You are on page 1of 121

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 103385-88 July 26, 1993


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELMA ROMERO y CRUZ, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose V. Juan, Bartolome P. Reus and Antonietta Pablo Medina for
accused-appellant.

NOCON, J.:
This is an appeal from a Joint Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 168 in Criminal Cases Nos. 78507-10 2 finding accusedappellant Elma Romero y Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.
Two (2) separate Informations were filed by Assistant Fiscal Edmundo O.
Legaspi in behalf of complainant Doriza Dapnit against Elma Romero for
the crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT committed as
follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 78507 ESTAFA
That sometime during the month of January, 1989, in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one Doriza Dapnit of the amount of P21,000.00, by
means of deceit and false representations which she made to

the latter to the effect that she could Facilitate the employment
overseas of said Doriza Dapnit, and would need certain amount
for expenses in the processing of her employment and travel
papers, which representation the accused well knew were false
and fraudulent and were only made by her to induce said
Doriza Dapnit to give and pay, as the latter gave and paid to
her the amount of P21,000.00 which the accused once in
possession of the said amount, misappropriate, misapply and
convert to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said Doriza Dapnit, in the aforementioned
amount of P21,000.00. 3
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 78510 ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
That in or about and during period comprised from January,
1989, up to February, 1989, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, knowing that she
was neither authorized nor licensed by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit workers for overseas employment and collect
from the following persons, to wit:
Doriza Dapnit P21,000.00
Bernardo T. Salazar 24,000.00
Richard Quillope 15,600.00
by falsely representing to the latter that she was a lawful
recruiter and in a position to obtain for their job placement
abroad. 4
Upon arraignment, accused Elma Romero pleaded "NOT GUILTY" and trial
ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
Sometime in January of 1989, complainant Doriza Dapnit went to the
residence of accused-appellant Elma Romero at Esteban Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro-Manila accompanied by Genalie Cruz, a cousin of
accused-appellant. At such meeting, complainant Doriza Dapnit told
accused-appellant of her desire to work abroad and the latter informed her

that she can work in Taiwan as a factory worker with a monthly salary of
US$5,000.00. 5
Thereafter, complainant Doriza Dapnit, relying upon the representation of
the accused-appellant that she can leave on April 1, 1989 for Taiwan as a
factory worker, paid the placement fee charged by the latter as evidenced
by the receipts issued by the accused-appellant totalling P21,000.00 which
were paid as follows: P3,000.00 on January 24, 1989 6, P15,000.00 on
February 4, 1989 7 and P3,000.00 on February 27, 1989. 8 Complainant
Doriza Dapnit also paid accused-appellant the amount of P1,800.00 for the
processing of her passport which is not included in her claim as she was
issued a passport. 9
When complainant Doriza Dapnit was not able to leave on April 1, 1989 for
Taiwan, accused-appellant told her, to wait as her visa was not yet issued.
However, after spending more than two (2) months futilely following up her
visa with the accused-appellant, complainant Doriza Dapnit went to the
office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and
found out that accused-appellant is not a licensed recruiter as shown by the
Certification issued by the POEA. 10
On June 30, 1989, complainant Doriza Dapnit executed an affidavit 11 at
the office of the POEA charging accused-appellant for illegal recruitment
and/or estafa.
Complainant Bernardo Salazar testified that sometime in the middle of
January 1989, he went to RSI Enterprises located at Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, Metro-Manila and met accused-appellant where he applied
for a job in Taiwan. During said meeting, accused-appellant promised
complainant Bernardo Salazar that he can leave for Taiwan on April 1,
1989 as a factory worker with a monthly salary of US$600.00 12 as soon as
he paid the placement fee.
After paying accused-appellant the amount of P24,000.00 as placement fee
which were evidenced by the five (5) receipts 13 issued by accusedappellant, complainant Bernardo Salazar was not able to leave on April 1,
1989 and accused-appellant told him that his departure was delayed
because she is still waiting for the issuance of his visa.
When accused-appellant failed to send complainant Bernardo Salazar to
Taiwan, the latter went to the Anti-illegal Recruitment Branch of the POEA

on June 30, 1989 and executed an affidavit 14 charging accused-appellant


for illegal recruitment and/or estafa.
When complainant Richard Quillope was presented to the court and sworn
in, prosecution's counsel manifested that complainant Quillope will testify to
the following:
. . ., that on January 25, 1989, Elma Romero made
representation to him as having capacity to send workers
abroad, overseas workers abroad. As made by Elma Romero
that she has the capacity of sending overseas workers abroad
he paid the following amount, first, in the amount of P3,000.00
dated March 10, 1989, second payment, dated January 10,
1989 in the amount of P10,000.00; third in the amount of
P1,600.00 dated February 17, 1989. That all these receipts
except that amount of P1,000.00 are for processing fee for visa
for Taipeh. That this witness was not able to go or was
deployed as promised by the accused, he found out that she
was not licensed nor engaged in the recruitment of overseas
employment. That there was representation made by Elma
Romero that this witness will be sent abroad as factory worker
in Taipeh or Taiwan. 15
to which accused-appellant's counsel did not object when he admitted said
manifestation in court, as follows:
ATTY. JAKOSALEM:
We have no objection and we admit the testimony
of the witness. So, we can dispense with the crossexamination of the said witness.
COURT:
He (We) dispensed with the cross-examination of the witness. 16
On January 18, 1990, the trial court issued an Order 17 dismissing Criminal
Cases Nos. 78508 and 78509 on the basis of the Joint Affidavit of
Desistance 18 executed by complainants Richard Quillope and Bernardo
Salazar on December 14, 1989.

On August 8, 1991, the trial court rendered its Joint Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused ELMA ROMERO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, the Court
hereby sentences her to suffer penalty of imprisonment of one
(1) year, 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision
correccional the as MAXIMUM and to indemnify complainant
Doriza Dapnit the sum of P21,000.00;
Finding the accused ELMA ROMERO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment constituting economic
sabotage, the Court hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) and a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).19
Hence, this appeal.
Accused-appellant contends that there was no misrepresentation nor
misappropriation on her part because the money paid by complainant
Doriza Dapnit was for the purpose of facilitating the processing of the
latter's passport and visa only as indicated in the receipts issued to the
complainant and not in consideration of a promised job placement abroad.
We do not agree.
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded
another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person. 20
In the instant case, all the elements of estafa are present because
complainant Doriza Dapnit gave the total amount of P21,000.00 to
accused-appellant on the latter's promise that she will be sent to Taiwan as
a factory worker as soon as she paid the placement fee. It will be observed
that accused-appellant gave complainant the distinct impression that she
had the power or ability to send people abroad for work so that complainant
was convinced to give her the money she demanded to enable her to be
employed as a factory worker in Taiwan. Furthermore, accused-appellant's
defense that she did not misrepresent herself as capable of finding

complainant Doriza Dapnit employment abroad is negated by the latter's


testimony when she testified that:
Q Did you have any conversation with Elma
Romero?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your conversation about, will you tell
the Court?
A She told me that I could be deployed as one of
the factory workers in Taiwan.
Q Did you ask her how much would be your salary if
you will be deployed as one of the factory workers
in Taiwan?
A Yes. sir.
Q How much?
A US$5,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was there any consideration for your employment
abroad as promised by Elma Romero?
xxx xxx xxx
For the promise to be deployed as factory worker in
Taiwan?
A She told me that I will have to pay the full
payment.
Q How much was the full payment as told to you by
Elma Romero?
A P21,000.00.

Q Were you able to pay this full amount of


P21,000.00?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you have receipt corresponding to that
payment?
A Yes, sir. 21
From the foregoing testimony, accused-appellant cannot claim that
complainant paid her only for the processing of her travel documents and
not in consideration of finding a job for her in Taiwan. Thus, accusedappellant is guilty of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment.
The contention of the accused-appellant that she cannot be convicted of
large-scale illegal recruitment which requires at least (3) persons to be
victimized considering that only one victim testified against her while the
other two complainants executed a joint affidavit of desistance which
resulted in the dismissal of their complaints against her is without merit.
The records show that aside from complainant Doriza Dapnit, complainant
Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope testified that they were both victims
of accused-appellant's illegal recruitment activities. Bernardo Salazar's
testimony is as follows:
Q And at the middle part of January 1989 where did
you see Elma Romero?
A At the RSI Enterprises, sir.
Q What was your purpose in going to RSI
Enterprises?
A My purpose in going to her office is to apply for
employment abroad.
xxx xxx xxx

Q Were you able to talk with Elma Romero with


respect to your employment abroad as factory
worker in Taiwan?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the result of that conversation?
A Elma Romero promised us employment in
Taiwan, sir?
Q Did Elma Romero mentioned (sic) about your
salary?
A Yes, sir.
Q How much is the salary?
A Six hundred dollars ($600.000), sir.
Q After the meeting with Elma Romero and she
promised you that she will sent (sic) you to Taiwan,
what transpired after that?
A Elma Romero promised us that we could leave for
abroad and from April 1 we were told to wait up to
April 4, sir.
Q Were you able to live (sic) on April 4?
A No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How much was the placement fee?
A Eighteen thousand pesos, sir. (18,000.00).
Q Did you give this eighteen thousand (P18,000.00)
pesos to Elma Romero?
A Yes, sir.

Q Was there any receipt of your P18,000.00 that


you give to Elma Romero?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you have pay (sic) the P18,000.00 to Elma
Romero what transpired next?
A We keep (sic) on talking to Elma Romero, sir.
Q Do you have any companion, Mr. Witness in
applying for employment abroad?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court who are
your companion (sic) you are referring to?
A My other companions are Richard Quillope and
Doriza Dapnit, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you were not able to leave for Taiwan,
what did you do next?
A When we were not able to leave for Taiwan we
proceed (sic) to the Office of the Anti-illegal
Recruitment at the POEA to tell our problem.
(TSN, April 5, 1990, pp. 5-11) 22
The fact that complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope
executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance does not serve to exculpate
accused-appellant from criminal liability insofar as the case for illegal
recruitment is concerned since the Court looks with disfavor the dropping of
criminal complaints upon mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant,
particularly where the commission of the offense, as is in this case, is duly
supported by documentary evidence. 23

Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of


desistance, especially when it is executed as an afterthought. It would be a
dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the
courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them, later
on, changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule would make
solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witness. 24
Complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope may have a change
of heart insofar as the offense wrought on their person is concerned when
they executed their joint affidavit of desistance but this will not affect the
public prosecution of the offense itself. It is relevant to note that "the right of
prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a
natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctly charged by the
common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the
interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties
of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights." 25 This
cardinal principle which states that to the State belongs the power to
prosecute and punish crimes should not be overlooked since a criminal
offense is an outrage to the sovereign State. As provided by the Civil Code
of the Philippines:
Art. 2034. There may be a compromise upon the civil liability
arising from an offense; but such compromise shall not
extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty.
The trial court had correctly found accused-appellant ELMA ROMERO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE.
The penalty imposed under Article 39 of the New Labor Code for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale is life imprisonment. However, life
imprisonment is not synonymous or interchangeable with reclusion
perpetua.Accordingly, reclusion perpetua should be deleted from the
appealed decision.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the term "reclusion perpetua" be deleted from said
decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178607

December 5, 2012

DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative


of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City),
SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and
MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La.
Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of
Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, 20073 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and
denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management
Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen
Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the
listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local
manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents
for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.5 The petitioner alleged

that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSIs


articles of incorporation6 to secure a license to operate as a recruitment
agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint
counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavits
allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any
counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved
his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal
Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge
Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor
reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to
withdraw the information.9 The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and
Gaza filed their opposition10 and comment to the opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to withdraw
information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the
respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus
motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of
arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC denied the omnibus
motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal
case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the
warrants of arrest.15
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to
expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice,
had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005
resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.16

In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent Alamils


motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had already found
probable cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution,
which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for
the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial.18 On
October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to
expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief
from the RTC.19
In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited
herself from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamils motion for
reconsideration and the petitioners motion to expunge. The case was later
re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamils motion
for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamils motion for judicial
determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found:
(1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false
information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the
POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs
jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus,
the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of
arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the
existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that
respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.22
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for
being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public
prosecutors conformity.23
In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in
issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion
expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public
prosecutors conformity.

