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RINGER V. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 277 U. 13.

An inference that Congress has approved an Act of the Philippine


S. 189 (1928) Legislature reported to it under § 10 of the Organic Act cannot be drawn from
Case Preview the failure of Congress to exercise its power to annul, reserved in that section,
Full Text of Case where the Act reported contravenes the Organic Act, and is therefore clearly
U.S. Supreme Court void. P. 277 U. S. 208.
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) Affirmed.
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands Certiorari, 275 U.S. 519, to two judgments of ouster rendered by the Supreme
Nos. 564 and 573 Court of the Philippine Islands in proceedings in the nature of quo warranto,
Argued April 10, 1928 which were brought in that court by the Philippine government against the
Decided May 14, 1928 present petitioners to test their right to be directors in certain corporations
277 U.S. 189 described in the opinion.
Syllabus Art 7 Sec 16(C)
1. Acts of the Philippine Legislature creating a coal company and a bank, the Flores et al. vs Drilon and Gordon
stock of which is largely owned by the Philippine government, provide that G.R. 104732 June 22 1993
the power to vote the stock shall be vested in a "Committee," in the one case,
and in a "Board of Control," in the other, each consisting of the Governor- Note: The petitioners herein are Roberto Flores, Daniel Figueroa, Rogelio
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Palo, Domingo Jadloc, Carlito Cruz and Manuel Reyes who claim to be
Representatives. Held, that the voting of the stock in the election of directors taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers
and managing agents of the corporations is an executive function, and that the and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities
attempt to repose it in the legislative officers named violates the Philippine in the Philippines. Drilon is then the Executive Secretary and Gordon is the
Organic Act. P. 277 U. S. 199. Mayor of the City of Olongapo.
2. In the Philippine Organic Act, which divides the government into three
departments -- legislative, executive, and judicial -- the principle is implicit, as Facts:
it is in state and federal constitutions, that these three powers shall be forever The petitioners filed for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
separate and distinct from each other. P. 201.. restraining order on Mayor Gordon for having been appointed as the
3. This separation, and the consequent exclusive character of the powers Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
conferred upon each of the three departments of the government, is basic and Authority (SBMA) under Sec 13, par (d) of R.A. 7227 or the Bases
vital -- not merely a matter of governmental mechanism. Id. Conversion and Development Act of 1992. Petitioners also question the
4. It may be stated as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional constitutionality of the proviso in the said paragraph, which states:
system that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers
conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power, Provided, however, That for the first year of this Act, the mayor of the City of
the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power, and the Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of
judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power. Id. the Subic Authority.
Page 277 U. S. 190
5. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority Issue:
to make laws, but not to enforce them or to appoint the agents charged with W/N the proviso in Sec 13, par (d) of RA 7227 infringes on the ff
the duty of enforcing them. The latter are executive functions. P. 277 U. S. constitutional and statutory provisions:
202. 1. Sec 7 of the first paragraph of Art 9-B of the Constitution (non-
6. Not having the power of appointment unless expressly granted or incidental eligibility of elective officials for appointment or designation to
to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative any public office during his tenure)
office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection. 2. Sec 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the President
Id.
shall appoint all other officers of the Government… (The Case
7. The appointment of managers (in this instance, corporate directors) of
property or a business in which the government is interested is essentially an book focused on this issue)  W/N the Congress abused their
executive act which the legislature is without capacity to perform, directly or authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no
through its members. P. 277 U. S. 203. other, can qualify in the appointments made by the President.
8. Whether or not the members of the "board" or "committee" are public 3. Sec 261 par (g) of the Omnibus Election Code (No appointments,
officers in the strict sense, they are at least public agents charged with etc must be made 45 days before a regular election otherwise there
executive functions, and therefore beyond the appointing power of the is an election offense.)
legislature. Id.
