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2 # p 161 - I find myself balking a bit at Kohlberg's argument by analogy here. As I understand it, he's saying that just as
"scientific" beliefs can't acceptably be defined in terms of the belief of the collective, neither can beliefs in the domain of
morals. While I agree with the heart of this point, his way of making it suggests that the domain of moral inquiry and the
domain of scientific inquiry (which he has so carefully distinguished up to this point) have the same relationship to
collective beliefs. Science, at least, is defined in part in contrast to, and in contrast to a reliance on, the backdrop of
conventional beliefs.
However, this character of "scientific beliefs" seems to me to be grounded in peculiarities of the domain of
scientific inquiry, rather than grounded in traits shared by all domains of knowledge, or in the nature of the barriers
between these domains. Kohlberg doesn't justify why he thinks the moral domain must operate in the same way as
science does, and as such, this analogy seems to be a red herring to some extent. The more important question in my
mind would be: Just as something inherent to science makes it unacceptable to define it in terms of collective belief,
what character inherent to the domain of moral judgment makes it unacceptable to define morality in terms of collective
belief?
Kohlberg's response to this (p 162) is to bootstrap a universal definition of morality off of research subjects'
own definitions of morality and use this to turn Berkowitz's (1964) own, culturally relative definition of morality against
him. Since "most people or cultures do not agree that morality is defined by the values of the majority", Berkowitz's
claim to the contrary is arbitrary and, indeed, hypocritical. While this response does undermine the position (attributed
to Berkowitz) that cultural relativism is grounded in value neutrality, it does not seem to justify the equation of the
structure of scientific beliefs and moral beliefs which was strongly suggested on the previous page.
methods in actual detail". Weber himself claimed that values in the moral sphere cannot be ranked, and
by doing so, he confined the idea of "progress" to the technical or rational sphere - but did so in the
context of designing legislation, and didn't acknowledge Brandt's (1959) insight that "moral
philosophers can define methodological criteria of moral judgment and argument with about as much
agreement and clarity as philosophers of science can define methodological criteria of scientific
judgment and argument". Weber never distinguished valid and consentual methodological criteria for
adequacy of moral inquiry, from arbitrary and value-laden bias; this is a distinction we must be careful
to make. In conclusion: "It is illogical to claim that something is impossible in advance of inquiry."
(163)
3 # p 174 - Having established that basic moral values are universal, he then addresses the relativist critique of "the
ordering or hierarchy of these values is idiosyncratic and relative". His response to this is that, Look, we've studied
moral reasoning and development in all sorts of cultures and found the exact same invariant sequence everywhere.
I want to be clear in my mind that this response hasn't yet reached beyond the empirical data to justify
normative assertions about what is mature morality. It's relying on an unstated argument of "Well, everyone we've talked
with seems to develop through the same sequence" and in it, the argument of "Everyone, given enough time, points
towards these and these traits as indicating mature morality", which is really a meta-form of "Mature morality is defined
by the beliefs of the collective". He hasn't yet tied these findings back into his discussion of how to (and how not to) link
empirics and norms, and thus his conclusion of "Therefore we can empirically find moral universals" is left somewhat
ambiguous in meaning.
Isn't this reminiscent of Berkowitz' argument, which Kohlberg just tore apart (p 161)? No, because Kohlberg's
critique was pointing to Berkowitz' hypocrisy in pre-rejecting any universal criteria for defining morals beyond the
scope of the local culture and community - a rejection which leads to logical inconsistencies. In contrast, Kohlberg is
starting out with the opposite suggestion, namely that there are universals in moral content and development, and indeed
this is a position consistent with the beliefs / experience of the majority - including, as he wryly points out, most cultural
and ethical relativists.
So in this sense Kohlberg is defining morality by drawing on the eventual beliefs of the global collective, rather
than the present beliefs of the local collective (in isolation from a larger context). But I'll acknowledge that he is still
committing a naturalistic fallacy here, and has yet to justify it.
