Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
NOCON, J.:
This is an appeal from a Joint Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 168 in Criminal Cases Nos. 78507-10 2 finding accusedappellant Elma Romero y Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.
Two (2) separate Informations were filed by Assistant Fiscal Edmundo O.
Legaspi in behalf of complainant Doriza Dapnit against Elma Romero for
the crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT committed as
follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 78507 ESTAFA
That sometime during the month of January, 1989, in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one Doriza Dapnit of the amount of P21,000.00, by
means of deceit and false representations which she made to
the latter to the effect that she could Facilitate the employment
overseas of said Doriza Dapnit, and would need certain amount
for expenses in the processing of her employment and travel
papers, which representation the accused well knew were false
and fraudulent and were only made by her to induce said
Doriza Dapnit to give and pay, as the latter gave and paid to
her the amount of P21,000.00 which the accused once in
possession of the said amount, misappropriate, misapply and
convert to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said Doriza Dapnit, in the aforementioned
amount of P21,000.00. 3
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 78510 ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
That in or about and during period comprised from January,
1989, up to February, 1989, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, knowing that she
was neither authorized nor licensed by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit workers for overseas employment and collect
from the following persons, to wit:
Doriza Dapnit P21,000.00
Bernardo T. Salazar 24,000.00
Richard Quillope 15,600.00
by falsely representing to the latter that she was a lawful
recruiter and in a position to obtain for their job placement
abroad. 4
Upon arraignment, accused Elma Romero pleaded "NOT GUILTY" and trial
ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
Sometime in January of 1989, complainant Doriza Dapnit went to the
residence of accused-appellant Elma Romero at Esteban Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro-Manila accompanied by Genalie Cruz, a cousin of
accused-appellant. At such meeting, complainant Doriza Dapnit told
accused-appellant of her desire to work abroad and the latter informed her
that she can work in Taiwan as a factory worker with a monthly salary of
US$5,000.00. 5
Thereafter, complainant Doriza Dapnit, relying upon the representation of
the accused-appellant that she can leave on April 1, 1989 for Taiwan as a
factory worker, paid the placement fee charged by the latter as evidenced
by the receipts issued by the accused-appellant totalling P21,000.00 which
were paid as follows: P3,000.00 on January 24, 1989 6, P15,000.00 on
February 4, 1989 7 and P3,000.00 on February 27, 1989. 8 Complainant
Doriza Dapnit also paid accused-appellant the amount of P1,800.00 for the
processing of her passport which is not included in her claim as she was
issued a passport. 9
When complainant Doriza Dapnit was not able to leave on April 1, 1989 for
Taiwan, accused-appellant told her, to wait as her visa was not yet issued.
However, after spending more than two (2) months futilely following up her
visa with the accused-appellant, complainant Doriza Dapnit went to the
office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and
found out that accused-appellant is not a licensed recruiter as shown by the
Certification issued by the POEA. 10
On June 30, 1989, complainant Doriza Dapnit executed an affidavit 11 at
the office of the POEA charging accused-appellant for illegal recruitment
and/or estafa.
Complainant Bernardo Salazar testified that sometime in the middle of
January 1989, he went to RSI Enterprises located at Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, Metro-Manila and met accused-appellant where he applied
for a job in Taiwan. During said meeting, accused-appellant promised
complainant Bernardo Salazar that he can leave for Taiwan on April 1,
1989 as a factory worker with a monthly salary of US$600.00 12 as soon as
he paid the placement fee.
After paying accused-appellant the amount of P24,000.00 as placement fee
which were evidenced by the five (5) receipts 13 issued by accusedappellant, complainant Bernardo Salazar was not able to leave on April 1,
1989 and accused-appellant told him that his departure was delayed
because she is still waiting for the issuance of his visa.
When accused-appellant failed to send complainant Bernardo Salazar to
Taiwan, the latter went to the Anti-illegal Recruitment Branch of the POEA
On August 8, 1991, the trial court rendered its Joint Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused ELMA ROMERO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, the Court
hereby sentences her to suffer penalty of imprisonment of one
(1) year, 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision
correccional the as MAXIMUM and to indemnify complainant
Doriza Dapnit the sum of P21,000.00;
Finding the accused ELMA ROMERO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment constituting economic
sabotage, the Court hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) and a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).19
Hence, this appeal.
Accused-appellant contends that there was no misrepresentation nor
misappropriation on her part because the money paid by complainant
Doriza Dapnit was for the purpose of facilitating the processing of the
latter's passport and visa only as indicated in the receipts issued to the
complainant and not in consideration of a promised job placement abroad.
We do not agree.
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded
another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person. 20
In the instant case, all the elements of estafa are present because
complainant Doriza Dapnit gave the total amount of P21,000.00 to
accused-appellant on the latter's promise that she will be sent to Taiwan as
a factory worker as soon as she paid the placement fee. It will be observed
that accused-appellant gave complainant the distinct impression that she
had the power or ability to send people abroad for work so that complainant
was convinced to give her the money she demanded to enable her to be
employed as a factory worker in Taiwan. Furthermore, accused-appellant's
defense that she did not misrepresent herself as capable of finding
SO ORDERED.
