LIST OF CASES

(Admission, Res Inter Alios Acta, Compromise, Hearsay Evidence)

(A) Admissions and Confessions

1. People v. Paragsa 84 SCRA 105 (1978)
2. People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
3. Virgilio Bon vs. Pp GR No.152160, 13 January 2004
4. Simangan vs. Pp GR No.157984, 8 July 2004
5. People vs. Renato Espanol, G.R. No.175603, 13 February 2009
6. Estrada v. Desierto, et al. 356 SCRA 108 (3 April 2001)

(B) Compromises
1. U.S. v. Torres
2. People v. Godoy
3. People v. De Guzman
4. People v. Yparriguirre
5. People v. Maqui
34 Phil. 994 (1916)
250 SCRA 676 (1995)
265 SCRA 228 (1996)
268 SCRA 35 (1997)
27 Phil. 97 (1914)

(C) Res Inter Alios Acta

1. People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109 (1979
2. People v. Raquel 265 SCRA 248 (1996)
3. Bank of Commerce v. Manalo 9 February 2006
4. People v. Cabrera 57 SCRA 715 (1974)
5. People v. Yatco 97 Phil. 941 (1955)
6. People v. Chaw Yaw Shun 23 SCRA 127 (1968)
7. People v. Serrano 105 Phil. 531 (1959)
8. City of Manila v. Del Rosario 5 Phil. 227 (1905)
9. Gevero vs. IAC 189 SCRA 201

(D) Conduct and Character As Evidence

1. U.S. v. Pineda 37 Phil. 457 (1918)
2. People vs. Irang 64 Phil. 285 (1937)
3. People v. Soliman 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
4. People v. Babiera 52 Phil. 97 (1928)
5. U.S. v. Mercado 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
6. Gonzales v. People 515 SCRA 480 (12 February 2007)
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(E) Hearsay Evidence Rule
1. People v. Gaddi
2. Estrada v. Desierto
3. Cornejo v. Sandiganbayan
4. People vs. Cerilla
5. Ariate vs. Pp
6. People v. Salison
7. People v. Bautista
8. People vs. De Joya
9. People v. Majuri
10. Fuentes v. CA
11. People v. Bernal
12. Parel v. Prudencio
13. Estrada v. Desierto
14. Gravador v. Mamigo
15. People v. Alegado
16. Tison v. CA
17. Mendoza v. CA
18. Solinap v. Locsin, Jr.
19 Jison v. CA
20. Ferrer v. de Ynchausti
21. People v. Lungayan
22. People v. Cudal
23. Aballe v. People
24. DBP Pool v. RMN
25. People v. Tulagan
26. Talidano v. Falcon Maritime
27. Lao v. Standard Insurance
28. Canaquie v. CA
29. Wallen Maritime v. NLRC
30. Manalo v. Robles
31. Northwest Airlines v. Chiong
32. Pp vs. Hubert Webb, et al.
33. Caltex v. Africa
34. People v. Leones
35. People v. Cabuang
36. People v. Gabriel
37. Escobar v. Luna
38. Barcelon v. Com. Of BIR
39. PNOC Shipping v. CA
40. Tan v. CA
170 SCRA 649 (1989)
356 SCRA (3 April 2001)
31 July 1987
G.R. No. 177147, 28 November 2007
G.R. No.173608, 20 November 2008
G.R. No. L-115690, Feb. 20, 1996
21 June 1999
203 SCRA 403, 8 November 1991
96 SCRA 472 (1980)
253 SCRA 430 (1996)
274 SCRA 197 (19 June 1997)
487 SCRA (19 April 2006
356 SCRA (3 April 2001)
20 SCRA 742 (1967
201 SCRA 37 (1991)
276 SCRA 582 (1997)
201 SCRA 675
371 SCRA (10 December 2001)
286 SCRA 495 (24 February 1998)
38 Phil. 905 (1918)
162 SCRA 100 (1988)
506 SCRA 466 (31 October 2006)
180 SCRA (15 March 1990)
27 January 2006
22 July 1986
G.R. No.172031, 14 July 2008
409 SCRA (14 August 2003)
305 SCRA 579
263 SCRA 174
99 Phil. (16 August 1956)
G.R. No.155550, 31 January 2008
G.R. No.176864, 14 December 2010
16 SCRA 448 (1966)
117 SCRA 382 (1982)
217 SCRA 675 (1993)
G.R. No. L-107735, Feb. 1, 1996
519 SCRA 1 (23 March 2007)
G.R. No.157064, 7 August 2006
299 SCRA 402 (1999)
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20 SCRA 54 (1967)
41. Manliclic vs. Calaunan 512 SCRA 643 (25 January 2007)
42. Mallari vs. People G.R. No.153911, 10 December 2004

A. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44060 July 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Bienvenido Paragsa, alias "Benben", appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Judge Agapito
Hontanosas, presiding), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused Bienvenido Paragsa of the crime of Rape as
charged in the Information beyond reasonable doubt and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to indemnify the
complaining witness in the amount of P8,000.00 (People vs. Rogato Rivera, 58, O.G. and People vs. Chan et al., CA
No. 03545-GR, August 11, 1967) with all legal accessories and to pay the costs. Being a detention prisoner, he is
entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment from the time of his confinement up to the date of the
promulgation of this judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 10-19, rollo).
Because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by the Court of Appeals on the accused, this case is now before US for review
pursuant to Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol Magallanes, the alleged rape victim, her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita
Parochel, and Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco of the Bantayan Emergency Hospital, Bantayan, Cebu, who examined the offended party and
submitted Exhibit A embodying his findings thereon,
Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then a little over twelve and a half (12½) years
old (Exhibit B, p. 7, rec.), was alone in her parents' house in Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking
hog feed. Her parents were away at the time — her father was in Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay, both in Negros Occidental (p.
16, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972) while the rest of the family were with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol
was a 6th grade student of the Bunacan Elementary School (p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Upon instruction of her mother, she did not go to
school that afternoon so that she could look after the pigs and cook their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground floor of their house
cooking hog feed when the accused, Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and closed the door after him.
Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol's neck, encircled her abdomen with his right arm, at the same time
pointing the hunting knife with s right hand at her breast, and threatened her not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter,
the accused pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled up her dress and, with his two hands, removed her panties. The accused then
placed his hunting knife on the bed by Mirasol's side, opened the zipper of his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol's
thighs, picked up the hunting knife again, placed himself on top of Mirasol, inserted his erect penis into her sexual organ and then
made four push and pull movement until he ejaculated (pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n.,Ibid). In the process, Mirasol's dress and panties
were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the accused to roll up her dress and pull her panties without any resistance
whatsoever. During the intercourse, the accused was not holding the hunting knife. After the accused had discharged, he ran to the
storeroom of the house upstairs because he heard Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father, calling from
outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not answer because she was then in the act of putting on
her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). After she had put on her panties, she opened the gate and saw her aunt Lita,
who asked her what the accused did to her, but she did not answer because she was afraid as the accused was still inside the house.
She also did not tell her aunt Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse with her under threats and against her will. Her aunt Lita
then walked away.
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she would tell her aunt Lita what he did, he would kill her (pp.
13-14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). After the incident, Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon of the same day and joined her
brother and sister and grandmother. She did not reveal to any of them what transpired between her and the accused in Tabagac.
Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but Mirasol did not also reveal the incident to him because she
was afraid her father might punish her. Her mother returned home on July 16, 1971 from Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not
also tell her mother about what happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac It was her aunt Lita who revealed the matter to Mirasol's
mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to reveal the incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother
asked her about it; because, according to her, she wanted to take revenge on the accused (p. 15, Dec. 3, 1971). Three days after her
return from Sagay, Negros Occidental — on July 19, 1971 — Mirasol's mother brought her to the Bantayan Emergency Hospital in
Bantayan, Cebu, where she was examined by Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as follows:
Abrasion of inguinal region
Abrasion, left thigh, medial side
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
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1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but negative for spermatozoa (Exh. A, p. 8, rec.; p.
2, t.s.n., Nov. 16, 1971).
Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father. Her house is fifty
(50) meters away from the house of her brother-in-law, Ruperto Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, she went to the house
of her brother-in-law in Tabagac Arriving there, she saw, through the gate which was made of split bamboos, the accused running away
when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act of putting on her panties, to open the gate (p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 15, 1972). Mirasol
opened the gate after she had put on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked Mirasol what the accused did to her, but
Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and from her hiding place she saw the accused emerge from his hiding place and run away, passing
through the gate of the fence. Thereupon, she told Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia because she was also going there (p. 15,
t.s.n., Ibid).
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same afternoon but she did not talk to him about what she saw earlier in
Tabagak However, she revealed the incident to her husband (p. 17, t.s.n., Ibid).
When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel had a conversation with her regarding the person of
the accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother filed the corresponding complaint against the accused (p. 18, t.s.n., Ibid).
Incidentally, in support of the complaint of Bernandina Magallanes, mother of Mirasol, Mrs. Parochel executed an affidavit which she
subscribed and swore to before the municipal judge of Madridejos, Cebu, on July 30, 1971, wherein she stated, among other things:
1. That at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, I went to the house of Ruperto Magallanes, my
neighbor;
2. That when I entered their fence, I found out that one Benben Paragsa ran from the bed where Mirasol
Magallanes was sitting on while putting on her panties;
3. That she, Mirasol Magallanes, upon my arrival, did not say anything to me about the happening; and that I was
only thinking that something had happened (Exh. 1, p. 5, rec.).
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as having been committed by the trial court. These errors
may, however, be boiled down to the issue of credibility.
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly denied that he did so by employing
force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who
invited him to the latter's house where they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the intercourse they had that
afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse (pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-9, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated by two witnesses for the defense, Mercado Batosbatosan and
Eduardo Ducay (pp. 5, 6-7, 12, 15-16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, t.s.n., Feb. 1, 1972).
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction.
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to the conclusion that the sexual
intercourse between the appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did
not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or resisted the
appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far from her
neighbors and during the daytime. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have revealed the
same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house
immediately after the intercourse took place and when the accused ran from the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing
and/or hearing the voice of her aunt Lita. or, she could have grabbed the hunting knife by her side when the copulation was going on,
and with it she could have possibly prevented the accused from consummating the sexual act. But she did not.
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was raped. It was only after her mother
arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after the incident, and confronted her about the rape incident that her mother
learned through her aunt Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused did to her in the afternoon of July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the
effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July
13, 1971, one of which happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept together in the
evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu (p. 10,
t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is
applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he
heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some
matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his
knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue (IV Francisco,
The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case.
Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the
truth of such assertion.
One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the testimony of Dr. Gandiongco that he did
not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's vagina, thus —
Q Doctor, you testified that according to your findings a foreign body might have inserted the
internal organ of the offended party?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a matter of fact, in your examination there was no laceration?
A There was no laceration (p 5, t.s.n., November 16, 1971; Emphasis supplied).
Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have been a virgin when she was allegedly raped
Page1

by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some pain as the accused tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did
she state that she was bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated that the accused
made four push and pull movements after which the latter ejaculated — indicating that he had an easy time doing it.
If WE are to believe her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the lacerations even after the lapse of three
(3) days from the coition, if the intercourse on July 13, 1971 was in fact her first experience. WE believe the absence of lacerations in
the walls of Mirasol's vagina, as testified to by Dr. Gandiongco, supra,eloquently confirms the truth of the accused's assertion that
before the incident in question, he and Mirasol had two prior copulations.
And still another circumstance which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the complaining witness and her aunt Lita is the matter of
the hunting knife. While it is true that on the witness stand these two witnesses practically corroborated each other on this particular
point, the matter of the accused having a hunting knife with him on the day of the incident was not, however, mentioned by Mrs.
Parochel in her affidavit, Exhibit 1, which she executed on July 30, 1971 — five months before she testified in court. Besides, at the
trial, the prosecution did not bother to present such "hunting knife".
A last circumstance which also engenders serious doubt on the veracity of Mrs. Parochel, whose testimony the trial court summarized,
runs thus:
... The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door.
... She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened. Mirasol was very pale, trembling
and in a state of shock, did not answer her inquiries ...(p. 3, Decision; p. 64, rec.; emphasis added).
The Solicitor General adopted the above factual summary made by the trial court by stating that —
Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel ... found her niece in a state of shock (p. 4, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 49, rec.;
Emphasis supplied).
A painstaking scrutiny of the record, particularly the transcript of stenographic notes, shows that contrary to the finding of the trial
court, Mirasol answered the call of her aunt and opened the gate of the house after she had put on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Dec. 3,
1971); and that Mirasol only seemed to be afraid, besides trembling (p. 23, t.s.n., 1972); nowhere in the record is any evidence of
Mirasol having been in a state of shock.
If Mirasol was in fact in a state of shock —
1. How come she was able to put on her panties and thereafter open the gate of the house when she heard her aunt Lita calling from
the outside?
2. Her aunt Lita would feel so alarmed and so concerned that she would not lose any time to bring her to a doctor or to a hospital for
medical treatment or assistance;
3. Her aunt Lita would have confronted the accused who was still hiding in the closet in a corner of the ground floor, or she would have
gone to the nearest police authority or barrio captain, who could have easily apprehended the accused:
4. Her aunt could have sought the assistance of their barriomates or neighbors; or
5. She could have brought Mirasol to her own house which was on about 50 meters away (pp. 7, 20, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). But what did
she do? She abandoned Mirasol "because" she Mirasol had to feed her hogs (p. 24, Idem).
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt discovered her having sexual intercourse at
so young an age and that she feared that her aunt would report the same to her parents.
And if Mrs. Parochel really believed that her niece Mirasol was raped by appellant about 3 o'clock that afternoon of July 13, 1971, why
did she not report the outrage to Mirasol's father — her husband's brother — whom she met about 4 o'clock that same afternoon, just
one hour after the alleged rape?
Mrs. Parochel's close relationship to her niece-daughter of her brother-in-law — vitiates her credibility.
Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, for the same is not warranted
by the wording of the information, which does not alleged deceit, although appellant testified that he promised to marry Mirasol if
"something happens to her body." Much less can simple seduction include rape.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY ACQUITTED, WITH COSTSde oficio  AND HIS IMMEDIATE
RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS BEING DETAINED ON OTHER CHARGES.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y
CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.
ANTONIO, J.:
This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch VII, Pasay City finding all
the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan,
guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario Comayas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4) aggravating circumstances, not
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offset by any mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of death, to be
carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo
 in the amount of P350,000.00, representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and
severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.
With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law.
During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on August 16, 1970, and the case
as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed on August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is
limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla.
This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her bathroom inside her
house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report,
she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before
12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.
Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open, and some
personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro
Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay
City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence
implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of
the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his
participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of
Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio
Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of
Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, " another
Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed
an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay
City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus
Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he
referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial confession of
Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez,
alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one John
Doe."
When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not guilty.
The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of
facts contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan.
Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to
"A-6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano
Isla and Hernando Carillo.
The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio Cudillan, the latter
pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the commission of the crime. According to him, said
appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing."
Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the accused
Melecio Cudillan with the other suspects'?
A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.
Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio Cudillan and other
suspects whom do you refer to as other suspects?
A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario. There was another person
Eduardo Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but Melecio Cudillan failed to point to
him as his companion.
Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the Police
Department of Pasay City as his companions?
A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas.
Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three persons do?
A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966).
According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously and not merely kept their
silence."
Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted to him that they took part
in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased,  viz.:
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point him out?
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INTERPRETER:
Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon being asked,
gave his name as Ramiro Alegre.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other.
Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about?
A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also anticipated in the commission of the
killing of Adelina Sajo.
Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less?
A. About the middle of June.
Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?
A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.
Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla, when did that
take place, more or less?
A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June.
Q. What year?
A. 1967.
Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other. Q. If he is inside the
courtroom, will you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario Comayas.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario Comayas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that, more or less?
A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June.
Q. And what did you talk about?
A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he admitted to me that he was one of those who
planned and killed Adelina Sajo.
Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any?
A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to by the door.
Q. How about the other accused Melencio Cudillan, do you know him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name as Melecio Cudillan.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan?
A. Because he is with me in one cell.
Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan?
A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case.
Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan, more or less?
A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the first week
of June, 1967.
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Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell you about this case?
 ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Objection, Your Honor, leading.
COURT:
Witness may answer, there is already a basis.
A. That they were the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing
of July 21, 1967).
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of
compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus
Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in question. they were
attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote. According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the
Maravilla compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery at about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas
confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon when he returned to the bakery where he was employed to resume his work.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus, Urbano Villanueva testified that
he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M. Consunji at the Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro
Alegre began working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he knew this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project. He Identified
the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning
up to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas
Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the number of hours he
actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.
Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now deceased) as
evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "Silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio
Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and credence to the
testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in the crime.
I
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"), on the basis of which the trial
court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not
competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet" 1 there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. 2As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as
the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the
case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime
would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their
purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
II
The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in the face of statements of
Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their
part of their participation therein.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as
evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. 5 It has also been held that while an accused is
under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may
not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona 7 held
that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, in
the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to
whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that
crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent, as
being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament.  8 Other courts have held that the circumstance that
one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a
person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he
chooses. 9
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating
him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be
considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his
silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of great
importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in man's
struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject
those' suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may
be obtained by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." 10
In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals: 11
... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court;' it
Page1

is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice
...
 Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor
may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a
confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free, genuine will.
It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the rights of an accused person
are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to
uphold the rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the
right, when under investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights;
the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's
detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.  12The
1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there
is this categorical mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to remain silent unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence. 13
This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, now Chief justice,
in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 thus:
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare:
'The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt.' Only
last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it
is the right of a defendant 'to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand —
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.'
Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual explained that the privilege against self-
incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to its detriment."
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in the face of the
incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold,
further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the
remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the
judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in
the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they
strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan and
Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which they are charged. Their immediate release from detention is
ordered, unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152160             January 13, 2004

VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was
true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 22, 2001 Decision 2 and the
February 15, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA - GR CR No. 15673. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is hereby  AFFIRMED with
modification on the penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED."4
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Antecedents
The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended[,] together
with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
‘That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province
Page1

of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, cut,
gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an
 approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent
of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary
permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the
owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.
‘Contrary to law.’
"Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of
‘Not Guilty’ to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution presented Nestor Labayan[e],
[Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and] Manuel
Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and
Virgilio Bon.
"The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as follows:
‘Prosecution’s evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones, Manuel Dangalan,
Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] which shows that Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] owns a titled
agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon.
Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed into lumber by her
administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7,
1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one
of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza’s] complaint of
Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid,
Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their investigation,
the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree.
Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the
trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches
upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.; Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found four stumps of
trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r] 4,315
board feet, with a value of P25,376.00 x x x.’
"In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Their testimonies were
summarized by the trial court, as follows:
‘All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge[.] [He said] that
he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the
purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land.
‘Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] [and was] instituted [as
such] by Teresita’s father. He developed the land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita [Dangalan-
Mendoza] wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have] an agrarian case. Since Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] refused to receive the landowner’s share of produce, he deposited the money in the Rural
Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] x x x. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in
the land and pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed by
Oscar Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his
complaint.
‘Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar
Narvaez [indicted] him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him. In a drinking spree, he
happened to box Oscar Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with] revenge.’
"On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for
the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal [to the CA]." 5
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution witnesses’ credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence
proving their guilt.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both
testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting of trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza’s land.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence in this case, the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to convict petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of Rule
1336 of the Rules of Court were amply satisfied by the following established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and
Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son Rosalio
went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she pay the value of the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to
forgive him for cutting the trees.
The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre. Aside from the testimony of Oscar
Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other evidence was presented to show the latter’s participation in the
offense charged. Moreover, the appellate court held that the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 130 7 of the Rules of
Court would be violated by binding Jeniebre to petitioner’s admission, which did not constitute any of the exceptions 8 to this provision.
It thus acquitted him.
As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code as amended, Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Page1

Hence, this Petition.9

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open court, is admissible in evidence
against him.
"II
Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not police operatives or media
representatives is admissible in evidence against the author because what a man says against himself[,] if voluntary, is
believable for the reason that it is fair to presume that [it] correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if they do not (U.S.
v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).
"III
Whether or not x x x the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses x x x that x x x petitioner Bon admitted his guilt to them
should be given high credence by the courts of justice considering that x x x many people who are being quoted in media
today x x x have been found to be x x x lying. In other words, how much probity should we give a lying witness?
"IV
Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial admission to the prosecution witnesses, [whether or not] x
x x the same [is constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him?" 10
Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the admissibility of his purported extrajudicial admission of the
allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; and 2) the credibility and the
sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded on Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 thereof,
"only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth" may be raised. A reading of the pleadings reveals that petitioner actually
raised questions of fact -- the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Nonetheless, this
Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion and after taking into account the attendant circumstances, opts to take cognizance of and
decide the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the interest of the proper administration of justice. 11
In the main, petitioner contends that Lascano’s and Dangalan’s separate testimonies 12 regarding his alleged extrajudicial admission
constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible. He also argues that his supposed admission should not have been
admitted, because it had been taken without the assistance of counsel at a time when he was already regarded as a suspect.
We disagree.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows:
"Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided
in these rules."
Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. 13 Hence, information that is relayed to
the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay. 14
In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered the
cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably present and
within hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from
their own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily
that the matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is
admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule. 15 Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto16 ruled that evidence regarding the making
of such statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Dangalan’s testimony,
because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they
are deemed to have waived their right to do so; thus, it may be admitted. 17 The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the
transcript of the stenographic notes, from which we quote:
"Atty. Fajardo:
Q Did you reach the land in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do?
A We were able to see the cut trees.
Page1

Q And were you able to see who cut the trees?

A We were not able to see.
 Q And how many trees were cut?
A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long time.
Q What kind of trees were cut according to you?
A Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw.
Q Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do?
A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that he took the liberty of cutting those trees.
Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused mean when he said that he took [the] liberty of cutting
those trees?
A He caused the cutting of the trees.
Q And during the time you were conversing, were you alone?
A I was with the barangay tanod.
Q And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you at that time?
A Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi."18
Moreover, a party’s verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it 19 fall under Section 26 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is
true.20 The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.
Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not given during a custodial investigation and, certainly,
not to police authorities. Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. 21 We have ruled previously that
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement that is not elicited through questioning
by the authorities, but is given in an ordinary manner. 22
Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which -- with the assistance of the barangay  tanods23 -- was conducted by the owner’s
brother, Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial investigation. Consequently, the guarantees of Section 12 (1) of Article III 24 of
the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, cannot be successfully invoked by petitioner. 25
Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. 26 In the present case, the conviction of petitioner was not deduced
solely from his admission, but from the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Second Issue:
Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be
respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified. 27 Equally established is the rule that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of
the trial court, 28 as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CA’s findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross
misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. 29 We have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts’
assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,30 provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered
the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found."
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the
legal documents.31
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. 32 It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering
or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court
may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 33 Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.34
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements concur:
Page1

1. There is more than one circumstance.

2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
 3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 35
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence, the
regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances:
"x x x Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big trees.
Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the [b]arangay [t]anod[,] Julian Lascano[,]
with other witnesses present[,] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-in-law, accused
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the
lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and not under custodial
investigation."36
The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioner’s culpability:
"x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he
caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and his son[,] x x x Rosalio
Bon[,] went to private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value of the questioned trees which they had
cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the
trees."37
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven
by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, 38 the investigation report of an
officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, 39 and
the CENRO’s computation of the value 40 of the timber generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial
evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged.
Correct Penalty
We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter because of the differing penalties imposed by the appellate and
the trial courts. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of  prision mayor as maximum. The CA, however, increased the
penalty to imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, 41 provides that any violation thereof "shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 42 and 31043 of Revised Penal Code." This amendment -- which eliminated the phrase
"shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" -- has already been
interpreted by this Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting,
removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute distinct offenses that are now independent of the crime of theft
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is provided under these
articles.44
Both the trial court45 and the CA46 found that the value of the lumber was P12,000. Under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the statutory
penalty should be two degrees higher than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; 47 or prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, 48 however, reduces the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Clearly, the sentences imposed by the trial court and the CA are within the allowable range.
In view, however, of the finding of the RTC that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty it imposed was more in accord with the liberal spirit of the law towards the accused. Hence, we adopt the trial court’s
indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision mayor as minimum; to
eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157984             July 8, 2004

MOISES SIMANGAN, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11971 and its Resolution denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
The petitioner Moises Simangan and Loreto Bergado were charged with murder in an Information filed with the Circuit Criminal Court
in Cagayan, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about February 10, 1980, in the municipality of Solana, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, Moises Simangan y Trinidad and Loreto Bergado y Rigor alias Boy, together with Bening
Gomabong (sic), who is still at large and not yet apprehended, and two (2) John Does, who were not identified, armed with
guns and knives, conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to kill; with evident premeditation and with
Page1

treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Ernesto Flores, inflicting upon
him several wounds on his body which caused his death.
 Contrary to law.2
The accused, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Case for the Prosecution
At 8:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, the petitioner, Loreto Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two other male persons arrived at the store
of the spouses Ernesto Flores and Sofronia Saquing in Barangay Maasin, Solana, Cagayan. The Flores Spouses, along with fifteen-year-
old Lorna Saquing, Sofronia’s niece, were then having dinner. The five men were in fatigue uniforms and were armed with long
firearms. When they knocked on the door, Lorna responded and inquired what they wanted, and she was told that they wanted to buy
cigarettes. Ernesto and Sofronia entertained the men, two of whom were their neighbors, Loreto Bergado and Bening Gumabong.
Momentarily, the petitioner asked Ernesto to go with them to serve as a guide. In response, Ernesto invited the men to sleep at their
house, but the latter refused. Ernesto then agreed to accompany the visitors. The petitioner warned Ernesto and Sofronia not to tell
anyone that they had been to the store. As they were leaving, Romeo Galano, the couple’s helper at the store, arrived. Ernesto ordered
Romeo to go with him, and the latter did as he was told. However, at about 9:00 p.m., Romeo returned to the store and told Sofronia
that Ernesto had sent him back to get money, matches and cigarettes. He also told Sofronia that he and Ernesto were seated as they
conversed with each other. Sofronia gave P50.00, a box of matches and a ream of Hope cigarettes. Romeo left the store at about 9:30
p.m.3 Ernesto did not return that evening.4
The next morning, Romeo Balunggaya arrived at Sofronia’s house and told her that Ernesto was dead, and that his body had been
found about three hundred (300) meters away. Sofronia and Lorna rushed to the place, and found Ernesto’s body near the
creek.5 Ernesto was lying on the ground, face down, with his hands tied behind his back. Police investigators Pagulayan and Caronan
arrived, along with a photographer. Pictures of the victim were taken. 6
Dr. Anastacia Taguba, the Municipal Health Officer, performed an autopsy of the cadaver and found that the victim sustained multiple
stabwounds. She concluded that the victim died because of shock due to massive internal and external hemorrhage from multiple stab
wounds.7 She also signed the Certificate of Death of Ernesto. 8
On February 18, 1980, Fernando Saquing attended his classes in civil engineering at the St. Louis University in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. He
noticed his seatmate and close friend, petitioner Moises Simangan, writing on a piece of paper. He grabbed the paper, read it, and saw
that the petitioner had written the following: "Andres Buena alias Ka Ren, Cely Peña alias Ka Laarni, Moises Simangan alias Ka Ronie
Ledesma." The petitioner warned Fernando not to divulge his secret to anybody. 9
On February 24, 1980, Fernando and the petitioner were on their way home from their ROTC classes at the St. Louis University. The
petitioner then narrated to Fernando that at about 7:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, after buying cigarettes from a store, the store-
owner agreed to go with him and his four companions. The petitioner revealed that they brought the victim over to the place where
twenty of his other comrades were waiting. He also told Fernando that he and his companions stabbed the victim over and over again,
and tasted the latter’s blood so that "they would not get sick." The petitioner warned that if Fernando divulged to anyone what he had
just revealed, he (the petitioner), would drink his blood, too. 10
The petitioner did not know that Fernando was the first cousin of Sofronia, the widow of Ernesto Flores, who was, in turn, the store-
owner referred to by Moises.11 Fernando immediately told Sofronia what the petitioner had told him.
On March 21, 24 and 25, 1980, Sofronia, Fernando and Lorna gave their respective statements 12 to Sgt. Quirino Espiritu of the
Philippine Constabulary in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in which they identified Moises as one of Ernesto’s assailants.
The Case for the Defense
The petitioner denied any involvement in the killing of Ernesto. He testified that on the day that Ernesto was killed, he was in his
boarding house in Tuguegarao. He was the classmate of Fernando at the St. Louis University in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where they were
enrolled in the civil engineering course. 13 Sometime in February 1980, Fernando asked him about Andres Balbuena who was from
Solana, Cagayan. A week later, he was arrested on suspicions that he had something to do with the death of Ernesto. 14 Fernando, who
was in the PC barracks, pointed to him as one of the assailants of Ernesto. He was surprised at Fernando’s accusation. 15
The petitioner also denied knowing Loreto Bergado, claiming that he only met the latter at the provincial jail. 16 He had not been to
Barangay Maasin, Solana.
The accused Loreto Bergado also denied killing Ernesto. He testified that he did not know Ernesto and the latter’s wife, Sofronia. On
February 10, 1980, he was in his house at Nangalasauan, Amulung, Cagayan. After waking up the next day, he went to his farm. 17
To corroborate his testimony, Bergado presented his neighbor, Feliciano Trinidad, who testified that after his classes on February 10,
1980, he went out of their house at Barangay Nangalasauan, Amulung, Cagayan, to get a breath of fresh air. He then saw Bergado and
spoke with him until 9:00 p.m.18
Cornelia Trinidad corroborated the testimony of the petitioner that she boarded in the house of Rosendo Tuddao in February 1980.
The defense also presented Leona Balunggaya, who testified that between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. on February 11, 1980, Sofronia and Leon
Rigor arrived at their house, crying. Sofronia inquired if Ernesto had passed by, because her husband had not slept in their house.
Balunggaya replied in the negative. When Balunggaya asked Sofronia if she recognized the armed men who were with her husband,
Sofronia replied that she did not because their faces were new to her. 19 Aside from their house, there were no other houses in the
vicinity of Sofronia’s place. Right after Sofronia and Leon had left, she and her husband Romeo went to their farm to drive away the
birds and saw the cadaver of Ernesto, about three hundred (300) meters away.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Moises Simangan y Trinidad and Loreto Bergado y Rigor having been found by the Court guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal code, and
considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances, are hereby sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
Page1

of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Ernesto Flores the sum of P30,000.00,
proportionately and to pay costs pro rata.
 SO ORDERED.20
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it rendered judgment, affirming with modification, the decision of the trial court. It found the
testimonies of Sofronia, Lorna, and Fernando, credible and entitled to full probative weight.
The Present Petition
Petitioner Moises Simangan filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, asserting that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE. 21
The petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to adduce circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove his guilt of the crime of
homicide beyond reasonable doubt. He asserts that Sofronia and Lorna pointed to and identified him only upon the prodding of
Fernando, who told Sofronia that he (the petitioner) had admitted to stabbing and killing the victim together with twenty of his other
companions. The petitioner contends that the testimony of Fernando is hearsay, as he had no personal knowledge that he was one of
those who killed the victim.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals declared in its assailed decision that the array of circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution constitutes proof beyond cavil that the petitioner was one of those who killed the victim. As catalogued by the appellate
court:
(1) at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of February 10, 1980, accused Moises Simangan, Loreto Bergado, Bening Gumabong
and two unidentified companions each of whom were armed with long rifles, went to the store of the victim Ernesto Flores
at Sitio Masin (sic), Iraga, Solana and bought cigarettes;
(2) that Moises Simangan asked Ernesto Flores to guide Simangan, Bergado, Gumabong and their two companions on their
way to the road;
(3) that Simangan, Bergado and their two companions, together with Ernesto Flores and Romeo Galano, were out of the
house;
(4) that Simangan warned Sofronia and Lorna not to tell anybody that he and his companions went to the house;
(5) that five days after the death of Ernesto, Simangan became worried when told by his classmate Fernando Saquing that
several persons were arrested at Nangalasauan, Amulung, for the death of Ernesto;
(6) that two weeks after the death of the victim, Simangan admitted to Fernando that he and twenty others had just killed a
person in Masin, (sic) Iraga, Solana, after the victim accompanied them to show them the way;
(7) and that Fernando was warned not to relate it to any other person with the threat that if it will be known by others,
Simangan will drink his blood.22
The Ruling of the Court
We find the contention of the petitioner to be unmeritorious. Sofronia narrated in detail how the petitioner and his companions,
armed with long firearms, managed to convince Ernesto to go with them and be their guide on the road. Sofronia pointed to and
identified the petitioner in open court. Thus:
Q On February 10, 1980, at 8:00, do you recall where you were?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where were you?
A We were at home, Sir.
Q And you mentioned . . . and who were your companions at that time?
A My husband, my sister Lorna Saquing, my daughter, Sir.
Q What is the name of your daughter?
A Jannet, Sir.
Q How old was she at that time?
A Two (2) years old, Sir.
Q What is the name of your sister?
A Lorna, Sir.
Q And your husband?
A Ernesto Flores, Sir.
Q What were you doing at that time?
A Eating, Sir.
Q Where is your house located?
Page1

A Masim (sic), Solana, Cagayan, Sir.

 Q Do you recall of anything unusual that happened on February 10, 1980, when you were actually eating with your family, if
any?
A On February 10, 1980, while we were actually taking our supper, there was a person who went to buy cigarette in our
store and it was my sister Lorna who went to open the store and saw five persons holding gun (sic), Sir.
Q Where is your store located?
A In Masim (sic), Solana, Cagayan, Sir.
Q Is your store also a part of your house where you live-in (sic)?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When these five persons came to your house and Lorna Saquing, your sister, was the one who opened the door, what
happened next?
A When those five persons entered our store, Lorna came to us in the kitchen and called for us and the three of us
proceeded to the store and looked to those five persons, Sir.
Q And what happened next when you went to see those five persons?
A We saw five persons with long firearms, Sir.
Q Do you know the names of those five persons whom you saw?
A I know the three of them only, Sir.
Q What are the names of these three persons whom you know?
A Moises Simangan, Boy Bergado and Bening Bungabong (sic), Sir.
Q This Bening Bungabong (sic), if he is in court, can you point him out?
A No, he is not here in court, Sir.
Q Yes, but this Loreto Bergado, if you can see him in the courtroom, can you point him out?
A Yes, Sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to that person in brown t-shirt who identified himself to be Loreto Bergado y Rigor when he was pointed to
by the witness.
Q How about this person by the name of Moises Simangan, will you look around the courtroom and see if he is here?
A He is there, Sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person seated in the courtroom who stood up when he was pointed to by the witness and identified
himself to be Moises Simangan y Trinidad.23
The petitioner even warned Sofronia and Ernesto not to tell anyone that he and his companions had been in their house:
Q And when Moises Simangan came to know that your barangay captain in Iraga was Mr. Mario Marsan, what happened
next, if any?
A Then Moises Simangan requested my husband to accompany them to the road because Moises Simangan is new in our
place, Sir.
Q And what did your husband say, if any?
A Then my husband told them if it will be alright for them, they may sleep in the house, Sir.
Q And what did he say?
A Then Moises Simangan answered my husband that: "we cannot sleep in your place because we might be late tomorrow,"
Sir.
Q And what happened next?
A And then Moises Simangan told us not to tell anybody about their going to our store, Sir.
Q And when Moises Simangan warned you not to tell anybody about their presence in your place, what happened next, if
any?
A Then my husband told me that he would accompany them to the road, Sir.
Q And when your husband told you that he would bring them to the road, what happened next, if any?
A And then Moises Simangan and his companions took my husband to the road and not long afterwards, my boy by the
name of Romeo Galano, went back to the store and told me that my husband told him to go back to get money and cigarette
and also [a] match, Sir.
Q And what time did they take away your husband from your house?
A 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Sir.
Page1

Q Was it exactly 8:00 o’clock or past 8:00?

A Past 8:00, it could be past 8:00 o’clock already, Sir.24
Lorna also testified that when she attended to the petitioner and his companions, she saw their faces:
Q Now, while at about that time on February 10, 1980, do you remember any unusual incident that happened in the house
of your sister?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was that incident that happened?
A On that evening, Sir, while we were eating I heard a voice calling outside or I heard someone calling outside with the
word "Diyos Apo"  and when I finished eating, I went inside the house and asked who was that, and nobody answered, and
so, what I did was to open the door and I was surprised there were five armed men at our door who went inside our house.
Q You said that these five men who entered the house were armed, will you please tell this Honorable Court what were their
arms?
A All the five men who entered our house were armed with long rifle each of them (sic).
Q Now, do you know the identity of these five armed men who entered the house where you were staying?
ATTY. VELASCO:
The question is vague, Your Honor.
Whether he refers to the present or at that time of the incident.
COURT:
Reformed. (sic)
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q At the time of the incident, of these five armed men who entered the house of your sister upon your opening the door, do
you know the identity of these five armed men or any of them?
A Yes, Sir, I know them.
Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court who were they?
A Moises Simangan, Boy Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two others whom I do not know.
Q You said that at the time you opened the door and these five men entered, you already knew three of them, namely
Moises Simangan, Bening Gumabong and Boy Bergado, why do you know them?
A I was able to recognize them, Sir, through their faces.
Q Why were they familiar to you?
A When I opened the door, Sir, and the five armed men entered our house, I stared at their faces.
Q Will you please answer my question, why were you able or why were you familiar with the faces of these men when they
entered the house of your sister that evening of February 10, 1980?
ATTY. SORIANO:
She answered, "I saw their faces."
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A These Boy Bergado and Bening Gumabong were my barcada in Maasim, Solana, Cagayan.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q What do you mean by saying that Gumabong and Bergado were your barcada?
A They were my companions, Sir.
Q For how long were they your barcada  before the incident?
A Three years, Sir.
Q Now, with respect to Moises Simangan, why do you say that his face is familiar to you at the time of the incident?
A I stared at his face because he was new in our place. 25
It was only when Fernando told his cousin Sofronia that the petitioner had admitted to being one of those who inveigled Ernesto into
going with them, and thereafter killed the victim, that she and Lorna heard the petitioner’s name for the first time.
Q Now, do you know, I withdraw that question, Your Honor. How about Moises Simangan, did you know him already before
February 10, 1980?
A No, Sir.
Q Why do you know his name then?
A I came to know his name when Moises Simangan informed Fernando, my cousin, about those things that they have done
to my husband, but Fernando did not mention to him that I am his cousin and it was Fernando, my cousin, who informed me
about his name, Sir.26
Page1
The testimony of Fernando, that the petitioner admitted to him that he was one of the victim’s killers, is not hearsay. The testimony of
Fernando was offered to prove the petitioner’s extrajudicial admission of his involvement in the killing of Ernesto. Such admission is an
admission against personal interest, and is admissible against the petitioner. 27
We note that the petitioner admitted during trial that he and Fernando were classmates in a civil engineering subject at St. Louis
University, and in the ROTC training. The petitioner also admitted that he and Fernando were friends. Hence, it was not impossible for
the petitioner to have revealed his involvement in the killing to Fernando. The petitioner did not hesitate to inform Fernando that he
and his companions had killed Ernesto because an informer had told them that Ernesto was "bad." The testimony of Fernando reads,
viz:
Q What else did he tell you?
ATTY. SORIANO:
May we ask the witness that he be directed to speak louder.
COURT:
You speak louder.
A There, Sir.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q And what was that?
A He informed me that they had just killed a person in Maasim (sic), Solana, Cagayan and we threw him beside a creek. And I
asked Moises Simangan, "How come that that person is bad," and he answered me, "We had an informer who is their
neighbor."
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q Now, you said that there were some companions of Moises Simangan because he used the word "WE," were you able to
find out from him how many persons were those who perpetrated the crime in Maasim (sic),  Solana, Cagayan, as you stated
recently?
ATTY. SORIANO:
May we request that witness should stop.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
That is the narration, Your Honor.
ATTY. SORIANO:
May we request that the narration should be in a question and answer (sic).
COURT:
Continue.
A What Moises Simangan narrated to me, Sir, is "We were five persons who went to the store of that person and  (sic) to buy
cigarette. At the time the persons were waiting in the store and after we bought the cigarette, we let the person accompany
us on our way because we do not know the way and then Moises Simangan brought the person to the place where there
were twenty persons waiting who were their companions and then they stabbed the person and in stabbing, each person
tasted the blood (sic) that, according to Moises Simangan, they will not get sick.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q Did you or did you not ask him what time of the day or night was that?
A No, Sir. When they visited the house of the victim to buy cigarette I was informed by Moises Simangan that it was 7:30 in
the evening.
Q Now, after having revealed to you all these things, do you remember if Moises Simangan told you anything else?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did he tell you?
A He told me that Nanding, I now warn you, and you know me, "once they know these, I am going to drink your blood." 28
The petitioner’s alibi and denial of the crime charged cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward identification made by Lorna
and Sofronia that he was one of the armed men who left with Ernesto, coupled with the petitioner’s own admission that he was one of
the victim’s assailants. We note that there is no evidence, nor any showing of any ill-motive on the part of Lorna, Sofronia and
Fernando to prevaricate. In fact, the petitioner and Fernando were close friends. Thus, the presumption is that the said witness acted
in good faith; hence, their testimonies must be accorded credence and full probative weight.
The three witnesses cannot be faulted, and their credibility denigrated for giving their statements to Sgt. Espiritu of the Philippine
Constabulary only on March 21 to 25, 1980. As copiously explained by the Court of Appeals:
Appellant’s attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of [the] positive identification made by Sofronia and Lorna that they
were among those five (5) armed persons who took along the victim Ernesto Flores on the pretext that appellant Simangan
being new to the place would need said victim to guide him on the road. Both Lorna and Sofronia knew personally appellant
Bergado and Gumabong being Lorna’s former friends and Sofronia’s neighbors. On the other hand, the delay in revealing the
Page1

identities of appellants Bergado and Simangan had been sufficiently explained. It must be recalled that appellant Simangan
had made a stern warning before they left that Sofronia and Lorna should not tell anybody about their presence in the place
that night. Those men being then armed and determined to take along with them the victim out on the road, even
 threatening Sofronia and Lorna not to divulge the incident to others, there was strong reason for said witnesses to keep
mum on the identities of appellants even when the police investigators arrived the following morning and asked them about
the names of the five (5) persons or at least any of them they had recognized. It is understandable when a witness does not
immediately report the identity of the offender after a startling occurrence, more so when he is related to the victim as this
makes it all the more traumatic. It is, likewise, understandable for a witness to fear for his safety especially when town
mates are involved in the commission of the crime. Even if the principal witnesses, Lorna and Sofronia, did not witness the
actual killing of Ernesto Flores, the circumstances that the latter was last seen alive together with the appellants and
Gumabong, along with two (2) other unidentified companions that night who were armed with guns, that he was never to
return home that night, and his dead body discovered in a nearby field, lying face down on the ground, both his arms tied at
his back with multiple stab wounds on his neck and back – the combination of these circumstances leave no doubt on their
minds that those five (5) persons were responsible for Ernesto’s gruesome death and such conviction was enough to
temporarily silence them from revealing immediately to the police investigators the identities of appellant Bergado and
Gumabong, and subsequently, Simangan.29
In sum, then, we find and so rule that the appellate court correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting the petitioner of
homicide. However, the appellate court erred in appreciating against the petitioner the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and
nighttime. In the first place, such circumstances were not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.30 Although the petitioner committed the crime before the effectivity date of said Rules, the same should
be applied retroactively as it is favorable to him. 31
Moreover, the crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For
cruelty to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the
perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim. 32 The number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof of
cruelty.
Consequently, then, the penalty imposed by the trial court on the petitioner must be modified. There being no modifying
circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of the
imposable penalty of homicide which is reclusion temporal. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full
range of the penalty lower by one degree for reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
11971 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is hereby sentenced an indeterminate penalty of from Ten (10) Years and One
(1) Day of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to Sixteen (16) Years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 175603               February 13, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 
vs.
RENATO ESPAÑOL, Appellant.
D E CI S I O N
CORONA,  J.:
This is an appeal of the November 30, 2005 decision 1 and June 29, 2006 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
1375 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42 convicting appellant of the crime of
parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant Renato Español was charged with killing his wife, Gloria Pascua Español, in an Information that read:
That on or about the 2nd day of February, 2000, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, RENATO ESPAÑOL @ Atong, being then legally married to one GLORIA ESPAÑOL, with intent to kill the
latter, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by shooting
her, hitting her on vital part of her body, thereby causing her death shortly thereafter due to "Hypovolemic shock, hemorrhage,
massive, due to multiple gunshot wound" as per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Benjamin Marcial Bautista, Rural Health Physician, to the
damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased, GLORIA ESPAÑOL, in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, and other consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.3
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense agreed on the
following stipulations and admissions:
1. That the appellant under detention and named in the information was the accused who had been arraigned;
2. That the victim, Gloria Pascua Español, was the legal wife of appellant;
3. That Gloria and appellant were living together as husband and wife prior to February 2, 2000 and that she was shot to
death at the early dawn of February 2, 2000 at Pantal, Dagupan City;
4. That before the victim was shot, appellant borrowed the tricycle of Federico Ferrer and drove said tricycle with his wife
inside the cab thereof from their house towards the house of Felicidad Ferrer, sister of the victim;
5. That appellant and the victim lived in their own house with their four children. 4
Page1

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The factual antecedents follow.
At about 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, Domingo Petilla was waiting for his companions at Pantal Road, Dagupan City. They were on
their way to Manila. All of a sudden, he heard two successive gunshots. A few moments later, a yellow tricycle sped past him along
Pantal Road headed towards Sitio Guibang, Dagupan City. The tricycle was driven by a man wearing a dark-colored long-sleeved shirt. 5
Petilla’s companions arrived shortly thereafter on board a van. As they started loading their things, they saw, through the lights of their
vehicle, a person lying on the pavement along Pantal Road. Upon closer scrutiny, they discovered the lifeless body of Gloria Español.
They immediately reported the matter to the police. 6
The gunshots were also heard by Harold Villanueva, 7 a boatman working at the Pantal River, while he was waiting for passengers at the
dock about 100 meters away from the crime scene. The shots were followed by the sound of a motorcycle’s revving engine. He then
saw a speeding yellow tricycle. The tricycle bore the name "Rina" in front of its cab. Its driver was wearing a dark jacket and blue pants.
The boatman was later told by a tricycle driver that there was a dead body nearby. Out of curiosity, he (the boatman) went there and
recognized the victim as one of his regular passengers. 8
Felicidad Pascua Ferrer, sister of the victim, was told by the police and neighbors that her sister was dead. She immediately proceeded
to the place. Upon confirming that it was indeed her sister, she asked bystanders to inform appellant about the death of his wife. 9
A few minutes later, appellant arrived. Even before he saw his dead wife, he shouted "She is my wife, she is my wife. Who killed her?
Vulva of your mother! She was held up." Appellant stepped across the body and saluted the police investigator. He told the police that
he brought the victim to the place where she was found and that she could have been robbed of the P2,000 he had earlier given her.10
Meanwhile, Villanueva noticed that the appellant seemed to be wearing the same clothes as those worn by the driver of the speeding
tricycle he saw along Pantal Road right after he heard the gunshots. 11
At around 3:00 a.m., appellant went to the house of Mateo Pascua, brother of Gloria, to inform him that Gloria was held up and killed.
They then proceeded to the scene of the crime using the yellow tricycle of their brother-in-law, Federico Ferrer. The tricycle had the
name "Rina" emblazoned in front. On the way, Mateo noticed that the seats and floor of the tricycle were wet. When asked about it,
appellant did not answer.12
Thereafter, at the morgue, appellant refused to look at the body and preferred to stay outside. 13 The autopsy yielded the following
results:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
CADAVER WAS IN RIGOR MORTIS AND REGULAR BUILT.
GUNSHOT WOUND, POE, 0.7 CM, MID FRONTAL AREA, LEVEL 5 CM ABOVE THE EYEBROW, COLLAR ABRASION, NO
GUNPOWDER BURN, PENETRATING, SKULL FRACTURE, BRAIN TISSUE.
POEx: NONE
GUNSHOT WOUND, POE, 1.5 CM, RIGHT MID AXILLIARY LINE, LEVEL 2 CM BELOW THE RIGHT NIPPLE, LESS DENSE,
GUNPOWDER BURN PERIPHERY, COLLAR ABRASION, SKIN ABRASION POSTERIOR, PENETRATING.
POEx: NONE
CONTUSION HEMATOMA AT THE RIGHT EYE AREA.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
INTRACRANIAL HEMORRHAGE, MODERATE
PENETRATING PERFORATING BRAIN TISSUE
INTRATHORACIC RIGHT, HEMORRHAGE MASSIVE
PENETRATING AND PERFORATING THRU AND THRU RIGHT [LUNG] AND HEART.
6th [RIB] FRACTURE, 2.5 CM, LEFT MID CLAVICULAR LINE, MEDIAL
SLUG FOUND ABOVE THE 6th [RIB], WITHIN THE MUSCLES, LEFT THORACIC AREA. 14
Disturbed by appellant’s actuations, Felicidad asked the police to interrogate her brother-in-law. At the police station, while appellant
was being investigated, he requested Senior Police Officer (SPO)1 Isagani Ico if he could talk privately with Felicidad. During their talk,
appellant begged Felicidad’s forgiveness and asked that he be spared from imprisonment. 15
During the victim’s wake in their house, appellant hardly looked at his wife’s remains. He chose to remain secluded at the second floor.
He repeatedly asked for Felicidad’s forgiveness during the first night of the wake. At one point, Delfin Hernandez, a nephew of the
victim, approached appellant and asked why the latter killed his aunt. Appellant just kept silent. 16
It was also disclosed by Norma Pascua Hernandez, Gloria’s other sister, that Gloria confided to her appellant’s illicit relationship with a
woman named Eva Seragas. Gloria went to Eva’s house and confronted her about the adulterous relationship but appellant came to
Eva’s defense and forcibly dragged Gloria away. Later, Gloria had another heated argument with Eva. Norma pacified her sister and
brought her home.17
After the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence in-chief, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence. The RTC denied the demurrer
in an order dated August 21, 2000.18
For his defense, appellant testified that he had been an employee of the Dagupan City Water District since 1990. In the early morning
of February 2, 2000, he and his wife were on their way to downtown Dagupan City on board a tricycle driven by him to
buy binuburan (fermented cooked rice), a local medication for his ulcer. However, upon reaching Quimosing Alley along Pantal Road,
Gloria decided to alight and wake up her sister Felicidad who lived nearby. Gloria and Felicidad were engaged in the trading of fish in
Dagupan City.19
Page1
After saying their goodbyes, appellant proceeded to the city proper alone. He bought  binuburan and other ulcer medications and went
home. Around 2:30 a.m., a passing tricycle driver informed him that the water engine of the Dagupan Water District was creating too
much noise. He decided to verify the information.20
On his way there, appellant noticed a commotion along Pantal Road. An unidentified man later told him, "Español, come here. Your
wife is dead." He immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime. As he was about to embrace the dead body of his wife, someone
tapped him on the shoulder and said "No, don’t touch her, she is still to be investigated." At the morgue, he noticed that his wife had a
bruise above her right elbow and that her zipper was partially opened. After a few minutes, he asked to be excused for he could not
bear the pain and sorrow.21
He denied that he asked forgiveness from his sister-in-law Felicidad for killing his wife; that he was barely around during his wife’s
wake and that he did not respond to his nephew’s accusation. He likewise denied having an adulterous relationship with Eva Seragas. 22
Rachel and Richwell Español, appellant’s children, corroborated their father’s story and maintained that he was at their house resting
at the time of the commission of the crime. They insisted that he was always beside the coffin of their mother during the wake and that
he had no other woman. Rachel testified that she and her mother were close. If it were true that her father had illicit relations with
another woman, her mother would have confided in her.1avvphi1
On February 19, 2001, the RTC convicted appellant:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RENATO ESPAÑOL alias "Atong" is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of PARRICIDE as defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by R.A. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous
Crime Law. Under the latter law, the offense is punishable byreclusion perpetua to death and there being no aggravating circumstance
alleged in the information, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, the death his
wife has to be indemnified by him in the amount of P50,000.00 and is further ordered to pay to Felicidad Ferrer the amount
ofP20,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages. No moral damages is awarded for the reason stated above.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, appellant filed an appeal in this Court which we referred to the CA in accordance with People v. Mateo.23 The CA affirmed
the RTC in a decision promulgated on November 30, 2005. It denied reconsideration in a resolution dated June 29, 2006.
Hence this appeal.
The issue for our resolution is whether appellant is guilty of the crime of parricide.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, parricide is the killing of one’s legitimate or illegitimate father, mother, child, any
ascendant, descendant or spouse and is punishable by the single indivisible penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death:
Article 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of  reclusion perpetua to
death.
In convicting the appellant, the RTC and CA found that the following circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty
of parricide:
1. appellant admitted that he was the one who brought his wife to the scene of the crime minutes before the latter’s body
was discovered. In other words, appellant was with the victim around the time she was shot and killed.
2. the tricycle which he used in transporting his wife was seen by Harold Villanueva and Domingo Petilla traveling at a high
speed coming from the direction where the gunshots were heard.
3. appellant, immediately after the incident, was wearing the same dark jacket and blue jeans worn by the driver of the
speeding tricycle.
4. appellant asserted that his wife was robbed, even before the investigation had started. However, the victim’s purse and
other belongings were all found intact.
5. appellant did not respond to his brother-in-law’s query as to why the tricycle’s sidecar which appellant had used in
transporting his wife was wet.
6. appellant isolated himself during the nine-day wake of his wife.
7. appellant repeatedly asked to be forgiven by Felicidad and spared from imprisonment during the investigation of the case,
which was corroborated by SPO1 Ico, and during the first night of the wake.
8. appellant had a paramour, a certain Eva Seragas. A month prior to the killing, the victim confided to her sister, Norma
Fernandez, that she had a confrontation with her husband’s paramour at the latter’s home, but appellant dragged and
pulled her away. A few days after, the two crossed paths again and quarreled. 24
We agree with the CA.
These circumstances are proven facts. We are convinced that at around 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, appellant shot his wife twice on
the head and breast, causing her death. Though there is no direct evidence, we have previously ruled that direct evidence of the actual
killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can adequately establish his or her guilt. 25
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.26
Circumstantial as it is, conviction based thereon can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.
Page1

Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identical to direct evidence. It is equally direct evidence of minor facts of such a nature that the
mind is led, intuitively or by a conscious process of reasoning, to a conclusion from which some other fact may be inferred. No greater
degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there
be proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that accused-appellant committed it. 27
None of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual killing of the victim by appellant. However, their separate and detailed accounts of
the surrounding circumstances reveal only one conclusion: that it was appellant who killed his wife. 28
Appellant argues that the lower courts should not have given weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses because they
were incredible and illogical.29 We disagree.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is accorded great respect in the absence of
proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily or that the trial court overlooked material facts. The rationale behind this rule is that the
credibility of a witness can best be determined by the trial court since it has the direct opportunity to observe the candor and
demeanor of the witnesses at the witness stand and detect if they are telling the truth or not. 30 We will not interfere with the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
Appellant’s bare denial that he did not kill his wife is a negative and self-serving assertion which merits no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 31 The prosecution
witnesses were not shown to have any ill-motive to fabricate the charge of parricide against appellant nor to falsely testify against
him.1avvphi1
Appellant’s defense of alibi is likewise weak. He alleged that he went home after he went downtown to buy his medications. His
children attested that he was with them in their house at the time of the commission of the crime. However,
[alibi] is easy to fabricate but difficult to prove. xxx We have held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and
place (or distance) must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime during its commission.32
Appellant’s house was merely minutes away from the place where the crime took place. Assuming that the children actually knew that
appellant was home when their mother was killed, this did not prove that he was not guilty. It was easy for him to hurry home right
after the crime. In fact, this is a reasonable conclusion from the circumstantial evidence gathered.
Another piece of evidence against appellant was his silence when his wife’s nephew asked him why he killed his wife. His silence on this
accusation is deemed an admission under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Section 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing observation of a party who does
or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible
for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise,
which in turn can be received as an implied admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130: 33
Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. —
xxx xxx xxx
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, the guilt of appellant was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence.  Reclusion perpetua  was correctly imposed
considering that there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present. 34 The heirs of the victim are entitled to a civil
indemnity ex delicto of P50,000, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for
the death.35
Likewise, moral damages in the amount of P50,000 should be awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of the emotional
suffering by the victim’s heirs. Although appellant’s two children sided with him in his defense, this did not negate the fact that the
family suffered emotional pain brought about by the death of their mother. 36 We also award them exemplary damages in the sum
of P25,000 considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being a case of parricide. 37
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 1375 finding the appellant, Renato Español,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Gloria Español, in the amounts of P50,000 as civil
indemnity, P20,000 as actual damages, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15.  April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST
Page1

CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,respondents.
 [G.R. No. 146738.  April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the
Court’s Decision of March 2, 2001.

In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds:

“I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION 3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THEREON.

II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS.

III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.

IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL
PUBLICITY.

V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED CAPACITY
OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION.”

In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:

1.  WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS OF JANUARY 20, 2001;

2.  WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE:
HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;

3.  WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE;

4.  WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONER’S INABILITY TO GOVERN CONSIDERING SECTION 11,
ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION; and

5.  WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL.

We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity.  Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper
accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned.  In our Decision, we used the totality test to
arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned.  We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and
posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president.  All these events are facts which are well-established and cannot be
refuted.  Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign.   These are: (1) the expose
of Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the “I accuse” speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3)
the joint investigation of the speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the
investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in
the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding petitioner’s resignation; (7) a similar
demand by the Catholic Bishops conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioner’s resignation by former Presidents Corazon C.
Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign; (10)
the resignation of the members of petitioner’s Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the
Department of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioner’s Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of
the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate President and of
Representative Villar as Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo
and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the
prosecutor’s motion to open the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit
in a secret bank account under the name of “Jose Velarde”; (17) the prosecutors’ walkout and resignation; (18) the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of
their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of support
of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of
all the armed services; (21) the same withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson, and
Page1

the major service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and
bureau chiefs; (23) petitioner’s agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope.   All these prior
events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court.  There was no need to cite their news accounts.  The reference by the
Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay.   The
news account only buttressed these facts as facts.  For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as
false.

We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo.  We used the
Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner.   Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to
distill a person’s subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases
involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases.   As will be discussed below, the
use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule.   Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the
Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.

We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo.  Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing his final statement which was
issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioner’s issuance of the
press release and his abandonemnt of Malacañang Palace confirmed his resignation. [1] These areovert acts which leave no doubt to the
Court that the petitioner has resigned.

In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 o’clock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, the claim that the office of the
President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.

We also reject the contention that petitioner’s resignation was due to duress and an involuntary resignation is no resignation at
all.

“x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated
only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action.  The three-part test for such duress has been
stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the other’s terms; (2) whether circumstances
permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side.  The view has
also been expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employer’s
conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter.  Factors to be considered, under this
test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the
choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she
was permitted to select the effective date of resignation.  In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether
real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employee’s purely subjective
evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation – for example, because of concerns about his or
her reputation – is irrelevant.  Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives – for example,
resignation or facing disciplinary charges – does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress or coercion, and was
therefore involuntary.  This is so even where the only alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless the
employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for termination existed.  In this regard it has also been said that a
resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion
without procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed.  Futhermore, a
resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined
that the officer’s alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the officer’s employment under
the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any
measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case.” [2]

In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation.  He proposed to the holding of snap
elections.  He transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of temporary inability.  He could not claim he was forced to resign
because immediately before he left Malacañang, he asked Secretary Angara: “Ed, aalis na ba ako?” which implies that he still had a
choice of whether or not to leave.

To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign.  But it is difficult to believe that the pressure completely vitiated
the voluntariness of the petitioner’s resignation.  The Malacañang ground was then fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard
armed with tanks and high-powered weapons.  The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in
Malacañang to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace.  Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was suffered
by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours.  Petitioner’s entourage was
even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his followers before finally going to his residence in
Polk Street, Greenhills.  The only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing between a small group of pro
and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor injuries to a few of them.  Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled through the
Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify
the conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign.

II

Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary.  It is urged that
the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the
admission of hearsay evidence.

We are unpersuaded.  To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement.  The Angara Diary is part of the
pleadings in the cases at bar.  Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary.  Nor can he feign surprise
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on its use.  To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. [3] The three parts of the Diary
published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents
Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001.  The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12
and 13 of the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001.   In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second
Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, [4] and the third part, published on
February 6, 2001.[5] It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments.   Thus, petitioner had all
the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.

Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule.
[6]
 Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. [7]There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of
cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. [8] Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence.  Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity. [9] The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein,
Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:

“x x x

On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons’ accounts of what happened, and verdicts
are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no objection was
made.  See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict).  Although volumes
have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence.  Indeed,
the decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2
and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra).  Furthermore, many states have added
to their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the admission of hearsay that
does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).

Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether instead of being loosened.  See, e.g.,
Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted):

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that ‘[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’  Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by
the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not
conceive of hearsay in that manner.  Prejudice refers to the jury’s use of evidence for inferences other than those for which the
evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jury’s ability to evaluate the strength of
a legitimate inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness was
particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt as to the usurpation of the jury’s function.  Thus, unlike prejudices
recognized by the evidence rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs of a
victim’s final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jury’s function by usurping its
power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.

Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate,
the only altenative to a general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior.  More important, the
assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay … seem insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions
of the function of the jury.  Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished.

Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available – which is, however, derived from simulations
– that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay evidence.  See
Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule:  Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655
(1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera,
Park, & Penrod, Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research
Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65
(1991).

Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether the benefits outweigh the cost:

The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice.  It also includes the time spent on litigating the
rule.  And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court – salaries,
administrative costs, and capital costs – are borne by the public.  As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an
enormous public subsidy.  Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays.  The rule imposes other costs as well.  Enormous
time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises.  In some law schools, students spend over
half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and … enormous academic resources are expended on
the rule.

Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendman’s Article:  The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797,
800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases).  See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of
Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).”[10]

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted
from the rules of exclusion.  A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions
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of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class.  Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” [11] It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if
they are hearsay.  Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are
not covered by the hearsay rule:[12]

“Wigmore, after pointing out that the party’s declaration has generally the probative value of any other person’s asssertion, argued
that it had a special value when offered against the party.  In that circumstance, the admission discredits the party’s statement with
the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements.  Moreover, he
continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no
opportunity  for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponent’s own declaration, and ‘he does not need to cross examine
himself.’  Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put
himself on the stand and explain his former assertion.  (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154,
McCormick)

According to Morgan:  ‘The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances
in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation.  A party can hardly
object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction
of an oath.’

A man’s acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to
presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not.  (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).”

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap
presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of
Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and “Pagod na
pagod na ako.  Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit.  Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga.  (I am very tired.  I don’t want any
more of this – it’s too painful.  I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue).  I just want to clear my name, then I will
go.”  We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his
resignation.  The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.

It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him.   The
argument overlooks the doctrine ofadoptive admission.  An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by
another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person.[13] Jones explains that the “basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or
adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made.” [14] To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick,
“this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense.”[15] In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to
dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief.  Thus, Executive Secretary
Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of “ dignified exit or resignation.”  Petitioner
did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country.   Petitioner’s silence on this and other related
suggestions can be taken as an admission by him. [16]

Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta.  The rule is
expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:   “The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.”

Again, petitioner errs in his contention.  The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions.  One of them is provided in section
29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.

Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner.  He was the Little President.  Indeed, he was authorized
by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacañang Palace .  Thus, according to
the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: “Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko.   At
hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin.”  (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve listened to.   And now at the end,
you still are.)”[17] This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the
first negotiation.  True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacañang after taking their
final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m.  The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: “ed,
kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?)” [18]Secretary Angara told him to go and he did.  Petitioner cannot deny that
Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency.   The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed
by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations.  Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial
days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.  Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of
Secretary Angara.

Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). [19] Jones very
well explains thereasons for the rule, viz:  “What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere
instrument.  So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the
performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular
contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers,  dum fervet opus  is, in legal effect, said by his
principal and admissible in evidence against such principal.” [20]

Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements .  These are statements which
are relevant independently of whether they are true or not.  They belong to two (2) classes:  (1) those statements which are the very
facts in issue, and (2) those statements which arecircumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.  The second class includes the following:
[21]

a.   Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and
other emotions;
Page1

b.  Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
 c.   Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the
knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;

d.  Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and

e.   Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.

Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition against hearsay
evidence:[22]

“§ 1088.  Mental State or Condition – Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon issues, forming a general class, in proof of
which hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the general
exclusionary rule.  Admissibility, in such cases, is as of course.  For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as
motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his
state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person.  Where his acts or
statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against
interest.  And even where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue as to constitute
one of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity.”

As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial
evidence of his intent to resign.  It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioner’s
intent to resign.  They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay.   This has long been a quiet area of our law on
evidence and petitioner’s attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.

Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence  were violated in our Decision,
viz:

“The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence, such as the rule on authentication of private
writings…

           x x x

A.  Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated

The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated.  The law provides that before any private writing offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or
written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

           x x x

B.  Best Evidence Rule Infringed

Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary.  It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity.  It
was however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the diary.  The
“Best Evidence Rule” should have been applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.

The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, “[w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.” [23]

Petitioner’s contention is without merit.  In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of
Rule 130, as follows:

“Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. – Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers,
figures or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Page1

Sec. 4. Original of document. – (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals.

(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction,
all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.”

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001.  In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on
evidence, states that:

“Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not
bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. [24]

“x x x

“In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real
dispute arised.  This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233).  Its essential feature
is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it.” (empahsis supplied)

Francisco’s opinion is of the same tenor, viz:

“Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is essential to bring the
best evidence rule into application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion might have
successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been taken.  No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the
admission of secondary evidence is set forth.  Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper season – that is,
whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been
admitted.  The objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the court’s consideration.” [25]

He adds:

“Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception.” [26]

In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz:

“Sec. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,  its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.”

On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that:

“A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document
must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission.  (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and
others) However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly
identified before it was admitted in evidence.  (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835).”[27]

Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts.  In that
case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos.  There is a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar.  In the Muro case,
Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account  without affording the prosecution” the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.”  In the instant cases, however,
the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated February
20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second
Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001.  He was therefore not denied due process.  In the words of Wigmore, supra,
petitioner had “been given an opportunity to inspect” the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility.  It is already too late in
the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly
on the basis thereof.

III

Temporary Inability
Page1
 Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution in that congress can
only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President.   The
situation presents itself when majority of the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs
Congress that his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet.  It is also urged that the
president’s judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review.

We cannot sustain the petitioner.  Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in G.R. No. 146738 that “Congress
has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.”[29] We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already
determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner.   If petitioner now feels aggrieved
by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself.   The power is conceded by
the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court .  The recognition of
respondent Arroyo as our de jure  president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment.  It is significant that House
Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as the “ people’s loss of confidence on the ability of former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern” and the “members of the international community had extended their recognition of Her
Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines” and it has a constitutional duty “of fealty to
the supreme will of the people x x x.” This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the people
for its judgment.  Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court of justice.   Needles to state,
the doctrine of separation of power constitutes an inseparable bar against this court’s interposition of its power of judicial review to
review the judgment of Congress rejecting petitioner’s claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and that respondent Arroyo is
merely an acting President.

Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine his inability to
govern, and whose determination is a political question by now arguing that whether one is a de jure or de facto  President is a judicial
question.  Petitioner’s change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress.  The cases at bar do not present the general
issue of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure  or a de facto President.  Specific issues were raised to the Court for resolution
and we ruled on an issue by issue basis.  On the issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the
issue is legal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.  On the issue of
inability to govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate authority to determine
the question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this Court cannot
review.  Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a
judicial question.

Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions which brushed off his temporary
inability to govern and President-on-leave argument.  He asserts that these acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal
significance because:  (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.

We disagree.  There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration by Congress of the
President’s inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency.  In the cases at bar, special
consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and
culminated on a Saturday.  Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioner’s letter
claiming inability to govern.  To be sure, however, the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the
Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella,
recognized respondent Arroyo as the “constitutional successor to the presidency” post facto.  Petitioner himself states that his letter
alleging his inability to govern was “received by the Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and the Office of the Senate
at 9 P.M. of the same day.” [30] Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes past 12 o’clock in the afternoon of January 20.   Before
the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states: [31]

“Joint Statement of Support

and Recognition from the
Senate President and the Speaker
Of the House of Representatives

We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are called upon to address the constitutional crisis affecting
the authority of the President to effectively govern our distressed nation.  We understand that the Supreme Court at that time is
issuing an en banc resolution recognizing this political reality.  While we may differ on the means to effect a change of leadership, we
however, cannot be indifferent and must act resolutely.  Thus, in line with our sworn duty to represent our people and in pursuit of
our goals for peace and prosperity to all, we, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, hereby declare
our support and recognition to the constitutional successor to the Presidency.  We similarly call on all sectors to close ranks despite
our political differences.  May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings.

Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino.

(Sgd.)  AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.

Senate President

(Sgd.)  ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA
Speaker of the House of Representatives”

This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the
“constitutional successor to the presidency” was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect,
confirming this recognition.  Thus, Resolution No. 176 expressed “x x x the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption
into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
Page1

expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation’s goal under the Constitution. [32] Resolution
No. 82 of the Senate and Resolution No. 178 of the House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President.[33] It also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring the impeachment court functus officio.[34] Both Houses
sent bills to respondent Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President of the Philippines. [35] These acts of Congress, a priori and post
facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic.   Petitioner’s
insistence that respondent Arroyo is just a de facto President because said acts of Congress “ x x x are mere circumstances of
acquiescence calculated to induce people to submit to respondent’s exercise of the powers of the presidency” [36] is a guesswork far
divorced from reality to deserve further discussion.

Similarly way off the mark is petitioner’s point that “while the Constitution has made Congress the national board of canvassers
for presidential and vice-presidential elections, this Honorable Court nonetheless remains the sole judge in presidential and vice
presidential contests. [37] He thus postulates that “such constitutional provision [38] is indicative of the desire of the sovereign people to
keep out of the hands of Congress questions as to the legality of a person’s claim to the presidential office.” [39] Suffice to state that the
inference is illogical.  Indeed, there is no room to resort to inference.  The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies
and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided.  Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the
President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled.  Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the death,
permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President.  Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President
transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office.  In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may
arise from the contingency.  In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court
sitting en banc.  In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue.   In case of
inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this
thesis which was shared by this Court.  In light of these clear provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the least, for
petitioner to make inferences that simply distort their meanings.

IV

Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution which provides:

“(7)             Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.”

Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally
prosecuted.  A plain reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion.  The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells
us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e.,  it cannot extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us theconsequence of the limited reach of a
judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e.,  that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.  No amount of manipulation will justify petitioner’s non sequitur submission that
the provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition  sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and
punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman.

Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors’ walk out from the impeachment proceedings “should be
considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate
is equivalent to acquittal.”[40] He explains “failure to prosecute” as the “failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal on
such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.” [41] He then concludes that “dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute  amounts to an
acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy.” [42]

Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioner’s submission.

The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of the impeachment cases when by a
vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in
a secret bank account under the name “ Jose Velarde”. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the
Speaker of the House tendering their resignation.  They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the
impeachment tribunal.  Senator Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until
the House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public prosecutors.  The Roco motion was then granted by
Chief Justice Davide, Jr.  Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January 20, 2001, petitioner
relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic.   Thus, on February 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio.

Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy.  Double jeopardy attaches only:  (1) upon a valid
complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
[43]
 Assuming arguendo  that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth
requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent.  Petitioner’s claim of
double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court.   At best, his claim of
previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute.   As
Bernas points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the
prosecution to prove the case.  Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits. [44]
Page1

This Court held in Esmeña v. Pogoy[45], viz:

“If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the
case. After the prosecution’s motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot
produce his evidence and, consequently fails to prove the defendant’s guilt, the court upon defendant’s motion shall dismiss the case,
such dismissall amounting to an acquittal of the defendant.”

In a more recent case, this Court held:

“It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent
to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.  It must be stressed, however, that these
dismissals were predicated on the clear  right of the accused to speedy trial.  These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State.  For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.” [46]

Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him.  Even assuming arguendo that there was a
move for its dismissal, not every invocation of an accused’s right to speedy trial is meritorious.   While the Court accords due
importance to an accused’s right to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be
invoked loosely.  Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the
accused to speedy trial.[47] The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are apropos:

“Rule 115, Section 1(h).  Rights of accused at the trial. --  In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following
rights:

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.”

“Rule 119, Section 2.  Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far
as practicable until terminated.  It may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial.  In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.”

Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment proceedings was unjustified, much less that it
was for an unreasonable length of time.  Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the impeachment proceeding was suspended until
the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public prosecutors.   This was justified and
understandable for an impeachment proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment process.   However,
three (3) days from the suspension or January 20, 2001, petitioner’s resignation supervened.  With the sudden turn of events, the
impeachment court  became functus officio and the proceedings were therefore terminated.  By no stretch of the imagination can the
four-day period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned, constitute an unreasonable
period of delay violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial.

Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of
the accused.  We reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the presidency,
thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio.    By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the
termination of the impeachmment case against him, for he brought about  the termination of the impeachment proceedings.  We
have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double
jeopardy.[48]

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit.  His arguments are merely
recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject.  In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time.  We held that given the intent of the 1987
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust,  the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President.  Petitioner’s rehashed arguments including their
thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave.  His stance that
his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and
there is now a new de jure  President.

Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his  term of office.  He
buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:

“Mr. Suarez.  Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee’s omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President.  I agree
with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original
provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution.  But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least
the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of
an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost
daily?

Fr. Bernas:  The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is
immune from suit.
Page1

Mr. Suarez:  So there is no need to express it here.

 Fr. Bernas:  There is no need.  It was that way before.  The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit
and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez;  On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.” [49]

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure.  The term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.   The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office.  The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent. [50] From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president
from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.

Indeed, petitioner’s stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not really for petitioner to
reclaim the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the
criminal cases pending against him in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial have been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity.   In
our Decision, we held that there is not enough evidence to sustain petitioner’s claim of prejudicial publicity.   Unconvinced, petitioner
alleges that the vivid narration of events in our Decision itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity.   He then posits the
thesis that “doubtless, the national fixation with the probable guilt of petitioner fueled by the hate campaign launched by some high
circulation newspaper and by the bully pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry
andall regions, so harsh and so pervasive that the prosecution and the judiciary can no longer assure petitioner a sporting
chance.”[51] To be sure, petitioner engages inexageration when he alleges that “all sectors of the citizenry and all regions” have been
irrevocably influenced by this barrage of prejudicial publicity.  This exaggeration collides with petitioner’s claim that he still enjoys the
support of the majority of our people, especially the masses.

Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur  (the thing or the transaction speaks for itself) to support his
argument.  Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s  prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. [52] It is not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule.  Its mere
invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove negligence.  It merely allows the plaintiff to present
along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or
presumption of negligence and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. [53]

We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur,  a rule usually applied only in tort cases, to the cases at
bar.  Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial
publicity.  We again stress that the issue before us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the petitioner has
prejudiced the minds of the members of the panel of investigators.  We reiterate the test we laid down in People v. Teehankee,[54] to
resolve this issue, viz:

“We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.  It is true that the print
and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials.  Then and now, we
rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.    To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x.  The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.  The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a
day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired
his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as hey happen straight to our breakfast
tables and right to our bedrooms.  These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life.  For another, our idea of
a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world.  We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. x x x  x x x  x x x.  Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation.  Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
characterized the investigation and trial of the case.  In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al.,  we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.  In the
case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias  against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.  The totality of circumstances of the case  does not prove that the trial judge
Page1

acquired a fixed  opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the
trial.  Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.”
 Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove how the impartiality of the panel of
investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by it.  As we held before and we hold it again, petitioner has
completely failed to adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of Investigators.  This fact must be
established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose surmises and conjectures.   In fact, petitioner did not even
identify the members of the Panel of Investigators.  We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur as
suggested by the petitioner.  The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the
burden to the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity.   Such a rule will
overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.  The cases are not wanting
where an accused has been acquitted despite pervasive publicity. [55] For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for
petitioner to conjure possibility of prejudice but must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain
his plea.  It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so.

Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period to allow passions to subside and hopefully
the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down.  We regret not to acquiesce to the proposal.  There is no assurance that
the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose.  The investigation of the petitioner is a natural media event.  It is the
first time in our history that a President will be investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous crimes
while a sitting President.  His investigation will even be monitored by the foreign press all over the world in view of its legal and historic
significance.  In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity.  But what is important for the petitioner is that his
constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation.  For this reason, we have warned the respondent Ombudsman in
our Decision to conduct petitioner’s preliminary investigation in a circus-free atmosphere.   Petitioner is represented by brilliant legal
minds who can protect his right as an accused.

VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that “the members of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put on record who they were and
consider recusing or inhibiting themselves, particularly those who had ex-parte contacts with those exerting pressure on this
Honorable Court, as mentioned in our Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for the cold neutrality of impartial judges.” [56]

We hold that the prayer lacks merit.  There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12) members of the Court who merely accepted
the invitation of the respondent Arroyo to attend her oath taking.  As mere spectators of a historic event, said members of the
Court did not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her oath.  Indeed, the
Court in its en banc resolution on January 22, 2001, the first working day after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President, held in
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:

“A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC – In re:  Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take Her Oath of Office as President of the
Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice – Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be
sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated
January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority
given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party.”

The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court.   It should be clear from the resolution that the Court
did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an
administrative matter.  If it were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the
legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency.  To dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the
letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was “without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may
be filed by a proper party.” In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another resolution to inform the parties and
the public that it “xxx did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did
the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution.” Thus, there is no reason for petitioner to request for the
said twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a motion to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is
regarded with general disfavor.

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of  pro tanto depriving
the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.  Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial
power.  And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the
Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself.  It affects the very heart of judicial independence. [57] The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave
the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership
of Justices.[58]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738
are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Page1
 B. COMPROMISES

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of legal protection accorded to the
offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human
fault. Indeed, there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the
crime. Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by the grace of executive clemency. But, even before that, all convictions
imposing the penalty of death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar, involving two death sentences, apostrophize
for the condemned the role of this ultimate judicial intervention.

Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and
267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:

That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot Center, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province
of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force, threat and
intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with one Mia Taha to her damage and prejudice.1

In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a private individual, and being a teacher of the victim,
Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of
17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty against her will and consent and
without legal justification, to the damage and prejudice of said Mia Taha. 2

During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial was terminated,
a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court. 3

According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin,
Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was
studying. When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that
there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by
the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to
recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her
Physics teacher at PNS.

When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the other hand,
opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was
her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was
continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she
was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.

Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with her to
the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went
after she left him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything about
the incident.

The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise
did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day,
appellant arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds
because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did
not want her parents to get into trouble.

Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind appellant, towards the
highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the
jeep because appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the
poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
Page1

At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three days. During the entire
duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was
continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced
to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.

In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where she was
raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or
on January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a
missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was
released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.

Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined by Dr.
Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:

GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.

BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.

EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora, hymenal opening stellate in shape, presence
of laceration superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2 cm. length.

INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2 fingers with slight resistance,
prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed.

CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance, presence of laceration, longitudinal at the fossa
navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an average size penis in erection with laceration. 4

Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a laceration, which shows
that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock
position, he could not say that there was force applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He
also examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.

During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she never
loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did to her; and that she did not notice if there were people
near the boarding house of her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to remove her panty, she was already lying down, and
that even as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was afraid. She could not remember with which hand appellant
held the knife. She was completely silent from the time she was made to lie down, while her panty was being removed, and even until
appellant was able to rape her.

When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but there was no threat made on her
or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house with
appellant walking ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid. However,
she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not
notice if there were other people inside. She likewise did not ask the appellant why he brought her there.

Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the courtroom which, even
if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they
stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up,
appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.

Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of January 22, 1994,
she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter
merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia
and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they
could not find them there, she went to the house of appellant because she was already suspecting that something was wrong, but
appellant's wife told her that he did not come home.

Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and
had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
at Puerto Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program
where she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he
informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia
and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.

In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified that
when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did
not return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and then they
proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn
statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.

Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their
part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to
before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband
wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly
because of what happened.

The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.

Page1

According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS). Although he did
not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious
relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as
lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because he was the coach of the Palawan
delegation for chess. At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she
then decided to spend the night there with him.

Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS, was looking
inside the school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS, when she heard voices apparently coming from the
Orchids Room. She went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at
tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding hands.
She asked them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously caught by surprise, could not
answer. She then hurriedly closed the door and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an
affair with appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's wife about it when the
latter arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.

Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the present case, but the same was
not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn
statement, later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha about the
latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that
she loves appellant very much.

Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking for help with the monologue
that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan.
However, when he reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a
bench near the road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They
stayed there for fifteen minutes, after which complainant returned to her boarding house just across the street while appellant headed
for home some fifteen meters away.

It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at PNS and who was
then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant
merely replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta
watering the plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant and
she noticed that they were quite intimate because they were holding hands. This made her suspect that the two could be having a
relationship. She, therefore, told appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and was already waiting for him. She also
advised Mia to go home.

Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench. Filomena further testified that she
had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She
had likewise told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant appearing
on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is familiar with the same because Mia was her former student. On
cross-examination, Filomena clarified that when she saw the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally,
she did not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading with her.

In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near their house and she invited
him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from
her mother for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a plastic
bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and
Mia went to the poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.

Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available transportation, so she suggested
that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations,
aside from the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to
stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from
the funds they had solicited. That evening, however, appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a
certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did
not bring complainant along because she had refused to go home.

The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and informed them that Mia
spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and
waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw
while waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to Sunset
Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was
opened by her.

Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely answered that what she was doing
was of her own free will and that at that moment her father was not supposed to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What
complainant did not know, however, was that appellant had already reported the matter to her parents, although he opted not to tell
her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions. Isagani Virey further testified that when he saw appellant and complainant
on January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple looked very happy.

Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January 22 to 24, 1994,
because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that what they were doing was wrong
but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant,
on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the matter.

Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask for assistance in procuring
transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were already looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto
Princesa City. Virey accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter
refused to help because of the complicated situation appellant was in.
Page1
 Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against appellant and after finding out
that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's
house that same day and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites but
appellant refused because he was already married. It was eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of appellant and
make arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's
house.

The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay their hotel bills, the couple
were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two
days. They just walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven
hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the couple were
very happy, they were intimate and sweet to each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that they were having a
relationship.

In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they were there, she would buy food at
the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose
to go with appellant despite the fact the he was a married man, Mia told him that she really loved appellant. She never told him, and
Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she was supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also
testified that several police officers lived within their neighborhood and if complainant had really been kidnapped and detained, she
could have easily reported that fact to them. Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never
locked because the lock had been destroyed.

On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his; that it was Naem who went to
the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police
Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.

Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed him that
complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994,
appellant was not able to talk to complainant's parents because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to
tell her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her that
within one hour he was be going to the police station at the municipal hall so that they could settle everything there.

After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo
who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents
and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994,
appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for
rape and kidnapping against him.

During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters from complainant
dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to
identify the handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of
desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not
until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither
did he request his mother to talk to complainants in order to settle the case.

Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January 21, 1994. However, he
admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already on January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's
Subdivision, they never had sexual relations. Appellant was told, when complainant visited him in jail, that her father would kill her if
she refused to testify against him, although by the time she testified in court, her father had already died.

Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn
Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have a relationship with her because he wanted to change
her and that was what they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that, during the time when they were staying together, Mia had
allegedly asked permission to leave several times but that he refused. On the contrary, he claimed that on January 27, 1994 when she
told him that her parents wanted to see her, he readily gave her permission to go.

He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on January 22, 1994, but which she
left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the
provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.

Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant for his arrest
was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty.
Paredes, it was no longer necessary since the complainants had already executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a
"Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with these cases.

On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to appellant when the latter was still
detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination, that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she
clarified that she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.

Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the incident at the Orchids
Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise
negated the claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant contending
that she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night
of January 21, 1994. She vehemently disavowed that she and appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since there
never was a time that they became sweethearts.

She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense witnesses: that she told appellant
Page1

"iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered "wala kang pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her
relationship with appellant; that she was the one who registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left her
at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani Virey came to their room and stayed there for five minutes, because the
only other person who went there was the room boy who served their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting
help for transportation; and that she was free to roam around or to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.

Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra, Palawan to have sex with him and
claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa
iyo" when she allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him, since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she
threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since she never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset Garden and at
Edward's Subdivison, she was not being guarded by appellant.

However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4" and admitted that
the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she
also admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to her.

On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in these cases,
identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail on February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty
at that time, he asked her what she wanted and she said she would just visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he
had a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting area which is around ten meters away from his post, and then he
saw her hand over to appellant a letter which the latter immediately read. This witness declared that appellant never requested him to
testify.

Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, he was plying
his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there
were already several passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the
Sunset Garden.

On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment 5 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape
and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both cases. 6 By reason of the
nature of the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.

The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape 7 and kidnapping with serious illegal detention 8filed by Mia Taha
and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point issued a resolution 9on February 4, 1994 finding the existence
of a prima facie case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha executed an affidavit of
desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention. 10 However, pursuant to a joint resolution 11 issued on
March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and
for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both
charges.

Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in reviewing the evidence adduced in a prosecution for the
crime of rape as cited in its decision reiterating the case of People vs. Calixto(193 SCRA 303).

III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had consummated the crime of rape against private
complainant.

IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the defense.

V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention as the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and completely ignoring the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.

VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on the part of the accused-appellant in view of
the offer to compromise.

VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the sum of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes committed.

IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the crimes charged on the accused-appellant despite
the fact that the crimes were allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659. 12

A. The Rape Case

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and the accuser to humiliation, fear
and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear for the rest of their

lives. 13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence.14 This notwithstanding,
the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a
sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed
to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted. 15

The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of
innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the
Page1

weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. 16 In other words, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the
offended woman, provided such testimony is clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.

There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the
crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne
in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent;
17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; 18 and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 19

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there was no
rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a
truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.

I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of rape under paragraph
(1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the
same was accomplished through force or intimidation.

1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress with
complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the
boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends that
on said date and time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible and sustained
by the evidence presented and of record.

According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already inside apparently waiting
for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she was going there on that particular day and at that time,
considering that she does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who
happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a generic intent with
an indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated by the prosecution.

Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as regards the setting
of the supposed sexual assault. 20 It will be noted that the place where the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence
but a boarding house where several persons live and where people are expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even bother
to elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding house had remained closed for some time, in order that it
could be safely assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at any given time.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of
complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able
to go inside the house because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This
testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of
January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even advised
them to go home because it was already late and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at
the school building. On rebuttal, complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 21

It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly
accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural
tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he had raped, 22and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given
the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to
distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected that one
who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things
and circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as to his guilt.
Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.

It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene of the crime are admissible
as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a circumstance tending to identify the appellant. 23 Consequently,
it is not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the complainant immediately after he had
allegedly raped her. 24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany
complainant up to the gate of the house, considering its strategic location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just across
the street, 25 and the PNS schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away. 26

Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her boarding house where she saw her
landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the former
was the very first person she came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan boarding
house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have testified on
complainant's physical appearance and to attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour, possibly
with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all.

We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited him to the boarding house
to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest. This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant
fetched her the following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that same school affair.

In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that she
was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said
that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at
the boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another version and said that when she
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reached the boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside.
 The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or realign the same with her prior
inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this single episode, thus:

Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, do you remember where you were?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why were you there?

A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.

COURT:

Q Conversing with whom?

A With my cousin, Your Honor.

Q Your cousin's name?

A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you please relate to this Honorable Court how that rape happened?

A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.

COURT:

Q Of what date?

A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q Then what happened?

A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I passed (through) the kitchen and then when I opened the
door somebody grabbed me suddenly.

xxx xxx xxx

Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding house where you said Danny Godoy raped you?

A None, Sir.

COURT:

Q So, the house was empty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?

A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor. 27 (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)

2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to her
neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative
of the prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer
scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible
means by appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994.

The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and already healed, and the conclusion
therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the date which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since
the same findings and conclusion are likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus took place with the consent of
complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994. 28Further, rather than substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid theory and the
supposed date of commission of rape, the finding that there were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more
credence to appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a later date and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical
force. 29 In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by physical
evidence showing use of force. 30

Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-legal expert opined
that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that
force was not applied. 31 He also added that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises. 32 The absence
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of any sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of complainant's consent to the act. 33 While the absence in
the medical certificate of external signs of physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, 34 the
instant case is clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.

Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated complainant's assertion that there
was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative
evidence is not considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal element of the crime is not corroborative proof of
facts necessary to constitute another equally important element of the crime. 35

Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was afraid of appellant. Again assuming
that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless strongly believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real.
It is evident that complainant did not use the manifest resistance expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity. 36 She failed
to make any outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no evidence on record
that she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and
inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any
force of whatever nature or form.

Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully unconvincing to make this
Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or
objected at all to the involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a woman defending her
virtue and honor. 37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped renders doubtful her charge of rape, 38 especially when we
consider the actual mise-en-scene in the context of her asseverations.

There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be presented, as they are not
indispensable evidence to prove rape. 39 We incline to the view, however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other
corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other
way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been presented
to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of
the essential elements of the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of
complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.

II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance as tending to
establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a conviction for the offense of rape should even be
sustained from the uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the time
when the alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the
circumstances of the

case. 40

Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house and asked permission from
them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy. Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply
that appellant was armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor
intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed threat previously made by appellant does not inspire belief
since appellant was alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no showing of any opportunity for him to make good his
threat, even assuming that he had really voiced any. On the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked
permission from her parents for her to accompany him.

Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was so strangely normal
as to be abnormal. 41 It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing the person who had allegedly raped her only the day before, she
did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and disgust. 42 Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the
presence of her parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from
pursuing any evil design. From her deportment, it does not appear that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in
the mind of complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be
expected of a person who had just suffered the ultimate invasion of her womanhood. 43

III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the
courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being
interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with
extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman
decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish
and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to
render justice based on the law. 44

The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses 45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and
conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of
the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 46

The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident.
Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her,
threatened to kill her if she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The question then
that confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is credible. 47 The technique in deciphering testimony is not to
solely concentrate on isolated parts of that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only upon a
perusal of the entire testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been stated. 48

In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no serious effort to
dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in
rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. 49 In finding that the crime of rape
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was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994
incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to
consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a
quowittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.

There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh against its being accorded the full
credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's
judgment of conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards
reversal of said judgment. 50 Thus:

1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and around three times at
Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations. If this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating
prosecutor could have overlooked these facts with their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant
with only one count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's representations is further magnified by the fact that even the trial court
did not believe it, as may be inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume
that it was similarly befuddled.

2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a
manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases,
this claim that complainant now advances appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.

3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she never noticed if appellant slept
because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side by side with appellant, complainant admitted that
everytime she woke up, appellant was invariably in bed beside her. 51

4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it could not be opened from the inside.
But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:

Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?

A No, Sir, it was locked.

Q Can you describe the lock of that room?

A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.

ATTY. EBOL:

Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the door be locked and opened from the inside.

COURT:

Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself if you can open that door from the inside.

CLERK OF COURT:

Witness holding the doorknob.

COURT:

The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic) inside you can open it?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held?

A There was, Your Honor.

Q What is that?

A The one that slides, Your Honor.

Q And that is used when you are already inside?

A Yes, Your Honor. 52 (Emphases ours.)

5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly offering token or futile
resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no attempt to flee or attract attention to her plight. 53 In her own
declaration, complainant mentioned that when they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at the information counter
where appellant registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact that appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She
likewise stated that a room boy usually went to their room and brought them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing from appellant,
she could have grabbed every possible opportunity to escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the
prosecution's failure to present these two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated
complainant's story.

6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the house together and walked in going to
the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that appellant went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had
evil motives, that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling such fear in
complainant that she could not dare take advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant, and run as far away from him as
possible despite all the chances therefor.

7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case, complainant was dropped from school
and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear
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that the school authorities were heartless people who turned their backs on her and considered her an outcast. That would be adding
insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia and her parents were never heard to complain about this apparent
injustice. Such complacency cannot but make one think and conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the
drastic action taken by the school and the docile submission thereto by the Taha family.

On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete with sweeping statements and
generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's testimony, declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and
then hastened to conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of that of the defense, which is totally repugnant to the elementary and
time-honored rule that conviction should be made on the basis of strong, clear and compelling evidence of the prosecution. 54

IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart theory" does
not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in
truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is
not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would
rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to
admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.

Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several witnesses for the
defense, viz.:

1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a bench in front
of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the
latter's illicit affair with appellant.

2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia
why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia answered that she really loves him. 55 He heard her call
appellant "Papa". 56 The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other. 57

3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he asked Mia if she knew what she
getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When
he was trying to give counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if appellant left her, she would commit suicide. 58 He could see
that the couple were happy together. 59

4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he worked was located within the
premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and that when he was advising appellant that what he was doing is
wrong because he is married and Mia is his student, complainant reacted by saying that no matter what happened she would not leave
Godoy, and that if she went home her father would kill her. 60 He also observed that they were happy. 61

5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident, inside one of the
classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at
tatakas tayo." 62 She tried to dissuade complainant from continuing with her relationship with appellant. 63

The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant, which were substantially
corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare,
unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed assertions of appellant. 64 Mere denials are self-serving negative
evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of credible disinterested witnesses. 65

Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete with details which could have
been known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability thereto. 66 His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the
earmarks of truth. This is not to say that the testimony of appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must have
colored his account, even on the assumption that he could be trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much in his
version that does not strain the limits of credulity. More to the point, there is enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some
basis in reality. 67

Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous, nonsensical and incredible is highly
uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible one. 68
It does not apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony and the supposed inconsistencies arise
merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although not completely. 69

Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the defense, the most telling of
which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For
analysis and emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:

27 Feb. 94

Dane,

Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.

Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako gagawa kang paraan na mailayo
ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw
ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila ako.

Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi ako
makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko ngayon ay wala sa
lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin
sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang
kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat ng
bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.
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alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila.

Please sir . . .
 (Sgd.) Mia Taha 70

3/1/94

Dane,

I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo nagawa ko lang naman ang
sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir
narinig ko na magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa
DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na
masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot
samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil
nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip
mong minahal lang kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon ang hangarin ko sa iyo.
higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto
kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya
pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga
magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may masama
akong hangarin sa iyo.

Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak kong anong
oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay inuutusan akong
lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay sa
tulong niya.

Love you

(Sgd.) Mia Taha 71

There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's handwriting
which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other defense witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as
belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of complainant and
highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these
qualified witnesses and refusing to give any probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that
no handwriting expert was presented to analyze and evaluate the same.

Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting experts, is
not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. 72 This is so
since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be
the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that
evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. 73

The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the examination papers submitted to
them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with
the standard writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions of
the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one and the same person. More importantly, complainant
herself categorically admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her.

It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn a deaf ear to this conclusive
portion of complainant's testimony:

ATTY. EBOL:

Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and Filomena Pielago were your teachers?

A Yes, sir.

Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this incident of January 21, 1994, am I not correct?

A That is true, sir.

Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been your teachers you took examinations in their classes in their
particular subject(s)?

A Yes, sir.

Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your teachers, am I correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it appears to be your test paper and with your signature and the
alphabet appears in this exhibit appears to be that of Mia Taha, please examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is your test
paper?

A Yes, sir.

Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature?

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A Yes, sir.
 Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable Court if you are familiar with
that.

A What subject is that?

Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.

A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.

Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that signature?

A That is min(e), sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math, are you familiar with that signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?

A That is my handwriting, sir.

Q Also Exhibit "2"?

A Yes, sir. 74

While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of complainant to herein appellant, the
witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time,
testified of his own accord because he knew that what Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor
requested him to testify for the defense, as related by the witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the
testimony of witness Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what
turned out to be the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense.

V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This inference
does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes
which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been
held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer
to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue
therefrom. 75

A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense
charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an
imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant.
As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of
these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases.
Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's
mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings. 76

It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer
of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. 77 In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be
drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and
the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort
to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties. 78

VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts
as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's explanation about the filing of criminal charges. 79

In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of desperation
and exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo,
aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his
predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of
the intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure
exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.

The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with
Page1

circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which
brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. 80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save
face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the
wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.

Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, that is not
always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose too many instances of false charges of rape. 81 While this
Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges, especially where the
offended parties were very young and presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story just to secure indictments for a crime as
grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and acquitted the accused when there are strong indications
pointing to the possibility that the rape charges were merely motivated by some factors except the truth as to their commission. 82
This is a case in point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting
test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of complainant's feelings
for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should have acted as adviser and counselor to complainant and
helped her develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting her. 83Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in a prison as
an instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a measure of divine retribution.
Additionally, these ruminations do not rule out such other legal options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.

VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a person with
rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is
deemed innocent until proven otherwise.

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions conflict,
one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for
each presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be
regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together
with all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues. 84

The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:

In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on the theory that she will not
choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the
truth. The rape victim who decides to speak up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also
irreparably sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind that she did not submit to
her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be
titillated by the intimate details of her violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled,
relating every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will
argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be
challenged and maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been
lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation
rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides instead to come out openly and point to her
assailant, courts

are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . . . 85

The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form but a
substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime;
nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. 86 Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven
contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that,
for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond
the whisper of a doubt. 87 This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence
rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so. 88

On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the overwhelming evidence in favor of
herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused
must prevail in this particular indictment.

B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case

It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty. 89 In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution.
Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and
irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant, as
hereunder explained:

To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents' house the day after the alleged rape
incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to permit her to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy.
When they left the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It
is difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these normal and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to
deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious
circumstances as described by complainant.

Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag which later
turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later
Page1

delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first
allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the
knowledge and consent of her parents who passively looked on without comment.
 Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they occupied, whether at Sunset Garden or at
Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from the inside. We must, however, recall that when she was asked on
cross-examination about the kind of lock that was used, she pointed to the doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that
the door of the courtroom be locked and then asked complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to do so and, in fact,
she admitted that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could also be opened from the inside in the same manner. This
demonstrably undeniable fact was never assailed by the prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the
room which was occupied by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock thereof was broken.

When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway in broad daylight. Complainant,
therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other people and free herself from appellant if it were true that she
was forcibly kidnapped and abused by the latter. 90 In fact, several opportunities to do so had presented themselves from the time
they left complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel and in the lodging house.

According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to Sunset Garden to inform them that
Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the
other hand, the allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the police about her missing daughter was not supported by any
corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the police officer to whom she allegedly reported the incident ever
identified or presented in court.

We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for the commission of the
crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime.
91 It is true that, as a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not
have to be proved. 92 Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the
accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in order. 93 Nowhere in the testimony of either the
complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement or
a lovers' tryst, immoral though it may be.

As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of clothes belonging to complainant
which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its announced supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought
from a department store. Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the fact that on rebuttal
the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or clarification from complainant about said clothes, strengthens and
reinforces our impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of discretion by the court below. Matters which could have been easily
verified were thus cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by
said court.

We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this Court against the practice of
excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court:

It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered where trivial objections to the admission of
proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections
to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages
of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication
of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement
of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over
which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal,
often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step
which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question
as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed
to know the law and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the
materials before it necessary to make a correct judgment. 94

At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and substantial evidence which
warrant and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and
experience of mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.

Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death penalty on certain heinous
crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila
Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal, 95 and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Danny Godoy is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the
Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith, unless he is
otherwise detained for any other valid cause.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117217 December 2, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

GENER DE GUZMAN y SICO, accused-appellant.

Page1

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

 On 1 April 1992, complainant Gilda Ambray filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, a complaint 1 charging
accused Gener de Guzman y Sico with the crime of rape allegedly committed at 9:00 p.m. of 31 March 1992 in Meadow Wood,
Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite. On even date, Gener de Guzman was arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail
of Bacoor, Cavite, but was released on 14 April 1992 upon the filing and approval of his bail bond. 2

Gener de Guzman did not submit any counter-affidavit as required in the subpoena 3 issued by the MTC on 14 April 1992.
Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, the MTC forwarded the record of the case to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the necessary information with the appropriate court. 4

On 14 July 1992, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite,
Branch 19, an information 5 charging accused Gener de Guzman with the crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of March 1992 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Meadow Wood Subd., Executive Village,
Barangay Panapaan, Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Gilda B. Ambray against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said Gilda B.
Ambray.

Contrary to law.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. B-92-216.

Upon arraignment on 10 August 1992, accused Gener de Guzman entered a plea of not guilty. 6 Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued and the prosecution moved for the cancellation of the bail bond.

On 9 December 1992, after complainant Gilda Ambray, Police Officer Efren Bautista, and Dr. Valentin Bernales of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), completed their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, the trial court cancelled the bail bond of
Gener de Guzman on the ground that the evidence of his guilt was strong. 7 He was re-arrested, and on 22 January 1993, his motion
for reconsideration 8 of the order cancelling his bail bond was denied by the trial court for lack of merit as he was charged with a
capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt was strong. 9

Two other witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, a kumadre of the accused, and
Aquilino Flores Ambray, the husband of the complainant.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts:

Homeward bound on 31 March 1992 from Anson Department Store where she worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda
Ambray, the 32-year old wife of Aquilino mores Ambray and a mother of two children, was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision,
Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite, at about 8:45 p.m. waiting for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When
she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some questions. He
answered in a stammering manner. The complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the gate of the
subdivision was well-lit. 10

After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed. While on
board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different route. She got scared but managed not to show it. The accused
would once in a while stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. 11 When they reached Phase II of the same
subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid
him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from
behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The accused then dragged her
to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. She attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill her if she made
noise. She fought to free herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to raise her T-shirt while holding her
neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she obligingly followed because of fear. He removed her bra
and kissed her breast. She shouted "Saklolo! Tulungan ninyo ako!," but the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that
she could hardly breathe. He held her hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He unzipped her pants and pulled it down her
knees. She struggled to liberate herself, but to no avail. The accused then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because
she struggled and fought back, then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried to stand, he pushed her
down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her pants and underwear. She pleaded to him to have mercy on her and
told him that she had two children. He warned her: "Huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita!" The accused again tried to insert his penis
into her, but she prevented him from doing so. The accused took her hand and let her hold his penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became
too weak to struggle against the accused's sexual advances, the accused was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then
pulled out his penis and "fingered" her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody, otherwise,
he would kill her and all members of her family. 12 He told her that she was his third victim but the two did not complain. He then
dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back. 13

When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she was raped by the accused.
Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by Gilda's mother. 14

At almost midnight of 31 March 1992, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony Antonio, the President of the
Homeowners' Association and President of the National Press Club. Antonio radioed the Bacoor Police Station to send an investigator.
PO3 Efren Bautista and Sgt. Saguisame responded to the alarm immediately. Upon their arrival at the house of Antonio, PO3 Bautista
saw Gilda with her mother. Gilda, who was crying, related to PO3 Bautista that she was raped and described to him her assailant as a
tricycle driver, tall, strong, with curly hair and in army cut. 15 Gilda also gave PO3 Bautista a vivid description of the accused's tricycle,
viz., blue in color with the name "Dimple" at the back. 16 The policemen left and went to the house of the accused. PO3 Bautista
invited the accused to go with him because the Mayor wanted to talk to him. The accused, together with PO3 Bautista, went to the
residence of Antonio. When the accused entered the house of Antonio, Gilda Ambray cried hysterically while pointing to the accused
as her rapist. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail. 17
Page1

Gilda Ambray was medically examined at the Las Piñas Hospital and issued a medical certificate. 18 She then proceeded to the
NBI for a medico-legal examination. Dr. Valentin Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the examination on Gilda. His
findings, contained in his medico-legal report, 19 were as follows:
 I. Physical Injuries:

Abrasion, brownish; lips, upper, left side, mucosal, 2.0 x 1.5 cm.; elbow, right, postero-lateral aspect, 2.0 x 1.5 cm. and postero-
medial aspect, multi-linear, with brown scab formation, 3.0 x 1.0 cm.

Contusion, reddish; back, right, scapular area, 7.0 x 5.0 cm. and left, 15.0 x 8.0 cm.

Contused abrasion, reddish black, scapular area, left, medial aspect, 3.0 x 2.0 cm.

II. Genital Examination:

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibulae, pinkish, smooth.
Hymen, reduced to carunculae myrtiformis. Vaginal orifice, admits a tube, 3.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal wall, lax. Rugosities, obliterated.

III. Conclusions:

1. The above physical injuries were noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.

2. Medical evidence indicative of recent sexual intercourse with man on or about the alleged date of examination.

IV. Remarks:

Laboratory Report S-92-94 20 shows positive result for the presence of human spermatozoa.

Dr. Bernales opined that the physical injuries sustained by Gilda Ambray resulted from force applied to her," 21while the
presence of human spermatozoa in Gilda's genitals indicated recent sexual intercourse. 22

On 3 April 1992, "Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the
accused's kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for the accused's sake. The following day, Resurreccion accompanied the accused's
parents, wife, children and sister-in-law to Gilda's house. 23 Gilda met them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she told them "that
should not be tolerated." 24

Gilda further testified that she suffered moral damages, had to resign from her job due to shame, and had spent P28,500.00 for
attorney's fees. 25

Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi and presented Alfredo Fenandez and Teotimo Camagong as his witnesses.

According to Gener de Guzman, on 31 March 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., he was about to go home and was at the corner of
Meadow Wood Subdivision coming from Justineville Subdivision. On his way home on his tricycle, he saw Gilda Ambray, who flagged
him down and hoarded his tricycle. After traveling about half a kilometer, his tricycle malfunctioned. He told her that she better walk
home because her house was already near. He pushed his tricycle home, and on his way, one Alfredo Fenandez approached him and
inquired what was wrong with his tricycle. Alfredo helped him push the tricycle towards his (accused's) home, and upon arrival thereat,
he told Alfredo not to leave at once. At around 9:10 p.m., they started to drink liquor until 11:00 p.m., and after their drinking spree, he
cleaned their mess and slept. Then at around 12:50 a.m. of 1 April 1992, PO3 Efren Bautista fetched and apprised him that he was
accused of rape by a certain Gilda Ambray. Thereafter, an investigation was conducted and he was brought to the Bacoor Police
Station.

Alfredo L. Fernandez, 37 years old, jobless, and a resident of Justineville Subdivision, corroborated Gener's story about the
malfunctioning tricycle and the drinking session. 26

Teotimo Camagong testified that he was present when the accused was investigated at the residence of Tony Antonio and that
the complainant did not pinpoint and identify the accused as her alleged molester. 27

In its Decision 28 dated 30 June 1994 and promulgated on 25 July 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused GENER SICO DE GUZMAN is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape punishable by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He should suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua and
indemnify herein private complainant Gilda Ambray the following: actual damages representing her lost monthly salary when she
resigned from her office due to shame for being a rape victim, in the sum of P30,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00,
exemplary damages of P10,000.00, litigation expenses of P5,000.00, and attorney's fee[s] including appearance fees for the private
prosecutor in the sum of P28,500.00.

It gave full gave weight to the testimony of Gilda Ambray because "[w]ithout doubt, the complainant had endured the rigors of
recalling her harrowing ordeal and had vividly, credibly and candidly portrayed in detail how she was raped by the accused." 29

As to whether sexual intercourse was consummated against the will or consent of the offended party, the trial court said:

No less than NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Valentin Bernales had corroborated the stance of herein private complainant that she
was raped by the accused. The victim had sustained contusions and abrasions at her body that indicated that she struggled against the
sexual advances of the accused. As a result of the doctor's examination on the victim, he confirmed the occurrence of a recent sexual
intercourse and presence in her private part of human spermatozoa as denoted in his Medico Legal Report (Exh. F) and Laboratory
Report (Exh. D). 30

Likewise it ruled that since the accused was drunk, he was more aggressive and sexually capable. 31Finally, it considered as
evidence of the accused's guilt the plea of his parents, wife and relatives for forgiveness and compromise. 32

The accused seasonably appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction, and in urging us to acquit him, interposes the
following assignment of errors in his Appellant's Brief:

1. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED HAS INDUBITABLY EMPLOYED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION IN THE RAPE OF THE
Page1

VICTIM.

2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE VICTIM.
 3. THE COURT ERRED IN STRESSING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS DRUNK AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF RAPE.

In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with the accused and prays that we affirmin toto the
appealed decision.

The first and second assigned errors may be taken up together. The upshot of the accused's stance in these alleged errors is that
he was not positively identified and that neither force nor intimidation was proven. As to the latter he cites these facts: (a) Gilda's
assailant had three acts of sexual intercourse with her; (b) the physical examination showed that she suffered injuries on the dorsal
portion only, and none was found on her neck; (c) her personal belongings — bra, pants, T-shirt and underwear — were completely
intact; and (d) no signs of physical violence were discernible on both the persons of the accused and Gilda Ambray.

Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places away from
prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and conviction invariably turns
upon her credibility, as the People's single witness of the actual occurrence. 33

In the review of rape cases, therefore, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made
with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its on merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 34

The resolution then of the first two assigned errors and the determination of the guilt of the accused depend primarily on the
credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and the accused witnessed the incident when it happened. Her testimony
alone, if credible, would render the accused's conviction inevitable.

A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story, which she narrated in a
categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further strengthening her credibility in recounting her ordeal at the hands of the
accused was her conduct immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home without looking back, and upon her arrival she reported
the rape to her husband and her mother at once. Immediately thereafter, she reported it to Tony Antonio, the President of the
Homeowners' Association and President of the National Press Club, who then sought police assistance. When the policemen arrived at
Antonio's residence in response to the latter's call, Gilda narrated the rape to the policemen and gave them the description of the
assailant. When the policemen brought the accused to the residence of Antonio, Gilda forthwith pointed to the accused as the person
who raped her. Gilda voluntarily submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Piñas Hospital and then to an examination of
her private parts by Dr. Bernales of the NBI. The following day she submitted herself to an investigations 35 by the PNP of Bacoor,
Cavite, and filed on the same day a complaint for rape against the accused with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite.

All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within twenty-four hours after the commission of the crime. The quickness and
spontaneity of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous woman who had just undergone sexual molestation against
herself, 36 and evinced nothing more than her instant resolve to denounce the beast who criminally abused and ravished her, and to
protect her honor. Moreover, she rejected the plea for forgiveness sought by the accused's parents, wife, and children, then suffered
the travails of a public trial which necessarily exposed her to humiliation and embarrassment by unraveling the details of the rape and
enduring a cross-examination which sought to discredit her.

What Gilda endured could only come from one whose obsession was to bring to justice the person who had abused her and
vindicate her honor, even if such vindication would never erase from her memory that excruciatingly painful chapter in her life which
left her psychologically and emotionally scarred forever. This Court has repeatedly held that no complainant would admit that she has
been raped, make public the offense, allow the examination of her private parts, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial
and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she had not in fact been raped. 37

We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda.

Another established rule in rape cases is that the force need not be irresistible; all that is necessary is that the force used by the
accused is sufficient to consummate his evil purpose, or that it was successfully used. It need not be so great or of such character that it
could not be repelled. 38 Intimidation, on the other hand, must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time
of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not
yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment, or even thereafter as when she is
threatened with death if she would report the incident. 39

In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her mouth. As she struggled to free
herself, she sustained her injuries. Dr. Bernales confirmed the use of force, and according to him, the abrasions and contusions on
Gilda's body were due to force applied on her. Moreover, the accused also threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to his
bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation.

The accused's contention that it was highly incredible that there was force or intimidation since the assailant committed three
acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Gilda explained in her re-direct
examination that the three hours mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the time which elapsed from the moment she was at
the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the incident to Tony Antonio. 40 The principal object of re-direct
examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the party who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to
explain the testimony given on cross-examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an
opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-examination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing
the answer of a witness, or of adding a new matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation of testimony.
41 In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice insert his penis into her
vagina. He failed in the first and second attempts because she struggled, but succeeded on the third because she was already weak.
While it may be true that on cross-examination she testified that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she
was raped three times, no inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications of
Page1

the three separate acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of law,
among which, legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be asked or permitted to
testify as to whether or not a party is responsible to the law. Law in the sense here used embraces whatever conclusions belonging
properly to the court. 42

What is clear to us is that there were, at least, two acts of attempted rape and one consummated rape, committed in light of the
testimony of Gilda. The information, however, charged the accused with only one act of rape; hence, consistent with the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 43 he cannot be held liable for more than
what he was charged. There can only be one conviction for rape if the information charges only one offense, even if the evidence
shows three separate acts of sexual intercourse. 44

Neither are we persuaded by the claim that Gilda was not able to positively identify the accused. He was familiar to Gilda one or
two weeks before the incident because she saw him driving a tricycle and had, in fact, been once a passenger of his. She saw him
clearly at the guardhouse before the incident because the guardhouse was well-lit; she was his passenger that evening until he stopped
his tricycle near the unfinished house; and she had ample opportunity to see and recognize him during the assault. Then, Gilda did not
hesitate to point to and identify the accused as her rapist when the latter was brought by the policemen to the house of Tony Antonio.

The accused's defense of alibi, which is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and fabricate, cannot prevail over his
positive identification by Gilda. 45

Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the overtures of
his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were
testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the
unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who
had gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the accused dared not assign that finding and
conclusion as an error and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the
decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified
the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised,
an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 46 No one would ask for
forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on
account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon

(an offender). 47 In People vs. Calimquim, 48 we stated:

The fact that appellant's mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazon's father is an indication of guilt. (See People vs.
Olmedillo,

L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193).

The accused may be correct in the third assigned error because no testimony of a witness established that the accused was in a
state of drunkenness when he sexually assaulted Gilda. The trial court may have formed its conclusion that the accused was drunk
from his testimony that he and Alfredo Fernandez were drinking liquor in his house from 9:00 to 11:00 p.m. of 31 March 1992. In any
event, that erroneous conclusion is innocuous.

We do not then hesitate to conclude that the accused, having had carnal knowledge of complainant Gilda Ambray through the
use of force and intimidation, committed the crime of rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prescribed penalty being reclusion perpetua.

The damages awarded by the trial court stand modification. No damage for loss of income due to Gilda's resignation from her
employment should have been awarded, the resignation being unnecessary. Conformably however with the current jurisprudence, she
is entitled to indemnity of P50,000.00. For her shame, as well as mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral
shock and social humiliation which rape necessarily brings to the offended party, 49 she is entitled to recover moral damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Article 2217 of the Civil Code. However, since no aggravating circumstance had been proved, exemplary
damages may not be awarded. In Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of 30 June 1994 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. B-92-216 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification on the civil liabilities, and as so
modified, the awards of P30,000.00 as actual damages for loss of monthly salary and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages are deleted,
and accused-appellant Gener de Guzman y Sico is further ordered to pay the complainant Gilda Ambray the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity. The awards for moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees stand.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as follows:

"That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
Page1

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Rosita Bacaling, against her will."[1]
 The prosecution established that Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00 in the evening
of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years
old and the other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children asleep. He approached Rosita
and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease. Rosita was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and
stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of the children. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside.
As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that
appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife
at her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her
face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After
satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach. She lost consciousness.Exsm

A few minutes later, Rosita woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood and changed her clothes. Seeing
her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the incident to her parents. Appellant then left the house.[2]

Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before leaving them to
return to her mother's house in Barrio Cagangohan. Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither
could she perform ordinary daily functions such as dressing herself. In short, Rosita became helpless. She was brought to the
Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo,
interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to talk. She conducted a physical examination and also found that:

"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;

Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;

Internal examination -- admits one finger;

Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.

x x x."[3]

Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and
treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by appellant.[4]

Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the alleged rape he was selling fish at
the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and worked straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left
the fish stall until after 8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.[5]

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to indemnify Rosita
BacalingP50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, thus:

"WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds accused Crispin Yparraguirre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Correspondingly, the court hereby sentences the said accused
to suffer and undergo the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.

Accused Crispin Yparraguirre is also ordered to indemnify the victim Rosita Bacaling the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, plus payment of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED."[6]

In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that:

"THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE;

II

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITNESS MARY ANN YPARRAGUIRRE WENT TO THE MOTHER OF THE ACCUSED ON
NOVEMBER 23, 1990 TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE DROPPING OF THE CASE."[7]

The appeal has no merit. After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence, which rests mainly on the
testimony of Rosita Bacaling, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner
and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress,
rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.[8]

The question of whether Rosita contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not important. The undisputed fact
is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that
Rosita should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping
tablets. They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts.[9] The delay in filing
the complaint does not in any way affect Rosita's credibility.[10] She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was
filed three months after Rosita told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period to file a complaint for rape.

Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner of the family.[11] It is hard
to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in
a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all.[12] Rosita suffered psychologically from the incident. Before the
rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months[13] and the spouses actually found her to be a good worker.[14]
When Rosita returned to her family, however, she lost her speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek
psychiatric treatment. Indeed, Rosita's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication.

Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann
Page1

Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the
complaint.[15]When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still Merlyn refused to
accept it.[16] As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made.
Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on
November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money.[17] An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal
complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror.[18] What is required is that after committing
the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.

The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi.[19] It was not physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented
room[20] and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.[21]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated May 10, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo, Davao is affirmed. Costs
against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8931 March 14, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JUAN MAQUI, defendant-appellant.

CARSON, J.:

The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of the caraballa and her calf, and sentenced to
imprisonment for the period of five years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay his share of the costs of the
proceedings.

Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of one Dagsa, the principal
witness for the prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been made by the accused,
including an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a sum of money; and in declining to accept as true the testimony of the
accused in his own behalf at the trial. We find nothing in the record, however, which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the
trial judge as to the degree of the credit which should be accorded the various witnesses called at the trial.

Counsel rests his contention that the evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused should have been
excluded on the ground that, as counsel insists, there is no formal proof n the record that they were made voluntarily, and that they
were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far as they can be construed as admission or confession of guilt. In answer to this contention
it is sufficient to say that there is no suggestion in the record in the court below that these extrajudicial statements were not made
voluntarily, and we are satisfied that if the evidence as to the circumstances under which these incriminating statements were made
be accepted as true it clearly rebuts the possibility that they were made involuntarily, or extorted by force, threats, or promise of
reward. The record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to compromise and that they
were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the hope that it accepted he would
escape prosecution.

The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases has frequently been discussed in the courts of the
United States, and the practice there does not appear to be wholly uniform. We think, however, that the weight both of authority and
of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not
made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would
justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if made merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence. (U. S. vs.Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)

In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the prosecutrix is inadmissible, if such
offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)

On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is admissible on behalf of the
prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the case could be
compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)

In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it could be settled, in reply
to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would be prosecuted for damages, and a solicitation to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40
Ga., 530.)

In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid a sum of money in settlement of a civil action
brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen. (State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)

An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply thereto, are admissible in
evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)

An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an admission of guilt, or as
disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and larceny charged in the indictment. (State vs. Rodriguez,
45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)
Page1

It may be shown that the prisoner sent a massage to the prosecutor, proposing to take a whipping and to be let go. (State vs.
DeBerry, 92 N. C., 800.)
 We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are opinion that in imposing the penalty the
trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance the manifest lack of "instruction and education" of the
offender. It does not clearly appear whether he is or not an uncivilized Igorot, although there are indications in the record which tend
to show that he is. But in any event, it is very clear that if he is not a member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorots, he is a densely ignorant
and untutored fellow, who lived in the Igorot country, and is not much, if any, higher that are they in the scale of civilization. The
beneficent provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature are peculiarly applicable
to offenders who are shown to be members of these uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the fact that their
lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in "instruction and education" that they
should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of those citizens who have had the advantage of living their
lives in contact with the refining influences of civilization.

It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery are not entitled to the benefits
of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act No. 2142, this on the theory that under the provisions of
the article prior to its amendment the ground upon which the courts were authorized in their direction to mitigate the penalties
prescribed by the code was "the circumstance of the offender being a native, mestizo, or Chinese." As to crimes of this nature we
declined to hold that the mere fact that one is a native of the Philippine Islands, a mestizo or a Chinese would justify a claim that upon
conviction of crimes such as theft or robbery he should be treated more leniently than the members of any other race or people, no
sounds presumption arising from the mere racial affiliation of the convict that he was less or to resist the temptation to commit them
than are they.

Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground upon which the courts are authorized to mitigate the
prescribed penalties is not racial affiliation of the convict, but "the degree of instruction and education of the offender;" and while
mere ignorance or lack of education will not always be sufficient to justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as
theft and robbery, there can be no doubt that cases may and will arise wherein under all the "circumstances attending" the
commission of these offenses the exercise of a sound discretion will justify a more lenient treatment of an ignorant and semicivilized
offender, than that which should be accorded one who has the advantage of such a degree of instruction and education as would
justify the court in believing that he was capable of fully and properly understanding and appreciating the criminal character of the
offense committed by him.

We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 111 as amended by Act No. 2142, the courts may and should, even
in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration where it appears that under all the circumstances attending the commission of
the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of responsibility prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender.

The larceny of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2030. According
to those sections, as amended, the value of the animals stolen being 650 pesetas, a penalty one degree higher than arresto mayor in its
medium degree to presidio correccional in its minimum degree should have been imposed; in other words, presidio correccional in its
medium degree to presidio mayor in its minimum degree. Giving the convict the benefit of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal
Code, as amended, this penalty should be imposed in its minimum degree — that is to say, the penalty applicable in this case is that of
presidio correccional in its medium degree.

Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the defendant and appellant was convicted in the
minimum degree — that is to say, by, imposing upon the accused the penalty of two years four months and one day of presidio
correccional, in lieu of that of five years' imprisonment imposed by the court below — the judgment convicting and sentencing him
should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Page1
 C. RES INTER ALIOS ACTA

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y
CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.

ANTONIO, J.:

This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch VII, Pasay City
finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y
Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario Comayas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions
of law, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00, representing the value of the pieces of
jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.

With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law.

During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on August 16, 1970, and
the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed on August 29, 1974. This decision,
therefore, is limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla.

This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her bathroom inside
her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy
Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours
before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.

Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open, and
some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant
Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to
the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any
evidence implicating him in the crime.

During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet,
one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he
admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police
authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was written in the English
language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte;
Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one
"Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio
Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the
Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission
of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell
within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas
as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial
confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso
Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas,
and one John Doe."

When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not
guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The
recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio
Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A",
"A-1" to "A-6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt.
Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.

The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio Cudillan, the
latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the commission of the crime. According to
him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing."

Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the accused Melecio Cudillan with the other
suspects'?
Page1

A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.

 Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio Cudillan and other suspects whom do you refer to as
other suspects?

A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario. There was another person Eduardo Comayas. He was also one of
those suspects but Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his companion.

Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the Police Department of Pasay City as his
companions?

A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas.

Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three persons do?

A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966).

According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously and not merely
kept their silence."

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted to him that they took
part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.:

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon being asked, gave his name as Ramiro Alegre.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where?

A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other.

Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about?

A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also anticipated in the commission of the killing of Adelina Sajo.

Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less?

A. About the middle of June.

Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?

A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.

Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla, when did that take place, more or less?

A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June.

Q. What year?

A. 1967.

Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why do you know him?

A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other. Q. If he is inside the courtroom, will you please point him
out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario Comayas.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario Comayas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When was that, more or less?

A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June.

Page1

Q. And what did you talk about?

 A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he admitted to me that he was one of those who planned and killed Adelina Sajo.

Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any?

A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to by the door.

Q. How about the other accused Melencio Cudillan, do you know him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name as Melecio Cudillan.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan?

A. Because he is with me in one cell.

Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan?

A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case.

Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan, more or less?

A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the first week of June, 1967.

Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell you about this case?

ATTY. RAMIREZ:

Objection, Your Honor, leading.

COURT:

Witness may answer, there is already a basis.

A. That they were the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing of July 21, 1967).

However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of
compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus
Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in question. they were
attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote. According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the
Maravilla compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery at about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas
confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon when he returned to the bakery where he was employed to resume his work.

Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus, Urbano Villanueva
testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M. Consunji at the Sheraton Hotel construction;
that Ramiro Alegre began working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he knew this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project.
He Identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 o'clock in
the morning up to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at
Roxas Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the number of hours
he actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.

Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now deceased)
as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "Silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio
Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and credence to the
testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in the crime.

The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"), on the basis of which the
trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not
competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet" 1 there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. 2As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as
the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the
case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime
would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their
purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.

II

The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in the face of statements
of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their
Page1

part of their participation therein.

 The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as
evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. 5 It has also been held that while an accused is
under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may
not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona 7 held
that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, in
the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to
whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that
crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent, as
being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament. 8 Other courts have held that the circumstance that
one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a
person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he
chooses. 9

We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another
implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations,
cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence
drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-
incrimination.

The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of
great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in
man's struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to
subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating
statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." 10

In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals: 11

... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court;' it is mandatory;
it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice ...

Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court
as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the
tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.

It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the rights of an accused
person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn
to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the
right, when under investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights;
the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's
detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 12The
1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there
is this categorical mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence. 13

This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, now Chief justice, in
Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 thus:

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: 'The accused
has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt.' Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant 'to forego testimony, to
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.'

Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual explained that the privilege against
self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to its detriment."

We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in the face of
the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold,
further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the
remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the
judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in
the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they
strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.

WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan
and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which they are charged. Their immediate release from detention
is ordered, unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996

Page1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

 vs.

SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused.

SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:p

The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused Amado Ponce, guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito
Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, and the amount of P1,500.00 representing the value of the stolen
revolver. 1 The Raquel brothers now plead for their absolution in this appellate review.

In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for robbery with homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 16, 2 allegedly committed on July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of
Kabacan.

Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before he could give
his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. 3

The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of record and with page references to the
transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellee's brief:

At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor
in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged
at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988)

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man took her husband's gun and
left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)

She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)

George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7,
TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, March 21, 1988)

Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime
and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the
shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)

Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April 2, 1991) 4

Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which are presented in their brief in this
wise:

Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and
went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with
Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities
accompanied by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the name of
accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan.

On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same Barangay. Before July 4, he
entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2, 1991, pp. 2-20).

Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel told him that he was
going to Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission
to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to
his house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tungol where they arrested
his son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26).

T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry
Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty on July 4, 1986.
(TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-20). 5

On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly. 6

Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they were appealing the decision
to the Court of Appeals. 7 The lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. 8 In view of the
penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded the same to us. 9

Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and
Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.

We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein
appellants in, the crime charged.
Page1
 The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. In her testimony on direct
examination in court she declared as follows:

Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you see any when you pip (sic) at the window?

A; Yes, sir.

Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?

A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump and I saw again two (2) persons who were running away, sir.

Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and two (2) persons running away?

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person?

A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado Ponce when the Police arrived. 10(emphasis ours.)

On cross-examination she further testified:

Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you?

A: I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while going to our room.

Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and got the gun of your husband because he was
mask(ed), is that not right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your house and got this gun?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have got this gun inside?

FISCAL DIZON:

Already answered.

She was not able to identify, your Honor.

Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is that right?

A: Yes, sir. 11

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help and you saw two (2) person(s) running, is
that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right?

A: I saw them running sir going around.

Q: These two (2) persons were running going around?

A: They were running towards the road.

ATTY. DIVINO:

Going to the road.

Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road?

A: No, sir. 12 (Emphases supplied.)

Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito Gambalan. In fact, in
his sworn statement executed in the Investigation Section of the Kabacan Police Station on July 5, 1986, he declared that:

19Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing about 5 meters away from where you were then drinking, what have you
noticed about them, if you ever noticed any?

A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a maong jacket. The other one wore a hat locally
known as "kipis" meaning a hat made of cloth with leaves protruding above the forehead and seemed to be holding something which I
failed to recognize. The other one wore a shortpant with a somewhat white T-shirt with markings and there was a white T-shirt
covering his head and a part of his face as he was head-down during that time.

20Q: Did you recognized any of these men?

A: No. Because they walked fast. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)

A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was
Page1

based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier
stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
 The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are
repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial
statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. 14 That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged
plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused.
A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the
opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.
15

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that,
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are
his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by
the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him. 16

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, 17 those exceptions do not however apply to the
present case.

Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants
to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of
Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente, 18 was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no
person by the name of Danny Clemente. 19

Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of
the intelligence and investigation section of their police station:

Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on the process of investigation?

A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the information from him . . . And after that I checked the information that he
gave.

Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should be assisted by counsel?

A: What I know is if when a person is under investigation you have in mind to investigate as to against (sic) him, and you have to
inform his constitutional right but if the purpose is to interrogate him to acquire information which will lead to the identity of the other
accused we do not need to inform him.

Q: Don't you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit; the accused should be (re)presented by counsel that is the ruling of the
Supreme Court?

A: I do not know if it is actually the same as this case.

Q: But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his right?

A: No sir.

Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel.

A: No counsel, Sir. 20

Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be
considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of
counsel. 21 These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.

A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. 22 Without the positive identification of
appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
to them. 23 While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in substance
and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the
strength of its own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's evidence is weak. 24

It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the
accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral
certainty was neither met nor were the standards therefor fulfilled.

WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano
Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 158149 February 9, 2006

BOSTON BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, (formerly BANK OF COMMERCE), Petitioner,

vs.

PERLA P. MANALO and CARLOS MANALO, JR., Respondents.

DECISION
Page1

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

 Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47458 affirming,
on appeal, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98, in Civil Case No. Q-89-3905.

The Antecedents

The Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) was the owner of parcels of land in Quezon City, known as the Xavierville Estate Subdivision, with
an area of 42 hectares. XEI caused the subdivision of the property into residential lots, which was then offered for sale to individual lot
buyers.3

On September 8, 1967, XEI, through its General Manager, Antonio Ramos, as vendor, and The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM), as
vendee, executed a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" over some residential lots in the subdivision, including Lot 1, Block 2, with an area of
907.5 square meters, and Lot 2, Block 2, with an area of 832.80 square meters. The transaction was subject to the approval of the
Board of Directors of OBM, and was covered by real estate mortgages in favor of the Philippine National Bank as security for its
account amounting toP5,187,000.00, and the Central Bank of the Philippines as security for advances amounting to P22,185,193.74.4
Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM.5

Sometime in 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the services of Engr. Carlos Manalo, Jr. who was in business
of drilling deep water wells and installing pumps under the business name Hurricane Commercial, Inc. For P34,887.66, Manalo, Jr.
installed a water pump at Ramos’ residence at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. Manalo, Jr. then
proposed to XEI, through Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and offered as part of the downpayment the
P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated February 8, 1972, Ramos requested Manalo, Jr. to choose
which lots he wanted to buy so that the price of the lots and the terms of payment could be fixed and incorporated in the conditional
sale.6 Manalo, Jr. met with Ramos and informed him that he and his wife Perla had chosen Lots 1 and 2 of Block 2 with a total area of
1,740.3 square meters.

In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots. He also pegged the price of the
lots atP200.00 per square meter, or a total of P348,060.00, with a 20% down payment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00
less theP34,887.66 owing from Ramos, payable on or before December 31, 1972; the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would
then be signed on or before the same date, but if the selling operations of XEI resumed after December 31, 1972, the balance of the
downpayment would fall due then, and the spouses would sign the aforesaid contract within five (5) days from receipt of the notice of
resumption of such selling operations. It was also stated in the letter that, in the meantime, the spouses may introduce improvements
thereon subject to the rules and regulations imposed by XEI in the subdivision. Perla Manalo conformed to the letter agreement.7

The spouses Manalo took possession of the property on September 2, 1972, constructed a house thereon, and installed a fence
around the perimeter of the lots.

In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to pay their monthly installments until they were assured that they would be
issued Torrens titles over the lots they had purchased.8 The spouses Manalo were notified of the resumption of the selling operations
of XEI.9 However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment on the lots because Ramos failed to prepare a contract of
conditional sale and transmit the same to Manalo for their signature. On August 14, 1973, Perla Manalo went to the XEI office and
requested that the payment of the amount representing the balance of the downpayment be deferred, which, however, XEI rejected.
On August 10, 1973, XEI furnished her with a statement of their account as of July 31, 1973, showing that they had a balance of
P34,724.34 on the downpayment of the two lots after deducting the account of Ramos, plus P3,819.6810 interest thereon from
September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973, and that the interests on the unpaid balance of the purchase price of P278,448.00 from September
1, 1972 to July 31, 1973 amounted to P30,629.28.11 The spouses were informed that they were being billed for said unpaid
interests.12

On January 25, 1974, the spouses Manalo received another statement of account from XEI, inclusive of interests on the purchase
price of the lots.13 In a letter dated April 6, 1974 to XEI, Manalo, Jr. stated they had not yet received the notice of resumption of Lei’s
selling operations, and that there had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, they should not be charged with
interest on the balance of the downpayment on the property.14 Further, they demanded that a deed of conditional sale over the two
lots be transmitted to them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands. Consequently, the spouses refused to pay the
balance of the downpayment of the purchase price.15

Sometime in June 1976, Manalo, Jr. constructed a business sign in the sidewalk near his house. In a letter dated June 17, 1976,
XEI informed Manalo, Jr. that business signs were not allowed along the sidewalk. It demanded that he remove the same, on the
ground, among others, that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he had purchased on installment basis from XEI.16 Manalo, Jr.
did not respond. XEI reiterated its demand on September 15, 1977.17

Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM, including the receivables for lots already contracted and those yet
to be sold.18On December 8, 1977, OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up of a business sign is specifically prohibited by their
contract of conditional sale" and that his failure to comply with its demand would impel it to avail of the remedies as provided in their
contract of conditional sale.19

Meanwhile, on December 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-265822 over Lot 1, Block
2, and TCT No. T-265823 over Lot 2, Block 2, in favor of the OBM.20 The lien in favor of the Central Bank of the Philippines was
annotated at the dorsal portion of said title, which was later cancelled on August 4, 1980.21

Subsequently, the Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM wrote Edilberto Ng, the
president of Xavierville Homeowners Association that, as of January 31, 1983, Manalo, Jr. was one of the lot buyers in the
subdivision.22 CBM reiterated in its letter to Ng that, as of January 24, 1984, Manalo was a homeowner in the subdivision.23

In a letter dated August 5, 1986, the CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since it
(CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction.24 She agreed to have a conference meeting with
CBM officers where she informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the property. When asked
to prove her claim, she promised to send the documents to CBM. However, she failed to do so.25 On September 5, 1986, CBM
reiterated its demand that it be furnished with the documents promised,26 but Perla Manalo did not respond.
Page1

On July 27, 1987, CBM filed a complaint27 for unlawful detainer against the spouses with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 51618. CBM claimed that the spouses had been unlawfully occupying the property
without its consent and that despite its demands, they refused to vacate the property. The latter alleged that they, as vendors, and XEI,
as vendee, had a contract of sale over the lots which had not yet been rescinded.28

While the case was pending, the spouses Manalo wrote CBM to offer an amicable settlement, promising to abide by the
purchase price of the property (P313,172.34), per agreement with XEI, through Ramos. However, on July 28, 1988, CBM wrote the
spouses, through counsel, proposing that the price of P1,500.00 per square meter of the property was a reasonable starting point for
negotiation of the settlement.29The spouses rejected the counter proposal,30 emphasizing that they would abide by their original
agreement with XEI. CBM moved to withdraw its complaint31 because of the issues raised.32

In the meantime, the CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. After CBM filed its complaint against the spouses
Manalo, the latter filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City on October 31, 1989.

The plaintiffs alleged therein that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them
by the defendant’s remote predecessor-in-interest, as might be or stipulated in the contract of sale, but no contract was forthcoming;
they constructed their house worth P2,000,000.00 on the property in good faith; Manalo, Jr., informed the defendant, through its
counsel, on October 15, 1988 that he would abide by the terms and conditions of his original agreement with the defendant’s
predecessor-in-interest; during the hearing of the ejectment case on October 16, 1988, they offered to pay P313,172.34 representing
the balance on the purchase price of said lots; such tender of payment was rejected, so that the subject lots could be sold at
considerably higher prices to third parties.

Plaintiffs further alleged that upon payment of the P313,172.34, they were entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering the subject lots, sufficient in form and substance to transfer title thereto free and clear of any and all liens and
encumbrances of whatever kind and nature.33 The plaintiffs prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in their favor, to
wit:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing:

(a) The defendant should be ordered to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over subject lots in favor of the plaintiffs
after payment of the sum of P313,172.34, sufficient in form and substance to transfer to them titles thereto free and clear of any and
all liens and encumbrances of whatever kind or nature;

(b) The defendant should be held liable for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of P300,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively, for not promptly executing and delivering to plaintiff the necessary Contract of Sale, notwithstanding repeated demands
therefor and for having been constrained to engage the services of undersigned counsel for which they agreed to pay attorney’s fees in
the sum of P50,000.00 to enforce their rights in the premises and appearance fee of P500.00;

(c) And for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.34

In its Answer to the complaint, the defendant interposed the following affirmative defenses: (a) plaintiffs had no cause of action
against it because the August 22, 1972 letter agreement between XEI and the plaintiffs was not binding on it; and (b) "it had no record
of any contract to sell executed by it or its predecessor, or of any statement of accounts from its predecessors, or records of payments
of the plaintiffs or of any documents which entitled them to the possession of the lots."35 The defendant, likewise, interposed
counterclaims for damages and attorney’s fees and prayed for the eviction of the plaintiffs from the property.36

Meanwhile, in a letter dated January 25, 1993, plaintiffs, through counsel, proposed an amicable settlement of the case by
payingP942,648.70, representing the balance of the purchase price of the two lots based on the current market value.37 However, the
defendant rejected the same and insisted that for the smaller lot, they pay P4,500,000.00, the current market value of the property.38
The defendant insisted that it owned the property since there was no contract or agreement between it and the plaintiffs’ relative
thereto.

During the trial, the plaintiffs adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional Sale executed between XEI and Alberto
Soller;39Alfredo Aguila,40 and Dra. Elena Santos-Roque41 to prove that XEI continued selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent
of OBM after the latter had acquired the said lots.

For its part, defendant presented in evidence the letter dated August 22, 1972, where XEI proposed to sell the two lots subject to
two suspensive conditions: the payment of the balance of the downpayment of the property, and the execution of the corresponding
contract of conditional sale. Since plaintiffs failed to pay, OBM consequently refused to execute the corresponding contract of
conditional sale and forfeited the P34,877.66 downpayment for the two lots, but did not notify them of said forfeiture.42 It alleged
that OBM considered the lots unsold because the titles thereto bore no annotation that they had been sold under a contract of
conditional sale, and the plaintiffs were not notified of XEI’s resumption of its selling operations.

On May 2, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant –

(a) Ordering the latter to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 1 and 2, Block 2 of the Xavierville Estate
Subdivision after payment of the sum of P942,978.70 sufficient in form and substance to transfer to them titles thereto free from any
and all liens and encumbrances of whatever kind and nature.

(b) Ordering the defendant to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P150,000.00; and

(c) To pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.43

The trial court ruled that under the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the plaintiffs, the parties had a "complete
contract to sell" over the lots, and that they had already partially consummated the same. It declared that the failure of the defendant
to notify the plaintiffs of the resumption of its selling operations and to execute a deed of conditional sale did not prevent the
Page1

defendant’s obligation to convey titles to the lots from acquiring binding effect. Consequently, the plaintiffs had a cause of action to
compel the defendant to execute a deed of sale over the lots in their favor.
 Boston Bank appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that the lower court erred in (a) not concluding that the letter of XEI to the
spouses Manalo, was at most a mere contract to sell subject to suspensive conditions, i.e., the payment of the balance of the
downpayment on the property and the execution of a deed of conditional sale (which were not complied with); and (b) in awarding
moral and exemplary damages to the spouses Manalo despite the absence of testimony providing facts to justify such awards.44

On September 30, 2002, the CA rendered a decision affirming that of the RTC with modification. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that (a) the figure "P942,978.70" appearing [in] par. (a) of
the dispositive portion thereof is changed to "P313,172.34 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from September 1, 1972
until fully paid" and (b) the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.45

The appellate court sustained the ruling of the RTC that the appellant and the appellees had executed a Contract to Sell over the
two lots but declared that the balance of the purchase price of the property amounting to P278,448.00 was payable in fixed amounts,
inclusive of pre-computed interests, from delivery of the possession of the property to the appellees on a monthly basis for 120
months, based on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of other lot buyers.46 The CA also declared that, while XEI
must have resumed its selling operations before the end of 1972 and the downpayment on the property remained unpaid as of
December 31, 1972, absent a written notice of cancellation of the contract to sell from the bank or notarial demand therefor as
required by Republic Act No. 6552, the spouses had, at the very least, a 60-day grace period from January 1, 1973 within which to pay
the same.

Boston Bank filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision alleging that there was no perfected contract to sell the two
lots, as there was no agreement between XEI and the respondents on the manner of payment as well as the other terms and
conditions of the sale. It further averred that its claim for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lots in its Memorandum dated
February 28, 1994 filed before the trial court constituted a judicial demand for rescission that satisfied the requirements of the New
Civil Code. However, the appellate court denied the motion.

Boston Bank, now petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA rulings. It maintains that, as held
by the CA, the records do not reflect any schedule of payment of the 80% balance of the purchase price, or P278,448.00. Petitioner
insists that unless the parties had agreed on the manner of payment of the principal amount, including the other terms and conditions
of the contract, there would be no existing contract of sale or contract to sell.47 Petitioner avers that the letter agreement to
respondent spouses dated August 22, 1972 merely confirmed their reservation for the purchase of Lot Nos. 1 and 2, consisting of
1,740.3 square meters, more or less, at the price ofP200.00 per square meter (or P348,060.00), the amount of the downpayment
thereon and the application of the P34,887.00 due from Ramos as part of such downpayment.

Petitioner asserts that there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the terms and conditions relating to the payment of the
balance of the purchase price of the property (as agreed upon by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable
to the contract entered into between the petitioner and the respondents. It insists that such a ruling is contrary to law, as it is
tantamount to compelling the parties to agree to something that was not even discussed, thus, violating their freedom to contract.
Besides, the situation of the respondents cannot be equated with those of the other lot buyers, as, for one thing, the respondents
made a partial payment on the downpayment for the two lots even before the execution of any contract of conditional sale.

Petitioner posits that, even on the assumption that there was a perfected contract to sell between the parties, nevertheless, it
cannot be compelled to convey the property to the respondents because the latter failed to pay the balance of the downpayment of
the property, as well as the balance of 80% of the purchase price, thus resulting in the extinction of its obligation to convey title to the
lots to the respondents.

Another egregious error of the CA, petitioner avers, is the application of Republic Act No. 6552. It insists that such law applies
only to a perfected agreement or perfected contract to sell, not in this case where the downpayment on the purchase price of the
property was not completely paid, and no installment payments were made by the buyers.

Petitioner also faults the CA for declaring that petitioner failed to serve a notice on the respondents of cancellation or rescission
of the contract to sell, or notarial demand therefor. Petitioner insists that its August 5, 1986 letter requiring respondents to vacate the
property and its complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 51618 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court amounted to the requisite
demand for a rescission of the contract to sell. Moreover, the action of the respondents below was barred by laches because despite
demands, they failed to pay the balance of the purchase price of the lots (let alone the downpayment) for a considerable number of
years.

For their part, respondents assert that as long as there is a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract of sale as to the
price, the contract is valid despite the parties’ failure to agree on the manner of payment. In such a situation, the balance of the
purchase price would be payable on demand, conformably to Article 1169 of the New Civil Code. They insist that the law does not
require a party to agree on the manner of payment of the purchase price as a prerequisite to a valid contract to sell. The respondents
cite the ruling of this Court in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals48 to support their submission.

They argue that even if the manner and timeline for the payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property is an
essential requisite of a contract to sell, nevertheless, as shown by their letter agreement of August 22, 1972 with the OBM, through XEI
and the other letters to them, an agreement was reached as to the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price. They
point out that such letters referred to the terms of the terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the other lot
buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly installments (excluding the downpayment, but
inclusive of pre-computed interests). The respondents assert that XEI was a real estate broker and knew that the contracts involving
residential lots in the subdivision contained uniform terms as to the manner and timeline of the payment of the purchase price of said
lots.

Respondents further posit that the terms and conditions to be incorporated in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale"
Page1

to be executed by the parties would be the same as those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by lot buyers in the
subdivision. After all, they maintain, the contents of the corresponding contract of conditional sale referred to in the August 22, 1972
letter agreement envisaged those contained in the contracts of conditional sale that XEI and other lot buyers executed. Respondents
cite the ruling of this Court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Manila E.R.R. & L. Co.49

The respondents aver that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual, inappropriate in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They assert that petitioner adopted a theory in litigating the case in the trial court, but changed
the same on appeal before the CA, and again in this Court. They argue that the petitioner is estopped from adopting a new theory
contrary to those it had adopted in the trial and appellate courts. Moreover, the existence of a contract of conditional sale was
admitted in the letters of XEI and OBM. They aver that they became owners of the lots upon delivery to them by XEI.

The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the factual issues raised by the petitioner are proper; (2) whether
petitioner or its predecessors-in-interest, the XEI or the OBM, as seller, and the respondents, as buyers, forged a perfect contract to sell
over the property; (3) whether petitioner is estopped from contending that no such contract was forged by the parties; and (4)
whether respondents has a cause of action against the petitioner for specific performance.

The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The reason is that this
Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court,
as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions:

(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.50

We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the ruling of the appellate court dismissing petitioner’s appeal is
contrary to law and is not supported by evidence. A careful examination of the factual backdrop of the case, as well as the
antecedental proceedings constrains us to hold that petitioner is not barred from asserting that XEI or OBM, on one hand, and the
respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected contract to sell the subject lots.

It must be stressed that the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when there is plain error.51 Although a
factual issue was not raised in the trial court, such issue may still be considered and resolved by the Court in the interest of substantial
justice, if it finds that to do so is necessary to arrive at a just decision,52 or when an issue is closely related to an issue raised in the trial
court and the Court of Appeals and is necessary for a just and complete resolution of the case.53 When the trial court decides a case in
favor of a party on certain grounds, the Court may base its decision upon some other points, which the trial court or appellate court
ignored or erroneously decided in favor of a party.54

In this case, the issue of whether XEI had agreed to allow the respondents to pay the purchase price of the property was raised
by the parties. The trial court ruled that the parties had perfected a contract to sell, as against petitioner’s claim that no such contract
existed. However, in resolving the issue of whether the petitioner was obliged to sell the property to the respondents, while the CA
declared that XEI or OBM and the respondents failed to agree on the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the
property, it ruled that XEI and the respondents had forged a contract to sell; hence, petitioner is entitled to ventilate the issue before
this Court.

We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a perfected contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law, there must be an
agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the property sold, but also on the manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.

Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code, in a contract of sale, whether absolute or conditional, one of the contracting parties
obliges himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or
its equivalent. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and the price. From the averment of perfection, the parties are bound, not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated, but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.55 On
the other hand, when the contract of sale or to sell is not perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a
binding juridical relation between the parties.56

A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal or real property because it
seriously affects the rights and obligations of the parties. Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable
contract of sale. The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But a price fixed by one of the
contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected sale.57

It is not enough for the parties to agree on the price of the property. The parties must also agree on the manner of payment of
the price of the property to give rise to a binding and enforceable contract of sale or contract to sell. This is so because the agreement
as to the manner of payment goes into the price, such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to
agree on the price.58

In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree on the price as well as the amount of
downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the other
terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such payment cannot be
considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale between the parties. Indeed, this Court ruled in Velasco v.
Court of Appeals59 that:

It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the petitioners themselves admit that they and the respondent
still had to meet and agree on how and when the down-payment and the installment payments were to be paid. Such being the
situation, it cannot, therefore, be said that a definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had been perfected over the lot in
question. Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an
Page1

essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the petitioners delivered to
the respondent the sum of P10,000.00 as part of the downpayment that they had to pay cannot be considered as sufficient proof of
the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement between the parties herein under article 1482 of the New Civil Code, as the
petitioners themselves admit that some essential matter – the terms of payment – still had to be mutually covenanted.60

We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, as held by the CA, there is no showing, in the records, of the schedule of
payment of the balance of the purchase price on the property amounting to P278,448.00. We have meticulously reviewed the records,
including Ramos’ February 8, 1972 and August 22, 1972 letters to respondents,61 and find that said parties confined themselves to
agreeing on the price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20% downpayment of the purchase price (P69,612.00), and credited
respondents for the P34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of the 20% downpayment. The timeline for the payment of the balance of
the downpayment (P34,724.34) was also agreed upon, that is, on or before XEI resumed its selling operations, on or before December
31, 1972, or within five (5) days from written notice of such resumption of selling operations. The parties had also agreed to
incorporate all the terms and conditions relating to the sale, inclusive of the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price and
the other substantial terms and conditions in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale," to be later signed by the parties,
simultaneously with respondents’ settlement of the balance of the downpayment.

The February 8, 1972 letter of XEI reads:

Mr. Carlos T. Manalo, Jr.

Hurricane Rotary Well Drilling

Rizal Avenue Ext.,Caloocan City

Dear Mr. Manalo:

We agree with your verbal offer to exchange the proceeds of your contract with us to form as a down payment for a lot in our
Xavierville Estate Subdivision.

Please let us know your choice lot so that we can fix the price and terms of payment in our conditional sale.

Sincerely yours,

XAVIERVILLE ESTATE, INC.

(Signed)

EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR.

President

CONFORME:

(Signed)

CARLOS T. MANALO, JR.