I'm curious to see what happens to this argument if Kohlberg finds one tiny exception to part of it. If he
someday studies a community or context where, say, the "desired" and the "desirable" aren't distinguished, does this
undermine the normative conclusion that a mature morality distinguishes those ideas? In other words, what conclusions
can be made from observing universals isn't nearly so interesting to me as what conclusions may be made from
observing almost-universals.
psychological need" or of culture. External moral judgments thus are arbitrary and have no meaningful
value. [Unsure how to interpret this...4]
"A more popular view" is a "moderate sociological relativism" where a universal form and
function of morality are recognized, but morality is seen as relative in content and specifics. This
moderate relativism is "sociological" in that it frames morality as "originating at the social-system
level, not the individual level". Form of moral reasoning is universal, but the rules and values (both
those we find universally, and those we consider more arbitrary) are shaped by sociocultural
particularities, and are then internalized to the individual. Examples of this view of morality include
Sumner (1906) and Durkheim (1925). Sociological relativism treats evaluations within a culture
differently from evaluations across cultures: The former is possible, based on the extent to which an
individual's attitude aligns with and respects that of the culture - thus children may be morally judged.
However, as (eg. for Durkheim) the content and values of morality do not have meaning beyond the
norms of the group, behavior of people in other cultures may not be evaluated by my culture's morals.
(176)
Challenging both extreme relativism and sociological relativism, Kohlberg's research finds
much less difference in the "concepts, values, or principles" of morality than often portrayed, both in
the presence of the 30ish moral categories previously discussed, and in the sequence of stages of
reasoning. Moreover, many of the "marked differences between individuals and cultures" which
relativists cite as evidence for moral plurality, are in fact better interpretable as the appearance of
different developmental stages - these differences, being developmental, aren't arbitrary. Moral
differences, both between individuals in a group, between a child and an adult, and between members
of different groups / cultures, can be evaluated "as being more or less adequate morally" - thus we
reject both ethical relativism, and the more moderate "sociological relativism", as morality has not only
universal form but also universal content.
This does not mean, as Asch (1952) would suggest, that moral principles are held the same by
all people or by all adults. Differences in morality are not merely differences in perception or
comprehension of a situation, leading the same moral principles to be applied differently; there are also
"fundamental differences in principles or modes of moral evaluation" on top of the mere differences in
interpretation of the world. Moral reasoning itself differs, in addition and somewhat independently of
other types of reasoning, but not arbitrarily so much as developmentally.
Notes that "sociological relativism" (which accepts universal moral categories and concepts, but
denies universality of moral content) is inconsistent with the empirical finding of a single stage factor
which influences moral thinking across culture and produces a universally "invariant order of
development". The related Durkheimian assertion that "the basic meaning of 'X is wrong' is 'X violates
4 # p 175 – Kohlberg notes an extreme relativist position which argues that moral judgments imposed from externally
don't account for the specific psychology and culture of a circumstance and thus are useless. He comments that this view
suggests that one's action is always the 'best' action, from the perspective of the actor. But it's possible to hold this “best
action at the time” view, taking a psychological empathic perspective, and still level moral judgments as these are
distinct perspectives of judgment. (I'm assuming that Kohlberg wouldn't similarly throw out the considerations of
psychology and culture in evaluating an action.)
Put from the perspective of the object of study, then, under this extension of Kohlberg's logic it is possible to be
doing the best you can, be acting as conscientiously and morally as you know how, and still to be acting immorally - not
only in the eyes of a 2nd perspective but in a more objective, universal sense. That troubles me.
the rules of my group' " is only valid at the conventional level, and applies neither at preconventional
nor postconventional levels. The reasoning pattern of conventional morality often allows it to "stretch"
to interpret behavior in new ways depending on social consensus and pressures, but underlying this
seemingly arbitrary extension of values is a dedication to the norms of the group. (177-178)
Kohlberg proposes this summary view of moral universality: Moral stage 6 is a universally
obtainable, though empirically rare, stage which imparts a fixed set of universal abstract moral
principles. At lower stages, morality is not fully principled; thus it is more subject to redefinition by
specific context and by one's social frame of reference. At lower stages, for example conventional, the
universal moral principles (not apprehended fully until stage 6) tend to 'pull' at values such that "the
more generalized and consistently held content" approximate some of these and are 'relatively'
universal.
