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G.R. No. L-25906

Attorney Pedro Dioquino, a practicing lawyer of Masbate, is the owner of a car. On March 31, 1964, he
went to the office of the MVO, Masbate, to register the same. Attorney Dioquino requested the defendant
Federico Laureano to introduce him to one of the clerks in the MVO Office, who could facilitate the registration
of his car and the request was graciously attended to. Defendant Laureano rode on the car of Atty. Dioquino on
his way to the P.C. Barracks at Masbate. While about to reach their destination, the car driven by plaintiff's
driver and with defendant Federico Laureano as the sole passenger was stoned by some 'mischievous boys,'
and its windshield was broken.

The defendant Federico Laureano refused to file any charges against the boy and his parents because he
thought that the stone-throwing was merely accidental and that it was due to ¢

. Laureano refused
to pay for the damaged done to the windshield and challenged the case for judicial adjudication. There is no
question that the plaintiff tried to convince the defendant Federico Laureano just to pay the value of the
windshield and he even came to the extent of asking the wife to convince her husband to settle the matter
amicably but the defendant Federico Laureano refused to make any settlement, clinging [to] the belief that he
could not be held liable because a minor child threw a stone accidentally on the windshield and therefore, the
same was due to ¢



Including in the action filed the wife, Aida de Laureano, and the fath er, Juanito Laureano.


‰1) Wheter or not there was fortuitous event and Federico Laureano is liable to pay for damages. 
‰2) Whether or not the plaintiff is liable for damages for including Federico Laureanoǯs wife and father.


‰1) The express language of Art. 1174 of the present Civil Code states that "Except in cases expressly
specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be, foreseen, or which, though foreseen were inevitable." Authorities of repute are in
agreement, more specifically concerning an obligation arising from contract "that some
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an
essential element of a caso fortuito." 5 If it could be shown that such indeed was the case, liability is
ruled out. There is no requirement of "diligence beyond what human care and foresight can
provide." 6 The throwing of the stone by the child was clearly unforeseen or if foreseen, was
inevitable. Hence, the law being what it is, such a belief on the part of defendant Laureano was
justified and he shall not be held liable for the damages caused to the car.
‰2) No moral damages should be awarded against the parties. Mistaken as plaintiff apparently was, it
cannot be concluded that he was prompted solely by the desire to inflict needless and unjustified
vexation on them. Considering the equities of the situation, plaintiff having suffered a pecuniary loss
which while resulting from a fortuitous event, perhaps would not have occurred at all had not
defendant Federico Laureano borrowed his car, we, feel that he is not to be penalized further by his
mistaken view of the law in including them in his complaint. Well-worth paraphrasing is the
thought expressed in a United States Supreme Court decision as to the existence of an abiding and
fundamental principle that the expenses and annoyance of litigation form part of the social burden
of living in a society which seeks to attain social control through law.
  c 
17 SCRA 739

 Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their three minor children, namely, Milagros ‰13), Raquel
‰4½) and Fe ‰2) boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352 bearing plate TPU No. 757 owned and operated by La
Mallorca at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with
them four pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. The conductor ‰half-brother of Beltran) of
the bus issued three tickets ‰Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child,
Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in
accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.

After about an hour's trip and after Beltranǯs family got off, Mariano Beltran went back to the bus to get the
baggage he had left under one of the seats near the door while the rest was waiting on a shaded area, he did not
notice that Raquel was following him. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting
for the conductor to hand him his h
, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly
started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given
the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by
Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten
meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board
without getting his h
 from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded
place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the
body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than
his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.

          !"
 

 La Mallorca is liable for damages. It was pointed out that even though, M. Beltranǯs family already
alighted from the bus, the fact that Beltran went back to the bus to retrieve his bayong, the relation of carrier-
passenger relation between La Mallorca and Beltran still subsist. It has been recognized as a rule that the
relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle
at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.

In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a
"very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the
bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even be fore the bus conductor
gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers
Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of
carriage.