Hurricane Rotary Well Drilling62

The August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the respondents reads:

Mrs. Perla P. Manalo

1548 Rizal Avenue Extensionbr>Caloocan City

Dear Mrs. Manalo:

This is to confirm your reservation of Lot Nos. 1 and 2; Block 2 of our consolidation-subdivision plan as amended, consisting of
1,740.3 square meters more or less, at the price of P200.00 per square meter or a total price of P348,060.00.

It is agreed that as soon as we resume selling operations, you must pay a down payment of 20% of the purchase price of the said
lots and sign the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale, on or before December 31, 1972, provided, however, that if we resume
selling after December 31, 1972, then you must pay the aforementioned down payment and sign the aforesaid contract within five (5)
days from your receipt of our notice of resumption of selling operations.

In the meanwhile, you may introduce such improvements on the said lots as you may desire, subject to the rules and regulations
of the subdivision.

If the above terms and conditions are acceptable to you, please signify your conformity by signing on the space herein below
provided.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

XAVIERVILLE ESTATE, INC. CONFORME:

By:

(Signed)

EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR. (Signed)

PERLA P. MANALO
Page1

President Buyer63
 Based on these two letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 had yet to be agreed upon on or
before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the parties sign the corresponding contract of conditional sale.

Jurisprudence is that if a material element of a contemplated contract is left for future negotiations, the same is too indefinite to
be enforceable.64 And when an essential element of a contract is reserved for future agreement of the parties, no legal obligation
arises until such future agreement is concluded.65

So long as an essential element entering into the proposed obligation of either of the parties remains to be determined by an
agreement which they are to make, the contract is incomplete and unenforceable.66 The reason is that such a contract is lacking in the
necessary qualities of definiteness, certainty and mutuality.67

There is no evidence on record to prove that XEI or OBM and the respondents had agreed, after December 31, 1972, on the
terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property and the other substantial terms and conditions relative to the
sale. Indeed, the parties are in agreement that there had been no contract of conditional sale ever executed by XEI, OBM or petitioner,
as vendor, and the respondents, as vendees.68

The ruling of this Court in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals has no bearing in this case because the issue of the manner of
payment of the purchase price of the property was not raised therein.

We reject the submission of respondents that they and Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms of payment contained in
the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale," which
would later be signed by them.69 We have meticulously reviewed the respondents’ complaint and find no such allegation therein.70
Indeed, respondents merely alleged in their complaint that they were bound to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property
"in installments." When respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was never asked, on direct examination or even on cross-examination,
whether the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI
and other lot buyers would form part of the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" to be signed by them simultaneously with the
payment of the balance of the downpayment on the purchase price.

We note that, in its letter to the respondents dated June 17, 1976, or almost three years from the execution by the parties of
their August 22, 1972 letter agreement, XEI stated, in part, that respondents had purchased the property "on installment basis."71
However, in the said letter, XEI failed to state a specific amount for each installment, and whether such payments were to be made
monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also, respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that they
were obliged to pay the P278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or annually. The allegation that the payment of the P278,448.00 was to
be paid in installments is, thus, vague and indefinite. Case law is that, for a contract to be enforceable, its terms must be certain and
explicit, not vague or indefinite.72

There is no factual and legal basis for the CA ruling that, based on the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of
the lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and the other lot buyers, respondents were obliged to pay the
P278,448.00 with pre-computed interest of 12% per annum in 120-month installments. As gleaned from the ruling of the appellate
court, it failed to justify its use of the terms of payment under the three "contracts of conditional sale" as basis for such ruling, to wit:

On the other hand, the records do not disclose the schedule of payment of the purchase price, net of the downpayment.
Considering, however, the Contracts of Conditional Sale (Exhs. "N," "O" and "P") entered into by XEI with other lot buyers, it would
appear that the subdivision lots sold by XEI, under contracts to sell, were payable in 120 equal monthly installments (exclusive of the
downpayment but including pre-computed interests) commencing on delivery of the lot to the buyer.73

By its ruling, the CA unilaterally supplied an essential element to the letter agreement of XEI and the respondents. Courts should
not undertake to make a contract for the parties, nor can it enforce one, the terms of which are in doubt.74 Indeed, the Court
emphasized in Chua v. Court of Appeals75 that it is not the province of a court to alter a contract by construction or to make a new
contract for the parties; its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one which they have made for themselves, without regard to
its wisdom or folly, as the court cannot supply material stipulations or read into contract words which it does not contain.

Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 to be
incorporated in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" were those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by
XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque.76 They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this Court.

The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or
180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment of theP278,448.00.

Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of
conduct or the intent of the parties.

Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did
or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of
conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts
with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of
the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot
buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove
usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price
of said lots in 120 months. It further failed to prive that the trial court admitted the said deeds77 as part of the testimony of
respondent Manalo, Jr.78

Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must contend with the caveat that,
Page1

before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and
frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-
automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The
examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic
conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of
prejudice and confusion.

In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of sampling
and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances.79 It is
only when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct
that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations.80

There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a particular trade or market or profession.
As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the United States Supreme Court: "Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will
someday become fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds which have taken form and shape from life."81 Usage furnishes a standard
for the measurement of many of the rights and acts of men.82 It is also well-settled that parties who contract on a subject matter
concerning which known usage prevail, incorporate such usage by implication into their agreement, if nothing is said to be contrary.83

However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove usage, habit or pattern of
conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right
to pay the P278,448.00 in 120 months, presumably because of respondents’ belief that the manner of payment of the said amount is
not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including
lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by them in the form of service, had executed contracts of
conditional sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by
XEI and three lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the purchase price to
two of them, but granted one 180 months to do so.84There is no evidence on record that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two
or more lots.

Irrefragably, under Article 1469 of the New Civil Code, the price of the property sold may be considered certain if it be so with
reference to another thing certain. It is sufficient if it can be determined by the stipulations of the contract made by the parties
thereto85 or by reference to an agreement incorporated in the contract of sale or contract to sell or if it is capable of being ascertained
with certainty in said contract;86or if the contract contains express or implied provisions by which it may be rendered certain;87 or if it
provides some method or criterion by which it can be definitely ascertained.88 As this Court held in Villaraza v. Court of Appeals,89 the
price is considered certain if, by its terms, the contract furnishes a basis or measure for ascertaining the amount agreed upon.

We have carefully reviewed the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of the parties and find no direct or implied reference to the
manner and schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the lots covered by the deeds of conditional sale executed by
XEI and that of the other lot buyers90 as basis for or mode of determination of the schedule of the payment by the respondents of the
P278,448.00.

The ruling of this Court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company91 is not applicable in this case
because the basic price fixed in the contract was P9.45 per long ton, but it was stipulated that the price was subject to modification "in
proportion to variations in calories and ash content, and not otherwise." In this case, the parties did not fix in their letters-agreement,
any method or mode of determining the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property amounting to
P278,448.00.

It bears stressing that the respondents failed and refused to pay the balance of the downpayment and of the purchase price of
the property amounting to P278,448.00 despite notice to them of the resumption by XEI of its selling operations. The respondents
enjoyed possession of the property without paying a centavo. On the other hand, XEI and OBM failed and refused to transmit a
contract of conditional sale to the respondents. The respondents could have at least consigned the balance of the downpayment after
notice of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI and filed an action to compel XEI or OBM to transmit to them the said
contract; however, they failed to do so.

As a consequence, respondents and XEI (or OBM for that matter) failed to forge a perfected contract to sell the two lots; hence,
respondents have no cause of action for specific performance against petitioner. Republic Act No. 6552 applies only to a perfected
contract to sell and not to a contract with no binding and enforceable effect.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47458 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98 is ordered to dismiss the complaint. Costs against the
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37398 June 28, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROSARIO CABRERA and CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendants, CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero
for plaintiff-appellee.

Jesus E. Mendoza & Raul M. Aviso for defendant-appellant.

BARREDO, J.:p
Page1

Appeal from the judgment of conviction of Robbery-Hold-up with Homicide of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, in
its Criminal Case No. O423-V, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc
guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime as charged in the information and hereby sentence each of them to life imprisonment; to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00; and also jointly and severally to pay the
amount of P8,000.00, the cost of the jeep stolen; and the further amount of P30,000.00 representing actual, moral and exemplary
damages; to suffer all the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs.

Accused shall be entitled to full credit for the preventive imprisonment they have already undergone in accordance with Rep. Act
6127.

SO ORDERED.

Accused Rosario Cabrera did not appeal. Only defendant Conrado Villanueva's appeal is before Us.

Accused Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva were charged in an information reading:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc of
the crime of robbery holdup with homicide, penalized under the provisions of Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1972, in the municipality of Valenzuela, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado Villanueva y Santos alias
Cadoc, with John Doe alias Ben and Peter Doe alias Abay, who are still at large, armed with knives or ice picks, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, holdup, take, rob and carry away with them a jeep with plate number 84-26 S'71, Bulacan,
being driven by Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and owned by one Reynaldo Santos, Jr., with a value of P8,000.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the said amount of P8,000.00; that during the commission of this crime, and on the occasion thereof, the
said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie and stab several times with
the said knives or ice picks the said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and thereafter was abandoned, thereby inflicting upon the said Luis dela
Cruz y de Jesus stabbed wounds which caused his death after a few days of confinement in the hospital.

Contrary to law.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are briefly stated in the brief of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza assisted by Assistant
Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero as follows:

At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan, while on a patrol duty
received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to proceed immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to
investigate an abandoned person who was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds (pp. 12-13, tsn., May 11,
1972).

This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz (pp. 6-7, tsn., May 11, 1972). He gave an ante mortem
statement (Exhibit A; p. 11, tsn., May 11, 1972). In the ante-mortem statement the deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the
person who hired his jeep (Exhibit A) but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his money and jeep (pp.
11-72, tsn., May 11, 1972; Exhibit A).

In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police (p. 18, tsn., May 18, 1972). On January
20, 1972 she executed an extra-judicial confession (Exhibit B, to B-3, inclusive). In the said extra-judicial confession she pointed to
appellant Conrado Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the
robbery and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant and his two unidentified companions (Ibid).

Lt. Carlos Palomares of the Valenzuela Police Department who took the extra-judicial confession of defendant Rosario Cabrera
testified to identify and to read the contents of the said extra-judicial confession (pp. 3-37, tsn., May 18, 1972). Dr. Ernesto G, Brion of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) testified regarding the post-mortem examination conducted on the body of the deceased
(pp. 310, tsn., September 7, 1972). Reynaldo Santos Jr. testified on the ownership and value of the jeep stolen (pp. 4-14, tsn., June 9,
1972). Alejandro de la Cruz testified on the expenses and damages suffered by the family of the deceased (pp. 15-27, tsn., June 9,
1972) on account of the deceased's untimely death. Dante Marcelo testified that in the early evening before the robbery took place he
saw defendant Rosario Cabrera riding on the jeep of the deceased (pp. 29-41, tsn., June 9, 1972) but did not notice whether there were
other passengers (p. 33, tsn., June 9, 1972).

Defendant Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva did not take the witness stand. Neither did they present any
evidence. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution together with their respective cross-examination and objections to
some of the exhibits, particularly appellants objection to the admission of Exhibits B to B-3 (defendant Cabrera's extra-judicial
confession) insofar as he was concerned, the case was considered submitted for decision." (Pp. 2-4, Brief for the Appellee)

xxx xxx xxx

The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Villanueva was the extra-judicial confession of his
co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the continuing objection of appellant's counsel (p. 10, tsn., May 18,
1972). Appellant reiterated his objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in evidence (p. 12, tsn., September
7, 1972)." (Id.)

In their prayer, counsel for the People, joining appellant's counsel, ask for the reversal of appellant's conviction and his acquittal.

After carefully going over the record and minutely reviewing the evidence, We are fully convinced that the prayer for acquittal is
in order.

The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and perpetrator, together with two
persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased Luis dela Cruz and the taking of the jeep he was driving. But
said statement is obviously inadmissible against appellant, who made timely objection thereto.
Page1

There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation conducted by the
Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question. For this reason alone, that is, that said
statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy
had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorities, Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said
provision reads:

Admission by conspirator.— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

There being no other evidence against appellant, We have no alternative but to reverse the judgment appealed from and to
acquit him, as prayed for by his counsel as well as counsel for the People.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, appellant Conrado Villanueva is acquitted, and his
immediate release from confinement is ordered, unless he is lawfully held for another case, with costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO
PANGANIBAN, respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and
another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case
No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the
prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning
one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-
judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore
incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an
altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following remarks were made:

FISCAL LUSTRE:

May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as against the accused
Consunji himself?

COURT:

That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first
conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9

The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion was denied.
Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of the
lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's
evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and
voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged,
may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-
accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by
other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43
Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that:

The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises("during its
existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to
an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil.,
985).

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence
against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the
presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. For all
Page1

we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their
confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in
question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of
conspiracy.

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection
interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issuedmotu proprio. Panganiban's
counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay
as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be
admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite
acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that
the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made,
the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil.,
1).

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions of two or
more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the confessions in essential details.
After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that
the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and
admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant
evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court
should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil.,
807, 816-817:

In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts
where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful
objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is
impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court
may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover,
it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in
judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the
error without returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the
admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result
in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case,
to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the
Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside
and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this opinion. Costs against respondents Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ.,concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19590 April 25, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA, VICTORIO ALVAREZ, DIONISIO CARASIG, and JOHN DOES, accused,

CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA and VICTOR ALVAREZ, appellants.

Jose L. Uy and Associates and Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

ANGELES, J.:

At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of July 15, 1959, the lifeless body of Hector Crisostomo, then an officer of the Presidential
Fact Finding Committee charged with the apprehension of dollar smugglers, was found in his Borgward sedan car at Lias Road, Marilao,
Bulacan.

Upon the advice of the NBI medico-legal officer, the cadaver was brought to Funeraria Quiogue, Manila, for autopsy.
Examination of the corpse revealed that the deceased suffered three gunshot wounds on the head: One, at the right temple, at a point
above the external auditory meatus right, the entrance wound directed from right to left; another, at the pre-auricular region left,
above the external auditory meatus left, directed from left to right; and the last, at the temporal region, scalp, left, at a point on the
above left external auditory meatus, directed from left to right. The cause of death was shock, severe, secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds on the head.
Page1

In the course of the investigation to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime, Capt. Dionisio Carasig, also a member of the
Presidential Fact Finding Committee working with the deceased, intimated to the PC authorities that the recent car deal of Crisostomo
with Victorio Alvarez may possibly have some connection with the killing. With that clue, an intensive investigation was pursued by the
police agencies, the Bulacan PC, the Marilao police, and the NBI agents joining hands together. Fingerprint experts and photographers
of the NBI examined the car where the body of the victim was found, but no clear fingerprints could be detected. Upon an inspection
of the car, some specimen evidence were found, such as, one (1) cartridge case caliber .25; one (1) unfired bullet, caliber .25; one (1)
slug, caliber .25; two (2) metal jacketed bullets retrieved from the head of the victim, caliber .25; and a bag.

Upon an examination of the bag, the investigators found a Philippine Trust Co.'s check in the amount of P1,000.00, drawn by
Victoria Alvarez in favor of Crisostomo, together with a receipt signed by the deceased acknowledging payment by Alvarez in the
amount stated in the check, with a further statement of an unpaid balance of P24,500.00.

Suspecting that Alvarez may have something to do with the killing, the authorities picked him up for questioning. Alvarez was
taken to the Criminal Investigation Section of the PC for fingerprinting and paraffin test for gun powder residue. The result of the test,
as contained in the report of Crispin Garcia, chief chemistry section of the PC, showed the presence of gun powder residue on both
hands of Alvarez.

On August 4, 1959, a complaint for murder was filed by Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC before the Justice of the Peace Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, against Victorio Alvarez and two John Does. The victim named in the complaint was Hector Crisostomo.

Victoria Alvarez was arrested on August 19, 1959. Immediately after his arrest, Alvarez was investigated. He made a tape-
recorded statement before Lt. Bautista and Major Santiago of the CIS at Camp Crame, admitting that he alone shot and killed
Crisostomo near Manga Avenue, Manila. (Vide question 68, Exhibit L, statement of Alvarez, August 21, 1959.)

On August 20, 1959, Alvarez executed a handwritten statement in narrative form before the CIS in the office of the PC Alabang
headquarters (Exhibit G). In this statement, he affirmed that a certain Johnny was the one who shot and killed Crisostomo in Marilao,
Bulacan. On the same day, Alvarez made another statement in the form of questions and answers repeating substantially the facts
contained in his handwritten statement. (Exhibit F.)

Still on the next day, August 21, 1959, Alvarez executed another statement before Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC (Exhibit L),
wherein Alvarez again admitted that he was the only one who shot and killed Crisostomo at barrio Lias, Marilao, Bulacan. In this
statement, Alvarez gave a detailed narration of the participation of George Chua in the commission of the crime, as follows: "At around
8:00 o'clock P.M. (July 14), the Borgward sedan car driven by Capt. Crisostomo was approaching our car within a distance enough to
call his attention. Johnny extended his arm and called Capt. Crisostomo. Capt. Crisostomo's attention was attracted and he cut in and
parked his car in front of the Olds mobile where we were riding. When his car was properly parked, Capt. Carasig and George Chua
approached Capt. Crisostomo, and finally they got in; Capt. Carasig first then followed by George Chua. After a few minutes
conversation, the car driven by Capt. Crisostomo with Capt. Carasig and George in it, left and we followed. They passed Taft Avenue
towards Isaac Peral to Otis, turned left towards Nagtahan bridge, turned right to Santa Mesa Boulevard, turned left to Santol, turned
left to Pararle St., turned left to Benito St." . . . and then we proceeded "towards Bulacan."

Q. — Were you constantly following the car of Capt. Crisostomo?

A. — Yes, sir,. . . .

Q. — Where in Bulacan did you go?

A. — Approximately one hundred meters before the road junction leading to Marilao poblacion where we stopped.

Q. — What happened then?

A. — Upon arrival there at approximately 10:00 p.m., the Oldsmobile stopped at the back of the white sedan. Then we all
alighted from the Oldsmobile and transferred to the white sedan. Our position inside the white sedan is that beside Capt. Crisostomo
who was on the wheel was George Chua. Behind George Chua, Capt. Carasig, behind the seat at the back extreme right, next to the left
at center is me and to my left is Johnny.

Q. — What did you talked about?

A. — George Chua started the talking by telling Capt. Crisostomo to please turn over the documents to them (documents
consisting of names of persons connected with the dollar syndicate, the modus operandi and activities) and then followed discussion,
Chua telling Crisostomo to turn over to us the papers and forget everything, then Capt. Crisostomo replied, I told you that I do not have
time to discuss that matter, and then Capt. Carasig said, Capt. we are business partners, and I am engaged in this business too, for my
sake, turn over the paper to them or to me, that will save the government from exposing the whole activities, then Capt. Crisostomo
replied it is too late already, I have no time to discuss the matter; then George Chua drew his revolver. When we saw George Chua
drew his revolver, we did the same thing. . . .

Q. — What happened next?

A. — When Capt. Crisostomo saw us drew our guns, he showed a sign of fighting back. George Chua gave a signal and I fired a
shot at Capt. Crisostomo on his right temple, then Capt. Crisostomo showed a sign of fighting back so Johnny held the left shoulder of
Capt. Crisostomo while Capt. Carasig held his right shoulder, then I fired again, hitting him at the back of the head, George Chua after
the first shot, opened the door and went out and then I fired the third shot on his left temple and Capt. Crisostomo snapped dead. . . .

Alvarez further declared that he was trusted by George Chua and was chosen to be the trigger-man; that Chua promised to pay
him P35,000.00 plus P400.00 a month for killing Crisostomo; that Chua was engaged in the business of dollar smuggling.

On September 1, 1959, the complaint was amended by including Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and Lim Bun Ping @ Johnny
Yao, together with Victorio Alvarez and two John Does.

On the basis of Alvarez' confessions, and with him as guide, the CIS agents proceeded to Chua's residence at 1834 M.H. del Pilar,
Malate, Manila. Upon arrival at the house, they were received by Chua's wife. Inquiring for Chua, the CIS agents were told by the wife
that her husband was not at home.
Page1

In the evening of August 24, 1959, George Chua, accompanied by his lawyer, Jose Uy, surrendered to General Isagani Campo of
the PC at the D & E restaurant in Quezon City, in the presence of newspaper reporters and photographers. Immediately thereafter,
George Chua was taken to Camp Crame and was investigated by Capt. Yapdiangco and other CIS agents for three hours, after which he
was allowed to sleep. The next day, August 25, 1959, Chua was again investigated by the CIS agents. The investigation was reduced to
writing. Believing that Chua was not telling the truth, because he would not admit participation in the crime, the investigator destroyed
the statements. To quote from Capt. Yapdiangco's testimony:

Q. — Will you please tell the court from what time George Chua was interrogated on August 24, 1959?

A. — Well, as far as I remember, from that time when General Campo turned over to us Mr. Chua, he was interviewed by us for
about three hours. After that, we allowed him to sleep. We also slept. But the following morning the 25th, naturally, we had to
interview him again.

Q. — During those interviews that you have made as well as your companions on August 24 and 25, did you attempt to make it
in writing?

A. — Well, there was an attempt to put it in writing, but it was destroyed.

Q. — Will you tell us the reason why you have to discontinue the written interrogation?

A. — Because what he was telling us we believe it was not true. (tsn pp. 34-35, Vol. 22).

In spite of knowledge on the part of Capt. Yapdiangco that a complaint against George Chua had already been filed in court,
nevertheless, in view of the insistent denial by Chua of any participation in the crime, at about midnight on August 26, 1959, Capt.
Yapdiangco brought him to the PC headquarters in Alabang, Rizal, where he was investigated in the presence of several CIS agents.
Chua made a written statement (Exhibit R). In his confession, Chua stated the following: That he ordered the killing of Capt.
Crisostomo; that the plot to kill Crisostomo was hatched up in his house at 1834 M. H. del Pilar, Malate, Manila, on July 13, 1959, in the
presence of Lim Bon Pin @ Johnny Yao and Victorio Alvarez; that he (Chua) and Johnny hired Alvarez to kill Crisostomo for P35,000.00
because his partners in Hongkong, Yao Chiong and Tay Seng got angry at him, because the $132,000.00 entrusted to a lady who was
leaving for Hongkong, was confiscated by the local authorities at the airport between June 15 and 25, 1959; that his partner, Yao Chung
who was in Hongkong called him through overseas telephone on June 29, 1959, at eleven o'clock in the morning, and told him to do
something for him and to finish Capt. Crisostomo; that Capt. Crisostomo was killed on July 14, 1959, at about ten o'clock at Marilao,
Bulacan, and that Victorio Alvarez killed him with a .25 caliber pistol by shooting him on the head two times; that when Capt.
Crisostomo was driving his car, Alvarez was seated at the rear, and a Filipino whose name he does not know, was seated on the front
seat beside Crisostomo when Alvarez shot Crisostomo; that after Capt. Crisostomo was shot by Alvarez, the latter drove the small car
to barrio Lias, Marilao, Bulacan, turning right, while he (Chua) in another car, drove the Filipino further away and dropped him at a
bridge, and he (Chua) returned to pick up Alvarez, and both of them returned to Manila in the Oldsmobile car; that upon reaching
Manila, Alvarez was dropped at the Quezon Bridge where Alvarez threw his pistol, caliber .25, and he (Chua) returned to his house;
that he (Chua) actually gave the amount of P35,000.00 to Johnny in his house, but does not know whether Johnny gave the money to
Alvarez.

On August 28, 1959, while George Chua was detained in the provincial jail of Bulacan, he asked the warden to summon the
provincial fiscal of Bulacan, because he wanted to give a statement. The assistant provincial fiscal, Pascual K. Kiliathko, interviewed
George Chua in the provincial jail on August 29, 1959. The interview was reduced to writing in the form of questions and answers
(Exhibit VVV) the pertinent portions of which are the following:

Q. — I understand from you that you sent for me?

A. — Yes, sir.

Q. — Are you ready to give the statement voluntarily and willingly?

A. — Yes, sir.

Q. — Now, Mr. George Chua, will you please state your name and other personal circumstances?

A. — (Witness does so, and said) because I am accused of murder.

Q. — What is this murder charge that you have just stated?

A. — I was implicated by Alvarez to be one of those responsible for the killing of Crisostomo.

Q. — Now Mr. Chua, what is it that you would like to state, you stated that you sent for me to give a statement, what is that
statement you would like to give?

A. — Because I want to report to you that I was maltreated by the CIS agents and forced to sign a statement.

Q. — You stated that you were maltreated before, how were you maltreated?

A. — First I was taken to the 5th PC Co. at 12:00 o'clock midnight at Alabang, Rizal, on August 25, 1959, and there I was
handcuffed, but before I was handcuffed, I was ordered to take off my clothes and then I was handcuffed again and blindfolded me by
wrapping a towel all around my face and my head and some of the agents turned my head seven or eight times.

Q. — Now, is there something more that you still like to disclose before I ask you to sign this statement?

A. — Yes, sir, I want to inform you that they also applied electric shock to my body and while doing so, they forced me to answer
the way they designed, two hours later they forced me to lie down on the ground, then a stout agent sat on my stomach and another
agent sat on my legs, and then I almost lost consciousness.

On March 24, 1960, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for murder against Victorio Alvarez, Dionisio Carasig, Chaw
Yaw Shun @ George Chua and two John Does, alleging that said accused, acting in conspiracy, with the attendant qualifying and
generic aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, use of motor vehicle, nocturnity
Page1

and by a band, killed Hector Crisostomo.

Upon arraignment, Victorio Alvarez, Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and Dionisio Carasig entered a plea of not guilty.
 After a trial, Dionisio Carasig was acquity on reasonable doubt; Victorio Alvarez and Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua were found
guilty of the offense as charged and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Hector Crisostomo in the sum of
P6,000.00, and to pay the proportionate costs. Both appealed from the decision.

On September 6, 1962, Alvarez filed a motion to withdraw his appeal which he reiterated in another motion on October 1, 1962.
On October 24, 1962, Alvarez' motion was granted.

The case before Us concerns the appeal of George Chua.

The evidence relied upon by the Solicitor General in sustaining the conviction of the appellant, as cited in the brief are:

The several confessions of Alvarez, which are self-contradicting and the confession of the appellant; testimonial evidence that
Capt. Yapdiangco and other CIS agents went to the house of Chua, and not finding him there, they told the wife of Chua that they were
looking for her husband; that on the next day, Capt. Yapdiangco secured a warrant to search the house of Chua, and they found "a
calling card of Victorio Alvarez and a sort of a telephone directory index marked exhibits H and H-1"; that Alvarez made a re-enactment
of the crime; that George Chua, accompanied by his lawyer, surrendered to General Isagani Campo; that during the investigation of
Chua, "Capt. Calderon asked Chua why he was implicated by Victorio Alvarez. At first he denied any participation in the killing of Capt.
Crisostomo. But when Alvarez was brought before him, the former told him, 'George I have already confessed the truth. Do not tell a
lie. Please tell the truth, George.' At this instance, Chua countered: 'I did not kill him. You killed him.' Alvarez told him again: 'Now, tell
the truth.' Chua, however, kept silent." (The foregoing incident testified to by CIS agents, does not appear in any signed statement of
Chua, although it is claimed that the confrontation had taken place during Chua's interrogation by the CIS agents, and neither does it
appear in any of the several statements of Alvarez); that "early in the morning on August 26, 1959, Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco brought
George Chua to Alabang PC headquarters for the purpose of taking down his statement. The reason of Capt. Yapdiangco in
investigating Chua in Alabang instead of at Camp Crame was explained by him thus:

. . . Your Honor, the reason why the investigation of George Chua whose true name is Chaw Yaw Shun was made at Alabang is
that there were so many newspapermen in the CIS building and it seems to confuse us in our manner of investigation, even now and
then, they interfere, thus obstructing our investigation, so we made it a point to bring Mr. Chua to Alabang so that more or less, we will
be in a position to investigate him thoroughly.;

that "After their arrival at Alabang, Capt. Yapdiangco in the presence of Agent Ricardo Chavez and some other agents, personally
investigated George Chua. According to Capt. Yapdiangco, Chua voluntarily submitted himself to the investigation and agreed that his
confession be made in writing." (Then follows the quoted confession of Chua.)

There is no evidence, oral or documentary, adduced by the prosecution, other than the several confessions of Alvarez, the
confession of Chua, and the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, that would tend to prove any overt act of Chua indicating some connection
between him and the other accused establishing a common criminal design to commit the crime.

With regard to Arturo Cayetano, this witness declared that between 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock in the evening of July 14, 1959, he saw
an Oldsmobile car parked at the corner of Isaac Peral and Florida streets, Manila, while he was at the opposite side of the street under
a waiting shed; that after a while, he was attracted by one of the occupants of the Oldsmobile car who was waving his hand in the act
of stopping another car coming from behind; that the latter car stopped and parked in front of the former car; that later on, he saw
two persons, whom he identified in court as Dionisio Carasig and George Chua, approach the car that had just stopped, board it, and
then the car left and moved away towards Taft Avenue, Manila.

The weakness of the testimony is apparent from the failure of the witness to identify the driver or occupant of the car into which
Carasig and Chua entered. In the brief of the appellee, no reference whatsoever is made to the testimony of Cayetano, for the obvious
reason that it is irrelevant and immaterial, as it would not in any way connect the appellant with the commission of the crime
committed in Marilao, Bulacan, about which fact there is not a scintilla of evidence showing that the appellant was ever seen thereat
on the night of July 14, 1959.

At the trial, George Chua repudiated his confession and denied any participation in the commission of the crime. With reference
to his confession, he declared thus: "When he was investigated by the CIS agents at Alabang PC headquarters on August 26, 1959, his
eyes were 'tied' (blindfolded) with a wet towel for about six (6) hours and the bandage was removed only at around 6:30 to 7:00
o'clock in the morning of said date, but he cannot remember who tied his eyes; that some agents used electric shock on his body for
two (2) hours simultaneously on his left upper back, left ear and knees; that the wire connected to his body is cranked; that he was
forced to lie down after which an agent sat on his stomach and another sat on his leg; that he was ordered to undress, and remove his
shoes and socks, then they applied the electric shock; that he signed his confession under threat, the agents telling him that if he did
not sign the statement, he will be killed and his body will be thrown away; that nobody read to him the written statement; that he was
not allowed to read his confession, and to save his life, he just signed it.

Corroborating appellant's claim of maltreatment, Dr. Jose Eustaquio, a private physician, declared that when he examined Chua
on August 26, 1959, at the instance of the latter's lawyer, he noticed some contusion on his left upper back, at the nape of the neck,
and in the middle term called linear abrasions also in the left upper back. His finding, however, was not put in writing. Dr. Eustaquio
examined Chua for the second time on August 27, 1959, and this time he put his findings in writing (Exh. 19-Chua, Vol. 1). Being asked
about the meaning of "multiple scratches likeline" mentioned in his medical certificate, he said, it means linear abrasions, the cause of
which he could not determine. When he was pressed to explain the contents of his certificate, he said these scratches could have been
cause by wires, rough stones, pointed objects or similar instruments applied by other persons; that the "reddish discoloration of the
nape of the neck" which is a "contusion" may have been caused by so called trauma or in common parlance, a blow that may cause
injury either by fist or objects; that the "reddish discoloration at the left upper back which is medial of shoulder blade" is the same as
the injury on the neck which may have been caused by any kind of object, such as fist or hand blow; that the "pinhead spot on the left
leg and multiple scratches likeline", could have been caused by a pointed object applied to the skin, but he does not know whether
electrical shocking apparatus introduced in the body could have produced the same. (tsn, pp. 149-195, Vol. 1)

In this appeal, the appellant assails the admission of his confession, contending that it is not admissible, because it was obtained
thru force, threat and intimidation.
Page1

In passing upon the weight and admissibility of a confession, the court may take into consideration the circumstances and
conditions under which it was obtained (People vs. Lauas, 58 Phil. 742), and may consider claims that a statement was taken in
circumstances which violate the standard of voluntariness — a standard grounded in the policies of privileged self-incrimination. (Davis
vs. State of North Carolina, 16 L. ed. 86.)

As narrated hereinabove, immediately upon Chua's surrender on August 24, 1959, Capt. Yapdiangco and several CIS agents
interrogated him for three hours. The next morning, August 25, 1959, Chua was again interrogated. The interrogation were reduced to
writing. But, because Chua would not admit his guilt, the investigators considered him a liar, and so they destroyed his written
statement. Persisting in their attempt to obtain a confession, at midnight on August 26, 1959, Chua was brought to Alabang, Rizal,
within the jurisdiction of the 3rd PC zone, for investigation, instead of taking him to the 1st PC zone in Bulacan where the crime was
committed. According to Capt. Yapdiangco, George Chua voluntarily submitted himself to an investigation and agreed that his
confession be made in writing. To quote from appellee's brief, p. 17:

After their arrival at Alabang, Capt. Yapdiangco, in the presence of agents Ricardo Chavez and other agents, . . . Chua voluntarily
submitted himself to the investigation and agreed that his confession be made in writing.

In the light of the foregoing testimony of Capt. Yapdiangco, it is food for thought to ask: What made Chua become a "dove",
when during all the time he was being investigated at Camp Crame, he had demonstrated an attitude of belligerency by refusing to
admit participation in the crime? Was the sudden transformation the result of some spiritual persuasion that moved the conscience of
the suspect to admit his guilt, or was it due to an overbearing pressure which finally subdued his will power? The observation made by
his Honor, the late Manuel M. Mejia, the first trial judge in the case, would seem to have an answered the riddle. Thus:

. . . Notwithstanding the fact that he surrendered or was surrendered to General Campo at the D & E Restaurant in the evening
of 25 August 1959, and was supposed to be confined at the CIS building Camp Crame, Quezon City, and notwithstanding the
prosecution's claim that defendant Chua executed his alleged confession, Exhibit M, voluntarily, the CIS agents had to take him to
Alabang, Rizal, approximately 20 kilometers away from Quezon City. Now, it may be asked, if defendant Chua were really willing to
execute a confession, why should the CIS agents have to take him to Alabang? Could not such a confession be taken right in the CIS
building in Quezon City, where they have all the facilities? And if the confession, Exhibit N, had really been voluntarily given by
defendant Chua, as claimed by the prosecution, why would it take the CIS several hours in an isolated place in Alabang, Rizal, to extract
from him a 3-page confession?. . . .1äwphï1.ñët

Of course, Captain Yapdiangco explained that the reason why appellant was investigated in Alabang, Rizal, was because of the
presence of newspapermen in the CIS building at Camp Crame, Quezon City, who interfered in their manner of investigation. His
Honor, Judge Manuel M. Mejia, did not accord credence to the explanation. Indeed, it is clear that it was only a pretext, considering
that, as admitted by the witness, the newspapermen are not always present in their office at Camp Crame. (tsn, p. 62, Vol. 1)

The appellant claimed that he was maltreated and intimidated by the investigators at Alabang, hitting his head, boxing him,
applying electric shock to his body, sitting on his stomach and legs, and required him to sign the confession under threat of death.

The claim merits serious consideration.

It appears that after Chua's investigation on August 26, 1959, he was examined by Dr. Eustaquio Bautista, a private medical
practitioner, and by doctors Arsenio Anastacio and Miguel Zarraga of the PC.

Dr. Eustaquio in his examination of Chua on August 27, 1959, as stated in his report, found "multiple scratch likeline on the left
upper back; reddish discoloration at nape of neck; reddish discoloration at left upper back just medial of the shoulder blade; multiple
pinhead reddish spots on left leg and multiple scratches like line; 3 scratches likeline on right leg" which according to the doctor could
not have been self-inflicted because of the location of the injuries.

On the other hand, upon an examination of Chua on August 27, 1959, by Dr. Anastacio, he found "7 linear reddish marks varying
in length — 1/4 x 3/4 inch, 7 in number pinhead in size skin eruptions reddish with some healed are noted on the outer half of the left
shoulder, upper part of the left arm and upper part of the left back. Similar eruptions appear on the upper part of the right back, both
legs and thighs. Linear reddish mark about 1 inch is noted on the antero-lateral aspect of the left thighs. Three small reddish marks are
noted on the junction of the upper and middle thirds lateral aspect of the right leg. The above-mentioned linear reddish marks
represent scratch marks." (Exh. 3-Chua p. 135, Vol. 1.)

Upon examination conducted by Dr. Miguel Zarraga, at about 10:00 a.m. on August 27, 1959, he found that "over the left
shoulder area, upper back, and upper arm are seen a number of superficial abrasions of various sizes from 0.6 to 1.5 cm. long in various
stage of healing, some reddish, some covered with brownish scab; there are observed similar superficial marks over the right upper
back, and both legs and thighs. An abrasion measuring 2.2 cm. is seen on the antero-lateral portion of the left thigh. On the right leg at
about the junction of the upper and middle thirds are three small abrasions lateral to another one which subject claims had already
been there for sometime now, the exact number of days he does not remember." (Exh. 4-Chua, Vol. 1.)

These findings of the three doctors, yielded one significant indication, the existence of "reddish marks and scratch abrasions on
appellant's body. True, that Dr. Arsenio Anastacio made a remark in his medical certificate (Exh. 3-Chua) that there is "no sign of
physical injury externally which can be appreciated at the time of his examination," and Major Miguel Zarraga declared that "the
abdomen revealed no external manifestation of any injury, nor is there any area of tenderness in the whole body" of the appellant,
these remarks, however, do not detract from the fact, physically and scientifically recognized, that some forms of torture do not
usually manifest external injury on the body of the person maltreated. For instance, sitting on the stomach and the use of electric
shock, which incidentally are among appellant's complaints, do not necessarily produce external physical injury. Dr. Anastacio
said:1äwphï1.ñët

Q. — You have long experience in medical practice, as a general rule, if blows are given in the abdomen, do they leave external
sign?

A. — Not all (tsn, p. 405 Exh. KKK, pp. 390-415, Vol. 1).

On the same point, Dr. Zarraga said:

Q. — In your experience, did you Doctor have come across a person given blows in the abdomen without leaving any external
Page1

mark?

A. — I have many cases, some of them leave signs and some of them do not leave any external injury.
 xxx xxx xxx

Q. — Have You come across a person who died in traffic accident where the wheel passed over the abdomen without leaving any
mark of external injury?

A. — I remember very well a man in Camp Murphy whereby a young child was ran over by wheel and she sustained serious
internal injuries without any external injuries. (tsn, pp. 424-425, Exh. LLL, Vol. 1, JP Marilao.)

And as regards the use of electric shock, Dr. Zarraga's findings that "there are no external manifestation to indicate the
application of electric current of such duration to almost cause death as alleged," does not negate the application of this form of
torture for according to him, the use of electricity with wire on the body of a person does not always leave any mark thereon. On cross-
examination, he said:

Q. — You also admit Doctor that electricity from 6 volts battery applied with wire will not leave any mark?

A. — I admit that. (tsn, p. 525, Exh. LLL, Vol. I, JP Marilao.)

Testifying further on this point, and confronted with a quotation from a medical book, Dr. Zarraga said:

Q. — I will just read to you a certain portion of this book on page 201, and I quote:

the autopsy of a person . . . dead and lying near an electric machine or wire may reveal a severe cardiac, which could account for
said death even without contact with the current. It may be very difficult to define in such a case if the death was due to the disease or
electric current if no electric current marks are present.

You agree with that, Doctor?

A. — I agree with the condition that those who died of cardiac as a result of small shock may really die without indication
externally. (tsn. pp. 426-427, Vol. I, JP Marilao.) .

Q. — And the abrasion you mentioned in Exh. R could that have been produced by minor or sharp object?

A. — Yes, sir, in fact I mentioned that in my statement.

From the foregoing facts and circumstances set forth, it is clear that the mere absence of external injury in appellant's body does
not destroy or rule out appellant's claim of maltreatment by the use of other scientific modes or forms of torture. Appellant's injuries,
certified by a private physician and constabulary doctors, were telltales corroboration of the charge of torture and maltreatment.

It is now settled that a confession which is induced or extorted by torturing the accused or by personal violence or abuse
directed against the accused for the purpose of obtaining a confession, is an involuntary one and is not admissible in evidence against
him, unless found to be true. (People vs. Tipay, 70 Phil. 615.)

Appellee argues, however, conceding that the confession was involuntary, that it is nevertheless admissible because the facts
stated in the confession have been corroborated by other evidence.

A review of the evidence, however, showed that other than the confession, there is no other evidence which proves the truth of
the facts stated in the confession. On the contrary, analyzing the confession of Chua, it will be noticed that it is replete with
improbabilities and falsities in its material and substantial parts.

1. — While in Chua's confession there appears a statement that the order to kill was given to him by his partners in Hongkong,
Yao Chung and Tay Seng, thru the overseas telephone on June 29, 1959, at 11:00 a.m., the records of the Bureau of
Telecommunications which in July, 1959 was the only agency operating an overseas telephone system between Hongkong and Manila,
failed to disclose any such telephone conversation between Yao Chung and appellant Chua. (Exhibit 17-Chua, and testimony of radio
technician, pp. 471-481, bail hearing before Judge Mejia.).

2. — In Chua's confession, it is said that the plot to kill Crisostomo was hatched up in Chua's residence at 1834 M. H. del Pilar,
Malate, Manila, on the night of July 13, 1959, with Alvarez and Lim Bon Ping @ Johnny Yao, but the records of the Bureau of
Immigration show that said Lim Bong Ping had re-entered Manila in November, 1958 and had left by Philippine Air Lines plane for
Hongkong on December 7, 1958 (Exhs. 13, 14 and 15). And there is no showing that he had re-entered the Philippines after his
departure for abroad on December 7, 1958. That Lim Bong Ping was not in Manila in July, 1959, is further shown by the sworn
declarations of members of the staff Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California on 30 April 1958, and returned thereto on 24 December 1958, where he had been living constantly ever since.
(Exhs. 5, 5-a and 6, 6-a.) And this fact was corroborated by the sworn statements of Mrs. Pilar R. Guerrero, Philippine Consulate
employee in San Francisco, and Enrique Herbosa, a Filipino student in California. (Exhs. 7 and 7-a.)

3. — In Chua's confession, it is said that Alvarez killed Crisostomo in consideration of P35,000.00. This is illogical and
unbelievable. As his Honor, the late Judge Manuel M. Mejia, the first trial judge in the case, said in his order granting bail to appellant,
"If Alvarez had really killed Crisostomo in consideration of a reward promised to him by Chua, it would seem to be unnatural and
illogical for Chua, to have gone along with Alvarez in the actual killing of Crisostomo on the night of July 14, 1959. On the other hand, it
is said by Alvarez in his tape-recorded statement that his motive in killing the deceased Crisostomo was to retrieve a rubber check
which he had issued to Crisostomo in connection with his purchase from the latter of a Ford Fairlane car for P20,500.00 (Exh. LL, pp. 13,
28, tsn, Oct. 31, 1959)." Indeed, the foregoing facts would show that it was Alvarez who had a motive to kill Crisostomo. In fact, he
withdrew his appeal.

4. — It is also said in the confession that Crisostomo was shot on the head while driving the car. This is incredible, because in that
situation, the car would have gone out of control or would have been involved in an accident which did not happen.

5. — And as a result of the incident discussed in the preceding number, if it were true, evidently the authorities would have
found bloodstains in the car which is not present.
Page1
 6. — The statement in the confession that Chua was with the group that killed Crisostomo at Lias road, Marilao, is impeached by
the testimony of Paulino Antonio, a witness for the prosecution, who declared that it was only Alvarez whom he saw at the vicinity of
the crime on the night of July 14, 1959.

The finding of the court that there was conspiracy among the accused, notwithstanding the fact that on the same evidence, the
court found one defendant not guilty, but sufficient to convict the two others, on the court's finding and conclusion "As regards the
testimony of Arturo Cayetano, the court is inclined to give a margin of error in his identifying Carasig on the night in question . . .," is
indeed, somewhat illogical —

Since in the instant case, the widow appears also to be a star witness of the prosecution whose testimony was given much
weight in pinning liability on appellants, we wonder whether this could be consistent and would be true to logic and fairness if it would
hold that on the strength of the same testimony which was discredited by the court, insofar as one of the appellants' co-accused in the
same case is concerned, would reach a verdict of conviction against said appellants. (People vs. Aquino, et al., L-13789, June 30, 1960,
67 Off. Gaz. No. 51, 9180.)

Aside from the foregoing consideration, conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The
admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator
during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made,
as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. (People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil. 985; People vs. Yatco, et al., 51 Off.
Gaz. No. 12, 6187). Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. (U.S. vs. Figueras, 2 Phil. 491). It must be proved as the crime itself,
independent from the confession. But in the case at bar, the trial court admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not
binding on the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial. There is, therefore,
no inter-locking confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an overt act of appellant Chua connected to
the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.

The appellant maintains that the trial court erred in not appreciating his defense of alibi.

The evidence shows that the appellant, even from the very beginning of his interrogation by the CIS agents upon his surrender
on August 24, 1959, has consistently claimed that on the night of July 14, 1959, when Crisostomo was killed at Marilao, Bulacan, he was
at No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City, playing mahjong. Capt. Yapdiangco corroborated this fact. Thus —

Q. — What were the things which you fear he was not answering your interrogation which you consider is not true?

A. — I remember he was declaring to us that on that day, on the evening of 14th of July 1959, he was in the mahjong game.

While Chua was being interrogated at the CIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City, on August 24, 1959, other agents of the CIS particularly
Agent Mariano Belen and Lt. Bautista, on the same date, were busy checking up on Chua's movements or whereabouts on July 14,
1959, and they were informed that on the night of July 14, 1959, Chua was indeed playing mahjong at No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City. To
this effect is the testimony of agent Belen:

Q. — Do you remember having gone with Lt. Bautista to a certain club house in Pasay on August 24, 1959?

A. — I remember, sir.

Q. — Do you remember where that club house is?

A. — No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City.

Q. — What was the purpose in going with Lt. Bautista to that club house at Salud St., Pasay City?

A. — To verify the allegation of Mr. Peter Lim that at said club house, George Chua was playing mahjong on the night of July 14,
1959.

Q. — Because of that information imparted to you by Peter Lim, you went direct to Salud St.?

A. — Yes, sir, in the afternoon of the same date.

Q. — Whom did you interrogate upon your arrival in the clubhouse?

A. — We interrogated Ong Kong Pay.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. — What was the answer of Ong Kong Pay?

A. — That Mr. George Chua was there and practically playing mahjong one week from July 8 to 14, 1959.

The foregoing facts were also corroborated by the testimonies of Ng Yu (tsn, p. 1024); Ong Kong Pay (tsn, p. 1245) and Peter Lim
(tsn, p. 1295).

As further proof of the fact that Chua was playing mahjong at Salud St., on the night of July 14, 1959, the record shows that
agent Belen of the CIS was given a notebook by Ong Kong Pay in-charge of the clubhouse, on August 24, 1959, wherein accused George
Chua was listed as one of the players thereat on the date in question. However, it appears that the prosecution had lost the notebook.
Whether it was really lost by the CIS or deliberately suppressed, the presumption of its truth has basis in law.1äwphï1.ñët

All the foregoing indubitably show that the defense of alibi of the appellant could not have been merely a concoction, as the
testimonies of the witnesses clearly showed that Chua was really playing mahjong at Salud St., Pasay City, on the date in question.

UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds that the guilt of the appellant Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua has not
been established beyond reasonable doubt, and he is hereby acquitted of the offense charged with costs de oficio. The bail bond
posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
Page1

G.R. No. 74657 February 27, 1989

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

LEONARDO SERRANO, accused-appellant.

THIRD DIVISION

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Marino L. Cueto for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 53 finding the accused Leonardo Serrano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P 20,000.00) and to pay actual damages in the amount of P 6,667.40,
and moral damages in the amount of P 10,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The information filed against the accused alleged:

That on or about the 23rd day of January 1983, at Barangay Masin Sur, Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, who was then riding in a tricycle, armed with
a sharp and pointed weapon, with intent to kill and with treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said deadly weapon one Jorge Villapando, a fellow passenger in said
tricycle, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:

1. Stab wnd. 1 1/2 cm. long, 2 cm. to the left of the midline 2nd I.C.S. non-penetrating.

2. Stab wnd. 1 1/2 cm. long at 4th I.C.S. left 3 cm. from the midline penetrating the chest cavity. Injuring the heart.

3. Stab wnd. 1 1/2 cm. long, 1/2 cm. below and. No. 2 non-penetrating.

4. Stab wnd. 1 1/2 cm. long left 5th I.C.S., 2 cm. from the midline penetrating the chest cavity hitting the heart.

5. Stab and. 1 1/2 cm. long at 3rd I.C.S., 7 cm. from the midline non-penetrating.

which directly caused his death. (Original Record, pp. 38-39).

The lower court summarized its findings of facts as follows:

On the night of January 23, 1983 Leonardo Serrano and Jorge Villapando were visitors of one Charito Valencia in the house of
latter's uncle Lamberts Espeleta in Barangay Masim, Candelaria, Quezon. Jorge Villapando is already the sweetheart of Charito Valencia
while Leonardo Serrano is a suitor and faithful admirer of Charito. A conversation took place between the three of them and it was in
this conversation that Leonardo Serrano discovered that Jorge Villapando has won the heart and the mind of Charito Valencia. Jorge
Villapando decided to leave the house early and so he intimated to leave but the accused Leonardo Serrano also decided to leave
together with Jorge Villapando. Apparently Leonardo Serrano in a fit of jealousy decided to get even with Jorge Villapando. As the place
between the house of Espeleta and that of the national highway would be a convenient place for him to accomplish his evil design, but
this was frustrated when Charito's uncle Leonardo (sic) Espeleta feeling apprehensive that their two visitors might be molested on their
way decided to accompany them to the railroad track where they could get a tricycle in going home. Serrano and Villapando were able
to ride on board the tricycle of Armando Alvarez on the national highway near the railroad track at Barangay Masim, Candelaria,
Quezon and while on board this tricycle in going to the poblacion of Candelaria, Quezon as Jorge Villapando was seated on his left side
and taking advantage of the unsuspecting Jorge Villapando the accused stabbed Villapando five times on the chest and as the two were
struggling inside the tricycle the driver Armando Alvarez noticed that his tricycle swayed and when he peeped inside he saw Serrano
still stabbing Villapando and when he slowed down it was at that time that accused Leonardo Serrano jumped out of the tricycle and
ran towards the place where they came from. Immediately thereafter Villapando was brought to the Candelaria Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. The identity of the accused was established not only by the testimony of Lamberto Espeleta but also by
the testimony of Armando Alvarez the tricycle driver.

From the testimony of Dr. Juan Cedeno who conducted the postmortem examination on the wounds of the victim, it shows that
all the wounds were inflicted on the left chest caused by only one pointed instrument and the thrust of the weapon came from the
front of the victim, (Original Record, pp. 190-191).

In this appeal, the accused Serrano raised the following assignments of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL JUDGE MISERABLY FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THREE-
HOUR PERIOD (MORE OR LESS) THAT LAPSED FROM THE TIME THE VICTIM LEFT THE HOUSE OF LAMBERTO ESPELETA (WHERE CHARITO
VALENCIA IS LIVING UP TO THE TIME THE VICTIM WAS FOUND BY THE TRICYCLE DRIVER ARMANDO ALVAREZ AT THE CROSSING OF
BARANGAY MASIN, CANDELARIA, QUEZON; CONSEQUENTLY, THE HON. TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY ARRIVED AT THE CONCLUSION
THAT VICTIM WAS STABBED INSIDE THE TRICYCLE INSTEAD OF MAKING THE LOGICAL FINDING THAT THE VICTIM WAS ALREADY
WOUNDED BEFORE BOARDING THE AFORESAID TRICYCLE AND HENCE, NO STABBING INCIDENT TOOK PLACE INSIDE THE SAME.

II. THE HONORABLE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MOTIVE OF THE ACCUSED WAS THE REVENGE OF A JILTED SUITOR
AND JEALOUSY WHEN NO IOTA OF EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE SAME.

III. THE HONORABLE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IdENTIFIED BY THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND IN SO HOLDING SIMPLY IGNORED THE SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT BY THE PRINCIPAL WITNESS ALVAREZ DURING
THAT SAME NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT, THAT HE DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE PERSON WHO STABBED THE VICTIM.
Page1

IV. THE HONORABLE TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE WITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR
TESTIMONIES WERE REPLETE WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES, AND THE PRODUCT OF AN AFTER THOUGHT.
 V. THE HONORABLE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER WAS
NOT PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. (Rollo, pp. 37-38).

The accused questions the trial court's findings of facts and its appreciation of the prosecution's evidence.

We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no cogent reason to depart from the well-established rule that
findings of trial courts are accorded great respect in the absence of any showing that they ignored, overlooked or failed to properly
appreciate matters of substance which would affect the results. (Centino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77298, January 13, 1989).

Serrano asserts that the victim was already "wounded and dead" (sic) when the tricycle driver, Armando Alvarez found him,
contrary to the finding that the victim was stabbed while inside the tricycle driven by Alvarez. He inferred this from an alleged time
discrepancy. Since the Espeleta's house to the "poblacion" could be traversed in ten minutes, the victim and Serrano would have
reached the "poblacion" about an hour earlier than the reported time of the stabbing incident. As such, the stabbing could not have
taken place inside the tricycle.

The assertion is without merit. The time of the stabbing incident need not be precise to the last second. The time given by the
witnesses is based on mere estimates and not the result of a deliberate effort to look at a watch or clock, verify the time as compared
to other clocks, and record the same in writing. The alleged time discrepancy cannot prevail over the positive Identification of the
accused.

Neither can the defense of alibi prevail over the positive Identification of the accused, more so as no ill motive has been
attributed to the prosecution witnesses to Identify Serrano as the assailant. (People v. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-79123- 25, January 9, 1989;
People v. Abigan, 144 SCRA 130 (1986); People v. Renejane, 158 SCRA 258 (1988); People v. de la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582 (1987)].

The appellant contends that Alvarez failed to positively Identify him as the assailant.

We agree with the Solicitor General who states:

Appellant assails the finding that he was positively Identified by the prosecution witnesses because eyewitness Armando Alvarez
allegedly made a spontaneous and unrehearsed statement that he did not recognize the person who stabbed the victim (pp. 14-19,
Appellant's Brief).

In open court, prosecution eyewitness Armando Alvarez, the tricycle driver, declared that he has no doubt that appellant was the
person who stabbed the deceased (p. 55, tsn, December 7, 1983). He was sure appellant was the assailant because he bad seen
appellant several times before the incident (pp. 37-37, tsn. Id.).

It may be true that in his affidavit Alvarez initially stated that he could not say (Hindi ko po masasabi, p. 4, tsn, Id.) whether be
would be able to recognize the assailant of the deceased. Alvarez, however, explained that at the time he was still trying to recall
where he had seen appellant before (pp. 48-49, 54-55, tsn, Id.). But later on he recalled he had seen appellant even before the incident
(p. 38, tsn, Id.) and he had no doubt about his Identity (p. 55, tsn, Id.).

Moreover, the Identification made by Alvarez was corroborated by Espeleta who testified that appellant boarded the tricycle of
Alvarez with the victim moments before the victim was stabbed in said tricycle. Both Espeleta and Alvarez had no motive to frame-up
appellant.

The appellant then contends that the motive was not clearly shown. Charito Valencia, the woman who was allegedly being
courted by both the accused and the victim was not presented as a witness, thus "no concrete and clear motive was shown".

This court has held that proof of motive is unnecessary where the assailant has been positively identified by the eyewitnesses.
[People v. Delavin, 148 SCRA 257 (1987), People v. Ramilo, 147 SCRA 102 (1987)]. But in any event, evidence was adduced through the
unrefuted testimony of Valencia's uncle Espeleta who testified that both the accused and the victim were courting his niece, Charito
Valencia.

The accused points out some alleged inconsistensies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

We adopt the Solicitor General's observations:

There is no contradiction between the earlier testimony of Pat. Cornejo that the deceased had no companion (p. 6, tsn, February
8, 1984) and his subsequent statement that the companion of the deceased jumped from the tricycle (p. 7, tsn, Id.). The first statement
refers to the occasion when the deceased was brought to the hospital while the second statement refers to the occasion when the
deceased boarded the tricycle after leaving Espeleta's house.

Likewise, there is no contradiction between the testimony of Alvarez to the effect (that) he was not told by the police to give a
written statement (pp. 35-36, tsn, December 7, 1983) and Pat. Cornejo's testimony to the effect that he instructed Alvarez to go to the
police to give a written statement (pp. 8 and 13-14, tsn, February 8, 1984). The seemingly contradictory testimonies can be reconciled.
Alvarez's testimony refers to the occasion when he brought the deceased to the hospital and was here (sic) verbally interviewed by the
police. (pp. 34-35, tsn, December 7, 1985). Pat. Cornejo's testimony refers to the occasion when he found it necessary to re-interview
Alvarez to complete Alvarez's narration (pp. 13-14, tsn, February 8, 1984).

Pat. Cornejo also explained why it was not recorded in the police blotter that the deceased had a companion when he boarded
the tricycle who subsequently jumped from the tricycle. He said he was waiting for the tricycle driver to come to the police
headquarters to complete his report and sign the lower portion of the entry (pp. 14-15, tsn, February 8, 1984). This action of Pat.
Cornejo merely shows that he was not a seasoned police officer but a typical simple and unsophisticated policeman of the rural areas,
and does not by any means indicate a deliberate attempt to falsify the truth (People vs. Verso, 21 SCRA 1403).

Moreover, these discrepancies and inconsistencies are only on minor details that do not detract from the veracity of their
testimonies. In fact, these strengthen their veracity as they show that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are unrehearsed.
(See People v. Delavin, supra).
Page1

The accused also argues that it is incredible that the accused would stab the victim at a time when somebody witnessed the
incident.
 As held in the case of People V. Delavin, supra:

One of the arguments invoked by the defense was that the accused-appellant, knowing that he could easily be Identified, would
not have committed the offenses openly but would have chosen a more subdued place and hour to prevent the discovery. In reply, the
Solicitor General says: "Time has changed a great deal. The brazenness with which crimes are committed in broad daylight are too
numerous to be recounted." We agree, with not a little sense of sadness. Vanished, indeed, are those gentler yesterdays when one's
neighbor was, as certain as the break of dawn, a friend.

Lastly, it cannot be denied that the accused went into hiding after the date of the commission of the crime. He never reported
for work again at the Peter Paul Corp. until the time be was dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from sentencing the accused Serrano to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Jorge Villapando civil indemnity and damages in the amount of P 36,667.40, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990

BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed, GEVERO,petitioners,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Carlito B. Somido for petitioners.

Benjamin N. Tabios for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the decision 2
of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and
absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450,
containing an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters more or less.

As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows:

The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters
and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per
Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff
(DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale
executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering
the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena,
Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square
meters.

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica
Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of
two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica
Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration
Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement
and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title
and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion
of lot 2476.

Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same
prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and
checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The
same with the subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo
Gevero — all of which were found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith
and for value, occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the defendants
Abadas forcibly entered the property. (Rollo, p. 23)

After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute
owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450,
containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878) square meters, more or less. The other portions of
Lot No. 2476 are hereby adjudicated as follows:

Lot No. 2476 – B – to the heirs of Elena Gevero;

Lot No. 2476 – C – to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;

Lot No. 2476 – E – to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and Francisca Aquino;

Lot No. 2476 – F – to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and Emilia Merida Rumohf ;
Page1

Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 — G — to defendant spouses Enrique Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada.
 No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering that the said lot is the subject of a civil case between
the Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is now
pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs,

SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)

From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from.

Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April 21, 1986.

Hence, the present petition.

This petition is devoid of merit.

Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether or not the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis
Lancero is valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no.
2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed of sale; and 3) whether or not the private respondents' action is barred by laches.

Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the signature of Ricardo
was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed the
document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children remained in the property notwithstanding the sale
to Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the share
of Eustaquio Gevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger
area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952 Subdivision survey without the consent
of the Geveros' to bring about the segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought about the
issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title T4320, both of which were illegally issued; and 8) the area sold as per document is
20,649 square meters whereas the segregated area covered by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square meters
(Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78).

As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged without Ricardo's
knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities of a
public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to
rebut the legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No.
77423, March 13, 1989). In fact it has long been settled that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the
notary public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to
contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521
[1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of
absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the
contrary is proven.

As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in
1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another,
the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is
however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order
that such admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil.
465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of
the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.

Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p. 71)
involves a question of fact already raised and passed upon by both the trial and appellate courts. Said the Court of Appeals:

Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found that Luis Lancero had taken possession of the land upon
proper investigation by plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed Luis Lancero who was the owner and possessor of Lot 2476 D. . . .
(Decision, C.A., p. 6).

As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282
[1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33 SCRA 737
[1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]).

Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been
raised before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985];
Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. C.A., 157
SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5, 1989).

Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included
in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to
the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica,
because the Deed did not recite that she was deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).

The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the
"causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Page1

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of
her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share
in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from
Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.

Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale considering that a paragraph of the
aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).

It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to the different provisions thereof
(Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203 [1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, its
entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners,
by citing only one paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only create contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught
the entire provisions thereof.

Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the petitioners have remained in the actual, open,
uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at present (Rollo, p. 17).

An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The
execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery.
Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property (Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza,
64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397
(1975]).

Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v.
C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the property is a registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the
certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws (Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan
v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. CA-G.R. No. 77427, March 13, 1989).

Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the
correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No. 49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171
SCRA 612 [1989]). This notwithstanding, DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The Court of Appeals
found that it had first investigated and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the
Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and
found everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any
other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question.

Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.

The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issues appear unnecessary.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page1

D. CONDUCT AND CHARACTER AS EVIDENCE

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12858 January 22, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant-appellant.

Francisco and Lualhati for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This appeal requires a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law.

Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Nos. 442,
444, Calle Santo Cristo, city of Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from
Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The
prescription read — "clorato de potasa — 120 gramos — en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of
Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda — Clorato potasa —
120.00 — en seis papeles — para caballo — Sto. Cristo 442, 444, Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the
potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was
mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly
afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of
the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of
Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was
found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a
veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of poisoning.

Four assignments of error are made. The first is that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Pena and
Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which substance proved on analysis to be barium
chlorate. What the appellant is here relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses
committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The
effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus
to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant
has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and
fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of
accidents. (See 10 R. C. L., pp. 938, 940.) The United States Supreme Court has held that:

On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or
to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not
interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to
prejudice the accused.

Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of
direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored.

Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another
offense by the defendant. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S., 57.)

The second assignment of error is that the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos
on the 22d of June, 1916, was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate. The proof demonstrates the contrary.

The third and fourth assignments of error that the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of an infraction of Act No. 597, section 17, as amended. The third assignment contains the points we should
consider, including, we may remark, a somewhat difficult question concerning which the briefs have given little assistance.

The Pharmacy Law was first enacted as Act No. 597, was later amended by Act Nos. 1921, 2236, and 2382, and is now found as
Chapter 30 of the Administrative Code. The law provides for a board of pharmaceutical examiners, and the examination and
registration of pharmacists, and finally contains sundry provisions relative to the practice of pharmacy. High qualification for applicants
for the pharmaceutical; examination are established. The program of subjects for the examination is wide. Responsibility for the quality
of drugs is fixed by section 17 of the Pharmacy Law, as amended (now Administrative Code [1917], section 751), in the following term:

Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale;
and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical,
medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so
used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the
meaning of this section if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia.

The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following penal provision: "Any person violating the provisions of this
Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollar." The Administrative Code, section 2676, changes
the penalty somewhat by providing that:

Any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy Law or
violating any provisions of said law for which no specific penalty s provided shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed
two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Page1

These are the provisions of law, pursuant to which prosecution has been initiated and which it is now incumbent upon us to
construe.
 Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a pharmacist. As
a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be
unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word "fraudulent" which has given the court
trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective?

Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant vigorously insists upon, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty
that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly
without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the
purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury. Such a construction with a
literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the
innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous
vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law.

The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist
to use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a special high degree," "the highest degree of care known to
practical men." Even under the first conservative expression, "ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and
most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be
constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine." (Tombari vs. Connors
[1912], 85 Conn., 235. See also Willson vs. Faxon, Williams and Faxon [1913], 208 N. Y., 108; Knoefel vs. Atkins [1907], 81 N. E., 600.)
The "skill" required of a druggist is denominated as "high" or "ample." (Peters vs. Jackson [1902], 50 W. Va., 644; 57 L. R. A., 428.) In
other words, the care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the
superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.

Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in nature, the question of negligence or
ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. In a decision which stands alone, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky said:

As applicable to the owners of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending drugs and medicines by retail, the legal maxim should
be reversed. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor. That is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a
purchaser or send to a patient one drug for another, as arsenic for calomel, cantharides for or mixed with snakeroot and Peruvian bark,
or even one innocent drug, calculated to produce a certain effect, in place of another sent for and designed to produce a different
effect. If he does these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged pretext that it was an accidental or an innocent
mistake; that he had been very careful and particular, and had used extraordinary care and diligence in preparing or compounding the
medicines as required, etc. Such excuses will not avail him. (Fleet vs. Hollenkemp [1852], 56 Am. Dec., 563.)

Under the other conception, in which the proof of negligence is considered as material, where a customer calls upon a druggist
for a harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facienegligence, placing the burden on him to
show that the mistake was under the circumstances consistent with the exercise of due care. (See Knoefel vs. Atkins, supra,) The
druggist cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate give instead to the customer barium chlorate, a
poison, place this poison in a package labeled "potassium chlorate," and expect to escape responsibility on plea of mistake. His
mistake, under the most favorable aspect for himself, was negligence. So in a case where a druggist filled an order for calomel tablets
with morphine and placed the morphine in a box labeled calomel, it was said:

It is not suggested, nor can we apprehend that it is in any wise probable, that the act of furnishing the wrong drug in this case
was willful. If it was furnished by the clerk, it was undoubtedly a mistake and unintentional. However, it was a mistake of the gravest
kind, and of the most disastrous effect. We cannot say that one holding himself out as competent to handle such drugs, and who does
so, having rightful access to them, and relied upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for
by the peculiarly dangerous nature of this business, can be heard to say that his mistakes by which he furnishes a customer the most
deadly of drugs for those comparatively harmless is not, in and of itself, gross negligence, and that of an aggravated form. (Smith's
Admrx. vs. Middleton [1902], 56 L. R. A., 484.)

The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms
length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to
anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar leaning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the
purchaser anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing.
Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.

In civil cases, the druggist is made liable for any injury approximately resulting from his negligence. If B negligently sells poison
under the guise of a beneficial drug to A, he is liable for the injury done to A. In a case, which has repeatedly been termed the leading
case on the subject and which has been followed by the United States Supreme Court, it was said, "Pharmacists or apothecaries who
compound or sell medicines, if they carelessly label a poison as a harmless medicine, and sent it so labeled into the market, are liable
to all persons who, without fault on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine, in consequence of the false label; the rule being
that the liability in such a case arises not out of any contract or direct privity between the wrong-doer and the person injured, but out
of the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others." (Nat. Savings Bank vs. Ward
[1879], 100 U. S., 195, following Thomas vs. Winchester [1852], 2 Seld. [N. Y.], 387.) In reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence
and care is no defense. Throughout the criminal law, run the same rigorous rules. For example, apothecaries or apothecary clerks, who
are guilty of negligence in the sale of medicine when death ensues in consequence, have been held guilty of manslaughter. (See
Tessymond's Case [1828], 1 Lewin, C. C., 169.)

Bearing these general principles in mind, and remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggist, that in
some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were
not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident
and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the
misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault.
Page1

Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word
"fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne
out by Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this
word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsify, deception, and injury must be present-but not
scienter.

In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it
too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or
mistake.

The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action
which may be instituted. So ordered.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45179 March 30, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

BENJAMIN IRANG, ET AL., defendants.

BENJAMIN IRANG, appellant.

Conrado V. Sanchez for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice Melencio for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The accused Benjamin Irang appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime robbery with homicide, the robbery having been committed in the house of
Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Melocotones, and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500, with the proportionate part of the costs of the trial.

In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as having been committed by the court a quo in its
decision in question, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant Benjamin Irang had been sufficiently identified beyond reasonable doubt,
and in not giving due weight to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense.

2. The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant Benjamin Irang on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The following undisputed facts have been established during the trial, to wit:

Between 7 and 8 o'clock of the night of November 9, 1935, seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two of whom
were armed with guns and two with bolos, went to the house of the spouses Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente, where
three lights were burning, one at the balcony, another in the room and another on a table. Some of said individuals went up and others
remained on guard downstairs. Those who went up approached Perfecto Melocotones immediately and ordered him to bring his
money. Melocotones answered in the affirmative but before he could do what was ordered him he was attacked with bolos until he fell
to the floor. Later another armed with a gun went up and approaching Maximiana Vicente, wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck herein
the face with the butt of his gun, making her lose consciousness momentarily. When she regained consciousness he saw her husband
already dead. One of the assailants then said to her: "Bring out the money and jewelry." Maximiniana Vicente turned over to the man
who had struck her with the butt of his gun P70 in cash and jewelry valued at P200, which she has kept in a trunk. During the short
space of time that she was turning over the money and jewelry, she looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a
scar on his left eyelid. That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assaulted by malefactors who had been firing shots before
arriving at and going up the house. All of them had white stripe upon their faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had
pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. It was he who opened her trunk.

After the malefactors had left Perfecto Melocotones house, the latter's son Toribio Melocotones, who had seen the assailants
arrive but without recognizing them, immediately reported the matter to the municipal authorities and to the constabulary, who went
to the scene of the crime without loss of time. Maximiniana Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of the Constabulary that
the person who had struck her with the butt of his gun and taken her money and jewelry was a man of regular statute, with a lean
body and pockmarked face. With this description, said lieutenant went in search of said individual. Having arrested a group of persons,
he brought them to Maximiniana Vicente's house so that the latter might identify among them the one who struck her with the butt of
his gun, but she did not find such man. Later another group was presented to her and in it she identified the herein accused-appellant
Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck her with the butt of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. He was
likewise the same man arrested by Lieutenant Alejandre at midnight on November 9, 1935, in the barrio of Tampac which is five or
seven kilometers from Maturanoc to which he was taken and brought to the house of the deceased. Juana de la Cruz also recognized
Benjamin Irang, through his pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who had gone up to her house that same night.
Once under arrest, the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang made an affidavit in Tagalog (Exhibit B), stating that while he was in the
barrio of Tampac, municipality of Guimba. Province of Nueva Ecija, on November 9, 1935 at about 7 o'clock in the evening, Fidel
Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian arrived; that Fidel Estrella invited him to go to the house of Ignacio Sebastian's brother-in-law named
Angel Talens because Estrella had something to tell him; that upon arriving at Angel Talens' house, Fidel Estrella invited him to go to
Maturanoc to look for business; that the appellant asked Fidel Estrella why he wanted to bring him in the latter told him to stop asking
questions otherwise he would slash him with his bolo; that Fidel Estrella carried a bolo and Ignacio Sebastian an unlicensed firearms;
that they went to the house of Perfecto Melocotones in the barrio of Maturanoc, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and upon arriving there Fidel
Estrella, who acted as the ringleader, assigned to each and every one of them his corresponding place, designating those who should
assault that of Ursula Cabigon; that Benjamin Irang was in the group formed by Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian, which assaulted
Page1

the house of Perfecto Melocotones, having been assigned to stand guard on the stairs of said house; that Fidel Estrella, once inside the
house, slashed Perfecto Melocotones thrice with his bolo; that Fidel Estrella later told him that they had succeeded in taking money
and the shotgun; and that after the assault they dispersed, each returning to his own home. This affidavit (Exhibit B) was sworn to by
Benjamin Irang before the deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija , in the presence of Graciano Piñgol, the
constabulary soldier who accompanied him. Before Irang affixed his thumbmark and took his oath, the deputy clerk of court asked him
if he understood Tagalog and when he answered in the affirmative said deputy clerk read the contends of the document to him. Asked
whether he had any thing else to add thereto, the appellant answered that he had nothing more to say.

The defense of the accused-appellant is an alibi to the effect that in the afternoon of the day of the commission of the crime, he
was in his rice field washing a fishing basket. There he met Roberto Alcantara. Later he went to the house of Buenaventura Javier to
return the fishing basket in question and to exercise on the rings (jugar a las arogallas) with the latter's son Pedro, and two unmarried
sons of the appellant's uncle, in the presence of several persons, returning home at 8 o'clock that night. When he was arrested the
constabulary soldiers opened his box but found nothing in it. They later took him in a jitney to the victims house in the barrio of
Maturanoc and upon being brought face to face with the widow Maximiniana Vicente, Lieutenant Alejandre told the widow: "this is the
one who slashed your husband and punctured your face." The widow answered saying: "Is it that man, sir." As Benjamin Irang
answered that he had not left his house, the lieutenant gave him a blow which made him lose consciousness. Then the lieutenant said
to the widow: "He is the same man. It was he to whom you delivered the money and jewelry. Look at him well. Identify him well." In
the constabulary barracks in Cabanatuan the soldiers and a sergeant manhandled him from the night of November 9, 1935, until 4
o'clock in the morning of the 11th of said month and year, for having denied all knowledge of the crime, making him lose his breath
and punching him in the stomach. When he could no longer bear the maltreatment, he agreed to tell what they wanted him to tell.
Upon being taken for investigation, the constabulary soldiers told him to agree to all that the clerk of court might read to him,
otherwise they would again manhandle him at the barracks. He was not present when the affidavit Exhibit B was prepared. Neither are
the contents thereof true. He merely affixed his thumbmark upon said document for fear of the soldiers.

Lieutenant Alejandre as well as Sergeant Lubrico denied that the accused had been maltreated in the least.

The only question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang was identified as
one of those who assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones, killed him and robbed his wife Maximiniana Vicente of money and
jewelry.

Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the face with the butt of his gun and of whom he
demanded delivery of her money and jewelry scrutinized the latter's face and notice that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left
eyelid. When on that same night of the assault Lieutenant Alejandre, guided by the description given him by Maximiniana Vicente,
went in search of the person who might have maltreated the latter and robbed her of her money and jewelry and presented a group of
persons to said Maximiniana Vicente, she said that the man who had maltreated her was not among those who composed that first
group. Said lieutenant later presented another group to her but neither did the widow find in it the man who had struck her with the
butt of his gun. In the third group presented to her, she immediately pointed at one who turned out to be the herein accused-
appellant. The man pointed at protested but when she told him that it was he who had struck her in the face with the butt of his gun,
the appellant became silent.

The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about one hundred meters from that of Perfecto
Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with
pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maong-colored suit, who later turned out to be the herein accused-
appellant, opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the man of the same description was the
open who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein accused-
appellant. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at
the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime (16, C.
J., 610, 611, sec. 1196).