On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.25


On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioners
notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal
and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.26
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to
expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal
the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents fraudulent acts in
forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.27
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioners notice of
appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor
General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in
criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of
appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule
65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006,
and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,29 the CA dismissed outright the
petitioners Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on
behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to represent the People,
under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in
interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to
the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The
CA denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that followed.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of
the criminal case since he is the private complainant and a real party in
interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the
respondents illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek
any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.

The Case for the Respondents


The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail
the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely
with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted
independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the
prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a
reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition
for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the
People of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."33 Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved.34 By real interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.35 When the plaintiff or the defendant
is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.36
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor."37 In appeals of criminal cases before the CA
and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People,
pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and

instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,


investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG
can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in
this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases38 and
continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be
allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf39 (as when there is
a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in
the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of
the criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the
criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The
petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an
offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal
action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which
pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.40
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's
person to the jurisdiction of the court.41
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the
criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs
other than an application for bail.42

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the


CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R.
SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984
MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court
of First Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal
of Dumaguete, and JULIAN L. TEVES, respondents.
Geminiano M. Eleccion and Jose A. Arbas for petitioners.
Lenin R. Victoriano for private respondent.

CUEVAS, J.:
Petitioners Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and
charged with 'ADULTERY' before the defunct Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental under Criminal Case No. 1079 assigned to Branch Ill
thereof, presided over by the Honorable respondent Judge. The said
criminal proceeding was initiated by a letter-complaint dated July 13,
1972 1 thumbmarked and sworn to by complainant Julian L. Teves, the
husband of petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves, on the same date before
respondent City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug. Said letter-complaint reads as
follows:
Sir:

I have the honor to file a criminal complaint for 'Adultery' against


my wife Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour, Manuel
Moreno, residents of this City and Bouffard Subdivision,
Sibulan, Negros Oriental, respectively.
The affidavits of my witnesses are hereto attached
Truly yours,
(Thumbmark)
JULIAN L.TEVES
Complainant

WITNESSES TO THUMBMARK:
1. (Sgd) Mita D. Escao
2. (Sgd) Rubi Villariza Destano
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of
July, 1972, at Dumaguete City.
(Sgd) PABLO E.
CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Dumaguete City
Attached to the said letter-complaint were the affidavits of Elisa Chiu,
Milagros Quiteves and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina, witnesses of complainant
Julian L. Teves. 2
On the basis thereof, respondent City Fiscal conducted a preliminary
investigation of the aforesaid charge. Complainant Julian L. Teves took the
witness stand affirmed the statements appearing in his letter-complaint. He
also Identified one of the respondents, his wife Milagros Donio-Teves.
Thereafter, he was cross-examined lengthily by counsel for both
respondents, now petitioners.
After terminating his examination, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,
assailing the jurisdiction of the City Fiscal to take cognizance of the case on
the ground that there was no proper complaint filed by complainant Julian

L. Teves. The motion was denied and continuation of the preliminary


investigation was thereafter set for December 2, 1972. Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of denial was likewise denied by
the respondent City Fiscal. Meanwhile, complainant Julian L. Teves filed a
new letter-complaint dated January 16, 1973, this time attaching his
affidavit thereto.
The said letter-complaint 3 reads as follows:
The City Fiscal
Dumaguete City
Sir:
I hereby accused my wife Milagros Donio-Teves and her
paramour Manuel Moreno, residents of Bais City and Bouffard
Subdivision, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, respectively of the crime
of 'Adultery committed as follows:
That on or about and during the months of May, 1970, to
December, 1970, in the City of Dumaguete, and within the
jurisdiction of this Office for preliminary investigation, the said
Milagros Donio-Teves who is my wife, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had sexual intercourse with her co-accused Manuel
Moreno, who is not her husband, while the latter, knowing her
to be married, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of her.
Contrary to law.
I hereby attach my affidavit in support of this complaint, in
addition to the affidavits of Milagros Quiteves, Elisa Chin and
Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina .... . This complaint is in amplication of
my complaint , dated July 23, 1972, against the same persons
for the same offense, filed with your office on July 13, 1972. ...
Truly
yours
,
(THU

MBM
ARK)
JULI
AN L.
TEV
ES
Com
plain
ant
xxx xxx xxx
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of January,
1973, at Dumaguete City.
(Sgd) PABLO E.
CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Continuation of the preliminary investigation was set for February 12, 1973.
It was later reset to March 6, 1973 and finally to March 23, 1973 at the
instance of respondents-petitioners.
At the resumption of the preliminary investigation scheduled on March 23,
1973, petitioners filed a Joint Urge Omnibus Motion dated March 23, 1973,
praying that portions of the affidavits of Elisa Chiu, Milagros Quiteves and
Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina which relate to the adulterous acts allegedly
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Dumaguete City be ordered
stricken out, the same not falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent
City Fiscal. With the said motion still unresolved, an information to which a
complaint thumbmarked by complainant Julian L. Teves, was filed before
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on March 26, 1973
which, as herein earlier stated, was docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
1097. The complaint reads:
Complaint
The undersigned complainant accused MILAGROS DONIOTEVES and MANUEL MORENO of the crime of ADULTERY,
committed as follows:

That on or about and during the months of May, 1970 to


December, 1970, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES, being then united in lawful
wedlock with the undersigned complainant, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously lay with, and had carnal knowledge of, her coaccused MANUEL MORENO, who in turn, knowing that said
MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES was a married woman, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay with, and had carnal knowledge
of her.
Contrary to law.
City of Dumaguete, Philippines, March 26,1973.
His
Thum
bmar
k
JULI
AN L.
TEV
ES
Com
plain
ant
WITNESS TO THUMBMARK:
(Sgd) YOLANDA D. BAGUIO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of
March, 1973, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines.
(Sgd) PABLO E. CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Witnesses:
1. Julian L. Teves, Bais City

2. Elisa Chiu, Bais City


3. Milagros Quiteves, Bais City
4. Lorenza Regala-Lacsina, Bais City and others.
On September 28, 1973, the day before the scheduled arraignment,
petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves filed a Motion to Quash challenging the
jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the offense charged and the
persons of both accused; and the authority of respondent City Fiscal of
Dumaguete to file the information. In a "Manifestation" dated September
28, 1973, petitioner Manuel Moreno formally adopted as his own, Milagros
Donio-Teves' aforesaid Motion to Quash.
After the Opposition and Joint Answer to Opposition were filed, respondent
Judge issued an Order dated December 3, 1973 denying petitioners'
Motion to Quash for lack of merit. Petitioners' joint motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated January 14, 1974.
Arraignment of petitioners was set for March 1, 1974 and later reset to
March 7, 1974.
Hence, the instant petition for CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION and
mandamus with preliminary injunction praying for the annulment of:
(1) all the proceedings conducted by the respondent City Fiscal
that led to the filing of the challenged information;
(2) the Order of the Honorable respondent Judge dated
December 3, 1973 denying petitioners' motion to quash as well
as the Order dated January 14, 1974 denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration; and
(3) commanding the respondent Trial Judge and respondent
City Fiscal to desist from taking any further action.
The petition is devoid of merit. Hence, its dismissal is in order.
Petitioners' attack against the validity of the proceedings conducted by the
respondent City Fiscal is anchored on the lack of a valid complaint on the
part of the offended party. The challenge against jurisdiction having been

acquired over the case and persons of the accused, is similarly predicated
on the same ground absence of a valid complaint.
Adultery, being a private offense, it cannot be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse who cannot institute the criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. 4
This Court has invariably maintained strict adherence to this jurisdictional
requirement of a complaint by the offended party, as defined in Section 2 of
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court and Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. 5 So much so, that an Information filed with the provincial fiscal
wherein the offended party signed at the bottom thereof over and above the
signature of the prosecuting officer, the information even reciting that the
provincial fiscal charges defendant with the crime of seduction at the
"instance of the offended party" was considered insufficient. 6 In another
case, 7 this Court motu proprio dismissed the case for failure of the
aggrieved party to file the proper complaint for the offense of oral
defamation imputing the commission of an offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, although the accused never raised the question on
appeal, thereby dramatizing the necessity of strict compliance with the
above legal requirement even to the extent of nullifying all the proceedings
already had in the lower court.
However, this legal requirement was imposed "out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through the scandal of a public trial. 8 Thus, the law leaves it to the
option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed by the erring spouse. This should be the overriding
consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition
precedent prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied with. For,
indeed, it is the spirit rather than the letter of the law which should prevail. 9
The complaint referred to which is required by way of initiating the criminal
prosecution of crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is, however,
that one filed with the Court and not that which is necessary to start the
required preliminary investigation by the fiscal's office. 10 In the latter case,
a letter of complaint sufficed for the purpose.

Coming back to the case at bar, the desire of the offended party Julian L.
Teves to bring his wife and her alleged paramour before the bar of justice is
only too evident. Such determination of purpose on his part is amply
demonstrated in the strong and unequivocal statement contained in his first
complaint of July 13, 1972 making clear and implicit his purpose, which is
no other than "to file a criminal complaint for ADULTERY against my wife
Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour Manuel Moreno"... plus the fact
that he filed no less than three (3) complaints in order to meet the
objections of the petitioner herein as to the sufficiency of his first complaint
dated July 13, 1972.
Petitioners' submission that there is no sufficient and valid complaint
instituted in the instant case so as to confer jurisdiction over the offense
and persons of the accused (herein petitioners), hardly convince Us. The
second complaint dated January 16, 1973 filed with the Fiscal's Office and
that filed with the respondent Court on March 26, 1973, are both sufficient
and valid complaints. Both state the name of the defendants; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed which is an absolute compliance with what
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court prescribe. 11 Both complaints were also thumbmarked by
and under oath of the complainant. The allegations of the complaints fully
apprised petitioners of the facts and acts subject matter thereof and
enables them to fully comprehend to which acts of theirs it refers. 12Both
sufficiently identify the acts constituting the offense, sufficient enough to
enable the Court to pronounce a valid judgment thereon in case of
conviction. 13
As it is, doubt could not have set in and confusion would not have arisen
had the Fiscal limited himself merely to the filing of the complaint
(thumbmarked and under oath of the complainant) instead of an
information with the complaint annexed thereto.
Finally, as a last-ditch attempt to throw the ADULTERY case out of court,
petitioners invoked the death of the complainant which took place on April
14, 1974 and during the pendency of this case, as an added argument in
support of their plea for dismissal.