 
     
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467 SCRA 569

 PASUDECO, sugarcane transporter, requested permission from Toll Regulatory Board ‰TRB) to pass
through NCLEX as the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga
were heavily damaged by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. PNCC, franchisee that operates and maintains
NCLEX, was furnished with the copy of the request to comment on. Thereafter, TRB and PASUDECO entered
into a Memorandum Agreement wherein PNCC was also furnished with a copy. The latter was allowed to enter
and pass through the NLEX provided they abide to the terms and conditions agreed upon.
At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co -employees
Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX and saw a pile of
sugarcane in the middle portion. Sundin, Ducusin and Pascual requested PASUDECO to clear the area as it was
hazardous for the travelers. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECO's equipment supervisor and
transportation superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was available as it was still very early.
Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five ‰5)
PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the
side of the road leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had
been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to ma n the traffic. As
dawn was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers. Sendin went
to his office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the necessary report.
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along
the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo
Generalao on their way to Baguio to attend their grandmother's first death anniversary. As the vehicle ran over
the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about
fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane. Latagan sustained injuries and Arnaiz car was totally
wrecked.
 Whether or not there was gross negligence on the part of Pasudeco and PNCC and the latter be made to
pay for damages.
 Pasudeco and PNCC are jointly and solidarily liable.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: ‰a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; ‰b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and ‰c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. [31] Article 2176 of
the New Civil Code provides:

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Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.[32] It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly demand, whereby
that other person suffers injury.[33] The Court declared the test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in 
 ( ,[34] *:
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaini ng the NLEX
safe for motorists. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger
motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning.
The petitioner cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, sin ce respondent Latagan
was not a party thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA:
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the
maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC
should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties.

PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no  of sugarcane, but evidence shows there
were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should have been sufficient warning devices
considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway.

The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that Arnaiz's car ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled from a
hauler truck.[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Moreover, the MOA refers  
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PASUDECO's negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in
removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and
proximate cause of Latagan's injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable .

2%  r#c 

L-22533, February 9, 1967

 On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.1 and Andres
Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the
car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision
driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its
driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio negligent and
declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs
P2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00
attorney's fees, with costs.

WON Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.

 Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.The uncontradicted testimony of
Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first
hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had
size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical
examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of:
First, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and
that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. +  
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 In the case of     
 No. L-9147 ‰1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's brief, our
Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a rule that "In order that the defendant may be considered as
having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere
possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment
as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service."

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides  
:

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, Pepsi Cola shall be
relieved from liability.








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No. L-46448 July 31, 1981 106 SCRA 391

 Plaintiff Jesus Samson averred that on January 8, 1951, he flew as co-pilot on a regular flight with
Captain Delfin Bustamente as commanding C-47 plane belonging to PAL, now herein the petitioner; that on
attempting to land the plane at Daet airport, Capt. Bustamante due to his slow reaction and poor judgment
overshot the airfield and as result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts of the plaintiff co-pilot to avert an
accident, the airplane crashed-landed beyond the runway. The jolt caused Samson to suffer from brain
concussion, wounds, abrasions of the forehead with intense pain and suffering.

Samson requested for expert and proper medical assistance however was only submitted for check-up to a
company physician who is a general med-practitioner. Several days after, he was called by PAL to report for
duty inspite of his previous request for expert medical assistance as he was already experiencing general
debility, dizziness and nervousness.

Samson, then, was discharged from duty on the grounds of physical disability causing him to lose his job and
become physically unfit to continue as aviator due to PALǯs negligence in not giving him the proper medical
attention.

 WON PAL did not exercise utmost diligence required of them as a common carriage.

 There was gross negligence by PAL for allowing Capt. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of the
accident, even if he was sick, having tumor on his nose. The duty of a common carrier, like PAL, to exercise the
highest degree of diligence extends to passengers and crew members.

The dizziness, headaches and general debility of private respondent were after-effects of the crash-landing. And
therefore there is causal connection between the accident and said after-effects. The negligence of PAL is
clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Art. 2219‰2) is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages. Even
from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employee-employer relationship between it and private
respondent arising from the contract of employment, private respondent is still entitled to moral damages in
view of the finding of bad faith or malice, applying the provisions of Article 2220 which provides that willful
injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.