Maximiniana Vicente's identification of the herein accused-appellant is likewise corroborated by the latter's own admission
invited to assault the house of Perfecto Melocotones which they in fact the lower court of the appellant's admission under oath upon
the assumption that it was not made voluntarily, is erroneous, inasmuch as the only evidence that it was not voluntarily is the accused-
appellant's own testimony that he had been manhandled by the constabulary soldiers and threatened with further maltreatment if he
did not testify as they wished. This imputation of fortune was categorically denied by Lieutenant Alejandre and Sergeant Lubrico of the
Constabulary, before whom the accused-appellant made the admission and who caused it to be put in writing. The imputation is
likewise contradicted by the deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija before whom the accused-appellant swore to his
admission and who testified that before he administered oath to said accused-appellant, he asked him whether he understood Tagalog
and, having been answered in the affirmative, he read said document to him and asked him whether he had anything to add, the
appellant affixing his thumbmark upon it after answering that he had nothing more to say (U. S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil., 308). There is no
doubt that an admission made under oath under such circumstances cannot be considered involuntary and therefore is admissible
against the person making it.

This court is of the opinion, therefore, that the accused-appellant identity as one of those who assaulted the house of Perfecto
Melocotones and robbed Maximiniana Vicente of her money and jewelry, is established conclusively beyond reasonable doubt.

The defense of the accused is an alibi and has for its purpose to show that he could both have been at the scene of the crime
between 7 and 8 o'clock at night because he was in another place about seven kilometers away at that time. This defense of alibi is
contradicted by the above-stated testimony of Juana de la Cruz and by the accused-appellant's own admission under oath Exhibit B.

The facts established at the trial as committed by the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt constitute the complex crime
of robbery with homicide defined in article 293, in connection with article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, and punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed
by the trial judge is in accordance with the evidence and with law. It is not so, however, with the pecuniary liability because, taking into
account the gravity of the offense, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased should be P1,000 and that for the stolen goods not
restored P390.

Wherefore, with the sole modification that the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang is sentenced further to indemnify the heirs of
Page1

the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to restore to Maximiniana Vicente the sum of P70 and the stolen jewelry and gun, or to
reimburse the value thereof in the amount of P390, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of this
instance to the appellant. So ordered.
 Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9723 June 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

GERONIMO SOLIMAN Y BUENAVENTURA alias EMONG and SOFRONIO PALIN Y PAZ alias POLONIO,defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellee.

Cipriano Azada and Buenaventura Evangelista for appellants.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Appellants were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Manila and were sentenced each to suffer the
extreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000, and to pay the costs. By operation of law, the
case was brought before this Court for review.

In the morning of April 29, 1955, at about 2 o'clock, while Ernesto Basa was sleeping in a pushcart placed along the sidewalk of
Sto. Cristo Street near the southeast corner of that street and Azcarraga, Manila, and Ernesto Balaktaw was also sleeping on a box
situated near the pushcart, with their heads opposite each other, Balaktaw was awakened when someone kicked his hand. Upon
awakening, Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin proceed toward the head of Ernesto Basa and hold the latter by the shoulder at which
moment his companion Geronimo, Soliman approached Ernesto Basa and stabbed him many times with a balisong. Thereafter, the
assailants ran away.

Balaktaw took Basa to a calesa and proceeded to a police outpost at the corner of Azcarraga and Elcano Streets and reported the
incident to Patrolman Tolentino. The patrolman boarded the calesa and directed the driver to proceed to Mary Johnston Hospital.
From there, the three transferred to an ambulance and proceeded to the North General Hospital where Basa was treated, but he
expired in the morning of the same day. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Dr. Mariano Lara, Chief Medical Examiner of the Manila Police
Department, made an autopsy of the deceased and found that the cause of death is as follows: "Profuse exsanguinating hemorrhage
(only 850 cc. recovered) and shock due to multiple (7) stab wounds, two (2) being fatal, piercing the pyloric portion of the stomach,
duodenum, jejunum, hepatic flexure of colon and right kidney."

Appellant Soliman testified that prior to the present incident, or on April 21, 1955, the deceased tried to borrow his pushcart
and, as he was not able to lend it to him, the deceased boxed him and as a consequence, he suffered physical injuries; that incident
was settled amicably on the same day by the companions of the deceased; that on another occasion the beat up Soliman with an iron
pipe and the latter had to undergo medical treatment; that in the night of April 29, 1955, after he had eaten in Folgueras St., he
proceeded to a truck by the United Bus Line of which he was a watchman; that while he was passing Sto. Cristo Street, the deceased
called him and asked for a drink; that he told the deceased he had no money, but the deceased forced him to give him money and even
boxed him; that because the deceased had three companions, he pulled out his knife and upon seeing this, the three companions ran
away; that he and the deceased fought in the course of which he stabbed him; that while they were fighting, one Sofronio Palin came
and separated them; and that when they were separated Palin advised him to surrender to the police, so he went home and asked his
brothers to accompany him to the Meisic Station.

Appellant Palin merely corroborated the testimony of his co-accused by declaring that while he was eating at a restaurant at the
corner of Sto. Cristo and Azcarraga Streets in the morning in question, he saw Soliman and the deceased grappling with each other;
that he tried to separate them and succeeded in doing so; that after the two were separated, he asked Soliman to surrender and the
latter heeded his advice.

The two appellants are charged with a very serious crime as in fact they were sentenced to the extreme penalty of death. It is
therefore important that we scrutinize carefully the evidence on which the conviction is made to depend. In this case, we notice that
the conviction is mainly predicated on the testimony of one eyewitness supported by some circumstantial evidence. This witness is
Ernesto Balaktaw. Whether this witness has told the truth or not in narrating the aggression which led to the death of the victim, much
depends upon the degree of his credibility. As usual, this is the function of the trial court. Because of its opportunity to observe the
conduct, demeanor and manner of testifying of the witness, the trial court is in a better position to pass upon and gauge their
credibility.

In this respect, we notice that the trial court has been most careful in taking notice not only of the conduct of the witness during
the trial, but of other extraneous matters that may help in reaching a correct conclusion. The Court found the testimony of Balaktaw
worthy of credence not only because it is in part corroborated by the testimony of appellant Soliman himself who admitted having
inflicted the wounds that caused the death of the victim, (although by way of self-defense) but also because it is supported by the
nature of the wounds as found by Dr. Lara in his autopsy. Thus, in brushing aside the defense of appellant Soliman because the same
runs counter to the nature and character of the wounds inflicted on the deceased, the court said:

The contention of the defense that the wounds were inflicted while the deceased Ernesto Basa was struggling or grappling with
Geronimo is believed by the testimony of the medical examiner and by the nature and character of the wounds on the body of the
deceased, as may be seen in Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3. An examination of the pictures of the deceased as appears in Exhibits D-1 and
D-2, especially the wound that appears a little above the duodenum, shows clearly that the wounds were inflicted when the deceased
was in a lying position as testified to by witness for the prosecution, Ernesto Balaktaw. The wounds that may be seen under the left
armpit of the deceased could not have been possibly inflicted if the deceased was in lying position with his hand extended upwards in
self-defense.

On the other hand, the trial court made also careful observation of the conduct and demeanor of the two accused during the
trial and in this respect made the following observation:
Page1

During the course of the hearing, in order to give every iota of evidence its proper probatory value, the Court had paid special
attention to the manner in which the accused and the witnesses testified, as well as their general appearance. The accused Soliman is a
well-built man, robust and apparently strong. The accused Palin is a little bigger than the other accused and of stronger physique. The
deceased, as it appears from the pictures, while he may be slightly higher in stature than the accused Soliman, has a thinner
constitution and much smaller than the accused Palin. Judging these two accused from the manner they testified in court, their
apparent indifference to all the court proceedings in spite of the seriousness of the crime charged against them, and the manner of
testifying in short, curt and confused manner, convinced this Court that they gave little importance to the case against them and to the
proceeding in court.

The defense, however, claims that the testimony of Ernesto Balaktaw should not be given credit because it is self-contradictory
and inconsistent with the testimony of Pat. Tolentino and Det. Senen. But, aside from the fact that the alleged contradictions refer to
unimportant details or circumstances, they can be explained and reconciled. This was done by the Solicitor General in his brief. After
going over the explanation and reconciliation made by this official, we are satisfied that the alleged contradictions or inconsistencies
cannot destroy the credibility of the witness.

An important flaw pointed out by the defense refers to the manner the witness identified the two defendants. It is claimed that
when this witness was made to identify accused Soliman he pointed to accused Palin and when he was asked to identify the latter, he
pointed to the former. And he also committed a mistake in designating the nicknames of the two accused.

While it is true that at the start of his testimony this witness was confused in identifying the accused by their names, however,
when he was asked by the court immediately thereafter to put his hands on each of them, he was able to identify them correctly. The
court then made the following observation:

Witness identified both accused. At the time when he pointed to the accused he apparently made a mistake may be due to the
fact that the accused were both seated together and when he pointed to the accused he might have been out of big sense of direction.
(pp. 2-3, t.s.n., Lloren.)

The defense also claims that the trial court erred in not granting its motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
which consists of the criminal record of prosecution witness Ernesto Balaktaw. This claim is untenable. In the first place, the criminal
record of Balaktaw cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence because the same was available to the defense much prior to
the trial of this Case. It appears that said record can be obtained from the Criminal Identification Section of the Manila Police
Department for, with the exception of one conviction rendered on September 1, 1955, all the other convictions and charges date as far
back as January 19, 1955, months prior to the trial of the instant case. In the second place, the fact that a person has been previously
convicted of a crime does not necessarily disqualify him as a witness for he may still prove to be a truthful one..

The claim that the trial court also erred in not allowing the defense to prove that the deceased had a violent, quarrelsome or
provocative character cannot also deserved consideration. While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the
probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in crime of murder where the
killing is committed through treachery premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that
it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary." (Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed, Vol. 3, 126.) This rule does not apply to cases of murder.

While the Court is the opinion that the evidence is sufficient to convict both appellants of the crime charged, some members
however expressed doubt as to propriety of imposing the extreme penalty and so, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the Court
has resolved to impose upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense of imposing upon appellants merely the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, affirming the decisions in all other respects, with costs.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 28871 September 19, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CLEMENTE BABIERA, JUSTO BABIERA and DOMINGA BORES, defendants-appellants.

Zulueta and Cordova and Jesus Trinidad for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo finding them guilty of the crime of murder, the first as principal, and the last two as accomplices, sentencing the former to life
imprisonment with the accessories of article 54 of the Penal Code, and each of the latter to fourteen years, eight months and one day
cadena temporal, with the accessories of article 54 and 59 of the Penal Code, respectively, and all three to indemnify the family of the
deceased Severino Haro in the sum of P1,000 jointly and severally, and each of them to pay one-third of the costs of the action in the
justice of the peace court and the Court of First Instance.

The six alleged errors assigned by the accused as committed by the trial court in its judgment may be shifted down to the
following propositions:

1. That the evidence adduced at the trial by the prosecution has not established the guilt of the defendants-appellants beyond a
reasonable doubt.

2. The Exhibit I of the prosecution is not an ante-mortem declaration and is therefore inadmissible as evidence.

3. That the offended party's quarrelsome disposition can be proved in the trial to determine who began the attack.
Page1

Before discussing the evidence adduced by both parties and determining its weight and probatory value, it is well to decide the
questions raised by the appellants on the admissibility of evidence.
 The first question of this nature refers to the character of the document Exhibit I, which is a statement made by Severino Haro in
Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo on the morning after the crime was committed.

Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as an ante-mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is nothing to show that at the
time he made it Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at the point of death, nevertheless, having ratified its contents a
week later when he was near death as a result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible as a part of that which he made ante-
mortem "A statement made under circumstances which would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as
such, it is held, if approved or repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery." (30 Corpus Juris, 257.)

Passing now to a consideration of the evidence, the prosecution tried to proved the following facts:

Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands. On
October 19, 1922 Justo Babiera executed a contract of sale with the right of repurchase in favor of Basilio Copreros whereby he sold
the two parcels of land to the latter for the sum of P124 with the condition that if the vendor did not repurchase them on or before
August 1, 1923, the sale would become absolute and irrevocable (Exhibit F). The period for repurchase having expired, Basilio Copreros
took possession of said two parcels of land, and on March 24, 1927, made application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo
for the registration of the consolidation of his title to said parcels. On the 26th of the said month, Basilio Copreros leased said parcels
to Severino Haro, municipal president of Oton (Exhibit G and G-1). In view of this, on March 31, 1927, Justo Babiera filed a complaint
against Basilio Copreros in the justice of the peace court of Oton for the recovery of the possession of said two parcels of land. The
complaint having been dismissed on April 19, 1927 on the ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
Justo Babiera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Exhibit M). Later on, said Justo Babiera asked for the dismissal of the
complaint for unlawful detainer and filed another one for the recovery of property (Exhibit F). Inasmuch as Severino Haro was already
in possession of the aforesaid two parcels of land as lessee, he bore all the expenses in the case of unlawful detainer as well as in that
for recovery of the property.

Fermin Bruces was Severino Haro's copartner on shares in said lands. About the month of May, 1927, Justo Babiera accompanied
by his copartner on shares, Rosendo Paycol, went to where Fermin Bruces was plowing and asked the latter: "Who told you to plow
here?" Fermin Bruces replied: "Severino Haro." Then Justo Babiera asked him: "If this Severino tells you to kill yourself, will you do it?"
"Of course not," answered Fermin Bruces. After this interchange of words Justo Babiera told Fermin Bruces to stop plowing and to tell
his master, Severino Haro, to come and plow himself. Fermin Bruces informed Severino Haro of the incident, and in answer the latter
only told him not to mind it, but to go on plowing.

On another occasion while Fermin Bruces was transplanting rice on the same lands, Clemente Babiera and Rosendo Paycol
arrived and told him that if he continued working they would pull out someone's intestines. Fermin Bruces also informed Severino Haro
of these threats, who as before, told him not to mind them, but to go on sowing.

On July 23, 1927, Jose Haro, brother of Severino Haro, visited his land in the barrio of Bita, which was under the care of
Victoriano Randoquile. He was told by the latter that he lacked palay seeds. At that time, Rosendo Paycol was in his field, Jose Haro and
Victoriano Randoquile approached him and asked him to give them some seeds. Rosendo Paycol answered that he could not do so
because he needed what he had for his own farms. Haro and Randoquile then asked him: "Which fields do you mean?" "The fields over
which Copreros and Babiera are in litigation," answered Rosendo Paycol. Surprised at this answer, Jose Haro told Rosendo Paycol that
what he said could not be because the lot in dispute was leased to his brother Severino Haro. Rosendo Paycol replied that attorney
Buenaventura Cordova had told Clemente Babiera and Justo Babiera that Severino Haro would never be able to reap or enjoy the fruits
of the land, because if they did not win the suit by fair means they would win it by foul.

Ever since he had leased said land Severino Haro visited it rather often, especially during the months of June and July, which is
the sowing season, trying always to return to town early. To go to the land, which was in the barrio called Bita, there was but a beaten
path that passed by the house of Rosendo Paycol, copartner on shares of Justo Babiera, where the latter and his family lived.

On August 21, 1927, Severino Haro, as usual, went to visit his land in the barrio of Bita, accompanied by Gregorio Torrija, Benito
Carreon and Pedro Tauro. On arriving there Fermin Bruces, his copartner on shares, told him that the day before he had found
Clemente Babiera's cow grazing on that land. It happened at that moment Clemente Babiera and Dominga Bores were passing by.
Severino Haro then informed Clemente Babiera of what his cow had done on the former's land and told him to take better care of his
cow in future and not to let it run loose. He then ordered Fermin Bruces to take the animal to where the Babiera family lived. Severino
Haro was not able to return to town until almost 7 o'clock in the evening. As it was already dark, he and his companions had to make
use of a torch made out of split bamboo to light them on their way. Severino Haro went ahead, followed by Pedro Tauro, who carried
the torch, some 8 brazas behind, with Gregorio Torrija and Benito Carreon following. On Coming to a place in the road near Rosendo
Paycol's house, Clemente Babiera suddenly sprang from the cogon grass, went after Severino Haro and struck him with his bolo in the
back. On turning his head to see who had attacked him Severino Haro received another bolo blow in the forehead near the right
eyebrow. In trying to defend himself with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the thumb. He then tried to grasp
his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then Justo Babiera appeared and placing himself upon Severino Haro's
stomach, held the latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores appeared on the scene and held both knees of the wounded man. When Justo
Babiera arrived, a voice was heard saying: "Hold him, papa," and at the same time, Severino Haro's voice was heard saying: "Help!
help!" Pedro Tauro wished to come near in order to help Severino Haro, but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo in the air and kept on
brandishing it to warn everybody off. Pedro Tauro, in fear, stepped back, dropping the torch he carried. Not far from there were also
Buenaventura Gabalfin and Gregorio Paycol, who threatened to kill Severino Haro's companions if they helped him. After the torch had
been extinguished they heard a voice which they recognized as Severino Haro's saying: "Uncle Justo, have patience with me, for I have
done no wrong." Then they heard another voice, that of Dominga Bores, which said: "Here is the revolver; let us return." Before the
assailants left two or three revolver shots were heard. When Severino Haro's companions saw that their assailants had already
departed, they drew near to where Severino lay stretched out to see what had happened to him. Severino Haro told them not to fear
for he did not feel as if he were going to die, and calling his copartner on shares, Fermin Bruces, directed him to bring a cot and take
him to town. Pedro Tauro and Gregorio Torrija did as Severino Haro wished, and on arriving at the barrio of Santa Monica, they by
chance came upon a truck in which were some policemen. They place the wounded man in the same truck and took him to Saint Paul's
Hospital in the City of Iloilo. When Severino Haro was taken to the town he did not have his revolver and the cartridge belt, without the
holster, was found by Gregorio Torrija near where the incident took place.
Page1

When Severino Haro was already in Saint Paul's Hospital he was examined by Dr. Mariano Arroy, who issued a certificate stating
that he found the following wounds: Three on the right frontal regions; one on the right forehead taking in the soft parts up to the
auditory arch; on the right palmar arch; another on the left arm; a deep one reaching down to the spinal column on the four slight
wounds on the right thigh; the ones on the forehead and the dorsal region being mortal of necessity. All the wounds were caused, in
the doctor's opinion, by a sharp-edged and pointed weapon, and while the combatants were on the same plane, except the wounds on
the middle of the calf which must have been caused while the assaulted party was on a lower plane than his assailant, and the wounds
on the right thigh, which must have been inflicted while the assailant was on a horizontal plane.

On the same morning, August 22, 1927, and in the same hospital, Severino Haro made a sworn statement before the deputy
fiscal, Edmundo S. Piccio (Exhibit I), relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who were present. This sworn statement was
ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal on the 27th of the said month and year when he had given up all hope of recovery.

In this statement, Exhibit I, Severino Haro, among other things, said the following:

"Without warning, I received a slash on the left shoulder. On turning back my face, I saw Clemente Babiera, and he then gave me
another slash on the forehead just above the right eyebrow. At that moment I also received a cut on the right hand, because on
receiving the blow on the forehead I defended myself with that hand. I then grasped him because I could no longer support myself due
to my two wounds. Then I fell. When I fell, Clemente Babiera's father placed himself upon my stomach, while his (Clemente's) wife sat
on my feet, while Justo Babiera, Clemente's father, grasped my two hands and said to me, "There, now draw your revolver" addressing
me. I shouted to my companion for help, for I felt I would die and while they approached, Clemente Babiera turned upon them, and
said: "Do not approach for you have nothing to do with this. Whoever comes near gets a slash from this bolo." I shammed death and
when they left me, and upon seeing that neither Clemente, nor his father, nor his wife remained, my three companions came up to me
from their hiding places. One Aunario, copartner on shares of Jose Abada, who lived near there, also came up to me, and later,
Fermin."

In his ante-mortem declaration made on the 27th of August, 1927 before the same deputy fiscal, Severino Haro, among other
things, said the following:

"They repeatedly passed their fingers over my upper lip and at the same time see if I still breathed; they felt and opened my
eyelids and then inserted a finger in my pupil, because they believed that if I was insensible, I was already dead. They knelt on my
stomach and one knelt on my lower limbs, and made a pass with something, which seems to me was bamboo or a bolo, over the
anterior surface of my calf, and Dominga then took the revolver from me. I got up because I was afraid Dominga would shoot me and
when I attempted to escape Clemente Babiera pursued me and gave me another cut on the left side of the waist, and I think the blow
struck the ammunition belt, and if it had not been for the belt it would have severed my waist."

The defense tried to prove the following facts:

On the afternoon of August 21, 1927 Clemente Babiera went to a place called Caboloan, passing by the house of one Oper,
located in the barrio of Bita, Oton, Iloilo. While he was in Oper's house, his father Justo Babiera arrived, and some moments later
Severino Haro also arrived, and at once said to him: "Clemente, why do you leave your cow loose?" Clemente denied the imputation
and said that his cow was tied. Severino Haro insisted, and added that said animal had damaged his sugar-cane plantation, and
therefore, Fermin Bruces, his copartner on shares caught and tied it, by his order, to a mango tree. Clemente Babiera answered that he
left the case in his hands and that he could charge him what he would, for the damages occasioned by his cow. As Severino Haro
charged him P2 for the damage, Clemente told him that at the moment he had no money, but that on the following day he would get
money from the town market and pay him. Severino Haro accepted the promise and left. Clemente Babiera in turn retired to his house,
together with Dominga Bores and his father, and upon reaching a coconut palm they met Fermin Bruces, copartner on shares with
Severino Haro, who told them that he had already tied up the cow as per his master's order. At about 7 o'clock in the evening while
Clemente Babiera was in his house conversing with his father about the land which they had in Caboloan, which was attached by the
Government, he suddenly heard a commotion; he went to the porch of the house to see what had happened and saw a number of
persons coming one carrying a light and another leading his cow by rope. Clemente Babiera told his father what he saw and went out
to meet said persons, and saw Buenaventura Cabalfin leading his cow by the rope and Severino Haro followed by his companions
Pedro Tauro, Gregorio Torrija, Benito Carreon, Margarito Mediavilla and Fermin Bruces. Clemente Babiera then asked Severino Haro:
"Why are you taking my cow away? Haven't I promised to pay you tomorrow the loss caused by the animal? If you have no confidence
in me, then prepare a receipt showing that tomorrow without fail, I will pay you." In reply, Severino Haro only said to Buenaventura
Cabalfin: "Get on, proceed." Clemente Babiera took hold of the rope by which the cow was led, and said: "Buenaventura, stop!"
Severino Haro then grasped Clemente Babiera by the hand and pulled him to one side. Clemente Babiera disengaged himself from
Severino Haro's grasp, but Margarito Mediavilla struck him with a bolo at the base of his little finger. Feeling himself wounded,
Clemente Babiera tried to unsheathe his bolo intending to return the blow to Margarito Mediavilla but failed to do so, because he
heard someone say: "Shoot him!" Immediately thereafter he saw Severino Haro with revolver unholstered, and without any loss of
time he went up to the latter and at that moment shots were heard. Clemente Babiera then began to slash blindly right and left
without considering what he was at, catching Severino Haro in the back, as a result of which the latter fell to the ground on his back.
Clemente Babiera threw himself upon him, held him down so he could not get up, and asked him: "Where is your revolver?" Severino
Haro answered that he did not have it. Then Clemente Babiera raised Severino Haro's hands and felt his back, but did not find the
revolver. Justo Babiera, Clemente's father, then appeared, and was told by his son: "Papa, hold him, while I search for his revolver."
When Clemente Babiera saw Fermin Bruces he thought that the latter meant to attack him because he had one hand behind, where he
carried his bolo, so Severino turned on him, but his wife, Dominga Bores, restrained him telling him not to approach. One Nario also
wanted to approach in order to defend Severino Haro but dared not do so in view of Clemente Babiera's threats. After having made
fruitless search for Severino Haro's revolver, Clemente Babiera, his father, and his wife went back to their house.

After charging Rosendo Paycol with the care of the children, the three went to town and passed the night in Florencio
Mayordomo's house. On the following morning Dominga Bores went to attorney Buenaventura Cordova's house and informed him of
what had happened. Buenaventura Cordova then went to Florencio Mayordomo's house and told Dominga Bores to return to the place
of the incident in order to look for the revolver and deliver it to the Constabulary if she found it. Then he accompanied Clemente
Babiera to the office of Captain Gatuslao of the Constabulary at Fort San Pedro, to whom they delivered the holster of the revolver and
the three shells they had picked up on the night of the incident. Dominga Bores having found the revolver in a furrow near the place of
the crime took it to Iloilo and delivered it to Captain Gatuslao of the Constabulary between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning.

Dr. Jose Gonzales Roxas, Constabulary physician, treated Clemente Babiera's wound and certified that the same was 2
Page1

centimeters long and half a centimeter deep and was situated at the base of the little finger of the right hand, taking in the cellular
tissue of the skin and the exterior ligament of the wrist.
 In rebuttal, the prosecution tried to prove that at about half past five in the morning of August 22, 1927, Dominga Bores was
seen in the ground floor of the provincial government building of Iloilo, carrying a package under her arm and from there she went to
the public market of Iloilo.

There is no question that Severino Haro had leased from Basilio Copreros two parcels of land the ownership of which had passed
to him due to Justo Babiera's failure to repurchase them within the stipulated period. Nor is there any question that the latter tried to
recover them, first, by an accion publiciana (action for unlawful detainer), and then by an action for the recovery of possession. There
is likewise no question that Severino Haro paid the expenses of the defendant Basilio Copreros for the reason that he was already in
possession of said lands as lessee. There is also no question that Clemente Babiera's cow damaged the plantings of Fermin Bruce, for
which reason the letter caught said cow, tied it, and notified his master of the matter when the latter went to visit the lands leased by
him. Neither is there any question that there was an agreement between Clemente Babiera and Severino Haro whereby the latter
ordered his copartner on shares Fermin Bruces, to take the cow near Clemente Babiera's house and tie it up there. In like manner there
is no question that at about 7 o'clock in the evening of August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions were returning to the
town of Oton, and upon their coming near Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente Babiera, his father Justo Babiera, and his
mistress Dominga Bores, said Severino Haro had an encounter with Clemente Babiera in which Severino Haro received several wounds
in consequence of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo.

The only question to determine in the present appeal is whether, as the prosecution contends, Severino Haro was suddenly and
treacherously attacked by Clemente Babiera, aided by his father and his mistress Dominga Bores; or, as the defense contends, Severino
Haro notwithstanding the agreement between himself and Clemente Babiera by which the latter was to indemnify him for the
damages caused by his cow, wanted to take the animal to town; that in trying to prevent it, Clemente Babiera was grasped by the hand
by Severino Haro and pulled to one side; that in disengaging himself Clemente Babiera received a bolo cut from Margarito Mediavilla
that wounded the little finger of his right hand; and that Severino Haro then unsheathed his revolver and fired several shots, in view of
which Clemente Babiera struck right and left with his bolo, thus causing the former's wounds.

In order to decide the question thus raised, it is necessary to take into account all the circumstances, previous, coetaneous and
subsequently to the incident in question, and to determine who had, or could have had, motives to assault the other.

We have seen that Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio Copreros with the right of repurchase, and that, having failed
to repurchase them within the period stipulated, the title thereto was consolidated, in the purchaser, who leased them to Severino
Haro, the latter taking possession of them. Justo Babiera restored to every lawful means to regain possession of said parcels of land,
first by an accion publiciana, which failed, and then by an action for the recovery of possession. Severino Haro paid the expenses of
Basilio Copreros in order to carry on the suits. Such interested intervention on Severino Haro's part without doubt must have vexed
Justo Babiera, for in the month of May 1927, he went with his copartner on shares, Rosendo Paycol, to where Fermin Bruces, Severino
Haro's copartner, was plowing, and asked him who had ordered him there, and when Fermin Bruces answered that it was Severino
Haro, Justo asked him whether he would commit suicide if told to do so by said Severino Haro, and then told him to tell his master to
go and plow himself. Later on, Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera's son, accompanied by his copartner Rosendo Paycol, seeing that
Fermin Bruces went on working the land, told him that if he continued plowing, Clemente would pull out someone's intestines. If all
these threats are true, as we believe they are, then Justo Babiera and Clemente Babiera must have borne Severino Haro deep
resentment, doubtless believing that it was due to him that they could not recover their two parcels of land, and this was sufficient and
adequate to move them, upon the failure of lawful means, to resort to violence.

It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-appellant, Clemente Babiera, only acted in defense of his life and
property, having been obliged to resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that the provocation consisted in that after
Severino Haro had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage caused, the latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's cow to the town,
and that the attack consisted in that Margarito Mediavilla gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the right hand, and that Severino
Haro threatened him with his revolver and fired several shots at him.

Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's alleged attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's
cow after having agreed to accept P2 for the damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its owner, is highly illogical,
and not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain this change of determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable.

With respect to the allegation that Margarito Mediavilla and Severino Haro began the attack, inasmuch as it has not been proved
that they were the instigators, it cannot be conceived that they committed said unlawful aggression, for he who has no reason to
provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully.

The defense also attempted to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of
starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it.

While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have been of
a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated
and specific acts (Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the
lower court did not err in not admitting such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of
such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who
treacherously attacked the deceased.

Another circumstance which shows the falsity of the theory of the defense is that of having made Buenaventura Cabalfin take
part as the person whom Severino Haro employed to lead Clemente Babiera's cow. If Severino Haro's copartner, Fermin Bruces, whom
he had told to return said cow to Clemente Babiera was with his master on that night, together with other companions, what need was
there of said Severino Haro's employing the services of another person and one not belonging to his group? The plan of the defense
necessitated a provocation and to that end they conceived the idea of the breach of the supposed agreement on the return of the
animal through the payment of an indemnity of P2, making use as an instrument of one on whom the defense could depend to serve
as witness, and there was no one better suited for such a purpose than Buenaventura Cabalfin who according to the witnesses for the
prosecution, was at the place of the crime with Gregorio Paycol threatening the deceased's friends if they offered to help him.

To rebut the evidence of the prosecution that Dominga Bores was the one who by order of Clemente Babiera took Severino
Haro's revolver from him on the night in question, the defense tried to prove that on the following morning attorney Buenaventura
Page1

Cordova, a relative of the Babieras, told Dominga Bores to return to the place of the incident and look for said weapon, and that she
found it in a furrow near the place and took it to the office of the Constabulary in Iloilo between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning. But
the rebuttal evidence of the prosecution disproved this contention and showed that Dominga Bores did not have to look for the
revolver in the field, since at half past five in the morning she was already in the provincial building of Iloilo carrying a package under
her arm.

With regard to the small wound at the base of the little finger of the right hand which Clemente Babiera showed to the
Constabulary physician as having been caused by Margarito Mediavilla, we are convinced that the latter was not in the company of
Severino Haro on the night in question and could not have inflicted such a wound. Bearing in mind the plan of the defense, it may
safely be said that in order to cast an appearance of reality on the concocted plea of an unlawful attack and self-defense, Clemente
Babiera inflicted on himself the slight wound; since, if in order to escape military service there were men who mutilated themselves,
who would not wound himself slightly in order to escape a life penalty?

The facts related above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and constitute the crime of murder defined in article 403
of the Penal Code, there being present at the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery, consisting in the
accused Clemente Babiera having attacked Severino Haro suddenly while the latter had his back turned, inflicting various wounds on
his body as a result of which he died a week later, said Clemente Babiera being criminally liable as principal by direct participation.

Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores are also liable but as accomplices, because, while they did not take a direct part in the infliction
of the wounds that caused Severino Haro's death, or cooperated by acts without which they could not have been inflicted, or induced
Clemente Babiera to inflict them, yet they took part in the commission of the crime by simultaneous acts consisting in the former
having mounted Severino Haro's body and held down his hands, while the latter sat on his knees while he lay stretched out on the
ground in order to allow Clemente Babiera to search the body for his revolver, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores cannot be held as
accomplices of the crime of murder, inasmuch as it does not appear to have been proven that they knew the manner in which
Clemente Babiera was going to assault Severino Haro, in accordance with the provision of article 79 of the Penal Code, to the effect
that the circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the act or their cooperation therein.
Although in the instant case the treachery is not considered a generic aggravating, but a qualifying circumstance, nevertheless, it does
not fail to produce a special aggravation.

To graduate the penalty, we are not to consider any modifying circumstance of the criminal liability, for while it is true that
Clemente Babiera took advantage of the darkness of nighttime, this circumstance is included in treachery, inasmuch as, considering the
fact that Severino Haro was followed by several companions, the accused would not have been able to conceal himself in the cogon
grass nor attack the deceased from behind without being seen in time and prevented from executing his criminal purpose had not been
for the darkness of the night.

The penalty provided by law for the crime of murder namely, that of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to death must
therefore be imposed upon Clemente Babiera in its medium degree, that is, life imprisonment.

The penalty provided for in article 404 of the Penal Code for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal in its full extent, and the
one next lower is prision mayor in its full extent, which is the penalty that must be imposed on Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores as
accomplices in the crime of homicide (art. 67, Penal Code). In graduating the penalty, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity must
be taken into consideration, without any extenuating circumstances to offset it, and therefore said penalty of prision mayor must be
imposed in its maximum degree, that is, ten years and 1 day.

As there are three persons civilly liable, one as principal in the crime of murder and two as accomplices in that of homicide, we
must fix the share, for which each must answer, of the P1,000 fixed by the trial court, in accordance with the provision of article 124 of
the Penal Code, that is, P600 for Clemente Babiera and P400 for Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores, each of the latter being liable
solidarily between themselves for their share, and subsidiarily liable for the share of the former and the former for the share of the
latter, according to the provision of article 125 of the same Code.

By virtue whereof, the appealed judgment is hereby modified, and it is held that Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores are guilty of
the crime of homicide as accomplices and each sentenced to ten years and 1 day prision mayor, and to pay the sum of P400 jointly and
severally, and Clemente Babiera to pay the sum of P600, the former to be subsidiarily liable for the latter's share, and the latter for the
former's share, payment to be made to the heirs of the deceased Severino Haro, the appealed judgment being affirmed in all other
respects with the proportional costs against each. So ordered.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8332 November 13, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and

CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants.

Eugenio Paguia, for appellants

Officee of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan. On the
13th of March, 1912, one Claro Mercado presented a complaint against the defendants in the court of the justice of the peace of
Baliuag. The justice of the peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that there was probable cause for believing that the
defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held them for trial in the Court of First Instance. On the 21st of March, 1912, the
Page1

prosecuting attorney of said province presented the complaint, which alleged:

 That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and
criminally, without legitimate authority therefore, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro Mercado,
prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria
R. Mateo, in a violation of law.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, found the
defendants guilty of the crime in the complaint, without any aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced each of them to
be imprisoned for a period of two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 325
pesetas and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, allowing to the defendants one-half of the time they had already
suffered in prison, and each to pay one-third part of the costs. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to this court and
made the following assignments of error:

I. The trial court erred in overruling the objection of the accused to the private prosecutor's question referring to the
character of the witness.

II. The trial court erred in reaching the conclusion that the crime prosecuted was committed and that the accused are
responsible therefor.

III. The trial court erred in sentencing the accused.

IV. The trial court erred in not having the accused testify in their own behalf, as they offered to do, allowing them to testify
in the same way as he did the sole witness for the defense.

With reference to the first assignment of error, we find by referring to page 75 of the record, that Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez
Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense, the said Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the
complaint presented in said cause, the following question:

How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other persons?

To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret
explained the purpose of his question by saying:

I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion to defend him in various causes for assault.

Upon the question and the objection Judge Barretto ruled that "the character of the witness has an intimate relation or
may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause. The objection is overruled."

To that ruling of the court the defendant duly accepted. Said exception is assigned here as the first assignment of error. The
only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of error is that the question had no relation to the question
which was being discussed by the court and id not tend to show that the defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the crime
charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial. In reply to the argument of the appellant, the
Attorney-General contends that the question was a proper question, because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness and
that such questions were for that purpose material and pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged that on the
occasion when the alleged crime was committed Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one Maria R. Mateo.
In answer to said question, the witness admitted that complaint had been presented against him for the offense of assault and battery.

The prosecution, in order to show the circumstances under which the crime charged here was actually committed, showed
that this witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria R. Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint.
That was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually take place, then the theory of the prosecution must fail. If there was no
assault or attempted assault, there was no occasion for the alleged interference on the part of the said Claro Mercado to prevent it,
and the probability of the guilt of the defendants is greatly lessened. If the witness who had committed the alleged assault, had
assaulted other persons and had been prosecuted therefor, may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof and in
testing the credibility of the witness? It was an important fact to prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place mentioned in the
complaint, had assaulted or attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, in order to show that there was occasion for the inference
of Claro Mercado.lawph!1.net

Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing (a)
that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad.
(Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made
contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the
credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty,
or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that
he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above
related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is
used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in
guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. The
question now arises, did the admission of the question prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there was proof enough adduced
during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the
crime. then the question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the
defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the
court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in
the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The
admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.

The second and third assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the proof adduced during the trial of the cause to
show that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged. A question of fact only is raised by these assignments of error. After a
careful examination of the proof, we are convinced that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants are each
Page1

guilty in the manner and form charged in the complaint. We find no reason for modifying the conclusions of fact reached by the lower
court.
 With reference to the fourth assignment of error, an examination of the record shows that but one witness was examined
for the defense: that was the said Santiago Mercado. At the close of the examination of said witness, we find the following statement
by the accused:

The accused state that should they testify they would testify in the same way as the witness Santiago R. Mercado, with
whose testimony they close their evidence.

Both parties close their evidence.

Even admitting that the accused, had they testified, would have made the same declarations as those by the only witness,
Santiago Mercado, we are of the opinion that such declarations would not have been sufficient, inasmuch as they would have added
nothing to the record, except an accumulation of proof, to have shown that the defendants were not guilty of the crime charged. We
find no reason in the fourth assignments of error for modifying the conclusions of the lower court.

After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the sentence of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 159950 February 12, 2007

JOEL P. GONZALES, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated March 11, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22157, affirming the
guilty verdict against petitioner for arson by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97.

Petitioner Joel P. Gonzales, Jr.2 was charged in an Information3 dated July 24, 1997, which read as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of June, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and deliberately set fire to an inhabited place, to wit: a two-storey residential building which [was] partitioned into
dwellings rented out to tenants, owned and occupied likewise by CARLOS C. CANLAS, located at No. 120 corner Halcon and Simon
Streets, Brgy. San Isidro Labrador, La Loma, Quezon City, thereby setting said residential building into flames and razing it including
other properties; and that the properties that were burned with their corresponding owners and value were as follows:

1. The residential building and other property owned by Carlos C. Canlas valued at . . . .P3,000,000.00

2. Property of Nicasio M. de Jesus valued at . . . 800,000.00

3. Property of Andres V. Villaflor valued at . . . 350,000.00

4. Property of Gloria V. Lacasandile valued at. . . 350,000.00

5. Property of Carmen B. Principio valued at . . . 300,000.00

6. Property of Dante L. Buri valued at . . . . . . 185,000.00

7. Property of Francis F. Simpao valued at . . . . 170,000.00

8. Property of Luisito C. Abonita valued at . . . . 150,000.00

9. Property of Miraflor Saldi Manuel valued at . . 100,000.00

10. Property of Estrella C. Villaflor valued at . . 60,000.00

with the total of FIVE MILLION, FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND (P5,465,000.00), all belonging to the aforesaid persons,
to the damage and prejudice of said owners in the aforesaid amount of P5,465,000.00, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty.

At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented eyewitness Carlos C. Canlas, owner of the two-storey building in the corner of
Halcon Street and Simon Street, Brgy. San Isidro Labrador, La Loma, Quezon City. He testified that at about 9:30 p.m. on June 26, 1997,
he was watching television in his room when his daughter called his attention to check the commotion in an adjacent room. On his way
to the room rented by Gonzales, he smelled gas. He saw Gonzales ignite a flame and throw it on a pile of clothes in the middle of the
living room where Gonzales had also placed an M-Gas liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tank. Fire quickly spread to the other parts of the
building.

The prosecution also presented two tenants, Andres V. Villaflor and Francis F. Simpao, as witnesses. Villaflor testified that he
heard Gonzales and his aunt quarreling before the fire. He said he heard Gonzales yell "Susunugin ko itong bahay na ito!" Alarmed, he
went to the Barangay Hall to report the incident but immediately went back to his place when someone informed him his house was
on fire. Simpao testified that he saw the fire coming from Gonzales’s room. He added that Gonzales was laughing while the building
was burning. After the fire was extinguished, the aunt of Gonzales told Simpao that her nephew was to blame.
Page1

The testimonies were corroborated by Police Officer Alejandro Mendoza, who testified that when he and his fellow officer
arrived at the crime scene, Gonzales admitted responsibility for the fire.
 Gonzales presented a different story. He averred that the fire was caused by faulty electrical wiring. He testified that he was
napping inside his room when he was awakened by heat beside his bed. The room was on fire. He shouted for help and Canlas tried to
help him but they failed to extinguish it.

Gonzales denied he and his aunt were quarreling that evening before the fire started. As his aunt was partly deaf, he said he had
to speak in a loud voice. He averred that he merely asked his aunt to buy food because they ran out of M-Gas LPG. Gonzales said that
when he met PO1 Mendoza, he explained that he noticed the fire had started in his room. He sought police protection from his
neighbors who accused him of starting it.

The defense presented as exhibit the Physical Science Report4 prepared by Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio showing that the
ashes obtained from the burnt premises were negative of any flammable substance.

On May 28, 1998, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 97 rendered a decision convicting Joel P. Gonzales, Jr. of arson, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, with full credit for the entire period of preventive imprisonment provided he
is qualified therefore (sic) according to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Civil liability not having been proved, the Court cannot grant
the same and can only award nominal damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each to the private complainants
who testified, namely, Carlos Canlas, Andres Villaflor and Francis Simpao.

SO ORDERED.5

Gonzales appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. In its Decision dated March 11, 2003, the Court
of Appeals held that the denial of Gonzales cannot prevail over the positive identification of a witness. The Court of Appeals also held
that the prosecution established circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals noted that although there were discrepancies in the testimony of Canlas and his affidavits, the discrepancies did
not necessarily discredit him because affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open
court. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the alleged discrepancies pertain to minor matters which negated any suspicion that
the testimony was perjured and rehearsed.

Gonzales moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, petitioner now raises the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CORRECTLY IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PERTINENT RULE AND JURISPRUDENCE
WHERE THERE ARE MATERIAL DISCREPANCIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES’ STATEMENTS MADE IN THEIR AFFIDAVITS AND
THOSE TESTIMONIES GIVEN ON THE WITNESS STAND;

II

WHETHER UPON THE AFORESTATED GIVEN SET OF FACTS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CORRECTLY IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CHARGE OF ARSON.6

Stated simply, in our view, the main issue is whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and the court testimonies of a witness are
sufficient to exculpate Gonzales of the crime of arson.

Petitioner argues that the trial court and the appellate court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witness
Canlas. He claims that the sworn statements of Canlas before the investigating officer of the fire department on June 27, 1997 and
before the city prosecutor of Quezon City on July 17, 1997, were inconsistent. Further, petitioner adds that Canlas had testified that he
saw petitioner start the fire, but Canlas’s testimony on this point was made only for the first time in court. Petitioner points out that in
the two prior sworn statements of Canlas, he made no mention of seeing petitioner start the fire. This discrepancy is a material point
that ought to cast doubt on the credibility of Canlas. He cites People v. Salik Magonawal,7 where the material discrepancies between
the court testimony and prior statements of a witness at a preliminary investigation made the testimony incredible.

Petitioner seeks to discredit the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses for being self-serving and ill-motivated. He avers
that both the trial court and the appellate court failed to consider the Physical Science Report which stated that no flammable
substance was found in the specimen ashes.

Finally, petitioner claims that although he had in the past threatened to burn the house, he never really meant it.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
should stand because their findings are well supported by the records.

The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses and their sworn statements were not substantial to
warrant a review of the findings of fact of the trial court. The OSG asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified, corroborated
and complemented his affidavit. Likewise, the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses corroborated Canlas’s testimony.

The OSG rebuts petitioner’s dependence on the case of People v. Acosta,8 where the court held that evidence that one did or did
not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time, but, it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, habit, custom or usage.

After thoroughly considering the submissions including testimonies and exhibits presented by the parties, we hold that the
instant petition lacks merit.

The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is covered by Section 3(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1613.9 In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus
Page1

delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson,
the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.10 When
these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parteare inferior to
testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate,11sometimes from partial suggestions
and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject.12

In this case, the eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts
found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. As a general rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this Court will
not reverse their findings of fact.

Furthermore, in our view, the findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative evidence and taken together with the bare
denial of petitioner, supported only with testimonies of relatives, constitute inferior evidence as against the circumstantial evidence
coupled with the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible witness.

On the damages, we have consistently held that proof is required to determine the reasonable amount of damages that may be
awarded to the victims of conflagration. As a rule, therefore, actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely
alleged.13 The records do not show concrete proof of the amount of actual damages suffered by each complaining witness. Thus, we
cannot grant actual damages. However, we may award nominal and temperate damages.

The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the trial court according to the circumstances of the case.
Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the
injured party. However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in
such a case, the law presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages are not proven. In truth, nominal damages are
damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the
existence of a technical injury.14

Now, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot from the nature of the case be proved with certainty.15 Under the circumstances, we find it reasonable to award Canlas with
P500,000 temperate damages, and to the other complaining witnesses, Simpao and Villaflor, the amount of P100,000 as temperate
damages each. In addition, exemplary or corrective damages should be awarded as a way to emphasize that any future conduct of this
nature is condemned so as to correct the anti-social behavior that is deleterious in its consequences.16 Thus, Canlas and the other
complaining witnesses, Simpao and Villaflor, should be awarded P50,000 each as exemplary damages.

Concerning the penalty to be imposed, Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporalto reclusion
perpetua. But there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum prison term should be within the range of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor and the maximum, twenty (20) years ofreclusion temporal. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
accused ought to be modified correspondingly.1awphi1.net

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 11, 2003 of the Court of Appeals sustaining the conviction by the RTC finding the
accused-petitioner guilty of the crime of arson of an inhabited dwelling is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. He is hereby sentenced to
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum, with full credit for the entire period of preventive imprisonment provided he is qualified therefor
according to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to his civil liability, he is ordered to pay temperate damages in the amount of P500,000 to Carlos C. Canlas, the owner of the
burnt premises, and P100,000 each to Francis F. Simpao and Andres V. Villaflor, together with exemplary damages of P50,000 to each
of them. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

E. HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE

G.R. No. 74065 February 27, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Page1

vs.

NERIO GADDI y CATUBAY, defendant-appellant.

 The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizen Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.

CORTES, J.:

Nerio Gaddi y Catubay was charged with murder for the death of one Augusto Esguerra y Navarro in an information which reads
as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about the 11th day of December, 1981, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, without any justifiable cause, qualified with treachery and with evident pre-meditation (sic), did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one AUGUSTO ESGUERRA y NAVARRO, by
then and there stabbing him several times with a knife, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
offended party in such amount as maybe awarded under the provision of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [Rollo, p. 15.]

After arraignment, wherein Gaddi pleaded not guilty, and trial Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City handed down a verdict of guilt for the crime charged, the decretal portion of which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused NERIO GADDI y CATUBAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as
charged in the information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to
pay his heirs of Augusta Esguerra the sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 31.]

On appeal to this Court, Gaddi assigns as errors of the trial court the following:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ERNESTO GUZMAN AND IN TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON HIS WRITTEN STATEMENT (EXH. "F") WHICH IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PRE-MEDITATION
[Rollo, p. 38.]

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses before the court a quo, namely: Ernesto Guzman, Pat, Arturo Angeles, Cpl. Rogello
Castillo, Pat. Jesus Patriarca and Dr. Gregorio C. Blanco. On the other hand, the accused Gaddi was the sole witness presented for the
defense. The prosecution's version of the facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 11, 1981, at San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw
appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, December 12, 1981, appellant
told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised
appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman went to the police and reported what appellant told him (pp. 2-3. tsn,
September 2, 1982; pp. 2-8. tsn, August 9, 1983).

At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, December 12, 1981, Corporal Rogelio Castillo and Detective Rodrigo
Salamat arrested appellant at Manrey Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City. Appellant told Corporal Castillo that he killed the victim
and where he buried the body. Later, Pat. Jesus Patriarca arrived. Appellant himself led the policeman and Barangay residents to where
the body was in a toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman. The policeman, with the help of the Barangay residents, dug out the
body. The body of the victim was Identified by Ernesto Guzman, his wife, and Jose Esguerra, victim's brother. Pat. Patriarca took
pictures of the body (Exhibits C to C-5), noted the statements of Ernesto Guzman and Jose Esguerra, (Exhibit D), and took down the
confession of appellant (Exhibit F). Later, the cadaver was subjected to autopsy (pp. 3-13, tsn, August 24, 1983; pp. 3-22, tsn, January 3,
1984).

A man's T-shirt with collar, colored yellow, red and blue, and red shorts, were recovered from the pit where the body of the
victim was dug out. The T-shirt and shorts were Identified by Ernesto Guzman as those worn by appellant while he was drinking with
the victim on December 11, 1981 (pp. 2-3, tsn, September 2, 1982). A small table, rubber slipper, bottle of wine and glass were likewise
recovered from the same pit. (p. 6, tsn, July 14, 1983). [Brief for the Appellee, pp. 35; Rollo, p. 52.1

On the other hand, the defense's version of the facts are as follows:

Accused Nerio Gaddi a resident of Novaliches, Quezon City, testified that on December 11, 1981, at around 2:00 to 5:00 p.m., he
was drinking with Augusta Esguerra (Bong Kuleleng) near the house of Ernesto Guzman. At about 5:00 p.m., be was requested by
Page1

Ernesto Guzman to buy gin. He left Ernesto Guzman and Augusta Esguerra (who were allegedly drinking) in order to buy a bottle of gin
in a nearby store, about 200 meters away. At the store, he met an acquaintance and they talked for a while before returning. Upon his
arrival at the place (where they had a drinking spree) he noticed stain of blood in the place where they had been drinking and Augusta
Esguerra, alias Bong Kuleleng was not there anymore. He inquired from Ernesto Guzman the whereabouts of Augusta Esguerra and was
told that the latter "went home already". He then asked Guzman about the blood and was told that it was the blood stain of a
"butchered chicken." At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, Ernesto Guzman informed him about the killing of Augusta Esguerra. Guzman
narrated to him that Bong Kuleleng (Augusta Esguerra) held his rooster by the neck and that his tattoo mark BCJ (Batang City Jail) will
be erased by him. He did not report the killing to the authorities. Guzman likewise requested ban to admit the killing but he refused.
While in the house, Guzman filed the case ahead. He was later arrested and investigated while looking for the corpse. When brought to
the police station, he was forced to admit the killing of Augusto Esguerra (TSN, pp. 3-14 August 20, 1984). [Appellant's Brief, p. 4-5;
Rollo, p. 38.]

The Court finds the instant appeal unmeritorious.

Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial evidence, as in this case, it is essential for the validity of
such conviction that: 1) there be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt [Section 5, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Court, People v. Modesto, G.R. No. L-25484, September 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 36; People v. Pajanustan, G.R. No. L-38162,
May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 699.] Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will
suffice for any case, yet all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty [People v.
Constante, G.R. No. L-14639, December 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 653; People v. Caneda, G.R. No. L-19132, September 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 9.]

In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficiently satisfies the quantum of proof necessary
to uphold a judgment of conviction. The following circumstances proven by the prosecution indubitably point to the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime committed against Augusto Esguerra.

1. The fact that said victim was last seen on the day he was killed in the company of the accused, drinking gin at the back of the
house of Ernesto Guzman [TSN, August 9,1983, p. 1.]

2. The fact that on the day after the drinking spree, December 12, 1981, the accused himself admitted to Ernesto Guzman that
he stabbed his drinking companion and that the latter was 'nadisgrasya niya" so he dumped the body of the victim in a hole being dug
out for a toilet, located at the yard of Ernesto Guzman [TSN, August 9,1983, p. 7.]

3. The fact that when he was turned over to Pat. Arturo Angeles and Pat. Rogelio Castillo of the Northern Police District by the
barangay people who apprehended him, be admitted the truth of the charge of the barangay residents that he killed someone and that
he dumped the body of the victim in a place being dug out as an improvised toilet [TSN, July 14, 1983, p. 5; TSN, August 24, 1983, p. 8.]
At the time the barangay people started digging for the body of the victim, the appellant was even instructing them as to the exact
location where the body was buried [TSN, August 24, 1983, p. 6.]

4. The fact that the place where be led the police officers and the barangay residents, i.e. the toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto
Guzman, was indeed the site where he buried the victim as the body of the victim was found there after the digging [TSN, January 3,
1984, p. 5.]

5. The fact that the T-shirt and shorts which the accused was wearing during the drinking spree were later recovered from the
place where the victim was buried [TSN, September 2, 1982, p. 3.]

Appellant however disputes the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as a basis for his conviction.
As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect [People v.
Valentino, G.R. Nos. L-49859- 60, February 20, 1986, 141 SCRA 397; People v. Dagangon, G.R. Nos. L-62654-58, November 13, 1986,
145 SCRA 464] since it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of a witness while on the witness stand and therefore can discern
if such witness is telling the truth or not [People v. Ornoza, G.R. No. 56283, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 495.]

Moreover, appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's testimony on Gaddi's confession of the crime to him cannot be given
credence for being hearsay is unavailing. This Tribunal bad previously declared that a confession constitutes evidence of high order
since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime
unless prompted by truth and his conscience [People v. Salvador, G.R. No. L-77964, July 26, 1988 citing People v. Castaneda; G.R. No. L-
32625, August 31, 1979, 93 SCRA 59.] Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can be presented in evidence
without violating the hearsay rule [Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court] which only prohibits a witness from testifying as
to those facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as to those facts which he "knows of his own knowledge: that is,
which are derived from his own perception." Hence, while the testimony of a witness regarding the statement made by another
person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose
of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement
[People v. Cusi Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was
bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact
which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, be was testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed
Augusta Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.

That the testimony of Guzman on appellant's oral confession is competent evidence finds support in People v. Tawat [G.R. No. L-
62871, May 25, 1984, 129 SCRA 4311 which upheld the trial court's reliance on an extrajudicial confession given, not to a police officer
during custodial interrogation, but to an ordinary farmer as the basis for conviction. The Court's pronouncements in the aforesaid case
find relevance in the instant case:

The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him'
(Sec. 29 Rule 130, Rules of Court). What Felicito told Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae.

The Rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it
must be given in its substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)
Page1
 Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was
present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused [citing Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., Niblack, Sec. 278, p. 551.) [at pp. 436-437; Emphasis supplied.]

The trial court found no reason to doubt Guzman's credibility as a witness considering his stature in the community as a member
of a religious movement participating in such activities as "mañanita" and procession of the Fatima and Black Rosary [Rollo, p. 30.] In
fact, on the day the killing took place, he left his house where appellant and his companion, Esguerra were still drinking and went to
the house of Junior Isla to attend a "mañanita" and participate in the weekly activity of bringing down the crucifix and the image of the
Fatima [TSN, September 2, 1982. p. 2] Besides, there was no showing at all that he was actuated by improper motives in testifying
against appellant so as to warrant disregard of his testimony [People v. Magdueno, G.R. No. L-68699, September 22, 1986, 144 SCRA
210.] On the contrary, the evidence shows that even though the appellant is not related at all to Guzman, the latter, as an act of
generosity, allowed the former to sleep in the porch of his house as the former had no immediate relatives in Quezon City [TSN, August
9, 1983, p. 14.]

As to the testimony of Pat. Angeles and Pat. Castillo, the police officers who apprehended the appellant, credence should be
given to their narration of how the appellant was apprehended and how he led the police and the barangay residents to the place
where he dumped the body of his victim since those police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in
the absence of evidence to the contrary [People v. Boholst, G.R. No. L-73008, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 263 citing People v. Gamayon,
G.R. No. L-25486, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 642; People v. Campana, G.R. No. L-37325, August 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 271; People v. Rosas,
G.R. No. L-72782, April 30 1987, 149 SCRA 464.]

Appellant's defense to the prosecution's charge rests on an uncorroborated and purely oral evidence of alibi. It has been ruled
time and again that courts look upon the evidence of alibi with suspicion [People v. Bondoc, 85 Phil. 545 (1950)] and always receive it
with caution [People v. Cinco, 67 Phil. 196 (1939); People v. de Guzman, 70 Phil. 23 (1940)] not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication [People v. Rafallo, 86 Phil. 22 (1950).] To overcome the evidence of the prosecution,
an alibi must satisfy the test of "full, clear and satisfactory evidence" [U.S. v. Pascua, 1 Phil. 631 (1903); U.S. v. Oxiles, 29 Phil, 587
(1915); U.S. v. Olais, 36 Phil 828 (1917).] This test requires not only proof that the accused was somewhere else other than the scene of
the crime but clear and convincing proof of physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the place of the commission of the
crime [People v. Pacis, G.R. Nos. L-32957- 58, July 25, 1984. 130 SCRA 540; People v. Coronado, G.R. No. 68932, October 28, 1986, 145
SCRA 250; People v. Ferrera, G.R. No. 66965, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 113.]

The testimony of the accused himself believes any claim of physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime since
according to him, the store where he allegedly bought another bottle of gin was only 200 meters away. He was able to return to
Guzman's house only after half an hour since he still had a chat with an acquaintance at the store. Even granting the truth of
appellant's story that he was ordered by Guzman to buy a bottle of gin at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and that he was back
after thirty minutes, it was not impossible for him to have committed the crime since Guzman and his wife left appellant alone with the
victim at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening to attend the mananita at the house of Junior Isla. Thus, his statements on the witness
stand, far from demonstrating physical impossibility of being at the scene of the crime, cast serious doubt on the veracity of his alibi.

As the culpability of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution, there is no
need to dwell on the admissibility of appellant's extra-judicial confession [Exh. F to F-9; Rollo, p. 20, et seq.] His conviction can be
sustained independently of said confession.

However, in the absence of proof as to how the victim was killed, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation cannot be properly appreciated. The killing must be considered as homicide only and not murder since the circumstance
qualifying the killing must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself [People v. Vicente, G.R. No. L-31725, February 18, 1986, 141
SCRA 347.] This Tribunal clearly pointed out in a previous case that

As heretofore stated, not a single eyewitness to the stabbing incident had been presented by the prosecution. Thus, the record is
totally bereft of any evidence as to the means or method resorted to by appellant in attacking the victim. It is needless to add that
treachery cannot be deduced from mere presumption, much less from sheer speculation. The same degree of proof to dispel
reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be reached respecting the attendance of alevosia[People v. Duero, G.R No.
65555, May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 515, 519-520; Emphasis supplied. ]

Neither can the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation be considered, absent a clear showing of

1. the time when the of tender determined to commit the crime;

2. an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his dead termination; and

3. a sufficient laspe of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act [People v. Diva, G.R. No. L-22946, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468; People v. Pacada, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-44444-45, July 7, 1986, 142
SCRA 427.]

As the evidence on record does not disclose the existence of treachery and evident premeditation in the stabbing of the victim,
the crime committed is only HOMICIDE and not murder, Since there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty
for homicide which is reclusion temporal should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range
of the imposable penalty is from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Absent any proof of actual damages, the heirs of Augusta Esguerra are entitled only to the indemnity of P 30,000.00. Hence, the
amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court should be reduced accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and the accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of HOMICIDE, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Augusto Esguerra in the
amount of P 30,000.00.
Page1

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
 [G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,respondents.

[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the
Court’s Decision of March 2, 2001.

In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds:

“I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION 3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE THEREON.

II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS.

III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.

IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY.

V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
THE INCUMBENT OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED CAPACITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A
BIASED FREE DECISION.”

In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:

1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS OF JANUARY 20, 2001;

2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY,
BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;

3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE;

4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONER’S INABILITY TO GOVERN CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII
OF THE CONSTITUTION; and

5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL.

We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper
accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to
arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and
posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are well-established and cannot be
refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose
of Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the “I accuse” speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3)
the joint investigation of the speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the
investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in
the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding petitioner’s resignation; (7) a similar
demand by the Catholic Bishops conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioner’s resignation by former Presidents Corazon C.
Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign; (10)
the resignation of the members of petitioner’s Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the
Department of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioner’s Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of
the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate President and of
Representative Villar as Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo
and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the
prosecutor’s motion to open the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit
in a secret bank account under the name of “Jose Velarde”; (17) the prosecutors’ walkout and resignation; (18) the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of
their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of support
of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of
all the armed services; (21) the same withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson, and
the major service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and
bureau chiefs; (23) petitioner’s agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope. All these prior
events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the
Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The
Page1

news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as
false.
 We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We used the
Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to
distill a person’s subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases
involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the
use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the
Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.

We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing his final statement which was
issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioner’s issuance of the
press release and his abandonemnt of Malacañang Palace confirmed his resignation.[1] These areovert acts which leave no doubt to
the Court that the petitioner has resigned.

In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 o’clock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, the claim that the office of the
President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.

We also reject the contention that petitioner’s resignation was due to duress and an involuntary resignation is no resignation at
all.

“x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is
vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action. The three-part test for such duress has
been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the other’s terms; (2) whether
circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite
side. The view has also been expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears
that the employer’s conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be
considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee
understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable time in which to choose;
and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test,
the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employee’s purely
subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation – for example, because of concerns
about his or her reputation – is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives – for
example, resignation or facing disciplinary charges – does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress or coercion,
and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless
the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a
resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion
without procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed. Futhermore, a
resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined
that the officer’s alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the officer’s employment under
the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any
measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case.”[2]

In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap
elections. He transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced to resign
because immediately before he left Malacañang, he asked Secretary Angara: “Ed, aalis na ba ako?” which implies that he still had a
choice of whether or not to leave.

To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure completely vitiated
the voluntariness of the petitioner’s resignation. The Malacañang ground was then fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard
armed with tanks and high-powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in
Malacañang to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was suffered
by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioner’s entourage was
even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his followers before finally going to his residence in
Polk Street, Greenhills. The only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing between a small group of pro
and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled through the
Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify
the conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign.

II

Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that
the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the
admission of hearsay evidence.

We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings
in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use.
To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.[3] The three parts of the Diary published in the
PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T.
Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of
the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second
Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001,[4] and the third part, published
on February 6, 2001.[5] It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had
all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.

Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule.[6]
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons
Page1

other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.[7]There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of
cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath.[8] Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity.[9] The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein,
Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:

“x x x

On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons’ accounts of what happened, and
verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no objection
was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although
volumes have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence.
Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay
(sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states
have added to their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the admission of
hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).

Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether instead of being loosened. See,
e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted):

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that ‘[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’ Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by
the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not
conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the jury’s use of evidence for inferences other than those for which the
evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jury’s ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate
inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness was particularly smooth
or convincing, there would be no doubt as to the usurpation of the jury’s function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence
rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs of a victim’s final state, the
exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jury’s function by usurping its power to process quite
ordinary evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.

Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either incoherent, inconsistent, or
indeterminate, the only altenative to a general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More
important, the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay … seem insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with
accepted notions of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished.

Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available – which is, however, derived from
simulations – that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay
evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76
Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683
(1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman &
Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law &
Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991).

Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether the benefits outweigh the cost:

The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also includes the time spent on litigating the
rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court – salaries,
administrative costs, and capital costs – are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an
enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous
time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over
half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and … enormous academic resources are expended on
the rule.

Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendman’s Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev.
797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of
Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).”[10]

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted
from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a
party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.”[11] It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are
hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are not
covered by the hearsay rule:[12]

“Wigmore, after pointing out that the party’s declaration has generally the probative value of any other person’s asssertion,
argued that it had a special value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the party’s statement
with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover,
he continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no
opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponent’s own declaration, and ‘he does not need to cross examine
himself.’ Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put
himself on the stand and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154,
McCormick)

According to Morgan: ‘The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that the
circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party
can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under
Page1

sanction of an oath.’
 A man’s acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to
presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).”

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a
snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by
Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and
“Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t
want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I
will go.” We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his
resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.

It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument
overlooks the doctrine ofadoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person
when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.[13] Jones
explains that the “basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of
the statements which the other person had made.”[14] To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, “this process of
attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense.”[15] In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when
the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask
Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of “dignified exit or resignation.” Petitioner did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related suggestions can be
taken as an admission by him.[16]

Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is
expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: “The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.”

Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section
29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.

Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by
the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacañang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara
Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: “Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa
huli, ikaw pa rin.” (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve listened to. And now at the end, you still
are.)”[17] This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first
negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacañang after taking their final
lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: “ed, kailangan ko
na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?)”[18]Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary
Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary
Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before
respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.

Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner).[19] Jones very
well explains thereasons for the rule, viz: “What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument.
So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any
act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction
in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible
in evidence against such principal.”[20]

Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are
relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts
in issue, and (2) those statements which arecircumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following:[21]

a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other
emotions;

b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;

c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge,
belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;

d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and

e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.

Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition against hearsay evidence:
[22]

Ҥ 1088. Mental State or Condition РProof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon issues, forming a general class, in proof
of which hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the
general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is as of course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue,
such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as
conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person.
Where his acts or statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to
admissions against interest. And even where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue
as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity.”

As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial
Page1

evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioner’s
intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on
evidence and petitioner’s attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.

Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated in our Decision, viz:

“The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence, such as the rule on authentication of private
writings…

xxx

A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated

The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides that before any private writing offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document
executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

xxx

B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed

Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It is secondary evidence, of dubious
authenticity. It was however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the
diary. The “Best Evidence Rule” should have been applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.

The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, “[w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself.”[23]

Petitioner’s contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule
130, as follows:

“Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. – Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers,
figures or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Sec. 4. Original of document. – (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are
equally regarded as originals.

(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the
transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.”

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence,
states that:

“Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.[24]

“x x x

“In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no
real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential
feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it.” (empahsis supplied)

Francisco’s opinion is of the same tenor, viz:

“Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is essential to bring
the best evidence rule into application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion might have
successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the
admission of secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper season – that is,
whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been admitted.
The objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the court’s consideration.”[25]

He adds:

“Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception.”[26]

In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz:
Page1

“Sec. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
 (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.”

On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that:

“A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the
document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263,
and others) However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly
identified before it was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835).”[27]

Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that
case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case,
Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution” the basic
opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.” In the instant cases, however, the
petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated February 20,
2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second Supplemental
memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had
“been given an opportunity to inspect” the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise
his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis
thereof.

III

Temporary Inability

Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution in that congress can
only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The
situation presents itself when majority of the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs
Congress that his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that the
president’s judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review.

We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in G.R. No. 146738 that “Congress has
the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.”[29] We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already
determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved
by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. The power is conceded by
the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The recognition of respondent
Arroyo as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is significant that House Resolution No.
176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as the “people’s loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada to effectively govern” and the “members of the international community had extended their recognition of Her Excellency,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines” and it has a constitutional duty “of fealty to the supreme will
of the people x x x.” This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the people for its judgment. Its
wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court of justice. Needles to state, the doctrine of
separation of power constitutes an inseparable bar against this court’s interposition of its power of judicial review to review the
judgment of Congress rejecting petitioner’s claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely an
acting President.

Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine his inability to
govern, and whose determination is a political question by now arguing that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial
question. Petitioner’s change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present the general issue
of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific issues were raised to the Court for resolution and we
ruled on an issue by issue basis. On the issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the issue is
legal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. On the issue of inability
to govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the
question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this Court cannot
review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a
judicial question.

Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions which brushed off his temporary inability
to govern and President-on-leave argument. He asserts that these acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal significance
because: (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.

We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration by Congress of the
President’s inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. In the cases at bar, special
consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and
culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioner’s letter
claiming inability to govern. To be sure, however, the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the
Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella,
recognized respondent Arroyo as the “constitutional successor to the presidency” post facto. Petitioner himself states that his letter
alleging his inability to govern was “received by the Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and the Office of the Senate
at 9 P.M. of the same day.”[30] Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes past 12 o’clock in the afternoon of January 20.
Page1

Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states:[31]

“Joint Statement of Support

 and Recognition from the

Senate President and the Speaker

Of the House of Representatives

We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are called upon to address the constitutional crisis
affecting the authority of the President to effectively govern our distressed nation. We understand that the Supreme Court at that
time is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing this political reality. While we may differ on the means to effect a change of
leadership, we however, cannot be indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus, in line with our sworn duty to represent our people and
in pursuit of our goals for peace and prosperity to all, we, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
hereby declare our support and recognition to the constitutional successor to the Presidency. We similarly call on all sectors to close
ranks despite our political differences. May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings.

Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino.

(Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.

Senate President

(Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA

Speaker of the House of Representatives”

This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of respondent Arroyo as
the “constitutional successor to the presidency” was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect,
confirming this recognition. Thus, Resolution No. 176 expressed “x x x the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption
into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation’s goal under the Constitution.[32] Resolution
No. 82 of the Senate and Resolution No. 178 of the House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President.[33] It also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring the impeachment court functus officio.[34] Both Houses
sent bills to respondent Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President of the Philippines.[35] These acts of Congress, a priori and
post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic. Petitioner’s
insistence that respondent Arroyo is just a de facto President because said acts of Congress “ x x x are mere circumstances of
acquiescence calculated to induce people to submit to respondent’s exercise of the powers of the presidency”[36] is a guesswork far
divorced from reality to deserve further discussion.

Similarly way off the mark is petitioner’s point that “while the Constitution has made Congress the national board of canvassers
for presidential and vice-presidential elections, this Honorable Court nonetheless remains the sole judge in presidential and vice
presidential contests.[37] He thus postulates that “such constitutional provision[38] is indicative of the desire of the sovereign people
to keep out of the hands of Congress questions as to the legality of a person’s claim to the presidential office.”[39] Suffice to state that
the inference is illogical. Indeed, there is no room to resort to inference. The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how
vacancies and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a)
the President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President,
the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the
death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the
President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues
that may arise from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by
this Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue.
In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself
submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. In light of these clear provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the
least, for petitioner to make inferences that simply distort their meanings.

IV

Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution which provides:

“(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.”

Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally
prosecuted. A plain reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells
us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us theconsequence of the limited reach of a
judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioner’s non sequitur submission that
the provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and
punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman.

Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors’ walk out from the impeachment proceedings “should be considered
failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate is equivalent to
acquittal.”[40] He explains “failure to prosecute” as the “failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal on such grounds
is a dismissal on the merits.”[41] He then concludes that “dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for
purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy.”[42]
Page1

Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioner’s submission.

 The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of the impeachment cases when by a vote
of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a
secret bank account under the name “ Jose Velarde”. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the
Speaker of the House tendering their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the
impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until the
House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief
Justice Davide, Jr. Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January 20, 2001, petitioner
relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus, on February 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio.

Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid
complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[43]
Assuming arguendo that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite
for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioner’s claim of double
jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. At best, his claim of previous
acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute. As Bernas points
out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to
prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.[44]

This Court held in Esmeña v. Pogoy[45], viz:

“If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial
of the case. After the prosecution’s motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or
cannot produce his evidence and, consequently fails to prove the defendant’s guilt, the court upon defendant’s motion shall dismiss
the case, such dismissall amounting to an acquittal of the defendant.”

In a more recent case, this Court held:

“It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is
equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that
these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at
bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.”[46]

Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him. Even assuming arguendo that there was a move
for its dismissal, not every invocation of an accused’s right to speedy trial is meritorious. While the Court accords due importance to an
accused’s right to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be invoked loosely.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to
speedy trial.[47] The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are apropos:

“Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following
rights:

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.”

“Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day
as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.”

Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment proceedings was unjustified, much less that it
was for an unreasonable length of time. Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the impeachment proceeding was suspended until
the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public prosecutors. This was justified and
understandable for an impeachment proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment process. However,
three (3) days from the suspension or January 20, 2001, petitioner’s resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the
impeachment court became functus officio and the proceedings were therefore terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can the
four-day period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned, constitute an unreasonable
period of delay violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial.

Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the
accused. We reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the presidency,
thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the
termination of the impeachmment case against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings. We have
consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double
jeopardy.[48]

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His arguments are merely
recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner’s rehashed arguments including their
thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that
his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and
there is now a new de jure President.
Page1

Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his term of office. He
buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
 “Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee’s omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I
agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration
of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him
that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations
almost daily?

Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is
immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that
explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.”[49]

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer may claim
to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent.[50] From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president
from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.

Indeed, petitioner’s stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not really for petitioner to
reclaim the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the
criminal cases pending against him in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial have been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. In
our Decision, we held that there is not enough evidence to sustain petitioner’s claim of prejudicial publicity. Unconvinced, petitioner
alleges that the vivid narration of events in our Decision itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He then posits the
thesis that “doubtless, the national fixation with the probable guilt of petitioner fueled by the hate campaign launched by some high
circulation newspaper and by the bully pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry andall
regions, so harsh and so pervasive that the prosecution and the judiciary can no longer assure petitioner a sporting chance.”[51] To be
sure, petitioner engages inexageration when he alleges that “all sectors of the citizenry and all regions” have been irrevocably
influenced by this barrage of prejudicial publicity. This exaggeration collides with petitioner’s claim that he still enjoys the support of
the majority of our people, especially the masses.

Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the transaction speaks for itself) to support his
argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.[52] It is not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere
invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present
along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or
presumption of negligence and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.[53]

We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied only in tort cases, to the cases at bar.
Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. We
again stress that the issue before us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the petitioner has prejudiced the
minds of the members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the test we laid down in People v. Teehankee,[54] to resolve this
issue, viz:

“We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the
print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and
now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances
an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was
given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as hey happen straight to our
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system
whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law
and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
Page1

prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.”

Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove how the impartiality of the panel of
investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by it. As we held before and we hold it again, petitioner has
completely failed to adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact must be
established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose surmises and conjectures. In fact, petitioner did not even
identify the members of the Panel of Investigators. We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur as
suggested by the petitioner. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the
burden to the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will
overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The cases are not wanting
where an accused has been acquitted despite pervasive publicity.[55] For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for
petitioner to conjure possibility of prejudice but must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain his
plea. It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so.

Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period to allow passions to subside and hopefully
the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down. We regret not to acquiesce to the proposal. There is no assurance that
the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. The investigation of the petitioner is a natural media event. It is the
first time in our history that a President will be investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous crimes
while a sitting President. His investigation will even be monitored by the foreign press all over the world in view of its legal and historic
significance. In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. But what is important for the petitioner is that his
constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation. For this reason, we have warned the respondent Ombudsman in
our Decision to conduct petitioner’s preliminary investigation in a circus-free atmosphere. Petitioner is represented by brilliant legal
minds who can protect his right as an accused.

VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that “the members of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put on record who they were and
consider recusing or inhibiting themselves, particularly those who had ex-parte contacts with those exerting pressure on this
Honorable Court, as mentioned in our Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for the cold neutrality of impartial judges.”[56]

We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12) members of the Court who merely accepted
the invitation of the respondent Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere spectators of a historic event, said members of the Court
did not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her oath. Indeed, the Court in
its en banc resolution on January 22, 2001, the first working day after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President, held in
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:

“A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC – In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take Her Oath of Office as President of the
Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice – Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be
sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated
January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority
given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party.”

The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court. It should be clear from the resolution that the
Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an
administrative matter. If it were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the
legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter
as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was “without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed
by a proper party.” In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another resolution to inform the parties and the
public that it “xxx did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the
Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution.” Thus, there is no reason for petitioner to request for the said
twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a motion to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is regarded
with general disfavor.