9. The instances in which Congress has devolved on persons not executive Note: Issues 1 and 3 came from the original case and were not discussed in
officers the power to vote in nonstock corporations created for governmental the case book, thereby the discussions of which will only be discussed in brief.
purposes lend no support to a construction of the Constitution which would
justify Congressional legislation like that here involved, considering the Held: The proviso is declared unconstitutional. Mayor Gordon’s appointment
limited number of such instances, the peculiar character of the institutions is declared Null and Void. However, he may be considered a de facto officer
there dealt with, and the contrary attitude of Congress towards governmentally and thus any emoluments which may have been received by Gordon if he was
owned or controlled stock corporations. P. 277 U. S. 204. the Chief Executive of SBMA may be retained by him (as in the ruling in the
10. The powers here asserted by the Philippine Legislature are vested in the Civil Liberties Union).
Governor-General by the Organic Act -- viz., by the provision vesting in him
the supreme executive power, with general supervision and control over all Rationale:
the departments and bureaus of the government; the provision placing on him 1. Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, the basic idea
the responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws, and the provision that really is to prevent a situation where a local elective official will
all executive functions of the government must be directly under him or work for his appointment in an executive position in government,
within one of the executive departments under his supervision and control. P. and thus neglect his constituents. The first paragraph appears to be
277 U. S. 205. more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
11. Where a statute contains a grant of power enumerating certain things appointment or designation of an elective official to the
which may be done, and also a general grant of power which, standing alone, government post, except as are particularly recognized in the
would include those things and more, the general grant may be given full Constitution itself.
effect if the context shows that the enumeration was not intended to be
exclusive. P. 277 U. S. 206.
12. In § 22 of the Organic Act, the clause in the form of a proviso placing all
2. When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
the executive functions directly under the Governor-General or in one of the officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of
executive departments under his direction the President to only one candidate. Once the power of
Page 277 U. S. 191 appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment
and control, and the proviso preceding it which grant certain powers to the necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the
legislature, are both to be construed as independent and substantive pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress
provisions. P. 277 U. S. 207. may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his
own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by One-half or twenty-five (25) of the seats allocated to party-list
Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment representatives is reserved for sectoral representatives, limited to three
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to consecutive terms after ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the
appointment. In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the appointment of sectoral representatives is vested upon the President until
subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first otherwise provided by law.
year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among
nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, others, the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of
i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can the Commission on Appointments. In Sarmiento vs. Mison, we construed
qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to
from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII
supposed power of appointment, without the essential element of require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as follows:
choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just
appointment. quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the public ministers and consuls officers of the armed forces from the rank of
necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
power . . . . him in this Constitution; x x x
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,
appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express
the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that
fundamental component of the appointing power sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other
3. The appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,"
by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are
prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
therefore it can be considered, under the Omnibus Election Code Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the
Sec 261 par (g), an election offense. Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no
Quintos-Deles, et al. v. Commission on Appointments confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his
Facts: deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been
Teresita Quinton-Deles and three others were appointed sectoral extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution.
Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, Petitioner's appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art.
paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution, Quinton-Deles VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 which provides:
as a representative of the women’s sector. However, petitioner and the three
other sectoral representatives-appointees were not able to take their oaths and The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall
congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as
members of the House of Representatives. This opposition compelled Speaker The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as
Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oath-taking of the four sectoral additional authority for the appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to
representatives. the case at bar. The records show that petitioner's appointment was made
Because of this, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. while Congress was in recess. Hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of
transmitted a letter of the President addressed to the Commission on Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her. Implicit in the
Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the
sectoral representatives. appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed to the House of Representatives authority that petitioner's appointment requires confirmation by the
alleging, among others, that since no attempt was made to subject the sectoral Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII,
representatives already sitting to the confirmation process, there is no appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be effective only
necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
would certainly be discriminatory." adjournment of the Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral
In a meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions representatives need no confirmation, the President need not make any
and Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the
Angara, the Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles. petitioner, As a matter of fact, the President expressly submitted petitioner's
Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus praying that appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
respondent Commission on Appointments be enjoined from subjecting to Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on
confirmation process the petitioner's appointment as sectoral representative Appointments having acted on petitioner's appointment, said
for the women's sector and as member of Congress. appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section
23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and "unless resubmitted shall not
Issue: again be considered by the Commission."