"A culture cannot be located at a single stage, and the individual's moral stage cannot be derived
directly from his culture's stage." [Brownian drift?] Stage-achievement of individuals takes the form of
a frequency distribution / probability distribution: it's easier, and more probable, to develop to stage 6
morality in modern America than 5th-century Athens. Moreover [and underlying cultural moral
development], the moral pioneers in any era create a "historical horizontal decalage" effect where it
gradually becomes easier to adopt higher moral stages. (178)
Hobhouse's (1906) early research on moral development - interesting that "cultural relativists
have never attempted to refute the basic facts" of Hobhouse's argument for social evolutionism.
Rejections of Hobhouse's evolutionism, such as the response of Westermarck (1960), have generally
taken the form of 'Social moral evolutionism leads to an unacceptable telos which must somehow be
arbitrary to the speaker's own perspective', rather than an actual logical or scientific response to the
argument. But "developed consciousness" can be defined in non-arbitrary terms using "objective
measures of ontogenetic or historical sequence", as both Kohlberg and Hobhouse have done. (179)
The confusion of ethical relativity (morals are non-universal in form and content) and cultural
relativity (morals appear differently in different cultures, possibly supported by a universal structure
and content of morality) - this confusion itself is "characteristic of a transitional phase in the movement
from conventional to principled morality". And longitudinally, all such extreme relativists eventually
move on to full moral principlation. "This suggests that relativism, like much philosophy, is the disease
of which it is the cure; the very questioning of the arbitrariness of conventional morality presupposes a
dim intuition of non arbitrary moral principles". The insight of relativity itself, presupposes an
underlying non-relativity. (180)
6 # p 184 - Kohlberg argues that the qualitatively variant reasoning at each moral stage, and the invariant sequence of
adoption of these, are grounds for rejecting the views of morals as either a) inborn intuitions or b) (imperfect) direct
apprehension of facts. Essentially he's using empirical observations of moral ontogeny and development, in order to
justify eliminating candidate views on the form of morality. I find myself wondering, could the same thing be done in
the domain of reflective judgment? What would this entail? Identifying ways that developmental (fundamentally
longitudinal) data can allow us to eliminate candidate views of the form of epistemology - a topic I have so often seen
discussed. Is this even a reasonable comparison?
in his analogous logico-mathematical stages). [p 186...7]
As stated earlier, "true stages" of development are defined as having: a) invariant order across
different contexts; b) a "structured whole" or deep structure underlying superficial differences, stages
being separated by qualitative rather than merely quantitative differences; c) hierarchical integration,
meaning that lower stages are somehow included and reorganized in the higher stages, and also
meaning that anyone with access to higher stages can also access / comprehend lower stages, though
higher stages are hierarchically preferred.
Because the empirical data shows moral stages to fit with these traits, and because Piaget's
cognitive stages also meet these criteria, "it is logically necessary that the two sets of stages be
isomorphic". Thus moral stages need logical underpinnings - and "each aspect of the stage must
logically imply each other aspect". ["aspects", I think, refer to different elements of moral reasoning,
which are linked by logical connectors which increase in complexity over development.]
This isomorphism of moral with cognitive development, and our explanation of moral
sequentiality through logical necessity, can explain why moral development always goes in one
direction, without requiring an explanation of it through neural hardwiring, external natural forces, or
invariant elements of cultural influence or educational systems.
However this does not mean that "moral judgment is simply the application of a level of
intelligence to moral problems"; Kohlberg asserts that moral development is its own process, its own
line, for which equivalent cognitive-logical development is a necessary but not sufficient precursor.
(187)
Based on this necessary-but-not-sufficient relationship, we would expect that "all children at a
given moral stage will pass the equivalent-stage cognitive task" but not vice versa. Cites research from
Kuhn, Kohlberg, Selman, and others which supports this prediction. (187) In addition, notes that IQ
tests ("mental age" tests) correlate with moral maturity, though not as well as Piagetian-stage-based
tests.
STAGE 1
defines sociomoral order as "differentials of power status and possessions", lacking a grasp of logical
(and moral) reciprocity. Sociomoral order involves obeying those stronger than you, or being punished
by them if you don't.