Such a stand is erroneous. Death of the offended party is not a ground for
extinguishment of criminal liability whether total 14 or partial. 15 The
participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of
the criminal action but soley for the initiation thereof.
The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies which cannot be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is
misleading. Far from what it implies, it is not only the aggrieved party who
is offended in such crimes but also the State. Every violation of penal laws
results in the disturbance of public order and safety which the State is
committed to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the condition that
private crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint
filed by the offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage
in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial." Once a
complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is ascertained and the
action proceeds just as in any other crime. This is shown by the fact that
after filing a complaint, any pardon given by the complainant to the offender
would be unavailing. 16 It is true, the institution of the action in so- called
private crimes is at the option of the aggrieved party. But it is equally true
that once the choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in full force
beyond the control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death
notwithstanding. 17
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED. The Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch of Negros Oriental to whose sala
Criminal Case No. 1097 had been assigned, is hereby ordered to
immediately continue with the trial of the aforementioned case and render
judgment thereon on the basis of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.

Herbert L. Packer Book


The argument of this book begins with the proposition that there are certain
things we must understand about the criminal sanction before we can begin
to talk sensibly about its limits. First, we need to ask some questions about
the rationale of the criminal sanction. What are we trying to do by defining
conduct as criminal and punishing people who commit crimes? To what

extent are we justified in thinking that we can or ought to do what we are


trying to do? Is it possible to construct an acceptable rationale for the
criminal sanction enabling us to deal with the argument that it is itself an
unethical use of social power? And if it is possible, what implications does
that rationale have for the kind of conceptual creature that the criminal law
is? Questions of this order make up Part I of the book, which is essentially
an extended essay on the nature and justification of the criminal sanction.
We also need to understand, so the argument continues, the characteristic
processes through which the criminal sanction operates. What do the rules
of the game tell us about what the state may and may not do to apprehend,
charge, convict, and dispose of persons suspected of committing crimes?
Here, too, there is great controversy between two groups who have quite
different views, or models, of what the criminal process is all about. There
are people who see the criminal process as essentially devoted to values of
efficiency in the suppression of crime. There are others who see those
values as subordinate to the protection of the individual in his confrontation
with the state. A severe struggle over these conflicting values has been
going on in the courts of this country for the last decade or more. How that
struggle is to be resolved is a second major consideration that we need to
take into account before tackling the question of the limits of the criminal
sanction. These problems of process are examined in Part II.
Part III deals directly with the central problem of defining criteria for limiting
the reach of the criminal sanction. Given the constraints of rationale and
process examined in Parts I and II, it argues that we have over-relied on
the criminal sanction and that we had better start thinking in a systematic
way about how to adjust our commitments to our capacities, both moral
and operational.

SECOND DIVISION

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS G.R. No. 165922


MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
(BAMARVEMPCO), represented by Present:
RECTO INSO, Operations Manager,
Petitioner, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,

DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES,


Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Promulgated:
Baguio City,
Respondent. ____________________
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For review[1] are the Orders[2] of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City finding petitioner Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative liable for payment of foreclosure fees.

The Facts

Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is


a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or
the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.[3] Article 62(6) of RA 6938
exempts cooperatives:
from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the
Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions
brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the

Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce


the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the
cooperative.[4]
In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially
foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended.[5] Under Section 7(c) of
Rule 141, as amended,[6]petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to
legal fees based on the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62
(6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes
(respondent), Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for
exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, exempting from the Rules coverage only the Republic of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and certain suits of local
government units.[7]
Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in
the Order dated 6 October 2004. This time, respondent reasoned that
petitioners reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced because the
fees collected under Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine
Government as they do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a special
fund[8] under the Courts control.[9]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the case calls for nothing more than a simple
application of Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation (in lieu of
Comment), joins causes with petitioner. The OSG submits that as the
substantive rule, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22 of Rule
141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG also takes issue with
respondents finding that the legal fees collected under Rule 141 are not
fees payable to the Philippine Government as the judiciary forms part of the
Philippine government, as defined under the Revised Administrative
Code.[10]

Although not a party to this suit, we required the Courts Office of the Chief
Attorney (OCAT) to comment on the petition, involving as it does, issues
relating to the Courts power to promulgate judicial rules. In its
compliance, the OCAT recommends the denial of the petition, opining that
Section 22, Rule 141, as amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938
because (1) the power to impose judicial fees is eminently judicial and (2)
the 1987 Constitution insulated the Courts rule-making powers from
Congress interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in
the 1973 Constitution allowing Congress to alter judicial rules. The OCAT
called attention to the Courts previous denial of a request by a cooperative
group for the issuance of guidelines to implement cooperatives fees
exemption under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.[11] Lastly, the OCAT
recommends the amendment of Section 22, Rule 141 to make explicit the
non-exemption of cooperatives from the payment of legal fees.
The Issue
The question is whether petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure
is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioners
foreclosure proceeding.
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to
cooperatives is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought
under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development
Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of
cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article
62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the
payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable
on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second,

petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim


exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of
cooperatives.
The Power of the Legislature
vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court
to Enact Judicial Rules

Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the


Court En Banc has recently ruled in Re: Petition for Recognition of the
Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of
Legal Fees[12] on the issue of legislative exemptions from court fees. We
take the opportunity to reiterate our En Banc ruling in GSIS.
Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous
constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature
and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935[13] and
the 1973[14] Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law. However, these constitutions also
granted to the legislature the concurrent power to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules.[15]
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme
under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII
Congress subsidiary and corrective power.[16] This glaring and
fundamental omission led the Court to observe inEchegaray v. Secretary of
Justice[17] that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress:
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII [18] x
xx.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This


Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)

Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section


5(5) should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request
by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from
payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No.
8291, exempting GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues
of all kinds.[19]Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the
Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading,
practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence:
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the
rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive
domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30


August 2004 and 6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court


Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision2of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February
28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents
Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime
of rape for the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private
respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together
with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen
Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons
Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA,
a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated,
brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging
house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having
carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered
a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.5cralawlawlibrary
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John
Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school
graduation ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house
in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her
mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her
bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at
around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father
that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her
friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at
the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After
eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons Palace, which was merely a
walking distance away from Gemenos house. Outside the Alsons Palace,
they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae
Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the
second floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen
Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one
Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate
their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two
(2) bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a
circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around:

one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing
the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard
liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with each
other. When it was AAAs turn, she became emotional and started
crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed
around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador
Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos
lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried
to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda
also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced
her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her
drink. She even heard Lim say, Hubuga na, hubuga na, (You make her
drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, You drink
it, you drink it. She leaned on Oportos lap again, then she fell
asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle
to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so
she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the
stairs, and then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness,
she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She
recognized that place because she had been there before. She would
thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times
that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on
different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started
crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw
Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto
abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting
his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola
then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all
alone. Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt
on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top
of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her
shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA
reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already

furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting
her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a
report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical
examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the
morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5
oclock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The
vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the
defense witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto,
Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemenos house. Gemeno
then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at
Alsons Palace, owned by the latters family. When they reached the place,
Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch
one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned
to Alsons Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently
ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela
Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy
and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto,
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but
did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil
Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain
Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and
instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA
rested on Oportos lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her
buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoys crotch, she remarked,
What was that, penis? Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the
latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same and AAA also kissed
him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was
at the Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and
Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested
Alquizola to accompany her to Alsons Palace to see her friends
there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying
on Oportos lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get

angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, I
just stay here. Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging
house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alsons Palace again, and saw
AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while
holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to
resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and
instead instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House
because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a
motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached
Alquizola and told him, Kuya, I want to sleep here for the
meantime. Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and
Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a
double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at
Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then
removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give
way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto
was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her
pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her
underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the
lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAAs
legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts
and went back to Alsons Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto
and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA
saw him, she said, Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a
problem. Alquizola thus started kissing AAAs breasts. Oporto stood up
and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on
him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to
have sexual intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning
and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with
Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more
times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alsons Palace to sleep. At around
6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They
tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went
home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m.
However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and
Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of
P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and the court
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount
of P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and
by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda,
Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of
litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their
prison terms provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the

Revised Penal Code.


Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March
2004 and detained since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also
surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to
this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered
voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the
DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted
cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved
by this court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the
custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on
the prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim
as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to
the CA. On June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed
Decision reversing the trial courts ruling and, consequently, acquitted
private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal
is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA,
JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are
instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private
respondents guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the
version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual
congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents
were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical
resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged
ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical report which
showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAAs genitalia,

giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man
before. The CA also stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of
hitting her when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more
consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had
premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition
for Certiorari9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed
private respondents conviction and ardently contending that the same was
made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.10
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment
dated November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE
ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.
IV.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE


COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL
CASES.11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1,
2009. It assigns the following errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF
ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR
HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN
EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be
tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict
adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial
justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due
process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally
construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules,
or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when
compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not
on sheer technicalities.14cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings
from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The
reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory,
and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of
the Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may
appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said
judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in
double jeopardy.17cralawlawlibrary
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court
said in People v. Santiago:18cralawlawlibrary
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may
represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended
party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said
offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state thatthe petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the

action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the
State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by
the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20cralawlawlibrary
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance
of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved
party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and
maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in
obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the
violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained
the private offended partys right in a criminal case to file a special civil
action forcertiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and
ruled that the Solicitor Generals intervention was not necessary, the
recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in
her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In any
event, the OSG joins petitioners cause in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling
the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.23cralawlawlibrary
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake
of argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without
violating their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for
petitioners failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of
a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not
absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order
is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for

the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.24cralawlawlibrary
Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the
same questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower court,
essentially revolving on the guilt of the private respondents. There is also
an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would
prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the
Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent
nullity for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when it is shown that the prosecutions right to due process was
violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on the
petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court
blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to
dispense justice.25cralawlawlibrary
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of
judicial discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial
courts findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private
respondents narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a
court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion
when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a

duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the


power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the
disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus
effecting an injustice.27cralawlawlibrary
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of
proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of
discretion in acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the
evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the
prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the facts28 of the case
was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more
careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted,
from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the
case before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private respondents
testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that transpired
during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemenos house to the
following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it presented
the private respondents account and allegations as though these were the
established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support
its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider
the entire evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the
same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind
eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one partys cause and brush
the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in this case
because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The
victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual
rendezvous. Thus, the CAs blatant disregard of material prosecution
evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave
abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioners right to due
process.33cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of
the RTC and made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.

First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the
whole ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance,
never cried out for help, and never fought against the private respondents,
bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of
the assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
cralawred
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of
age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor
more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she
was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or
unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA,
however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply
because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding
her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication,
thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.35 The appellate court
never provided any reason why AAAs testimony should deserve scant or

no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing


rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself,
sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it
has been established that when a woman declares that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been
raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused
can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of
the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the
guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony itself.36 The trial court
correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not
have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was
certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she
narrated her harrowing experience.37cralawlawlibrary
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated
her. She tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her
assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAAs testimony simple and
candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise
observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were
simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony.38 Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
xxxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep,
when did you regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the
bottle of Emperador Brandy.cralawred
xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining
contained (sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.

Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?


A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were
carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy
carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?
A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was
awakened by the flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that
(sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.cralawred
xxxx

Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what
happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.cralawred
xxxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on
top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I was saying dont because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually
abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the
witness is crying.cralawred
xxxx
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of

you, who else was there inside that room?


A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?
A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
A: I could not remember, sir.cralawred
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened?
A: I went asleep again, sir.
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw
Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him dont.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.

Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you
said that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw
Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the
defense. It noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual
and incredible.40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was
belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid
culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial
stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their turn to
take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise.41 More importantly,
it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that
the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual,
as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now
enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established with
sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed
consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to
establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused
who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases,
conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is
that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during
the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when
created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the
burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and
adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44 However, when the accused
alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as

love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or


sexual relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having
admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to
the accused to prove his defense by substantial
evidence.45cralawlawlibrary
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA
but unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of
them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the lodging
house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then approached
her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter,
Oporto also removed AAAs lower garments and then went to kiss
AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between AAAs legs and had
intercourse with her.46 On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he
had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While Carampatana was
removing AAAs shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the
bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her
buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to
Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that
AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with
Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went back to
the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and
after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly
thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time.47 Despite
said shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently
prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAAs part amounts to
approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual
intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply because she
was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a
valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy
and exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the
accused after her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness.48 To be
believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the attending
circumstances.49cralawlawlibrary

When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great


weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial
evidence.50 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge
who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight
and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally
appeared before him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the
details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the
case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses,
therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the
advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due
deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any
palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the
trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive
and binding.53cralawlawlibrary
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician
found old hymenal laceration on AAAs private organ. The lack of a fresh
hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present when the alleged
sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to
the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the
vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any
laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer
innocent considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could
have resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The defense,
however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for
organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a
minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated
from high school on that same day. In a similar case,54 the Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual
intercourse with two men or three, according to Antonio Gallardo
in the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as
morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no
indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can

be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the


simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not
even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the
commission of the crime charged.55
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and be subjected to
public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true.56 And even if she
were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still
not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who
was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victims moral character in rape is
immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived
of reason or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the
private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is
the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent.57 A freshly broken
hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim
was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of
the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To
repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the womans
genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape.58cralawlawlibrary
Neither does AAAs mothers act of hitting her after learning about the rape
prove anything. It is a truism that the workings of the human mind when
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react
differently.59 Different people react differently to a given type of situation,
and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it
merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that
her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a
settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was
impelled by improper motive in making the accusation against the accused,
her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence.61 So if AAA in fact
consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell her
parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she
ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love
with any of the private respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a
relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved.63 She never
became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save

her reputation, why would she have to drag the private respondents into the
case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating
the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents
simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain
justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already
acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks
justice for her honor that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose
to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic
and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her
complaint,65 contrary to common human experience, and in utter disregard
of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the
conspiracy because his participation in the crime was
uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his participation was
not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.68 The
Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizolas liability is
not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement
to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted
in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an
offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof
of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the offense.70cralawlawlibrary
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and
Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying
weaponsduring the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling
by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not,
Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not
necessary. In this case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with

respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation


in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts
that there was conspiracy:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the
victim based on the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso
succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela
Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private
parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts
of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and
mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the
parked jeep,molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the
commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was
properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of the crime.73
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizolas participation in the
crime is not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging
House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease
and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while
Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to
stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs
lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was
conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse
AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them,
Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true
that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed
from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of
the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as
law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accusedappellant.75cralawlawlibrary

Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single
Information, it, however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As
a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense,
otherwise, the same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule
prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the
accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to
quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense
simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity
of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have
waived their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the
acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts
of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no
duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against them because the
Information, in fact, stated that they took turns in having carnal knowledge
against the will of AAA on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made
and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was
indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused
themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in
between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto
admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two
or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola
can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4)
counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus
be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while
Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAAs mouth,
the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor
because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however,
without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as

long as prescription has not yet set in.


Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or
more persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article
266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each count. With regard to
Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal,
being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of
prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and
the maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance.85 With
that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of
rape committed.86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87 which extends even to one
who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he
committed the crime when he was still a child,88 and provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:89cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps
and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the
foregoing provision should be taken into consideration by the judge in order
to accord children in conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond
twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00

as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each


case. Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by
way of an example and to deter others from committing the same bestial
acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court
hereby renders judgment:
a)

b)

c)

Finding accused-respondent Raymund


Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts
of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua in each case;
Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, in each case; and
Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly


and severally, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the
four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the
execution of judgment.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
\
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015


FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN
PEREZ, Petitioners, v. REYNALDO P. VENTUS AND JOJO B.
JOSON, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated August
11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its December 4, 2006
Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094. The CA dismissed for lack of merit
the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioners Felilibeth
Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez, praying for the following reliefs: (1) the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order to enjoin the public respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia from
implementing the Orders dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005; (2) the
issuance of a Writ ofCertiorari to annul the said Orders, and (3) the
dismissal of the estafa case against them for having been prematurely filed
and for lack of cause of action.
The procedural antecedents are as follows:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo
B. Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit3 for estafa against petitioners
Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Manila. Claiming to be business partners in financing casino players,
private respondents alleged that sometime in March and April 2002,
petitioners connived in convincing them to part with their Two Hundred
Sixty Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two
motor vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by
Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by one Levita De Castro,
manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.
On January 15, 2003, Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit,4 denying the
accusation against him, and claiming that his only participation in the
transaction between private respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to
having initially introduced them to each other.

On January 22, 2003, private respondents filed their ReplyAffidavit,5 asserting that Perez was the one who showed them photocopies
of the registration paper of the motor vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as
well as the one who personally took them out from the rent-a-car company.
On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit,6 stating that
neither original nor photocopies of the registration was required by private
respondents to be submitted to them because from the very start, they
were informed by Aguinaldo that she merely leased the vehicles from
LEDC Rent-a-Car.
On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F.
Gonzaga issued a Resolution7recommending both petitioners to be indicted
in court for estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). He also noted that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit
any controverting evidence despite the subpoena.
On July 16, 2003, an Information8 (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners
with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-216182, entitled People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo
and Benjamin Perez, the case was raffled to the public respondent.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for
Reduction of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent
granted in an Order of even date.9
On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to
Recall or Quash Warrants of Arrest,10 alleging that the Resolution dated
February 25, 2003 has not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file
a motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the
Information Prematurely Filed With the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City
of Manila.11 Citing the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez,
Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or false pretenses was
committed because private respondents were fully aware that she does not
own the pledged motor vehicles.

On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order12 granting the


motion for withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest
warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her
motion for reconsideration with the OCP.
On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of
Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed
with the OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution's motion,13 the public
respondent ordered the proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.14
On December 23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived
pending resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP
of Manila.15
On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel,
filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial,16 considering that petitioners' motions
for reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been
denied for lack of merit.
On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) a petition for review17 in I.S. No. 02L-51569 for estafa, entitled
Benjamin Perez and Felilibeth Aguinaldo v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo
B. Joson.
Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners'
motions for reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its
motion to set the case for trial, the public respondent issued an
Order18 dated March 15, 2004 directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for arraignment.
On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel
Arraignment and Suspend Further Proceedings,19 until their petition for
review before the DOJ is resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the
same prayer in their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration20 of the Order
dated March 15, 2004.
On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion
to cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for

reconsideration.21
On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapea and
Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest.22 De Castro alleged that she was the private complainant in the
estafa case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition
with Motion to Expunge,23 alleging that De Castro is not a party to the said
case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for
review before the DOJ.
On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation24 informing the public
respondent that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated
September 6, 2004 denying petitioners' petition for review in I.S. No. 02G29349 & 02G-28820 for estafa, entitled Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth
Aguinaldo.25
On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the
Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor
with conformity of the public prosecutor. x x x
It appears from the records that:
(1) the warrant of arrest issued against accused Aguinaldo was recalled
pending resolution of the Petition for Review filed with the DOJ; x x x
(2) the Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed x x x
(3) accused Aguinaldo has not yet posted bail bond.
In view of the foregoing, (the) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest is GRANTED. Let this case be REINSTATED and let
warrant of arrest be issued against accused Aguinaldo.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.26
On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Quash Warrant of Arrest.27

On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying


petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of
Arrest, and setting petitioners' arraignment, as the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows only a 60-day period of
suspension of arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul,28 he also ruled that the
issuance of the warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial
court. He also noted that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved
the petition for review, although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in issuing
the Orders dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005. On August 11, 2006,
the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution29 dated December 4,
2006. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE
THAT THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE CASE AND ISSUE A
WARRANT OF ARREST WAS FILED BY ONE LEVITA DE CASTRO WHO
IS NOT A PARTY TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182.
II.
A PROCEDURAL TECHINICALITY THAT THE SUSPENSION ALLOWED
FOR ARRAIGNMENT IS ALREADY BEYOND THE 60-DAY PERIOD MAY
BE RELAXED IN THE INTEREST OF AN ORDERLY AND SPEEDY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
III.
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE I.S. NO. 02L-51569
(CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182) BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF MANILA HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED.30
On the first issue, petitioners argue that the public respondent erred in

issuing the Order dated May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and issuing an
arrest warrant against Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and to Issue a Warrant of Arrest against Aguinaldo was
filed by De Castro who is not a party in Criminal Case No. 03-216182,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin
Perez, instead of private complainants Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B.
Joson. They also assert that said motion was erroneously granted based
on the purported denial of their petition for review by the DOJ, despite a
Certification showing that their actual petition in I.S. Number 02L-51569,
entitled Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo, has not yet been
resolved and is still pending with the DOJ.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to
only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of
their procedural right to due process, as their petition for review has not yet
been resolved by the DOJ.
On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could
receive a copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and
thus move for its reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03216182 had already been filed with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They
contend that such precipitate filing of the Information and issuance of a
warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the
preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
In support of their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the
right to preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural
right; that an Information filed without affording the respondent his right to
file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse resolution, is fatally
premature; and, that a denial of a complete preliminary investigation
deprives the accused of the full measure of his right to due process and
infringes on his constitutional right to liberty.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest31 was filed by one Levita
De Castro who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records
show that De Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness

for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in


defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with their
P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners'
motion to expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of
paper with no legal effect, as it was filed by one who is not a party to that
case.
Petitioners are also correct in noting that De Castro's motion was granted
based on the purported dismissal of their petition for review with the DOJ.
In reinstating the case and issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo, the
public respondent erroneously relied on the DOJ Resolution dated
September 6, 2004 dismissing the petition for review in a different
case, i.e., I.S. No. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820, entitled Levita De Castro v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo, for two (2) counts of estafa. As correctly noted by
petitioners, however, their petition for review with the DOJ is still pending
resolution. In particular, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido,
Jr. certified that based on available records of the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor, their petition for review filed in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled
Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo for estafa, is still pending
resolution as of May 27, 2005.32 It bears stressing that their petition
stemmed from Criminal Case No. 03-216812, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez wherein the public
respondent issued the interlocutory orders assailed before the CA, and now
before the Court.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that
the provision of Section 11 (c),33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the
suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus,
the estafa case against them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their
petition for review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway,34 the Court explained that while the pendency
of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of
60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.35
In Dio v. Olivarez,36 the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite
suspension of the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the

reviewing authority, the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the


soonest possible time was anchored on the rule provided under
Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which
mandates that the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for
review shall be seventy- five (75) days.37
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court ruled that in a long line
of decisions, it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are
liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly
applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays,
and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants,
and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere
expedience of invoking substantial justice. Relaxation or suspension of
procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is
warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice
requires it.39
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and there being no such
reasons shown to warrant relaxation of procedural rules in this case, the
CA correctly ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon
the petitioners' motion, the arraignment of the petitioners herein was
ordered deferred by the public respondent. We believe that the period of
one year and one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the
public respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
petitioner Aguinaldo, was more than ample time to give the petitioners the
opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ.
The petitioners though submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May
30, 2005 stating that their petition for review is pending resolution by the
Department as of May 27, 2005. However, such delay in the resolution
does not extend the period of 60 days prescribed under the afore-quoted
Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Besides, the petitioners may be faulted for the delay in the resolution of
their petition. According to their counsel, she received the letter dated April
15, 2004 from the DOJ requiring her to submit the pertinent pleadings
relative to petitioners' petition for review; admittedly, however, the same
was complied with only on October 15, 2004. We therefore find that the trial

court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
orders.40
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners'
argument that the precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a
warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the
preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is
a substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in
arguing that the Information filed, without affording the respondent his right
to file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally
premature. In support of their argument, petitioners cite Sales v.
Sandiganbayan41 wherein it was held that since filing of a motion for
reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper, an
Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation.
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales42 as misplaced. A closer look
into said case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to
move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman
before the filing of an Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were
afforded their right to move for reconsideration of the adverse resolution in
a preliminary investigation when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,43 pursuant to Section 3 of
the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal)44 and Section
56 of the Manual for Prosecutors45.
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July
16, 2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to
quash warrant of arrest, and setting their arraignment, pending the final
resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes that
the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the time
petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004
to September 14, 200546 when the trial court finally set their arraignment,

was more than ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a
resolution of their petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very
liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60-day period from
the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years having
elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to
be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the
merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the
filing of the petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the
affirmative. Having submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit
to the OCP of Manila before the filing of Information for estafa, Perez
cannot be heard to decry that his right to preliminary investigation was not
completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally informed of
any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information,
she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such
investigation. In petitioners' motion for reconsideration47 of the February 25,
2003 Resolution of ACP Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the CounterAffidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the recommendation of
the prosecutor to indict her for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for
reconsideration was held to be consistent with the principle of due process
and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors,48 she cannot
complain denial of her right to preliminary investigation.
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete
preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After all,
[d]ue process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to
be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.49
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16,
2005 Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest, as it was filed by one who is not a party to the case, and it was
based on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition for review in a different case.
Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August 23,

