USSC2602 Essay Money In Primary Elections

440340195 Aidan Molins

The failure of the Republican establishment to present a deciding influence in the 2016
presidential primary election poses several questions about how various power influences the
outcomes of national electoral races. Notably, one must reassess the influence of soft and
hard money in presidential elections, since in the 2016 race, Jeb Bush and Marco Rubios lack
of support forced them to end their campaigns relatively early despite being two of the best
funded candidates. Is the influence of money on these campaigns null or is the influence of
money simply less direct than previously assumed? In a system where endorsements are often
the best predictors of a successful candidate, is the indecision of the party establishment to
blame? Or is the previous theory correct, but simply void in an election where the contingency
factor dearly privileges anti-establishment candidates? If money can only amplify messages
voters want to hear, Does this mean, therefore, that a Donald trump nomination indicates a
fundamental shift in party thought in the Republican voter base?

Conclusions about the influence of money on political outcomes in the US system are mixed.
John Samples, a Cato Institute supported scholar, drawing from the empirical data Frank J.
Sorauf and others, argues the overly simplistic notion that money buys elections or that
money buys legislative votes is entirely unfounded. (Samples, 2006: 89) If campaign donations
were part of an exchange for political outcomes, the amounts would be much higher- indeed,
most PACs never reach their donation limits. The amounts donated compared to the supposed
benefits received suggest that campaign donations are genuine political participation rather than
investments or bribes. Similarly, Sorauf himself identifies a diminishing returns from political
spending in elections, especially for incumbents. (Sorauf 1988: 303) Money in the political
system does not always align with success, and when it does, it is difficult to separate the
influence of money from the influence of grassroots organization and other contingency factors.

Indeed, this is mirrored in the results of the 2016 Republican presidential primary, where money
raised by campaigns and their aligned Super PACs did not translate into any significant voting
majorities for the two best funded candidates, Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio. However, this does
not mean campaign donations are only political participation and speech on the part of donorsSorauf concluded money has significant influence on the system, however that influence hinges
on contingency factors. (Sorauf 1988: 326) The analysis by Samples is a strawman argument in
that it only disproves the over simplistic model of election purchases and not the influence of
money in the broader system and accounting intersection with contingency factors.

A less direct theory seems more plausible- that the impact of money in presidential primaries is
through the invisible primary of endorsements from legislators which usually decide
nominations. The effect of money in presidential primary and general elections is not just
through the actual donations and PAC media buys themselves. The analysis of Samples, which
downplays the impact of donations on the system fails to take into account the outcomes of US
policymaking and its alignment with special interests. A 2014 study by Gilens and Page used
data from 1779 policy issues and compared outcomes with the preferences of business
interests, mass political movements, and other special interests. It found overwhelmingly that
legislative decisions in the house and senate were aligned with particularly an economic elite,
rather than other groups. (Gilens and Page 2014) Combined with this, the pro-campaignspending position ignores the material circumstances of legislators, who often spend hours daily
in designated fundraising call centers rather than communicating with constituents. (Grim and
Siddiqui 2016) The US legislative system is an ecosystem largely influenced by the needs and
desires of special interests. Primary elections especially are hugely influenced by the greater
surrounding political ecosystem in which they take place, an ecosystem which is in this case
infused with the interests of capital. Cohen, Karol, Noel & Zallers (henceforth Cohen) volume
The Party Decides looks to primaries since the 1970s reforms as a continuation of political