December 5, 2012
CUEVAS, J.:
Petitioners Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and
charged with 'ADULTERY' before the defunct Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental under Criminal Case No. 1079 assigned to Branch Ill
thereof, presided over by the Honorable respondent Judge. The said
criminal proceeding was initiated by a letter-complaint dated July 13,
1972 1 thumbmarked and sworn to by complainant Julian L. Teves, the
husband of petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves, on the same date before
respondent City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug. Said letter-complaint reads as
follows:
Sir:
WITNESSES TO THUMBMARK:
1. (Sgd) Mita D. Escao
2. (Sgd) Rubi Villariza Destano
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of
July, 1972, at Dumaguete City.
(Sgd) PABLO E.
CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Dumaguete City
Attached to the said letter-complaint were the affidavits of Elisa Chiu,
Milagros Quiteves and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina, witnesses of complainant
Julian L. Teves. 2
On the basis thereof, respondent City Fiscal conducted a preliminary
investigation of the aforesaid charge. Complainant Julian L. Teves took the
witness stand affirmed the statements appearing in his letter-complaint. He
also Identified one of the respondents, his wife Milagros Donio-Teves.
Thereafter, he was cross-examined lengthily by counsel for both
respondents, now petitioners.
After terminating his examination, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,
assailing the jurisdiction of the City Fiscal to take cognizance of the case on
the ground that there was no proper complaint filed by complainant Julian
MBM
ARK)
JULI
AN L.
TEV
ES
Com
plain
ant
xxx xxx xxx
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of January,
1973, at Dumaguete City.
(Sgd) PABLO E.
CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Continuation of the preliminary investigation was set for February 12, 1973.
It was later reset to March 6, 1973 and finally to March 23, 1973 at the
instance of respondents-petitioners.
At the resumption of the preliminary investigation scheduled on March 23,
1973, petitioners filed a Joint Urge Omnibus Motion dated March 23, 1973,
praying that portions of the affidavits of Elisa Chiu, Milagros Quiteves and
Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina which relate to the adulterous acts allegedly
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Dumaguete City be ordered
stricken out, the same not falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent
City Fiscal. With the said motion still unresolved, an information to which a
complaint thumbmarked by complainant Julian L. Teves, was filed before
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on March 26, 1973
which, as herein earlier stated, was docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
1097. The complaint reads:
Complaint
The undersigned complainant accused MILAGROS DONIOTEVES and MANUEL MORENO of the crime of ADULTERY,
committed as follows:
acquired over the case and persons of the accused, is similarly predicated
on the same ground absence of a valid complaint.
Adultery, being a private offense, it cannot be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse who cannot institute the criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. 4
This Court has invariably maintained strict adherence to this jurisdictional
requirement of a complaint by the offended party, as defined in Section 2 of
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court and Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. 5 So much so, that an Information filed with the provincial fiscal
wherein the offended party signed at the bottom thereof over and above the
signature of the prosecuting officer, the information even reciting that the
provincial fiscal charges defendant with the crime of seduction at the
"instance of the offended party" was considered insufficient. 6 In another
case, 7 this Court motu proprio dismissed the case for failure of the
aggrieved party to file the proper complaint for the offense of oral
defamation imputing the commission of an offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, although the accused never raised the question on
appeal, thereby dramatizing the necessity of strict compliance with the
above legal requirement even to the extent of nullifying all the proceedings
already had in the lower court.
However, this legal requirement was imposed "out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through the scandal of a public trial. 8 Thus, the law leaves it to the
option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed by the erring spouse. This should be the overriding
consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition
precedent prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied with. For,
indeed, it is the spirit rather than the letter of the law which should prevail. 9
The complaint referred to which is required by way of initiating the criminal
prosecution of crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is, however,
that one filed with the Court and not that which is necessary to start the
required preliminary investigation by the fiscal's office. 10 In the latter case,
a letter of complaint sufficed for the purpose.
Coming back to the case at bar, the desire of the offended party Julian L.
Teves to bring his wife and her alleged paramour before the bar of justice is
only too evident. Such determination of purpose on his part is amply
demonstrated in the strong and unequivocal statement contained in his first
complaint of July 13, 1972 making clear and implicit his purpose, which is
no other than "to file a criminal complaint for ADULTERY against my wife
Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour Manuel Moreno"... plus the fact
that he filed no less than three (3) complaints in order to meet the
objections of the petitioner herein as to the sufficiency of his first complaint
dated July 13, 1972.
Petitioners' submission that there is no sufficient and valid complaint
instituted in the instant case so as to confer jurisdiction over the offense
and persons of the accused (herein petitioners), hardly convince Us. The
second complaint dated January 16, 1973 filed with the Fiscal's Office and
that filed with the respondent Court on March 26, 1973, are both sufficient
and valid complaints. Both state the name of the defendants; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed which is an absolute compliance with what
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court prescribe. 11 Both complaints were also thumbmarked by
and under oath of the complainant. The allegations of the complaints fully
apprised petitioners of the facts and acts subject matter thereof and
enables them to fully comprehend to which acts of theirs it refers. 12Both
sufficiently identify the acts constituting the offense, sufficient enough to
enable the Court to pronounce a valid judgment thereon in case of
conviction. 13
As it is, doubt could not have set in and confusion would not have arisen
had the Fiscal limited himself merely to the filing of the complaint
(thumbmarked and under oath of the complainant) instead of an
information with the complaint annexed thereto.