2005 Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and


setting their arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review
with the DOJ. For one, the public respondent had been very liberal in
applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which allows
suspension of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For another,
records show that petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the
preliminary investigation of their estafa case.
Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without
petitioners having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case
to the trial court for trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No.
38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or the Implementing the Provisions of
Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All
Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes.' In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot
invoke violation of their right to speedy trial because Section 9 (3) of
Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time within which trial must
commence the delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA and the Court.
Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or
petition for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest
previously issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take
place upon the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover, judges
should take note of the following:
1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for
reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court
may suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However,
the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the
public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion on
or before the period fixed by the court, which in no instance could be
more than the period fixed by the court counted from the granting of
the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise the court will proceed
with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.

2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the
court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ to
submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before the period
fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more than sixty
(60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review before the DOJ,
otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled
and without further delay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
December 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, areAFFIRMED. Considering
that the proceedings in this criminal case had been held in abeyance long
enough, let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court which is
hereby directed to try the case on the merits with dispatch in accordance
with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

FRANCISCO A. LABAO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 187984


Present:

versus CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,


BRION,

LOLITO N. FLORES, AMADO A. BERSAMIN,


DAGUISONAN, PEPE M.
VILLARAMA, JR., and
CANTAR, JULIO G. PAGENTE,
JESUS E. ARENA, CRISPIN A. SERENO, JJ.
NAVALES, OSCAR M. VENTE,
ARTEMIO B. ARAGON,
ARNOLD M. CANTAR,
ALBERTO T. CUADERO, RASMI
E. RONQUILLO, PEDRO R.
GABUTAN, ELPEDIO E.
MENTANG,* WILFREDO R.
MIOSA,** RODERICK P.
NAMBATAC, MARCIAL D.
RIVERA, SANDE E.
CASTIL,***CRISOSTOMO B.
ESIC, and AMBROSIO M.
CANTAR,****
Respondents.
Promulgated:
November 15, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner


Francisco A. Labao (petitioner) to challenge the decision[2]and
resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN.[4]
The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.

The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San


Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), a licensed security-service
contractor. Respondents Lolito N. Flores, Amado A. Daguisonan, Pepe M.
Cantar, Julio G. Pagente, Jesus E. Arena, Crispin A. Navales, Oscar M.
Vente, Artemio B. Aragon, Arnold M. Cantar, Alberto T. Cuadero, Rasmi E.
Ronquillo, Pedro R. Gabutan, Elpedio E. Mentang, Wilfredo R. Miosa,
Roderick P. Nambatac, Marcial D. Rivera, Sande E. Castil, Crisostomo B.
Esic, Ambrosio M. Cantar (respondents) and Jimmy O. Bicoy, were
SMPSA security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation,
Mindanao Regional Center (NPC-MRC), Ditucalan, Iligan City. Each of the
respondents had a monthly salary of P7,020.00.

On July 27, 2004, the petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all


security guards to submit their updated personal data files, security guard
professional license, and other pertinent documents by July 30, 2004 for
reevaluation in connection with the SMPSAs new service contract with the
NPC-MRC. [5]

When respondents failed to comply with the petitioners directive,


despite several notices to do so, the petitioner relieved them from NPCMRC duty starting September and October 2004, and ordered them to
report to the Senior Operations Officer, Nemesio Sombilon, for new
assignments.

Sometime in March and April 2005, the respondents filed individual


complaints with the Iligan City Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal and
money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed when they were
not given new assignments for a period of over 6 months, despite repeated
requests for NPC-MRC redeployment and for new assignments. The
complaints were consolidated.

The petitioner and SMPSA denied the charge of constructive


dismissal. They countered that the respondents relief from NPC-MRC duty
was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Furthermore, they
issued a notice (dated January 17, 2005)[6]directing the respondents to
report to SMPSAs main office for new assignments, but the latter failed or
refused to comply without any valid reasons.

The Labor Arbiter Ruling

In a December 27, 2005 decision, Labor Arbiter (LA) Noel Augusto S.


Magbanua dismissed the consolidated complaints for lack of merit. He held
that the respondents relief from NPC-MRC duty was due to their failure to
comply with SMSPAs requirement for its employees to submit updated
documents to meet NPC-MRC contract renewal requirements. According to
the LA, this was a legitimate exercise of NPC-MRCs management
prerogative, in light of the information it received that some security guards
carried falsified documents.[7]

The respondents appealed the dismissal of their complaints to the


NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In a July 31, 2006 resolution, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision. It


noted that the respondents relief was in good faith, without grave abuse of
discretion, and in the best interest of the business enterprise since SMPSA
merely exercised its management prerogative and discretion to protect its
business interest.[8]

It also noted that the respondents temporary off-detail did not exceed
the 6-month period permitted by law, since the respondents were directed,
through the January 17, 2005 notice, to report for a new assignment on
January 25, 2005, but they failed or refused to do so.

In a September 29, 2006 resolution, the NLRC denied the


respondents subsequent motion for reconsideration.[9] The respondents
counsel, Atty. Demosthenes R. Plando, received the September 29, 2006
resolution on October 13, 2006.

Eighty-eight (88) days later, or on January 9, 2007, the respondents,


through their new counsel, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that they were informed of the

September 29, 2006 resolution onDecember 6, 2006, while Bicoy received


a copy of the resolution on November 6, 2006.

The CA Ruling

In its September 5, 2008 decision, the CA set aside the NLRC


resolution, finding that the respondents were constructively dismissed when
they were not given new assignments for more than 6 months, from
September and October 2004, when the respondents were off-detailed,
until March and April 2005, when they filed their individual complaints for
illegal dismissal. The appellate court noted that the January 17, 2005 notice
to report for new assignments did not toll the 6-month floating status period
since the respondents failed to receive the notice before the appointed
date, as SMPSA sent the notice by registered mail, which normally takes at
least 5 working days to reach the intended recipients.[10]

Finding that reinstatement was no longer viable under the


circumstances, the CA awarded the respondents separation pay at one (1)
months salary for every year of service, plus full backwages, allowances
and other statutory benefits under the law.

The petitioner and SMPSA moved for reconsideration, arguing that


the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for late filing, and that
there was no compelling reason for the reversal of the LA and the NLRCs
factual findings.[11]

In its April 22, 2009 resolution, the CA modified its September 5,


2008 decision by dismissing Bicoys petition for having been filed out of
time. However, it considered the respondents petition as timely filed. It also

opined that disregarding any procedural lapses best served substantial


justice.[12]

The petitioner then filed the present petition. Bicoy, with respondents
Castil, Esic, and Ambrocio M. Cantar filed a separate appeal, docketed as
G.R. No. 190848. The Court denied this appeal in its April 5, 2010
resolution for late filing and for non-compliance with Rules 45 and 46 of the
Rules of Court.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that: (a) the respondents CA petition


for certiorari was filed 28 days late; (b) the respondents new counsel
concealed Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 26,
2006 resolution and relied on the respondents December 6, 2006 notice of
the resolution; and (c) the evidence on record supports the LA and NLRC
decisions.

The Case for the Respondents

In contrast, the respondents submit that: (a) December 6, 2006 is the


reckoning date of the 60-day period; (b) Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006
receipt did not bind them because his secretary, Sonia M. Barnachea,
misplaced the September 29, 2006 resolution and they should not suffer for
her negligence; and (c) the evidence on record does not support the LA
and NLRC rulings.

Issue

The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in acting on the
respondents petition despite its late filing, and in reversing the LA and
NLRC decisions.

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

Timeliness of the CA petition for certiorari

Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil


Procedure,[13] certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from
notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed.[14] The
60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would
violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
case.[15]

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist
for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to
provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial
system.[16] While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on

reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the


prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business.[17] The timeliness of filing a pleading
is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.[18]

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or


dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a
party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed.
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance,
such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant
from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the
case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances.[19]Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for
his/her failure to comply with the rules.

Negligence of former counsel binds the respondents

In the present case, the respondents petition for certiorari was filed
twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt of
the September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they should
not suffer for Atty. Plandos negligence in failing to inform them of the

September 29, 2006 resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day
period should be their December 6, 2006 notice.

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of
his counsel in the realm of procedural technique.[20] The exception to this
rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and
inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.[21] The failure of a
partys counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable him
to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not excusable. We have
repeatedly held that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon
the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an
adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.[22]

We cannot sustain the respondents argument that they cannot be bound by


Atty. Plandos negligence since this would set a dangerous precedent. It
would enable every party-litigant to render inoperative any adverse order or
decision of the courts or tribunals, through the simple expedient of alleging
his/her counsels gross negligence.

We thus find that the CA erred in acting on the respondents petition


for certiorari despite its late filing. The NLRC resolution was already final
and executory, and the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition,
except to order its dismissal.

Immutability of NLRC resolution

The NLRCs resolution became final ten (10) days after counsels
receipt, and the respondents failure to file the petition within the required
(60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65

petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the
resolution.[23]

Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes


immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or
law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.[24] All the issues between the parties are deemed
resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory;
execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are
acquired by the winning party.[25] Just as a losing party has the right to
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.[26] After all, a denial of
a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the
merits.[27] Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to
naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the
rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.[28]

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed


decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter
is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

ANITA CHENG,

G.R. No. 174238


Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and

Promulgated:

TESSIE SY,
Respondents.

July 7, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of


Court of the Order dated January 2, 2006[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng
v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy.

The antecedents are as follows

Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7,
Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case
No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953
against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)
Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their
loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been
drawn against a closed account.

Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed
against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25,
Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).

On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases
for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the
civil liability of Tessie Sy.[3] On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case
No. 98-969953 contained a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the
accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in nature.[4]

Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg.
22 cases in its Order[5] dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of
petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also
did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused
respondents.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC,
Branch 18, Manila, a complaint[6] for collection of a sum of money with
damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount
of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the
estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.