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving
the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial
power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the
Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.[57] The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.[58]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738
are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEMARIE CERILLA

G.R. No. 177147 November 28, 2007

Page1

DECISION
 Tinga, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 dated 26 October 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00032 which
affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 23 dated 15 August 2000 in Criminal
Case No. 496502 finding appellant Joemarie Cerilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On 6 July 1998, an Information was filed against appellant charging him of the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about April 24, 1998, in the Municipality of Leganes, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill and by means of
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Alexander Parreño with the firearm which the accused was
then provided, hitting and inflicting pellet wound at the right back portion of his body which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The prosecution’s evidence shows that at around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998, the victim, Alexander Parreño (Alexander), his 14-
year old daughter, Michelle, and neighbor, Phoebe Sendin (Sendin), went to the house of appellant. They were cordially welcomed and
entertained by appellant and his wife.5 An hour later, a blackout occurred. At this time, Alexander sought permission from the couple
to leave, which the latter acknowledged.6 On their way home, Michelle was walking ahead of Alexander with the latter closely
following his daughter. Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters

from appellant’s house, Michelle heard an explosion. Michelle immediately turned her back and saw appellant pointing a gun at
Alexander who, at that moment, was staggering towards her.7 Sendin, who was also with Alexander and Michelle, did not look back
but instead ran away and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Parreño.8 Meanwhile, Michelle was cuddling Alexander beside the road
when the latter repeatedly told her that it was appellant who shot him.9 Twenty minutes later, Alexander’s other daughter, Novie
Mae, arrived; she was also told by Alexander at that moment that it was appellant who shot him.10

SPO3 Frederick Dequito (SPO3 Dequito) and other police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped carry Alexander to an
ambulance. SPO3 Dequito was able to ask Alexander who shot him to which he answered "Pato." "Pato" is an alias by which appellant
is known.11

Alexander’s wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by Alexander that it was appellant who shot him.12 Alexander
died the following day.13

Dr. Tito D. Doromal, Philippine National Police medico-legal officer, performed an autopsy on the body of Alexander. The autopsy
report stated the cause of death to be hemorrhage secondary to pellet wounds.14 Testifying on his report, Dr. Doromal explained that
Alexander died from a gunshot wound which penetrated the ribs and lacerated the right lobe of the liver, colon, stomach, duodenum,
and right kidney. The entrance wound was located at the middle-back portion of the body. Seven (7) pellets were recovered on the
muscle of the upper and middle abdominal wall.15

The defense’s evidence consists of the testimonies of appellant himself and of his wife, Madoline, his stepdaughter, Franlin, PO1
Manolito Javelora, PO3 Alberto Sarmiento, and PO3 Wilson Allona. Appellant interposed alibi as his main defense. He claimed that
Alexander, together with his daughter and Sendin, had gone to his house on 24 April 1998 at around 6:00 p.m. where they were
welcomed and offered snacks.16They were having a conversation when a blackout occurred. Alexander then asked permission to
leave. After the visitors had left, appellant ordered his stepdaughter Franlin to buy candle at the store across their house. Appellant
and Madoline posted themselves at their doorway holding a flashlight to light Franlin’s path. Upon Franlin’s return to the house,
appellant heard an explosion and he immediately closed the door. Later, the policemen

went to his house and told him that he was a suspect in the shooting of Alexander and was then brought to the police station.17
The following day, he was subjected to paraffin test the result of which turned out to be negative.18

Appellant’s testimony was corroborated by Madoline and Franlin. PO1 Javelora declared that when he asked Alexander who shot
him, the latter did not answer.19 Likewise, PO3 Sarmiento and Allona stated that when they went to the hospital to interrogate
Alexander, the latter could not give a definite answer as to who shot him.20

On 15 August 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, judgement is hereby
rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, hereby sentencing the said accused to the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659[,] amending Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
said accused is further condemned to indemnify the surviving heirs of the deceased, Alexander Parreño, the sum of P257,774.75 by
way of actual damages; the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and the sum of P50,000.00 by way of death
compensation. The accused who is detained is entitled to be credited in full with the entire period of his preventive detention. The Jail
Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center is ordered to remit the said accused to the National Penitentiary at the earliest opportunity.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court regarded the victim’s dying declaration as the most telling evidence pointing to appellant as the assailant.22 It
appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying the crime to murder because the victim was unarmed and walking on his way

home when he was suddenly and unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant.23 The trial court ruled that appellant’s alibi and
denial could not prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses.24 Moreover, it observed that appellant was not able to
prove the impossibility of his presence at the crime scene which could have proven his alibi.25

In view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant, the case was initially elevated to this Court for review.
Page1

However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,26 the case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling but modified the award of moral damages from Thirty Thousand Pesos to
Fifty Thousand Pesos.27 Hence, the instant appeal.

In a Resolution dated 16 July 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs
if they so desired.28 Both parties manifested that they would adopt their briefs filed before the appellate court.29 Thereafter, the case
was deemed submitted for decision.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Michelle, as
well as the dying declaration of Alexander considering that the circumstances under which the crime was committed rendered the
identification of the gunman impossible.

This argument essentially challenges the credibility of the witnesses, including the eyewitness, whose testimonies were relied
upon by the trial court in convicting appellant. Basic is the principle that the findings of fact of a trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is because the

trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and is in the best position to discern whether they
are telling the truth. This rule holds true especially when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court.30

Appellant’s authorship of the crime was proven by the positive identification of an eyewitness and the victim’s dying declaration.

The prosecution presented Michelle, who categorically identified appellant as the one who shot Alexander, viz:

Q: While you and your father were walking towards home, did you remember anything unusual that happened?

A: Yes, Ma’am.

Q: What was that?

A: I heard an explosion.

Q: Where were you in relation to your father when you heard that shot?

A: I was in front of my Daddy and he was at my back.

Q: You said you heard a shot, what did you do when you heard a shot?

A: When I heard the shot, I turned back and I saw Joemarie pointing to my Dad.

COURT:

Q: What did he point towards your Dad?

A: Firearm.

PROSECUTOR PADILLA:

Q: You said Joemarie was pointing a firearm to your father. Was it [a] long or short firearm?

A: About 11 inches.

Q: After you saw Joemarie pointing a firearm to your father, what happened next?

A: I saw my father staggering towards me and I saw Joemarie Cerilla ran.

Q: Where was he going?

A: Maybe towards his house.31

xxxx

Q: If this Joemarie Cerilla is inside the Courtroom, can you identify him?

A: Yes, Ma’am.

Q: Please point to him. (Witness pointing to the accused Joemarie Cerilla).32

Michelle’s account of how her father was shot by appellant was corroborated by the post-mortem examination which reveals
that the entrance wound is located at the back of the victim.33 In the same vein, the medico-legal expert concluded that the gunshot
was fired at a close range, as evidenced by the presence of a power burn measuring four (4) centimeters in diameter surrounding the
periphery of the wound 34 and penetrating his internal organs.35

Significantly, the eyewitness’s positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is fully supported the victim’s
dying declaration.

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which concern the cause and
circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in
a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement
made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause
and circumstances surrounding his/her death.36

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest
order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.37
Page1

It is thus admissible to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the
circumstances under which the assault was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and
 trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant’s death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often
happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it, therefore, prevents a failure of justice. And
trustworthiness, because the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive to
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of
death as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.38

Of the doctrines that authorize the admission of special classes of hearsay, the doctrine relating to dying declarations is the most
mystical in its theory and, traditionally, among the most arbitrary in its limitations. In the United States, the notion of the special
likelihood of truthfulness of deathbed statements was widespread long before the recognition of a general rule against hearsay in the
early 1700s. Not surprisingly, nearly as soon as we find a hearsay rule, we also find an exception for dying declarations.39

Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: first, the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters
both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarant’s injury or
the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying
or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the act are admissible.40 Second, at the time the declaration was made,
the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not
the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching
death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and
looked on death as certainly impending.41 Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would
not have been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Accordingly, declarations made
by a child too young to be a competent witness or by a person who was insane or incapable of understanding his own statements by
reason of partial unconsciousness are not admissible in evidence.42 Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could
not have been competent to be a witness had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been competent.43
Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.44
Anent this requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused its witnesses to take the stand
and testify in open court on the substance of Alexander’s ante mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.

The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with unanimity that they had been told by
the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him. Michelle recounted:

Q: You said your father moved towards you, what happened next?

A: I approached my father and cuddled him.

Q: What happened next?

A: While I was cuddling my father he said, "Day, it was Joemarie who shot me."

Q: How many time he said he was shot?

A: Not once but about 10 times.45

Shortly thereafter, Novie Mae arrived and was told by Alexander that it was appellant who opened fire at him:

Q: When you reached Confessor Street, what happened?

A: I saw that my elder sister was assisting my father.

COURT:

Q: What’s the name of your sister?

A: Michelle.

COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL:

Q: When you saw your sister Michelle assisting your father, what [sic] happened next?

A: And I immediately went near my father and asked him who shot him and he answered it was Joemarie Cerilla who shot him.

Q: Before you reached your father, did you observe his physical appearance of what happened to him?

A: Yes, Ma’am, he was supporting with his arm and when I asked him he still made a response.

Q: You said [that] before you approached your father[,] you saw him supporting his body, what was his position at that time?

A: He was in a position of lying with his hand on the road and my sister was assisting him.

xxx

Q: Were you able to observe why your father was sitting on the ground and supporting himself not to fall.

A: Yes, Ma’am.

Q: Why, [sic] what did you observe?

Page1

A: My father was supporting himself in order that blood will not [ooze] from his body and his body will not fall down.46

SPO3 Dequito, who responded immediately to the crime scene, corroborated the testimonies of the Alexander’s children, to wit:
 Q: So, what did you do when you arrived at the crime scene?

A: We advised the group to carry Mr. Parreño to the ambulance because the ambulance was on the way and after our mobile
arrived, the ambulance arrived also [sic] so we carried Mr. Parreño to be brought to the hospital.

COURT:

Q: Meaning you loaded the victim into the ambulance?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: And after he was loaded, what did you do?

A: Before the ambulance left the area, I questioned the victim who shot him and he answered Alias "Pato." I am referring to
Joemarie Cerilla, the accused.

Q: The accused Cerilla, Alias "Pato"?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR:

Q: Can you remember the exact words uttered by the victim when you asked him who shot him?

A: He answered me that: I questioned him, "Who shot you?" and he answered that it was Cerilla and I further asked him "The
husband of Madoline" and he answered "Yes, Alias "Pato", the husband of Madoline.47

Likewise, Alexander’s wife, Sonia, testified:

Q: You said from your house when you were told by the girls that your husband was shot, what did you do?

A: I looked for a taxi and proceeded to the hospital.

xxx

Q: When you arrived at the hospital, where did you go first?

A: To my husband.

xxx

Q: When you reached that hospital and your own mother led you to where Alexander was, in what part of the hospital did you
first see him.

A: Outside the operating room.

Q: What was the situation of your husband when you first saw him?

A: He was leaning on his side and many nurses attending to him and saying "araguy."

xxx

Q: Between you and your husband who spoke first?

A: My husband.

Q: What were the exact words stated by your husband?

A: He told me that it was Joemarie who shot him.48

These statements comply with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First, Alexander’s declaration pertains to the identity of
the person who shot him. Second, the fatal quality and extent of the injuries49 he suffered underscore the imminence of his death as
his condition was so serious that his demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would have
been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was
the victim.

Other police officers were presented by the defense to refute the dying declaration. PO1 Javelora alleged that he happened to
pass by the crime scene and saw a young girl crying. The girl led him to her father who was sitting on the roadside. He asked the victim
who shot him but he did not get any reply.50 PO3 Allona and Sarmiento arrived at the hospital and questioned Alexander as to who
shot him but the latter told them, "I am not sure because it was dark."51 These statements cannot be construed as a categorical
statement of the victim denying knowledge as to the identity of his assailant. It can be recalled that at the time Alexander was being
questioned, he was already being readied for surgery. At that point, he was understandably no longer fit to respond to questions.
Between these two seemingly conflicting testimonies, it is the positive identification made by Alexander in his dying declaration which
must be sustained.

Appellant insists that there was an inherent impossibility in identifying the assailant with clarity since there was a power blackout
at the time of the commission of the crime and was then a moonless night.

The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexander’s and Michelle’s positive
identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this did not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the
assailant, especially since the shot was delivered at close range.

In dismissing appellant’s contention, the trial court rationalized:

Page1

x x x This argument deserves scant consideration. In the case of People v. Hillado, G.R. No. 122838[,] promulgated on May 24,
1999[,] citing the case of People v. Oliano, "visibility at nighttime is possible not only at the exact minute and date when the moon is
full as indicated in the calendar. Thus, a person’s nocturnal eyesight, is not necessarily diminished just because there is no illumination
from the moon, because it is a fact that our eyes can actually adjust to the darkness so that we can still see objects clearly even without
sufficient lighting. In the case at bar, it would not be so hard for Michelle to identify a person’s fact especially if the latter – as in the
present case – was barely two (2) arms length away from them which is confirmed by the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the body
of the victim. We stress, that the normal reaction of the person is to direct his sight towards the source of a startling [shot] or
occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, the most natural reaction of the victims in criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and
faces of their assailants and to observe the manner in which the crime is committed. Added to this is the fact that the accused Joemarie
Cerilla and the victim Alexander Parreño have known each other quite well before the incident so that they became familiar with each
other’s face and physical features. x x x 52

Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were not shown to be impelled by ill motive to testify falsely against appellant. Besides,
Susan, Michelle and Novie Mae, being immediate relatives of the deceased, would naturally be interested in having the real culprit
punished.53

The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi.54 It was not physically impossible for appellant to
have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from
the locus criminis is only 120-150 meters, more or less.55

Appellant counters that there was absence of any motive on his part to kill the victim; that it was not clearly proven that he fired
a gun, based on the paraffin test; and that he appeared calm and composed and showed no indication of guilt when he was invited by
the police officers shortly after the commission of the crime.

Time and again, we have ruled that a negative finding on paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun
because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrates or gunpowder, as when the culprit washes his hands
or wears gloves.56The trial court correctly rejected the result of the paraffin test in light of the positive identification of appellant.

The trial court held that the killing was qualified by treachery because Alexander, who was unarmed, was suddenly and
unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant without any risk to the latter from any defense which the former might make. There was
no opportunity given to Alexander to repel the assault or offer any defense of his person. There was not the slightest provocation on
his part.57 We agree with the findings of the trial court. The presence of treachery was evident in the execution of the crime. Appellant
suddenly, and without warning, shot Alexander from his back.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, murder is punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death. Because the killing of Alexander, although qualified by treachery, was not attended by any other aggravating
circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

We deem it proper to further impose exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 which is recoverable in the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, in the commission of the crime.58

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2006, affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court
Judgment dated 15 August 2000 finding appellant, Joemari Cerilla, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Alexander Parreño P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173608 November 20, 2008

JESUS GERALDO and AMADO ARIATE, petitioners

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were, by Information dated December 23, 2002 filed on December 27, 2002 before
the Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Sur, charged with Homicide allegedly committed as follows:

x x x [O]n the 1st day of July, 2002 at about 3:00 o'clock early morning, more or less, at Sitio Tinago, Barangay Bunga,
municipality of Lanuza, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, armed with xxx handguns and with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sho[o]t one ARTHUR U.1 RONQUILLO, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter wounds described
hereunder:

POINT OF ENTRY:

1. Right lumbar area

2. Right iliac area

POINT OF EXIT

1. Left lateral area of abdomen

2. Right hypogastric area

which wounds have caused the instantaneous death of said ARTHUR U. RONQUILLO, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in
Page1

the following amount:

P50,000.00 - as life indemnity of the victim;

 10,000.00 - as moral damages;

10,000.00 - as exemplary damages; and

40,000.00 - as actual damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other persons, on being informed of the shooting
of Arthur Ronquillo (the victim), repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him lying on his side and wounded.
Although gasping for breath, he was able to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing distance of Arnel, that he was shot by Badjing3 and
Amado.

Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado" responsible for the shooting of the victim were subjected to
paraffin tests at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Butuan City. In the PNP Chemistry Report No. C-002-2002-
SDS,4 the following data are reflected:

xxxx

TIME AND DATE RECEIVED : 1105H 03 July 2002

REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT : Chief of Police

Lanuza Police Station

Lanuza, Surigao del Sur

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED :

Paraffin casts taken from the left and the right hands of the following named living persons:

A = Jesus Geraldo Jr. alias Bajing

B = Amado Ariate

/x/x/x/ /x/x/x/

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION

To determine the presence of gunpowder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on specimens A and B gave NEGATIVE results for powder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/

CONCLUSION:

Specimens A and B do not reveal the presence of gunpowder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/

REMARKS:

The original copy of this report is retained in this laboratory for future reference.

TIME AND DATE COMPLETED:

1700H 03 July 2002

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

In a document dated July 1, 2002 and denominated as "Affidavit"5 which was subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court II
Manuel A. Balasa, Sr. on July 26, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a statement in a question and answer style that herein petitioners
Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father.

In another document dated July 4, 2002 also denominated as "Affidavit"6 which was subscribed and sworn to also before the
same Clerk of Court II Balasa on July 26, 2002, Mirasol also gave a statement in a question and answer style that her father uttered that
herein petitioners shot him.

At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing" and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially
corroborated Mirasol's statement.7

Upon the other hand, petitioners gave their side of the case as follows:

Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod of Bunga, declared that Barangay Kagawad Omboy Roz (Roz) woke him up at 3:00 a.m. of July
1, 2002 and informed him that the victim was shot. He and Roz thus borrowed a tricycle, proceeded to the crime scene and, along with
others, brought the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Ariate submitted himself to a paraffin test and
tested negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates.8

Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in his house located also in Barangay Bunga, Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June 30, 2002 and
woke up at 4:00 a.m. the following day. At 6:30 a.m., on seeing many people in the vicinity of the 45-meter away house of one Josita
Bongabong where the victim's body was found, he inquired and learned that the victim was shot. Policemen subsequently went to his
house and advised him to take a paraffin test. He obliged and was tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory and was found negative for
gunpowder residue/nitrates.9
Page1

In the course of the testimony of Ariate, his counsel presented the PNP Chemistry Report reflecting the negative results of the
paraffin test on him and Geraldo. The trial court restrained the presentation of the document, however, as reflected in the following
transcript of stenographic notes taken on March 21, 2003:
 xxxx

Q I am showing to you [Ariate] a copy of the result of the paraffin test attached to the record of this case.

COURT

Is it covered in the Pre-trial Order? You cannot do that. That is why I told you; lay your cards on the table.

ATTY. AUZA

May I ask for the court's reconsideration.

COURT

Denied. I am warning you, all of you.

ATTY. AUZA

With the denial of our motion for reconsideration, I move to tender exclusive evidence. He would have identified this result. The
paraffin test, which [forms] part of the affidavit of this witness attached to the record of this case on page 29. May I ask that this will be
marked as Exhibit "3" for the defense.

COURT

Mark it. (Marked).10 (Underscoring supplied)

As shown from the above-quoted transcript of the proceedings, the trial court restrained the presentation of the result of the
paraffin tests because the same was not covered in the Pre-trial Order. In the Pre-trial Order,11 the trial court noted the parties'
agreement "that witnesses not listed in this Pre-trial Order shall not be allowed to testify as additional witnesses." Significantly, there
was no agreement to disallow the presentation of documents which were not reflected in the Pre-trial Orders. At all events, oddly, the
trial court allowed the marking of the PNP Chemistry Report as Exhibit "3."12

When petitioner Geraldo's turn to present the same PNP Chemistry Report came, the trial court ruled:

COURT

That is the problem in the Pre-Trial Brief if the exhibits are not stated. I will set aside that Order and in the interest of justice I will
allow the accused to submit, next time I will not any more consider exhibits not listed in the Pre-trial Order.13 (Underscoring supplied)

The version of the defense was in part corroborated by witnesses.

The trial court, passing on the demeanor of prosecution witness-the victim's eight-year old daughter Mirasol, observed:

. . . She talks straightforward, coherent and clear, very intelligent, with child mannerism[s]. While testifying she was criss-crossing
her hands, touching anything within her reach, innocent and simple, pressing of[f] and on her stomach but she talks with correct
grammar. No doubt, this Court was convinced of her testimony which was corroborated by her brother Arnel Ronquillo.14

On the nature and weight of the dying declaration of the victim, the trial court observed:

A dying declaration may be xxx oral or in writing. As a general rule, a dying declaration to be admissible must be made by the
declarant while he is conscious of his impending death. However, even if a declarant did not make a statement that he was on the
brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the wound and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards may be considered as
substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition; People vs.
Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353.

Even assuming that the declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae since it
was made shortly after the startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, hence, under the circumstances, the victim evidently
had no opportunity to contrive.15 (Underscoring supplied)

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted petitioners, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused JESUS GERALDO y CUBERO and AMADO ARIATE y DIONALDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and with the presence of one (1) aggravating
circumstance of night time and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of which could be properly imposed
under the rules of said code and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribe[d] by the
code for the offense, hereby sentences each to suffer the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum, with all the accessory
penalties provided for by law. To pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as life indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The claim for actual damages is denied, there being no evidence to support the same.

The bail bond put up by the accused Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate are ordered cancelled and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.16 (Underscoring supplied)

The Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 30, 2006,17 affirmed with modification the trial court's decision. It found that the trial
court erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. And it reduced the award of moral damages18 to P50,000, and
deleted the award of exemplary damages. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED save for the modification of the penalty
imposed. Accordingly, accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years, Five (5)
Months and One (1) Day of prision mayor medium as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of reclusion
Page1

temporalmedium as maximum, with all accessory penalties provided by law, and to jointly and solidarily pay the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
 SO ORDERED.19 (Italics in the original)

Hence, the present Petition20 raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS THE ALLEGED ASSAILANT HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY
ESTABLISHED AS PER EVIDENCE ON RECORD?

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT?21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners argue:

With due respect, herein petitioners disagree with the holding of the Honorable Court of Appeals that "It is not necessary that
the victim further identify that "Badjing" was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that "Amado" was Amado Ariate" because, [so petitioners
contend], it is the obligation of the prosecution to establish with moral certainty that indeed the persons they identified as the as the
assailant of Arthur O. Ronquillo were really the ones who perpetrated the crime.

Admittedly, prosecution witnesses were able to identify positively herein petitioners as the alleged assailant[s] of Arthur O.
Ronquillo. But said identification is based on the assumption that they were the very same "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND
AMADO" referred to by their deceased father in his dying declaration.

What the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider is that, just because the victim declared that it was "BADJING AMADO"
and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" who shot him does not necessarily follow that herein petitioners were really the perpetrators in the
absence of proof that the "BADJING" referred to by him is Jesus Geraldo and that the "AMADO" is Amado Ariate. It would have been a
different story had the prosecution witnesses [been] eyewitnesses because proof that the "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND
AMADO" referred to by the victim and the persons identified by the prosecution witnesses are the same is unnecessary.

Herein petitioners believe, that even assuming that there are no other "BADJING" or "AMADO" in the barangay, still it does not
follow that the person[s] referred to by the dying declarant as his assailant were Jesus Geraldo alias "BADJING" and Amado Ariate alias
"AMADO". Although, it is inconceivable how the Honorable Court of Appeals arrived at the said conclusion that there are no other
"BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" in the barangay absent any proof to that effect from the prosecution.22
(Underscoring in the original)

The petition is impressed with merit.

The trial court relied on the dying declaration of the victim as recounted by his daughter Mirasol and corroborated by his son
Arnel.

A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying
declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.23

There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the identities of his assailants. As for the victim's
consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove that he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that, judging
from the nature and extent of his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it may safely be inferred that
such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death.24 The location of the victim's two gunshot
wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual death before arriving at the hospital meet this requirement.25

It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify had he survived the attack. There is
no showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant. Among other things, there is no indication whether he was shot in front,
the post-mortem examination report having merely stated that the points of entry of the wounds were at the "right lumbar area" and
the "right iliac area."26 "Lumbar" may refer to "the loins" or "the group of vertebrae lying between the thoracic vertebrae and the
sacrum,"27 or to "the region of the abdomen lying on either side of the umbilical region and above the corresponding iguinal."28
"Iliac" relates to the "ilium," which is "one of the three bones composing either lateral half of the pelvis being in man broad and
expanded above and narrower below where it joins with the ischium and pubis to form part of the actabulum."29

At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant with certainty;
otherwise it loses its significance.30

In convicting petitioners, the trial court, as stated earlier, relied on the testimony of the victim's daughter Mirasol, which was
corroborated by her brother Arnel, that the "Badjing" and "Amado" mentioned by the victim as his assailants are herein petitioners
whom they claimed to know because they live in the same barangay.31 The Court of Appeals believed too the siblings' testimonies,
holding that

It is not necessary that the victim further identify that "Badjing" was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that "Amado" was Amado Ariate.
There was never an issue as to the identity of the accused. There was no other person known as "Badjing" or "Amado" in their
neighborhood or in their barangay.Accused-appellants never presented any proof that a person in their locality had the same aliases or
names as they. It is not uncommon that even an eight-year-old child can identify that Jesus Geraldo was known as "Badjing" and that
Amado Ariate was "Amado."32 (Underscoring supplied)

Contrary, however, to the immediately-quoted ruling of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had the
burden of proving that petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames or aliases. This,
the prosecution failed to discharge.
Page1

When there is doubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction.33 The Court notes that in their
affidavits supporting the criminal complaint, the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not knowing any possible
motive for petitioners to shoot the victim.34 At the trial, no evidence of any motive was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners'
defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance.

Specifically with respect to petitioner Ariate, the victim's wife admitted that Ariate accompanied her family in bringing the victim
to the hospital.35 While non-flight does not necessarily indicate innocence, under the circumstances obtaining in the present case,
Ariate's spontaneous gesture of immediately extending assistance to the victim after he was advised by the Barangay Kagawad of the
victim's fate raises reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the crime charged.36

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2006 affirming with modification the
Decision of Branch 41 of the Surigao del Sur Regional Trial Court isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado
Ariate are ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City who is directed to cause the
immediate release of petitioners unless they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within
ten (10) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115690 February 20, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

REY SALISON, JR.,* TIRSO ANDIENTE, RUFINO DIGNARAN and LEONILO FEDILES, accused.

REY SALISON, JR., accused-appellant.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellant Rey Salison, Jr., alias "Loloy," appeals from a judgment in Criminal Case No. 21805-91 of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 16, which imposed upon him the penalty of relusion perpetua for the murder of one Rolando Valmoria.

The information filed against appellant and the co-accused Tirso Andiente, alias "Sano"; Rufino Dignaran, alias "Jongjong"; and
Leonilo Fediles, alias "Ondoy," alleges:

That on November 30, 1990 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, confederating and mutually helping one another, with abuse of superior strength and with intent to kill, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously mauled and pummeled with hard wood one Rolando Valmoria. Serious and fatal injuries were inflicted
which subsequently caused the death of Rolando Valmoria on December 4, 1990.1

Upon arraignment, appellant Rey Salison, Jr., assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of "not guilty."2 Trial then proceeded
only against him, because his three other co-accused were and, still are, at large. On November 26, 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rey Salison guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the Court has no other alternative but to impose the proper
penalty of "reclusion perpetua", the same being the medium period within the range of the penalty imposable and to pay the cost(s);
to indemnify the offended party (in) the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P7,270.70 as actual damages.
3(Corrections in parentheses ours.)

In the present appeal, herein appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in finding that there was proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused conspired with his co-accused in killing the victim, (2) in not holding that accused is only responsible for the
injuries that he actually inflicted on the victim, and (3) in admitting in evidence the alleged "dying declaration" of the victim, as well as
the "agreement" between the parents of the accused and the victim.4

During the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, a picture of the pieces of wood5 used by the accused in killing the
victim, receipts of expenses incurred in the hospital for the treatment of said victim,6 a written declaration of the victim after the
incident,7 and a written agreement between the parents of appellant and the victim.8

The evidence of record reveals that at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 30, 1990, witness Maria Magdalena Ayola
saw appellant Salison approach the victim, Rolando Valmoria, who was then watching television in a store at Cory Village, Agdao,
Davao City. Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's shoulder and brought him behind a neighbor's house where there was a mango
tree. There, appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the abdomen.9

During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused Andiente, Dignaran and Fediles suddenly appeared
and joined the fight and simultaneously attacked Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia Fernandez approached them that the three
co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and Valmoria behind. Fernandez was able to separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the
three co-accused returned and started to maul Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the victim. 10

When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente picked up pieces of wood and started to hit Valmoria at the
back on his nape, and on the rear part of his head, Valmoria fell to the ground and, upon finding a chance to do so, he stood up and ran
towards his house which was a few meters away. The assailants followed Valmoria but failed to further hit the victim because Valmoria
was able to hide inside his house. All of the accused shouted for Valmoria to come out but the latter refused, causing his four assailants
to hit the walls and windows of the Valmoria residence. During this time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly
thereafter, Valmoria started to complain of dizziness and pain in his head which was bleeding at that time. 11

Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of witness Patricia Alcoseba, the purok
Page1

leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should die and no witness
would testify, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence.
 At the trial of the case, Alcoseba presented the written and signed declaration of Valmoria and she affirmed what was written in
the declaration, testifying as follows:

PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:

Q Mrs. Alcose(b)a, on November 30, 1990, where were you?

A I was in our house.

Q Where?

A At Gory Village.

xxx xxx xxx

Q After you heard that there was trouble in Cory Village, what happened next, if any?

A I noticed that the mother and father of Rolando Valmoria helped Rolando Valmoria in walking towards my house.

Q When they arrived (at) your house, what happened next?

A When they arrived (at) the house, the father requested that his son be allowed to sit on our chair.

Q And what happened next after that?

A At that time Rolando Valmoria was sitting on the chair and he was so weak and his neck and head slumped on the chair and
the Valmorias requested me that he has something to say and requested it to be written and he stuttered in talking.

Q What did you do after the victim requested you?

A I obeyed. I obeyed the request and I got a ballpen and paper.

Q Then what happened next?

A He related to me as to who started the trouble as to who struck him first, the second and the third.

Q Now Mrs. Alcose(b)a, while the victim was narrating to you, what did you observe about his condition?

A I observed that he was so weak and he was in pain and I believed at that time he was dying.

Q Did the victim utter the words to that effect that he was dying?

A Yes, sir. He told me by saying "I believe that I will die".

Q What else?

A Because he said that he felt a terrible pain on his head.

Q Did he tell you the reason why he requested you to make a declaration in writing?

A He told me that if anybody will testify regarding my death this declaration of mine could be utilized as evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Showing to you this statement, what a relation is this one (sic) to the one you said which is the statement of the victim?

A Yes, this is the one.

xxx xxx xxx

Q There is a printed name . . . a signature over the printed name Rolando Valmoria, "ang guibunalan/pasyente'', whose
signature is this?

A That is the signature of Rolando Valmoria.

COURT:

Q When the victim signed that document, was he sitting?

A Yes, sir.

Q After the victim signed that document what happened next?

A They left and they went to the detachment.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What happened to this piece of paper after the victim signed this?

A I gave it to the mother.

Q So you did not keep that piece of paper?

A No, sir. I gave it to them so they will be able to use it.

Q Before they left your house you gave that piece of paper to the mother?
Page1

A At that time I did not give that declaration first to the mother because they were attending to their son.
 Q When did you give that document to the mother?

A When Rolando Valmoria died.

xxx xxx xxx

Q At the time you were taking this statement, from the victim did he tell you the persons who were responsible for his
injuries?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who?

A Rufino Dignaran, Jr. alias Jongjong and the second is Loloy Salison and the third one is name(d) Tirso and the fourth, I
cannot remember the name of the fourth person who hit the victim . . . yes, now I remember, it's Leonilo Fideles.

Q You wrote that statement (o)n a piece of paper?

A Yes, sir. 12 (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)

After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents proceeded to the hospital where he
was X-rayed and treated for his head injuries. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However, at 4:00 o'clock the following
morning, he started to convulse and was rushed to the hospital. After three days there, Valmoria died. 13

The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Edmundo Visitacion, Jr. who had conducted the necropsy which established the cause of
death of Valmoria indicated in the post mortem certificate. He explained that the head injury sustained by the victim caused by a blunt
external trauma probably made by a solid object and this trauma caused the subdular hemorrhage. 14

On December 12, 1990, the parents of the victim and those of the accused Salison and Dignaran entered into a written
agreement for the refund of hospital expenses of Valmoria. However, no reinbursement was actually made.

On the other hand, the lone defense witness was appellant Salison himself who merely denied having killed the victim. He
testified that on that day, together with his friends Andiente, Dignaran, Fideles and a certain Andy, he was visiting his girlfriend, a
certain Neneng Edpalina, when he heard Valmoria and Andiente shouting at each other. He tried to pacify the two but the victim told
him not to interfere because he had nothing to do with them. Then he saw Valmoria, Andiente, Dignaran, Fideles and a certain Andy
engaged in a fistfight. He was trying to stop the group from fighting when witness Fernandez came and told him not to interfere.

He then left and while he was on his way home, he heard somebody shout "agay," so he went back and saw Andiente holding a
piece of wood while Valmoria was running towards his house. He had just grabbed the piece of wood from Andiente when two
CAFGU's arrived and arrested him, Andiente, Dignaran and Fideles. All of them were subsequently released after the investigation. 15

The errors imputed to the trial court may be consolidated and narrowed down to the question of credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, the existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime, and the evidentiary weight of the dying declaration, as well as of
the written agreement of the parents of the victim and the accused.

In the instant case, the lower court held that:

The testimony of the prosecution's witnesses were clear, strong and convincing to deserve full faith and credence. As against the
pure denial of the accused of his direct participation as a conspirator, the positive, clear and straightforward declaration of the
prosecution's witnesses, must prevail. No motive or reason has been shown, why they would falsely impute to the accused the
commission of such a grave crime. The accused Rey Salison has no quarrel or bickering with the prosecution's witnesses. In fact, two of
the prosecution's witnesses are friends of the mother of Rey Salison. These prosecution's witnesses declared that they saw (that) the
accused Rey Salison together with the other accused participated in boxing and mauling Rolando Valmoria with pieces of wood. 16

We agree with the findings of the trial court giving full faith and credit to the witnesses for the People. The uncorroborated
testimony of appellant can not prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution's witnesses. In fact, there were three
eyewitnesses, with no ill motives whatsoever, who testified against appellant and confirmed Salison's direct participation in the
commission of the crime.

The defense did not present any evidence to support the denials of appellant. The putative girlfriend of Salison, who was
allegedly with him on that day, was not presented to confirm that fact and thereby prove that he did not participate in the fight
between his co-accused Andiente and the victim. His testimony pinpointing Andiente as the killer was only a convenient way to avoid
liability since Andiente remained at large and could not refute Salison's testimony imputing the crime to him.

Moreover, denial is a self-serving negative evidence that can not be given greater weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 17 Definitely, therefore, the case of the Government has outweighed and overwhelmed
the evidential ramparts of the defense.

Appellant's assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the eyewitness accounts submitted by the
prosecution. The manner by which the killing was executed clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose and concerted action on the
part of the accused. Prosecution witness Magdalena Ayola, who saw the entire incident, testified on this point, thus:

Q During that time were they alone? The two of them?

COURT:

A When Salison brought Valmoria under the mango tree, they were only 2 but later, alias Sano, Fideles and alias Ondoy and
alias Jong-jong boxed Valmoria.

xxx xxx xxx

Page1

PROSECUTOR MANDALUPE:
 Q In other words aside from accused Salison alias Loloy who first boxed Rolando Valmoria, other three persons joined Salison
and also boxed Rolando Valmoria?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q Did you see the 3 come from the bushes?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you during the time when these three appeared from the bushes?

A I was nearby because we were watching them.

Q Were you alone watching them or you had a companion?

A I had some neighbors with me.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR MANDALUPE:

Q After alias Sano, alias Jong-jong and alias Ondoy joined Salison in boxing Rolando Valmoria, what else did he do against the
person of Rolando Valmoria?

A Valmoria fought back and there was exchange of fist(icuffs) and Loloy Salison, alias Ondoy and alias Sano picked up some
wooden pieces of wood (sic).

Q After these three persons you mentioned picked up wood, what did they do after picking up the wood?

A They struck Valmoria with the piece of wood.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that you saw these 4 persons struck Rolando Valmoria many times while still under the mango tree. Can you tell
the Honorable Court what part of the body of Rolando Valmoria was hit by the striking of wood by the 4 accused, if you can recall?

A He was hit at his back and at the back of his head. 18

xxx xxx xxx

From the aforesaid testimony, these simultaneous attacks on the victim proved the common intent of the accused to inflict fatal
blows upon the victim.

Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. 19 A conspiracy may be inferred without need of showing that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. 20 For collective responsibility among
the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all of them acted in concert each doing his part to fulfill
their common purpose to kill the victim. 21

Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all of the accused had a prior agreement on how to kill Valmoria, the doctrine is
well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, Very seldom would such
prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in
writing.22

It is equally a well-accepted corollary rule that where a conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the accused
rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character of
their participation, because the act of one is the act of all. 23

What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed by him right after the
incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he sustained. Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement, which
was reduced into writing by witness Patricia Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence since it was
in the Cebuano regional language and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino.

However, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration. Thus, the defense waived
whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or
Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record. 24

Also, while such statement was given, as in the nature of things they are generally in oral form, they are not thereby rendered
inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. If the declarations have thereafter been reduced to writing and
signed by the declarant, the writing is generally held to be the best evidence, and it must be produced. 25

More than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied by the
required translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection by the accused.26 In those instances, the Court
merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the revised Rules of Court now prohibits the
admission of such document in an unofficial language but we believe that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken
literally here, especially since no objection thereto was interposed by appellant, aside from the fact that appellant, the concerned
parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the
Page1

document was written. There was, therefore, no prejudice caused to appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of
the trial court.
 Also, the written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the victim's declaration into
writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. The witness was able
to explain and discuss what was written in the declaration and how she came to prepare the same. Significantly, everything written in
that declaration of the victim was confirmed by the Government's eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of
the declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts and give
retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.

Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader can not be considered as a dying
declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an impending death." As earlier narrated, at the
time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his
declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover
and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still
admissible as part of the res gestae, 27 since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim
had no opportunity to contrive.

We are in conformity with the verdict of the lower court finding appellant guilty of murder since the killing was qualified by the
circumstance of the accused having taken advantage of their superior strength. The victim was unarmed and defenseless at the time
when all of the accused mercilessly bludgeoned his back and head with big pieces of wood. The number of assailants and the nature of
the weapons used against the hapless victim show a notorious inequality of force between the latter and the aggressors, assuring a
superiority of strength advantageous to Salison and his co-accused in the commission of the crime. The accused purposely used
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 28

Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present in the case at bar, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, the same being the medium period in the range of the imposable penalty.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-
appellant Rey Salison, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117685 June 21, 1999

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ALFONSO R. BAUTISTA @ "POLDO", accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the Decision of May 26, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Criminal Case
No. D-12278 convicting appellant Alfonso R. Bautista of the crime of murder as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Alfonso Bautista alias Poldo Bautista guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, pursuant to law, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.

Accused is ordered to pay Letecia (sic) Bandarlipe the amount of P35,000.00 representing the money spent during the wake of
Cipriano Bandarlipe.

SO ORDERED. 1

Appellant was originally charged with murder along with Samuel Ventura and Alejandro Defuntorum 2 before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian, Pangasinan. 3 Upon reinvestigation by the provincial prosecutor, however, the charge against Ventura
and Defuntorum was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. 4 In due course, on November 15, 1993, the following information was
filed against appellant:

That on or about November 30, 1992 in the evening at barangay Anonang, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a long firearm with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there wilfully and unlawfully and feloniously shoot CIPRIANO BANDARLIPE y SION
inflicting upon him a gunshot wound (omental evisceration right upper abdomen) which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code. 5

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. At the trial of the case, the prosecution adduced the following
evidence:

At around 7 o'clock in the evening of November 30, 1992, Leticia Bandarlipe 6 was seated on a sled near a kamiastree by her
house in Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan to await the arrival of her husband, Cipriano Bandarlipe. An hour and a half later, she heard
a gun report and the ensuing shout of her husband that he was shot. Leticia ran to her husband's succor and found him prostrate on
the road about fifteen (15) meters away from where she was seated. As she embraced her husband and cried for help, she saw
appellant standing at a distance of two (2) meters from Cipriano, pointing a long firearm at the latter. Leticia recognized appellant
whom she identified in court as "Leopoldo Bautista," as she had seen him several times before. Moreover, it was a moonlit night and
the place was illuminated by the lights originating from the house of her in-laws and a passing payloader. Leticia asked her husband
who shot him and Cipriano replied that appellant did. When Leticia looked up, appellant was no longer there. Thereupon, together
with her sister-in-law, Barangay Captain Felipe M. Solis, Jose C. Gagaza, Jr., Barangay Tanod De Leon and others, Leticia rushed Cipriano
Page1

to the provincial hospital in Binloc, Dagupan City. There, Cipriano expired. 7

 Leticia's neighbor, Rogelio Peralta, was walking on his way home when, by the light of a passing payloader, he saw appellant
carrying a long firearm immediately after he had heard gunfire. Rogelio went to the side of the road and, after appellant had vanished,
continued on his way home. He later learned that Cipriano was shot and rushed to the hospital. 8

Dr. Alberto Gonzales, the resident physician who attended to the victim, issued a medico-legal certificate stating that the 37-
year-old Cipriano Bandarlipe had alcoholic breath and omental evisceration at the right upper abdomen. Cipriano died of cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock due to gunshot wound on the abdomen. 9

According to Leonardo Tabilen, Chief of the Intelligence Unit of the 152nd PC Company, he had known appellant as a "dreaded
killer in San Fabian and San Jacinto, Pangasinan" who was suspected of having killed Federico Dispo, Efren Reyes and the Barangay
Captain of Pozorrubio, aside from Cipriano Bandarlipe. Based on information gathered from barangay people, Tabilen conducted a
surveillance operation upon appellant. At the invitation of Barangay Captain Solis, who was his partner in keeping peace and order in
the community, Tabilen went to the house of Prudencio Feriamil on October 5, 1992 (sic). There, he invited appellant and his brother-
in-law, Rufino Reyes, to the headquarters to shed light on the killing of Cipriano Bandarlipe. Appellant willingly went with him and the
investigation conducted at the headquarters resulted at a finding that appellant was the killer of Cipriano. The witnesses who were
investigated and who pointed to appellant as the culprit were Rogelio Peralta, Cipriano's wife, Prudencio Feriamil, the Chief Barangay
Tanod and the Barangay Captain. 10

In his defense, appellant claimed that he was framed up and that it was actually Feriamil who killed Cipriano. A handicraft worker
from Lipit, Manaoag, Pangasinan, appellant, who was also known as "Poldo," was introduced to Prudencio Feriamil by his brother-in-
law at a gathering in Macayog, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Feriamil convinced appellant to work as his industrial partner in the tobacco
plantation the former operated in Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Leaving his family behind, appellant accepted the offer and began
work in January 1992. He stayed with Feriamil in a hut about a hundred meters away from the tobacco plantation. He met Leticia
Bandarlipe for the first time when the latter arrived with Feriamil who introduced her as his kumadre. Leticia had, since then, become a
frequent visitor of Feriamil in the hut. 11

Appellant recalled that he last saw Leticia in an uncompromising situation with Feriamil sometime in April 1992. The two were
lying naked on a bamboo bed inside the hut with Leticia on top of Feriamil. Perplexed by what he saw, appellant hurriedly went out of
the hut. The illicit lovers emerged a little later and begged appellant not to disclose to anybody what he had witnessed. Appellant told
them not to worry. The two did not go home immediately for fear that they would get sick (pasma) but apparently in her haste to
leave, Leticia left in a corner of the hut a pink panty with the name "Letty Bandarlipe" embroidered on it. Appellant kept the panty in a
plastic bag intending to return the same to its owner. However, since Leticia never visited the house again, appellant could not return
the panty to her. Appellant produced the panty in court as Exhibit 4 and 4-A. 12

After the harvest season in May 1992, appellant went home to visit his family in Manaoag. During his absence, Feriamil and
Leticia sold tobacco for Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) but they refused to give appellant his share in the proceeds. Appellant
made several attempts to collect his share but Feriamil merely advised him to keep his patience while he searched for money as Leticia
had taken the proceeds of the sale. 13

While appellant was in his hometown, Cipriano Bandarlipe was killed. The person who rushed him to the hospital, namely,
Barangay Captain Felipe Solis, Jose Gagaza, Jr. and Barangay Security Force Chief Zaldy Aquino, proceed to the PNP Headquarters in
San Fabian, Pangasinan to report the incident. 14 Solis believed that Feriamil (Periamil) could have authored the crime per information
given him by Gagaza because Feriamil was often in the company of "Leopoldo Bautista." 15 The report of Solis was written on the
police blotter as Entry No. 187. 16 In fact, Solis brought Feriamil to the police station on December 1, 1992 and even the NBI 17 in
Dagupan City but Feriamil's investigation yielded a negative result so that Feriamil was able to go home with Solis. 18

On the other hand, Gagaza's report to the police was entered blotter as follows:

This has ref to entry Nr. 187, in this Police Blotter dtd 30 Nov. 92, Jose Gagaza y Castro, 25 years old, single, a resident of brgy.
Anonang this mplty appeared to this station and informed that when he accompanied the victim (Cipriano Bandarlipe) at the hospital.
He the (victim) stated that he was shot by one Domy Ferreamil also of same place, and in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Felipe Solis and
chief Brgy. Force Saldy Aquino of brgy. Anonang this town, when he stated same words against the suspect.

Jose C. Gagaza, Jr. 19

Exhibit "3-a," a document dated September 11, 1998 that was issued by Chief Inspector Fausto M. Cayabyab, Jr., shows that
SPO2 Ricardo D. Abrio, police desk officer, confirmed that Gagaza, Jr. had affixed his signature on the same police blotter. 20

Sometime in August 1993, appellant returned to Anonang to collect his share of the proceeds of the sale of tobacco from
Feriamil. The latter requested him to come back after one month. In his frustration, appellant threatened to reveal the amorous
relationship between Leticia and Feriamil. 21 In the evening of September 3, 1993, Zaldy Aquino invited Solis and Feriamil to his
residence. Solis and Aquino asked Feriamil if he had anything to do with the killing of Cipriano Bandarlipe or if he knew anything about
it. Feriamil replied that "Poldo Bautista" killed Cipriano and that "Poldo Bautista" was supposed to go to his residence on September 5,
1993. 22

Appellant, his sister and brother-in-law indeed returned to Feriamil's house on that date. Feriamil asked them to wait while he
prepared some snacks. While appellant's group was drinking coffee, several people including Solis, Sgts. Tabilen and De Guzman,
Rogelio Peralta and Jose Gagaza, Jr. entered the house. They, pointed a gun at appellant and his companions, telling them not to move.
They told appellant's group that if they valued their lives, they should go down the house. As they were descending from the house,
someone asked Feriamil, "Who among these?" Feriamil pointed to appellant and immediately someone struck him with the butt of a
gun. With his hands tied at the back, appellant was brought to the 152nd PC Command in Lingayen, Pangasinan where he was mauled
to force him to admit the killing of Cipriano with whom he was not even acquainted. 23

Based on the statements executed on September 5, 1993 by Jose Gagaza, Jr., 24 Prudencio Feriamil, 25 Leticia Bandarlipe, 26
Rogelio Peralta 27 and Felipe Solis, 28 an information for murder was filed against appellant. In his sworn statements, Jose Gagaza, Jr.,
Page1

a Barangay Tanod declared, among others, that at the time of the incident he heard a gun explosion; that immediately after he heard
Cipriano asking for help as he was shot; that when he came near the victim, the latter while being cradled by his wife Leticia, declared
that it was "Poldo Bautista" who shot him; and that while on the way to the hospital where he was brought by a group, including
Gagaza Jr., the victim repeatedly identified "Poldo Bautista" as the one who shot him.

Feriamil, for his part, stated that when appellant came home disturbed and with a gun that fateful night of November 30, he
confessed to having killed Cipriano. He and appellant then slept. In the morning of November 31, 1992 (sic), Barangay Captain Solis and
some policemen arrived and brought him (Feriamil) to the police station where he was asked about the killing of Cipriano. Feriamil told
the police that he did not know anything about the matter but he did not relate to them what appellant had confessed to him the night
before because he was afraid.

The sworn statements of Leticia Bandarlipe, Rogelio Peralta and Felipe Solis were all reiterated in their respective testimonies.

As stated at the outset, the trial court convicted appellant of the crime of murder and condemned him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. It gave weight and credence to the circumstantial evidence that appellant was seen holding a gun near the fallen
victim soon after witnesses Leticia Bandarlipe and Rogelio Peralta had heard the gun report. Thus, the trial court ratiocinated:

The reason given by Alfonso Bautista that he was framed up in this case in order that he could not reveal what he had observed
between Prudencio Feriamil and Leticia Bandarlipe is devoid of merit. The prosecution, thru the testimony of Rogelio Peralta, clearly
established that Rogelio Peralta had seen Alfonso Bautista holding a gun on November 30, 1992 at around 8:30 in the evening while on
the road walking near the house of Cipriano Bandarlipe at Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, at which place he heard a burst of a gun.
He met accused Alfonso Bautista and the latter was carrying a firearm. This witness could not have committed a mistake because there
was a light of the payloader which was focused to the accused. The testimony of Rogelio Peralta was supported by the testimony of
Leticia Bandarlipe who declared that she had seen Alfonso Bautista holding a gun and the gun was still pointed to the deceased while
he was sprawled on the ground. In fact, this prosecution witness clearly stated that the accused immediately ran away when she had
seen him.

There is no question that the witness had seen the accused. In fact she (Leticia Bandarlipe) testified that she saw Alfonso Bautista
standing near her husband about two meters away. The place where the incident took place was lighted by a payloader, aside from the
light coming from the house of her in-laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, when he was invited to the headquarters at Lingayen, Pangasinan, the accused went with Leonardo Tabilin, Chief
of the Intelligence of the PNP Command willingly. During the investigation, it was found out that Alfonso Bautista was the one who
killed Cipriano Bandarlipe. 29

Aggrieved by the above decision, appellant interposed the instant appeal assigning the following as errors of the court a quo:

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DYING DECLARATION MADE BY THE
DECEASED VICTIM.

II

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT FAILURE OF WITNESSES TO POINT THE
ACCUSED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SHOOTING INCIDENT WEAKENS THEIR CREDIBILITY.

III

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCES (sic) BY
THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED. 30

Appellant asserts that Gagaza's statement in the police blotter that the victim identified "Domy Feriamil" as his assailant
constituted a dying declaration that should have been given due evidentiary weight.

A dying declaration, also known as an ante mortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is admissible under the following
requisites: (1) that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and (4)
that the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of the inquiry.

In the case at bar, the trial court correctly rejected the ante mortem statement of the victim. Records show that Jose Gagaza, Jr.,
the person who allegedly heard the victim's ante mortem statement, was never presented in court to testify on the matter. It has been
held that if the dying declaration was made orally, it may be proved by the testimony of the witness who heard the same or to whom it
was made. 31

The entry of the same statement in the police blotter alone will not suffice to confer upon it the desired evidentiary weight.
Entries in police blotters are only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 32

The above exposition notwithstanding appellant's bid for exoneration deserves a second look.

While as a general rule, the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and
respect on appeal, this rule cannot be strictly applied where significant facts and circumstances that could affect the result of the case
if properly considered, had been overlooked and disregarded by the trial court.

In the instant case, we find that the prosecution's evidence are so teeming with loopholes and inconsistencies as to render them
unworthy of belief.
Page1

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases does not entail absolute certainty of the
fact that the accused committed the crime. Neither does it exclude the possibility of error. What is required is moral certainty or that
degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 33 Thus, inconsistencies in testimonies that refer only to minor and
insignificant details of an incident are considered to reinforce rather than weaken a witness' credibility because minor inaccuracies
suggest that the witness is telling the truth. 34 However, the rule that factual findings and assessment of credibility of witnesses
generally bind this Court cannot be strictly applied where significant facts and circumstances that could affect the result of the case if
properly considered, were overlooked and disregarded by the trial court. 35 In this case, the Court finds that inconsistencies in the
testimony of the principal prosecution witness as regards the identity of the assailant are so glaring that giving such testimony the
weight and credence stamped upon it by the trial court would result in grave injustice.

In her direct testimony, principal prosecution witness Leticia Bandarlipe categorically stated that the victim identified appellant
as his assailant. Thus:

Q: Aside from seeing the accused two (2) meters standing from your husband (sic), what else did you do there?

A: When I went to embrace him and I saw Leopoldo Bautista (sic) standing and asked my husband who shot him and he said it
was Poldo Bautista. 36

However, on cross-examination, Leticia admitted that she was not able to talk to her husband anymore thereby reversing herself
on the identification of appellant by the victim. She testified as follows:

Q: The records show that inspite of the fact that you saw Poldo Bautista pointing a gun towards the body of your husband, you
still ask(ed) him who shot him, am I right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Madam Witness, I have here a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes during the reinvestigation of this case and you
answered to the question on page 19 of said transcript that you were not able to talk to him anymore, the prosecutor referring to your
husband, from Anonang to the hospital and your answer is, no more, do you remember this answer, "no more, sir"?

A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied.) 37

This testimony has left the Court baffled as to whether or not the victim indeed identified appellant as his assailant. Likewise, the
Court cannot see its way clear why Leticia should still ask her husband who shot him when she allegedly saw appellant still pointing the
gun at him. 38 She would have asked her husband who shot him only if she did not see or identify appellant as the culprit. However,
she categorically testified that as soon as she heard gunfire, she rushed to her husband who was sprawled on the ground and saw, two
(2) meters away, appellant with a gun in his hand. 39 In fact, in her sworn statement, she admitted having seen appellant shoot her
husband. Thus:

06. T — Papaano ninyo nalaman na si Poldo Bautista ang pumatay sa inyong asawa?

S — Nakita (sic) ko po nang barilin ni Poldo Bautista ang aking asawa, sir. 40

While her statement that she saw Poldo Bautista shoot her husband may be interpreted loosely as that she was present when
her husband was shot but not necessarily that she saw the actual shooting incident nevertheless, the seeming inconsistency cannot but
engender doubt in our minds as to what actually transpired during that fateful evening. At the very least, Leticia Bandarlipe's testimony
does not inspire belief that she was telling the truth as to the identity of appellant as the felon.

It is also worthy to note that whereas Leticia initially denied having talked to the local officials who accompanied her to the
hospital she subsequently admitted that Barangay Captain Solis, et al. went to her house the day after the incident and talked to her
about filing a case in connection with her husband's murder, which she refused to do.

If it is true that Leticia Bandarlipe actually saw her husband being shot by appellant, or that her dying husband told her that it
was appellant who shot him, why did she not report what she saw and heard to the two barangay tanods, Gagaza and de Leon, who
responded to her shouts for help; and, why was she reluctant to file a complaint against the gunman whom she allegedly saw shoot her
husband. Her acts are contrary to the natural tendency of a witness closely related to the victim, to report a crime and describe the
malefactor at the earliest possible opportunity. 41

In fact, it was not until about ten (10) months later that Leticia executed a sworn statement pointing to appellant as the assailant
of her husband Cipriano.

On the other hand, prosecution witness Rogelio Peralta testified that on the evening of November 30, 1992, while he was
passing near the victim's house on his way home, he heard a gunshot. As he walked on, he met appellant whom he recognized by the
light of a payloader which was passing by. He allegedly saw appellant carrying a long firearm. He went to the side of the road and when
appellant was no longer in view, he continued walking home. About an hour thereafter, he learned that the victim was shot. 42 And
yet, Peralta gave his statement on the above incident only on September 5, 1993 or about ten (10) months after the shooting allegedly
out of fear of the appellant. While the initial reluctance and consequent delay of a witness in getting himself involved in a criminal case
may not impair his credibility nor destroy the probative value of his testimony, this holds true only when said delay is adequately
explained. 43 But where the witness' reason for delay in reporting to authorities is baseless, his testimony will not inspire belief. 44
Here, Peralta was then a member of the Barangay Tanod or "security force" of the locality. 45

He knew policeman Tabilen who is also a resident of Anonang, 46 and from whom he certainty could have asked for help and
protection if he wanted to. Note that this is the same Sgt. Tabilin who led the group, which included Peralta, in arresting appellant. 47

More importantly, based on his own admission, Peralta merely learned of the shooting of Bandarlipe from the people who
rushed to the scene of the crime. He did not in fact witness the shooting, but merely presumed it was appellant who shot the victim
because he saw appellant carrying a gun near the vicinity of the crime scene.

Appellant contends that the prosecution suppressed evidence in not presenting Jose Gagaza, Jr., Prudencio Feriamil and
Barangay Captain Felipe Solis. 48 The records show, however, that Felipe Solis did testify for the accused at the trial in this wise:
Page1

Q. In this affidavit Mr. Witness, the (sic) question No. 11, which I quote: Q — pagkatapos na namatay sa Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital si Cipriano Bandarlipe, ano ang sumunod na action ninyo bilang Barangay Kapitan ng Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan? A —
Ako at si Barangay Chief Tanod Zaldy Aquino ay pumunta kami sa himpilan ng pulisya ng San Fabian dahil pinagsususpetsahan namin si
Prudencio Periamil (sic)," do you still affirm this question and answer of yours?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you inform the Court what is your basis in suspecting Prudencio Periamil (sic)?

A. We suspected him because we believed that he was the one.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Will you please tell us, who mentioned the name Periamil (sic)?

A. Jose Gagasa, sir. 49

Given the alleged knowledge of Gagaza of certain vital facts surrounding the crime, it is highly surprising why the prosecution did
not call him to testify if only to clarify why on the day the crime was committed, he caused the entry in the police blotter naming
Feriamil as the main suspect in the murder; whereas, in his sworn statement dated September 5, 1993, he made a contradictory
declaration, by saying that while they were on their way to the hospital the victim repeatedly told him that he was shot by appellant.

It is true that the matter of deciding whom to present as witness for the prosecution is not for the accused or for the trial court
to decide, as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor. 50 However, it is equally true that when a party has in his possession or power to
produce the best evidence of which the case in its nature is susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the evidence is
withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart his evil or fraudulent purpose. 51

In the case at bar, there are pieces of evidence on record which, if properly considered, would certainly raise questions
consistent with the proposition that the prosecution might have accused the wrong person, foremost of which is Barangay Captain
Solis' testimony that Feriamil was the original suspect in the murder, and Leticia Bandarlipe's admission that Solis and Gagaza went to
her house the day after her husband's murder to solicit her cooperation in the prosecution of Feriamil.

If Prudencio Feriamil was the original suspect, why was he not duly investigated for the murder of Cipriano Bandarlipe? And why
did Leticia Bandarlipe refuse to cooperate with the authorities in the investigation and prosecution of Feriamil?

Finally, why did the prosecution not present Feriamil as a witness when the records show that he was instrumental in naming
appellant as the alleged assailant, and in leading the authorities to the latter's arrest?

Noteworthy is the testimony of prosecution witness Leonardo Tabilin, who upon cross-examination answered thus:

Q. And as a matter of fact, it was Prudencio Feriamil who related that this Alfonso Bautista was the one responsible of the killing
(sic) of several persons, and these are Federico Dispo, Efren Reyes, and alleged Barangay Captain of Pozorrubio?

A. While we are gathering, it is not only from persons whom we directly gather, we will also proceed in order that we could
arrive at intelligence work (sic).

Q. But on September 3, when Prudencio Feriamil informed you that Alfonso Bautista was the one responsible of killing (sic)
including Cipriano Bardarlipe?

A. Yes, sir. 52

Likewise on record is Feriamil's own incredible version of how he came to know of appellant's involvement in the crime:

Q. Maalaala mo pa ba kung nasaan ka noong Nobyembre 30, 1992 bandang alas 8:30 ng gabi?

A Opo sir. Nasa labas po ako ng aking bahay sa Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan.

Q Noong oras na iyon, mayroon bang nangyari na hindi pangkaraniwan?

A Opo, sir. Nakarinig po ako ng isang putok ng baril na sa pagkaalam ko po ay malapit lang sa amin.

Q Ano naman ana iyong ginawa pagkarinig sa putok ng baril na sinasabi mo?

A Pumasok ako kaagad sa loob ng aking bahay at humiga na ako.

Q Ano naman ang sumunod na nangyari?

A Noong bandang alas 9:00 ng gabing iyon, Nobyembre 30, 1992, isang nagngangalang Poldo Bautista ay dumating sa aking
bahay na may dalang mahabang baril at nahiga sa loob ng aking bahay pero sa pakiwari ko ay parang balisang-balisa. Kaya tinanong ko
siya kung bakit parang hindi siya makatulog at balisang-balisa at sinabi niya sa akin na pinatay niya si Cipriano Bandarlipe.

Q Ano naman ang ginawa mo noong nalaman mo na si Poldo Bautista ay pinatay niya si Cipriano Bandarlipe?

A Ako at si Poldo Bautista ay nakatulog na hanggang sa kinabukasan.

Q Ano ang ang iyong ginawa noong pagkagising mo kinabukasan?

A Noong bandang alas sais ng umaga noong Nobyembre 31, (sic) 1992, Barangay Captain Felipe Solis at may kasamang mga pulis
ay dumating sa aking bahay at dinala ako sa himpilan ng pulisya ng San Fabian.

Q Ano naman ang ginawa sa iyo noong dinala ka sa himpilan ng pulisya ng San Fabian, Pangasinan sa araw na iyon?

A Tinanong po ako tungkol sa pagkamatay ni Cipriano Bandarlipe pero sinabi ko sa kanila na hindi ko po alam ang bagay na iyon.
Page1

Q Hindi mo ba sinabi sa mga pulisya ng San Fabian ang ipinagtapat sa iyo ni Pol Bautista noong dumating sa iyong bahay noong
gabing iyon?
 A Hindi po sir, dahil natakot po ako. 53

As in the case of witnesses Rogelio Peralta and Leticia Bandarlipe, Feriamil's alleged reaction to the killing of Cipriano Bandarlipe
is beyond credulity. How could Feriamil have slept so easily and so soundly with the confessed assailant of his "kumpadre?" Even more
amazing is the fact that when he (Feriamil) was brought for questioning to the police station the day after the shooting he simply kept
silent about what he knew despite the fact that he was the main suspect in the murder, and only revealed appellant's alleged
confession about ten (10) months after the incident.

Finally, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General appellant has no motive at all for killing the victim. While generally, the motive
of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven, 54 proof of the same becomes relevant and essential
when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. 55

Considering the apparent unreliability of the evidence proffered by the prosecution, this Court is constrained to rule for an
acquittal. In all criminal cases, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused on the principle that it is better to liberate a guilty
man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proven by the required quantum of evidence. 56 Conviction, it is
said, must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt that we find here to be wanting. 57

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant Alfonso Bautista is hereby
ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of murder against Cipriano Bandarlipe. The
Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Rodolfo P. Liwanag for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:p

In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before the Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial
Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of robbery with homicide committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of (sic) gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner and, by means of violence and intimidation, take, carry
and cart away two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1) piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda.
de Salac, to their damage and prejudice in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00); and that on the occasion of the said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take the said properties, the accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage of superior strength, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by stabbing and hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her
body with pointed instrument causing injuries which directly caused the death of the said Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac.

That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances were present (1) abuse of superior strength; (2)
committed in the dwelling of the offended party; (3) disregard of age and sex; (4) abuse of confidence.

Contrary to law. 1

At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986
convicting De Joya of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, committed with the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age, disregard of sex the victim a woman
88 years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim. The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed
against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P20,000.00 and to pay damages in the amount of P550.00.

The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be confined immediately in the National Penitentiary pending
review of his case by the Supreme Court.

The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of this case to the Supreme Court for review.

SO ORDERED. 2

In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which, however, amount to one basic assertion: that the lower court
erred in concluding that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor General in the following manner:
Page1

The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia
Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, June 11, 1981, p. 2). Both spouses
are teachers by profession.
 Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia teaches
in an intermediate school at Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 7).

In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then
[sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. (TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 3).

Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 8).

At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong,
together with a friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction
of the Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's. (TSN, June
11, 1981, pp. 2-4).

When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He
immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?". (TSN, March 11,
1980, p. 10).

. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed
away. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 14 and 17).

Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng
told him to immediately see his mother Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her of what happened. (TSN, Id).

Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood." (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 20).

Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. Alvin followed, riding his bicycle (TSN, Id.,
p. 21). When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in front of the television. Her
mother's hands were stretched open and her feet were wide apart. Blood was oozing out of her mother's ears. She then embraced her
mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin and the tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 25-
26).

Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared
that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother's ears were
punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and
instead immediately left. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 27-29).

Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise
missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00 (TSN, Id., p. 15).

That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador)
were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 15-
17).

When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found the two (2) rooms thereat in disarray.
She then caused the rooms and things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto (Exhibits "A" to "A-11"; TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 17).

Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a death certificate so that her mother could be
embalmed. (TSN, Id., pp. 33-34).

On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the cabinet near the door of their room
downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying prostrate. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 24-25).

Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her
husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old
and wornout pair of slippers of the latter. (TSN, Ibid.).

Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein
appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house. (TSN, Id.).

On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Romulo Madrid, a medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation. Per examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was "shock, secondary to punctured wound
neck" (Exhibit "D-1") situated at the right side of the neck, just below the right ear wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost
in the same location, from one side of the neck to the opposite side. (Exhibit "D-2").

In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the judgment of conviction against appellant.
These factors, as set out in the decision of the trial court, were the following:

In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as testified to by the
witnesses and proven during the trial, also the dying statement of the deceased, which are: Herminia testified that two weeks before
the incident the accused and the deceased quarreled over a bicycle which the former took from their house without the consent of the
latter; that Exhibit "B" (step-in beach walk type) which was found near the cabinet one meter away from the body of the victim was
identified by Herminia as the step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and which she saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978
when she visited them in their house; the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of January 31, 1978
at around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the accused admitted, although his wife is the sister of the
husband of Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that it was lying in state without any justifiable reason and
contrary to the ordinary experience of man; last but most convincing is the dying statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin
Page1

asked her "Apo, Apo, what happened?" and she answered, "Si Paki", then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who
is this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his testimony never denied that he is called Paki.
 The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the dying statement of the deceased leads only to one fair and
reasonable conclusion, that the accused is the author of the crime.

Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the court in convicting appellant De Joya of
robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:

1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: "Si Paqui";

2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two weeks before the
robbery and homicide, between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the
Valencia's house without the consent of the victim;

3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their
house one (1) meter away from the body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had given to the wife
of the accused the previous Christmas Season;

4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias,
standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing;

5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day wake.

We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his grandmother who was
sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with blood: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After
uttering those two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted
at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could have been
intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to designate the
subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb, we must
note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by
Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"

It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that
the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given
fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. 3 The doctrine of
completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:

The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be merely apart of the
whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the
death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by
death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect
from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a
portion of what he might have been able to tell. 4 (Emphasis supplied)

The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since
the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been
qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received. 5

It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was
cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by
uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and
through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication
might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the
appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.

The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are
examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed
the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before
Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a
violent and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no identification was shown at all, certainly weakens the case of the
prosecution.

The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in the living room where
Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of
slippers that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made
in such quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same color, shape
and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife. And even if conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered, and it
is assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those very slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular
slipper did not clearly and directly connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying. At most, under that assumption, the presence of
that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and there mislaid that
slipper. We note in this connection, that appellant himself had testified that he did enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon, but
after the killing of Eulalia Diamse had been perpetrated, and there had found many persons in the house viewing the body.

The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of
the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that
appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of the appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no basis
for supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old woman by skewering her through the neck and had
Page1

ransacked both floors of the Valencia house.

 Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does
not give rise to any inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work,
sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the afternoon Eulalia
Diamse was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or inability to
participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with the trial judge that such behaviour was
"contrary to the ordinary experience of man" although respect for the dead is a common cultural trait of the Filipinos.

In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence against appellant included: "the attempt
on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his counsel to settle the case amicably." 6 We have examined the testimony that
the Solicitor General pointed to in referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal charge amicably. That testimony, given by
Arnedo Valencia, son-in-law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse and brother-in-law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya, was as follows:

Q You also testified that before the release of the accused from the municipal jail, you had a conversation with him, is that right?

A Yes, air.

Q What was this conversation about?

A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and according to him if only Atty. Aguilar can talk with me, everything
will be settled.

Q Have you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar?

A Yes, I went with him to Manila, sir.

Q When was this?

A The time he was fetched out of jail.

Q You are referring to the municipal jail?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able to see Atty. Aguilar?

A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty. Aguilar asked me as to what I liked to happen.

Q What did you say?

A I said if it will be settled, well and good.

Q Anything else that transpired?

A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and her sisters.

Q Did he tell you he can settle this?

A He was very certain that he can settle this, the very reason why he told me because I was very certain as to what happened.

Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were discussing this with his lawyer?

A Yes, sir

Q He heard what his, lawyer was telling you?

A It is possible because he is only one or two meters distance away.

Q Did the accused say anything?

A None, sir. (Emphasis supplied)

We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel,
to offer a compromise on the criminal charge is concerned. We are aware of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court which provides that

Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and is not
admissible in evidence against the person making the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis
supplied)

We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of the (extended) family of the
deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of
the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of
appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did not believe
that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly
admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary to
justify a conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.

The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a
number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that appellant had indeed
robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the instant case is
insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court
Page1

remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence supporting the judgment of
conviction.
 The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the crime of robbery and homicide was not shown
beyond reasonable doubt.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

It is so ordered.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-38833 March 12, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.

AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused whose death sentence is under review.

Mamintal Tamano for the accused.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:

This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm on January 28, 1972 at Calarian,
Zamboanga City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days later.

Girlie Aling a relative of Airol Aling stated in her affidavit of February 21, 1972 that she and Darla Aling (Norija's daughter)
brought the victim to the hospital. They learned from the police that Norija was stabbed by her husband (p. 4, Record).

On March 24, 1972 Airol Aling 35, was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was
translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because e he was informed in prison by his
relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men. He recounted the killing in this manner:

At or about one o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1972, I was at the seashore of Calarian relaxing since I have just arrived
from Jolo, Sulu that particular day.

At that time, I was already running away from the authorities because I am an escapee from San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm.

Later on, I proceeded to my father's house which is just near the seashore, Upon reaching the house, I saw Nori Mohamad but I
had no time to talk to her because immediately after seeing me, Nori ran away, going to the direction of the street.

Armed with the bolo which I had been carrying with me, I chased after Nori and I catch up with her at the street where I started
stabbing her with the bolo, hitting her on the different parts of the body.

When I saw Nori fell down on the street badly wounded, I hurriedly left the place and ran towards the far end of Calarian. (Exh.
2).

Two policemen in their affidavit of March 24, 1972, affirmed that Airol admitted to Sergeant Antonio Macrohon in their presence
that he stabbed his wife because she had been going with many men (Exh. 1).

On April 19, 1972, Airol Aling was charged with parricide in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. It was alleged in the
information that Airol was a convict serving sentence at the penal colony for robbery with frustrated homicide.

The case was first called for arraignment on March 15, 1974. The accused signified his willingness to plead guilty although he had
no lawyer. A counsel de oficio was appointed for him. The trial court granted counsel's motion to transfer the arraignment to March
18.

On that date, by agreement of the parties, the arraignment was transferred to March 29, then to April 5, and later to April 30,
1974. On that last date, the information was translated into the Tausug dialect which is spoken by the accused. With the assistance of
his counsel, he pleaded guilty.

Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and examined by his counsel. He admitted that he killed his wife. He declared
that after he was informed by his counsel that the penalty for parricide is death or life imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted the
killing of his wife because that was the truth.

In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he understood that by pleading guilty he could be sentenced to
death or reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped convict.

He described the confrontation with his wife. When he arrived at his home, his wife ran and he pursued her. He overtook her,
stabbed her but she was able to parry the blow, and when -she fell on the ground, he repeatedly stabbed her in the abdomen.

He said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into entering a plea of guilty. He admitted that he was a prisoner in the penal colony.
He was a Muslim belonging to the Samal tribe of Siasi Sulu. He killed his wife because while he was in prison, she did not visit him and
she neglected their four children.

He agreed that his father-in-law could have the custody of his children. He was able to leave the penal colony because he was a
"living-out-prisoner". When he went to his house on January 28, 1972, his purpose was to be reconciled with his wife but when she
saw him, instead of waiting for him, she ran away. He had information that his wife was guilty of infidelity or had a "kabit". That was a
grievous offense under Muslim customs.
Page1

He Identified his signature in his confession which was sworn to before the clerk of court (Exh. B or 2).
 The trial court sentenced Airol Aling to death and to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of Norija Mohamad.
It noted that he pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his plea.

The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review of the death penalty.

Counsel de oficio assigned to present the side of the accused in this review, contends that the marriage of Airol to Norija was not
indubitably proven. That contention cannot be sustained. The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an
admission against his penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" (Sec. 5[bbl, Rule 131,
Rules of Court).

He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the deceased was his
lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure to visit him n prison and her neglect of their children are other
circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.

The contention that the accused did not understand fully he nature and effect of Ms plea of guilty is belied by the record. The
trial judge, a Muslim, took pans to follow the rule that in case a plea of guilty is entered in a capital case, evidence should be received
in order to leave no room for reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full knowledge of the
meaning and consequences of his plea of guilty (People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).

In this case, the arraignment was postponed three times in order to enable his counsel to confer with him and explain to him the
consequences of his plea of guilty. The accused testified. His confession and the affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were
presented in evidence.

The contention that the crime was mitigated by the plea of guilty lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong and the
circumstance that the accused is a non-Christian is not well taken because he is a quasi-recidivist. The special aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by generic investigating circumstances.

The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity and incorrigibility His being
a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense. He understood the gravity of his crime because he had
attained some education. He reached first year high school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring firm.

However, only since Justices (Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera) voted for the imposition of the death penalty.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that, for lack of one vote, the accused is sentenced to
reclusion perpetua Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111692 February 9, 1996

ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder.1

At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto
Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the
shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair."2 Suddenly petitioner stabbed
Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled.
Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.3

Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that
death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar region 1-1/2 in. in length with extracavitation of the small and large intestines."4

Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the
victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear
would "kill all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought
refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a
boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie"
jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a
store in the barangay.5

The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed on
him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs.6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it held that petitioner was positively and categorically identified as the
Page1

killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgment of conviction and in holding petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim.
 Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok
to the effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending physician that the
victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region.

This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three (3) prosecution
witnesses positively identified petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had known petitioner for quite
some time and never had any personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any suspicion that they were
impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him.

That it was another person who committed the offense is too incredible. No less than petitioner's own witness, Nerio Biscocho
who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and the same
person. Thus -

COURT:

Q Who is this Joni Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes?