Finally, as a last-ditch attempt to throw the ADULTERY case out of court,
petitioners invoked the death of the complainant which took place on April
14, 1974 and during the pendency of this case, as an added argument in
support of their plea for dismissal.
Such a stand is erroneous. Death of the offended party is not a ground for
extinguishment of criminal liability whether total 14 or partial. 15 The
participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of
the criminal action but soley for the initiation thereof.
The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies which cannot be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is
misleading. Far from what it implies, it is not only the aggrieved party who
is offended in such crimes but also the State. Every violation of penal laws
results in the disturbance of public order and safety which the State is
committed to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the condition that
private crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint
filed by the offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage
in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial." Once a
complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is ascertained and the
action proceeds just as in any other crime. This is shown by the fact that
after filing a complaint, any pardon given by the complainant to the offender
would be unavailing. 16 It is true, the institution of the action in so- called
private crimes is at the option of the aggrieved party. But it is equally true
that once the choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in full force
beyond the control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death
notwithstanding. 17
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED. The Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch of Negros Oriental to whose sala
Criminal Case No. 1097 had been assigned, is hereby ordered to
immediately continue with the trial of the aforementioned case and render
judgment thereon on the basis of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review[1] are the Orders[2] of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City finding petitioner Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative liable for payment of foreclosure fees.
The Facts
Although not a party to this suit, we required the Courts Office of the Chief
Attorney (OCAT) to comment on the petition, involving as it does, issues
relating to the Courts power to promulgate judicial rules. In its
compliance, the OCAT recommends the denial of the petition, opining that
Section 22, Rule 141, as amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938
because (1) the power to impose judicial fees is eminently judicial and (2)
the 1987 Constitution insulated the Courts rule-making powers from
Congress interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in
the 1973 Constitution allowing Congress to alter judicial rules. The OCAT
called attention to the Courts previous denial of a request by a cooperative
group for the issuance of guidelines to implement cooperatives fees
exemption under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.[11] Lastly, the OCAT
recommends the amendment of Section 22, Rule 141 to make explicit the
non-exemption of cooperatives from the payment of legal fees.
The Issue
The question is whether petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure
is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioners
foreclosure proceeding.
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to
cooperatives is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought
under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development
Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of
cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article
62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the
payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable
on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second,
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision2of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February
28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents
Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime
of rape for the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private
respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together
with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen
Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons
Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA,
a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated,
brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging
house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having
carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered
a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.5cralawlawlibrary
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John
Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school
graduation ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house
in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her
mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her
bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at
around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father
that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her
friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at
the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After
eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons Palace, which was merely a
walking distance away from Gemenos house. Outside the Alsons Palace,
they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae
Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the
second floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen
Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one
Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate
their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two
(2) bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a
circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around:
one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing
the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard
liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with each
other. When it was AAAs turn, she became emotional and started
crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed
around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador
Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos
lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried
to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda
also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced
her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her
drink. She even heard Lim say, Hubuga na, hubuga na, (You make her
drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, You drink
it, you drink it. She leaned on Oportos lap again, then she fell
asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle
to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so
she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the
stairs, and then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness,
she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She
recognized that place because she had been there before. She would
thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times
that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on
different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started
crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw
Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto
abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting
his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola
then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all
alone. Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt
on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top
of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her
shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA
reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already
furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting
her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a
report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical
examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the
morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5
oclock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The
vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the
defense witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto,
Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemenos house. Gemeno
then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at
Alsons Palace, owned by the latters family. When they reached the place,
Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch
one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned
to Alsons Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently
ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela
Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy
and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto,
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but
did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil
Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain
Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and
instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA
rested on Oportos lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her
buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoys crotch, she remarked,
What was that, penis? Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the
latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same and AAA also kissed
him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was
at the Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and
Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested
Alquizola to accompany her to Alsons Palace to see her friends
there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying
on Oportos lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get
angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, I
just stay here. Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging
house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alsons Palace again, and saw
AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while
holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to
resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and
instead instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House
because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a
motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached
Alquizola and told him, Kuya, I want to sleep here for the
meantime. Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and
Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a
double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at
Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then
removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give
way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto
was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her
pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her
underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the
lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAAs
legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts
and went back to Alsons Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto
and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA
saw him, she said, Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a
problem. Alquizola thus started kissing AAAs breasts. Oporto stood up
and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on
him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to
have sexual intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning
and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with
Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more
times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alsons Palace to sleep. At around
6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They
tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went
home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m.
However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and
Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of
P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and the court
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount
of P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and
by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda,
Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of
litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their
prison terms provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the
giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man
before. The CA also stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of
hitting her when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more
consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had
premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition
for Certiorari9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed
private respondents conviction and ardently contending that the same was
made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.10
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment
dated November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE
ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.