parties largely deciding the nominee, rather than public opinion per se. (Cohen, 2008: 7) In this
analysis of party decision-making, Cohen finds the internal alignment around a candidate to be
a party centered, rather than candidate centered process.
In other words, party leaders and legislators are the ones who are driving the success of
successful candidates rather than legislators being driven to endorse strong candidates to
maintain their position within the party. To support this, Cohen notes several cases where
stronger candidates in the traditional sense were out-endorsed by party favorites and went on to
win their nomination- these include George HW Bushs win over Jack Kemp in 1988, (Cohen
2008: 208) and George W Bushs win over John McCain in 2000 (ibid: 225). In both cases,
Kemp and McCain were broadly considered better candidates, from the perspective of the base
and from the media- and were both strong campaigners. However, with McCain, his lack of
insider support due to his maverick status gained from policies like campaign finance reform
and disapproval of senate pork made him unappealing to the establishment, and to their
fundraisers, like the National Rifle Association, whose power in government comes largely
through large donations to Republican candidates.
Thus, moneys involvement the invisible primary is twofold: party support gives successful
candidates key fundraisers, donors and fundraising resources in order to run a successful
primary race across key electoral battlegrounds, but it money is also a secondary influencer
through how party insiders choose their support in the first place. This is especially applicable in
the 2016 race. Presumptive nominee Donald Trump has gained status as an outsider due to his
recent membership in the GOP, and his brash political style. However, one could equally argue
the outsider status has arisen from unorthodox views on trade and commerce which would have
dissuaded potential house and senate backers. (Casselman 2016) Trumps image is probusiness, however his stances on issues like NAFTA and his highlighting of issues like
dwindling manufacturing jobs and the influence of the military industrial complex land him in

conflict with the interests that fund a large portion of congressional, senatorial, and gubernatorial
races.
Why, then, in the 2016 example, did the The Party Decides thesis not hold up? Cohen notes in
his introduction that historical exceptions to his thesis come when parties delay a decision
significantly, or never fully decide. (Cohen 2008: 5) A simple answer would be that indeed, the
party never fully decided on Bush, Rubio, or Kasich. It was clear early in the race that although
his fundraising efforts were impressive, Bush did not quite have the endorsements of previous
successful nominees, and the early primaries were largely won by Trumps substantial base as
the rest of the race was split remaining candidates. Leaving aside fringe, factional candidates
like Cruz and Trump, there is the question as to why the Republican base did not rally around
Bush, Rubio or Kasich as it did around McCain and Romney in previous elections. One answer
comes from David Karol whose work Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition
Management (Karol 2009) outlines processes of coalition expansion where parties shift issue
positions to expand their coalitions in order to gain favorability in upcoming elections, especially
with ungrouped issues (i.e. issues without major lobbies, unions, etc.) like in the 2016 election,
the immigration issue. The issue became important after Trumps controversial statements
around building a wall along the southern border brought the discussion to primary debates. The
establishment candidates had similar stances on the issue, which all included a legal path to
citizenship among illegal immigrants. Much of the base had seen immigration as a potential
issue to win over broadening minority demographics who are alienated by the hardline
Republican position. Rubio was forced into a stronger position on border control after he was
attacked from conservatives for his support for the bipartisan gang of eight bill, (Enten, 2016)
while Bush and Kasich maintained more compassionate, moderate views aimed at appealing to
the center. Here we see party change occurring as in Karols work, but occurring more at the
factional level rather than the party level. The establishment split among a moderate aim at the

center, and a fresh, revamped ideological conservative message from Rubio, a minority
candidate created a rift which made it impossible for the party to unite over Cruz and Trump.
Hence the substantial media budget amassed by Bush was insignificant considering micro
changes created heterogeneity within party base making rallying behind one candidate difficult.
Sorauf asserts campaign donations are of utmost importance to candidates, until they begin to
produce diminishing returns. This is because campaign advertising in the media is mainly used
for two reasons, to introduce candidates, their story, and solicit donations to the campaign.
(Devlin, 1994: 83) Once campaigns are well known, advertising becomes an inefficient way to
change the minds of decided voters or increase turnout. (Sorauf 1988: 203) Although
messaging in political advertising may appear complex, what is usually retained by audiences is
little more than an image and a name, which lasts about a week. In particular, 2016 was a year
where the MEH (minimally-effective-hypothesis) in television advertising purchases seemed to
be bolstered. The theory, which posits advertising has little influence over voting patterns,
especially closer to election days, was studied by The Economist magazine with regards to
2016 candidates in the Iowa caucus. ("A Bit MEH - Does Political Advertising Work?" 2016)
Indeed, successful candidates like Cruz, Trump and Clinton spent less on advertising than their
counterparts Sanders, Rubio and Bush who spent millions more to receive less votes. In
particular, the Bush campaign did particularly poorly in Iowa and successive states, and
dropped out after the South Carolina after winning only one delegate. If much of what is on offer
to be purchased from campaign funds is name recognition, it could not have been a beneficent
commodity in the atmosphere of the 2016 primary for Bush, whose name brings associations
with the relatively moderate, establishment politics of his family. In previous races identified in
The Party Decides, party support provided funds to amplify the establishment message over
that of the outsider. (Cohen, 2008: 6) However, in the 2016 race, it appears the message Bushs
support was amplifying wasnt one voters wanted to hear in the first place.

