argued that the parents had received Php
4,160 from petitioner and had signed release papers discharging petitioner from any
liability arising from the death of their son, and that they had already been compensated
by the Workmen's Compensation Commission for the same incident, for which reason
they are now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same employer under
the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation remedy under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by
an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies available under the Civil Code.
Held:
In the Floresca case, the Court held that the action is selective and the employee or his
heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under that WCA or of suing in
the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason
of his negligence. But once the selection has been exercised, the employee or his heirs
are no longer free to opt for the other remedy.
Respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the
WCC and had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA. Therefore, if
a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits
thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option.

Vicente vs. Employee's Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 85024
January 23, 1991
Facts:
Domingo Vicente was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the Veterans
Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City. At the age of forty-five and after having
rendered more than twenty-five years of government service, he applied for optional
retirement, giving as reason his inability to continue working as a result of his physical
disability. He also filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an
application for income benefits claim for payment, under PD No. 626, as amended.
The petitioner's application was granted but only for permanent partial disability
compensation or for a period of nineteen months. The petitioner requested the General
Manager of the GSIS to reconsider the award given him, but was subsequently denied.
The respondent Commission also argued that the petitioner only suffers from
"permanent partial disability" and not from permanent total disability.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner suffers from permanent total disability?

Held:
Yes. Under the Comments and Annotations on the Workmen's Compensation Act by
Severo M. Pucan and Cornelio R. Besinga, "total disability does not mean a state of
absolute helplessness, but means disablement of the employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work, or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for, or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do."
Permanent partial disability, on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use
of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with this
former work.
Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled,
under good behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement
application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment. For optional
retirement is allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already physically
incapacitated to render sound and efficient service.

LOTT VS. GSIS

GR NO. 86994; June 30,1993
ROMERO, J
FACTS: Petitioner, a lawyer, retired at age of 65 as Special Assistant in the Development
Bank of the Philippines on September 27, 1980. He started serving the government in
1939 as a clerk in the Bureau of Health and had a short stint as a military officer from
1941 to 1947, after which, he started working as a stenographer at the DBP.
Sometime in 1969, when he was branch manager of the DBP in Puerto Princesa, he
began complaining of headache and chest pain. He consulted physicians at the DBP but
he was referred to the St. Luke's Hospital where he was disposed as suffering from
hypertensive cardiovascular disease.
One year after his retirement in 1980, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for
compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Attached to his
claim was a certification from his attending physician at the United Doctors Medical
Center, Dr. Antonio F. Guytingco, stating that petitioner was suffering from
"arteriosclerotic hypertensive cardiovascular disease" and "left ventricular hypertrophy
by voltage criteria" and that his degree of disability was "permanent total."
GSIS considered him to have only partial permanent disability , and awarded him
medical benefits from September 1980 to March 1982 or for 19 months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner's disease is a permanent total disability
HELD: Total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or
totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that she cannot
pursue her usual work and earn therefrom . . . . It is not the injury which is compensated
but the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.

While we do not question the competence of GSIS physicians in determining the extent
of an employee's disability, yet we cannot close our eyes to the fact that these
physicians place more reliance on reports rather that on personal examination of an
employee. It must be conceded that the findings of the medical staff of the GSIS should
be given due weight.
Moreover, the ECC's contention that petitioner suppressed evidence by his failure to
present certifications of other physicians who attended to him during his hospitalization
at the Philippine General Hospital cannot adversely affect petitioner's rights under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the same manner, the strain and tension caused by managing a branch of a bank may
have aggravated petitioner's ailment, such that aggravation persisted even after he had
retired from the service. His longevity inspite of a debilitating ailment should not stand in
the way of his availment of the benefits provided for by the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Being a social legislation, said law should be liberally construed to attain its
objective of amelioration of workmens' plight to prevent them from becoming objects of
charity.