IV.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may
appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said
judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in
double jeopardy.17cralawlawlibrary
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court
said in People v. Santiago:18cralawlawlibrary
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may
represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended
party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said
offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state thatthe petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the
State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by
the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20cralawlawlibrary
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance
of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved
party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and
maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in
obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the
violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained
the private offended partys right in a criminal case to file a special civil
action forcertiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and
ruled that the Solicitor Generals intervention was not necessary, the
recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in
her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In any
event, the OSG joins petitioners cause in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling
the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.23cralawlawlibrary
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake
of argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without
violating their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for
petitioners failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of
a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not
absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order
is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for
the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.24cralawlawlibrary
Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the
same questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower court,
essentially revolving on the guilt of the private respondents. There is also
an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would
prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the
Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent
nullity for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when it is shown that the prosecutions right to due process was
violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on the
petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court
blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to
dispense justice.25cralawlawlibrary
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of
judicial discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial
courts findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private
respondents narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a
court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion
when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the
whole ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance,
never cried out for help, and never fought against the private respondents,
bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of
the assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
cralawred
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of
age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor
more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she
was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or
unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA,
however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply
because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding
her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication,
thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.35 The appellate court
never provided any reason why AAAs testimony should deserve scant or
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what
happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.cralawred
xxxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on
top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I was saying dont because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually
abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the
witness is crying.cralawred
xxxx
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you
said that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw
Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the
defense. It noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual
and incredible.40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was
belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid
culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial
stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their turn to
take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise.41 More importantly,
it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that
the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual,
as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now
enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established with
sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed
consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to
establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused
who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases,
conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is
that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during
the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when
created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the
burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and
adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44 However, when the accused
alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as
her reputation, why would she have to drag the private respondents into the
case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating
the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents
simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain
justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already
acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks
justice for her honor that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose
to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic
and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her
complaint,65 contrary to common human experience, and in utter disregard
of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the
conspiracy because his participation in the crime was
uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his participation was
not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.68 The
Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizolas liability is
not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement
to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted
in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an
offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof
of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the offense.70cralawlawlibrary
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and
Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying
weaponsduring the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling
by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not,
Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not
necessary. In this case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single
Information, it, however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As
a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense,
otherwise, the same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule
prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the
accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to
quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense
simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity
of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have
waived their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the
acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts
of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no
duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against them because the
Information, in fact, stated that they took turns in having carnal knowledge
against the will of AAA on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made
and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was
indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused
themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in
between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto
admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two
or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola
can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4)
counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus
be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while
Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAAs mouth,
the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor
because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however,
without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as
b)
c)
On January 22, 2003, private respondents filed their ReplyAffidavit,5 asserting that Perez was the one who showed them photocopies
of the registration paper of the motor vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as
well as the one who personally took them out from the rent-a-car company.
On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit,6 stating that
neither original nor photocopies of the registration was required by private
respondents to be submitted to them because from the very start, they
were informed by Aguinaldo that she merely leased the vehicles from
LEDC Rent-a-Car.
On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F.
Gonzaga issued a Resolution7recommending both petitioners to be indicted
in court for estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). He also noted that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit
any controverting evidence despite the subpoena.
On July 16, 2003, an Information8 (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners
with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-216182, entitled People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo
and Benjamin Perez, the case was raffled to the public respondent.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for
Reduction of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent
granted in an Order of even date.9
On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to
Recall or Quash Warrants of Arrest,10 alleging that the Resolution dated
February 25, 2003 has not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file
a motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the
Information Prematurely Filed With the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City
of Manila.11 Citing the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez,
Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or false pretenses was
committed because private respondents were fully aware that she does not
own the pledged motor vehicles.
reconsideration.21
On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapea and
Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest.22 De Castro alleged that she was the private complainant in the
estafa case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition
with Motion to Expunge,23 alleging that De Castro is not a party to the said
case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for
review before the DOJ.
On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation24 informing the public
respondent that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated
September 6, 2004 denying petitioners' petition for review in I.S. No. 02G29349 & 02G-28820 for estafa, entitled Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth
Aguinaldo.25
On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the
Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor
with conformity of the public prosecutor. x x x
It appears from the records that:
(1) the warrant of arrest issued against accused Aguinaldo was recalled
pending resolution of the Petition for Review filed with the DOJ; x x x
(2) the Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed x x x
(3) accused Aguinaldo has not yet posted bail bond.
In view of the foregoing, (the) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest is GRANTED. Let this case be REINSTATED and let
warrant of arrest be issued against accused Aguinaldo.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.26
On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Quash Warrant of Arrest.27
issuing the Order dated May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and issuing an
arrest warrant against Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and to Issue a Warrant of Arrest against Aguinaldo was
filed by De Castro who is not a party in Criminal Case No. 03-216182,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin
Perez, instead of private complainants Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B.