STAGE 2
has a sense of "fairness as quantitative equality in exchange and distribution". Reciprocity is conceived
as tit for tat (whether positive or negative) and conceives of non-interference, "leave me alone and I'll
leave you alone".
STAGE 3
can role-take in Selman's (1971) theory-of-mind logical perspectival tasks, which require a recognition
that an "other child would anticipate that the finder would try to anticipate him" - stage 2 is incapable
of this. Adapting this task into the moral domain, asking children what the Golden Rule tells you to do
if someone hits you in the street, will differentiate stage-2 responses (literal reciprocity: hit them back)
from stage-3 responses (ideal reciprocity - involves taking both self's and other's roles simultaneously).
Stage 3 can see the problematic vicious circle of the "strict equal exchange" of stage 2 -- this is
replaced by an ideal, eventual reciprocity which might require unilaterality in some situations.
However this ideality is restricted to taking those roles one more directly identifies with; simplistic role
stereotypes limit role-taking. The Golden Rule doesn't require the object of role-taking to also role-
take, meaning that in developmentally unequal situations it can result in an anemic "turn the other
cheek" ethic.
STAGE 4
extends beyond merely orienting around "concrete dyadic interpersonal relationships", to orienting
around a "social order of roles and rules" which constitute a larger community. Justice isn't about
reciprocity between pairs, so much as a relationship of individual to the social order. Social inequality
is seen as an acceptable reflection of effort and talent. Justice is easily conflated with "maintaining
social order", and as such, stage-4 morality isn't good at imagining / creating new social orders; better
at maintaining the existing system.
However, there's an important distinction between stage-4 ability to maintain order, and the
stage-1 ability to merely obey the existing order. Stage 4 is Durkheimian in flavor, although as
discussed above, it can only be attained through cognitive and moral development, not through a
simple socialization process or internalization / learning of rules (as Durkheim, Freud, and Piaget
would say). It's more "rational" in nature than these other views would suggest. (199)
STAGE 5
Many moral philosophers and social scientists argue that it's impossible to develop a meaningful
morality grounded in anything beyond the relative context of one's specific community beliefs. The
demonstration that a "substantial body (25%)" of society has developed a morality which builds off of
stage-4 conventional morality and which "more adequately handles moral problems than does stage 4",
undermines this claim. (200)
Limits to stage 4: it gives no guidelines for moral interaction with anyone outside the
community context; and it only maintains, cannot easily author or adjust, the social order. This causes
friction in times of social change where the creation of new rules is called for.
Stage 5, in contrast, is "rule utilitarian" in that it can step back from the current order enough to
evaluate what rules would best serve society's fundamental goals. Stage 5 differentiates the means of
social order (laws, private property, etc.) from the ends of social welfare (health, safety, liberty, etc.),
and as such, can see rules of social order as mechanisms to an end. For example, a stage-5 "rational
member" might put faith in the abstract arrangements created by "Constitutional Democracy" not
because of the concrete rules which this generates, but because the procedures of generating those rules
take certain social welfare maxims into account (representation, liberty, etc.) (202)
Stage 5 lawmaking procedures always seem to revolve around the idea of social contract
(conceived as a procedure for generating rules, rather than as the act of accepting rules already fixed).
Because contracts rely on voluntary consent, personal liberty tends to be the most fundamental
principle of stage-5 morality. Lawmaking is discussed foremost here because ontogenetically, the
lawmaking perspective must be established before moral rules can be made. But in social history,
"critical moral philosophy and constitutional democracy" have arisen simultaneously.
Stage 5 morality sees laws as "exemplifications of universal logical possibilities" and as such,
becomes aware of the arbitrariness of one's own rule system. This is the basis for the abilities of critical
thinking and reflection (which involves thinking about one's own thought, norms, etc.) This reflection
raises the question of "Why should I be moral?": the relativism resulting from this question can push
people around the 4 --> 5 transition to a pseudoregressive instrumental-egoistic view of morality,
reduces stage 5 morality in terms of conformity with the motive of maintaining personal comfort.
