Consti Law Review Digest 1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST 1
1. PEOPLE V.
PERFECTO
2. MACARIOLA V.
ASUNCION
3. MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL V. GSIS
4. CHAVEZ V.
JUDICIAL & BAR
COUNCIL
5. PERFECTO V.
MEER
6. ENDENCIA V.
DAVID
7. NITAFAN V. CIR
8. REPUBLIC V. SB
9. AQUINO, JR. V.
ENRILE
10.
JAVELLANA
V. EXEC.
SECRETARY
11.
OCCENA V.
COMELEC
12.
PHIL. BAR
ASSOC. V.
COMELEC
13.
LAWYERS
LEAGUE FOR A
BETTER
PHILIPPINES V.
AQUINO
14.
IN RE:
BERMUDEZ
15.
IN RE:
LETTER OF
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE PUNO OF
THE CA
16.
DE LEON V.
ESGUERRA
17.
GONZALES
V. COMELEC
18.
DEFENSORSANTIAGO V.
COMELEC
19.
LAMBINO V.
COMELEC
1.PEOPLE V PERFECTO
G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
FACTS:
The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an
investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence,
the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force
and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of
the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor
its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty
over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision
of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of
the SPC to be political in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its
inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that it is a general principle of the public
law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated.Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer
in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was
acquitted.
2. MACARIOLA V ASUNCION
114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
Facts:
When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias
B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack
of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in
an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant
Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot
according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the
plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as
Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion
of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses
Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge
Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case
No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge"
alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E
violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code
of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a
decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia
Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated

March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.
Issue:
Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil
Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation
during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming
of a judge"?
Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an
"act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private
and business activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only
to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963
was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation.
Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased
Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.
3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on
from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must
be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty,
the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of
the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly reenacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or
affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code
of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019
because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had
obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their
immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that
their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
3.MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
I.THE FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS
sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares atP41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares atP44.00 per share, orP2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to
allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First
Policyenshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,which
provides that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.
II.THE ISSUES
1.Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it
into effect;
2.Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation;

3.Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to
implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4.Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
III.THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1.YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it
into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,
the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions.
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second
par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If
the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully
owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, thena fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It isper sejudicially
enforceable.When our Constitution mandates that[i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos,it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by

its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2.YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form
part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the termpatrimonypertains to
heritage.When the Constitution speaks ofnational patrimony,it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the termnatural resources, but also to thecultural heritageof the Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that theFilipino First
Policyprovision is not applicablesince what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
3.YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to
implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out
with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a state action.In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1)
when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but
also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed
of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a

constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.
4.YES, GSISshould give preference to the petitioner in the sale of
the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
theFilipino First Policyprovision of the Constitution bestows preference onqualified
Filipinosthe mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest
bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound
to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by
the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that[i]f for any reasonthe
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself isreason enoughnot to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of astrongerreasonthan the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to theFilipino First
Policyprovision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.
4.CHAVEZ V JBC
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the
vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas
departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme

Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the
Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as
two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House
of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a
vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the
National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive
with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional
Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral
legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding
adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of
Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of
representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing
balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most
likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
presidential appointees. Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the
case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but
for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter
and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle
of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section
8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of
Congress, the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress
is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what
the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that
more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words
in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to
each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the
statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a
singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look
into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable
from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from
the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of
the records of Constitutional Commission, held that Congress, in the context of
JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are
still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by
the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have
more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak,
whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle
of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one
whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the
JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of
the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which
all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate
the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the
government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play
under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section
8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately
executory.

5.PERFECTO V MEER
Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year
1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court
of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation
of the Constitution.
Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution
thereof?
Held:
Yes. Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the
Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the
O'Malley case is not relevant. As in the United States during the second period, we
must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the
Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to
wit:
First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable
"income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must
be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine
Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of
the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on
judicial salaries really impairs them.
Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as
may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office." It also provides that "until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not
"provided otherwise", by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received
salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay
taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the
corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on
incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the
tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their
official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the

fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not
perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The
undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges
personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or
executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the compensation of the
judges "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office"? Is it primarily to
benefit the judges, or rather to promote the public weal by giving them that
independence which makes for an impartial and courageous discharge of the
judicial function? Does the provision merely forbid direct diminution, such as
expressly reducing the compensation from a greater to a less sum per year, and
thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet effective, diminution, such as
withholding or calling back a part as tax on the whole? Or does it mean that the
judge shall have a sure and continuing right to the compensation, whereon he
confidently may rely for his support during his continuance in office, so that he need
have no apprehension lest his situation in this regard may be changed to his
disadvantage?
The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of
liberty and justice would be assured by vesting the three powers the legislative,
the executive, and the judicial in separate departments, each relatively
independent of the others and it was recognized that without this independence
if it was not made both real and enduring the separation would fail of its purpose.
all agreed that restraints and checks must be imposed to secure the requisite
measure of independence; for otherwise the legislative department, inherently the
strongest, might encroach on or even come to dominate the others, and the judicial,
naturally the weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the other two, especially by the
legislative.
These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that the primary purpose of
the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause
in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench, and to
promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the
maintenance of the guaranties, limitations, and pervading principles of the
constitution, and to the admiration of justice without respect to persons, and with
equal concern for the poor and the rich.
Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing them
together, the logical conclusion may be reached that although Congress may validly
declare by law that salaries of judges appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income
(O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those judges already in
office at the time of such declaration because such taxation would diminish their

salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing
principle that will harmonize the allegedly discordant decision may be condensed.
In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of the United States decided
that by taxing the salary of a federal judge as a part of his income, Congress was in
effect reducing his salary and thus violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the Constitution.
Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a
law taxing the salaries of judges appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines
no such law has been approved. The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in
which judges already in office are made to pay tax by executive interpretation,
without express legislative declaration.
It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may
imperil the independence of the judicial department. The danger may be
demonstrated. Suppose there is power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary
incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income
tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all salaries of government officials
on the level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the judges by 30 per
cent, but they may not grumble because the tax is general on all receiving the
same amount of earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in
equal measure. However, means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the
increase of salaries of the Executive and the Legislative branches, or their
perquisites such as allowances, per diems, quarters, etc. that actually compensate
for the 30 per cent reduction on their salaries. Result: Judges compensation is
thereby diminished during their incumbency thanks to the income tax law.
Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second consequence: Some few
judges might falter; the great majority will not. But knowing the frailty of human
nature, and this chink in the judicial armor, will the parties losing their cases against
the Executive or the Congress believe that the judicature has not yielded to their
pressure?
6. ENDENCIA V DAVID
93 Phil. 699 Political Law The Judiciary Te Legislature Separation of Powers
Statutory Construction Who May Interpret Laws
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary
pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax,
payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are
exempt from taxation this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of
powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from
the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the
salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that
taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9,
Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in
Perfecto vs Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts
have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In
Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the courts
when it inserted the phrase: payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a
diminution of their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment
of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to
the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory
act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any
binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute
is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would
be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a
law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a
way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of
the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
7. NITAFAN V CIR
152 SCRA 284 Political Law Constitutional Law The Judicial Department
Judicial Autonomy Income Tax Payment By The Judiciary
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek
to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction
of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount
to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June
7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice
which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of
the judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue
once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment
of income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their
deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation.
Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the
government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims
and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the
general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?

Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the
judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent
members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law increasing their
salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary
but such will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed
AFTER the effectivity of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs David.
8. REPUBLIC V SB
GR NO. 104768, 2003, SEPARATE OPINION PUNO J.
Bill of Rights
Effect of the 1986 February Revolution on the 1973 Constitution.
The 1986 February Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government, assumed under
international law. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was inoperative
during that period, as it was abrogated by the Revolutionary government. But since
the Philippines is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Human Declaration of Human Rights, the protection accorded to
individuals under the same remained in effect even without the 1973 Constitution.

(Republic vs. SB, Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas, et al., G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003).
The 1973 Constitution was abrogated by the Revolutionary government;

During the interregnum (from the time of the Revolutionary government up to
February 2, 1987), the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were
the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful resolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during that interregnum. (Republic vs. SB,
et
al.,
supra.)
Effect of the operation of the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
operative even during the Revolutionary government.
It rendered void all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the adoption of
the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and
even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial
action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of
Rights. During the interregnum the government in power was concededly a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question
the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill
of Rights at that time. (Republic vs. SB, et al., supra.).
9. AQUINO, JR. V ENRILE

Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued
and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even
without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas
corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special
affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial
Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration
of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion,
or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President
may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing

the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent
danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
Presidents order.
10. JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

50 SCRA 30 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the
1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973
Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec
Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana
averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the
president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify
such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC
justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made
by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives.
Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation
during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or
accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973
Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign
capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.
11. OCCENA V. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the
Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that
framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox

aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue:
What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments and how may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is
the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary
for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission?
Held:
The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar
as pertinent it reads thus: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same
powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular
National Assembly and the Members thereof. One of such powers is precisely that
of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested
the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special
call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos,
met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and
did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It
may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the
question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of
Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme
Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a
restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been
intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as
through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware
of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue:
Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they
go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather
than amendment?
Held:
Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to
the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an

entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is
of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of
the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because
amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At
any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people.
Issue:
What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission?
Held:
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can
propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be
an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it
sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as
a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in
this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to
propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of
three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not
disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of
land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with
1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a
proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the
period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people
so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to
the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the
matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The three resolutions
were approved by theInterim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly
on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the

plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
12. PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION VS. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls
for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of
President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the
constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling
of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did
not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution
which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice
President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter
states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President
effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and
qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his
office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President,
their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the
purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that
President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and
prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an
injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in
as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883

unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely
justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the
actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the
people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue
more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the
people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new president.
13. LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO

(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
-----------------------(There is no "Full-Text" of this case. This is a Minute Resolution made by the SC.)
Minute Resolutions
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS.
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C.
Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution
vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs.
Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is
questioned. It is claimed that her government is illegal because it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for
the reasons to be stated below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested
that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is
functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no
personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de

factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All
the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.
Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court
* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., MelencioHerrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo,
JJ.-----------------------------------------DIGEST
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government;
and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
14. IN RE BERMUDEZ no digest found haha short case
15. IN RE: LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO

Wednesday, April 30, 2014
Facts:
o The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals on 1980.
o On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
o On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the
Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
o After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire
government, including the Judiciary.
o A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate
Court and lower courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate
Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11
in the roster of appellate court justices.
o When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority
ranking changes from number 11 to 26.
o Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to
"inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to the
provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
o Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the
correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
o The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
o A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr.
and Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.
o They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the
courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of
his last appointment.
Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court
of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the promulgation of
E.O. No. 33.
Held:

The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing
prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987
Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is
considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts
existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization
launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of
the people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in
any country or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as sudden.
radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
16. DE LEON V. ESGUERRA

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain
of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of
the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8,
1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over
their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June
7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue

of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six
years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing
the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC
Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly,
Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore,
the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982
should still govern.
17. GONZALES V. COMELEC
21 SCRA 774 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political Question vs
Justiciable Question
FACTS: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It
was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that
the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that
this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the
people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election
rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when
they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of
Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political
question.

II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend
as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not
constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to
the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when
Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so
as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a
legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a
special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a
general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be
scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection. They should be able to compare the original proposition
with the amended proposition.
18. SANTIAGO, ET AL V. COMELEC

March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
FACTS: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative
The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said
petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars
to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec
1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin

Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative
to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed
provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made
for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as
pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments
to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to
the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of
Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs
an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate.
Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment
which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally
guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten
justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples
initiative.

19. LAMBINO V. COMELEC
Amendment vs Revision
FACTS: Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes
comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative
district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This
has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to
the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by
adding Art XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift
the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino
group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et
al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the
parties within that case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2
ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people.
The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present
the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often
pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the
proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.
The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the
proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition
contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they
did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed
amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by
petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be
parliament to enact more rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided
upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long
as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.
***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the
Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735
is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples
initiative.
20. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC
41 SCRA 702 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Doctrine of Proper
Submission
FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite
concerning only the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even
before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been
approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper
submission to the people. Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification.
Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted
for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a
proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision because they had at the
time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and
therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the
entire document. This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that all the
proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the
ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.
21. JAVELLANA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (SAME WITH NO. 10)

22. SANIDAD V. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the Constitution
FACTS: On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum
on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers
of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.
991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to
have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing
for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935

and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the
court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency
to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution).
The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments
thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid,
thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no
treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in
the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself.
The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a
delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient
time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.
73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Definition of Political Question

FACTS: In September 1976, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 991 calling
for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays)
to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous
PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting
and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendumplebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of
PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16,
1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition
to the convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendumplebiscite of Oct 16.
On September 27, 1976, Atty. Pablito Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD
1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As
a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court
cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners have
no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance
of the SC; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the
authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable
one. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by
the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions are neatly associated
with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of
the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is confronting the SC
is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to

perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should
the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a
brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the
judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the
procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
This petition is however dismissed. The President, who was also the legislature, can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time.
23. REPUBLIC vs CA

G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993
The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of
land owned by the private respondents for the widening and concreting of the
Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-Japan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the
right of the Republic is not now disputed, the private respondents, however,
demand that the just compensation for the property should be based on fair market
value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes
payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation
by the owner, whichever is lower. The Regional, Trial Court ruled for the private
respondents. When elevated to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc. et al., 1 this Court held
the determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function
and it thereby declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees,
including Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional
and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now
conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases. 2
The petition for review, despite the aforesaid pronouncement by this Court, has
been given due course upon the pleas of the Solicitor General to have us address
the following concerns:
I
EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PD 1533 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND VOID; UP TO WHEN RETROACTIVELY; EFFECT ON A PENDING
APPEALED CASE WHERE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1533 NOT
ASSAILED BEFORE COURT A QUO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN EPZA
VS. HON. DULAY, ETC., ET AL. (G.R. NO. 59603, APRIL 29, 1987)
DECLARING PD 1533 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID, BE APPLIED IN
THIS CASE.
III