Petitioners further contend that nowhere in the Constitution nor in
Does an appointment as Sectoral Representative by the President Executive Order No. 198 is mention made of the need for petitioner's
pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution require confirmation appointment to be submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
by the Commission on Appointments? confirmation. EO 198 is denominated: "Providing for the Manner of
Nomination and Appointment of Sectoral Representatives to the House of
Held: Representatives." We agree with the submission of respondent Commission
that the provisions of Executive Order No. 198 do not deal with the manner of
The petition is dismissed. Appointments by the President of appointment of sectoral representatives. EO 198 confines itself to specifying
sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on the sectors to be represented, their number, and the nomination of such
Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of sectoral representatives.
the Constitution. The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives
remains directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution
Ratio: which is quoted in the second "Whereas' clause of Executive Order No. 198.
Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the
consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the point,
petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. G.R. No. 149724: August 19, 2003
198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section
7 of the Constitution which require submission to the confirmation process. Facts: Israel C. Gaddi (Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region
XII) issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII
Regional Offices from Cotobato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), to
NAMARCO v. Arca South Cotobato. This was issued in pursuance to Admin. Order No. 99-14,
Facts: issued by DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles. DAO No. 99-14 says that
Juan T. Arive held a position in NAMARCO, which is a government owned “DENR adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment and
corporation. The president of the Philippines then reversed the decision of the Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional
NAMARCO Board of Directors. The president reinstated Juan T. Arive. District except in ARMM and NCR. The Regional Executive Directors (REDs)
are hereby authorized to realign/relocate existing CENROs to implement this
Issue: policy...”
Whether or not the president had the authority to reverse the decision of the
Board of Directors if NAMARCO. Employees of DENR (members of association COURAGE) represented by
Baguindanai A. Karim filed with the RTC petition for nullity of orders with
Held: prayer for preliminary injunction because of lack of legal basis and grave
Yes, the president can reverse the decision. abuse of discretion in regards to the Memorandum issued. The RTC granted
their petiton.
Ratio:
The President shall have control of all executive department, bureaus, or DENR filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Motion to Dismiss and petition for
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be certiorari in the RTCs and CAs but were always denied and dismissed. Hence,
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. they filed in the SC. Their claim was the doctrine of qualified political
Corporations owned or controlled by the government, such as NAMARCO, agency: “…the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic the acts of the Secretaries of such depts…are, unless disapproved or
Department. reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively acts of the Chief
This administrator, whose rank is like that of a Head of an Executive Executive.”
Department, is directly under the President. Thus, the action of the President
to reverse the decision of a subordinate is justified. Issues:
DADOLE, ET AL. V COA 1. Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the
GR No 125350 same were valid
3 December 2002 2. Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the
Petitioners – RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City DENR
Respondent – Commission on Audit
FACTS Held: YES. Petition is GRANTED and previous ones were REVERSED.
• The local government of Mandaue City gave P1,500 allowance for
RTC and MTC judges Ratio: Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the
• The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Local President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to
Budget Circular 55 (LBC 55), which capped the allowances given his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive
to government officials at a maximum of P1,000 only department. P.D. 1772 grants the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize national government. This decree was not repealed or
• The City Auditor ordered the judges to return the amount received
revoked and is consistent with the Constitution so it remains operative.
in excess of P1,000, and the Commission on Audit (COA) upheld
this decision in a motion for reconsideration
• The COA also said that Mandaue City’s issuing of allowances
violated the appropriation laws of Congress, because there is no
provision that allows them to get allowance money from the IRA
(Internal Revenue Allocation).
ISSUES
• W/N LBC 55 was void for exceeding the supervisory powers of
the president.
• W/N the allowances given by the Mandaue City local government
violated the appropriation laws of Congress.

HELD
• The SC decided in favor of the petitioner judges. LBC 55 was
VOID.
• LBC exceeded the supervisory powers of the President
o Supervisory powers – the executive can’t interfere with
local government autonomy unless there has been a
violation of law (can only make sure that laws by the
legislative are implemented)
o The President’s power of control only applies to
executive departments
• LBC 55 was clear interference because the law it was supposedly
based on (RA 7160) did not authorize the setting of a ceiling in
allowances. It only said “as long as finances permit.”
• LBC 55 was also void for not being published.Only internal and
interpretative regulations are exempt from publication.
• The DBM can’t claim that the Mandaue appropriations violated the
general appropriations act because the DBM failed to:
o Conduct a formal review of the appropriations
o Order a disapproval of the appropriation within 90 days
of receipt of the appropriation ordinance.
o
DENR vs. DENR EMPLOYEES

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