The "metaethical questioning" and reflection characteristic of the transition out of stage 4,
doesn't always lead directly to stage 5. Sometimes it results in ideologies exalting the self or a given
group as the grounding for all morality. "Such college student ideologies" are generally short-lived, but
sometimes solidify into long-term orientations which at best resemble spin-offs of stage-3 or stage-4
systems, at their worst produce such "amorality" structures as that of Stalin or Hitler. These exceptions
aren't considered stages because they aren't universally present, and mostly remix elements from earlier
stages with no clear higher-order organization present. (203)
Kohlberg claims that stages 5 and 6 are the only two higher modes of moral judgment which
may succeed stage 4 - allowing, of course, that the particular content of morality derived from these
moral stages may vary greatly. Stage 5 resolves the problem of the arbitrary-ness of laws by grounding
these in procedures of lawmaking which draw on non-arbitrary criteria of social welfare. However,
stage 5 morality will break down when the contract lawmaking procedures underlying it aren't morally
adequate; it has no universal moral grounding beyond its legitimate procedures of developing morality.
Stage 6 improves on this.
STAGE 6
In some situations, the constitutional contract procedures sacrosanct to stage 5 don't yield clear morals,
or provide laws which are clearly immoral. Example: "civil disobedience of constitutionally legitimate
laws" is treated relativistically, or up to personal preference. These situations need a grounding for a
universal morality outside of the sphere of law. That's because stage-5 procedural principles of deriving
morality (such as the rule-utilitarianism, above) are methodological principles rather than true moral
principles. Kohlberg quotes the mutually contradictory arguments of 2 stage-5 philosophers who
were asked the Heinz dilemma, to demonstrate that the structure of stage 5 morality can lead to equally
valid but contradictory judgments, and thus stage 5 produces non-universal morality in contexts where
a legitimately established law can be questioned (the Heinz dilemma being one such context). (206)
Stage 6 is a moral orientation which achieves more universality than stage 5 by grounding
morality in "what may alternately be conceived of as (a) the principle of justice, (b) the principle of role
taking, or (c) the principle of respect for personality." Kohlberg quotes (p 208) a stage-6 philosopher
who grounds his answer to the Heinz dilemma in 2 universal moral principles: the value of human life,
and justice. This response acknowledges rule-utilitarianism and the value of social contract, but sets
these in their place as institutionalized means to these universal principles which cannot account for all
conceivable situations. This stage-6 response is the only response (contrasted with the 2 stage-5
responses) which defines moral obligation as independent from one's social role (and context).
The stage-6 philosopher applies the concept of universality as a principle of role-taking: any
person in the same situation should apply the same values and considerations to their moral decision.
Notes that this stage-6 form of universalization is distinct from Kant's categorical imperative (ie, only
act on maxims which you would have everyone else act on). The categorical imperative can lead to
conclusions like "it is wrong to lie to save a life because to universalize lying for good causes is to
negate the meaning of truth telling" - because maxims refer to concrete rules rather than abstract
principles, in the context of stage-6 universal principles it makes no sense to universalize maxims; and
indeed, doing so can produce conservativism which frustrates a post-conventional morality. Stage-6
"primary principles", on the other hand, "explicitly refer to humanity in the person of yourself and
every other" and is more universalizable and reversible than are the conclusions generated by a literal
adherence to the categorical imperative. (211)
Rather than just promoting formalistic procedures to developing morality, stage 6 seeks
"substantive moral principles" themselves: fully universalizable, reversible groundings which state
what's fundamentally morally worthy. This contrasts with Kantian justice which prescribes the formal
character of justice, but lacks substantive principles. Indeed, the substantive principle of justice is
required to make Kant's " 'ends in themselves' formulation workable" as it lets us specify that the
treatment of humans as ends should be considered a right or claim of all people, which correlates duties
with rights and makes duties specific to a person, distinguishing Kant's morality of ends from a
utilitarianism which creates the "heap of unconnected obligations" critiqued by Ross (1930). (212)
Justice (reciprocity and equality) was a fundamental obligatory theme at every stage just
described. Stage 5 defines justice in terms of civil rights, equality of opportunity, and contract. Stage 6
defines justice in terms of human rights based in the value of human beings as ends in themselves - and
redefines those stage-5 concepts in terms of this fundamental human worth.