WHETHER OR NOT VALUATION OF LAND SOUGHT FOR EXPROPRIATION
AS APPEARING ON THE TAX DECLARATION BE USED AS PRELIMINARY
BASIS FOR THE TEN PER CENT (10%) DEPOSIT REQUIRED UNDER RULE
67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED BEFORE PLAINTIFF
IS PERMITTED ENTRY THEREON.
The last item is not an issue; being merely provisional in character, the matter has
not been questioned by the private respondents. 3 We will thus limit ourselves to
the first two issues which, in turn, really boil down to whether the declaration of
nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not retroactive, application.
The petitioner proposes the affirmative.
Instruction is the brief treatise made by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, whose words we
quote
There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a statute.
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton
v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is
therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have
existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the
declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court
in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as
if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for
ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties
only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or
reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination
of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the
statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the
statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no
one else is bound.
The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing
that "when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. . . . 4

The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional
as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had
never existed. Here, of course, we refer to the law itself being per se repugnant to
the Constitution. It is not always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally
faulty per se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import. but invalid in its
application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise valid law may be
held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as,
in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its
retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of
contracts. 5
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all
the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration.
Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws, 6 we have been constrained to
recognize the interim effects of said laws prior to their declaration of
unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable to simply ignore strong
considerations of equity and fair play. So also, even as a practical matter, a situation
that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further
inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a
governing statute.
The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from any of the above
exceptional cases. To this day, the controversy between the petitioner and the
private respondents on the issue of just compensation is still unresolved, partly
attributable to the instant petition that has prevented the finality of the decision
appealed from. The fact of the matter is that the expropriation cases, involved in
this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and
forthwith invoked by said parties.
In fine, we hold that the appellate court in this particular case committed no error in
its appealed decision. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. No costs.
24. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I.
THE FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS

sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to
allow it to match the bid of RenongBerhad. It invoked the Filipino First
Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the

Filipinos.
II.
THE ISSUES
1.
Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2.
Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over RenongBerhad, a foreign corporation, in the
sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to
carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,
the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second

par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If
the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully
owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially

enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibiremedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form
part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx
xxx
xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated
to implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out
with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS
and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved
or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51%
of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of
state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by

respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but
also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed
of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of
the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that
the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are
not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one
with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed
to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.
26.TAADA V. ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the
World Trade Organization for being violative of provisions which are supposed to

give preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the ground that it infringes
legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on most favored
nation and national treatment, require that nationals and other member countries
are placed in the same footing in terms of products and services. However, the
Court brushed off these contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional.
Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be read
in relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also, Section 10 is
self-executing only to rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony but not every aspect of trade and commerce. There are
balancing provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO
agreement. Also, the Constitution doesnt rule out foreign competition. States waive
certain amount of sovereignty when entering into treaties.
Facts:
This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the
World Trade Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed the
Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in the said treaty.
Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton
Woods to discuss global economy. This led to the establishment of three great
institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank), International Monetary Fund and International Trade Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General
Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT
that the WTO was then established.
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the
reduction of tariff and barriers.
Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to
qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.
It is petitioners position that the national treatment and parity provisions
of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless
the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!

In seeking to nullify the Senates act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. It becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute

Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II
and Section 10 & 12, Artilce XII of the 1987 Constitution? NO!
Petitioners Contentions:
Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution
mandating economic nationalism are violated by the so-called parity
provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in parts of WTO
Agreement
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS
(trade-related investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of
intellectual property rights), Trade in Services, and par. 4 of Article III of
GATT 1994.
o shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin
Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
Filipinos.
Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
help make them competitive.
Ruling:
These provisions are not self-executing

o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the
other sections in said article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:
o A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
o An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is selfexecuting or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough
balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
o Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the
basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight.
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o Tariff reduction developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6
years, developing 24% in 10 years
o Domestic subsidy developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6)
years,developing countries at 13% in 10 years

Export subsidy developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing
countries, 3/4ths of 36% in 10 years
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
o Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets
The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade
liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional
duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion
o
Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the
exercise of legislative power by Congress? NO!
A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and allencompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as
a member of the family of nations.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be
considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: limitations
imposed by the nature of membership in the family of nations & limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations.

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Very truly yours,

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