A That Joni Fuentes is the same of that or the accused Alejandro Fuentes. I do not know his real name but he is called as Joni,
sir, . . .7

On cross-examination witness Biscocho further admitted that he himself would call petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., as "Joni" or
"Jonie" Fuentes, as some of his friends did, but victim Malaspina occasionally called petitioner "Junior".8

Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and
therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of
petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he
was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he
used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the
deceased. The following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a
crime he did not commit.9

For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July
1989, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it
was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally went to Barangay San
Isidro to investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled.10

One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on
necessity and trustworthiness.11

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be
available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. We are not unaware of People v. Toledo, 12 a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm
writing for the Court endeavored to reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary to their penal interest. In that case, the
protagonists Holgado and Morales engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously wounded
gave a sworn statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales fought there was nobody else
present. One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the Court was agreed that Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the
fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be exonerated on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the admissibility
of Exh. 1. One group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample testimonial evidence to support an acquittal. The second
group considered Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which
Justice Malcolm belonged, opined that the court below erred in not admitting Exh. 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest.

For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of declarations against penal interest,
the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the alleged
declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo
Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the
acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to
prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find
that the admission of such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, "shocking to the sense of justice."13 Let us assume
that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was
subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely
nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement.

But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case
is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable
under this rule. 14 For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution
and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that
Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a
witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by
the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the
Page1

probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the
declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo -
 The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement
of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the
inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.15

The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified by treachery. The
suddenness of the attack, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of Malaspina treacherous.16
However, the court a quo erred in imposing an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since aside from treachery qualifying the crime to murder
there is no other modifying circumstance proved, the medium period of the penalty, i.e. reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed
on petitioner.17

Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual
damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to support such
claim. This is a valid point. in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.18 To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves
the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. 19
Courts cannot simply, rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.20

The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the
testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina. 21
However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can
only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of
the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted.22

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to
indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty
imposed should be as it is corrected to reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.

ROMERO, J.:

Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were
charged with the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, under an
information 1 dated July 13, 1992, which reads as follows:

That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring, confederating and cooperating together and helping one another, and by
means of force, violence, intimidation and threat, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one Bienvenido Openda,
Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor with his friends as Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed and carried away using the
PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby depriving the said Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four
witnesses. 2 On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.

The materials facts and events as found by the court a quo are:

It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a
drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.

After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men
arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat." 3 When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a
handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso" or a
score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the
latter's mother of the abduction.

The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had
an illicit affair with Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive behind the former's kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.

On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence,
was never kidnapped. 4

On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment 5 finding Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish
and moral suffering." 6
Page1

Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses' allegedly illusory testimonies and for
convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.

The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This, however, does not preclude the Court
from ruling on the merits of the case. In Kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the
subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily
avoid punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of their victim's bodies.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:

Art. 267. — Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. —

Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim's liberty, which is the essential element of the offense,
must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals "as shown by
their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose." 7 Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. 8The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the participation of
Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.

The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together with his two companions, abducted
Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at
the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to "Tarsing's Store" to check
if a certain person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the latter's presence was
confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernal's
companions.

Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both Bernal and the victim, the
former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim were drinking at "Tarsing's Store" on that fateful day
when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the
store and asked for "Payat." When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed "Payat," hew was handcuffed and taken away by the
unidentified men.

Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr.
confided to him that he and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to
pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it again because she (was) a married woman. 9 Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was
ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.

Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence of facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction. 10 Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible
in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration
against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal. 11

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was
aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true." 12

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a
declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13 because no sane person
will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. 14

In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarino's testimony. He alleges that the latter could not have seen the
actual handcuffing because "Tarsing's Store" could not be seen from the billiard hall. Sagarino's testimony shows that after Bernal and
two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed.

Q The three of them together?

Page1

A Yes, sir.

Q And what about you, where did you stay?

 A I just stayed in the billiard hall.

Q While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did you see next?

A The two came back.

Q Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back?

A The companions of Bernal.

Q And what did these two men do?

A They apprehended Jun-jun Openda. 15

From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda, Jr. arrested. The lower court correctly rejected
this argument by holding that:

But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of Openda, Jr. at the Tarsing or Tarcing store. On the contrary, he
says that he had not known who the person was that Bernal referred to when he requested one of this two companions to go see if
that person was still there at the store, and that he came to know that he was Openda, Jr. only after he saw Openda, Jr. pass by the
billiard hall already handcuffed, with the two unidentified companions of Bernal with him, on their way out to the main road. 16

If one had a direct view of "Tarsing's Store" from the billiard hall, Bernal would not have requested his companion to check if
Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed out by Bernal arose from the testimonies of Racasa and
Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-examination, stated:

Q After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned (sic) with his child, is that correct?

A Yes, sir, because I was still in the store. 17

On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:

Q When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long (sic) were you able to see him again?

A Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions came back and proceeded to Tarcing Store and arrested Jun-jun
Openda. When these two men brought out Jun-jun Openda, fifteen minutes later, Bernal came.

Q Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic)

A He was coming from outside.

Q He has with him his son?

A He was with nobody, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A Yes, sir.

Q He was alone?

A Yes, sir. 18

The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each other as to be irreconcilable. Considering the
proximity of the store from the billiard hall, there is a possibility that when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store, the latter could
have already brought home his son before proceeding alone to the billiard hall where he was seem by Segarino. 19

Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarino's testimony by imputing revenge as his motive for testifying. He alleges that on
July 29, 1991, or six days before the alleged kidnapping, five policemen arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol car asking for
Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza, Dansoy Madelo and Dagoy Balagan. He replied that they were residents of the place and
staying at the billiard hall and mahjong house. The policemen departed and went to the places he mentioned.

Q Minutes later do you know what happened?

A They came back.

Q What did you do after they came back?

A I asked these police officers if they found these (sic) persons they were looking (for) ?

Q What was their answer?

A They answered in the negative.

Q Since the answer is in the negative, what did you do ?

A I asked the police officers why they were looking for these persons.(?)

Q What was the answer of the policemen?

A The police officer said that those people were wanted by them because accordingly (sic) they were marijuana pushers. 20

Bernal's position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest was made by pursuing policemen. This
contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous.
Page1
 The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any ill-motive against Bernal. If the latter's
allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony in court. No such arrest
was, however, made.

The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal. The
court said that Sagarino's forthright answers to the questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the participation
of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping or Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself. 21 This Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the established rule that the findings of fact
of a trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is
in a better position to decided the question of credibility of witnesses. 22

We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to resurface. Considering the circumstances, it is
safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead.

Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, recommended to this Court the penalty of seventeen
(17) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. The maximum penalty must be determined in
accordance with rules and provision of the Revised Penal Code. With respect to the minimum penalty, however, "it is left entirely
within the discretion of the court to fix it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without reference to the periods into
which it may be subdivided." 23 Consistent with this ruling, this Court imposes reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, as the
minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision dated November 18, 1993, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 146556 April 19, 2006

DANILO L. PAREL, Petitioner,

vs.

SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Danilo Parel (petitioner) which seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated
March 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Baguio, in Civil
Case No. 2493-R, a case for recovery of possession and damages. Also assailed is CA Resolution2 dated November 28, 2000.

On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National
Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely from his own funds
and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of said house in 1972 until its completion
three years later; when the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner’s parents, Florentino (now
deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to
supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials; when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent
allowed petitioner’s parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as
petitioner’s parents have no house of their own and since respondent’s wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father; in
November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and he
needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent’s
knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of respondent’s house; petitioner’s
refusal to vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the instant action for recovery of possession.
Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month thereafter until the latter vacates
the said premises and surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that: his parents are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the
upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents; he is occupying the ground floor upon the
instruction of his father, Florentino, with respondent’s full knowledge; his parents spent their own resources in improving and
constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house
stands and as a co-owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof; the demand to vacate was respondent’s attempt to
deprive petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-owner of the said house; that respondent had filed ejectment case as well as criminal
cases against them involving the subject house which were all dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed
for damages and attorney’s fees.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision3 dated December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares that the house erected at No. 61 DPS Compound, Baguio City is
owned in common by the late Florentino Parel and herein plaintiff Simeon Prudencio and as such the plaintiff cannot evict the
defendant as heirs of the deceased Florentino Parel from said property, nor to recover said premises from herein defendant.

Likewise, the plaintiff is ordered to:

(a) pay the defendant in the total sum of P20,000.00 for moral and actual damages;
Page1

(b) pay the defendant P20,000.00 in Attorney’s fees and P3,300.00 in appearance fees;

(c) pay the costs of this suit.4

 The RTC found the following matters as conclusive: that petitioner’s father was an allocatee of the land on which the subject
house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government employees at that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave them the
chance to construct their own house on said reservation; that respondent failed to show proof of any contract, written or oral, express
or implied, that the late Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as mere lessees, nor any other proof that
would clearly establish his sole ownership of the house; and, that the late Florentino was the one who gathered the laborers for the
construction of the house and paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-ownership existed between respondent and petitioner’s
father, Florentino.

The RTC concluded that respondent and petitioner’s father agreed to contribute their money to complete the house; that since
the land on which said house was erected has been allocated to petitioner’s father, the parties had the understanding that once the
house is completed, petitioner’s father could keep the ground floor while respondent the second floor; the trial court questioned the
fact that it was only after 15 years that respondent asserted his claim of sole ownership of the subject house; respondent failed to
disprove that petitioner’s father contributed his own funds to finance the construction of the house; that respondent did not question
(1) the fact that it was the deceased Florentino who administered the construction of the house as well as the one who supplied the
materials; and (2) the fact that the land was in Florentino’s possession created the impression that the house indeed is jointly owned
by respondent and Florentino.

The RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City Assessor’s assessment of
the property all in respondent’s name since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the affidavit executed by
Florentino declaring the house as owned by respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the
purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer
concerning the property’s tax assessment and Florentino, thought then that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and
that the affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.

Aggrieved by such decision, respondent appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated March 31, 2000, the CA reversed the trial court
and declared respondent as the sole owner of the subject house and ordered petitioner to surrender possession of the ground floor
thereof to respondent immediately. It also ordered petitioner to pay respondent a monthly rental of P2,000.00 for use or occupancy
thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

The CA found as meritorious respondent’s contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any documentary
evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent. It ruled that the trial court’s statement that "defendants’
occupancy of the house is due to a special power of attorney executed by his parents most specially the deceased Florentino Parel who
is in fact a co-owner of said building" is wanting of any concrete evidence on record; that said power of attorney was never offered,
hence, could not be referred to as petitioner’s evidence to support his claim; that except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua,
the carpenter-foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who
testified that the lot was allocated to petitioner’s father, there was no supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual
bases for the trial court’s conclusion; and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory.

The CA found the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 of Florentino, petitioner’s father, stating that he is not the owner of the
subject house but respondent, as conclusive proof of respondent’s sole ownership of the subject house as it is a declaration made by
Florentino against his interest. It also found the tax declarations and official receipts representing payments of real estate taxes of the
questioned property covering the period 1974 to 1992 sufficient to establish respondent’s case which constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2000.1avvphil.net

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari with the following Assignment of Errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING RESPONDENT AS THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AT 61
FORBES PARK NATIONAL RESERVATION, NEAR DPS COMPOUND, BAGUIO CITY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF CO-OWNERSHIP BETWEEN THE LATE FLORENTINO PAREL AND RESPONDENT;

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO SURRENDER POSSESSION OF THE
GROUND FLOOR OF THE SUBJECT BUILDING TO RESPONDENT;

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY RESPONDENTP2,000.00/MONTH FOR
USE OR OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PREMISES FROM APRIL 1988 UNTIL PETITIONER ACTUALLY VACATES THE SAME;

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY TO RESPONDENTP50,000.00
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT;

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 5

Petitioner concedes that while his former counsel failed to make a formal offer of his documentary evidence before the trial
court and that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, he maintains that the said rule is not absolute,
citing the case of Bravo, Jr. v. Borja; 6 that his documentary evidence which were not formally offered in evidence were marked during
the presentation of the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses and were part of their testimonies; that these evidence were part of the
memorandum filed by him before the trial court on July 12, 1993.

Petitioner insists that even in the absence of the documentary evidence, his testimony as well as that of his witnesses
substantiated his claim of co-ownership of the subject house between his late father and respondent as found by the trial court.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding the affidavit of petitioner’s father declaring respondent as owner of the subject
house as conclusive proof that respondent is the true and only owner of the house since the affidavit should be read in its entirety to
determine the purpose for which it was executed.

Petitioner further contends that since he had established his father’s co-ownership of the subject house, respondent has no legal
right to eject him from the property; that he could not be compelled to pay rentals for residing in the ground floor of the subject
Page1

house; that respondent should bear his own expenses and be adjudged liable for damages which petitioner sustained for being
constrained to litigate.
 The principal issue for resolution is whether petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-
owner of the subject two-storey residential house.

The issue raised by petitioner is mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule
45. However, considering that the findings of the RTC and CA are contradictory, the review of the case is in order.7

We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of possession of the
ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. Respondent presented the affidavit dated September 24, 1973
executed by Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:

I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn to
according to law depose and say:

That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City which is the subject of an
advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation
purposes;

That I am not the owner of the building in question;

That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District,
Quezon City.

Further, affiant say not.8 (Underscoring supplied)

Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts
facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.9

The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with respect to the subject
covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he
is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have
made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests as his heirs.10 A
declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.11 Notably, during
Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had
revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino)
and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that
petitioner entered the house against the latter’s will and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action for ejectment;12 and
even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed
on the ground that respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.13

Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of respondent and his wife. It was
established during petitioner’s cross-examination that the existing structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said
building plan.14

Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house declared under his name since
1974.15 In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor
declared any portion of the house in their name.16

We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.17 The house which petitioner claims to be co-owned by his late father
had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances
above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house subject matter of the litigation.

Respondent having established his claim of exclusive ownership of the subject property, it was incumbent upon petitioner to
contravene respondent’s claim. The burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove that his father was a co-owner of the subject
house.

We held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, to wit:18

xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the
burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the
duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in
favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon,
with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to
it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.19

In this case, the records show that although petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his documentary evidence in
writing, he, however, did not file the same.20 Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
Page1

the evidence is offered must be specified.

 A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties to the suit.21 It is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.22

Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally offered, the same were marked during the
presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.23

Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy of the birth
certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that the birth certificate
was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioner’s minority which was never challenged by the prosecution and it
already formed part of the records of the case. The rule referred to in the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on
affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.

and not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to the present case.

Even assuming arguendo that the documentary evidence of petitioner should be considered in his favor, the evidence showing
that respondent had filed civil and criminal cases against petitioner which were dismissed as well as the alleged Special Power of
Attorney of petitioner’s parents whereby they authorized petitioner to stay in the ground floor of the house, did not establish co-
ownership of Florentino and respondent of the subject house.

The testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co-owned by petitioner’s father and
respondent.

Candelario Regua merely testified that he was hired by petitioner’s father, Florentino, to construct the residential building in
1972;24 that he listed the materials to be used for the construction which was purchased by Florentino;25 that he and his men
received their salaries every Saturday and Wednesday from Florentino or his wife, respectively;26 that he had not met nor seen
respondent during the whole time the construction was on-going.27 On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he cannot tell
where the money to buy the materials used in the construction came from.28

Corazon Garcia merely testified that Florentino started building the house when he was allocated a lot at DPS compound, that
she knew Florentino constructed the subject house29 and never knew respondent. 30 The bare allegation that Florentino was
allocated a lot is not sufficient to overcome Florentino’s own affidavit naming respondent as the owner of the subject house.

Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and purchased the materials to be
used; 31 and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon order of his father 32 and never saw respondent in the
construction site. The fact that not one of the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish
that petitioner’s father and respondent co-owned the house.

We also find that the CA did not err in ordering petitioner to pay respondent being the sole owner of the subject house a
monthly rental of P2,000.00 from April 1988, the date of the extra-judicial demand, until petitioner actually vacates the subject house.
Although the CA made no ratiocination as to how it arrived at the amount of P2,000.00 for the monthly rental, we find the same to be
a reasonable compensation for the use of the ground floor of the subject house which consists of a living room, a dining room, a
kitchen and three bedrooms. The rental value refers to the value as ascertained by proof of what the property would rent or by
evidence of other facts from which the fair rental value may be determined. 33

We likewise affirm the CA’s award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondent. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows the recovery of
attorney’s fees in cases when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest 34 and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation should be recovered 35 which are both shown in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000 and its Resolution dated November 28, 2000 are
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967

PEDRO GRAVADOR, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

EUTIQUIO MAMIGO, THE DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF BAYAWAN-STA. CATALINA SCHOOL DISTRICT,

THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS and THE SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION, (all sued in their official and personal capacities),respondents-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor Genero Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo and Solicitor F. J. Bautista for
respondents-appellants.

Newton E. Serion for petitioner-appellee.

CASTRO, J.:
Page1

The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental on
August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the respondent Supervisor
Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. The
advice reads:

According to your pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools, including your Employee's Record Card, which has just been
found in connection with the verification of the services of all school officials including elementary school principals in this division, you
were born on November 26, 1897. As of this date, therefore, you are now 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old.

In view of the above, you are hereby advised of your separation from the service effective immediately unless you can show valid
proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that you are below sixty-five years of age today.

A few days later the respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary school.

On August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the
date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was the affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962,
of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in which these two affiants declared that they knew that the
petitioner "was born on December 11, 1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of Negros
Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late spouses, NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA
[petitioner's parents], and we were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore,we were also invited during the
baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said PEDRO GRAVADOR."

On October 19, 1964 the petitioner wrote to the Division Superintendents of Schools, reiterating his claim that he had not
reached the age of 65 and enclosing some papers in support thereof.

On April 13, 1965 he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental.
He asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order payment to
him of not only his back salaries but also damages in the total amount of P52,400. Named as respondents were Eutiquio Mamigo, the
District Supervisor, the Superintendent of Schools, the Director of Public Schools and the Secretary of Education.

The respondents filed their answer, entered into a stipulation of facts with the petitioner, and thereafter the case was submitted
for decision. The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on December 11, 1901 accordingly granted his petition. Immediate
execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was reinstated.

The respondents appealed directly to this Court.

On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the issues posed thereby had become
moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the corresponding retirement benefits.
We deem it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on the merits, considering that the computation of retirement
annuities is based among other things, on the number of years of service of a retiree,1 and that payment of benefits already made to
the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as the date of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund
should this Court ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the respondents claim.

The controversy on the petitioner's date of birth arose as a result of the conflicting records of the Division of Schools of Negros
Oriental. On the one hand the pre-war records show his date of birth to be November 26, 1897. These records consist of two Insular
Teachers Cards2 and one Employee's Record Card.3 It is on the basis of these records that the Superintendent of Schools determined
the petitioner's age to be 66 years, 8 months and 22 days on August 15, 1964.

On the other hand, the post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card,4 an Employee's Record Card,5 and
an Employee's Record of Qualifications,6 state that the petitioner was born on Dec. 11, 1901. These are the records on which the
petitioner bases his claim.

The problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records of the church where the petitioner was
baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the municipal civil register contains no record. of the petitioner's birth.

According to the trial court, the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the correct date of
birth of the petitioner is December 11, 1901. The court also took into account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924, filed by the petitioner's brother, Romulo Gravador, now deceased. It is
therein stated that the petitioner, said to be one of the co-owners of a piece of land, was at the time 23 years old.

The respondents now contend that the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of
birth (December 11, 1901) of the petitioner. They argue that these records were made only because it was thought that the pre-war
records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-war records had since been located, the date contained in the pre-war records
should be regarded as controlling and that the finding of the Superintendent of Schools that the petitioner was born on November 26,
1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the court.

That the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence, is a settled rule
of administrative law, But whether there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the
issue in this case. The school official based his determination of the petitioner's age on the pre-war records in the preparation of which
the petitioner does not appear to have taken a part.7 On the other hand, the petitioner post-war records which he personally
accomplished to prove the date of his birth.8

It is our considered view that the lower court correctly relied upon the post-war records, for three cogent reasons.

In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as
to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.9
Indeed, even in is application for back pay which he filed with the Department of Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of
Schools, on October 7, 1948, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He repeated the same assertion in
1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the Government Service Insurance System and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date
of his birth to December 11, 1901.
Page1

In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case
way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Madeante litem motam by a deceased
relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but also by
the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.1äwphï1.ñët

Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on
June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war
records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.10

Still it is argued that the petitioner's action was prematurely brought because he had not availed of all administrative remedies.
This argument is without merit. Suit for quo warranto to recover a public office must be brought within one year.11 Before filing this
case the petitioner waited for eight months for the school officials to act on his protest. To require him to tarry a little more would
obviously be unfair to him since on April 13, 1965, when this case was filed, he had only four months left within which to bring the case
to court. There was neither manner nor form of assurance that the decision of the Director of Public Schools would be forthcoming.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its observance would result in the nullification of
the claim being asserted.12

Accordingly, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 93030-31 August 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ALFREDO ALEGADO Y DELIMA, accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch
58 in its decision promulgated on October 26, 1989 with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punished under Article 335 paragraphs 1
& 3 of the Revised Penal Code, said accused is hereby sentenced toRECLUSION PERPETUA on both counts, the sentences to be served
successively, to pay the offended party the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), and to pay costs of suit. (RTC Decision, p. 8;
Rollo, P. 32)

This appeal prays for a reversal of the trial court's judgment of conviction and submits before us the following assignment of
errors to wit.:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF STATUTORY RAPE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART.
335, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION FAILURE TO PROVE WITH CERTAINTY THE ACTUAL AGE
OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUIRING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT (Appellant's Brief, p. 1, Rollo p. 55)

The accused-appellant, in two criminal complaints filed by the offended party herself and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-
437 and RTC 438, was charged with rape on two counts committed as follows:

That on or about 7:00 p.m., April 20, 1988 at the Public Market, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the herein offended party, CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age, against her will and
without her consent. (Criminal Case No. RTC-437: Rollo, p. 14)

That on or about 6:00 p.m., April 14, 1988 at the Public Market, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the herein offended party, CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age, against her will and
without her consent. (Criminal Case No. RTC-438; Rollo, p. 16)

At the pre-trial, both the prosecution and the defense agreed on a joint trial and stipulated on only one fact, i.e., that the
accused, as watchman of the San Carlos City public market was inside the said premises during the two occasions when the alleged
rapes transpired. Both parties presented two common issues for the trial court's consideration, namely: (1) whether the offended party
was actually below 12 years old at the time of the incidents; and (2) whether the accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party
by means of force and intimidation (Pre-trial Order dated June 2, 1988; Records, p. 16)

The antecedent facts as stated by the Solicitor General in the People's brief are as follows:

On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, complainant was playing at the Freedom Square inside the public
market of San Carlos City when appellant, a 170-pound, 53 year old market watchman at the time, held her by the hand and took her
upstairs to the second floor of the public market building which houses some government offices and which at the time was expectedly
deserted (tan, May 17, 1989, pp. 13, 21-22). When they reached the upper floor of the building, appellant ordered complainant to hold
his penis and masturbate it (ibid, p. 22). Thereafter, appellant ordered complainant to lie down, and when she refused he pushed her
Page1

down on the floor (ibid). When complainant was lying prostrate on her back, appellant placed himself on top of her while she was still
wearing her pedal pusher shorts and panty (ibid, p. 23). So, appellant forced her to take off her pedal pushers and panty (ibid, pp. 26-
27) and thereupon he lay on top of her (ibid). Appellant then tried to insert his penis into her vagina but it did not penetrate fully
before he ejaculated (ibid, pp. 23, 27-28). Complainant bled a little (ibid, p. 52) Thereafter, appellant gave complainant P 2.00 and left
(ibid, p. 28). Complainant stood up and went down the building but never told anybody about it because she was afraid appellant
would kill her (ibid p. 28)

On April 20, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening complainant was sitting at the Freedom Square when appellant
approached her and told her to go with him upstairs to the second floor of the public market (tsn, May 17, 1989, pp. 11-12).
Complainant refused but appellant shoved her towards the stairs, held her by the left arm, and brought her to the upper floor near the
civic center (ibid, pp. 12-13). There, appellant ordered complainant to take off her shorts and panty, but she refused (ibid, p. 14).
Appellant then tried to take off her shorts and panty by himself but she resisted and told the former she would not submit to his evil
desires (ibid). Thereupon, appellant threatened to kill complainant if she would not take off her shorts and panty (ibid). Then appellant
again tried to remove complainant's shorts and panty and the latter out of fear allowed him to do it (ibid). When appellant succeeded
in removing complainant's shorts and panty, he forced her to lie down and then placed himself on top of her (ibid, p. 15). Appellant
was then already without his pants on (ibid). Appellant inserted his penis into complainant's vagina but it took sometime before his
organ could penetrate the girl (ibid). When it did, complainant felt excruciating pain and begged appellant to stop (ibid, p. 16).
Appellant just ignored her and continued on without saying anything (ibid). Complainant felt some liquid oozing out from appellant's
organ and into her being (ibid, p. 17) And after appellant had withdrawn his sex organ, complainant discovered that her vagina was
bleeding (ibid). Appellant then stood up and told her not to tell anybody about it (ibid, pp. 17-18). Then appellant gave her P 2.00 and
left (ibid, p. 18).

As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, a member of the San Carlos City INP
assigned at Precinct No. 1, a police outpost near the main entrance of the public market (tsn, September 28, 1988, pp. 4-5). Pat. Alfaro
knew appellant well because he was the public market watchman at the time (ibid, p. 5). A minute later, Pat. Alfaro saw complainant
coming down the same stairs (tsn, September 28, 1988, p. 6; May 17, 1989, pp. 18-19). Pat. Alfaro noticed that complainant was pale,
with blood flowing to her thighs and legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy (tsn, September 28, 1988, p. 6)

Pat. Alfaro approached complainant and asked what happened to her (tsn, September 28, 1988, p. 6; May 17, 1989, pp. 19-20).
Complainant answered that she was taken upstairs and raped by appellant (ibid). Immediately, Pat. Alfaro brought complainant to the
city hospital where she was examined by Dr. Oscar Jagdon in the presence of two medical technologists (tsn, September 28, 1988, pp.
7-8; May 17, 1989, p. 20). Dr. Jagdon confirmed the report that indeed complainant was raped (ibid). Thereafter, Pat. Alfaro reported
the incident to the Station Guard by phone then took complainant to the police station after the medical examination (tsn, September
28, 1988, p. 8; May 7, 1989, p. 20). When they reached the station, appellant who had already been taken into custody was readily
identified by complainant as the rapist (tsn, September 28, 1988, pp. 8-10; May 17, 1989, pp. 2021). Complainant was then
investigated and she rendered her statement to the police.

Dr. Oscar Jagdon, who examined complainant at about 8:40 o'clock in the evening of April 20, 1988, found some secretion inside
complaint's vagina along the cervical wall which, upon laboratory examination, turned out to be sperm cells and that complainant's
vagina was lacerated, one (1) centimeter long, at 9:00 o'clock position although there was only partial penetration of the male organ
into complainant's vagina (tsn, August 10, 1988, pp. 4-9; Exhibit 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 84-89)

On the other hand, the accused-appellant's version as summarized in his brief reads:

Evidence for the Defense:

Alfredo Alegado testified that on April 14, 1988 at about 6:00 p.m., he was on duty, he being a watchman of the public market.
His tour of duty is from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the following day. Before 7:00 p.m. of that day, he and his co-watchman roamed around
the area checking the padlocks of the stores if they are in order. At about 8:30 p.m., they closed all the doors of the vegetables section,
meat section and the dried fish section. He knows Cristina Deang who used to sell calamansi in the area. On April 14, 1988, he did not
meet Cristina Deang as he and his companions were then busy roving around the area. On April 20, 1988, at about 5:00 p.m., he was
having snacks at Valdevia Street, with Cpl. Allarce and Lito Alverez. They stayed there until about 7:30 p.m. when to his surprise, he
was arrested and brought to the station by Pat. Apuhin and companions including Pfc. Evangeline Alfaro. From 5:00 p.m., to 7:30 p.m.
on April 20, 1988, he never met and/or saw Cristina Deang. Pfc. Evangeline Alfaro has been harboring ill-feelings on him when on a
certain occasion, he turned down her request to ask the four (4) armed men whom they saw in the market (what they wanted) (t.s.n.,
pp. 2-3, September 14, 1989).

Sgt. Rolando Allarce testified that he knew accused because he is assigned at the police precinct in the public market. At about
5:00 p.m. on April 20, 1988, he was invited by Alfredo Alegado to have a snack at Namie's Lunch. They finished having snack at about
6:00 p.m. Thereafter, Alfredo Alegado and Lito Alverez invited him to go to Valdevia Street for a drinking spree. He accepted their
invitation and went with them. He went out at about 7:00 p.m., leaving behind Alfredo Alegado in the store. (t.s.n. pp. 25-27, Ibid)
(Rollo, pp. 59-60)

Whether or not any cogent reason exists to constrain us to reverse the trial court's verdict of conviction under paragraphs 1 and
3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the issue in this appeal.

Firstly, the accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not
establisher with certainty, hence, it was error on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape as defined
and penalized under paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

We are not persuaded. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather,
Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the
accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:

SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. ...

The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
Page1

when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.

In the case of Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, 261 [1979], we stated that:
 ... [D]eclarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of
persons who must know the truth (See Sec. 33, Rule 130 Revised Rules of Court now Sec. 39, Rule 130 under the new Rules). Pedigree
testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection
of such proof than from its admission. (Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1420)

In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond
question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed
previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must
be a member of the family of said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of
the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon
reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the
maternal grandfather of the rape victim.

Thus, we quote the pertinent portions of Cornelio Villarosa's testimony:

PROSECUTOR FABROZ: (to witness)

Q Mr. Villarosa, how many children do you have?

A I have 5 children.

Q How old is the eldest?

A Thirty Nine (39) years old.

Q How about the youngest?

A May be 24 years old because I forgot the birth date.

Q The complainant in this case is a certain Cristina Deang. Do you know her?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know her?

A She is my granddaughter.

Q If she is in court, would you able to point her?

A Yes, sir. (At this juncture the witness is pointing to a person sitting inside the courtroom who when asked answered by the
name of Cristina Deang.)

Q Who is the mother of Cristina Deang?

A Angelita.

Q Angelita Villarosa?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is she your daughter?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is she here?

A No, she is not here.

Q Where is she now?

A I don't know where she work now, because she did not send a letter to me.

Q The last time, where is her whereabouts?

A She was in Manila, my last knowledge about her whereabouts.

Q You said, Cristina Deang was the daughter of your daughter, Angelita. Do you know how many children does Angelita have?

A She has five (5) children.

Q With whom is this Cristina Deang living now?

A In our residence.

Q How did it happen that Cristina Deang has been living with you.

A The mother left her to me.

Q When was it that the mother left her to you.

A In 1983.

Q How old was Cristina Deang at the time her mother left her to you?
Page1

A The mother of Cristina Deang told me that she was born in 1976 and please let her go to school.
 ATTY. BRIONES:

I would like to make it of record that the information gathered by the mother, Angelita, is a hearsay your Honor.

PROSECUTOR FABROZ:

I would like to prove the fact about the birth of the child.

COURT:

Let it stay in record.

PROSECUTOR FABROZ:

Q By the way, do you have a talk or conversation with your daughter, Angelita, the mother of the complainant Cristina Deang,
when was Cristina Deang born?

A We did not talk about the birth of Cristina, but she told me to let her daughter Cristina go to school because she is already 7
years old.

Q Did you ask her about the birth of Cristina Deang?

ATTY. BRIONES:

I think that is misleading your Honor.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

WITNESS:

A That is what she told me, she was born on September 5, 1976.

PROSECUTOR FABROZ:

Q So based from the information you get from your mother Angelita, did you in fact send your granddaughter Cristina Deang to
school?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A SMAC Elementary School.

Q What grade did you send her?

A Grade 1.

Q Was she able to finish Grade I?

A No, sir.

(TSN, January 31, 1989, pp. 4-7)

Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in open court that she was born on September 5, 1976 (TSN, May 17,
1989, p. 8). As correctly submitted by the Solicitor General:

It is long-settled, as early as in the cases of U.S. v. Bergantino (3 Phil. 118 [1903] and U.S. v. Angeles(sic) and Sabacahan (36 Phil.
246, 250 [1917] citing U.S. v. Estavillo and Perez (10 O.G. 1984), that the testimony of a person as to his age is admissible although
hearsay and though a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a person has of his age is
acquired from what he is told by his parents (U.S. vs. Evangelista, 32 Phil. 321, 326 [1951] – he may testify as to his age as he had
learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA
742) ... (Rollo, p. 93-94)

Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to dispute the prosecution's claim that the victim in this
case was below twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape incidents under consideration, we affirm the trial court's finding that the
victim in these rape cases was under twelve years of age.

Time and again we have held that the gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided under Article 335, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. (People v. Edgardo Puedan y Lalongisip, G.R. No.
92586, April 26, 1991 citing People v. Villegas, Jr., 127 SCRA 195, 200 [1984]; People v. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329 [1990] citing People v.
San Buenaventura, 164 SCRA 150 [1988] and People v. Villegas, Jr., supra). Hence, the only elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age. (People v. Santos, 183 SCRA 25
[1990]). It is not necessary to prove that the victim was intimidated or that force was used against her because in statutory rape the
law presumes that the victim on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own. (People v. Bacani, 181 SCRA
393 [1990]; People v. Lualhati, 171 SCRA 277 [1989]; People v. Derpo, 168 SCRA 447 [1988])

Considering that in the instant case there is clear and competent evidence that the victim was under twelve (12) years old at the
time of the rape incidents complained of, the second argument purported by the accused-appellant that the alleged rapes were not
attended by any force or intimidation must also fail. Proof of carnal knowledge of the victim in this case who was only eleven (11) years
old on the two separate occasions reported (April 14 and 20, 1988) is overwhelming while unnecessary force and intimidation also
Page1

appear in the records. The offended party's testimony regarding the abominable and wicked acts of the accused-appellant against her
chastity on the two occasions indicated in the separate informations filed by the victim herself was given in a straightforward manner
without any indication that the same was motivated by any ill- feeling toward the pinpointed perpetrator. The fact of rape on the said
occasions related by the offended party was corroborated by the examining physician whose medical finding revealed the presence of
sperm cells inside the victim's sexual organ due to partial penetration of the male organ into it.

It is axiomatic in rape cases that the slightest penetration of the female's private organ is sufficient to consummate the came.
(People v. Jun Aquino [John Aquino], G.R. No. 83214, May 28, 1991 citing People v. Cruz, 180 SCRA 765 [1989]; People v. Patonog 155
SCRA 675 [1987]; People v. Alverez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988]; People v. Bacani,supra). A careful review of the evidence on record readily
shows that the trial court did not commit any reversible error in disregarding the defenses of denial and alibi given by the accused-
appellant and in finding that the accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape. We affirm the
trial court's verdict of conviction in consonance with our oft-repeated pronouncement that we accord great respect to the trial court's
findings of fact in the absence of a showing that certain facts of substance and value were erroneously overlooked that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case (see People v. Eleuterio Raptus y Jeray, G.R. Nos. 92169-70, June 19,1991 citing People v. Aboga, et.
al., 147 SCRA 404 [1987]; People v. Estenzo, et al., 72 SCRA 428 [1976]; see also People v. Frankie Arenas, et al., G.R. No. 92068, June 5,
1991, citing People v. Somera, 173 SCRA 684 [1989]; People v. Baysa, 172 SCRA 706 [1989]; Aguirre v. People, 155 SCRA 337 [1987])

Lastly, we commend the trial court's additional finding that the commission of the rapes in question was attended by force and
intimidation although for conviction under Article 335 paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code such finding is no longer necessary. It
bears emphasis, therefore, that the accused-appellant not only took advantage of the offended party's tender age in giving vent to his
aberrant sexual behavior but also perpetrated the carnal acts complained of through force and intimidation. There is no meat in the
accused-appellant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that there was force and intimidation since the
information did not contain any allegation to that effect simply because the phrase "against her will and without her consent"
contained in both informations charging the accused-appellant of rape connotes the attendance of force and intimidation.

The absence of external signs of physical injuries and the failure of the victim to shout for help at the first opportunity do not
negate the commission of rape contrary to the accused-appellant's propositions. The force used in rape cases need not be absolutely
overpowering or irresistible. What is essential is simply that the force employed was sufficient to allow the offender to consummate his
lewd purpose (see People v. Cpl. Mario Ramos, G.R. Nos. 92626-29, May 27, 1991 citing People v. Mendoza, 163 SCRA 568 [1988];
People v. Tablizo, 182 SCRA 739 [1990] citing People v. Pasco, et al., 181 SCRA 233 [1990]; People v. Villaflores 174 SCRA 70 [1989]
citing People v. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530 [1989]).

We further note with approval the trial court's observation that the accused-appellant's act of giving the offended party the sum
of P2.00 after each of the aforestated "forcible copulation" apparently as "full atonement for his dastardly act" smacks of "insult a
hundred times compounded." The accused-appellant, despite the trial court's strong words, even had the gall to reiterate before us his
claim that the acceptance of the said measly amount of P2.00 was tantamount to a tacit consent on the part of his victim. We deplore
such a highly offensive and depraved argument for we cannot allow the innocent and helpless victims of unsolicited and forcible
defloration to be brutally insulted while yet nursing their irreparably wounded sexual purity. Considering the age of the victim, the
depravity of the crimes, and the psychological trauma involved, we increase the indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with the recent
rulings in the cases of People v. Cpl. Mario Ramos, supra; People v. Edgardo Puedan y Lalongisip, supra; and People v. Rodante Felipe,
G.R. No. 90390, October 31, 1990.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of civil
indemnity which the accused shall pay to the offended party in each of the two rape cases is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 1995 1
which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private
respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.

The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land
with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and
nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller.
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband,
Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15,
1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement 2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of
Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.

Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November 2,
1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
Page1

At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution:

(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;
 (2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;

(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation of the plaintiffs to the estate
of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title of the defendant;

(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees for the willful and malicious
refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully
well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said deceased; and

(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal property of the spouses Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the following documentary
evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora
and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of
Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller;
joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint
affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and
the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of
these exhibits to which a Comment 5 was filed by herein private respondent.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their
legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the
testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving,
uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to
establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely
proof of the alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar
certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never
presented for cross-examination. 6

On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance. 7

In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

We find for petitioners.

The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the
quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for
consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero.

I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other,
are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts
in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly
controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their
legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts.

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized
presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8And well settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:

The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status
cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties, and within the period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code
(Article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint
before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and
171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.

Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention
of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force
early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be
facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.

xxx xxx xxx

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the
Page1

moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. 9
 The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly
controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is
not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of
petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.

Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have
the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been
sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have
delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.

Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce
evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of proof
to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of
persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must
adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. 12

Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a
presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. 14 Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is
uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facieproof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus
established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15

Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely
filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the
evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he
alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.

II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is
the subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and extensive examination.

Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and
marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third
persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and as part of her testimony.

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former
is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is,
whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than
such declaration.

American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the
very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated
thus:

One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the declarant and to establish the
admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's relationship
to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there
must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular family;
otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But when the
party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and
the policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he
was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the
declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from
that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The
distinction we have note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the otherthey are competent from
reasons of necessity. 17 (Emphasis ours.)

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may
not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. 18 As an exception, the requirement that
there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate
of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the
family. 19

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence
aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration
made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such
relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is
rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20 More importantly, there is in
the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
Page1

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without
need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where
the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurb to require, as a foundation for the
admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render
the main evidence unnecessary.

Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the
same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being
offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary that an objection shall

be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection shall be treated
as waived, 24 since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25

As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection
against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper
time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the
inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.

Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver if the provisions of the law.
That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection to the admission of
evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance, failure to object
to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28

The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone
witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the
possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondent's counsel elicited answers from the witness on the
circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said documents: The observations later made by private respondent in her comment
to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already apparent at the time these documents were being
adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no
longer serve to rectify the legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent's failure to object thereto, the same may
be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29

Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo
Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J)
which both reflect the names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were made by petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to
prove that herein petitioners are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller — these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the
relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima facie showing is sufficient
and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial
evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32

III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this
case, to wit:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the other half.

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving
spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half
shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence,
Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private
respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.

All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence should have been, as it is hereby,
denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of
revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence." 33

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein
petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-
fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991

CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, respondents.

Page1

Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr. for petitioner.

 Domingo Antigua & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:p

The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He
denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court did
not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue is before us on certiorari.

The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private
respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza,
married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such
and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.

Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages
and attorney's fees.

Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him
Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she married
Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the
truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on
his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint
savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years
later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after
admonishing Margarita. 1

Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so. He would kiss
his hand whenever they saw each other and Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his house and give him
jackfruits. when his grandfather learned that he was living on a rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former's
land. 2

Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.

Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao.
Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted
in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's
baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida. 3

Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his
grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would
also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give
certain properties to Teopista. 4

Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim.

Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring, declared that Teopista's father was not Casimiro
but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low price
because she was his half sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when
Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father. 5

The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro's niece, who also affirmed that Vicente
Toring used to work as a cook in Casimiro's boat. She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her husband, who was a
mechanic. 6

The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code, which has been held to be applicable not only
to natural children but also to spurious children. 7 The said article provides:

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;

(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father.

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family Code as follows:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
Page1

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.

In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous
possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. His Honor declared:

In this particular case the established evidence is that plaintiff continuously lived with her mother, together with her sister
Paulina. Neither the plaintiff nor her husband had come to live with the defendant. At most, only their son, Lolito Tufiacao was allowed
to construct a small house in the land of the defendant, either by the defendant himself, as claimed by the plaintiff, or by Vicente
Toring, as claimed by the witnesses of the defendant. The defendant never spent for the support and education of the plaintiff. He did
not allow the plaintiff to carry his surname. The instances when the defendant gave money to the plaintiff were, more or less, off-and-
on or rather isolatedly periodic. They were made at considerable intervals and were not given directly to the plaintiff but through a
third person. Thus, while it may be conceded that: a) the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself told Gaudencio Mendoza
and Isaac Mendoza that Teopista is the daughter of the defendant; b) that Teopista calls the defendant as "Papa Miroy"; c) that
Teopista would kiss defendant's hand when she met him; d) that the defendant gave to her and her husband the income of the
passenger truck as well as the proceeds of the sale thereof, all these acts, taken altogether, are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff
had possessed continuously the status of a recognized illegitimate child.

On appeal, however, the respondent courts 8 disagreed and arrived at its own conclusion as follows:

Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We find that appellant has sufficiently proven her continuous possession of such
status. Although the court a quo did not pass on the credibility of the various witnesses presented, We consider the witnesses for the
plaintiff as credible and unbiased. No proof was shown to render them otherwise. There is no showing that Isaac and Gaudencio
testified falsely. They were disinterested parties with no axe to grind against the appellee or the people actively acting in his behalf. In
fact even the court a quo conceded to the truthfulness of some of their testimonies.

By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested party who was claiming to be the sole recognized natural child of
Casimiro and stood to lose much inheritance if Teopista's claim were recognized. He had earlier filed theft charges against his own
sister and libel charges against her husband. As for Julieta Ouano, the respondent court found it difficult to believe that she had never
met Teopista although both of them have been living in the same barangay since birth.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on August 11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, and it was
only from the opposition thereto of the private respondent that Casimiro's counsel learned that his client had died on May 1986. He
immediately informed the respondent court build the motion for reconsideration was denied without any substitution of parties having
been effected. The said counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring, then asked this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased Casimiro
Mendoza in the present petition.

The applicable provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3, reading as follows:

Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. — Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes
incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or
incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, guardian or other legal representative.

Sec. 17. Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice,
the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.

In the early case of Masecampo vs. Masecampo, 9 it was settled that:

The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced during Ms lifetime by one who pretended to be his
natural son. It may survive against the executor, administrator, or any other legal representative of the testate or intestate succession.

Pursuant to the above rules and jurisprudence, we hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc
pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former's illegitimate son. This disposes of the private respondent's contention that
the lawyer-client relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and that Vicente has no personality now to substitute him.

Now to the merits.

We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their respective conclusions, focused on the question of
whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was
understandable because Teopista herself had apparently based her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under
Article 283 of the Civil Code.

To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain
jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not
be of an intermittent character while it continues. 10 The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his
own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is
illegitimate). 11 There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. 12

With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of
a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
Page1

The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is
true, as the respondent court observed, that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual
for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in
this case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently
without objection from the latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not
decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio
Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were "off-
and-on," not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath she said that her
mother solely spent for her education and in another that Casimiro helped in supporting her. 13

But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another method.

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish
his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence
or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 14

The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39,
of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:

Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to
the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred,
and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate. To set the record straight, we will stress
that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that
he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was
Casimiro's illegitimate daughter. 15

Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of
the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. 16 Nevertheless,
precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision,
Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be
admitted in evidence:

1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

2. The pedigree must be in issue.

3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than
such declaration. 17

All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista,
namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The
declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for
compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose
between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than
such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one
of his heirs. 18

The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at
the trial of the case.

If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her witnesses, such as the financial
doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the
vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house on his
land after he found that the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with
Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.

We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring
Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding,
we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of
illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including
evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate
child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146737 December 10, 2001

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late
Page1

Maria Locsin Araneta), the successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the intestate
estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR.,petitioners,
 vs.

JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General
pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, if there are material discrepancies
between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of
the September 13, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which affirmedin toto the September 13, 1996 order
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No. 4742. The September 13 order of the trial court appointed
Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.

Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.1 died intestate on December
11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of
Administration" (docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime,
the deceased owned personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6
portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin
Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.

On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly
published,2 thereby giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition.

Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and
Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of
administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his
lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.

On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De
Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a
natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.

The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings,
joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla
(another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.

Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.

To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed
administrator of the intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D")3 of his Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the
information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his
signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D"
was machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court
the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.

Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")4 showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a
coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as
family members of the deceased.

In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified
true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8",5 indicating that
the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late
Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded
on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario dearly suggests
that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the
signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound
volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

After hearing, the trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are
sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued on September 13, 1996 an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr.

"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his filing of a bond in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
to be approved by this Court.

"SO ORDERED."6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial court dated September
13, 1996. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were,
however, denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Page1

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.

 The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents — Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.

The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal7 does not apply when there appears in the record of the case some facts or circumstances of weight and
influence which have been overlooked, or the significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the
result of the case.8 Here, the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that would have altered its conclusion.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:

"Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of a person to apply for administration
or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select."
(Emphasis ours)

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person, thus:

"Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)

An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor.9 Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship
with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.10 In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,11 this Court
held that in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the
interest in said estate of the one to be appointed administrator.

Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters
of administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person
in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased?
On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:

"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential
in order to establish the child's acknowledgment."12 (Emphasis ours)

Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased.

Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the trial court made the following findings, affirmed by the
Appellate Court:

"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original having
been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner since birth enjoyed the open and
continuous status of an acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his mother was summoned to attend to the
burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of the deceased with petitioner and his mother in the picture. x x x. It was
duly proven at the trial that the standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in public document and may also be called
questioned document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477, the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or primary
evidence. The anomalous and suspicious characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of live birth as alleged by oppositors
was found was testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the office of the Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957
and requisitioned forms. However, the forms sent to them was the 1958 revised form and that she said their office usually paste the
pages of the bound volume if destroyed. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness of the signatures of Juan C. Locsin,
Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious circumstances of the bound volume were erased due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer."

This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.

Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and municipalities in
the Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since
the records of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General
Page1

requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly
unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the
Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
 With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of
Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent.

The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer,
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth which took place on October 22,
1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge
of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general
impressions of the existing records in that Office.

When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted
to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner.
In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.

Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958
form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in
1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."13

The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December
1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.

Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No
102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used
several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.

There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil
Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.

The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like
a sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the
contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race,
occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit
"D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence
Certificate were not filled up.

When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this
because I am not a bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the volume, she explained as follows:

"COURT:

I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees would only paste a document like this Certificate of Live Birth?

WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to replace the record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the record
when the leaves were taken.

ATTY. TIROL:

You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume to be taken out?

A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so we have to paste them."14(Emphasis ours)

There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.

Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she
actually highlighted the suspicious circumstances surrounding its existence.

The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D",
should have been given more faith and credence by the courts below.

The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and documents
presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar General, thus:

"Duties of Local Civil Registrar. — Local civil registrars shall (a) file registrable certificates and documents presented to them for
entry; (b) compile the same monthly and prepare and send any information required of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified
transcripts or copies of any document registered upon payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly classified, of all
certificates or documents registered during the year; (e) send to the Civil Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each month, a
copy of the entries made during the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate search and identification in case any
information is required; and (g) administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register purposes"15 (Emphasis ours)

In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be
identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil
Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance
should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit
"D" a spurious document.

Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of
Page1

Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28,
1954 do not appear.
 In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar16 that:

"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the
father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the
statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority
to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an
illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours)

The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals17 where this Court said
that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."

A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for
purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which
Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.

At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In
this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of
Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.

Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute
proof of filiation,19 lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody
can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.

Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules
of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
57708 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998

FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 32860 1 which reversed the decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 16373. 2
The latter dismissed the complaint of private respondent Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for recognition as an illegitimate child of
petitioner Francisco Jison (hereafter FRANCISCO).

In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error, which, in this instance, necessitates an
inquiry into the facts. While as a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court, nevertheless, in light of the
conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this case falls under an exception to this rule? 3

In her complaint 4 filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia
Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then
employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since
childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family.
MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree,
became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly
recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.

In his answer, 5 FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period
specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then;
further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO
contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or
prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.

After MONINA filed her reply, 6 pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated on the following issues:

1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946?

2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family?

3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by estoppel, laches and/or prescription?

4. Damages. 7
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 At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela
Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tiangson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and
Lope Amolar.

Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years
at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO's Iloilo residence. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCO's wife suffered a miscarriage
or abortion, thereby depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCO's wife managed a nightclub on the ground floor of
Nelly Garden which operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day, thereby allowing FRANCISCO free access to
MONINA's mother, Esperanza Amolar, who was nicknamed Pansay.

Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya ("nanny") of Lourdes from July 1946 up to February
1947. Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden two (2) weeks before Adela started working for the Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in
September 1946, or about one month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask FRANCISCO for support. As a result, Pansay and Lilia
Jison, FRANCISCO's wife, quarreled in the living room, and in the course thereof, Pansay claimed that FRANCISCO was the father of her
baby. To which, Lilia replied: "I did not tell you to make that baby so it is your fault." During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till
11:00 a.m., FRANCISCO was supposedly inside the house listening.

Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977, he worked as FRANCISCO's houseboy at the
latter's house on 12th Street, Capitol Subdivision, Bacolod City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the bookkeeper at
Nelly Garden, informed Arsenio that MONINA, FRANCISCO's daughter, would arrive at Bacolod City with a letter of introduction from
Lagarto.

Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to X-11) of MONINA, 8 and as he paid for the
telephone bills, he likewise identified six (6) telephone cards (Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA arrived in
Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him as FRANCISCO's daughter. She stayed at FRANCISCO's house, but when the latter and his
wife would come over, Arsenio would "conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her face." Once, Arsenio
hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCO's sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in Silay City; another time, at the residence of FRANCISCO's
cousin, Mrs. Concha Lopez Cuaycong. Finally, Arsenio declared that the last time he saw MONINA was when she left for Manila, after
having finished her schooling at La Salle College in Bacolod City.

On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was FRANCISCO who instructed that MONINA be hidden
whenever FRANCISCO and his wife were around; that although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the Bacolod house only
once, they called each other "through long distance;" and that MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as "Daddy" during their lone meeting at
the Bacolod house and were "affectionate" to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod
house twice: first for a month, then for about a week the second time. On both occasions, however, FRANCISCO and his wife were
abroad. Finally, Arsenio recalled that FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat MONINA like his (FRANCISCO's) other daughters.

The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of Iloilo City, initially touched on how he and his wife
were related to FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's wife and MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the family trees of the Jison
and Lopez families, which showed that former Vice-President Fernando Lopez was the first cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, then told the
court that the family of Vice-President Lopez treated MONINA "very well because she is considered a relative . . . by reputation, by
actual perception." Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X-13 to X-18, photographs taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs.
Fernando Lopez, which showed MONINA with the former Vice-President and other members of the Lopez family.

Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter paid for some of MONINA's school needs and
even asked MONINA to work in a hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, a certain
Remedios Lopez Franco, likewise helped MONINA with her studies and problems, and even attended MONINA's graduation in 1978
when she obtained a masteral degree in Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh. X-12). Moreover, upon
Remedios' recommendation, MONINA was employed as a secretary at Merchant Financing Company, which was managed by a certain
Danthea Lopez, the wife of another first cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, and among whose directors were Zafiro himself, his wife and
Danthea's husband. In closing, Zafiro identified MONINA's Social Security Record (Exh. W), which was signed by Danthea as employer
and where MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.

Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the first cousin of her husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and
that she came to know MONINA in the latter part of 1965 when Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for employment at
Merchant Financing Co., which Danthea managed at that time. Remedios introduced MONINA to Danthea "as being reputedly the
daughter of Mr. Frank Jison;" and on several occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latter's husband understand that
MONINA was "reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]" While MONINA worked at Merchant Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA
lived with Remedios; however, in the latter part of 1966, as Remedios left for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin
University, Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with them. During MONINA's 6-month stay with them, she was not
charged for board and lodging and was treated as a relative, not a mere employee, all owing to what Remedios had said regarding
MONINA's filiation. As Danthea understood, MONINA resigned from Merchant Financing as she was called by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first
cousin of Danthea's husband who lived in Bacolod City.

Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO from 1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in
various capacities: as a procurement officer, hacienda overseer and, later, as hacienda administrator. Sometime in May, 1971, Romeo
saw and heard MONINA ask "her Daddy" (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to give her, but FRANCISCO answered that
he did not have the money to give, then told MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the middle of September that
year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and bring him to the office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty.
Tirol, Mr. Cruz and MONINA entered a room while Romeo waited outside. When they came out, Atty. Tirol had papers for MONINA to
sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be released to MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded,
although Atty. Tirol intended not to give MONINA a copy of the document she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz gave MONINA a check (Exh.
Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document she signed and ran outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to his
motive for testifying, Romeo stated that he wanted to help MONINA be recognized as FRANCISCO'S daughter.

Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was employed by FRANCISCO's wife at the Baguio
Page1

Military Institute in Baguio City; then in 1965, Rudy worked at FRANCISCO's office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda expenses, typing
vouchers and office papers, and, at times, acting as paymaster for the haciendas. From the nature of his work, Rudy knew the persons
receiving money from FRANCISCO's office, and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job, Rudy gave MONINA her allowance
from FRANCISCO four (4) times, upon instructions of a certain Mr. Lagarto to give MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled that
he first met MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden whenever FRANCISCO's wife was not around. On some of these
occasions, MONINA would speak with and address FRANCISCO as "Daddy," without objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965, Rudy
saw FRANCISCO give MONINA money thrice. Rudy further declared that in April 1965, FRANCISCO's office paid P250.00 to Funeraria
Bernal for the funeral expenses of MONINA's mother. Finally, as to Rudy's motives for testifying, he told the court that he simply
wanted to held bring out the truth "and nothing but the truth," and that MONINA's filiation was common knowledge among the people
in the office at Nelly Garden.

On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCO's office to MONINA were not reflected in the books of the
office, but were kept in a separate book, as Mr. Lagarto explained that FRANCISCO's wife and children "should not know [of] this." Rudy
further revealed that as to the garden "meetings" between FRANCISCO and MONINA, Rudy saw MONINA kiss FRANCISCO on the cheek
both upon arriving and before leaving, and FRANCISCO's reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say in the Visayan dialect:
"Kamusta ka iha?" ("How are you, daughter?"); and that MONINA was free to go inside the house as the household staff knew of her
filiation, and that, sometimes, MONINA would join them for lunch.

Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Central Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from
1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then when Mr. Lagarto
died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced Mr. Lagarto as office manager.

Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim her P15.00 monthly allowance given upon
FRANCISCO's standing order. Alfredo further declared that MONINA's filiation was pretty well-known in the office, that he had seen
MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the main building to the office, with FRANCISCO's arm on MONINA's shoulder; and that the office
paid for the burial expenses of Pansay, but this was not recorded in the books in order to hide it from FRANCISCO's wife. Alfredo also
disclosed that the disbursements for MONINA's allowance started in 1961 and were recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the
allowances ceased when MONINA stopped schooling and was employed in Bacolod City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served as
FRANCISCO's accountant-auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to the offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza, and
arrange for the preparation of FRANCISCO's income tax return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When Alfredo asked her how she came
to work there, she answered that "her Daddy," FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact confirmed by Mr. Atienza Alfredo then claimed
that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., was the most trusted man of FRANCISCO.

Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as FRANCISCO's houseboy at Nelly Garden from November
1953 up to 1965. One morning in April 1954, MONINA and her mother Pansay went to Nelly Garden and spoke with FRANCISCO for
about an hour, during which time, Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to seven (7) meters away. Due to the noise of
the vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their conversation. As FRANCISCO
asked Pansay why they came, Pansay answered that they came to ask for the "sustenance" of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then
touched MONINA's head and asked: "How are you Hija?," to which MONINA answered: "Good morning, Daddy." After FRANCISCO told
Pansay and MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his wallet and said to Pansay. "I am giving this for a child."

In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagarto's office where Dominador was to get "the day's expenses," while MONINA
was claiming her allowance from Mr. Diasnes. The next month, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in the office that
MONINA was there to get her allowance "from her Daddy." In December 1960, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden, in the room
of Don Vicente (father of FRANCISCO's wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift "and she was calling Don Vicente, Lolo
(grandfather)." At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around. Then sometime in 1961, when Dominador went to Mr.
Legarto's office to get the marketing expenses, Dominador saw MONINA once more claiming her allowance.

Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working for FRANCISCO, Dominador was at Mrs.
Franco's residence as she recommended him for employment with her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA, who was
then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. Franco's daughter and son. Mrs. Franco pointed at MONINA and asked Dominador if he
knew who MONINA was. Dominador answered that MONINA was FRANCISCO's daughter with Pansay, and then Mrs. Franco remarked
that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and that she was sending MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin.

Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of Esperanza Amolar (Pansay), testified that he
worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy from March to November 1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to work at
Elena Apartments in Manila. By November 1945, Pansay was also working at Elena Apartments, where she revealed to Lope that
FRANCISCO impregnated her. Lope then confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope "don't get hurt and don't cause any trouble, because I
am willing to support your Inday Pansay and my child." Three (3) days after this confrontation, Lope asked for and received permission
from FRANCISCO to resign because he (Lope) was hurt.

On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner.
She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and baptismal certificates
(Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April
1965) and FRANCISCO. 9 MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to
Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO
or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA
studied in different schools, 10 but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling.

For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which required a
week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In
1963, she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However,
expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA
would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After
finishing two (2) semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records (Exh. Z showing the FRANCISCO was
listed as Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1], she transferred to "De Paul College," just in front of Mrs. Franco's house, and studied there for a
year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelor's degree in Commerce in
April 1967. During her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the
CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO
Page1

was likewise listed as "Guardian" (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-2).

 MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly Garden, to wit: Luz, the household cook; the
houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the housemaid Natang; the yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente, Adelina;
and others. MONINA likewise enumerated the members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto, Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni,
Supertisioso, Doroy, and other), and identified them from a photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then corroborated the prior
testimony regarding her employment at Merchant Financing Co., and her having lived at Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs. Cuaycong's
residence in Bacolod City, while working at the hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.

MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met FRANCISCO at Elena Apartments at the corner of
Romero and Salas Streets, Ermita. She told FRANCISCO that she was going for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs. Franco's mother, with
whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon her return from Baguio City, MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to work, so the latter
arranged for her employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz, a
partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she would start working first week of September, sans examination. She resigned from Miller &
Cruz in 1971 and lived with Mrs. Cuaycong at her Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she
resigned and asked him for money to go to Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak Spanish and would not be able find a
job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO ordered a helper to send MONINA out of the house. In the process, MONINA broke many
glasses at the pantry and cut her hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged her, gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked her to return
to Bacolod City and promised that he would giver her the money.

MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket (Exh. M) which FRANCISCO gave. She
called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed by Mr. Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll card (Exhs. G to L),
with annotations at the back reading; "charged and paid under the name of Frank L. Jison" and were signed by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-
1 to L-1). PLDT issued a certification as to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB). Likewise introduced in evidence was a
letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on MONINA's behalf (Exh. N).

MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo and sign a certain affidavit, before Mr.
Cruz would turn over the money promised by FRANCISCO. She went to Atty. Tirol's office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft of the
affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was not FRANCISCO's daughter. She explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO
was that he would pay for her fare to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her illegitimacy. She started crying,
begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded that he was also a father and did not want this to happen to
his children as they could not be blamed for being brought into the world. She then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent it to
the latter's Forbes Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by JRS courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7). MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in
Bacolod City where they discussed the affidavit which she refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her that the affidavit was for his wife, that in
case she heard about MONINA going abroad, the affidavit would "keep her peace."

MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirol's office, she was accompanied by one Atty. Fernando
Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit (Exh. P) 11 would "boomerang" against FRANCISCO "as it is contrary to law." MONINA
returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol did not relent. Thus, on the morning
of 20 or 21 September 1971, she signed the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to support herself and finish her
studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of Asia check for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the
P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO allegedly promised to give. As Atty. Tirol seemed hesitant to give her a copy of the affidavit after
notarizing it, MONINA merely grabbed a copy and immediately left.

MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters of introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin,
Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCO's elder sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCO's elder brother), addressed to another
cousin, Beth Jison (Emilio's daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S contained a statement (Exh. S-1) expressly recognizing that
MONINA was FRANCISCO's daughter. Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting instead to spend the proceeds of
the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board exam and graduate studies. After finishing her graduate studies, she again planned to
travel abroad, for which reason, she obtained a letter of introduction from former Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed to then
United States Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).

As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one occasion, as FRANCISCO's wife was going to arrive at
the latter's Bacolod City residence, FRANCISCO called Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus, MONINA stayed
with Mrs. Luisa Jison for the duration of the stay of FRANCISCO's wife. MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice President Fernando
Lopez and his wife, Mariquit, even before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs.
Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs.
Lopez expressly recognized MONINA as FRANCISCO's daughter. As additional proof of her close relationship with the family of Vice
President Lopez, MONINA identified photographs taken at a birthday celebration on 14 April 1985.

MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife, namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr., (Junior) and
Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior and the two (2)
occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when she sought his blessings to get
married.

In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iñigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose
Cruz and Dolores Argenal.

FRANCISCO declared that Pansay's employment ceased as of October, 1 1944, and that while employed by him, Pansay would
sleep with the other female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second
floor. At that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in
October 1944, she never communicated with him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having
had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about MONINA's birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for
MONINA's tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover,
FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He
likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that
MONINA was his daughter.
Page1
 FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971, he fired Alfredo Baylosis upon discovering that
Alfredo had taken advantage of his position during the former's absence. FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and Romeo Bilbao,
but did not give the reasons therefor.

Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINA's long distance calls from his Bacolod residence; nevertheless, when he
subsequently discovered this, he fired certain people in his office for their failure to report this anomaly. As regards the caretaker of his
Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained that since MONINA lived at Mrs. Cuaycong's residence, the caretaker thought that he could
allow people who lived at the Cuaycong residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCO's) house.

Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nelly's Garden from 1963 up to 1974, then from 1980 up to 1986, the assistant
overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified that he did not know MONINA; that he learned of her only in June 1988, when he was informed
by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him; and that he never saw MONINA at Nelly's Garden, neither did he know of any instructions
for anyone at Nelly's Garden to give money to MONINA.

Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCO's bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986, testified that FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo
Baylosis due to certain unspecified discrepancies; and that he never saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto or Mr.
Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial court, however, Teodoro admitted that he prepared vouchers for only one of FRANCISCO's
haciendas, and not vouchers pertaining to the latter's personal expenses.

Iñigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nelly's Garden from 1964 up to 1984 as a field inspector,
paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officer-in-charge (OIC). He confirmed Alfredo Baylosis' dismissal due to these unspecified
irregularities, then denied that FRANCISCO ever ordered that MONINA be given her allowance. Likewise, Iñigo never heard FRANCISCO
mention that MONINA was his (FRANCISCO's) daughter.

Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCO's daughter, testified that she saw (but did not know) MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy Hospital,
on the occasion of the birth of Lourdes' first son, Mark. Over lunch one day, Lourdes' aunt casually introduced Lourdes and MONINA to
each other, but they were referred to only by their first names. Then sometime in 1983 or 1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes'
house in Sta. Clara Subdivision requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was then job-hunting. However, Lourdes
did not comply with the request.

Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at Miller & Cruz from 1968 up to 1971, however, he did
not personally interview her before she was accepted for employment. Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual screening procedure
before being hired. Jose recalled that one of the accountants, a certain Mr. Atienza, reported that MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCO's
daughter. Jose then told Mr. Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza) could stop her from spreading this rumor. Mr.
Atienza reported that he spoke with MONINA, who told him that she planned to leave for the United States and needed P20,000.00 for
that purpose, and in exchange, she would sign a document disclaiming filiation with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to
request that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA confirmed Mr. Atienza's report. Jose then informed Atty. Tirol,
FRANCISCO's personal lawyer, about the matter.

Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirol's) office in Iloilo. Jose then wrote out a letter of
introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol Jose relayed Atty. Tirol's message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then later, Atty.
Tirol told Jose to go to Iloilo with a clerk for P15,000.00 Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirol's office, Jose saw MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his
secretary reading some documents. MONINA then expressed her willingness to sign the document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that he
drew the P15,000.00 from his personal funds, subject to reimbursement from and due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.

Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May 1946, testified that she knew that Pansay was
Lourdes' nanny; that Lourdes slept in her parents' room; that she had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment to Pansay; that there
was no "unusual relationship" between FRANCISCO and Pansay, and if there was any, Dolores would have easily detected it since she
slept in the same room as Pansay. Dolores further declared that whenever FRANCISCO's wife was out of town, Pansay would bring
Lourdes downstairs at nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep in the room where FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared that
Pansay stopped working for FRANCISCO and his wife in October, 1944.

The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective memoranda.

It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21 October 1986, thereby hearing only the
testimonies of MONINA's witnesses and about half of MONINA's testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard
the rest of MONINA's testimony and those of FRANCISCO's witnesses.

In its decision of 12 November 1990 12 the trial court, through Judge Devera, dismissed the complaint with costs against
MONINA. In the opening paragraph thereof, it observed:

This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina Jison against defendant Francisco Jison.
This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985 at the time when plaintiff, reckoned from her death of birth, was already thirty-nine years
old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was instituted twenty years after the death of plaintiff's mother, Esperanza Amolar. For the
years between plaintiff's birth and Esperanza's death, no action of any kind was instituted against defendant either by plaintiff, her
mother Esperanza or the latter's parents. Neither had plaintiff brought such an action against defendant immediately upon her
mother's death on April 20, 1965, considering that she was then already nineteen years old or, within a reasonable time thereafter.
Twenty years more had to supervene before this complaint was eventually instituted.

The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial, without, however, summarizing the testimonies
of the witnesses nor referring to the testimonies of the witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of the issues.

The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was improbable for witness Lope Amolar to have noticed
that Pansay was pregnant upon seeing her at the Elena Apartments in November 1945, since Pansay was then only in her first month of
pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion that "copulation did indeed take place between Francisco and Esperanza;" and that
MONINA's attempt to show opportunity on the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider "that there was also the opportunity for
Page1

copulation between Esperanza and one of the several domestic helpers admittedly also residing at Nelly's Garden at that time." The
RTC also ruled that the probative value of the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA paled in light of jurisprudence, especially
when the misspellings therein were considered.

The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that MONINA's evidence thereon "may either be one of
three categories, namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence." To the first category belonged the
testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINA's filiation was based, as to the former, on
"utterances of defendant's wife Lilia and Esperanza allegedly during the heat of their quarrel," while as to the latter, Alfredo's
conclusion was based "from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendant's daughter, front his personal observation of
plaintiff's facial appearance which he compared with that of defendant's and from the way the two (plaintiff and defendant) acted and
treated each other on one occasion that he had then opportunity to closely observe them together." To the second category belonged
that of Dominador Savariz, as:

At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nelly's Garden and allegedly on those occasions when defendant's wife, Lilia
was in Manila, this witness was there and allegedly heard pieces of conversation between defendant and Esperanza related to the
paternity of the latter's child. . .

The RTC then placed MONINA's testimony regarding the acts of recognition accorded her by FRANCISCO's relatives under the
third category, since the latter were never presented as witnesses, for which reason the trial court excluded the letters from
FRANCISCO's relatives (Exhs. S to V).

As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by prescription for it was of "the perception . . . that the
benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children may be availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same manner as the
Family Code has so provided;" or by laches, "which is [a] creation of equity applied only to bring equitable results, and . . . addressed to
the sound discretion of the court [and] the circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this case immediately upon
the death of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, . . . there seems to be no inequitable result to
defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff."

The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed because of the affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed
"when she was already twenty-five years, a professional and . . . under the able guidance of counsel."

Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCO's claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not file the complaint with malice, she having
been "propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable cause."

MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860) and sought reversal of the trial court's decision on
the grounds that:

THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO ADJUDGE THIS CASE AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS MISPERCEPTION
THAT APPELLANT'S DELAY IN FILING HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER CASE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANT'S WITNESSES AS TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE
AND INCREDIBLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED
BY APPELLANT AS PART OF HER EVIDENCE.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS TO THE ACTUAL ACT O COPULATION BETWEEN THE APPELLEE
AND APPELLANT'S MOTHER SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID EFFECT.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DULY IDENTIFIED NOTES AND LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF
THE APPELLEE AS HEARSAY.

VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVIT (EXH. P) SERVED AS A BAR AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR
RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF REINFORCING SAID CLAIM. 13

Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellee's Brief. 14

In its decision of 27 April 1995, 15 the Court of Appeals initially declared that as no vested or acquired rights were affected, the
instant case was governed by Article 175, in relation to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code. 16While the Court of Appeals rejected
the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as FRANCISCO did not sign them, said court focused
its discussion on the other means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child or, by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, such as "the baptismal certificate of the
child, a judicial admission, a family bible wherein the name of the child is entered, common reputation respecting pedigree, admission
by silence, testimonies of witnesses . . ." 17 To the Court of Appeals, the "bottom line issue" was whether or not MONINA established
her filiation as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter by preponderance of evidence, as to which issue said court found:

[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that [MONINA] is the illegitimate daughter of
[FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such status by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
Page1

In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were
already sufficient to establish MONINA's filiation:
 As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolar's testimony by saying that Lope could not have detected
Esperanza's pregnant state in November, 1945 since at that point in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of pregnancy. Apparently,
the trial court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned by Lope Amolar than on the tenor and import his testimony. As . . . Lope . . .
was asked about an incident that transpired more than 41 years back, [u]nder the circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect that Lope
could still be dead right on the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted his sister. At any rate, what is important is not the
month that they met but the essence of his testimony that his sister pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one responsible for
her pregnancy, and that upon being confronted, [FRANCISCO] assured him of support for Esperanza and their child. It would appear
then that in an attempt to find fault with Lope's testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that even [FRANCISCO], in his
deposition, did not deny that he was confronted by Lope about what he had done to Esperanza during which he unequivocally
acknowledged paternity by assuring Lope of support for both Esperanza and their child.

The Court of Appeals further noted that Casabuena and Savariz "testified on something that they personally observed or
witnessed," which matters FRANCISCO "did not deny or refute." Finally, said court aptly held:

Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies

. . . let alone such circumstantial evidence as [MONINA's] Birth Certificates . . . and Baptismal Certificates which invariably bear
the name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot go along with the trial court's theory that [MONINA's] illegitimate filiation has not
been satisfactorily established.

xxx xxx xxx

Significantly, [MONINA's] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCO's] former employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy
Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Carefully evaluating appellant's evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis
[FRANCISCO's] controversion thereof, We find more weight in the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her]
witnesses . . . all bearing on [FRANCISCO's] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA]
as his illegitimate daughter have not been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition, only casually
dismissed [MONINA's] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by [MONINA's] witnesses, he
merely explained that he had fired [them] from their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCO's] vague denial is grossly inadequate
to overcome the probative weight of [MONINA's] testimonial evidence.

Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court . . . does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA's]
logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse . . . Further,
the testimony of Jose Cruz concerning the events that led to the execution of the affidavit . . . could not have been true, for as pointed
out by [MONINA] she signed the affidavit . . . almost five months after she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. . . .

At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or
his lawyer to have secured [MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost
of P15,000. [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA] . . .

In fine, We hold that [MONINA's] filiation as [FRANCISCO's] illegitimate daughter has been conclusively, established by the
uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had admitted
his paternity of the appellee, and also by the testimonies of appellant; Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo
Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees,
school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying appellant's hospitalization expenses,
providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal
greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending
appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance
telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to
use his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs. Z, AA, AA-1, to AA-5, W & W-5), appellee had continuously recognized
appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the acts of [FRANCISCO's] relatives acknowledging or treating [MONINA] as
[FRANCISCO's] daughter (Exh. U) or as their relative (Exhs. T & V). On this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of Iloilo City,
whose spouse belongs to the Lopez clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA) has been considered by the Lopezes as a
relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the company of the Lopezes (Exhs X-16 & X-17). Another witness, Danthea H. Lopez,
whose husband Eusebio Lopez is appellee's first cousin, testified that appellant was introduced to her by appellee's cousin, Remedios
Lopez Franco, as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a] secretary in the Merchant's Financing
Corporation of which she was the manager, and further allowed her to stay with her family free of board and lodging. Still on this
aspect, Dominador Savariz declared that sometime in February, 1966 appellee's relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to
appellant as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison.

Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as [MONINA's] Baptismal Certificates (Exhs C
& D) which the trial court admitted in evidence as part of [MONINA's] testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to further
reinforce [MONINA's] claim that she is [FRANCISCO's] illegitimate daughter by Esperanza Amolar.

True it is that a trial judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal. But the rule admits of
certain exceptions. One such exception is where the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. [citations omitted] In the
present case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINA's] witnesses . . . whose testimonies were not given credence did not testify
before the judge who rendered the disputed judgment . . .

The Court of Appeals then decreed:

Page1
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby entered for appellant
Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and privileges granted by
law.

Costs against appellee.

SO ORDERED.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 29 March 1996, 18FRANCISCO
filed the instant petition. He urges us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that said court committed errors of law:

I.

. . . IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF
PETITIONER, CONSIDERING [THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE OCCURRED.

II.

. . . IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF
PATERNITY AND FILIATION IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.

III.

. . . IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION
CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE PETITIONER UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF
EVIDENCE.

IV.

. . . IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SWORN STATEMENT (EXH. "P" /EXH. "2") IN A MANNER NOT IN CONSONANCE
WITH THE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.

V.

. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE PRESENT PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT
TO LACHES.