In the assailed Order[7] dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila,
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil
action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already
impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph
(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[8] which the court denied in its
Order[9] dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal
issue

Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of


Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on
the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of
criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present
case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for
bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the
failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused
(respondents herein)?[10]

Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on
January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given
only prospective application. She further contends that that her case falls
within the following exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent
to the criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter

(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is


necessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of the case;

(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even


more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings
on the civil aspect of the case;

(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the


civil liability of the accused amounting to a reservation of
the right to have the civil liability litigated in a separate
action;

(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist;

(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation excontractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article 31[11] of
the Civil Code; and

(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under
Article 29[12] of the Civil Code.

Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private
prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against
respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express
reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding
civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal
cases.[13]

This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa
and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was
impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial
courts. This is consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada[14] that
the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing
check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the
estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously
available to the complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against
forum shopping.[15] Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP
Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have
elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal
proceedings to the exclusion of the other.[16]
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubtwhere in Criminal Case No.
98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the
accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared

that the liability of the accused was only civil in natureproduced the legal
effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the
civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of
the Civil Code.[17]

However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on
account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the
petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be
prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v.
Ponferrada ruling.

With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the
identity of the accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal
would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put
differently, may petitioners action to recover respondents civil liability be
also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were
dismissed?

Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal


Procedure states

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22


shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not
so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded
by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in
1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already
pending at the time of their promulgation.The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason
for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.[18]

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of
BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of
the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the
separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate
civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP
Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal
the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions
for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.[19]

Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while


not cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of
justice and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this
objective.[20]

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that


petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover from respondents
the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the
petitioners Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special
Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin
Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly
archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of
time.[21]Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that
petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the
amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was not assisted
by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings
critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to
protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the
identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the
civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this
ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners


recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to
appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents
corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may
proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of
petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary period was
tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability
of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the
BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of
their counsel.[22] But this rule admits of exceptions (1) where the counsels
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his
day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting
in the clients deprivation of liberty or property without due process of
law.[23] Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioners lot falls
within the exceptions.

It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of


existing laws and rules and to keep abreast with legal developments,
recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with
such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the Bar.[24] Further, lawyers in the
government service are expected to be more conscientious in the

performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are
not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost
fidelity to public service.[25] Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to
equip himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22
cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed to
appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the
only remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the
money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases
on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to
prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.

Moreover, we take into consideration the trial courts observation


when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if
there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in
nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to
recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of
respondents, as they may now conveniently evade payment of their
obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited,


and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to
another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to
profit or enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense. One condition for
invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has
no other recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or
any other provision of law.[26]

Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a
liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties
the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the
truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances
should not be barred by technicalities.[27] For reasons of substantial justice

and equity, as the complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to


dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules
and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent to do so,[28] we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452


entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby
ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ATTY. MANGONTAWAR M. GUBAT,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167415

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,


Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 26, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:


Truly, there is no doubt that the rights of others cannot be prejudiced
by private agreements. However, before this Court can act and
decide to protect the one apparently prejudiced, we should
remember what Aesop taught in one of his fables: Every truth has
two sides; it is well to look at both, before we commit ourselves to
either.
A lawyer asserts his right to his contingent fees after his clients, allegedly behind
his back, had entered into an out-of-court settlement with the National Power
Corporation (NPC). The trial court granted his claim by way of summary
judgment. However, this was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA) because
the counsel was allegedly enforcing a decision that was already vacated. In this
petition, petitioner Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat (Atty. Gubat) attempts to
persuade us that the compensation due him is independent of the vacated
decision, his entitlement thereto being based on another reason: the bad faith of
his clients and of the respondent NPC.
Factual Antecedents
In August 1990, plaintiffs Ala Mambuay, Norma Maba, and Acur Macarampat
separately filed civil suits for damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Sur in Marawi City (RTC), respectively docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 294-90, 295-90, and 296-90. In the said complaint, plaintiffs were
represented by Atty. Linang Mandangan (Atty. Mandangan) and petitioner
herein, whose services were engaged at an agreed attorneys fees
of P30,000.00 for each case and P600.00 for every appearance. Petitioner was
the one who signed the complaints on behalf of himself and Atty. Mandangan.[1]
During the course of the proceedings, the three complaints were
consolidated because the plaintiffs causes of action are similar. They all arose

from NPCs refusal to pay the amounts demanded by the plaintiffs for the cost of
the improvements on their respective lands which were destroyed when the
NPC constructed the Marawi-Malabang Transmission Line.
On the day of the initial hearing on the merits, NPC and its counsel failed to
appear. Consequently, respondent was declared in default.Despite the plea of
NPC for the lifting of the default order, the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8,
rendered its Decision[2] on April 24, 1991, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the herein plaintiffs and against the defendant National
Power Corporation as represented by its President Ernesto Aboitiz,
P.M. Durias and Rodrigo P. Falcon, ordering the latter jointly and
severally:
(1)
In Civil Case No. 204-90 to pay plaintiff Ala Mambuay
the sum of P103,000.00 representing the value of the improvements
and the occupied portion of the land, P32,000.00 as attorneys
fees, P20,000.00 as moral and/or exemplary damages, P50,000.00
as actual damages and the costs;
(2)
In Civil Case No. 295-90 to pay plaintiff Norma Maba
represented by Capt. Ali B. Hadji Ali the sum of P146,700.00
representing the value of the improvements and the occupied
portion of the land, P32,000.00 as attorneys fees, P20,000.00 as
moral and/or exemplary damages,P50,000.00 as actual damages
and the costs;
(3)
In Civil Case No. 296-90 to pay plaintiff Acur
Macarampat the sum of P94,100.00 representing the value of the
improvements and the occupied portion of the land, P32,000.00 as
attorneys fees, P20,000.00 as moral and/or exemplary
damages, P50,000.00 as actual damages and the costs.[3]

NPC appealed to the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.


33000. During the pendency of the appeal, Atty. Gubat filed an Entry and Notice
of Charging Lien[4] to impose his attorneys lien of P30,000.00 and appearance
fees of P2,000.00 on each of the three civil cases he handled,
totalling P96,000.00.
On August 19, 1992, NPC moved to dismiss its appeal[5] alleging that the
parties had arrived at a settlement. Attached to the motion were
acknowledgment receipts[6] dated April 2, 1992 signed by plaintiffs Acur
Macarampat,
Ala
Mambuay,
and
Norma
Maba,
who
receivedP90,060.00, P90,000.00, and P90,050.00 respectively, in full
satisfaction of their claims against the NPC. The motion stated that copies were
furnished to Atty. Mandangan and herein petitioner,
although it was only Atty. Mandangans signature which appeared therein.[7]
On January 24, 1996, the CA rendered its Decision[8] disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Order of Default dated December 11,
1990; the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration to Lift
Order of Default dated January 25, 1991; and the Decision dated
April 24, 1991, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the
records of Civil Case Nos. 294-90, 295-90 and 296-90 are hereby
ordered remanded to the court of origin for new trial.[9]
After the cases were remanded to the RTC, petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment[10] on his attorneys fees. He claimed that the plaintiffs
and the NPC deliberately did not inform him about the execution of the
compromise agreement, and that said parties connived with each other in
entering into the compromise agreement in order to unjustly deprive him of his
attorneys fees. Furthermore, he alleged:
xxxx

12. That, in view of such settlement, there are no more genuine


issues between the parties in the above-entitled cases except as to
the attorneys fees; As such, this Honorable Court may validly render
a partial summary judgment on the claim for attorneys fees; and
13.
That the undersigned counsel hereby MOVES for a
partial summary judgment on his lawful attorneys fees based on the
pleadings and documents on file with the records of this case.[11]
xxxx
Petitioner thus prayed that a partial summary judgment be rendered on his
attorneys fess and that NPC be ordered to pay him directly his lawful attorneys
fees of P32,000.00 in each of the above cases, for a total of P96,000.00.
NPC opposed the motion for partial summary of judgment. It alleged that a
client may compromise a suit without the intervention of the lawyer and that
petitioners claim for attorneys fees should be made against the plaintiffs. NPC
likewise claimed that it settled the case in good faith and that plaintiffs were paid
in full satisfaction of their claims which included attorneys fees.
On March 15, 2000, the trial court issued an Order[12] granting petitioners
motion for summary judgment. It found that the parties to the compromise
agreement connived to petitioners prejudice which amounts to a violation of the
provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations.[13] It ruled that:
xxxx
There is no dispute that the Compromise Agreement was
executed during the pendency of these cases with the Honorable
Court of Appeals.Despite the knowledge of the defendant that the
services of the movant was on a contingent basis, defendant
proceeded with the Compromise Agreement without the knowledge
of Atty. Gubat. The actuation of the defendant is fraudulently
designed to deprive the movant of his lawful attorneys fees which

was earlier determined and awarded by the Court. Had defendant


been in good faith in terminating these cases, Atty. Gubat could
have been easily contacted.
x x x x[14]
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs Ala Mambuay,
Norma Maba and Acur Macarampat as well as defendant National
Power Corporation are hereby ordered to pay jointly and solidarily
Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat the sum of P96,000.00.[15]
NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] but the motion was denied by
the
trial court in its June 27, 2000 Order.[17] Thus, NPC filed a Petition
for Certiorari[18] before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60722, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the court a quo for granting petitioners Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. It prayed that the subject order be set aside insofar
as NPC is concerned.
NPC maintained that it acted in good faith in the execution of the
compromise settlement. It likewise averred that the lower courts award of
attorneys fees amounting to P96,000.00 was clearly based on the award of
attorneys fees in the April 24, 1991 Decision of the trial court which had already
been reversed and set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 33000. Moreover,
NPC contended that petitioner cannot enforce his charging lien because it
presupposes that he has secured a favorable money judgment for his clients. At
any rate, since petitioner is obviously pursuing the compensation for the services
he rendered to his clients, thus, recourse should only be against them, the
payment being their personal obligation and not of respondent. NPC further
alleged that even assuming that the subject attorneys fees are those that fall
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code[19] which is in the concept of indemnity for
damages to be paid to the winning party in a litigation, such fees belong to the

clients and not to the lawyer, and this form of damages has already been paid
directly to the plaintiffs.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he was not informed of the
compromise agreement or furnished a copy of NPCs Motion to Dismiss
Appeal. He alleged that the same was received only by Atty. Mandangan who
neither signed any of the pleadings nor appeared in any of the hearings before
the RTC. Petitioner clarified that his motion for a partial summary judgment was
neither a request for the revival of the vacated April 24, 1991 Decision nor an
enforcement of the lien, but a grant of his contingent fees by the trial court as
indemnity for damages resulting from the fraudulent act of NPC and of his clients
who conspired to deprive him of the fees due him. He asserted that NPC cannot
claim good faith because it knew of the existence of his charging lien when it
entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs.
Petitioner also alleged that NPCs remedy should have been an ordinary
appeal and not a petition for certiorari because the compromise agreement had
settled the civil suits. Thus, when the trial court granted the motion for partial
summary judgment on his fees, it was a final disposition of the entire case. He
also argued that the issue of bad faith is factual which cannot be a subject of
a certiorari petition. He also insisted that NPCs petition was defective for lack of
a board resolution authorizing Special Attorney Comie Doromal (Atty. Doromal)
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to sign on NPCs behalf.
On September 9, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision[20] ruling that:
The reasoning of Atty. Gubat is a crude palusot (a sneaky
fallacious reasoning) for how can one enforce a part of a decision
which has been declared void and vacated. In legal contemplation,
there is no more decision because, precisely, the case was
remanded to the court a quo for further proceeding.

