Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Before
Torruella, Howard, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Court
granted
his
certiorari
petition,
vacated
our
See Barnes v.
And
of drugs involved.
involving, say, 50 kilograms of marijuana activates no mandatoryminimum prison sentence (but a 20-year maximum) and carries a
mandatory-supervised release term of 3 years (with a life maximum).
See 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) and 841(b)(1)(C); see also United
-2-
kilograms
of
marijuana
preponderance-of-the-evidence
finding
standard
that
made
using
triggered
the
the
-3-
Anyway,
this
drug-quantity
finding
helped
yield
extent the [judge] found that the drug weight was more than 1,000
kilograms, the supervised-release range would be 5 years." "Okay,"
the judge said.
"recognized that a 5-year " before being cut off by the judge, who
said "[n]ow you're recommending 3 years."
replied.
When his turn to speak came, Barnes's counsel again said
that judges should not be able to determine drug quantity by a
preponderance of the evidence.
-4-
And
has
to
impose
at
least
five
years
of
supervised
release."
Ultimately, the judge sentenced Barnes to 210 months'
imprisonment
and
five
years'
supervised
release.1
The
judge
thought about giving him a "higher sentence." But "I don't usually
exceed
the
government's
recommendation"
if
"there
is
plea
e.g.,
Barnes's
personal
history
and
characteristics,
the
seriousness of the crime, the need for adequate deterrence, and the
need
to
protect
the
public.
Significantly,
in
his
written
statement of reasons for the sentence, the judge checked the box
indicating that he had imposed a "[m]andatory minimum sentence."
Barnes appealed, arguing (among other things) that drug
quantity must be treated as an element of the offense and thus
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
facts
that
increase
defendant's
mandatory-minimum
sentence.
A little later the Supreme Court held in Alleyne that most (but not
all) facts that increase statutory minimum penalties must (if the
defendant does not admit them) be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.2
88, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing Alleyne error). They also do
not dispute that an Alleyne error is of constitutional magnitude.
About this, they are right again.
Alleyne did not change the preexisting rule that a judge may
find the fact of a prior conviction. See 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1;
see also United States v. Rodriguez, 759 F.3d 113, 122 (1st Cir.
2014).
3
353
F.3d
1,
17
government
must
prove
(1st
Cir.
"beyond
any
(explaining
reasonable
doubt
that
the
that
the
The first is
The
The
range
and
the
relevant
section
3553(a)
We view
Here's why:
words "mandatory minimum," but she did advise the judge that for
1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, "the supervised release range
would be 5 years" which is the mandatory minimum under section
841(b)(1)(A).
activated
And
if,
mandatory
as
probation
minimum
suggested,
supervised-release
that
term,
amount
then
-8-
given
the
drug-quantity
findings,
to
which
counsel
Not quite.
prison
stay
government's
because
he
recommendation"
recommendation,
we
repeat,
"usually"
in
that
does
not
plea-agreement
the
prosecutor
"exceed
cases
made
the
while
explaining how a 210-month sentence "captures the applicable 10year mandatory minimum." Remember too that in his formal statement
of reasons (which judges must complete when sentencing defendants),
the judge indicated that he had handed out a "[m]andatory minimum
sentence."
See
Prez-Ruiz,
353
F.3d
at
17.
The
when
the
probation
officer
told
the
judge
5-year
also notes, defense counsel later told the judge that he had to
"impose at least five years of supervised release."
But those
-10-
defense never asked him to explain whether (to quote its latest
brief) "the term was statutorily required or simply desirable."
Essentially, the government wants us to ignore everything that
preceded the sentence's imposition e.g., the defense's fighting
and losing on drug quantity and the probation officer's then
telling the judge that 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana (the
threshold for triggering a 5-year supervised-release term) made
Barnes eligible for at least 5 years of supervised release.
that we will not do.
And
So we
entirety
Our
work
and
remand
over,
the
we
vacate
case
for
-11-
Barnes's
new
sentence
sentencing
in
its
proceedings