Joson. They also assert that said motion was erroneously granted based
on the purported denial of their petition for review by the DOJ, despite a
Certification showing that their actual petition in I.S. Number 02L-51569,
entitled Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo, has not yet been
resolved and is still pending with the DOJ.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to
only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of
their procedural right to due process, as their petition for review has not yet
been resolved by the DOJ.
On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could
receive a copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and
thus move for its reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03216182 had already been filed with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They
contend that such precipitate filing of the Information and issuance of a
warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the
preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
In support of their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the
right to preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural
right; that an Information filed without affording the respondent his right to
file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse resolution, is fatally
premature; and, that a denial of a complete preliminary investigation
deprives the accused of the full measure of his right to due process and
infringes on his constitutional right to liberty.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest31 was filed by one Levita
De Castro who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records
show that De Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
orders.40
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners'
argument that the precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a
warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the
preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is
a substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in
arguing that the Information filed, without affording the respondent his right
to file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally
premature. In support of their argument, petitioners cite Sales v.
Sandiganbayan41 wherein it was held that since filing of a motion for
reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper, an
Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation.
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales42 as misplaced. A closer look
into said case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to
move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman
before the filing of an Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were
afforded their right to move for reconsideration of the adverse resolution in
a preliminary investigation when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,43 pursuant to Section 3 of
the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal)44 and Section
56 of the Manual for Prosecutors45.
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July
16, 2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to
quash warrant of arrest, and setting their arraignment, pending the final
resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes that
the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the time
petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004
to September 14, 200546 when the trial court finally set their arraignment,
was more than ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a
resolution of their petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very
liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60-day period from
the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years having
elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to
be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the
merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the
filing of the petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the
affirmative. Having submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit
to the OCP of Manila before the filing of Information for estafa, Perez
cannot be heard to decry that his right to preliminary investigation was not
completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally informed of
any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information,
she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such
investigation. In petitioners' motion for reconsideration47 of the February 25,
2003 Resolution of ACP Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the CounterAffidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the recommendation of
the prosecutor to indict her for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for
reconsideration was held to be consistent with the principle of due process
and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors,48 she cannot
complain denial of her right to preliminary investigation.
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete
preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After all,
[d]ue process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to
be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.49
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16,
2005 Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest, as it was filed by one who is not a party to the case, and it was
based on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition for review in a different case.
Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August 23,
2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the
court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ to
submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before the period
fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more than sixty
(60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review before the DOJ,
otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled
and without further delay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
December 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, areAFFIRMED. Considering
that the proceedings in this criminal case had been held in abeyance long
enough, let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court which is
hereby directed to try the case on the merits with dispatch in accordance
with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
FRANCISCO A. LABAO,
Petitioner,
BRION, J.:
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.
It also noted that the respondents temporary off-detail did not exceed
the 6-month period permitted by law, since the respondents were directed,
through the January 17, 2005 notice, to report for a new assignment on
January 25, 2005, but they failed or refused to do so.
The CA Ruling
The petitioner then filed the present petition. Bicoy, with respondents
Castil, Esic, and Ambrocio M. Cantar filed a separate appeal, docketed as
G.R. No. 190848. The Court denied this appeal in its April 5, 2010
resolution for late filing and for non-compliance with Rules 45 and 46 of the
Rules of Court.
The Petition
Issue
The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in acting on the
respondents petition despite its late filing, and in reversing the LA and
NLRC decisions.
Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist
for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to
provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial
system.[16] While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on
In the present case, the respondents petition for certiorari was filed
twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt of
the September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they should
not suffer for Atty. Plandos negligence in failing to inform them of the
September 29, 2006 resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day
period should be their December 6, 2006 notice.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of
his counsel in the realm of procedural technique.[20] The exception to this
rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and
inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.[21] The failure of a
partys counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable him
to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not excusable. We have
repeatedly held that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon
the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an
adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.[22]
The NLRCs resolution became final ten (10) days after counsels
receipt, and the respondents failure to file the petition within the required
(60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65
petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the
resolution.[23]
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
ANITA CHENG,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
TESSIE SY,
Respondents.
July 7, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7,
Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case
No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953
against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)
Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their
loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been
drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed
against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25,
Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases
for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the
civil liability of Tessie Sy.[3] On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case
No. 98-969953 contained a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the
accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in nature.[4]
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg.
22 cases in its Order[5] dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of
petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also
did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused
respondents.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC,
Branch 18, Manila, a complaint[6] for collection of a sum of money with
damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount
of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the
estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order[7] dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila,
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil
action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already
impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph
(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[8] which the court denied in its
Order[9] dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal
issue
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on
January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given
only prospective application. She further contends that that her case falls
within the following exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent
to the criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation excontractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article 31[11] of
the Civil Code; and
(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under
Article 29[12] of the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private
prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against
respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express
reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding
civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal
cases.[13]
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa
and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was
impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial
courts. This is consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada[14] that
the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing
check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the
estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously
available to the complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against
forum shopping.[15] Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP
Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have
elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal
proceedings to the exclusion of the other.[16]
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubtwhere in Criminal Case No.
98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the
accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared
that the liability of the accused was only civil in natureproduced the legal
effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the
civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of
the Civil Code.[17]
However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on
account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the
petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be
prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v.
Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the
identity of the accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal
would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put
differently, may petitioners action to recover respondents civil liability be
also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were
dismissed?
xxx
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not
so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded
by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in
1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already
pending at the time of their promulgation.The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason
for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.[18]
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of
BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of
the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the
separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate
civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP
Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal
the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions
for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.[19]
It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was not assisted
by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings
critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to
protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the
identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the
civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this
ground, we agree with petitioner.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of
their counsel.[22] But this rule admits of exceptions (1) where the counsels
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his
day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting
in the clients deprivation of liberty or property without due process of
law.[23] Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioners lot falls
within the exceptions.
performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are
not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost
fidelity to public service.[25] Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to
equip himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22
cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed to
appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the
only remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the
money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases
on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to
prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a
liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties
the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the
truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances
should not be barred by technicalities.[27] For reasons of substantial justice
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ATTY. MANGONTAWAR M. GUBAT,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
DECISION
from NPCs refusal to pay the amounts demanded by the plaintiffs for the cost of
the improvements on their respective lands which were destroyed when the
NPC constructed the Marawi-Malabang Transmission Line.
On the day of the initial hearing on the merits, NPC and its counsel failed to
appear. Consequently, respondent was declared in default.Despite the plea of
NPC for the lifting of the default order, the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8,
rendered its Decision[2] on April 24, 1991, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the herein plaintiffs and against the defendant National
Power Corporation as represented by its President Ernesto Aboitiz,
P.M. Durias and Rodrigo P. Falcon, ordering the latter jointly and
severally:
(1)
In Civil Case No. 204-90 to pay plaintiff Ala Mambuay
the sum of P103,000.00 representing the value of the improvements
and the occupied portion of the land, P32,000.00 as attorneys
fees, P20,000.00 as moral and/or exemplary damages, P50,000.00
as actual damages and the costs;
(2)
In Civil Case No. 295-90 to pay plaintiff Norma Maba
represented by Capt. Ali B. Hadji Ali the sum of P146,700.00
representing the value of the improvements and the occupied
portion of the land, P32,000.00 as attorneys fees, P20,000.00 as
moral and/or exemplary damages,P50,000.00 as actual damages
and the costs;
(3)
In Civil Case No. 296-90 to pay plaintiff Acur
Macarampat the sum of P94,100.00 representing the value of the
improvements and the occupied portion of the land, P32,000.00 as
attorneys fees, P20,000.00 as moral and/or exemplary
damages, P50,000.00 as actual damages and the costs.[3]
clients and not to the lawyer, and this form of damages has already been paid
directly to the plaintiffs.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he was not informed of the
compromise agreement or furnished a copy of NPCs Motion to Dismiss
Appeal. He alleged that the same was received only by Atty. Mandangan who
neither signed any of the pleadings nor appeared in any of the hearings before
the RTC. Petitioner clarified that his motion for a partial summary judgment was
neither a request for the revival of the vacated April 24, 1991 Decision nor an
enforcement of the lien, but a grant of his contingent fees by the trial court as
indemnity for damages resulting from the fraudulent act of NPC and of his clients
who conspired to deprive him of the fees due him. He asserted that NPC cannot
claim good faith because it knew of the existence of his charging lien when it
entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs.
Petitioner also alleged that NPCs remedy should have been an ordinary
appeal and not a petition for certiorari because the compromise agreement had
settled the civil suits. Thus, when the trial court granted the motion for partial
summary judgment on his fees, it was a final disposition of the entire case. He
also argued that the issue of bad faith is factual which cannot be a subject of
a certiorari petition. He also insisted that NPCs petition was defective for lack of
a board resolution authorizing Special Attorney Comie Doromal (Atty. Doromal)
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to sign on NPCs behalf.
On September 9, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision[20] ruling that:
The reasoning of Atty. Gubat is a crude palusot (a sneaky
fallacious reasoning) for how can one enforce a part of a decision
which has been declared void and vacated. In legal contemplation,
there is no more decision because, precisely, the case was
remanded to the court a quo for further proceeding.
It was bad enough that Atty. Gubat tried to pull a fast [one] but
it was [worse] that respondent Judge fell for it resulting in a plainly
erroneous resolution.
Like his predecessor Judge Adiong, Judge Macarambon
committed basic errors unquestionably rising to the level of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court issues
the writ of certiorari and strikes down as void the Order dated March
15, 2000 granting Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubats Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as well as the Order dated June 27, 2000
denying petitioner National Power Corporations Motion for
Reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied by
the CA in its January 19, 2005 Resolution,[22] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner insists on the propriety of the trial courts order of summary
judgment on his attorneys fees. At the same time, he imputes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the CA for entertaining
respondents Petition for Certiorari. He maintains that the petition should have
been dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of appeal.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners resort to Rule 65 is not proper.