It was bad enough that Atty. Gubat tried to pull a fast [one] but
it was [worse] that respondent Judge fell for it resulting in a plainly
erroneous resolution.
Like his predecessor Judge Adiong, Judge Macarambon
committed basic errors unquestionably rising to the level of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court issues
the writ of certiorari and strikes down as void the Order dated March
15, 2000 granting Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubats Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as well as the Order dated June 27, 2000
denying petitioner National Power Corporations Motion for
Reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied by
the CA in its January 19, 2005 Resolution,[22] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner insists on the propriety of the trial courts order of summary
judgment on his attorneys fees. At the same time, he imputes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the CA for entertaining
respondents Petition for Certiorari. He maintains that the petition should have
been dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of appeal.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners resort to Rule 65 is not proper.
At the outset, the petition should have been dismissed outright because
petitioner resorted to the wrong mode of appeal by filing the instant petition

for certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1 of the said Rule explicitly provides that a
petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the
remedy of appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
not only available but also the proper mode of appeal. For all intents and
purposes, we find that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule
65 as a substitute for a lost appeal. We note that petitioner received a copy of
theJanuary 19, 2005 Resolution of the CA denying his motion for
reconsideration on January 28, 2005. Under Section 2 of Rule 45, petitioner has
15 days from notice of the said Resolution within which to file his petition for
review on certiorari. As such, he should have filed his appeal on or
before February 12, 2005. However, records show that the petition was posted
on March 1, 2005, or long after the period to file the appeal has lapsed.
At any rate, even if we treat the instant petition as one filed under Rule 45, the
same should still be denied for failure on the part of the petitioner to show that
the CA committed a reversible error warranting the exercise of our discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.
Petitioners resort to summary judgment is
not proper; he is not entitled to an
immediate relief as a matter of law, for the
existence of bad faith is a genuine issue of
fact to be tried.
A summary judgment is allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds that except
as to the amount of damages, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and
admissions show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[23]The purpose of a summary judgment
is to avoid drawn out litigations and useless delays because the facts appear
undisputed to the mind of the court. Such judgment is generally based on the
facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of
the parties.[24] For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for

summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of


genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to
constitute a genuine issue.[25] Genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls
for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious
or contrived.[26]
Petitioner pleaded for a summary judgment on his fees on the claim that
the parties intentionally did not inform him of the settlement.He alleged that he
never received a copy of NPCs Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the CA and
that instead, it was another lawyer who was furnished and who acknowledged
receipt of the motion. When he confronted his clients, he was allegedly told that
the NPC deceived them into believing that what they received was only a partial
payment exclusive of the attorneys fees. NPC contested these averments. It
claimed good faith in the execution of the compromise agreement. It stressed
that the attorneys fees were already deemed included in the monetary
consideration given to the plaintiffs for the compromise.
The above averments clearly pose factual issues which make the
rendition of summary judgment not proper. Bad faith imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It is
synonymous with fraud, in that it involves a design to mislead or deceive
another.[27] The trial court should have exercised prudence by requiring the
presentation of evidence in a formal trial to determine the veracity of the parties
respective assertions. Whether NPC and the plaintiffs connived and acted in bad
faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. Bad faith has to be established by
the claimant with clear and convincing evidence, and this necessitates an
examination of the evidence of all the parties. As certain facts pleaded were
being contested by the opposing parties, such would not warrant a rendition of
summary judgment.

Moreover, the validity or the correct interpretation of the alleged


compromise agreements is still in issue in view of the diverse interpretations of
the parties thereto. In fact, in the Decision of the CA dated January 24, 1996, the
appellate court ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for new trial,
thereby ignoring completely NPCs motion to dismiss appeal based on the
alleged compromise agreements it executed with the plaintiffs. Even in its
assailed Decision of September 9, 2002, the CA did not rule on the validity of the
alleged compromise agreements. This is only to be expected in view of its earlier
ruling dated January 24, 1996 which directed the remand of the case to the court
of origin for new trial.
Considering the above disquisition, there is still a factual issue on whether
the NPC and the plaintiffs had already validly entered into a compromise
agreement. Clearly, the NPC and the plaintiffs have diverse interpretations as
regards the stipulations of the compromise agreement which must be
resolved. According to the NPC, the amounts it paid to the plaintiffs were in full
satisfaction of their claims.Plaintiffs claim otherwise. They insist that the amounts
they received were exclusive of attorneys claim. They also assert that NPC
undertook to pay the said attorneys fees to herein petitioner.
A client may enter into a compromise
agreement without the intervention of the
lawyer, but the terms of the agreement
should not deprive the counsel of his
compensation for the professional services
he had rendered. If so, the compromise
shall be subjected to said fees. If the client
and the adverse party who assented to the
compromise are found to have intentionally
deprived the lawyer of his fees, the terms
of the compromise, insofar as they
prejudice the lawyer, will be set aside,
making both parties accountable to pay the
lawyers fees. But in all cases, it is the client

who is bound to pay his lawyer for his legal


representation.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.[28] It is a
consensual contract, binding upon the signatories/privies, and it has the effect
of res judicata.[29] This cannot however affect third persons who are not parties to
the agreement.[30]
Contrary to petitioners contention, a client has an undoubted right to settle
a suit without the intervention of his lawyer,[31] for he is generally conceded to
have the exclusive control over the subject-matter of the litigation and may, at
any time before judgment, if acting in good faith, compromise, settle, and adjust
his cause of action out of court without his attorneys intervention, knowledge, or
consent, even though he has agreed with his attorney not to do so.[32] Hence, a
claim for attorneys fees does not void the compromise agreement and is no
obstacle to a court approval.[33]
However, counsel is not without remedy. As the validity of a compromise
agreement cannot be prejudiced, so should not be the payment of a lawyers
adequate and reasonable compensation for his services should the suit end by
reason of the settlement. The terms of the compromise subscribed to by the
client should not be such that will amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyers
fees, especially when the contract is on a contingent fee basis. In this sense, the
compromise settlement cannot bind the lawyer as a third party. A lawyer is as
much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the
part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The
duty of the court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful
manner, but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees.[34]
Even if the compensation of a counsel is dependent only upon winning a
case he himself secured for his client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on

the clients own volition should never completely deprive counsel of any
legitimate compensation for his professional services.[35] In all cases, a client is
bound to pay his lawyer for his services. The determination of bad faith only
becomes significant and relevant if the adverse party will likewise be held liable
in shouldering the attorneys fees.[36]
Petitioners compensation is a personal obligation of his clients who have
benefited from his legal services prior to their execution of the compromise
agreement. This is strictly a contract between them. NPC would only be made
liable if it was shown that it has connived with the petitioners clients or acted in
bad faith in the execution of the compromise agreement for the purpose of
depriving petitioner of his lawful claims for attorneys fees. In each case, NPC
should be held solidarily liable for the payment of the counsels
compensation. However, as we have already discussed, petitioners resort to
summary judgment is not proper. Besides, it is interesting to note that petitioner
is the only one claiming for his attorneys fees notwithstanding that plaintiffs
counsels of record were petitioner herein and Atty. Mandangan. Nevertheless,
this is not at issue here. As we have previously discussed, this is for the trial
court to resolve.
The CA soundly exercised its discretion in
resorting to a liberal application of the
rules. There are no vested right to
technicalities.

Concededly, the NPC may have pursued the wrong remedy when it filed a
petition for certiorari instead of an appeal since the ruling on attorneys fees is
already a ruling on the merits. However, we find that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered
NPC solidarily liable with the plaintiffs for the payment of the attorneys fees. The
rule that a petition for certiorari is dismissible when the mode of appeal is

available admits of exceptions, to wit: (a) when the writs issued are null; and, (b)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.[37] Clearly, respondent has shown its entitlement to the exceptions.
The same liberal application should also apply to the question of the alleged lack
of authority of Atty. Doromal to execute the certification of non-forum shopping
for lack of a board resolution from the NPC. True, only individuals vested with
authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping in behalf of the corporation, and proof of such authority must be
attached to the petition,[38] the failure of which will be sufficient cause for
dismissal. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Atty. Doromal does not enjoy the
presumption that he is authorized to represent respondent in filing the Petition
for Certiorari before the CA. As Special Attorney, he is one of the counsels of
NPC in the proceedings before the trial court, and the NPC never questioned his
authority to sign the petition for its behalf.
In any case, the substantive issues we have already discussed are
justifiable reasons to relax the rules of procedure. We cannot allow a patently
wrong judgment to be implemented because of technical lapses. This
ratiocination is in keeping with the policy to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.[39] As we have explained
in Alonso v. Villamor:[40]
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their
forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were
created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself,
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other
words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of
the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault
and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their
obvious duty.

The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage


of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair
sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's case
smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of
technicalities in which one more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the
other. It is rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing
aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Law-suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves
scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record
of a court of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial
rights have not been prejudiced thereby.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The September 9, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its January
19, 2005 Resolution are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179611

March 12, 2013

EFREN S. ALMUETE, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal;
otherwise, the decision becomes final.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the May 4, 2007 Resolution4and the September 4, 2007
Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98502.
Factual Antecedents
This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as G.R.
No. 144332 and promulgated on June 10, 2004.
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
27, with violation of Section 687 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,
otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines," as
amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,8 docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2672.9
On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioners counsel
informed the trial court that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not
notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The RTC, however, found their
absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as
scheduled.11 The dispositive portion of the September 8, 1998 Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila
y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended, they are each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum period. Costs against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12

Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and
Lloren13 and issued warrants of arrest against them.14
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the
validity of the promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction,
and the correctness of the penalty imposed.15
On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit.16
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49953, with the CA.17
On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
GRANTED. On the basis of the evidence on record, accused Efren S.
Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against
him.
The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the
presence of the accused Ila and Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of their
own choice, after notice and allow them to appeal. Let the complete
records of this case be remanded to the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.18
The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate
the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144332.
On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioners acquittal and reinstated
the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order, to
wit:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
September 8, 1998 and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied
by this Court in a Resolution dated January 17, 2005.20
On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21
Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration,
which were denied by this Court in its March 28, 2005 and November 9,
2005 Resolutions, respectively.22
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he could still
appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without
action his Motion for Clarification in its July 26, 2006 Resolution.24
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Repromulgation25 of the September 8, 1998 Decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order,26 denied the Motion for
Repromulgation.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its
February 20, 2007 Order.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari28 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA rendered its
Resolution29 which dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration30 was likewise denied by the CA in
its September 4, 2007 Resolution.31
Issues
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner raising the following issues:
1. Whether x x x the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner
Almuete of the charge against him passed the requisite conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Whether x x x the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC


convicting the petitioner was valid despite the absence of the
petitioner and regardless of petitioners intention to be present at the
promulgation of the Decision.
3. Whether x x x the Honorable CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it acquitted petitioner Almuete in a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
4. Whether x x x the judgment of acquittal by the Honorable CA bars
further proceedings and that to do so would constitute a violation of
petitioners constitutional right against double jeopardy.
5. Whether x x x the denial of the RTC of petitioners motion for repromulgation is in order, the denial being based on an inappropriate
Administrative Order of this Honorable Supreme Court (Administrative
Order No. 16-93).32
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly
convicted by the RTC because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.33 He argues that his conviction was based on circumstantial and
hearsay evidence as he was convicted only because he owns the truck
containing the lumber.34 Thus, he contends that his earlier acquittal by the
CA was proper,35 and that his acquittal can no longer be assailed without
violating the principle of double jeopardy.36
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the promulgation of the judgment
against him since it was made in his absence.37 He insists that he had a
valid reason for not attending the promulgation of the judgment as he was
suffering from stress, anxiety, and some physiological disturbance, and
thus, was advised to rest.38 He also claims that the RTCs denial of his
Motion for Repromulgation was not proper.39 Hence, a repromulgation of
the judgment should be made to allow him to avail of his right to appeal.40
Respondents Arguments
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, contends that the issues
and arguments raised by petitioner may no longer be entertained as these

have been addressed in People v. Court of Appeals,41 which is already the


"law of the case."42 He likewise points out that the promulgation of
judgment in absentia is allowed under Section 643of Rule 120 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure,44 and that the denial of petitioners Motion for
Repromulgation of the September 8, 1998 Decision is proper as the same
is in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93.45
As to petitioners right to appeal, respondent opines that petitioners right
has prescribed,46 as the same should have been filed within 15 days from
the time he or his counsel received a copy of the September 8, 1998
Decision instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.47
However, notwithstanding the finality of petitioners conviction, respondent
recommends that the penalty be modified by reducing the same to six (6)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).48
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The denial of the Motion for
Repromulgation is in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 16-93
Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993, provides
that:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
RE: PROCEDURE AFTER AFFIRMANCE OR MODIFICATION BY
SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS OF JUDGMENTS OF
CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
To ensure uniformity in the procedure to be observed by the trial courts in
criminal cases after their judgments of conviction shall have been affirmed
or modified by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, attention is
invited to the decisional and statutory guidelines set out hereunder.