As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the second paragraph of MONINA's complaint wherein she
claimed that he and Pansay had sexual relations "by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946," it was physically impossable for him
and Pansay to have had sexual contact which resulted in MONINA's birth, considering that:

The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private respondent in her complaint that her mother
was impregnated by FRANCISCO "at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946", she would have been born sometime in late September or
early October and not August 6, 1946 . . . The instant case finds factual and legal parallels in Constantino vs. Mendez, 19 thus: . . .

FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by him at the time in question was
unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay during the time of or even after her employment by him.

As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINA's testimonial evidence is "shaky, contradictory and unreliable," and
proceeds to attack the credibility of her witnesses by claiming, in the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have detected Pansay
pregnancy in November 1945 when they met since she would have been only one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador Savariz did
not in fact witness the meeting between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior motive in testifying for
MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then under Central Bank supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to
Iloilo; and (d) Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever favorable treatment MONINA received from Danthea was
due to the former's employment at Merchants' Financing Company and additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides Danthea
admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of paternity and filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and
40 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court did not come into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of the trial court as regards the
testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis.

FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINA's testimony that he answered for her schooling was self-serving and uncorroborated by
any receipt or other documentary evidence; and assuming he did, such should be interpreted as a manifestation of kindness shown
towards the family of a former household helper.

Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter, FRANCISCO points to the fact that Pansay was the former
laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA resided with the families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because she was in their
employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA failed to present Mrs. Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs.
Cuaycong; and MONINA's employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to her educational attainment,
there being absolutely no evidence to prove that FRANCISCO ever facilitated her employment thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot v.
Baluyot,21 the quantum of evidence to prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance thereof, was
not met.

With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of Appeals' reliance on the certifications of the Local
Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence is misplaced. First, their genuineness
could not be ascertained as the persons who issued them did not testify. Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 22 the contents
of the baptismal certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest who solemnized the baptism, who
likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally, the name of the father appearing therein was "Franque Jison," which was not
FRANCISCO's name. Third, in both Exhibits E and F, the names of the child's parents were listed as "Frank Heson" and "Esperanza
Amador" (not Amolar). FRANCISCO further points out that in Exhibit F, the status of the child is listen as "legitimate," while the father's
Page1

occupation as "laborer." Most importantly, there was no showing that FRANCISCO signed Exhibits E and F or that he was the one who
reported the child's birth to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. As to MONINA's educational records, FRANCISCO invokes Bañas v.
Bañas 23which recognized that school records are prepared by school authorities, not by putative parents, thus incompetent to prove
paternity. And, as to the photographs presented by MONINA, FRANCISCO cites Colorado v.Court of Appeals, 24 and further asserts that
MONINA did not present any of the persons with whom she is seen in the pictures to testify thereon; besides these persons were, at
best, mere second cousins of FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and letters written by his relatives (Exhs. S to V) as they
were not identified by the authors. Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the telephone cards (Exhs. G to L) nor did
these reveal the circumstances surrounding the calls she made from his residence.

Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of MONINA's affidavit of 21
September 1971 ran counter to Dequito v. Llamas, 25 and overlooked that at the time of execution, MONINA was more than 25 years
old and assisted by counsel.

As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals' failure to consider the long and unexplained delay in the
filing of the case.

In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCO's arguments, leading FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.

On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda,
which they subsequently did.

A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.

Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary matters relating to the applicable law and the
guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the former, plainly, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs the
present controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco 26 served as a judicial confirmation of Article 256 of the
Family Code 27 regarding its retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true here, it appearing
that neither the putative parent nor the child has passed away and the former having actually resisted the latter's claim below.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the
same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.

For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph. which MONINA relies upon given that
she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high standard of proof" 28 is required. Specifically, to prove open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but
also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. 29

By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time. 30

The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. 31

The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil
cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the
course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out aprima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. 32

With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.

FRANCISCO's arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant consideration. While it has been observed that
unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence,33 this does not favor FRANCISCO.
Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in
deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victim's or mother's word,
as against the accused's or putative father's protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's mother could no longer testify as to the fact
of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not
mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other
than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether MONINA's evidence is coherent, logical and natural. 34

The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay "by about the end of 1945." We agree with MONINA that
this was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual
relations between FRANCISCO and MONINA's mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of
Page1

FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO and
MONINA's mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO
fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the
status as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter.

We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that
occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established the following facts:

1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the employ of the former;

2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to
enumerate, thus:

[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del
Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellant's hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral
expenses of appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his
office personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long
distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z,
AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5) . . .

3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years publicly, 35 spontaneously, continuously
and in an uninterrupted manner. 36

Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second assigned error must fail.

There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative value of some of MONINA's documentary
evidence.

MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced.
It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of
paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil
Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. 37 Simply put, if
the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the
mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of
voluntary acknowledgment on the latter's part. 38 In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal
certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former
being competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified. 39 However, despite the
inadmissibility of the school records per seto prove the paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINA's testimony to corroborate
her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.

We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the
baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINA's filiation. Since they areper se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

As to Exhibits "S," "T," "U" and "V," the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio
Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINA's filiation, while their due execution and
authenticity are not in issue, 40 as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39,
the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to
testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.
41 As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further elaboration.

Rule 130, Section 40, provides:

Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also
a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings,
family portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree. (emphasis supplied)

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored clause which
pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the
witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as
private documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "[e]ntries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits,"

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule ofejusdem
generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's
joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. 42 These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and well known
to the family," 43 or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." 44 Other examples of these
objects which are regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, 45
monuments or coffin plates. 46

Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted
on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation, 47 it having been observed that:

[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the family,
and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. . . . [Thus] matters of
pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree
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in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community. 48

 Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits "S" to "V," inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINA's school records, properly be
admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.

We now direct our attention to MONINA's 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2), subject of the fourth assigned error,
where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her father. MONINA contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no
savings and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. Moreover, she signed Exhibit P upon the advice of Atty.
Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived and that FRANCISCO's ploy would "boomerang" upon him. On the other hand,
FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded Exhibit P as MONINA was already 25 years old at the time of its execution and
was advised by counsel; further, being a notarized document, its genuineness and due execution could not be questioned. He relies on
the testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm of Miller & Cruz, who declared that he intervened in the matter as
MONINA was spreading rumors about her filiation within the firm, which might have had deleterious effects upon the relationship
between the firm and FRANCISCO.

On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of the Court of Appeals:

Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court . . . does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA's]
logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse . . .

At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] of
his lawyer to have secured [MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost
of P15,000. [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA] . . .

Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly
appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution of the sworn
statement in question, hence negating FRANCISCO's theory of the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller & Cruz regarding the
identity of MONINA's father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of the credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed
above, it is evident that the standard to contradict a notarial document, i.e. clear and convincing evidence and more than merely
preponderant, 49 has been met by MONINA

Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.

Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCO's defense beg to be addressed: First, that his testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife
with bare, unsubstantiated responses such as "That is not true," "I do not believe that," or "None that I know." In declining then to lend
credence to FRANCISCO's testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his
statements, laid down as early as 1921:

The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties
are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain
to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his
message.

For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately related to the principal
fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not
infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as "I don't know" or "I don't remember." . . . 50

Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence
FRANCISCO's attempt to prove ill-motive on their part to falsely testify in MONINA's favor may not succeed. As may be gleaned, the
only detail which FRANCISCO could furnish as to the circumstances surrounding the dismissals of his former employees was that
Baylosis allegedly "took advantage of his position" while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from this bare claim,
FRANCISCO's account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis for a finding of bias against FRANCISCO on the part of his former
employees.

As to FRANCISCO's other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either. Nonito Jalandoni avowed that he only came to
know of MONINA in June 1988; 51 that during his employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not recall ever having
seen MONINA there, neither did he know of any instructions from FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto (FRANCISCO's office manager before
passing away) regarding the disbursement of MONINA's allowance. 52 Teodoro Zulla corroborated Jalandoni's testimony regarding not
having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINA's allowance; declared that Alfredo Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies
discovered after an audit, without any further elaboration, however; but admitted that he never prepared the vouchers pertaining to
FRANCISCO's personal expenses, merely those intended for one of FRANCISCO's haciendas. 53Then, Iñigo Superticioso confirmed that
according to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza, Baylosis "was dismissed by Mr. Jison for irregularities," while Superticioso was
informed by FRANCISCO that Tingson was dismissed for loss of confidence. Superticioso likewise denied that MONINA received money
from FRANCISCO's office, neither was there a standing order from FRANCISCO to release funds to her. 54

It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are likewise insufficient to overcome MONINA's
evidence. The former merely consist of denials as regards the latter's having gone to Nelly Garden or having received her allowance
from FRANCISCO's office, which, being in the form of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony; 55
bare assertions as regards the dismissal of Baylosis; ignorance of FRANCISCO's personal expenses incapable of evincing that FRANCISCO
did not provide MONINA with an allowance; or hearsay evidence as regards the cause for the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But
what then serves as the coup de grace is that despite Superticioso's claim that he did not know MONINA, 56 when confronted with
Exhibit H, a telephone toll ticket indicating that on 18 May 1971, MONINA called a certain "Eñing" at FRANCISCO's office, Superticioso
admitted that his nickname was "Iñing" and that there was no other person named "Iñing" in FRANCISCO's office. 57

All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's
illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws;" moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Page1

The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part
of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would assert
the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complaint, or the
suit is not held barred. 58 The last element is the origin of the doctrine that sale demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of
time it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. 59

As FRANCISCO set up, laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its elements.
However, he only succeeded in showing MONINA's delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any
event, it must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of state claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced
or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. 60
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within the period granted her
by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of
27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12993 October 28, 1918

RAFAEL J. FERRER, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,

vs.

JOAQUIN J. DE INCHAUSTI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Vicente Sotto for appellants.

Araneta & Zaragoza and Cohn & Fisher

TORRES, J.:

This appeal was taken through bill of exceptions by counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of February 12, 1917,
whereby the judge of the Court of First Instance held that Rosa Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs, could not have been legitimate
daughter of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez, who, on her death, left some legitimate children. The court did not deem it necessary to
discuss whether the said Rosa Viademonte could be a daughter of the said Isabel Gonzalez for reason, given in his decision, and held
that the plaintiffs should not be entitled to what they have demanded, and that they should pay the costs.

Under date of May 12, 1916, the attorney of Rafael J. Ferrer y Viademonte and Maria Angelina Ferrer y Viademonte with
her husband Ricardo Hernandez y Aracil filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, praying for the rendition of
a final judgment declaring that Rosa Matilde Viademonte y Gonzalez had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez
in the same proportion and capacity as the other four children of the latter, namely, Ramon Viademonte, Rafael C. de Inchausti,
Joaquin C. de Inchausti, and Clotilde de Inchausti de Vidal; that the plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer are the only and
legitimate heirs of the deceased Rosa Viademonte and the only ones entitled to receive her share of the inheritance left by Isabel
Gonzalez, that is, the on-fifth part of the latter's estate; that the defendants render to the plaintiffs an account of the fruits and
administration of all the property from the moment the said community of property from the moment the said community of property
was constituted among them, and to deliver to the plaintiffs that part which corresponds to them in their capacity as sole heirs of Rosa
Viademonte y Gonzalez, that is, the one-fifth part of the inheritance with all its accession, fruits, and interests; and , finally, that the
defendants pay the costs. In fact, it is alleged that the plaintiffs are the legitimate children of Rosa Matilde Viademonte , who in turn
died on November 20, 1898, leaving the two plaintiffs as surviving legitimate children that the said Isabel Gonzalez was married, first to
Ramon Martinez Viademonte, and from his marriage two children, named Roman and Rosa Matilde, and surnamed Viademonte y
Gonzalez survived; that after the death of her husband Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Sr., the widow, Isabel Gonzalez, contracted a
second marriage with Don Jose Joaquin de Inchausti with whom she had three children named Clotilde, Rafael and Joaquin, all
surnamed Inchausti y Gonzalez, that Ramon Viademonte y Gonzalez Jr., died on January 1, 1905, without leaving any forced heir, and
by a will dated May 216, 1900, he left his property to the son or sons which Rafael C. de Inchausti might have, and in default or such
child or children, to the same Rafael C. de Inchausti, by a will, left as his heirs and successors in interest his legitimate son Jose R. de
Inchausti, his recognized natural daughter Maria Consolacion de Inchausti de Ortigas, and his widow Maria Consolacion Rico y Medina;
that on her death, Isabel Gonzalez left a certain property in her marriage with Jose de Joaquin de Inchausti, which would amount
approximately to P1,000,000 with its accessions, according to present valuation, as shown by the inventory of said property which
makes up Exhibit A, that on January 14, 188, Jose Joaquin Inchausti y Gonzalez and Clotilde de Inchausti y Gonzalez de Vidal, each of
whom received on-fourth of the estate left by the deceased Isabel Gonzalez, excluding therefrom Rosa Viademonte, the mother of the
plaintiffs., notwithstanding the fact that she had an equal rights to inherit from Isabel Gonzalez; that since January 188 till his death,
Ramon Viademonte, Jr. had been the possessor and administrator of the fourth part of the inheritance which he received from his
deceased mother Isabel Gonzalez which portion of the property later came to the possession and control of Rafael C. de Inchausti, and
on the death of the latter, this fourth part of the inheritance came to the possession of Maria Consolacion Rico de Inchausti, widow of
said Rafael C. de Inchausti, in her capacity as guardian of her son Jose Rafael de Inchausti, and part of it, to the possession of Maric
Consolacion de Inchausti de Ortigas; and that a great part of the property which the defendants actual possess, came from the young
children, who received from Isabel Gonzalez with the earnings and accessions thereof; these children have been possessing it pro
indiviso or in coownership, in their lifetime, with Rosa Viademonte while living, and upon the death of the latter, with her heirs, but
Page1

that, in spite of the demands made by the plaintiffs for the delivery to them by the defendants of their corresponding share in the
inheritance the latter have always refused to do so.
 In his answers, for Clotilde Inchausti de Vial admitted that the plaintiffs are the children of Rosa viademonte and Benigno
Ferrer; that Isabel Gonzalez was married first o Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, and afterwards to Jose Joaquin de Inchausti; that on
the death of her mother Isabel Gonzalez, on December 13, 1886, her share in the conjugal partnership amounted to P191, 248.81, and
on January 14, 1888, Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, as executor of his wife, after paying the legacies mentioned in the testament, paid to
this defendant in cash the sum of P46,295.70 as her hereditary portion in the liquidated property of her mother, and likewise delivered
to the other three sons of said Isabel Gonzalez similar amounts; that, after receiving her share of the inheritance from her mother, she
spent it all, and she no longer has any part of it, nor has she left any portion of it during the last thirty years, and that neither the
plaintiffs nor their deceased mother had ever possessed or enjoyed the said sum; and denies generally all the allegations of the
complaint which are not admitted, and denies specially the allegation that the mother of the plaintiffs had ever married with their
father Benigno Ferre, that they and their mother ever had the surname of Viademonte or Viademonte y Gonzalez and that the mother
of the plaintiffs was a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez.

As a special defense, she alleged that her possession of the money derived from the inheritance of her mother had been
public, adverse, pacific, continuous and under a claim of ownership, in good faith and with just title, since January 14, 1888; that never
during the lifetime of the plaintiff's mother did she make any claim or assert any right in the amount received by this defendant form
the inheritance of her deceased mother; that more than thirty years had elapsed since she received by this defendant inheritance of
her deceased mother; and that the action for the plaintiffs has already prescribed in accordance with the provisions of article 1955 of
the Civil Code and section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure they (the plaintiffs) and their mother ever had the surname of
"Viademonte" or Viademonte y Gonzalez," and that the mother of the plaintiffs was a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez.

As a special defense, she alleged that her possession of the money derived from the inheritance of her mother had been
public, adverse, pacific, continuous, and under a claim of ownership, in good faith and with just title, since January 14, 1888; that never
during the lifetime of the plaintiffs' mother did she (plaintiff's mother) make any claim or assert any right in the amount received by
this defendant from the inheritance of her deceased mother; that more than thirty years had elapsed since she received said amount
to the date of the presentation of the complaint; and that the action of the plaintiff has already prescribed in accordance with the
provisions of article 1955 of the Civil Code and section 38 of the Code of Civil procedure.

Counsel for Maria de la Consolacion de Inchausti, in turn, set up a special defense similar to that of Clotilde, and alleged
that Ramon Martinez Viademonte, son of Isabel Gonzalez, died in the city of Manila on January 1, 1905, without leaving any heirs, and
bequeathed by will to his brother Rafael C. de Inchausti, father of this defendant, all of his property, with the exception of some
property of little importance which he had bequeathed to others; but denied that any part of his (Ramon Maritnez Viademonte's)
property thas ever been bequeathed to the children of said Rafael C. de Inchausti; that, on the death of said Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte, his will was allowed to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and all his remaining property delivered to Rafael
C. de Inchausti with Martinez Viademonte's property received by her father Rafael C. de Inchausti was a small piece of land situated in
Santa Ana and known by the name of Hacienda de Lamayan; that the title of Rafael C. De Inchausti to said land was registered by virtue
of a decree of the Court of Land Registration, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Ac; that said land was in turn
inherited by this defendant from her father upon the death of the latter, and that she appears in the registry of property as owner of
the same; that, upon the allowance of said will in the Court of First Instance of this city, the plaintiffs did not present any claim to the
commissioners appointed to appraise the property, and that the period allowed for the presentation of such claims expired on October
20, 1914, and that, therefor, the action now filed by the plaintiffs has prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of section 695 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. In similar terms, counsel for Joaquin C. de Inchausti worded his defense in a written answer as amended
under date of September 19, 1916.1awph!l.net

Counsel for Maria de la Consolacion Rico y Medina in her personal capacity an das a widow of Rafael Inchausti and also as
guardian of her son Jose Rafael de Inchausti y Rico, in his answer to the foregoing complaint, admits that Ramon Martinez and Isabel
Gonzalez Ferrer, both now deceased, were in their lifetime husband and wife, and were survived by a child named Ramon Martinez
Viademonte y Gonzalez, but denied that the said Rosa Matilde was a daughter of that marriage or of any of the said spouses; he also
admits that the deceased Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr., died in this city on January 1, 1905, without leaving any forced heir, and by
a will dated May 16, 1900, he left to his maternal brother Rafael C. de Inchausti husband of this defendant, all his property with the
exception of some small legacies, denying at the same time that any portion of the inheritance of said Ramon Viademonte, Jr., had
been left to the children of the defendant's husband; that Isabel Gonzalez Ferrer, the mother of her husband, who died on December
13, 1886, executed a will on April 29 of the said year, wherein she declared that she had a son with her first husband Ramon Martinez
Viademonte, and the name of said on son was also Ramon, and that with her second husband Jose Joaquin de Inchausti. She Counsel
for Maria de la Consolacion Rico y Medina in her personal capacity and a widow of Rafael Inchausti and also as guardian of her son Jose
Rafael de Inchausti y Rico, in his answer to the foregoing complaint, admits that Ramon Martinez and Isabel Gonzalez Ferre, both now
deceased were in their lifetime husband and wife, and were survived by a child named Ramon Martinez Viademonte y Gonzalez but
denied that the said Rosa Matilde was a daughter of that marriage or of any of the said spouses; he also admits that the deceased
Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr., died in this city on January 1905, without leaving any forced heir, and by a will dated May 165, 1900,
he left to his maternal brother Rafael C. de Inchausti, husband of this defendant, all his property with the exception of some small
legacies, denying at the same time that any portion of the inheritance of said Ramon Viademonte, Jr., had been left to the children of
the defendant's husband, who died on December 13, 1886, executed a will on April 29 of the said year, wherein she declared that she
had some with her first husband Ramon Martinez Viademonte and the name of said son was also Ramon, and that with her second
husband Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, she had three children, and he instituted the said four children as the sole and universal heirs to the
remainder of her property in equal parts, her property being the one half of the conjugal property had during her marriage with her
second husband Inchausti who had survived her; that no portion of the inheritance from the deceased Isabel Gonzalez y Ferrer was
adjudicated to the mother of the plaintiffs; that the deceased Rafael C. de Inchausti inherited from the said Ramon Martinez
Viademonte, Jr., a parcel of land known by the name of Hacienda de Lamayan, registered in the name of the deceased Rafael de
Inchausti, which property was, in turn, inherited by the defendant Maria Consolacion de Inchausti de Ortigas. As a special defense, she
alleged that in the said will wherein the testatrix Isabel Gonzalez name d her sole and universal heirs, Rosa Matilde, the mother of the
plaintiffs, was not designated a heiress or legatee, but on the contrary, was omitted therefrom, that from the death of the testratrix of
this compliant neither Rosa Matilde nor the plaintiffs presented any claim whatsoever against the omission of Rosa Matilde from the
will of said Isabel Gonzalez for the plaintiffs could have availed themselves of any right which Rosa Matilde could have had in the
property inherited by the defendant and her son Jose Rafael de Inchausti, derived by law for contesting the will of Isabel Gonzalez on
the ground of prejudicial omission therefrom of Rosa Matilde expired long before the date on which this compliant was filed; and
Page1

consequently, said action has prescribed; that, after the death of Ramon Viademonte, Jr., in February 1905, probate proceedings were
had in the Court of First Instance of Manila, an administrator of the decedent's estate was appointed, on July 21 of said year the
commissioners to appraise the estate of the deceased were appointed, and after the lapse of the period fixed for allowing claims
against the state, the property of the deceased was adjudicated to his heir Rafael C. de Inchausti and to the legatees, the plaintiffs not
having presented to the commissioners, any claim against the estate of said deceased has thus prescribed by the lapse of the period for
its presentation, that after the death of Rafael C. de Inchausti, on October 5, 1913, probate proceedings were had regarding his will in
the Court of First Instance of the city, an executor was appointed, as well as the commissioners to appraise the estate, and the period
within which claims against he estate might be received has expired, and the plaitniffs have not presented any claim whatsoever
against he estate of said Rafael C. de Inchausti, and finally, she alleged that he period fixed by law for presenting claims against he
estate of said Rafael C. de Inchausti expired long before the date of the filing of this complaint, and consequently, the action to assert
the claim has already prescribed, and that therefore the defendant should be absolved from the complaint with the costs against the
plaintiffs.

Counsel for the plaintiffs, in his written reply amending his replies of September 20 and 21, 1916, denied generally and
specifically each and all of the new facts alleged in the answers of the defendants, and added that the will of Isabel Gonzalez, dated
October 12, 1886, is null and void, inasmuch as Rosa Viademonte Gonzalez and having equal rights as her other children; that he
defendants are estopped form denying that the surname of Rosa Matilde was a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez with Ramon Martinez
Viademonte; that the plaintiffs are legitimate children of said Rosa Matilde with Benigno Ferre inasmuch as both their predecessors in
interest as well as the present defendants have previously made declarations and formal affirmations, written and oral, recognizing
that the surname of Rosa Matilde was Viademonte y Gonzalez, that the same was legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez and Ramon
Martinez Viademonte and that the plaintiffs are legitimate children of Rosa Viademonte y Gonzalez with Benigno Ferrer.

The trial having been held and the evidence of both parties adduced, the trial judge, on February 12, 1917, rendered a
judgment declaring that the plaintiffs receive nothing in this action and pay the costs. To this decision the plaintiffs excepted and
moved for a new trial, which motion was denied by order of the court on the 27th day of the same month and year. An exception was
taken to the order denying the motion for a new trial, and the corresponding bill of exception was presented, approved, certified, and
forwarded to the office of the clerk of this court.

The parties are agreed as regard the allegations that the plaintiffs Rafael J. Ferrer and Maria Angelina Ferrer are children of
the deceased Rosa Matilde Viademonte, although the defendants deny that they (plaintiffs) were legitimate children of their mother
contrary to the affirmation of the plaintiffs to this effect. The evidence of record concerning this point is of such a character that it is
difficult to deduce therefrom a certain and definite conclusion, because, while it appears that Rosa Matilde Viademonte has, on various
occasions, stated that she was unmarried and never contracted a marriage, she has made entirely different statements on other
occassions. In the proceedings (Exhibit 8) instituted by the said Rosa Matilde against Rafael C. de Inchausti, it was disclosed that she
had never been married and that if her children with Benigno Ferrer were baptized as legitimate children, it was so done in order to
conceal her dishonor, such statement being found in a document drawn in 1892 and signed by her (Exhibit 8, pp. 3-4). On page 159 of
the records of the said proceedings (Exhibit 8) it appears that said Rosa Matilde stated under oath before a judge, on January 21. 1893,
that she had never married, and the same declaration was made by her on April 15th of the same year in another case. (Exhibit 7, pp.
17-26.)

In a document found on page 166 of said Exhibit 8, executed in 1890, Rosa Matilde stated that she was a widow; but, in a
document executed in 1893, found on page 257 of Exhibit 8, and in a document (Exhibit 1, page 136 of the first document executed in
1894) she made the statement that she was unmarried. Rosa Matilde might have made these contradictions due perhaps to her
extreme poverty, which had prompted her to tell a lie before the courts of justice, with the sole purpose of recovering the amount
claimed by her as her legacy, while, on the hand, it is undeniable that she could not duly justify the marriage contracted by her with
Benigno Ferrer.

Even if the plaintiffs be considered as legitimate children of Rosa Matilde, Viademonte in her marriage with Benigno Ferrer,
still this action filed by them will not prosper, inasmuch as the evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action
referred to shows, in a manner which leaves no room for doubt that Rosa Matilde was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez,
and it follows that her children as well as her privies have no right to a part of the hereditary property of said Isabel Gonzalez.

Counsel for plaintiffs pretend to establish that Rosa Matilde Viademonte had been treated and considered as a daughter by
Isabel Gonzalez, and as a sister the children of the latter; that, on one occasion, said Gonzalez remarked that the father of Rosa Matilde
was Ramon Martinez de Viademonte; that Joaquin Matilde in the following manner: "To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa." that
when Rosa Matilde entered the College de la Compania de Jesus, her name as recorded in the registry of that college was Rosa Matilde
Viademonte, and her expenses were defrayed by Rafael de Inchausti and in the same registry said Rafael de Inchausti appears as
brother of Rosa; that when Rosa entered the Colegio de Santa Isabel, she used the same name and surname; that Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte, Jr., presented Rosa Matilde also sister, saying that the father of the same was also his father named Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte, while Rosa Matilde has always been known by the same name and surname during the time she was studying in the
Colegio de Luisa Oda de Birgi; that Clotilde de Inchausti called Rosa Matilde her sister in her letters to Rafael Ripol, and that Joaquin de
Inchausti himself in the codicil of his testament designates Rosa Matilde with the surname of Viademonte.

From all the evidence adduced, the slightest indication cannot be inferred that Rosa Matilde was born during the marriage
of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., with Isabel Gonzalez or within the 300 days after the dissolution of their marriage by the death
of the husband, nor has the said Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., in his lifetime recognized said Rosa Matilde as his daughter. If
Rosa Matilde is a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez, it follows that she was also a daughter of Isabel's husband, Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte, under the assumption that she was born in the marriage of both or at a time prior or subsequent to that of the
celebration of the marriage, as fixed by law. (Arts. 119, 120, 121, and 122 of the Civil Code.)

Legitimate filiation presupposes the existence of marriage contracted by the presumed parents in accordance with law, and
therefore a person can not be declared to be a legitimate daughter of her mother, without presuming at the same time that she was
born in the marriage of this mother with the presumed father, who, in his lifetime, and without his consent, could not have been
considered as father of a child that was not conceived by his own wife, because the mere fact of having used his surname after his
death, without his assent or consent, does not constitute a proof of filiation of parternity.

In this decision it is to be determined whether Rosa Matilde was born in the lifetime of Ramon Martinez de viademonte to
decide on the truth of the assertion made by the plaintiffs that their predecessor in interest was a legitimate daughter of the said
spouses Viademonte and Gonzalez.
Page1

At the trial, the death certificate of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, first husband of Isabel Gonzalez, was not presented in
evidence; but it is uncontroverted that he died on September 30, 1836; as corroborated by the accountant of the naval division of
Puerto Galkera in charge of the Leiutenant of the Spanish Navy, Jose Atienza, saying that the Lieutenant, who had the rank of captain in
the navy, Ramon Viademonte, died on September 30, 1836, as appears in the list of officers found in the payroll under his custody,
having paid till the date of the death of said Viademonte all his salaries corresponding to him as such officer, and further saying that, by
request of the widow of the deceased, he issued the proper certificate on December 31, 1836.

So certain is the death of said Ramon Martinez de Viademonte that his widow Isabel Gonzalez on January 31, 1837, applied
to the Government for a pension sufficient to cover her widowhood expenses, alleging that she was a widow with children of the
deceased. The application was made in a paper stamped as of the years 1836 and 1837, a fact which proves the authenticity of the
document written in a stamped paper, and the presentation of said application by the widow demonstrates the fact that her husband
really died, wherefore she asked for a pension, because she would have been held responsible if, in truth and in fact, her husband had
been living and not dead as she claimed.

The said documents, as constituting a supplementary proof of the death of the deceased Ramon Martinez, de Viademonte,
appear to be corroborated by an entry in a notebook belonging to Ramon Viademonte, Jr. wherein it is stated that his mother was
married in 1833 to Ramon Martinez de Viademonte who died on September 30, 1836, at the age of 33 years, being then a major in the
naval division assigned at Puerto Galera, Mindoro.

Notwithstanding the fact that the death certificate of said Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, first husband of Isabel
Gonzalez was not presented in evidence, still the documentary and circumstantial evidence of record, especially the fact of the
marriage of his widow Isabel Gonzalez with Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, some years after the death of Viademonte died before that
marriage or on September 30. 1836. If this be true, let us see on what day Rosa Matilde was born,, and in this way it will be shown that
she did not have the status of a legitimate child of those spouses, even after the dissolution of their marriage by the death of the
husband.

It appears in the certificate that on September 1, 1852, a child three days old, born of unknown parents, was baptized in
the Cathedral Church of this city, and given the name of Rosa Matilde Robles. In view of the fact that the plaintiffs have not shown that
such baptismal certificate was not that of their mother Rosa Matilde, it remains proven therefore that said certificate was presented as
exhibit by Rafael C. de Inchausti in a case concerning the delivery of a legacy instituted against Rosa Matilde, who, instead of denying
that such a baptismal certificate referred to her, admitted that such certificate might have been hers.

On Page 9 of the day-book which Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., kept during his lifetime, appears a memorandum
which says: On September 1, 1862, seven o'clock in the evening a children three days old named Rosa Matilde Robles, according to the
baptismal certificate issued by the acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to my mother;
this child was baptized by the priest Don Remegio Rodriguez with the authority of said rector, and according to the baptismal
certificate, it was a child of unknown parents." This memorandum agrees with the above-mentioned baptismal certificate of Rosa
Matilde Robles.

Notwithstanding the argument of counsel for the appellants Joaquin de Inchausti stated that one day he was assured by his
half-brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his sister, but that she was only a mere protegee and that her
true name was Rosa Matilde Robles, and that on that occasion the said brother showed him the certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is
a copy, which he took from the parochial church.

In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to
the said deceased is admissible, for they are members of the same family, in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act No.
190, and consequently, the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robels which is mentioned in Exhibit 6 and
because she was born in 1852, in no manner could her be legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel Gonzalez whose
marriage was dissolved in 18365 by the death of the husband. Moreover, the witness Pilar Abarca presented by the plaintiffs testified
that she had known Rosa Matilde in the Colegio de Santa Isabel in 1863, she being then 20 years old and Rosa, 9 years. If the witness
Abarca was 73 years old on the date of giving this testimony in 1916, it follows that Rosa Matilde was born in 1854, and that therefore
she could not be a daughter of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte who died in 1836.

Notwithstanding the attempt of the plaintiffs to impugn the testimony of said witness, said testimony is admissible
according to section 263 of the Code of civil Procedure which provides the when part of an act, declaration conservation, or writing is
given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other. It is true that the said witness was not
presented to prove that the date of Rosa Matildes birth but the fact is that the age of the child is 9 years old as well as that of a youth
19 or 22 years of age can be known from the appearance of the child, and even if, in fixing the age of Rosa Matilde, as mistake has
been made, said mistake could not be such as to reduce her true age by 10 years; but even then and even supposing still that Rosa
Matilde was 20 years old in 1863, the fact remains that she must have been born in 1843, and so she could not have been a daughter
of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr. that the age of a child 9 years old as well as that of a youth 19 or 22 years of age can be known
from the appearance of the child, and even if, in fixing the age of Rosa Matilde, a mistake has been made, said mistake could not be
such as to reduce her true age by 10 years; but even then and even supposing still that Rosa Matilde was 20 years old in 1863, the fact
remains that she must have been born in 1843, and so could not have been a daugther of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr.

Juan Ferrer, another witness for the plaintiffs, testified that Benigno Ferrer and Rosa Matilde married in 1872, that Rosa
Matilde must have been then between 22 and 30 years of age. It is inferred from this testimony that, if Rosa Matilde could no be over
30 years old in 1872, she could not have been born before 1842, and much less in 1836 or 1837.

The document No. 663, page 257 of Exhibit 8, appears to have been executed by Rosa Matilde in 1893, wherein she
declared to the notary public before whom the document was executed that she was then 39 years of age. If she was 39 years old in
1893, she could not have been born in 1854 and much less in 1836 and 1837.

In Exhibit 1, page 135, which is a certified copy of a discharge in full executed by Rosa Matilde in 1894 in favor of Joaquin
Jose de Inchausti, it is said that the maker of the deed was 40 years old, thus corroborating ina convincing manner what has been
stated regarding this point in the preceding document.

In view of the objection and arguments made by counsel for the plaintiffs against the admission of the aforementioned
documents, it becomes necessary to say in this connection that it is undeniable that Rosa Matilde, in executing said two documents,
Page1

gave as her age those appearing therein, and that there was no reason for the belief that she told a lie and tried to conceal her true
age; but, even admitting that we had made a mistake by telling that she was older or younger than she really was, such a mistake could
not have given a difference of 10 years from her true age, inasmuch as she was an educated person, and it is not possible to believe
that, through ignorance, she gave an age difference from her true anger; and, even if 10 years be added to the age given by Rosa
Matilde in the documents referred to, still the fact remains that in 1894 she must have been only 50 years old and that she must have
been born in 1844. It is undisputed that Roa Matilde was born 16 years after the death of Ramon Viademonte, and therefor could not
be a daughter of the latter.

Counsel for plaintiffs objected to the admission in evidence of the day-book kept by Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr.,
during his lifetime, alleging that it has not been proven that the entries in said book were made at the same time that those events
occurred; that the witness who identified it did not see Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., in the act of making the said entries, and
that, even if it were so, still the writing contained in the book, being a mere memorandum of an interested party, can not be admitted
at the trial.

The above objection can be met and disposed of by the provisions of section 298, No. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of common
reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of
pedigree.

The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of those events;
hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the defect attributed to it, The witness Joaquin Jose de Inchausti
declared affirmatively that the memorandum under consideration has been written in the handwriting of his brother Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte, whose handwriting he was familiar with, and the testimony of this witness contains some reference to a member of
the family, now dead, and concerning the family genealogy of the same.

It remains now to be decided whether Rosa Matilde Viademonte was a natural daughter of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez or
was a mere protegee cared for and maintained in the house of said Isabel Gonzalez, and, if in the first case, the plaintiffs have the right
to succeed ab intestato to a part of the inheritance of Isabel Gonzalez in representation of their mother Rosa Matilde Viaddemante or
Robles.

The record does not furnish satisfactory proof that Rosa Matilde was a daugther or at least a natural daughter of Isabel
Gonzalez; on the other hand, it is shown in the records of the case that she was a protegee in the house of said Isabel, for, in a
conciliation proceeding had on April 15, 1893, between Rosa Matilde and Joaquin F. de Inchausti, it appears in the record thereof that,
although in some of the documents presented to justify the accounts, Rosa Matilde called Rafael de Inchausti her brother, this manner
of calling him was due to the intimacy in which both have been brought up from childhood in the same house, she being a mere
protegee of the latter's parents, and of because they were really brother and sister.

This statement made by Inchausti in the presence of Rosa Matilde Viademonte did not bring about a protest or objection
on the part of Rosa Matilde herself or her attorney. In addition to this fact, Rafael C. De Inchausti stated under oath that it is not true
that Rosa MatildeViademonte was his maternal sister.

Rosa Viademonte herself, in a document dated June 15, 1894 (Exhibit 1, page 135), made the statement that Jose Joaquin
de Inchausti, who, together with his wife, cared for her since her early childhood, bequeathed to her, by virtue of a codicil executed
before a notary public on January 12, 1889, a legacy amounting to P4,000. The contents of this document constitute a most convincing
proof that Rosa Matilde was not a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez, but only a protegee of hers and of her husband Jose Joaquin de
Inchausti.

Ramon Viademonte, Jr., while yet living, told his brother Joaquin J. de Inchausti (record, p. 85), that Rosa Matilde was not
their sister but only a protegee of their parents, whose name was Rosa Matilde Robles. It is thus fully proven in the records of the case
that Rosa Matilde, the mother of the plaintiffs, was not a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez.

Even supposing that Rosa Matilde was in fact a natural child of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez, because the records show
that it was impossible that he was a legitimate daughter of the latter, still it cannot be disputed that the said Rosa Matilde could not
inherit from her supposed natural mother, Isabel Gonzalez.

It is a positive fact admitted by the plaintiffs that Isabel Gonzalez died in 1886(record, p. 325) or some years before the Civil
Code became operative in these Islands, and therefore, the hereditary rights of the successors of the said deceased should be
determined in accordance with the prior laws or the Law of Toro, which provides, among other things, that natural children have no
right to succeed to their natural mother when, on her death, the latter leaves legitimate children, as in the present case, and for this
reason it is useless to inquire as to whether Rosa Viademonte or Robles was a natural or even an acknowledged natural child of Isabel
Gonzalez.

Rule 1 of the transitory provisions of the Civil Code invoked by the appellants provides as follows; "Rights arising under the
legislation prior to this code, out of matters carried out under its rules, shall be governed by said prior legislation, even if the code
should regulate them in another manner, or does not recognize the same. But if said right is declared for the first time in this code, it
shall be effective at once, even when the act which gave rise thereto may have taken place under the prior legislation, provided it does
not prejudice other acquired rights having the same origin."

When Isabel Gonzalez died on December 12, 1886, or some time before the Civil Code became effective in these Islands,
she was survived by four children, the eldest being Ramon Viademonte had with her first husband, and the other three, had with her
second husband Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, are Clotilde, Rafael, and Joaquin. On her death, the right to succeed her was transmitted by
operation of law to her legitimate and legitimated children, and for this reason, even supposing that Rosa Matilde was a natural child
of Isabel Gonzalez, she could not claim any right to the inheritance of her supposed natural mother, inasmuch as against her right there
exist the rights acquired by the four legitimate and legitimated children of said Isabel Gonzalez, which rights can not be injured or
prejudiced in accordance with the conclusive provision of the aforementioned Rule 1 of the transitory provision of the Civil Code.

Besides, the records show that the action brought by the plaintiffs has already prescribed, because section 38 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides that the rights of action which have already accrued, with the exception of the two cases mentioned in the
same section, among which the present case is not included, must be vindicated by the commencement of an action or proceeding to
Page1

enforce the same within ten years after Act No. 190 came into effect, and, as this Act became operative in 1901, it is evident that the
action instituted against the estate of Isabel Gonzalez has already prescribed.
 The plaintiffs, by their complaint, do not only seek the partition of the estate of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez, but also and
principally to recover the part of the inheritance corresponding to their mother Rosa Matilde in her succession to the said deceased, so
that the discussion during the proceedings referred mainly to the question as to whether the plaintiffs were descendants of an heiress
to the said deceased, and if so, whether they had a right derived from their mother to a part of the estate of Isabel Gonzalez. This
action must be brought within ten years. He who brings an action for the partition or division of hereditary estates or property in
common is supposed to by a coheir and to have an undisputed right to the property claimed or to be coowner of the same property
possessed in common. He who claims a right to a part of an inheritance of a deceased person, and who alleges that he is a relative of
the latter and has a right of testate or intestate succession thereto, has for his principal object the recognition of his right to the
inheritance claimed by him and the delivery to him of his share as fixed by law.

Before concluding this decision, it must be stated that, on page 21 of the brief signed by Vicente Sotto as the plaintiffs
attorney, and after the first five lines thereof, the following statement appears: "It is also established that Rosa Viademonte was born
of Isabel Gonzalez in the year 1852, that is, during the widowhood of the latter."

Counsel for the defendants with reason, qualify as false, this affirmation made by the counsel for the plaintiffs to the effect
that the judge has established the fact that Rosa Viademonte was born of Isabel Gonzalez, when such affirmation does not appear in
any part of the decision rendered by the said judge.

This court can not look with indifference on any attempt to alter or falsify, for certain purposes, the facts or their important
details in the extracts or references that have to be made in proceedings or records brought before it. All the records in a proceeding
should contain and reflect the truth in such a way that all who intervene in it may have absolute confidence that the course and
procedure of a trial are under the vigilance and inspection of the court.

It is unprofessional and worthy of the highest form of rebuke for a lawyer to attribute to a judge a statement which he had
not made in his decision, and in view of the fact that Vicente Sotto has already been disbarred from the exercise of his profession by
resolution of this court, it is deemed unnecessary to determine what punishment shall be adopted for said act, which in his case,
should be imposed upon him as a lawyer

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from are deemed to have been refuted,
the said judgment should be, as it hereby is, affirmed and the defendants absolved from the complaint, with the costs against the
appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-64556 June 10, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.

CEFERINO LUNGAYAN, accused.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Rape is a serious offense against chastity. Its essential element is involuntariness. More often than not, the credibility of the
offended party is vital. Failing in this, the prosecution cannot make out a case.

This is demonstrated in a review of the conviction of the accused Ceferino Lungayan by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Echague,
Isabela for the crime of rape, who was thereby imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for
by law, and ordered to indemnify the victim Agripina Juan Vda. de Garzota in the amount of P12,000.00 for moral damages without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, in a decision dated April 8, 1982.

The evidence for the prosecution show that the complainant Agripina Juan Vda. de Garzota, then 52 years old and a widow, was
asleep inside the room at their market stall located in the public market of barangay Oscariz, municipality of Ramon, Isabela, on the
evening of January 20, 1980. With her were her two married daughters Silveria and Leticia, the latter's husband Berting Garcia and the
children of said daughters. At about 10:00 o'clock of that evening, Silveria heard someone knock at their door and when she opened it
she saw the accused who was then the barangay captain of Barangay Oscariz. He asked Silveria if her mother was in. She answered in
the affirmative and added that her mother was asleep. Nevertheless, the accused entered the room where complainant was sleeping
and woke up the complainant. He invited her to join him to observe the persons drinking wine in the market stall identified as Linda's
canteen in violation of the barangay ordinance prohibiting the same after 10:00 o'clock in the evening.

Complainant went with the accused to the said canteen which was only one market stall away. They stood about two meters
away from the open door of the canteen, the electric lights of which were open inside. They stayed at the place for ten minutes
standing side by side without talking to each other. They were observing the people drinking in the canteen. Suddenly the accused
grabbed both hands of complainant so complainant reacted by shouting very loud only once. Her cries could not be heard by the
people drinking inside the canteen because of the loud stereo player. The accused slapped her and brought out his gun which he
pointed at her breast threatening to kill her if she creates any noise. The accused then pulled her and she fell on the ground hitting her
head on the pavement so she lost consciousness, sustaining injuries on the palms of her hands.

When she regained consciousness after a short while, she was dragged by the accused towards the banana grove near the
market. She managed to stand and walk while being dragged. The accused then carried her body across the canal and dropped her on
the ground causing her to fall flat on her belly and her fingers were again injured by the broken glasses on the ground. She could not
free herself nor shout for help because of the threat to her life.

After she fell flat on the ground, the accused held her and pressed her down and he proceeded to remove her skirt and shorts
and thereafter her blouse leaving her exposed naked with her back to the ground. She was not wearing any panty or brassiere then.
Besides pressing her down the accused stepped on her thigh with his left foot as he went on top of her naked body. Then he stood up
warning her not to make any noise and he removed his pants and tee-shirt after which he again went on top of her naked body holding
Page1

her hands. Pointing the gun at her breast anew, the accused repeated his threat to kill her if she resisted. Then the accused started
mashing her breast and succeeded in having sexual congress with the complainant. She felt his penis penetrating her vagina followed
by a push and pull movement for less than an hour, until she felt semen emitting from his penis and entering her body. After a while,
he stood up, put on his pants and warned her not to tell her children about what he had just done to her or ask for help for he will kill
her. He left her in tears. After the accused had gone, complainant put on her shorts and shirt which were muddy as it previously rained
that day and went home still crying.

When she reached home about 12:00 midnight, Silveria asked her what happened and she revealed that the accused abused
her. When Silveria pressed for details, the complainant replied that she will tell her the following morning.

As she promised, the next morning complainant told Silveria everything that happened to her and thereafter she proceeded to
Santiago town and reported the incident to Mr. Segundo Maylem, post commander and Executive Vice Chapter Commander, VFP
Southern Isabela, from whom she sought assistance. She was advised to submit herself to an investigation and medical examination,
On the same day, the complainant was examined by Dr. Normita Villarico, chief of the Cagayan Valley Sanitarium Hospital. After due
investigation by the PC, a complaint for rape was filed signed and sworn to by complainant in the Municipal Circuit Court of Ramon,
Isabela against the accused.

In appealing his conviction, the accused, through counsel assailed the credibility of complainant and interposed the defense of
denial and alibi. However, by way of rebuttal of the People's brief filed by another collaborating counsel for appellant, the failure of the
prosecution to establish involuntariness on the part of the victim was emphasized.

The appeal is impressed with merit.

There is no question that there was sexual congress between the complainant and the appellant on that fateful evening. The
medical findings and the analysis of the court a quo to this effect is well- founded. However, the environmental circumstances of the
case militates against the claim of the complainant that the appellant employed force or intimidation in the perpetration of the said
sexual act.

Complainant was a widow, 52 years of age. She had been married three times. She was not that innocent about the world. When
appellant invited her at 10:00 P.M. to step out of her house, she should have declined. Going out alone with a man late in the evening
is not in good taste nor safe even if the one who invited her was the barrio captain. Instead, she should have suggested that the
appellant invite some other person for the purpose.

But obviously, the appellant was quite intimate with the complainant. When he knocked at her door and was allowed entry, he
proceeded into the bedroom of complainant and woke her up himself.

Complainant went with the appellant in her shorts. She took no precaution as any discreet woman would do by at least putting
on her panty and a brassiere instead of stepping out with the appellant in her shorts.

For about ten minutes, they were together side by side watching from a distance the people who were drinking at Linda's
canteen. Then suddenly, the appellant allegedly held her two hands. She allegedly shouted for help but only once. If she could not be
heard as her voice was drowned by the blaring stereo player, she should have shouted louder again and again. Better still, she should
have ran towards the canteen which was just two meters away or to her residence which was one market stall away. After allegedly
shouting once, she kept her peace.

She was allegedly dragged although she admits she willingly walked along. She was allegedly carried across the canal by the
appellant although she was taller and definitely bigger than appellant.

When she fell on the ground, the appellant removed her shorts and skirt without difficulty. She offered no resistance. Even as he
stood up to remove his pants she did not attempt to stand up to escape nor to shout for help. There was no sign of struggle or
resistance. Then the appellant put his penis into her vagina penetrating her. They had sexual intercourse for almost one hour. She even
felt the semen of appellant as it entered her body. Not a whimper, not a sound from the complainant was heard. She claims she was
afraid due to the gun of appellant and his threats. She did not even describe the type of gun the appellant threatened her with several
times. Nor had the prosecution shown appellant ever had a gun. All indications show that she submitted to his advances.

The incident happened at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening. She went home only at about 12:00 o'clock that evening.
Apparently, she still moved around or spent sometime alone for about one hour. She must have contemplated what to do with her
clothes all muddy. When she reached home she was confronted by her daughter as to what happened. She had no choice but to tell
her that she was abused by appellant but she was not prepared to reveal everything. She promised to tell all the details to her
daughter the following day. She thought about her predicament the whole night. She had no choice. She must have to tell everything
the following day.

As the Court sees it, what actually happened in this case, is that when the complainant went out with the appellant that evening,
she was aware of the risk of going out alone with a man for a reason that is far from unavoidable. They were close and side by side for
sometime, allegedly watching the drinking session at Linda's canteen. They must have succumbed to the temptation of the flesh. One
thing led to the other until they had sexual intercourse. Perhaps the complainant did not initiate or motivate the sexual interlude. In
the least, she must have abetted it if not willingly submitted to the advances of the appellant. Indeed, they were in ecstasy for almost
one hour. Such mutual and passionate lovemaking can certainly not be characterized as involuntary. It was free and without any
compulsion.

The appellant was 48 years old when the incident happened. To think that a younger man would rape an elderly woman of 52
years, widow, three times married, would be quite unusual. It is more probable that it was consensual.

The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter Silveria of what happened to her when she returned
home as part of the res gestae. It is important to stress that her statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made at a
time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her own story. 1 As the Court observed, the complainant did not
immediately go home after the sexual encounter. She took a walk. She spent sometime thinking of what to do. Her clothes were
muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back because she was lying down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their
passionate interlude. She had enough time to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be
categorized as part of the res gestae.
Page1

Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds that if there was any sexual congress between appellant
and complainant, it was upon their mutual consent. There was no compulsion or force. The version of the complainant is far from
credible. A verdict of acquittal is in order.
 WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING
the appellant of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167502 October 31, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

PABLO CUDAL, accused-appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Under final review is the Court of Appeals Decision1 of February 11, 2005 affirming that of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court
of Lingayen, Pangasinan2 convicting Pablo Cudal (appellant) of parricide and meting out to him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

About 2:00 o’clock in the morning of January 1, 1998,3 as appellant arrived home in Barangay Bonlalacao, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan from a drinking spree with his cousins and nephews, he roused his 79-year old father Crispin Cudal (the victim) from his
sleep. Appellant then asked money from the victim so he could go back to the drinking session and pay for the liquor that he
consumed. The victim replied that he had no money, and told appellant that he was already drunk.4 This drew the two to a fight.5

Some 50 meters away from the place of the incident, Camilo Cudal (Camilo), appellant’s first cousin who was then in the house
of his mother-in-law, heard the commotion.6 Camilo immediately rushed to the place and there saw the victim sitting on his bed and
wiping blood oozing from his forehead. When asked about what happened, the victim quickly replied that he quarreled with appellant
and that he was hit by him with a stone.7

When Camilo confronted appellant, the latter reasoned out that he was asking money from his father but the latter refused.8

Camilo brought the wounded victim to the house of his (victim’s) brother Segundino Cudal9 where first aid was applied on his
wounds. Camilo then fetched from Urbiztondo, Pangasinan the victim’s daughter Leoncia10 who brought the victim to a nearby
hospital where he expired the following day, January 2, 1998, at about 4 o’clock p.m.11 The postmortem report prepared by Dr. Cleofe
Orence, Rural Health Physician of Mangatarem, Pangasinan who examined the body of the victim revealed the following findings:

External Physical Injuries:

(1) Lacerated wound, old, about 4 cm. midfrontal area.

(2) Hematoma, dorsal aspect right hand.

(3) Contusion 2x3 cm., right upper quadrant area, abdomen.

Probable Cause of Death:

INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE secondary to Craniocerebral Injury secondary to Trauma

T/C Ruptured Viscus, abdomen.12

Appellant was arrested by police authorities on January 3, 199813 and brought for treatment at the Mangatarem District
Hospital on the same day. The medical findings on him showed:

- (-) Negative alcoholic breath

- Stab wound 2 cm., left side face

- Stab wound 1.5 cm. zygomatic area left

- Periorbital hematoma left superimposed with punctured wound .5 cm. left lower eyelid

- Punctured wound left eyebrow

- Contusion hematoma 1x1 cm. occipital area14

An Information was soon filed against appellant reading:

xxxx

That on or about January 1, 1998, at about 2:00 o’clock dawn, in barangay Bonlalacao, municipality of Mangatarem, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, willfully, unlawfully and
feloneously (sic), and with evident premiditation (sic), that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his own father with whom he
was living with, and with treachery, attack, assault and hit with the use of stone his father, Crispin Cudal, on the head and other parts
of his body, inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said victim Crispin Cudal.

CONTRARY to Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.15

Page1

xxxx
 Denying having struck the victim, appellant claimed that it was he who was assaulted with a bolo,16 and that while going after
him, the victim accidentally fell down and hit the bedpost in the process, wounding himself on the forehead.17 Asked how the victim
sustained injury on his abdomen, appellant explained that the victim subsequently fell on the floor, hitting his abdomen with the
handle of the bolo he was holding.18

After trial, Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, by Decision of October 28, 1998, convicted appellant of
parricide, but considered his intoxication at the time of the commission of the offense as a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 3,
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Pablo Cudal Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Parricide for the killing of his father Crispin Cudal, on the early morning of New Year, January 1, 1998 with the presence of
one (1) mitigating circumstance, and accordingly the Court sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay
the heirs of the accused the sum of P30,000.00 representing funeral expenses, plus indemnity of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.

Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is credited with his detention to its full extent.

SO ORDERED.19

Appellant appealed his conviction before this Court, assailing the trial court for "accept[ing] the prosecution’s account as gospel
truth despite the fact that its witnesses were not actually direct witnesses to the crime charged."20 The appeal was docketed as G.R.
No. 140637.

By Resolution21 of August 30, 2004, this Court ordered the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action
and disposition conformably with People v. Mateo.22

The appellate court affirmed, with modification, appellant’s conviction. The decretal text of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, dated October 28, 1998, in
Criminal Case No. L-5778, convicting the appellant, Pablo Cudal, of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. The last sentence of the first paragraph of its dispositive portion is however hereby modified
to read, as follows: "Accused-appellant Pablo Cudal is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Crispin Cudal, the sum ofP30,000.00
representing funeral expenses, plus indemnity of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs."

No pronouncement as to costs.23 (Emphasis in the original)

Hence, the elevation of the case to this Court for final review.

In a Manifestation dated September 7, 2005,24 appellant informed that he was opting not to file a Supplemental Brief.

The appeal fails.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.

Prosecution witness Camilo Cudal narrated what he knew of the circumstances surrounding the incident as follows:

Q Do you still recall where you were on the late evening of December 31, 1997 before midnight?

A I could remember, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was in the house of my in[-]laws, sir.

Q Will you please tell the name of your in-laws?

A Marissa Dancel, sir.

Q Where is the place of Marissa Dancel located?

A Bulalakao, Mangatarem, sir.

Q Why were you there at the house of your mother-in-law, Marissa Dancel?

A Because we were celebrating the New Year[’s] Eve, sir.

Q Now by the way, how far is your house from the house of your mother-in-law where you were celebrating New Year[’]s Eve?

A Around 50 meters away, sir.

Q Now, at about 2:00 o’clock in the early mornignof (sic) January 1, 1998, can you tell us where you were?

A Yes, sir, I was in the house of my in-laws.

Q As you were stay (sic) there, can you still recall if there was unusual thing that you observe[d] when you were at the house of
your mother-in-law?

A Yes, sir, there was.

Page1

Q What was that that you observe[d]?

 A I heard something like quarreling on the house of Crispin Cudal, sir.

Q Now, can you tell us why do you say that there is a sounds (sic) like warning in the house of Crispin Cudal?

A Because they were uttering words, sir.

Q Can you tell us if you could recognize that voices as you said they are quarreling?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please tell the Honorable Court whose voice is that?

A Pablo Cudal and Crispin Cudal, sir.

Q Now, what did you [do] if any when you heard this quarreling voices of accused Pablo Cudal?

A Because I went near, sir.

Q How did you go near?

A I walked towards the house of Crispin, (sic) Cudal and I was listening to them, sir.

Q Where did you go when you went near?

A I [e]ntered there (sic) house, sir.

Q Whose house?

A House of Crispin Cudal, sir?

Q How did you [e]nter the house of Crispin Cudal?

A The door was opened, sir.

Q As you [e]ntered the door of the house of Crispin Cudal, what did you see, if any?

A I saw blood oozing from the forehead of Crispin Cudal, sir.

Q Where did you see Crispin Cudal inside the house blooded as you have pointed in the forehead?

A In the place where he sleep (sic), sir.

Q What was his position when you saw him blooded on the forehead?

A He was seating down and he was wiping the blood of his forehead, sir.

Q When you saw wiping his blood on the forehead, what next happened?

A I asked him, "Uncle what happened,["] and he answered, "we quarreled with Pablo Cudal,["] he said.

Q Do you remember having asked, what caused the injury of the forehead?

A Yes, sir, I asked him.

Q What did the victim answer if any when you asked him what caused his injury on the forehead if he answer (sic) you?

A I was hit with the stone by Pablo Cudal.25 (Emphasis supplied)

Another prosecution witness, Segundino Cudal, declared that when his brother − the victim was brought to his house by Camilo,
the victim who was "strong," albeit his face was bloodied, told him that he was struck with a stone by appellant.

FISCAL CHIONG:

Q Do you know where you were on the early morning of January 1, 1998?

A I was at home, sir.

Q Do you recall if there is unusual incident that came to your knowledge involving your brother Crispin Cudal?

A None yet when I am at home.

Q Do you know, if any one came to your house that morning of January 1, 1998?

A Yes, Crispin Cudal, sir.

Q How was your older brother Crispin Cudal brought to yourhouse (sic) by Camilo Cudal?

A He was loaded in a tricycle, sir.

Q Now, when you saw your brother when he was brought to your house, can you tell us his physical appearance or condition?

A He was strong but his face was bloody, sir. Even his clothes were stained or tainted with blood, sir.

Q Now, when you saw your brother’s face bloody as well as his clothes, what did you do, if any as he was already in your house?

A I asked him what happened to him and he told me "I was struck with stone by my son[.]"
Page1

Q Did you ask him who is this son of him who struck him with stone?
 A Yes, sir his name is Pablo Cudal.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the witness stand, defense witness Dr. Orence, declared:

Q Is it also possible Doctor[a] that this contusion was due to the force of a stone struck on the victim? Stone is a hard object?

A It could be, sir.

Q Likewise, this hematoma on the dorsal right hand of the victim was possibly caused by the impact of the stone being thrown at
the victim when the victim tried to parry it, is that not also possible, Doctora?

A Yes sir, it is possible.27 (Underscoring supplied)

That the complained act of appellant was the proximate cause of the death of the victim is evident from the above-quoted
postmortem report on the body of the deceased showing the probable cause of his death as "INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE secondary to
Craniocerebral Injury secondary to Trauma" and "T/C Ruptured Viscus, abdomen."

It is axiomatic in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, an appellate court will normally not
disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless the latter has reached conclusions that are clearly unsupported by evidence, or
unless some facts or circumstances of weight or influence were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the result of the case.
The rationale for this is that trial courts have superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the
opportunity to observe at close range the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying.28 In the absence of any showing that
the trial court, whose findings were affirmed by the appellate court, acted arbitrarily in the appreciation of evidence, this Court
respects the same.

That Camilo and Segundino were not eyewitnesses to the incident does not render their testimonies inadmissible, for they may
be considered part of the res gestae,29 an exception to the hearsay rule. For the same to be considered part of the res gestae, the
following requisites must concur:

(1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and the statement was made during the occurrence or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.30

The spontaneity of the utterance and its logical connection with the principal event, coupled with the fact that the utterance was
made while the declarant was still "strong" and subject to the stimulus of the nervous excitement of the principal event, are deemed to
preclude contrivance, deliberation, design or fabrication, and to give to the utterance an inherent guaranty of trustworthiness.31 The
admissibility of such exclamation is based on experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a
stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the
utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the
external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and
reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may
be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him.32

The victim’s information to Camilo and Segundino as to the material facts was made immediately after the startling incident
occurred. It is as categorical as it is spontaneous and instinctive. It cannot be concluded that in a very short span of time, taking into
consideration the ripe age of the victim, his relationship to appellant, and the cruelty and suffering which immediately preceded the
confession, the victim had the opportunity to concoct the facts surrounding the incident and its authorship. Besides, there appears to
be no reason or motive on the part of the victim to point his son as the culprit if such were not indeed the truth.

Appellant’s intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime, being an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code, may be appreciated as aggravating if the same is habitual or intentional, otherwise it shall be considered as a
mitigating circumstance. The trial court observed:

We now come to another matter, which is the fact that during the incident, the accused was drunk. This was testified to by
Camilo Cudal and admitted by the wife of the accused. The accused himself admitted that he had been drinking with his cousins and
nephews, but he claims that he did not drink much. Drunkenness is an alternative circumstance. It is aggravating if the accused is a
habitual drunkard. It is mitigating if it is otherwise.

The date of the incident is two (2) hours after midnight which ushered in the new year. Before that, the accused and his relatives
were celebrating and they drank San Miguel gin. No evidence was presented to establish that he is a habitual drunkard. It is a legal
maxim that when there is doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. This court[,] therefore, believes that this should
be taken as a mitigating circumstance, which is favorable to the accused.33 (Underscoring supplied)

Absent any showing then that appellant’s intoxication was habitual or intentional, it may only be considered as mitigating to
correctly call for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2(3) of the Revised Penal
Code.34

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of February 11, 2005 which affirmed the October 28, 1998 Decision of Branch 39 of
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, convicting appellant Pablo Cudal of parricide and meting out the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-64086 March 15, 1990

PETER PAUL ABALLE Y MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
Page1

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE BERNARDO V. SALUDARES, respondents.
 Faustino C. Fanlo counsel de oficio for petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J.:

This is a direct appeal from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch II, finding petitioner Peter Paul
Aballe y Mendoza guilty of homicide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal with all the accessory penalties and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Jennie Banguis y Aquino in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages. 1

At around seven o'clock in the evening of November 7, 1980 in Saypon, Toril, Davao City, Quirino Banguis, a 42-year old driver,
attended a birthday party at the residence of his neighbor Aguilles Mora. He brought along his

wife and other children, leaving his 12-year-old daughter Jennie alone in their house. 2

Upon their return at around 8:30 that same night, Quirino found Jennie in the sala, lying prostrate, bathed in her own blood with
multiple wounds on different parts of her body. There were no eyewitnesses to the bizarre killing.

The postmortem report disclosed that Jennie sustained a total of thirty-two (32) stab wounds. Cause of death was attributed to
hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. 3

At daybreak of the following day, November 8, 1980, acting on information furnished by the victim's father, a police team
headed by Sergeant Herminigildo Marante sought the accused Peter Paul Aballe for questioning. They found him just as he was coming
out of the communal bathroom in Saypon and wearing what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt. Upon seeing Sgt. Marante, the
accused without anyone asking him, orally admitted that he killed Jennie Banguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the Toril
police station for interrogation.

While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 years old, a school dropout (he finished second year high school) and next door
neighbor of the victim, brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot at the "bangera" where he had concealed the
death weapon which was a four-inch kitchen knife. 4 Also taken from Aballe was the bloodstained red and white striped T-shirt which
he claimed he wore during the commission of the crime. 5 Aballe also made an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt in killing
Jennie while under the influence of liquor and marijuana. 6 The sworn affidavit in the main reads as follows:

Preliminary Question: Mr. Aballe, you are under investigation in connection with an offense. Any statement you may give may be
use (sic) for or against you in court in the future. Under our New Constitution, you have the right to remain silent and the right to the
presence and assistance of a counsel of your own choice, do you understand? Do you waive all these rights?

Answer: Yes sir.

Q After apprising you of your rights under our new Constitution, do you still wish to proceed with this investigation?

A Yes sir.

Q Are you willing to waive all these rights?

A Yes sir. . . .

Q If so will you please state your name and other personal circumstances.

A Peter Paul Aballe y Mendoza, 17 years old, single, a high school drop out, jobless and presently residing at Saypon, Crossing
Bayabas, Toril, Davao City.

Q Are you aware on why you are in this Office?

A I am here sir in connection with the death of a minor JENNY BANGUIS Y AQUINO, our neighbor in the night of November 7,
1980.

Q What do you know about the death of the said JENNY BANGUIS?

A I was the one who killed her sir while she was sleeping alone at their residence by stabbing her with the use of a kitchen knife
for several times while I was under the influence of liquor and marijuana at about 6:30 P.M. November 7, 1980.

Q Where did you get the said marijuana you were referring to?

A From one alias Dodong Flores who sold it to me for Fifteen pesos (P15.00) per match box.

Q Showing you this kitchen knife and this blooded (sic) T-shirt, (Investigator showing the subject a kitchen knife measuring about
(4) inches in length with a wooden handle and a striped T-shirt with blood stains) can you identify this (sic)?

A That is the very same knife sir I used in stabbing JENNY BANGUlS and that was the T-shirt I wore during the incident.

Q Do you have any standing grudge with the said JENNY?

A No sir, for I only stabbed her when she slapped me after I woke her up at their residence where she was sleeping alone.

Q You mean to say that you just stabbed her because she slapped you when you woke her up?

A Yes sir, and I was not at my right sense for I was under influence of liquor and the marijuana I took.

Q After you have stabbed her, where did you go?

Page1

A I went to watch television at the residence of one Alias Ma at Saypon, Crossing Bayabas, Toril, Davao City and I only knew that
the said JENNY BANGUIS was dead the morning after and I was apprehended by the Police and was brought to this office.
 Q I have no more to ask, do you have something more to say in investigation?

A No more sir.

Q Are you willing to affix your signature in this statement signifying veracity to the best of your knowledge and belief ?

A Yes sir, . . . . 7

Whereupon, an information was filed against Aballe, charging him with homicide penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. 8 At his arraignment on April 13, 1981, he pleaded not guilty. 9 He also disavowed his extrajudicial confession on the
ground that it was obtained through coercion and in the absence of counsel.

Aballe's repudiation of his earlier confession notwithstanding, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime of homicide. 10

In this petition for review on certiorari, Aballe contends that the trial court erred in giving full weight to his extrajudicial
confession taken during custodial investigation and in imposing a penalty which was not in accordance with law.

The argument that Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have been disregarded by the lower court for having been obtained in
violation of Aballe's constitutional rights is well taken. Throughout the custodial interrogation, the accused's parents and relatives were
almost always around but at no stage of the entire proceedings was it shown that the youthful offender was ever represented by
counsel. Since the execution of the extrajudicial statement 11was admittedly made in the absence of counsel, whether de oficio or de
parte, and the waiver of counsel was not made with the assistance of counsel as mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, said confession should have been discarded by the lower court. 12

Indeed, equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife 13 recovered from Aballe after his capture and after the police had started to
question him. Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally infirmed interrogation and
must consequently be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt, 14 however, is admissible, being in the nature of an evidence in plain view
15 which an arresting officer may take and introduce in evidence. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "an officer making an
arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the
crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which
may be used in evidence in the trial of the cause . . ." 16

But even with the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession and the fatal weapon we agree with the trial court that the guilt of the
accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is well to note that even before the taking of the extrajudicial confession,
the accused, upon being picked up in the morning of November 8, 1980 as he was coming out of the communal bathroom and wearing
a T-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to cover with his hands, suddenly broke down and knelt before Sgt. Marante and
confessed that he killed Jennie Banguis. The testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oral confession is competent evidence to positively
link the accused to the aforesaid killing. His testimony reads in part:

Q: In the morning of November 8, 1980, where were you at that time?

A: At the police station.

Q: And could you tell us of any unusual incident?

A: The father of the deceased came to the office and he told us that he suspected somebody whom he observed to be suspicious
so we responded immediately to the call of assistance of the father and went back to the scene of the incident and asked for the
whereabouts of the person whom he confided to us the name.

Q: And what did you find out?

A: Somebody told us that the subject was still in a common bathroom so I posted myself outside the bathroom.

Q: This subject you are referring to Sgt. Marante, who is he?

A: Peter Paul Aballe.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And after finding out that . . . ah, by the way, where was the bathroom?

A: It was a common bathroom located just a few meters away from infront of his house.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And when you found out that the subject was still in the bathroom what did you do?

A: I waited until he came out.

Q: And did that person come outside?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is he the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened next?

A: I saw bloodstains in his T-shirt and I pointed to the bloodstain and he tried to cover it and I notice again that he had a swollen
knuckle — and I asked him what is this and then he broke down, held my hand, knelt down and confessed that he was the one who
killed the victim and I said you stop that because whatever you will say now might led (sic) you to jail and he continued and so I asked
Page1

him where is (sic) his parents and the mother was nowhere to be found and I asked for his relatives and they accompanied him to the
police station. At the police station the mother later arrived and I told her that your son confessed to the commission of the crime.
 Q: And in the station what did you do per your procedure?

A: As I was appraising (sic) him or asking him in front of her (sic) mother I still repeated the same thing. I appraised (sic) him if he
needs a lawyer and he said he does not need a lawyer because he just wanted to tell the truth. And in the course, I called the desk
officer to record what he mentioned as to the commission of the crime.

Q: Aside from the admission of the accused in this case what other physical objects of the crime were you able to recover?

A: I was able to recover the fatal weapon, the knife.

Q: Where?

A: From the house of the accused.

Q: Who gave it to you?

A: The accused himself.

Q: What else?

A: The T-shirt with bloodstain.

Q: Where is the knife now?

A: In the possession of the desk officer in Toril.

Q: And also the T-shirt?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So after interviewing the accused, what other procedure followed?

A: The accused was indorsed to the office investigator to take down the statement of said accused.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When did you apprehend the accused, while he was inside or already outside the bathroom?

A: He was coming out.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What was he wearing?

A: T-shirt with bloodstain on the breast that is why I asked him immediately what is this and I pointed to the bloodstain.

Q: Mr. Marante you immediately asked or rather you informed the accused immediately of the death of Jennie Banguis after
getting out of the bathroom?

A: He confessed to me.

Q: You just answer the question, did you inform him?

A: No, I did not.

Q: So without informing him about it as you said he immediately confessed.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: At that time were you in your police uniform?

A: No, I was in civilian.

Q: Without even introducing yourself at that time is was only after bringing the accused to the police station did he know that
you were a Deputy District Commander of the police in Toril?

A: Probably yes. 17

"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged may be given in evidence against him."
18

The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it
must be given in its substance. (23 C.J.S. 196) 19

Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim. 20

The penalty decreed by the lower court must however be modified. The killing of Jennie is mitigated by minority (the accused
was born on June 29, 1963), but it is aggravated by dwelling since Jennie was fatally stabbed while in her parents' house, a fact
overlooked by the trial court. Not having been alleged in the information, dwelling is considered generic and cannot therefore offset
minority which is a privileged mitigating circumstance.

The imposable penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. For being only 17 years, 4
Page1

months and 8 days of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed on the accused but always in the proper period. With the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty is imposable in its
maximum period or from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years or prision mayor maximum. 21 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the penalty next lower is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED with the penalty modified to an indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The civil indemnity is increased
to P30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence. Costs against the accused Peter Paul Aballe.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 147039 January 27, 2006

DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES, Petitioner,

vs.

RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This refers to the petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the review of the Decision1 dated November
16, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56351, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in Civil Case No.
90-602 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the interest rate is hereby reduced to 6% per annum.

Costs against the defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.2

The assailed decision originated from Civil Case No. 90-602 filed by Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (respondent) against DBP Pool
of Accredited Insurance Companies (petitioner) and Provident Insurance Corporation (Provident) for recovery of insurance benefits.
Respondent owns several broadcasting stations all over the country. Provident covered respondent’s transmitter equipment and
generating set for the amount of P13,550,000.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No. 30354, while petitioner covered respondent’s
transmitter, furniture, fixture and other transmitter facilities for the amount of P5,883,650.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-66860.

In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondent’s radio station located in SSS Building, Bacolod City, was razed by fire causing damage
in the amount of P1,044,040.00. Respondent sought recovery under the two insurance policies but the claims were denied on the
ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d), to wit:

6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of
the following consequences, namely:

(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be declared or not), civil war.

(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power.3

The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that the fire was caused by members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied the claims. Hence, respondent was constrained to file Civil
Case No. 90-602 against petitioner and Provident.

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, rendered a decision in favor of respondent. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff. Defendant Provident Insurance Corporation is directed to pay
plaintiff the amount of P450,000.00 representing the value of the destroyed property insured under its Fire Insurance Policy plus 12%
legal interest from March 2, 1990 the date of the filing of the Complaint. Defendant DBP Pool Accredited Insurance Companies is
likewise ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P602,600.00 representing the value of the destroyed property under its Fire Insurance
Policy plus 12% legal interest from March 2, 1990.

SO ORDERED.4

Both insurance companies appealed from the trial court’s decision but the CA affirmed the decision, with the modification that
the applicable interest rate was reduced to 6% per annum. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner DBP which was denied
by the CA per its Resolution dated January 30, 2001.5

Hence, herein petition by DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies,6 with the following assignment of errors:

Assignment of Errors

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE WERE NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE
APPROXIMATELY TENTY [sic] (20) ARMED MEN WHO CUSED [sic] THE FIRE AT RESPONDENT’S RMN PROPERTY AT BACOLOD CITY WERE
MEMBERS OF THE CPP-NPA.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ADJUDGED THAT RESPONDENT RMN CANNOT BEHELD [sic] FOR
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR INSTITUTING THE PRESENT ACTION AGAINST THE PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLES 21, 2208, 2229
AND 2232 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.7

Petitioner assails the factual finding of both the trial court and the CA that its evidence failed to support its allegation that the
loss was caused by an excepted risk, i.e., members of the CPP/NPA caused the fire. In upholding respondent’s claim for indemnity, the
Page1

trial court found that:

 The only evidence which the Court can consider to determine if the fire was due to the intentional act committed by the
members of the New People’s Army (NPA), are the testimony [sic] of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who
were admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their testimony [sic] was [sic] limited to the fact that an investigation was
conducted and in the course of the investigation they were informed by bystanders that "heavily armed men entered the transmitter
house, poured gasoline in (sic) it and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting "Mabuhay ang NPA" (TSN, p. 12., August 2,
1995). The persons whom they investigated and actually saw the burning of the station were not presented as witnesses. The
documentary evidence particularly Exhibits "5" and "5-C" do not satisfactorily prove that the author of the burning were members of
the NPA. Exhibit "5-B" which is a letter released by the NPA merely mentions some dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in
the media in Bacolod. There was no mention there of any threat on media facilities.8

The CA went over the evidence on record and sustained the findings of the trial court, to wit:

To recapitulate, defendants-appellants presented the following to support its claim, to wit: police blotter of the burning of DYHB,
certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated National Police, Bacolod City regarding the incident, letter of alleged NPA members
Celso Magsilang claiming responsibility for the burning of DYHB, fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988, and the testimonies of Lt.
Col. Nicolas Torres and SFO III Leonardo Rochas. We examined carefully the report on the police blotter of the burning of DYHB, the
certification issued by the Integrated National Police of Bacolod City and the fire investigation report prepared by SFO III Rochas and
there We found that none of them categorically stated that the twenty (20) armed men which burned DYHB were members of the
CPP/NPA. The said documents simply stated that the said armed men were ‘believed’ to be or ‘suspected’ of being members of the
said group. Even SFO III Rochas admitted that he was not sure that the said armed men were members of the CPP-NPA, thus:

In fact the only person who seems to be so sure that that the CPP-NPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col. Nicolas
Torres. However, though We found him to be persuasive in his testimony regarding how he came to arrive at his opinion, We cannot
nevertheless admit his testimony as conclusive proof that the CPP-NPA was really involved in the incident considering that he admitted
that he did not personally see the armed men even as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt. Col. Torres was presented as
witness, he was presented as an ordinary witness only and not an expert witness. Hence, his opinion on the identity or membership of
the armed men with the CPP-NPA is not admissible in evidence.