Notes that the stage-6 philosopher equated universalizability with reversibility. Reversibility
implies that duties are correlative to rights, and also implies that having a right requires the holder to
recognize that right in others. Rawls (1971) offers a thought experiment to concretize these
conclusions: A just solution (ie to the Heinz dilemma) is one that all parties would accept if described
to them beforehand, assuming they could be placed in any role and didn't know which role they would
take. Similarly, the valid claims of each role are those acknowledged by each party in this experiment,
and those valid claims define valid duties. "In the sense just outlined, a universalizable decision is a
decision acceptable to any man involved in the situation who must play one of the roles affected by the
decision, but does not know which role he will play." His [or hers] is not a greatest-good perspective
nor an "ideal spectator" perspective (which is impartial and uninvolved); it's a shared perspective,
product of the overlay of all relevant role-takings. (213)
8 # p 217 - I'd like to hear Kohlberg's thoughts on the relationship between "moral as opposed to amoral" (or his term
"morally neutral") and "moral as opposed to immoral". He never uses negating terms like these, and I really wish he had
for clarity. What it sounds like he's saying on p 217 ("our developmental metaethical conception of the higher or later as
the more moral is not a normative ethical principle generating moral judgments") is that his "is to ought" claim is merely
that higher stages are more "moral as opposed to amoral" - ie, more differentiated from other domains of judgment - but
is saying that our understanding of higher and lower stages canNOT inform us as to distinguishing "the moral from the
immoral" - nor justify moral action, etc.
Or, perhaps more precisely, Kohlberg is commenting that the FORM of morality (ie, his formalist claim that
higher stages are formally more adequate and thus "more moral") can only justify certain claims. That would make
sense.
9 # p 218 - I wonder where Kohlberg is grounding his assertion that "the whole notion that there is a distinctively moral
form of judgment demands that moral judgment be principled". He is saying that in our very conception and definition
of a "moral" domain, given the unique function we allocate to that domain, we've prescribed an absolute value to the
principles contained in it. For him, to hold to "principles" of morality means to use a universal method of judgment and
choice and to expect all others to adopt given a similar situation.
Does the acceptance that principles are paramount in morality, necessarily follow from all reasonable
Kohlberg is defining principles as "a general guide to choice" rather than a concrete immutable rule -
considerations in moral choice.
Categories of principles found in Kohlberg's data include (corresponding to Sidgwick's
categories): prudence / self-realization, benevolence / welfare of others, respect for authority / society /
others, and justice. These principles appear at all stages (though prudence and respect for authority
disappear from consideration by stage 6). These principles are all good in themselves prima facie (not
means to a higher end), and they refer to "states of affairs which are involved in all moral situations and
are potentially relevant to all people".
Principles are neither means nor ends, neither rules nor values; they are guides to thorough
moral consideration. "They reduce all moral obligation to the interests and claims of concrete
individuals in concrete situations" and help to resolve moral conflicts / competing claims. When moral
principles are thusly reduced to guides for considering claims, we can then say that justice is the most
fundamental principle, underlying the others. (219-220)
Benevolence may also be considered relatively universal, as "the content of moral concerns and
claims is always welfare"; however, it can never adjudicate between welfare claims. Welfare concern is
impetus, "precondition for experiencing a moral conflict" rather than a "mechanism for its resolution".
The most obvious method of applying benevolence is through "quantitative maximization" - Kohlberg
discussed this earlier, and now dismisses it as "no true moral principle". [see rule utilitarianism,
discussion of stages 5 & 6, above]
To review - Kohlberg's argument for justice as the fundamental moral principle: [Some big
ungrounded claims here, that I'm left to trust Kohlberg on. If any of these are meant to follow logically
from earlier arguments or be redundant to earlier conclusions, they don't / aren't.] (220)
1 - conceptions of justice and empathy are present throughout development, in successively more
differentiated & integrated forms
2 - only justice, not empathy, is a principle at the highest stage of development - in that it trumps "all
other considerations, including welfare"
3 - other principles, when made fundamental, either don't resolve moral conflicts effectively, or result
in wrong-seeming and unsatisfying resolutions.
4 - many philosophers have argued similarly that justice is most fundamental.
