The 18th Century philosopher Immanuel Kant is one of historys

true titans. His philosophy on animals represented marked

progress from Descartes theory that they were mere automata,
or things incapable of real pain and suffering. Kant
acknowledged animal pain but still believed that they are not
self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an
end. That end is man. Our duties towards animals are
merely indirect duties towards humanity.
Thus, we should strive to treat animals well, but not because we
owe them any direct moral duty. In refraining from animal
cruelty (Kant argued that vivisection and butchery are justified,
while sport is wanton), we cultivate good behavior towards our
fellow human beings: If he is not to stifle his human
feeling, he must practice kindness towards animals, for
he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his
dealing with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his
treatment of animals. Animals, lacking the ability to judge,
cannot be moral agents; hence they are not part of the moral
community.
Kants philosophy almost entirely informs our contemporary
analysis of serial killers: Hogarth depicts this in his
engravings. He shows how cruelty grows and develops.
He shows the childs cruelty to animals, pinch the tail of
a dog or a cat; he then depicts the grown man in his cart
running over a child; and lastly, the culmination of
cruelty in murder. We should beware of the child who
tortures neighborhood pets because one day he
may graduate to people. But what if data revealed otherwise?
What if animal abusers stopped at animals? Would this outlet or
aggression-release then be acceptable, perhaps even a good for
humanity? The end (less violence towards humans) would justify
the means (cruelty to morally-irrelevant beings). In that case, a
Kantian worldview would require us to accept a child nailing a
cat to a tree, for that act would presumably prevent some future
human molestation. Distasteful, even repulsive, but since
animals must be regarded as mans
instruments, justifiable nonetheless.

In fairness to Kant, he lived in a Christian world almost entirely

devoid of knowledge on the animal mind. Unlike Descartes,
however, there are hints of ambivalence in Kants words: The
more we come in contact with animals and observe their
behavior, the more we love them, for we see how great is
their care for their young. It is then difficult for us to be
cruel in thought even to a wolf. Because, as Kant
says, animal nature has analogies to human nature, we
should not shoot a dog who is no longer useful (instead,
he deserves reward and should be kept until he dies
naturally). Still, for Kant, only rational beings (which animals are
not) can be ends. This, however, presents a large problem for
Kantians.
If rationality is to be the criterion for direct moral obligations,
then what to do about humans who lack this capacity (the
philosopher Christina Hoff writes, It is implausible that our
duty to feed a hungry retarded child would turn out to be
indirect and, in this respect, essentially distinct from our
duty to feed a normal child.)? If we are unprepared to make
certain disadvantaged humans means to our ends (which we
are, and rightly so), then we must forever dismiss intelligencerelated criteria for moral relevance. Benthams quote bears
repeating: What else is it that should trace the
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps,
the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is
beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or
even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise,
what would it avail? the question is not, Can
they reason? nor, Can thy talk? but, Can they suffer?
Were Kant here today, he might champion animal rights.
Ethological studies demonstrating animal intelligence (even selfawareness) would have astounded him. Also, the uses that he
considered necessary (food, research) are now no longer so. It is
not difficult to imagine him espousing direct duties to animals. I
submit that we intuitively feel that causing an animal to suffer is
wrong on its own merits; that is, it matters not how the cruelty
will affect future behavior towards other people. And, I believe,

Immanuel Kant (perhaps even Rene Descartes) would see this as

a reasonable argument.