At the outset, the petition should have been dismissed outright because
petitioner resorted to the wrong mode of appeal by filing the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1 of the said Rule explicitly provides that a
petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the
remedy of appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
not only available but also the proper mode of appeal. For all intents and
purposes, we find that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule
65 as a substitute for a lost appeal. We note that petitioner received a copy of
theJanuary 19, 2005 Resolution of the CA denying his motion for
reconsideration on January 28, 2005. Under Section 2 of Rule 45, petitioner has
15 days from notice of the said Resolution within which to file his petition for
review on certiorari. As such, he should have filed his appeal on or
before February 12, 2005. However, records show that the petition was posted
on March 1, 2005, or long after the period to file the appeal has lapsed.
At any rate, even if we treat the instant petition as one filed under Rule 45, the
same should still be denied for failure on the part of the petitioner to show that
the CA committed a reversible error warranting the exercise of our discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.
Petitioners resort to summary judgment is
not proper; he is not entitled to an
immediate relief as a matter of law, for the
existence of bad faith is a genuine issue of
fact to be tried.
A summary judgment is allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds that except
as to the amount of damages, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and
admissions show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[23]The purpose of a summary judgment
is to avoid drawn out litigations and useless delays because the facts appear
undisputed to the mind of the court. Such judgment is generally based on the
facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of
the parties.[24] For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for
the clients own volition should never completely deprive counsel of any
legitimate compensation for his professional services.[35] In all cases, a client is
bound to pay his lawyer for his services. The determination of bad faith only
becomes significant and relevant if the adverse party will likewise be held liable
in shouldering the attorneys fees.[36]
Petitioners compensation is a personal obligation of his clients who have
benefited from his legal services prior to their execution of the compromise
agreement. This is strictly a contract between them. NPC would only be made
liable if it was shown that it has connived with the petitioners clients or acted in
bad faith in the execution of the compromise agreement for the purpose of
depriving petitioner of his lawful claims for attorneys fees. In each case, NPC
should be held solidarily liable for the payment of the counsels
compensation. However, as we have already discussed, petitioners resort to
summary judgment is not proper. Besides, it is interesting to note that petitioner
is the only one claiming for his attorneys fees notwithstanding that plaintiffs
counsels of record were petitioner herein and Atty. Mandangan. Nevertheless,
this is not at issue here. As we have previously discussed, this is for the trial
court to resolve.
The CA soundly exercised its discretion in
resorting to a liberal application of the
rules. There are no vested right to
technicalities.
Concededly, the NPC may have pursued the wrong remedy when it filed a
petition for certiorari instead of an appeal since the ruling on attorneys fees is
already a ruling on the merits. However, we find that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered
NPC solidarily liable with the plaintiffs for the payment of the attorneys fees. The
rule that a petition for certiorari is dismissible when the mode of appeal is
available admits of exceptions, to wit: (a) when the writs issued are null; and, (b)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.[37] Clearly, respondent has shown its entitlement to the exceptions.
The same liberal application should also apply to the question of the alleged lack
of authority of Atty. Doromal to execute the certification of non-forum shopping
for lack of a board resolution from the NPC. True, only individuals vested with
authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping in behalf of the corporation, and proof of such authority must be
attached to the petition,[38] the failure of which will be sufficient cause for
dismissal. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Atty. Doromal does not enjoy the
presumption that he is authorized to represent respondent in filing the Petition
for Certiorari before the CA. As Special Attorney, he is one of the counsels of
NPC in the proceedings before the trial court, and the NPC never questioned his
authority to sign the petition for its behalf.
In any case, the substantive issues we have already discussed are
justifiable reasons to relax the rules of procedure. We cannot allow a patently
wrong judgment to be implemented because of technical lapses. This
ratiocination is in keeping with the policy to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.[39] As we have explained
in Alonso v. Villamor:[40]
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their
forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were
created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself,
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other
words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of
the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault
and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their
obvious duty.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal;
otherwise, the decision becomes final.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the May 4, 2007 Resolution4and the September 4, 2007
Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98502.
Factual Antecedents
This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as G.R.
No. 144332 and promulgated on June 10, 2004.
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
27, with violation of Section 687 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,
otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines," as
amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,8 docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2672.9
On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioners counsel
informed the trial court that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not
notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The RTC, however, found their
absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as
scheduled.11 The dispositive portion of the September 8, 1998 Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila
y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended, they are each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum period. Costs against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and
Lloren13 and issued warrants of arrest against them.14
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the
validity of the promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction,
and the correctness of the penalty imposed.15
On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit.16
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49953, with the CA.17
On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
GRANTED. On the basis of the evidence on record, accused Efren S.
Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against
him.
The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the
presence of the accused Ila and Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of their
own choice, after notice and allow them to appeal. Let the complete
records of this case be remanded to the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.18
The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate
the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144332.
On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioners acquittal and reinstated
the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order, to
wit:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
September 8, 1998 and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied
by this Court in a Resolution dated January 17, 2005.20
On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21
Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration,
which were denied by this Court in its March 28, 2005 and November 9,
2005 Resolutions, respectively.22
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he could still
appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without
action his Motion for Clarification in its July 26, 2006 Resolution.24
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Repromulgation25 of the September 8, 1998 Decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order,26 denied the Motion for
Repromulgation.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its
February 20, 2007 Order.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari28 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA rendered its
Resolution29 which dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration30 was likewise denied by the CA in
its September 4, 2007 Resolution.31
Issues
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner raising the following issues:
1. Whether x x x the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner
Almuete of the charge against him passed the requisite conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
shall submit to this Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen
(15) days from date of such execution. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to
appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or
modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal
cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC
in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTCs September 8, 1998
Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals.49
The promulgation of judgment is valid.