5 - in situations of moral conflict with legitimacy such as civil disobedience, only justice can resolve
definitions of a domain of morality? I question that. Intuitively I feel that this jump lacks a consideration of
development, particularly development in perception, which would seem to demand of us a more sophisticated handling
of the concept of "principles". I personally make different moral judgments of others based on my sense of their
development (what they are able to perceive and understand) - which also requires me to differentiate an "ideal" moral
judgment from a "person-applied" moral judgment.
Maybe a highly developmentalized approach to morality such as mine is one of the unsustainably unformalistic
moralities which Kohlberg cursorily dismisses as marginal to honest moral inquiry (p 218). I can't evaluate that right
now. In any case, that's an example of a potential morality which doesn't apply its moral "principles" evenly to everyone.
It's worth noting on this note, Kohlberg's list of principles (p 219 - both empirically derived and philosophically
confirmed) omits reference to growth. This doesn't bode well for Wilber's "Basic Moral Intuition", the main inspiration
for my moral views.
the conflict adequately.
6 - philosophers have only questioned justice as the fundamental moral principle because of a "refusal
to accept a formal deontological concept of morality". (But again, no strong alternative positive
definition of morality has been offered in place of this.)
"Formalists who disagree with the primacy of justice usually do so because they wish to keep
morality completely content-free." Kohlberg asserts that "the moral form of universality, tied to the
notion that obligations are to persons, logically implies the principle of justice" but he can't fully justify
that claim in this article; he simply "points to the fact that no principle other than justice has been
shown to meet the formal conception of a universal prescriptive principle". Quotes Alston's critique
(this volume) that universal presciptivity can be a feature of any moral principle and thus there's
nothing special about justice. Kohlberg acknowledges that he has not proven justice to be the only
possible universal moral principle, but responds that no one has suggested anything better: "no
philosopher has ever seriously attempted to demonstrate that an alternative substantive principle to
justice could function in a universal prescriptive fashion in a satisfactory way".
In summary: although a (1) formalistic definition of morality, (2) based most fundamentally in
the principle of justice, are not proven as the only possible basis for morality, no one has proposed
serious alternatives. Thus "my definition of stage 6 as the way people ought to reason" is not arbitrary
nor based on Kohlberg's own preference, as Alston would argue.
10 # p 226 - Kohlberg comments that stage psychology implies "that arguments for a normative ethic must be stepwise"
and gives enough example of this to give me a pretty good sense of what he means by that, but fails to really justify or
argue this point. For example, why specifically should an argument to stage 5 be addressed to stage 4 reasoning rather
than stage 2? In what specific ways do arguments directed towards the "instrumental egoistic man"-directed arguments
for social contract institutions "fail to be fully convincing"?
Kohlberg's relying on the reader either to fully accept his described Piagetian mechanics of his stage theory as
given, or he's counting on the reader to know more than I do about the pitfalls of reducing political theory to
instrumental stage-2 concerns. Either way, by doing so, he fails to highlight the actual benefits of stage theory for
normative philosophy. The benefits of a theory only become clear to me when it leads to conclusions which you can
verify as valuable independently of a reliance on the theory, and which you could not have easily reproduced without the
theory.
recent philosophic work".
11 # p 228 - Does any serious moral philosopher use a "bag of virtues" approach to describe how moral thought and action
are connected? This discussion of "There are different ways to interpret immoral actions" and "Everyone cheats to some
extent" seems very simplistic, almost a different writing style, compared to the previous sections. Maybe this is the
article's age (40 years old) showing through.
on "the cognitive adequacy of the belief", we must "start theorizing about thought and action in a new
way." Inquiry into this "new way" cannot necessarily rely on the analogies of physical or social
thought-action, because the realm of morality involves a concept of sacrifice which "has no parallel in
the realm of scientific and logical thought". (230-231)
Ends with a quote by Socrates stating 1) that virtue has fundamentally one universal form, 2)
this form is justice, 3) virtue is "knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good.",
and 4) knowledge of the good is obtained through philosophy or intuition, not "correct opinion or
acceptance of conventional beliefs".
SELECT REFERENCES
Alston, W. P. (1968.) Moral attitudes and moral judgments. Nous, 1968. 2(1): 1-23.
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