1. The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in


criminal cases, differs from that prescribed for the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals where promulgation is effected by filing the signed copy of
the judgment with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies thereof to be
served upon the parties. The procedural consequence of this distinction
was reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of Prisons, to wit:
By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in
relation to section 17 of Rule 120 (now Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment
is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the
records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
judgment for execution.
In the case of People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it
was explained that "the certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of
the appellate court to the lower court under section 9 of rule 53, not for the
promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the execution of
the judgment against him," it "not being necessary to promulgate or read it
to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney
had already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as
amended, of the same Rules 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule 51)," and
that the duty of the court of first instance in respect to such judgment is
merely to see that it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention
of the court of first instance is necessary to that end.
2. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for
"promulgation" of the judgment of the appellate court should, therefore, be
immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage
entailing unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems
where the convict was already under detention during the pendency of the
appeal, and the place of confinement is at some distance from the station
of the court. Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the
appellate court if the convict is under detention, the trial court should issue
forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the
prisoner may be considered remitted or may be transferred to the
corresponding prison facility for confinement and service of sentence.
When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall immediately order the
bondsman to surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and
thereafter issue the corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court

shall submit to this Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen
(15) days from date of such execution. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to
appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or
modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal
cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC
in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTCs September 8, 1998
Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals.49
The promulgation of judgment is valid.
Petitioners attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTCs
September 8, 1998 Decision must likewise fail as this has already been
addressed by this Court in People v. Court of Appeals.50 As this Court has
explained, there was no reason to postpone the promulgation because
petitioners absence was unjustifiable.51Hence, no abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence
of petitioner.52
It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained
finality. In fact, an Entry of Judgment was made by this Court on February
15, 2005.
Petitioners right to appeal has prescribed.
As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998
Decision, we rule in the negative.
In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioners acquittal by
the CA as it was made with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained
that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because "the
authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its
judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of
error."54 Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal,
petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Thus:
In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused,
respondents herein, guilty of the crime charged based on the evidence on

record and the law involved, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and
305 of the Revised Penal Code. They had a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law to overturn the decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision on its merits, and for the nullification of
the promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial courts denial of their
motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of
error, from the decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The
appeal of the petitioners in due course was a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners could question the findings of facts
of the trial court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the
penalty imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case open for review and that the appellate court
can reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or unassigned,
found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of
error, the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing
the decision of the trial court on its merits. They questioned their conviction
and the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to
prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being
merely hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents
alleged mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It
behooved the appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of
giving it due course and granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record, its
findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA
forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which
to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent Almuete of
the crime charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it
ventured beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the
certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the trial
court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible
only by appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA
acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is
authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and
undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the
statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of
statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. In this case, the CA is authorized to entertain and


resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or
create rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent Almuete
cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate courts
decision.55 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioners right to appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision
has long prescribed. Consequently, the said Decision is no longer open to
an appeal.
The penalty imposed must be modified.
Nonetheless, we agree with the suggestion of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the penalty imposed by the RTC in its September 8, 1998
Decision must be modified. Concededly, this case is an offshoot of G.R.
No. 144332 which the Court decided on June 10, 2004 which found grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in acquitting Almuete.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides that:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools

illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state
that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in
the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the
plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied)
Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty
as prescribed in Article 310 which is two degrees higher than those
specified in Article 309.56 This is erroneous considering that the penalty
prescribed in Article 310 would apply only if the theft was committed under
any the following circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of
the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these

circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable


penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article 309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is P57,012.00. Since the
amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods57 should be imposed in its maximum period58 plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000 pesos in excess
of P22,000.00 or three more years.59 Thus, the correct imposable
maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one
degree lower than that prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum
penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years.
This Court is not unaware of the rule that "a final judgment may no longer
be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest
court of the land, rendered it."60 However, this Court has suspended the
application of this rule based on certain recognized exceptions, viz:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant
the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an
examination and review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings
of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.61
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty
of petitioner. If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would
be not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside

the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper
imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of
2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the
maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day
of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice
demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the
power of the court to suspend its own Rules or except a particular case
from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed,
when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would
result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to
relax the same in the interest of substantial justice."62 Suspending the
Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as
serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof."63 After all,
the Courts "primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x."64
Surely, this is not the first time that the Court modified the penalty imposed
notwithstanding the finality of the assailed decision.
In People v. Barro,65 Benigno Barro (Benigno), Joel Florin (Florin) and Joel
Barro (Joel) were charged with murder. After trial, the trial court convicted
them as charged. Only Benigno and Florin filed their notice of appeal. Joel
failed to appeal as he escaped from confinement. Hence, the trial courts
Decision insofar as Joel is concerned had become final and executory. In
the Courts Decision of August 17, 2000, the appeal filed by Benigno and
Florin was found without merit. However, the Court noted that as regards
Joel, the penalty imposed by the trial court was "outside the range"66 of the
penalty prescribed for the offense. Consequently, the Court modified the
penalty imposed on him notwithstanding that the same had already
become final and executory. The Court ratiocinated that:
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense,
is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to
Article 68, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Two degrees lower is
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Joel Barro
escaped from jail, hence, he is disqualified from the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be meted the straight
penalty of eight years which is within the medium period (6 years 1 month
and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court
erred in imposing the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months

because it is outside the range of said penalty. The records show that Joel
Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty imposed on the coaccused who did not appeal was a nullity because it was never authorized
by law, that penalty imposed on the accused can be corrected to make it
conform to the penalty prescribed by law, the reason being that, said
penalty can never become final and executory and it is within the duty and
inherent power of the Court to have it conformable with law.67
In Estrada v. People,68 petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa.
While the trial was pending, petitioner jumped bail. Understandably, during
the promulgation of judgment in 1997, petitioner was absent. Two years
later, or in 1999, petitioner was arrested. She then moved for
reconsideration of the trial courts Decision. The same was denied for
having been filed out of time. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA which was denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case before
this Court. In its Decision dated August 25, 2005, the Court ruled that
petitioners trial in absentia was proper; that she was not denied due
process; and that the denial by the trial court of her motion for
reconsideration was proper as the same was filed beyond the reglementary
period. However, the Court noted that the penalty imposed by the trial court
(which is 12 years of prision mayor to 24 years as maximum) on petitioner
was erroneous. As computed by the Court, considering that the amount
defrauded is only P68,700.00, the proper minimum imposable penalty
should only be within the range of "6 months, and 1 day of prision
correccional in its minimum period and 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional in its medium period"69 while the proper maximum imposable
penalty should only be within the range of "10 years, 8 months and 21 days
and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period."70 Hence,
notwithstanding the finality of the trial courts Decision, the Court modified
the penalty imposed, as the same was outside the range prescribed by law.
In Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,71 this Court also
modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner notwithstanding the finality
of the trial courts Decision based on the observation that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous because it was outside the range
prescribed by law. The Court ruled thus:
However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint Decision of
the trial court that must be rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial
court erroneously included an additional one day on the maximum period of

arresto mayor imposed on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the


range of said penalty. The duration of arresto mayor is only from one month
and one day to six months. Adding one day to the maximum penalty will
place it within the range of prision correccional.
Moreover, imposing the maximum penalty of imprisonment of four years,
four months and one day of prision correccional is also incorrect as it is
outside the range of the penalty imposable in this case. x x x
xxxx
The error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it
conform to the penalty prescribed by law as it is within the Courts duty and
inherent power. x x x
xxxx
Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty
imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with the law and nothing
else. It is not tantamount to a reduction in order to be favorable to the
petitioner nor an increase so as to be prejudicial to him.72
In People v. Gatward73 the Court explicitly stated that by merely modifying
the penalty imposed, it is not reopening the case; neither is it saying that
there was error in judgment. In the same manner, in this case, we are not
reopening G.R. No. 144332, much more reversing it. Thus:
x x x In the case of U Aung Win, and the same hold true with respect to
Gatward, the penalty inflicted by the court a quo was a nullity because it
was never authorized by law as a valid punishment. The penalties which
consisted of aliquot one-third portions of an indivisible penalty are selfcontradictory in terms and unknown in penal law. Without intending to
sound sardonic or facetious, it was akin to imposing the indivisible penalties
of public censure, or perpetual absolute or special disqualification, or death
in their minimum or maximum periods.
This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by
inflicting a penalty higher or lower than the one imposable under the law
but with both penalties being legally recognized and authorized as valid
punishments. An erroneous judgment, as thus understood, is a valid
judgment. But a judgment which ordains a penalty which does not exist in

the catalogue of penalties or which is an impossible version of that in the


roster of lawful penalties is necessarily void, since the error goes into the
very essence of the penalty and does not merely arise from the
misapplication thereof. Corollarily, such a judgment can never become final
and executory.1wphi1
Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal, his
case was reopened in order that a higher penalty may be imposed on him.
There is here no reopening of the case, as in fact the judgment is being
affirmed but with a correction of the very substance of the penalty to make
it conformable to law, pursuant to a duty and power inherent in this Court.
The penalty has not been changed since what was decreed by the trial
court and is now being likewise affirmed by this Court is the same penalty
of reclusion perpetua which, unfortunately, was imposed by the lower court
in an elemental form which is non-existent in and not authorized by law.
Just as the penalty has not been reduced in order to be favorable to the
accused, neither has it been increased so as to be prejudicial to him.
Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the
imposition upon him of the corrected duration, inherent in the essence and
concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence
with an illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between judicial
legislation and unequal protection of law. He would thus be the victim of an
inadvertence which could result in the nullification, not only of the judgment
and the penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually
have served. Far from violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the
remedial and corrective measures interposed by this opinion protect him
against the risk of another trial and review aimed at determining the correct
period of imprisonment.74
Also, it would not be amiss to mention that the Office of the Solicitor
General prayed for the modification of the imposable penalty.75
Finally, pursuant to Section 11(a),76Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the favorable modification of the penalty should
likewise apply to petitioner's co-accused who failed to appeal.77
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 4, 2007 and the
September 4, 2007 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
98502 are hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, for reasons stated above, the

September 8, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya,


Branch 27, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2672, is hereby MODIFIED
insofar as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. The accused, namely,
Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz are each
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.

You might also like