Similarly, if name recognition and basic association of campaign messaging is the main
commodity to be bought by candidates available funds, Trumps campaign bought that resource
with an alternative currency: media attention. Although not all of it has been positive, Trumps
campaign has made consistent efforts to dominate coverage in major media outlets, which
attempts to not necessarily create a positive public image, rather to cast a wide net, polarizing
the electorate to secure potential voters, many of which have not voted in Republican primaries
before. (Silver 2016) Data journalism website Fivethirtyeight rated the value of Trumps media
coverage from the beginning until mid-march at over $1.9 billion, compared to the $10 million
actually spent on campaign funds, a number putting him behind wildly unsuccessful candidates
like Kasich and Christie. (Silver 2016) Hence, Trumps results dont invalidate the need

for

campaign funds, in fact his campaign underperformed its polling several times in primaries due
to the lack of sufficient ground operations leading up to elections, which better funded
campaigns like Cruzs did better with. Trumps campaign simply found an alternate route to
success in outcomes like name recognition and message distribution which were previously
unavailable without significant funding for media buys.
Hence, notions that campaign finance is the determining factor in deciding US primary elections
is clearly simplistic and not supported by evidence. Rather, campaign finance is amplifying
factor which gives lesser known candidates name recognition and gives a brief opportunity for
candidates to associate a policy or image with their brand. Thus, it relies on candidates
alignment with contingent factors, since television spots are too short to convince already
decided voters. Moreover, it is only a means to an end. Media buys are unnecessary if the
media is providing the resources needed to succeed in the form of constant coverage. However,
an understated impact of money in primary elections is its secondary impact through
endorsement deals as senators, members of congress and governors determine the distribution
of campaign resources which often determine elections. Special interests, especially corporate

special interests, have significant influence in the process in determining the establishment
position on given issues which candidates must abide by or leave party orthodoxy and receive
lesser resources.

Bibiography
"A Bit MEH - Does Political Advertising Work?". 2016. The Economist.
Casselman, Ben. 2016. "Manufacturing Jobs Are Never Coming Back". Fivethirtyeight.
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/manufacturing-jobs-are-never-coming-back/.
Cohen, Marty. 2008. The Party Decides. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Devlin, L. Patrick. 1994. "Television Advertising In The 1992 New Hampshire Presidential
Primary Election". Political Communication 11 (1): 81-99. doi:10.1080/10584609.1994.9963012.
Enten, Harry. 2016. "Why ArenT Republican Leaders Rallying Behind Marco
Rubio?".Fivethirtyeight. http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-arent-republican-leaders-rallyingbehind-marco-rubio/.
Gilens, Martin and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. "Testing Theories Of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, And Average Citizens". Perspect. Polit. 12 (03): 564-581.
doi:10.1017/s1537592714001595.
Grim, Ryan and Sabrina Siddiqui. 2016. "Call Time For Congress Shows How Fundraising
Dominates Bleak Work Life". The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/calltime-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291.html?section=australia.
Karol, David. 2009. Party Position Change In American Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Samples, John Curtis. 2006. The Fallacy Of Campaign Finance Reform. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Silver, Nate. 2016. "How Trump Hacked The Media". Fivethirtyeight.
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-donald-trump-hacked-the-media/.
Silver, Nate. 2015. "Donald Trump Is Running A Perpetual Attention Machine". Fivethirtyeight.
http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/donald-trump-is-running-a-perpetual-attention-machine/.
Sorauf, Frank J. 1988. Money In American Elections. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman/Little,
Brown College Division.