Petitioners attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTCs
September 8, 1998 Decision must likewise fail as this has already been
addressed by this Court in People v. Court of Appeals.50 As this Court has
explained, there was no reason to postpone the promulgation because
petitioners absence was unjustifiable.51Hence, no abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence
of petitioner.52
It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained
finality. In fact, an Entry of Judgment was made by this Court on February
15, 2005.
Petitioners right to appeal has prescribed.
As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998
Decision, we rule in the negative.
In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioners acquittal by
the CA as it was made with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained
that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because "the
authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its
judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of
error."54 Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal,
petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Thus:
In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused,
respondents herein, guilty of the crime charged based on the evidence on
record and the law involved, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and
305 of the Revised Penal Code. They had a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law to overturn the decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision on its merits, and for the nullification of
the promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial courts denial of their
motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of
error, from the decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The
appeal of the petitioners in due course was a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners could question the findings of facts
of the trial court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the
penalty imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case open for review and that the appellate court
can reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or unassigned,
found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of
error, the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing
the decision of the trial court on its merits. They questioned their conviction
and the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to
prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being
merely hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents
alleged mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It
behooved the appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of
giving it due course and granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record, its
findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA
forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which
to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent Almuete of
the crime charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it
ventured beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the
certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the trial
court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible
only by appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA
acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is
authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and
undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the
statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of
statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state
that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in
the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the
plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied)
Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty
as prescribed in Article 310 which is two degrees higher than those
specified in Article 309.56 This is erroneous considering that the penalty
prescribed in Article 310 would apply only if the theft was committed under
any the following circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of
the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these
the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper
imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of
2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the
maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day
of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice
demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the
power of the court to suspend its own Rules or except a particular case
from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed,
when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would
result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to
relax the same in the interest of substantial justice."62 Suspending the
Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as
serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof."63 After all,
the Courts "primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x."64
Surely, this is not the first time that the Court modified the penalty imposed
notwithstanding the finality of the assailed decision.
In People v. Barro,65 Benigno Barro (Benigno), Joel Florin (Florin) and Joel
Barro (Joel) were charged with murder. After trial, the trial court convicted
them as charged. Only Benigno and Florin filed their notice of appeal. Joel
failed to appeal as he escaped from confinement. Hence, the trial courts
Decision insofar as Joel is concerned had become final and executory. In
the Courts Decision of August 17, 2000, the appeal filed by Benigno and
Florin was found without merit. However, the Court noted that as regards
Joel, the penalty imposed by the trial court was "outside the range"66 of the
penalty prescribed for the offense. Consequently, the Court modified the
penalty imposed on him notwithstanding that the same had already
become final and executory. The Court ratiocinated that:
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense,
is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to
Article 68, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Two degrees lower is
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Joel Barro
escaped from jail, hence, he is disqualified from the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be meted the straight
penalty of eight years which is within the medium period (6 years 1 month
and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court
erred in imposing the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months
because it is outside the range of said penalty. The records show that Joel
Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty imposed on the coaccused who did not appeal was a nullity because it was never authorized
by law, that penalty imposed on the accused can be corrected to make it
conform to the penalty prescribed by law, the reason being that, said
penalty can never become final and executory and it is within the duty and
inherent power of the Court to have it conformable with law.67
In Estrada v. People,68 petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa.
While the trial was pending, petitioner jumped bail. Understandably, during
the promulgation of judgment in 1997, petitioner was absent. Two years
later, or in 1999, petitioner was arrested. She then moved for
reconsideration of the trial courts Decision. The same was denied for
having been filed out of time. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA which was denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case before
this Court. In its Decision dated August 25, 2005, the Court ruled that
petitioners trial in absentia was proper; that she was not denied due
process; and that the denial by the trial court of her motion for
reconsideration was proper as the same was filed beyond the reglementary
period. However, the Court noted that the penalty imposed by the trial court
(which is 12 years of prision mayor to 24 years as maximum) on petitioner
was erroneous. As computed by the Court, considering that the amount
defrauded is only P68,700.00, the proper minimum imposable penalty
should only be within the range of "6 months, and 1 day of prision
correccional in its minimum period and 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional in its medium period"69 while the proper maximum imposable
penalty should only be within the range of "10 years, 8 months and 21 days
and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period."70 Hence,
notwithstanding the finality of the trial courts Decision, the Court modified
the penalty imposed, as the same was outside the range prescribed by law.
In Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,71 this Court also
modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner notwithstanding the finality
of the trial courts Decision based on the observation that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous because it was outside the range
prescribed by law. The Court ruled thus:
However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint Decision of
the trial court that must be rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial
court erroneously included an additional one day on the maximum period of