Anent the letter of a certain Celso Magsilang, who claims to be a member of NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person which is
not a party to the present action, is likewise inadmissible in evidence under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The reason
being that an admission is competent only when the declarant, or someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the
action.9

The Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling or exceptional reasons. It should be stressed that a review by
certiorari under Rule 45 is a matter of discretion. Under this mode of review, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact.10

Moreover, when supported by substantial evidence, findings of fact of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are conclusive and
binding on the parties,11 which this Court will not review unless there are exceptional circumstances. There are no exceptional
circumstances in this case that would have impelled the Court to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and the CA.

Both the trial court and the CA were correct in ruling that petitioner failed to prove that the loss was caused by an excepted risk.

Petitioner argues that private respondent is responsible for proving that the cause of the damage/loss is covered by the
insurance policy, as stipulated in the insurance policy, to wit:

Any loss or damage happening during the existence of abnormal conditions (whether physical or otherwise) which are
occasioned by or through in consequence directly or indirectly, of any of the said occurrences shall be deemed to be loss or damage
which is not covered by the insurance, except to the extent that the Insured shall prove that such loss or damage happened
independently of the existence of such abnormal conditions.

In any action, suit or other proceeding where the Companies allege that by reason of the provisions of this condition any loss or
damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured.12

An insurance contract, being a contract of adhesion, should be so interpreted as to carry out the purpose for which the parties
entered into the contract which is to insure against risks of loss or damage to the goods. Limitations of liability should be regarded with
extreme jealousy and must be construed in such a way as to preclude the insurer from noncompliance with its obligations.13

The "burden of proof" contemplated by the aforesaid provision actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going
forward).14 As applied in this case, it refers to the duty of the insured to show that the loss or damage is covered by the policy. The
foregoing clause notwithstanding, the burden of proof still rests upon petitioner to prove that the damage or loss was caused by an
excepted risk in order to escape any liability under the contract.

Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden of proof never parts.15
For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but
one which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e. an "avoidance" of the claim.16

Particularly, in insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the terms of a policy which insures against other perils or hazards,
loss from such a risk constitutes a defense which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and from this it follows that
an insurer seeking to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss comes
within the purview of the exception or limitation set up. If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a contract of insurance, the
burden is upon the insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a
Page1

cause which limits its liability.17

 Consequently, it is sufficient for private respondent to prove the fact of damage or loss. Once respondent makes out a prima
facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to petitioner to controvert respondent’s prima facie case.18 In this
case, since petitioner alleged an excepted risk, then the burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove such exception. It is only
when petitioner has sufficiently proven that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift back
to respondent who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why such excepted risk does not release petitioner from any
liability. Unfortunately for petitioner, it failed to discharge its primordial burden of proving that the damage or loss was caused by an
excepted risk.

Petitioner however, insists that the evidence on record established the identity of the author of the damage. It argues that the
trial court and the CA erred in not appreciating the reports of witnesses Lt. Col Torres and SFO II Rochar that the bystanders they
interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA as an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae.

A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived
from his perception.19 A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard
the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule
is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given
under oath or solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing counsel to test
the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth
of the out-of-court statement depends.20

Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself
did not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that
the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive
or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.21

The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it may concede that these statements were
made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by
the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the
bystanders’ statements while they were making their investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when
these statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and
exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations where hysteria is
likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may
be mere idle talk is not remote.

At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements were made may be considered as
independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but
to the fact that they had been thus uttered.22

Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency.23 Admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade.24 Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused
the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be
calibrated vis-à-vis the other evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted that there is a need for additional convincing proof,
viz.:

The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that the cause of the fire was the intentional burning of the radio
facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned the radio facilities
shouted "Mabuhay ang NPA" does not furnish logical conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or that their act was an act of
rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing proof need be submitted. Defendants failed to discharge their responsibility to present
adequate proof that the loss was due to a risk excluded.25

While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police blotter; (2) the certification from the Bacolod Police
Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records,
nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the
CPP/NPA.26 Rather, it was stated in the police blotter that: "a group of persons accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be
CPP/NPA … more or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,"27 while the certification from the Bacolod Police station stated that "…
some 20 or more armed men believed to be members of the New People’s Army NPA,"28 and the fire investigation report concluded
that "(I)t is therefore believed by this Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed men suspected to be
members of the CPP/NPA where (sic) the ones responsible …"29 All these documents show that indeed, the "suspected" executor of
the fire were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the
quantum of proof.

All told, the Court finds no reason to grant the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 16, 2000 and Resolution dated January
30, 2001 rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 56351 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68620 July 22, 1986

Page1

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
 FREDDIE TULAGAN alias "Eding", VALENTIN DE GUZMAN alias "Satsoy", alias "Vicente", RAMON MENDOZA, and ROMEO "Romie"
MENDOZA, accused, ROMEO "Romie" MENDOZA, accused-appellant.

NARVASA, J.:

On the night of May 19, 1979, at about 11 o'clock, Marlon Catungal 19, died a violent death, succumbing to "Shock, due to
severe hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound, anterior chest." (Exh. F-2). The fatal stab wound is described in the autopsy report 1, as
follows:

... stab wound, elliptical in shape, 1 1/2 inches in length, located 1 inch from left para-sternal region at level of 5th intercostal
space, directed upward, penetrating the upper portion of anterior lobe of left lung and the ascending portion of the aorta.

No one saw precisely how, where and when that single stab wound was inflicted, or by whom, but there seems to be no
question — both prosecution and defense agreeing on this point — that the deceased was killed while attempting to flee from at least
two men, Identified as Freddie (or Eding) Tulagan and Valentin "Satsoy" de Guzman. The chase began at or near the public hall of
Barangay Don Pedro, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, where a dance was being held on the occasion of the barrio fiesta, and ended, tragically
for Catungal, at the porch (azotea) of the house of a certain Cesar Evangelista, some 300 meters away. The deceased appeared to have
been carried, after he had been fatally stabbed, from the house of Evangelista to the shoulder of the provincial road about 10 meters
away, where his corpse was later found by police investigators and barangay officials.

The only person with any claim to some sort of direct observation of the pursuit and its sanguinary ending is Bonifacio Ulanday,
who gave a sworn statement before the provincial Fiscal at Dagupan City on June 6, 1979 2 and later testified before the Trial Court 3
His version of the sequence of events leading to the death of Marlon Catungal is as follows:

1. The chase began at the dance hall, at about 10 o'clock p.m., after Marion Catungal was accosted by Valentin de Guzman alias
"Satsoy" and 3 other persons.

2. Marlon Catungal ran away when he saw "Satsoy" receive a "balisong" about a foot long from one of his companions.

3. In Ulanday's words: "Satsoy chased Marlon Catungal." "When Satsoy chased Marlon, his three other companions also chased
Marlon." "I followed them to the direction where they proceeded." 4

4. Ulanday followed in such a way as to avoid being noticed by the pursuers, staying about 15 meters behind them 5.

5. Ulanday "only lost sight of the four persons running after Marlon Catungal when said Marlon Catungal entered a certain yard"
6; he "never saw (he 'did not witness') how the four allegedly overtook Marlon Catungal." 7 he "did not see any person who stabbed or
killed Marlon Catungal." 8

6. Ulanday "only saw four persons who lifted him and placed him in front of that big house", at which time Marlon was
"motionless" and blood was oozing from the body of Marlon Catungal 9 what Ulanday said in his statement before the Provincial Fiscal
10 is:

While I was running towards the North (following the pursuers) I saw Satsoy and his companions carrying the cadaver of Marlon
Catungal from the azotea of a house located around ten meters away from the road to Bayambang." "They placed the cadaver of
Marion Catungal on the left side of the road from Malasiqui 11.

On the basis of the above-mentioned sworn statement of Bonifacio Ulanday 12 and those of Barangay Captain Jose B. Macaraeg
and his daughter, Natalia Macaraeg, an information was filed with the Circuit Criminal Court at Dagupan City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. CCC-III-0432, charging Freddie Tulagan alias "Eding," Valentin de Guzman alias "Satsoy," Romie Mendoza and Ramon
Mendoza with the crime of murder, allegedly committed as follows:

That in the evening of May 19, 1979 in the barangay of Don Pedro, municipality of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
intent to kill, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab Marlon Catunggal when said Marlon Catunggal was held helpless and defenseless by accused Freddie Tulagan alias
Eding, Ramon Mendoza and Romie Mendoza and Valentin de Guzman alias Satsoy alias Vicente, armed with a sharp pointed
instrument delivered the fatal wound which resulted in the instantaneous death of Marlon Catunggal 13

As may at once be perceived, there is no direct evidence to establish what is alleged in the underscored portion of the
information: that "Satsoy" (Valentin de Guzman) stabbed Marlon Catungal while the latter was being held "helpless and defenseless"
by the three (3) other accused. This Court has examined the record carefully, and neither before the Investigating Fiscals nor before the
Trial Court was any proof adduced directly and positively demonstrating precisely how and by whom the single fatal wound was
inflicted.

Of the four thus charged, only Romie Mendoza was arrested. Arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. After trial, he was found guilty of
the offense charged by judgment promulgated on August 9, 1984, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo "Romie" Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the crime of
MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and the commission of the offense having been attended
by one generic aggravating circumstance without any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentence him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY
OF DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Marlon Catungal in the amount P 30,000.00; P15,000.00 as moral damages; another
P15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and reimburse them to amount of P1,500.00 for the wake plus P2,500.00 for the coffin and P
l,200.00 for the tomb, and to pay the costs.

Let this case be archived as against accused Freddie Tulagan, Valentin de Guzman alias Vicente alias Satsoy and Ramon Mendoza,
without prejudice to its reinstatement as against said accused, upon their arrest and upon motion of the prosecution.
Page1

The case is now before this Court on automatic review 14.

 The decision under review lays stress on a statement attributed to one of the suspects, Vicente "Satsoy" de Guzman by
prosecution witness Natalia Macaraeg, which the Trial Court deemed to be part of the res gestae or an "oral confession." Said the
Court in this connection:

Moreover, the testimony of the prosecution witness Natalia Macaraeg is clear that when she asked Vicente de Guzman, Freddie
Tulagan and Romeo Mendoza what they did to her neighbor who is working with the PNR, accused Vicente de Guzman, while standing
side by side with Freddie Tulagan and Romeo Mendoza told her that they killed Marlon Catungal, her neighbor, an employee of the
Philippine National Railways. ...

Actually — and this is apparent from a reading of Natalia Macaraeg's testimony — it was Vicente de Guzman who supposedly
volunteered information, without initially having to be asked by Natalia.

Q What happened when these three persons you mentioned arrived in your store for the second time naked waist up?

A Vicente de Guzman, alias Satsoy, told me that they ran after my neighbor Atchi Taling.

Q What else if any?

A Then I asked them, what did you do to him? Then they told me — they ran after my neighbor who is working with the PNR.

Q What did they answer you?

A Vicente de Guzman told me that — we killed him. 15

The Trial Court opined that:

...The statement made by accused Valentin de Guzman alias Satsoy ... is admissible against accused Romeo Mendoza as part of
the res gestae. Section 36, Rule 130 provides that statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae
(Revised Rules of Court). Besides, the statement of Valentin de Guzman alias Vicente de Guzman ... partakes of an oral confession or
part of the res gestae. The testimony of Natalia Macaraeg on his point is competent evidence. ... 16

This is error. That statement is not admissible as part of the res gestae; and considered as an oral confession, it is admissible only
against Valentin de Guzman, not against any other person.

There is no evidence whatsoever that the statement attributed to Valentin de Guzman was made by him "immediately
subsequent" to the startling occurrence which the Trial Court obviously had in mind: the slaying of Marion Catungal. On the contrary, if
account be taken of the claim of another prosecution witness, Bonifacio Ulanday, that he had followed the four persons pursuing the
deceased for "almost one hour" 17 , it would most certainly have taken Valentin de Guzman and his companions that length of time to
return from the crime scene to where the chase had started, or to Natalia's store. Natalia herself testified that the three (3) accused
returned to her store at "about 10:30 PM," or after "more or less 1 1/2 hours." 18 More importantly, not every statement made on the
occasion of a startling occurrence is admissible as part of the res gestae; only such are admissible as appear to have been involuntarily
and spontaneously wrung from an observer by the shock or impact of the occurrence such that, as has aptly been said, it is the event
speaking through the witness, not the witness speaking of the event. 19 The startling occurrence must produce so powerful an effect
or influence on the observer as to extract from his lips some description of the event practically without being conscious of his
utterance. There is no indication in the record that Valentin de Guzman was so affected when he made the statement in question
under the circumstances related by Natalia Macaraeg. Indeed, it may reasonably be inferred from Natalia's testimony that he was in
nowise agitated, stunned or shocked but was, on the contrary, calm, imposed, in full possession of his faculties and fully aware of what
he was doing and saying. His statement regarding the killing of Marlon Catungal is not admissible as part of the res gestae, contrary to
the view of the court a quo.

Considered as an "oral confession," Valentin de Guzman's statement is, of course, admissible against him, but its use against
others for any purpose is proscribed by the well known rule res inter alios acta 20.

The Trial Court's use of Natalia Macaraeg's testimony — regarding "Satsoy's" utterances, as part of the res gestae, therefore, be
declared an error. Moreover, there are circumstances which preclude giving full credit to the testimony Natalia Macaraeg, as will
presently be discussed.

The Trial Court also considered as another incriminating circumstance the alleged failure of Romie Mendoza to deny "certain
circumstances and pieces of evidence." According to the court:

Aside from the evidence that accused Romeo Mendoza, Freddie Tulagan and Valentin de Guzman chased Marlon Catungal at
May 19, 1979 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, it was shown that upon the return of the three accused to the store at about 10:30
PM, Natalia Macaraeg noticed blood stains on their hands and bodies. These circumstances and pieces of evidence have not been
denied by accused Romie Mendoza. These constitute conclusive and decisive evidence of the guilt of accused Romeo Mendoza as one
of the authors of the death of Marion Catungal 21.

The above-quoted conclusion is completely contrary to the record. It is belied by the very decision itself, which in a later part
states:

Accused Romeo 'Romie' Mendoza DENIED the testimony of Bonifacio Ulanday that he was one of the persons who chased
Marlon Catungal on the night of May 19, 1979. He claimed that Freddie Tulagan and Valentin de Guzman chased the person who
passed by while he was at the store of Nenet Quribe. ... (emphasis supplied)

And the inaccuracy of the Trial Court's declaration that Romeo Mendoza has also failed to deny Natalia Macaraeg's claim of his
having appeared at her store, accompanied by Eding Tulagan and Satsoy de Guzman, is disclosed by the following testimony of said
accused (Mendoza):

Q Witness for the prosecution Natalia Macaraeg testified that you went to her store with Freddie Tulagan and Valentin de
Page1

Guzman, what do you say to that?

A That is not true, sir.

 Q On that night of May 19, 1979, did you ever go to the store of Natalia Macaraeg?

A No, sir. 22

Again:

Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court why Natalia Macaraeg testified in the manner that she testified by alleging that you
went to her store on the night of May 19, 1979 with your hands stained with blood?

A We never went to the store of Natalia Macaraeg on the night of May 19,1979. 23

At any rate, the record also shows that Romie Mendoza did deny taking part in the pursuit of the deceased 24, and his counsel
did present two (2) witnesses who substantiated his denial, namely: Victoriano Deldio 25 and Andres Nevado 26

The Trial Court would refuse credence to Romie Mendoza's denial of having taken part in the chase of Marlon Catungal and
considers "worth-stressing," as "an indication of guilt":

... the fact that despite the issuance of the warrant of arrest on September 14, 1979 (Exhibit 'H'), accused Romeo Mendoza was
arrested only on November 5, 1981 (Exhibit 'L').

The relevance and logic of the argument escape this Court. The mere lapse of two (2) years or so between the issuance of an
order of arrest and the actual apprehension of its subject standing alone - signifies nothing insofar as the guilt of person arrested and
his denial of complicity in the crime charged are concerned. Such circumstance can just as plausibly suggest that the officers charged
with serving the warrant exhibited less than a desirable diligence and concern in the performance of that duty as that the accused
person sought to hide himself and evade arrest. To be sure, the record does show a written statement of the PC officer concerned,
dated November 6, 1979, that the initial arrest order was "unserved" because "subjects accused can not be located in their given
address" 27 and another report of the same officer, dated February 16, 1980, that "Valentin de Guzman alias Satsoy is now residing at
Barangay Anamperez, Villasis, Pangasinan and his (3) co-accused was reportedly left in undisclosed place in Metro Manila (sic)" 28; but
these documents cannot, under the circumstances, be considered as adequate proof that Romie Mendoza did hide himself and
otherwise deliberately eluded arrest. Indeed, the fact that he was ultimately arrested in Malasiqui, the municipality of his residence (as
indicated by Exhibit L), is inconsistent with his having "reportedly" gone to live in an" undisclosed place in Metro Manila" and militates
against the notion of his having gone into hiding.

Equally unacceptable to this Court is the Trial Court's conclusion, quoted hereunder, that the crime was attended with the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength:

... The qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength qualified the killing and raised it to murder. Marlon
Catungal was chased by accused Freddie Tulagan, Valentin de Guzman and Romeo Mendoza and one of the accused who was armed
with a sharp pointed instrument, stabbed him, resulting in his (Marion Catungal) death.

Given the fact, already stressed, that the victim's last moments are veiled in obscurity insofar as what evidence has been offered
is concerned, there being no direct evidence of how the killing was done, no evidence of whether or not authorities the pursuers took
part in the final assault or of what role each played therein, and no evidence of which of them inflicted the single fatal stab wound, and
what the others were doing while the deceased was being stabbed, said conclusion, lacking any kind of support in the record, is
nothing but pure and simple speculation.

Furthermore, as already intimated, certain relevant and significant considerations prevent this Court from giving fun faith and
credit to the evidence given by Natalia Macaraeg; and the same is true with respect to Bonifacio Ulanday.

Concerning Natalia Macaraeg, there is, for one thing, her singular omission to mention Valentin "Satsoy" de Guzman's alleged
admission that "we killed" Marlon Catungal in two (2) sworn statements that she gave to the investigating authorities: the first on May
21, 1979, two days after the slaying 29 and the second, on June 6, 1979 30. Only when she took the stand three (3) years later on May
29, 1982 did she make that revelation. Her excuse, when confronted with said omission, that" If possible I do not like trouble" 31 is
unconvincing. For if she feared retaliation, why give any statement at all, let alone two (2), both of which, even without mention of de
Guzman's "confession," clearly implicated all the accused and put her in danger of reprisal at their hands? This inexplicable discrepancy
raises grave doubts of Natalia's veracity.

Natalia's conduct on the night of the killing exhibits a curious mix of interest and apathy. When "Satsoy" de Guzman "confessed"
the killing to her, she became disturbed enough to send people to verify if in fact there had been such a killing and the victim was
Marion Catungal. But when her worst fears were confirmed, she did nothing, appeared to lose all interest in the affair. She did not even
report the crime or what transpired at her store to her father, Barangay Captain Jose B. Macaraeg of the neighboring Barangay Pulong
Sur, who received the news from other persons 32, although the victim was a neighbor and known to her.

Also by Natalia's account, Vicente "Satsoy" de Guzman, and his companions first appeared at her store only to announce their
intention of going after the man or men who had chase de Guzman's father, and later returned, also only to proclaim — perhaps
"boast" would be the better word — that their purpose had been accomplished. Why de Guzman and his companions should thus
needlessly call attention to themselves and their crime impresses this Court as highly unnatural conduct, hardly to be expected of men
whose normal instincts would be to conceal, rather than publicly declare, the plotting and execution of a killing. In this context, said
account makes little sense and does not merit uncritical acceptance.

The evidence given by Bonifacio Ulanday is not noticeably better, and exhibits similar defects. The rather sparse account of the
tragic event given in his sworn statement 33 acquires some embellishments in his recorded testimony which diminish, rather than
enhance, his credibility. For example, in his sworn statement, those who accosted Marlon Catungal at the dance hall only "went near"
him, but on the stand he declared that they suddenly seized Catungal and held him by both shoulders 34. When Catungal managed to
break away and run, only Ulanday, a stranger to the place, made bold to follow his pursuers, while the other on-lookers, as commotion
ensued, merely stepped backwards" 35, obviously loath to involve themselves. Ulanday also testified that he was in Malasiqui on the
night in question at the invitation of Barangay Captain Jose B. Macaraeg and even partook of supper at the latter's house before
leaving for the Don Pedro auditorium with Marlon Catungal 36 . But Macaraeg remembers none of this. He never confirmed the
Page1

alleged invitation and testified only that he saw Ulanday in front of the house of Benigno Catungal, Marlon's father, on the afternoon of
May 19, 1979.
 Q On May 19, 1979 in the afternoon, do you remember having seen this Bonifacio Ulanday?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where did you see him?

A I saw him in Malasiqui, sir, Barangay Pulong Sur.

Q Where in Malasiqui?

A Barangay Pulong, sur.

Q Where in Barangay Pulong did you see?

A In front of the house of Benigno Catungal.

Q Do you know why Mr. Ulanday was at Barangay Pulong at the house of Benigno, in front of Benigno Catungal?

A I don't know, sir. 37

Ulanday also claims long acquaintance, if not friendship, with the victim and his father, possibly to explain why he dared to
follow Marlon Catungal's pursuers when no one else did so. But, strangely, after seeing Catungal lying by the roadside, apparently
dead, at the end of the chase, he simply returned to the house of Jose B. Macaraeg, where he slept until 6.00 o'clock in the morning, at
which hour he stole out of the house without even waking or taking leave of Macaraeg, his alleged host, and left for his home in San
Fabian, Pangasinan 38. He saw no cause to inform Catungal's family about the death of their son or to report that matter to Macaraeg.
Worse still he kept silent about what he knew until he chanced to meet Catungal's father in Dagupan City on June 3, 1979, two (2)
weeks after the event 39.

The Court, therefore, cannot bring itself to accept the testimonial declarations of these two witnesses, which form the pillars of
the prosecution's case, and this, particularly in view of the firm denials of the accused and the exculpatory testimony of Victoriano
Deldio 40 and Andres Nevado 41, as to whom no clear motive or reason to subvert the truth to favor said accused has been shown.

No less than a man's life is at risk in this case. This Court cannot sanction its sacrifice except upon clear, strong and compelling
evidence. The evidence against the accused does not strike the Court as being up to that standard. It is unimpressive and, as already
shown, inadequate to command belief and support a conviction. Considered even in the best light, it might raise doubts as to the
complete innocence of the accused; it does not exercise reasonable doubts of his guilt.

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused Romeo ("Romie") Mendoza not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the
decision under review is reversed and said accused is acquitted, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

JUANITO TALIDANO v. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 172031 July 14, 2008

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 16 November 2005 and 2 February 2006, respectively, which upheld the validity of the dismissal of Juanito Talidano
(petitioner). The challenged decision reversed and set aside the Decision4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.5

Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was
assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in Korea. His one (1)-year
contract of employment commenced on 15 October 1996 and stipulated the monthly wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of
$270.00 and leave pay of $75.00.6

Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against and maltreated the vessel’s Filipino crew. This
prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a measure
that allegedly was resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on 21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal on 27 October 1999.7

Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily disembarked the vessel after having been warned several times of
dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an incident
involving petitioner’s incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of
petitioner who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of
incident, reporting the vessel’s deviation from its course due to petitioner’s neglect of duty at the bridge,8 as well as a copy of the
report of crew discharge issued by the master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.9

Private respondent stated that since petitioner lodged the complaint before the Labor Arbiter two (2) years and nine (9) months
after his repatriation, prescription had already set in by virtue of Revised POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996 which
provides for a one-year prescriptive period for the institution of seafarers’ claims arising from employment contract.10

On 5 November 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioner’s complaint, holding that he was validly
dismissed for gross neglect of duties. The Labor Arbiter relied on the fax messages presented by private respondent to prove
petitioner’s neglect of his duties, thus:

x x x The fax message said that the Master of M/V Phoenix Seven received an emergency warning call from Japan Sisan Sebo
Page1

Naika Radio Authority calling attention to the Master of the vessel M/V Phoenix Seven that his vessel is invading other route [sic].
When the Master checked the Bridge, he found out that the Second Officer (complainant) did not carry out his duty wathch. There was
a confrontation between the Master and the Complainant but the latter insisted that he was right. The argument of the Complainant
asserting that he was right cannot be sustained by this Arbitration Branch. The fact that there was an emergency call from the Japanese
port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was invading other route simply means that Complainant neglected his duty. The fax message
stating that Complainant was not at the bridge at the time of the emergency call was likewise not denied nor refuted by the
Complainant. Under our jurisprudence, any material allegation and/or document which is not denied specifically is deemed admitted. If
not of the timely call [sic] from the port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven invaded other route, the safety of the vessel, her crew and
cargo may be endangered. She could have collided with other vessels because of complainant’s failure to render watch duty.11

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and declared the dismissal as illegal. The dispositive portion of the
NLRC’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered
declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal. Respondents Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc. and Hansu Corporation are
hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay complainant the amount equivalent to his three (3) months salary as a result thereof.12

The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the alleged misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative
value and are self-serving. It added that the ship’s logbook should have been submitted in evidence as it is the repository of all the
activities on board the vessel, especially those affecting the performance or attitude of the officers and crew members, and, more
importantly, the procedures preparatory to the discharge of a crew member. The NLRC also noted that private respondent failed to
comply with due process in terminating petitioner’s employment.13

Private respondent moved for reconsideration,14 claiming that the complaint was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
The NLRC, however, denied reconsideration in a Resolution dated 30 August 2002.15 Rejecting the argument that the complaint had
already prescribed, it ruled:

Records show that respondent in this case had filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription before the Labor Arbiter a
quo who denied the same in an Order dated August 1, 2000. Such an Order being unappealable, the said issue of prescription cannot
be raised anew specially in a motion for reconsideration. (Citations omitted)16

It appears that respondent received a copy of the NLRC Resolution17 on 24 September 2002 and that said resolution became
final and executory on 7 October 2002.18

Private respondent brought the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari19 on 8 October 2002. The petition,
docketed as CA-G.R. Sp. No. 73521, was dismissed on technicality in a Resolution dated 29 October 2002. The pertinent portion of the
resolution reads:

(1) [T]he VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING was signed by one Florida Z. Jose, President of
petitioner Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc., without proof that she is the duly authorized representative of petitioner-
corporation;

(2) [T]here is no affidavit of service of the petition to the National Labor Relations Commission and to the adverse party;

(3) [T]here is no explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of the required personal service. (Citations omitted)20

An entry of judgment was issued by the clerk of court on 23 November 2002 stating that the 29 October 2002 Resolution had
already become final and executory.21 Meanwhile, on 12 November 2002, private respondent filed another petition before the Court
of Appeals,22 docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 73790. This is the subject of the present petition.

Petitioner dispensed with the filing of a comment.23 In his Memorandum,24 however, he argued that an entry of judgment
having been issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 73521, the filing of the second petition hinging on the same cause of action after the first petition
had been dismissed violates not only the rule on forum shopping but also the principle of res judicata. He highlighted the fact that the
decision subject of the second petition before the Court of Appeals had twice become final and executory, with entries of judgment
made first by the NLRC and then by the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court ultimately settled the issue of prescription, categorically declaring that the one-year prescriptive period
applies only to employment contracts entered into as of 1 January 1997 and not those entered prior thereto, thus:

x x x The question of prescription is untenable. Admittedly, POEA Memorandum Circular [No.] 55 prescribing the standard terms
of an employment contract of a seafarer was in effect when the respondent was repatriated on January 21, 1997. This administrative
issuance was released in accordance with Department Order [No.] 33 of the Secretary of Labor directing the revision of the existing
Standard Employment Contract to be effective by January 1, 1997. Section 28 of this revised contract states: all claims arising
therefrom shall be made within one year from the date of the seafarer’s return to the point of hire.

It is crystal clear that the one-year period of prescription of claims in the revised standard contract applies only to employment
contracts entered into as of January 1, 1997. If there is still any doubt about this, it should be removed by the provision of Circular [No.]
55 which says that the new schedule of benefits to be embodied in the standard contract will apply to any Filipino seafarer that will be
deployed on or after the effectivity of the circular.

The respondent was deployed before January 1, 1997. As acknowledged by the petitioners, the rule prior to Circular [No.] 55
provided for a prescriptive period of three years. We cannot avoid the ineluctable conclusion that the claim of the respondent was filed
within the prescriptive period.25

Despite ruling that prescription had not set in, the appellate court nonetheless declared petitioner’s dismissal from employment
as valid and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

The appellate court relied on the fax messages issued by the ship master shortly after petitioner had committed a serious neglect
of his duties. It noted that the said fax messages constitute the res gestae. In defending the non-presentation of the logbook, it stated
that three years had already passed since the incident and Hansu was no longer the principal of private respondent.
Page1

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence he filed this instant petition.
 Citing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, petitioner reiterates his argument that the appellate court
should not have accepted the second petition in view of the fact that a corresponding entry of judgment already has been issued. By
filing the second petition, petitioner believes that private respondent has engaged in forum shopping.26

Private respondent, for its part, defends the appellate court in taking cognizance of the second petition by stressing that there is
no law, rule or decision that prohibits the filing of a new petition for certiorari within the reglementary period after the dismissal of the
first petition due to technicality.27 It rebuts petitioner’s charge of forum shopping by pointing out that the dismissal of the first petition
due to technicality has not ripened into res judicata, which is an essential element of forum shopping.28

In determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping, the test to be applied is whether the elements of
litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.29 This issue has been
thoroughly and extensively discussed and correctly resolved by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

The respondent’s two arguments essay on certain developments in the case after the NLRC rendered its decision. He points out
with alacrity that an entry of judgment was issued twice – first by the NLRC with respect to its decision and then by the Ninth Division
of the Court of Appeals after it dismissed on technical grounds the first petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner. Neither event, for
sure, militates against the institution of a second petition for certiorari. A decision of the NLRC is never final for as long as it is the
subject of a petition for certiorari that is pending with a superior court. A contrary view only demeans our certiorari jurisdiction and will
never gain currency under our system of appellate court review. It is more to the point to ask if a second petition can stand after the
first is dismissed, but under the particular circumstances in which the second was brought, we hold that it can. The theory of res
judicata invoked by the respondent to bar the filing of the second petition does not apply. The judgment or final resolution in the first
petition must be on the merits for res judicata to inhere, and it will not be on the merits if it is founded on a consideration of only
technical or collateral points. Yet this was exactly how the first petition was disposed of. SP 73521 was dismissed as a result of the
failure of the petitioner to comply with the procedural requirements of a petition for certiorari. The case never touched base. There
was no occasion for the determination of the substantive rights of the parties and, in this sense, the merits of the case were not
involved. The petitioner had actually the option of either refilling [sic] the case or seeking reconsideration in the original action. It chose
to file SP 73790 after realizing that it still had enough time left of the original period of 60 days under Rule 65 to do so.

Since the dismissal of the first petition did not ripen into res judicata, it may not be said that there was forum shopping with the
filing of the second. The accepted test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping insofar as it is
applicable to this setting is whether the judgment or final resolution in the first case amounts to res judicata in the second. Res judicata
is central to the idea of forum shopping. Without it, forum shopping is non-existent. The dismissal of the first petition, moreover, if it
does not amount to res judicata, need not be mentioned in the certification of non-forum shopping accompanying the second action.
The omission will not be fatal to the viability of the second case. (Citations omitted)30

Private respondent, in turn, questions the propriety of the instant certiorari petition and avers that the issues raised by
petitioner can only be dealt with under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.31 Against this thesis, petitioner submits that the acceptance of
the petition is addressed to the sound discretion of this Court.32

The proper remedy to assail decisions of the Court of Appeals involving final disposition of a case is through a petition for review
under Rule 45. In this case, petitioner filed instead a certiorari petition under Rule 65. Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, this Court
resolves to rule on the merits of the petition in the interest of substantial justice,33 the underlying consideration in this petition being
the arbitrary dismissal of petitioner from employment.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying merely on fax messages to support the validity of his dismissal from
employment. He maintains that the first fax message containing the information that the vessel encroached on a different route was a
mere personal observation of the ship master and should have thus been corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages
cannot be considered as res gestae because the statement of the ship master embodied therein is just a report. He also contends that
he has not caused any immediate danger to the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident would have been
recorded in the logbook. Thus, he posits that the failure to produce the logbook reinforces the theory that the fax messages have been
concocted to justify his unceremonious dismissal from employment. Hence, he believes that his dismissal from employment stemmed
from his filing of the complaint with the ITF which his superiors resented.34

Private respondent insists that the appellate court is correct in considering the fax messages as res gestae statements. It likewise
emphasizes that non-presentment of the logbook is justified as the same could no longer be retrieved because Hansu has already
ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was dismissed because he filed a complaint with
the ITF in behalf of his fellow crew members. It claims that petitioner’s allegation is a hoax because there is no showing that the alleged
complaint has been received by the ITF and that no action thereon was ever taken by the ITF.35

Private respondent also asserts that petitioner was not dismissed but that he voluntarily asked for his repatriation. This
assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. It is highly illogical for an employee to voluntarily request for repatriation and then
file a suit for illegal dismissal. As voluntary repatriation is synonymous to resignation, it is proper to conclude that repatriation is
inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.36

The paramount issue therefore boils down to the validity of petitioner’s dismissal, the determination of which generally involves
a question of fact. It is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate the facts and the evidence again, our jurisdiction being
generally limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the trial court or administrative agency. Nevertheless,
since the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter are at variance with those of the NLRC, we resolve to evaluate
the records and the evidence presented by the parties.37

The validity of an employee's dismissal hinges on the satisfaction of two substantive requirements, to wit: (1) the dismissal must
be for any of the causes provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee was accorded due process, basic of which
is the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.38

The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner’s absence during his watch duty when an emergency call was received from the Japanese
port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was "invading other route" constituted neglect of duty, a just cause for terminating an
employee. Records reveal that this information was related to private respondent via two fax messages sent by the captain of M/V
Page1

Phoenix Seven. The first fax message dated 18 January 1997 is reproduced below:

JUST RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MASTER N C/OFFICER THAT THEY DECIDED TO DISCHARGE 2/OFFICER AT OSAKA PORT.
 DUE TO MIS-BEHAVIOUR N RESEST [SIC] TO OFFICIAL ORDER.

CAPT. HAD RECEIVED EMERGENCY WARNING CALL FROM JAPAN BISAN SETO NAIKAI RADIO AUTHORITY THAT SHIP IS INVADING
OTHER ROUTE.

SO, HE WAS SURPRISED N CAME TO BRIDGE N FOUND 2/O NOT CARRY OUT HIS WATCH DUTY.

MASTER SCOLD HIM ABOUT THIS N CORRECT HIS ERROR BUT HE RESIST [SIC] THAT HE IS RIGHT AND THEN SAID THAT HE WILL
COME BACK HOME.

FURTHER MORE HE ASKED MASTER TO PAY HIM I.T.F. WAGE SCALE.

MASTER N/CIO STRONGLY ASKED US HIS REPATRIATION WITH I.E.U.

PLS. CONFIRM YOUR OPINION ON THIS HAPPENING.39

The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a report of crew discharge essentially containing the same
information as the first fax message. The Court of Appeals treated these fax messages as part of the res gestae proving neglect of duty
on the part of petitioner.

Section 42 of Rule 13040 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous
statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res
gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act.41 We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.

To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.42

Assuming that petitioner’s negligence—which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its course—is the startling occurrence,
there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition,
no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the
critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the first kind.

Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be characterized
must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4)
the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.43

Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that
such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as
parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with
the purported equivocal act.

Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion is
questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only
from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.

In any event, under Article 282 of the Labor Code,44 an employer may terminate an employee for gross and habitual neglect of
duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the
performance of one’s duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon
the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.45

Petitioner’s supposed absence from watch duty in a single isolated instance is neither gross nor habitual negligence. Without
question, the alleged lapse did not result in any untoward incident. If there was any serious aftermath, the incident should have been
recorded in the ship’s logbook and presented by private respondent to substantiate its claim. Instead, private respondent belittled the
probative value of the logbook and dismissed it as self-serving. Quite the contrary, the ship’s logbook is the repository of all activities
and transactions on board a vessel. Had the route invasion been so serious as to merit petitioner’s dismissal, then it would have been
recorded in the logbook. Private respondent would have then had all the more reason to preserve it considering that vital pieces of
information are contained therein.

In Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC,46 the Court held that the vessel’s logbook is an official record of entries made by a person in
the performance of a duty required by law.47 In Abacast Shipping and Management Agency, Inc. v. NLRC,48 a case cited by petitioner,
the logbook is a respectable record that can be relied upon to authenticate the charges filed and the procedure taken against the
employees prior to their dismissal.49 In Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC,50 the logbook is a vital evidence as Article 612 of the
Code of Commerce requires the ship captain to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel's head.51 Therefore, the
non-presentation of the logbook raises serious doubts as to whether the incident did happen at all.

In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer.52 Private
respondent miserably failed to discharge this burden. Consequently, the petitioner’s dismissal is illegal.

We also note that private respondent failed to comply with the procedural due process requirement for terminating an
employee. Such requirement is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern
since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man's innate sense of justice. The Labor Code does not, of course,
require a formal or trial type proceeding before an erring employee may be dismissed. This is especially true in the case of a vessel on
the ocean or in a foreign port. The minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings, which must be complied with
even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of
an opportunity to present their own side of the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the management's decision to terminate.
To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices
before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the
Page1

employer’s decision to dismiss him.53

 Private respondent’s sole reliance on the fax messages in dismissing petitioner is clearly insufficient as these messages were
addressed only to itself. No notice was ever given to petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular acts showing neglect of duty.
Neither was he informed of his dismissal from employment. Petitioner was never given an opportunity to present his side. The failure
to comply with the two-notice rule only aggravated respondent’s liability on top of dismissing petitioner without a valid cause.

Pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 804254 or the Migrant Worker’s Act, employees who are unjustly dismissed from
work are entitled to an amount representing their three (3) months’ salary considering that their employment contract has a term of
exactly one (1) year plus a full refund of his placement fee, with interest at 12% per annum.55

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the NLRC is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that in addition to the payment of the sum equivalent to petitioner’s
three (3) months’ salary, the full amount of placement fee with 12% legal interest must be refunded.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140023. August 14, 2003]

RUDY LAO, petitioner, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Decision[1] dated February 4, 1999, as well as its Resolution,[2]
dated September 7, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47227. The assailed decision dismissed petitioner’s appeal and the resolution denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The original action was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, as Civil Case No. 17045 for breach of
contract and damages, as a result of the insurance company’s refusal of petitioner’s claim on the insurance policy of his truck which
figured in an accident during the effectivity of the policy.

The following are the antecedent facts:

Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate No. FCG-538. The truck was insured with respondent Standard
Insurance Co., Inc. under Policy No. CV-21074[3] for the maximum amount of P200,000 and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover any
damages that might be caused to his goods.

While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City,
the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate No. FBS-917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of
the insured truck and was bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around P110,692, while the
damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were placed at P35,000 more or less.

Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was denied by the
insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured
truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper driver’s license at the time of the accident. The restriction[4] in Leonardo Anit’s driver’s
license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving
weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the “authorized driver” clause[5] of the insurance policy. In addition, respondent
cited the following excerpts from the police blotter of the Iloilo INP, to wit:

C-UN-85 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY W/ PHY INJURIES – R/ IMPRUDENCE

11:30 PM – Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a collision took place at Brgy. Buhang, Jaro, IC. Investigation conducted by Pat.
Villahermosa, assisted by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed that at about 8:00 PM this date at the aforementioned place, a collision took
place between a truck (Hino) with Plate Nr FB[S] 917 owned by Rudy Lao and driven by BOY GIDDIE Y COYEL, 38 yrs, a res. of Balasan,
Iloilo, with License Nr DLR 1108142 and another truck with Plate Nr. FCG-538 owned by Rudy Lao and driver (sic) by LEONARDO ANIT Y
PANES, 33 yrs, a res. of Brgy Laya, Balasan, Iloilo with License Nr 1836482.… (Emphasis supplied.)[6]

Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the
insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a driver’s license authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck which weighed more than
4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report[7] wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D.
Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three days after
the accident or on April 27, 1985. However, respondent insurance company was firm in its denial of the claim.

Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC. After trial, the court disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that plaintiff lacks sufficient cause of action against the defendant and hence
ordered his case dismissed and further orderes (sic) him to pay the defendant the following:

1) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P500.00 for appearance fee; and

2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[8]

On appeal with the Court of Appeals, the RTC decision was affirmed. The petition was dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration was denied. The CA stated:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, the complaint is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[9]
Page1

In his petition for review now before us, petitioner cites the following as grounds therefor:
 A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT RELIED MAINLY ON SECTION 44, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF
COURT IN UPHOLDING THE ENTRY IN THE POLICE BLOTTER WHICH STATED THAT THE DRIVER OF THE INSURED VEHICLE WAS
LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, WHO WAS NOT AN AUTHORIZED DRIVER. UNDER THE SAID SECTION 44, RULE 130 ITSELF HOWEVER, THE
POLICE BLOTTER IS MERELY A PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN WHICH MAY BE NULLIFIED BY OTHER EVIDENCE;
[10]

B. PERCEPTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ ON THE “DIMINISHED” CREDIBILITY OF PAT. FELIPE VILLAHERMOSA,
THE TRAFFIC POLICE INVESTIGATOR, IS MISPLACED AND UNFOUNDED;[11]

C. THE DRIVER OF THE INSURED TRUCK WITH PLATE NR. FCG-538 WAS GIDDIE BOY Y COYEL, AN AUTHORIZED DRIVER OF THE
SAID TRUCK. THE DRIVER OF THE OTHER TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WITH PLATE NR. FBS-917 WAS LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES;
[12]

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED ARTICLES 2232 AND 2208 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN GRANTING
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES TO RESPONDENT. UNDER ARTICLES 2229 AND 2234 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE,
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CANNOT BE AWARDED IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AWARD FOR MORAL, TEMPERATE, LIQUIDATED OR
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES;[13]

E. TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT NAMELY, SGT. BERNAS, THE DESK OFFICER AND ROMEO GUIERGEN,
INSURANCE ADJUSTER, WERE INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE;[14] and

F. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DESPITE GLARING MISAPPLICATION OF
THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ESTABLISHED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AS WELL AS CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF THE
FACTS IN THIS CASE.[15]

Three issues must be resolved: (1) The admissibility and probative value of the police blotter as evidence; (2) The assessment of
the credibility of witnesses; and (3) The propriety and basis of the awards for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Also pertinent
here is the factual issue of whether or not Leonardo Anit, an unauthorized driver, was driving the insured truck at the time of the
accident.

Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis for the factual finding of the RTC
and the CA. He contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating
policeman himself, attesting that it was Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who was driving the insured vehicle.[16]

Respondent avers that the same police report and testimony were of dubious nature. Both trial and appellate courts noted that
the report was made three days after the accident and did not form part of the official police records.[17]

The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court.[18] Under the said rule, the following are the
requisites for its admissibility:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law;

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
by him personally or through official information.[19]

We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official
records.[20]Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.
[21] Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent
evidence to refute the facts stated therein.

In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that
Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia,[22] where we said that “entries
in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value,” since the Court there found that “the entries in
question are sadly wanting in material particulars”.

Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries
was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied
to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No
explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.

Petitioner also assails the credence given by the trial court to the version of the respondents vis-à-vis the testimonies of the
witnesses. Time and again we have reiterated the settled doctrine that great weight, and even finality, is given to the factual
conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial courts.[23] We find on this score no reason to overturn such
conclusions.

On the issue of damages, we agree with petitioner that the award of exemplary damages was improper. In Tiongco v. Atty.
Deguma[24] we held that the entitlement to the recovery of exemplary damages must be shown. In the case at bar, respondent have
not shown sufficient evidence that petitioner indeed schemed to procure the dubious documents and lied through his teeth to
establish his version of the facts. What was found was that the document he presented was inadmissible, and its contents were
dubious. However, no proof was adduced to sufficiently establish that it came to his hands through his employment of underhanded
means. In Tiongco, we further stated:

Although exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they also need not be proved. But a complainant must
still show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded.[25]
Page1

Thus, it was error for the courts below to award exemplary damages in the absence of any award for moral, temperate or
compensatory damages.
 The award of attorney’s fees must also be deleted. Such award was given in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages
to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party.[26] But it was not sufficiently shown that petitioner acted maliciously in
instituting the claim for damages. Perforce, the award of attorney’s fees was improper.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is hereby DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 96202. April 13, 1999]

ROSELLA D. CANQUE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks a reversal of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City ordering petitioner -

. . . to pay [private respondent] the principal sum of Two Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Seventeen Pesos and
Seventy Five Centavos (P299,717.75) plus interest thereon at 12% per annum from September 22, 1986, the date of the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; to pay [private respondent] the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for reasonable attorney’s
fees; to pay the sum of Five Hundred Fifty Two Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P552.86) for filing fees and to pay the costs of suit. Since
[private respondent] withdrew its prayer for an alias writ of preliminary attachment vis-a-vis the [petitioner’s] counterbound, the
incident on the alias writ of preliminary attachment has become moot and academic.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC Construction. At the time material to
this case, she had contracts with the government for (a) the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan
access road; and (c) the asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City.[3] In connection with these projects, petitioner entered into two
contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation. The first contract (Exh. A),[4] dated April 26, 1985, provided:

The Sub-Contractor (SOCOR Corporation) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the consideration hereinafter named,
hereby agree as follows:

1. SCOPE OF WORK:

a. The Sub-Contractor agrees to perform and execute the Supply, Lay and Compact Item 310 and Item 302;

b. That Contractor shall provide the labor and materials needed to complete the project;

c. That the Contractor agrees to pay the Sub-Contractor the price of One Thousand Pesos only (P1,000.00) per Metric Ton of
Item 310 and Eight Thousand Only (P8,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 302.

d. That the Contractor shall pay the Sub-Contractor the volume of the supplied Item based on the actual weight in Metric Tons
delivered, laid and compacted and accepted by the MPWH;

e. The construction will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.

The second contract (Exh. B),[5] dated July 23, 1985, stated:

The Supplier (SOCOR Construction) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the consideration hereinafter named, hereby
agree as follows:

1. SCOPE OF WORK:

a. The Supplier agrees to perform and execute the delivery of Item 310 and Item 302 to the jobsite for the Asphalting of DAS
Access Road and the Front Gate of ACMDC, Toledo City;

b. That the Contractor should inform or give notice to the Supplier two (2) days before the delivery of such items;

c. That the Contractor shall pay the Supplier the volume of the supplied items on the actual weight in metric tons delivered and
accepted by the MPWH fifteen (15) days after the submission of the bill;

d. The delivery will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.

On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing a revised computation,[6] for P299,717.75, plus
interest at the rate of 3% a month, representing the balance of petitioner’s total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and
services rendered by private respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the amount, claiming that
private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the
acceptance thereof by the government.[7]

Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to recover from petitioner
the sum ofP299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.

In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private respondent as well as receipt of the billing (Exh. C),
dated May 28, 1986. However, she disputed the correctness of the bill ¾

. . . considering that the deliveries of [private respondent] were not signed and acknowledged by the checkers of [petitioner],
the bituminous tack coat it delivered to [petitioner] consisted of 60% water, and [petitioner] has already paid [private respondent]
Page1

about P1,400,000.00 but [private respondent] has not issued any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments and there is no agreement
that [private respondent] will charge 3% per month interest.[8]
 Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into sub-contracts with private respondent.[9]

During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O. Sanchez, and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper.

Petitioner’s evidence consisted of her lone testimony.[10]

On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus
interest at 12% per annum, and costs. It held:

. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiff’s Book of Collectible Accounts particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. “K”) this Court is convinced that
the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account of SOCOR’s
commercial transactions with RDC which were entered therein in the course of business. We cannot therefore disregard the entries
recorded under Exhibit “K” because the fact of their having been made in the course of business carries with it some degree of
trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent
reason for us to doubt their authenticity.[11]

The trial court further ruled that in spite of the fact that the contracts did not have any stipulation on interest, interest may be
awarded in the form of damages under Article 2209 of the Civil Code.[12]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial court’s reliance on private respondent’s Book of Collectible
Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, §37[13] of the Rules of Court.

Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends that ¾

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AS ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS THE ENTRIES IN
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S BOOK OF COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE PERSON WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES ACTUALLY
TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE BUT UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF SAID ENTRIES.

II. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT HAS ONLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.

First. Petitioner contends that the presentation of the delivery receipts duly accepted by the then Ministry of Public Works and
Highways (MPWH) is required under the contracts (Exhs. A and B) and is a condition precedent for her payment of the amount claimed
by private respondent. Petitioner argues that the entries in private respondent’s Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) cannot take the
place of the delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible in evidence.[14]

We agree with the appellate court that the stipulation in the two contracts requiring the submission of delivery receipts does not
preclude proof of delivery of materials by private respondent in some other way. The question is whether the entries in the Book of
Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery. Private respondent cites Rule 130, §37 of the Rules
of Court and argues that the entries in question constitute “entries in the course of business” sufficient to prove deliveries made for
the government projects. This provision reads:

Entries in the course of business. ¾ Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.[15]

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions:

1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;

2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and

5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.[16]

As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and third requisites. Dolores Aday, who
made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her
testimony that the entries were presented and marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the
presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.

Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they are the best available evidence. Said a learned judge: “What a
man has actually done and committed to writing when under obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the business he has
undertaken, and he being dead, there seems to be no danger in submitting to the consideration of the court.” The person who may be
called to court to testify on these entries being dead, there arises the necessity of their admission without the one who made them
being called to court be sworn and subjected to cross-examination. And this is permissible in order to prevent a failure of justice.[17]

Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries
based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the
materials stated in the bills were supervised by “an engineer for (such) functions.”[18] The person, therefore, who has personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, i.e., that such deliveries were made in the amounts and on the dates stated, was the
company’s project engineer. The entries made by Aday show only that the billings had been submitted to her by the engineer and that
she faithfully recorded the amounts stated therein in the books of account. Whether or not the bills given to Aday correctly reflected
the deliveries made in the amounts and on the dates indicated was a fact that could be established by the project engineer alone who,
however, was not presented during trial. The rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran, thus:

[W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the person who gave him the information is
Page1

individually known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of
employees have intervened, such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.[19]
 Second. It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be considered an exception to the
hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, §10[20] of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. ¾ A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by
anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time
when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must
be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in
evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be
admitted for another purpose. She cites the following from Chief Justice Moran’s commentaries:

The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Where the offer is general, and the evidence is admissible for
one purpose and inadmissible for another, the evidence should be rejected. Likewise, where the offer is made for two or more
purposes and the evidence is incompetent for one of them, the evidence should be excluded. The reason for the rule is that “it is the
duty of a party to select the competent from the incompetent in offering testimony, and he cannot impose this duty upon the trial
court.” Where the evidence is inadmissible for the purpose stated in the offer, it must be rejected, though the same may be admissible
for another purpose. The rule is stated thus: “If a party x x x opens the particular view with which he offers any part of his evidence, or
states the object to be attained by it, he precludes himself from insisting on its operation in any other direction, or for any other object;
and the reason is, that the opposite party is prevented from objecting to its competency in any view different from the one proposed.
[21]

It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose. Private respondent’s counsel offered
it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioner’s indebtedness. He said:

Exhibit “K,” your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible Accounts of the plaintiff, reflecting the
principal indebtedness of defendant in the amount of Two hundred ninety-nine thousand seven hundred seventeen pesos and
seventy-five centavos (P299,717.75) and reflecting as well the accumulated interest of three percent (3%) monthly compounded such
that as of December 11, 1987, the amount collectible from the defendant by the plaintiff is Six hundred sixteen thousand four hundred
thirty-five pesos and seventy-two centavos (P616,435.72);[22]

This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as a witness.
In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is changed, not the purpose for which it is offered.

Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As explained in Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals:[23]

Under the above provision (Rule 132, §10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute
evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed
memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a
memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness
may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his
open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless
the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the
express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to
conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the
admission of such evidence . . . .[24]

As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only corroborate Dolores Aday’s
testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.

Third. Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private respondent’s claim as petitioner argues?[25] The
answer is in the negative. Aside from Exh. K, private respondent presented the following documents:

1) Exhibit A - Contract Agreement dated 26 April 1985 which contract covers both the Toledo wharf project and the Babag Road
project in Lapulapu City.

2) Exhibit B - Contract Agreement dated 23 July 1985 which covers the DAS Asphalting Project.

3) Exhibit C - Revised Computation of Billings submitted on May 28, 1986.

4) Exhibit D - an affidavit executed by [petitioner] to the effect that she has no more pending or unsettled obligations as far as
Toledo Wharf Road is concerned.

5) Exhibit D-1 - Statement of Work Accomplished on the Road Restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf project.

6) Exhibit E - another affidavit executed by [petitioner] attesting that she has completely paid her laborers at the project located
at Babag, Lapulapu City

7) Exhibits F, G, G-1, G-2, G-3 - Premiums paid by [private respondent] together with the receipts for filing fees.

8) Exhibits H, I, J - certifications issued by OIC, MPWH, Regional Office; Lapulapu City, City Engineer; Toledo City Treasurer’s
Office respectively, proving that RDC construction has no more collectibles with all the said government offices in connection with its
projects.

10) Exhibit L - Bill No. 057 under the account of RDC Construction in the amount of P153,382.75 dated August 24, 1985.

11) Exhibit M - Bill No. 069 (RDC’s account), in the amount of P1,701,795.00 dated November 20, 1985.
Page1

12) Exhibit N - Bill No. 071 (RDC’s account) in the amount of P47,250.00 dated November 22, 1985.
 13) Exhibit O - Bill No. 079 (RDC’s account) in the amount of P7,290.00 dated December 6, 1985.

As the trial court found:

The entries recorded under Exhibit “K” were supported by Exhibits “L”, “M”, “N”, “O” which are all Socor Billings under the
account of RDC Construction. These billings were presented and duly received by the authorized representatives of defendant. The
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its
dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant immediately protest to plaintiff’s
alleged incomplete or irregular performance. In view of these facts, we believe Art. 1235 of the New Civil Code is applicable.

Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness and irregularity and without expressing any
protest or objection, the obligation is deemed complied with.

FINALLY, after a conscientious scrutiny of the records, we find Exhibit “D-1” (p. 85 record) to be a material proof of plaintiff’s
complete fulfillment of its obligation.

There is no question that plaintiff supplied RDC Construction with Item 302 (Bitunimous Prime Coat), Item 303 (Bituminous Tack
Coat) and Item 310 (Bitunimous Concrete Surface Course) in all the three projects of the latter. The Lutopan Access Road project, the
Toledo wharf project and the Babag-Lapulapu Road project.

On the other hand, no proof was ever offered by defendant to show the presence of other contractors in those projects. We can
therefore conclude that it was Socor Construction Corp. ALONE who supplied RDC with Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous Tack Coat
and Bituminous Concrete Surface Course for all the aforenamed three projects.[26]

Indeed, while petitioner had previously paid private respondent about P1,400,000.00 for deliveries made in the past, she did not
show that she made such payments only after the delivery receipts had been presented by private respondent. On the other hand, it
appears that petitioner was able to collect the full amount of project costs from the government, so that petitioner would be unjustly
enriched at the expense of private respondent if she is not made to pay what is her just obligation under the contracts.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108433 October 15, 1996

WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and WALLEM SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSELITO V. MACATUNO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:p

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution 1 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
affirming the Decision 2 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which disposed of POEA Case No.(M) 89-09-865
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. and Wallem Shipmanagement Ltd. are
hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay complainant the following in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the
time of payment:

a) THREE HUNDRED THREE US DOLLARS

(US$303.00) — representing salary for the month of June 1989;

b) THREE THOUSAND FIFTY FOUR US DOLLARS

(US$3,054.00) — representing salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract (July-December 1989); and

c) ONE HUNDRED SIX & 50/100 US DOLLARS

(US$106.50) — or five percent (5%) of the total award as and by way of attorney's fees.

The claim against Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc. is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondent Joselito V. Macatuno was hired by Wallem Shipmanagement Limited thru its local manning agent, Wallem
Maritime Services, Inc., as an able-bodied seaman on board the M/T Fortuna, a vessel of Liberian registry. Pursuant to the contract of
employment, private respondent was employed for ten (10) months covering the period February 26, 1989 until December 26, 1989
with a monthly salary of two hundred seventy-six US dollars (US $276); hourly overtime rate of one dollar and seventy-two cents (US
$1.72), and a monthly tanker allowance of one hundred twenty-seven dollars and sixty cents (US $127.60), with six (6) days leave with
pay for each month.

On June 24, 1989, while the vessel was berthed at the port of Kawasaki, Japan, an altercation took place between private
respondent and fellow Filipino crew member, Julius E. Gurimbao, on the one hand, and a cadet/apprentice officer of the same
nationality as the captain of the vessel on the other hand. The master entered the incident in the tanker's logbook.

As a consequence, private respondent and Gurimbao were repatriated to the Philippines where they lost no time in lodging
separate complaints for illegal dismissal with the POEA. 3 According to the affidavit private respondent executed before a POEA
Page1

administering officer, the following facts led to the filing of the complaint.
 At about 5:50 a.m. of June 24, 1989, private respondent was on duty along with Gurimbao, checking the manifold of the vessel
and looking for oil leakages, when a cadet/apprentice who was of the same nationality as the vessel's captain (Singh), approached
them. He ordered Gurimbao to use a shovel in draining the water which, mixed with oil and dirt, had accumulated at the rear portion
of the upper deck of the vessel.

Gurimbao explained to the cadet/apprentice that throwing dirty and oily water overboard was prohibited by the laws of Japan;
in fact, port authorities were roaming and checking the sanitary conditions of the port. The cadet/apprentice got mad and, shouting,
ordered Gurimbao to get a hose and siphon off the water. To avoid trouble, Gurimbao used a shovel in throwing the dirty water into
the sea.

Having finished his job, Gurimbao complained to private respondent about the "improper and unauthorized act" of the
cadet/apprentice. The two then went to the cadet/apprentice who was idly standing in a corner. They reminded him that as a mere
apprentice and not an officer of the vessel, he had no right whatsoever to order around any member of the crew. However, the
cadet/apprentice reacted violently — shouting invectives and gesturing "as if challenging" the two to a fight. To prevent him from
"intimidating" them, private respondent pushed twice the cadet/apprentice's chest while Gurimbao "mildly hit" his arm. Frantic and
shouting, the cadet/apprentice ran to the captain "who happened to witness the incident" from the cabin's window.

The captain summoned private respondent and Gurimbao. With their bosun (head of the deck crew), they went to the captain's
cabin. The captain told them to pack up their things as their services were being terminated. They would disembark at the next port,
the Port of Ube, from where they would be flown home to the Philippines, the repatriation expenses to be shouldered by them. The
two attempted to explain their side of the incident but the captain ignored them and firmly told them to go home.

Before disembarking, they were entrusted by the bosun with a letter of their fellow crew members, addressed to Capt. Diño,
attesting to their innocence. At the Port of Ube, an agent of the company handed them their plane tickets and accompanied them the
following day to the Fukoka Airport where they boarded a Cathay Pacific airplane bound for Manila.

A few days after their arrival in Manila or on July 1, 1989, the two gave the letter to Capt. Diño and conferred with him and Mr.
James Nichols. The latter told private respondent that they could not secure a reimbursement of their repatriation expenses nor could
they get their salaries for the month of June. Private respondent, in a letter addressed to Capt. Diño, asked for a reconsideration of
their dismissal but the latter did not respond. Frustrated, private respondent sought the assistance of a lawyer who wrote Wallem a
demand letter dated August 28, 1989 but the same was ignored. 4

Petitioners, defending their position, alleged that the incident was not the first infraction committed by the two. As shown by the
logbook, on June 19, 1989, while the vessel was docked in Batangas, they left it during working hours without asking permission. For
this offense, they were given a warning. On June 27, 1989 (sic), while the vessel was anchored at the Port of Kawasaki, Japan, they
assaulted the officer on watch for the day, Mr. V.S. Sason. The three were "mustered" and it was found that Sason "was attacked with
a spanner without provacition (sic)." The two were "severely warned that they will be dealt according to the rules and regulation of
their contact of employment (sic)." When the vessel was about to sail that day, the two went ashore inspite of the warning given them.
They were arrested by Japanese authorities but the vessel's departure was delayed for five (5) hours. The agency in Manila was
informed that their wages should be settled "after deducting recoveries" or fines and air fare. Their dismissal from the service was also
recommended. 5

In his aforementioned decision of September 14, 1990 finding private respondent's dismissal to be illegal, POEA Deputy
Administrator Manuel G. Imson held:

We find complainant's dismissal to be without just and valid cause. We cannot give much weight and credence to the "certified
true copy of the official logbook" (Annex "1", answer) because the alleged entries therein were only handpicked and copied from the
official logbook of the vessel M/V "Fortuna". There is no way of verifying the truth of these entries and whether they actually appear in
the log entries for the specific dates mentioned. The pages in the official logbook where these entries appear should have been the
ones reproduced to give the same a taint of credence. Moreover, no documentary evidence was submitted to support the alleged
official logbook, like the Master's report and the police report or any report by the Japanese authorities by reason of their arrest.
Finally, the copy of the alleged official logbook was not properly authenticated. The authentication is necessary specially so since this
document is the only piece of evidence submitted by respondents.

Granting that the entries in the logbook are true, a perusal thereof will readily show that complainant was not afforded due
process. The warnings allegedly given to complainant were not submitted in evidence. Likewise, no investigation report was presented
to prove that complainant was given the opportunity to air his side of the incident.

It is also noteworthy to mention that complainant was able to describe with particularity the circumstances which led to his
misunderstanding with the cadet/apprentice and which we believe is not sufficient to warrant his dismissal. 6

As stated above, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA, adopting as its own the latter's findings and conclusions. Hence,
the instant petition contending that both the POEA and the NLRC gravely abused their discretion in finding that private respondent was
illegally terminated from his employment.

As with G.R. No. 107865, where herein petitioners likewise questioned the NLRC decision affirming that of POEA Case No. (M)
88-11-1078 finding the dismissal from employment of Gurimbao to be illegal, 7 the Court sees no merit in the instant petition.

An employer may dismiss or lay off an employee only for the just and authorized causes enumerated in Articles 282 and 283 of
the Labor Code. However, this basic and normal prerogative of an employer is subject to regulation by the State in the exercise of its
paramount police power inasmuch as the preservation of lives of citizens, as well as their means of livelihood, is a basic duty of the
State more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. 8 One' s employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right within
the protection of the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. 9

We agree with petitioners that the ship captain's logbook is a vital evidence as Article 612 of the Code of Commerce requires him
to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel's head. Thus, inHaverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, 10 the Court held that a
copy of an official entry in the logbook is legally binding and serves as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Page1

However, the Haverton Shipping ruling does not find unqualified application in the case at bar. In said case, an investigation of
the incident which led to the seaman's dismissal was conducted before he was dismissed.11 Consequently, the facts appearing in the
logbook were supported by the facts gathered at the investigation. In this case, because no investigation was conducted by the ship
captain before repatriating private respondent, the contents of the logbook have to be duly identified and authenticated lest an
injustice result from a blind adoption of such contents which merely serve as prima facie evidence of the incident in question. 12

Moreover, what was presented in the Haverton Shipping case was a copy of the official entry from the logbook itself. In this case,
petitioners did not submit as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself, or even authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which
could have been easily xeroxed or photocopied considering the present technology on reproduction of

documents. 13 What was offered in evidence was merely a typewritten collation of excerpts from what couldbe the logbook 14
because by their format, they could have been lifted from other records kept in the vessel in accordance with Article 612 of the Code of
Commerce. 15

Furthermore, the alleged entry in the "logbook" states, as regards the June 27, 1989 (sic) incident, as follows:

KAWASAKI KAWASAKI This is to place on record

27.6.89 that at the time, date and

place mentioned Mr. J. V.

MACATUNO (Sr No. 147) and

Mr. J.E. GURIMBAO (Sr No.

156) attacked and assaulted

apprentice officer Mr V.S.

SASON while on duty. All three

were mustered and it was found

that Mr. SASON was attacked

with a spanner without

provacition (sic). Both the

seaman (sic) have been severely

warned that they will be dealt

according to the rules and

regulation of their contact of

employment. 16

Under the Table of Offenses and Corresponding Administrative Penalties appended to the contract of employment entered into
by petitioners and private respondent, the offense described by the logbook entry may well fall under insubordination and may
constitute assaulting a superior officer "with the use of deadly weapon" punishable with dismissal 17 if the victim is indeed a "superior
officer." However, an "apprentice officer" cannot be considered a "superior officer." An apprentice is a person bound in the form of law
to a master, to learn from him his art, trade, or business, and to serve him during the time of his apprenticeship.18 In other words, Mr.
V. S. Sason was merely a learner or a trainee and not a regular officer on board M/T Fortuna.

In this regard, it should be clarified that this Court does not tolerate nor sanction assault in any form. Physical violence against
anyone at any time and any place is reprehensible. However, in cases such as this, where a person's livelihood is at stake, strict
interpretation of the contract of employment in favor of the worker must be observed to affirm the constitutional provision on
protection to labor.

Moreover, the aforequoted entry in the logbook is so sketchy that, unsupported by other evidence, it leaves so many questions
unanswered. Although private respondent candidly admitted in his affidavit having hit Sason on the chest twice, he did not admit using
a spanner. The conflicting versions of the incident rendered it impossible to determine whether it was private respondent or Gurimbao
who wielded said tool. In the absence of a more detailed narration in the logbook entry of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
assault, the same cannot constitute a valid justification to terminate private respondent's employment. 19

H ence, as the typewritten excerpts from the "logbook" were the only pieces of evidence presented by petitioners to support the
dismissal of private respondent, have no probative value at all, petitioners' cause must fail. Their failure to discharge the onus probandi
properly may have no other result than a finding that the dismissal of private respondent is unjustified. 20

Petitioners' failure to substantiate the grounds for a valid dismissal was aggravated by the manner by which the employment of
private respondent was terminated. It must be borne in mind that the right of an employer to dismiss an employee is to be
distinguished from and should not be confused with the manner in which such right is exercised. Dismissal from employment must not
be effected abusively and oppressively as it affects one's person and property. Thus, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending paragraph (b)
of Article 278 of the Labor Code, imposed as a condition sine qua non that any termination of employment under the grounds provided
in Article 283 must be done only after notice and formal investigation have been accorded the supposed errant

worker. 21

That the workers involved in the incident were "mustered" or convened thereafter by the captain is inconsequential. It is
insufficient compliance with the law which requires, as a vital component of due process, observance of the twin requirements of
Page1

notice and hearing before dismissing an employee. As regards the notice requirement, the Court has stated:
 On the issue of due process . . . , the law requires the employer to furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause or causes for termination and shall afford him ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative. Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with two (2)
written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (b) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him. (Emphasis supplied.) 22

Neither is the ship captain's having witnessed the altercation an excuse for dispensing with the notice and hearing requirements.
Serving notice to private respondent under the circumstances cannot be regarded as an "absurdity and superfluity." 23

ON ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition at bar is DISMISSED and the Resolution of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8171 August 16, 1956

EMILIO MANALO and CARLA SALVADOR, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

ROBLES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., defendant-appellant.

Cornelio S. Ruperto and Lazaro Pormarejo for appellant.

San Juan, Africa, Yñiguez and Benedicto for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Robles Transportation Company, Inc., later referred to as the Company, is appealing from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, civil case No. 2013, ordering it to pay plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife, Clara Salvador, the sum of P3,000 with
interest at 12 per cent per annum from November 14, 1952 plus the amount of P600 for attorney's fee and expenses of litigation, with
cost.

The facts involved in this case are simple and without dispute. On August 9, 1947, a taxicab owned and operated by defendant
appellant Company and driven by Edgardo Hernandez its driver, collided with a passenger truck at Parañaque, Rizal. In the course of
and a result of the accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven year old, causing him physical injuries which resulted in
his death several days later. Edgardo Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and after trial was found
guilty of the charge and sentenced to one year prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P3,000, in
the case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay costs. Edgardo Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to
pay the indemnity. Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity, but both writs were
returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who certified that property, real or personal in Hernandez" name could be found.

On February 17, 1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara Salvador, father and mother respectively of Armando filed the
present action against the Company to enforce its subsidiary liability, pursuant to Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Company filed its appearance and answer and later an amended answer with special defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint unless and until the convicted driver Hernandez was included as a party defendant, the Company considering
him an indispensable party. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Hernandez was not an indispensable party
defendant. Dissatisfied with this ruling, the Company filed certiorari proceedings with the Court of Appeals, but said appellate court
held that Hernandez was not an indispensable party defendant, and consequently, the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss
acted within the proper limits of its discretion. Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant Company to pay
to plaintiffs damages in the amount P3,000 with interest at 12 per cent per annum from November 14, 1952, plus P600 for attorney's
fee and expenses for litigation, with cost. As aforesaid, the Company is appealing from this decision.

To prove their case against the defendant Company, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the decision in the criminal case
convicting Hernandez of homicide through reckless imprudence, the writs of execution to enforce the civil liability, and the returns of
the sheriff showing that the two writs of execution were not satisfied because of the insolvency of Hernandez, the sheriff being unable
to locate any property in his name. Over the objections of the Company, the trial court admitted this evidence and based its decision in
the present case on the same.

Defendant-appellant now contends that this kind of evidence is inadmissible and cities in support of its contention the cases of
City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Company (52 Phil., 586), and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric decided by this tribunal in the case of
Martinez vs. Barredo (81 Phil., 1). After considering the same two cases now cited by appellant, this court held that the judgment of
conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and offended party, is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable.

The appelant also claims that in admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of the writs of execution to prove the insolvency of
Hernandez, without requiring said opportunity to cross-examine said sheriff. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public
official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123, section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff's making the return need not testify in
court as to the facts stated in his entry. In the case of Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil., 151 citing Wigmore on Evidence, this court said:

To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving private documents an exception is made with reference to the
method of proving public documents executed before and certified to, under the land of seal of certain public officials. The courts and
the legislature have recognized the valid reason for such an exception. The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily
needed, the occasion in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The
public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official statements, host of
official would be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witness in court or delivering their depositions before an
Page1

officer. The work of Administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in
consequence.
 And this Court added:

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trust with accuracy
and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken of their
public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of
each a case may appear to require.

The appellant also contends that Article 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code were repealed by the New Civil Code,
promulgated in 1950, particularly, by the repealing clause under which comes Article 2270 of the said code. We find the contention
untenable. Article 2177 of the New Civil Code expressly recognizes civil liabilities arising from negligence under the Penal Code, only
that it provides that plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of omission of the defendant.

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of omission of the
defendant.

Invoking prescription, appellant claims that the present action is barred by the Statute of Limitations for the reason that it is an
action either upon a quasi delict, and that according to Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, such action must be instituted within four
years. We agree with the appellee that the present action is based upon a judgement, namely, that in the criminal case, finding
Hernandez guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentencing him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P3,000, and, consequently may be instituted within ten years.

As regards the other errors assigned by appellant, we find it unnecessary to discuss and rule upon them.

Finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. 155550 January 31, 2008

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

STEVEN P. CHIONG, respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 503082 which affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision3 holding petitioner Northwest
Airlines, Inc. (Northwest) liable for breach of contract of carriage.

On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent of
TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOcean’s vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego,
California Port. Under the service crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary of US$440.00 and a
monthly overtime pay of US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one year.

Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOcean’s agent at
the San Diego Port, confirming Chiong’s arrival thereat in time to board the M/V Elbiawhich was set to sail on April 1, 1989 (California,
United States time). For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California with a
departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. Ten (10) days before his scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire family from
Samar and brought them to Manila to see him off at the airport.

On April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport4 (MIA), at about 6:30 a.m., three (3) hours before the
scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimare’s Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to
the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiong’s seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiong’s passport
was duly stamped, after complying with government requirements for departing seafarers.

Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest check-in counter. When it was Chiong’s
turn, the Northwest personnel5 informed him that his name did not appear in the computer’s list of confirmed departing passengers.
Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwest’s counters from whom Chiong could allegedly
obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached the "man in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor. Without
the said amount, and anxious to board the plane, Chiong queued a number of times at Northwest’s Check-in Counter and presented his
ticket. However, the Northwest personnel at the counter told him to simply wait and that he was being a pest.

Frustrated, Chiong went to Calvo at the PCG counter and inquired if she had money so he could obtain a boarding pass from the
"man in barong." Calvo, who already saw that something was amiss, insisted that Chiong’s plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he
could check-in smoothly and board the plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a boarding pass. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed
to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia by April 1,
1989 (California, U.S.A. time).

It appears that Chiong’s name was crossed out and substituted with "W. Costine" in Northwest’s Air Passenger Manifest.6

In a letter dated April 3, 1989, Chiong’s counsel demanded as recompense: (1) the amount equivalent to Chiong’s salary under
the latter’s Crew Agreement7 with TransOcean; (2) P15,000.00 for Chiong’s expenses in fetching and bringing his family from Samar to
Manila; (3) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P500,000.00 as legal fees.8

Northwest demurred. Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the RTC.
Northwest filed a Motion to Dismiss9 the complaint citing the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but
the trial court denied the same.10
Page1
 In its Answer,11 Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong
had no cause of action against it because per its records, Chiong was a "no-show" passenger for Northwest Flight No. 24 on April 1,
1989.

In the RTC’s Pre-trial Order12 based on the parties’ respective Pre-trial Briefs,13 the triable issues were limited to the following:

(a) Whether [Chiong] was bumped-off by [Northwest] from Flight NW 24 or whether [Chiong] "no-showed" for said flight.

(b) If defendant is found guilty of having breached its contract of carriage with plaintiff, what damages are awardable to plaintiff
and how much.

In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990, filed a separate criminal complaint for False Testimony14
against Chiong based on the latter’s testimony that he did not leave the Philippines after April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his
seaman service record book that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on October 5 of the same year. Chiong did not
participate in the preliminary investigation; thus, on December 14, 1990, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information against
Chiong with the RTC Manila, Branch 54, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-89722.

In the meantime, after a flurry of motions filed by Northwest in the civil case were denied by the RTC, Northwest filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.15 Correlatively, Northwest moved for a suspension of the
proceedings before the trial court. However, both the Petition forCertiorari and Motion for Suspension of the proceedings were denied
by the CA and RTC, respectively.16

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for
breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled that the evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was
deliberately prevented from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an American passenger by the
name of W. Costine.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant
liable to plaintiff in damages by reason of the latter’s inability to take defendant’s NW Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, for the following
amounts:

1) U.S.$8,447.0017 or its peso equivalent at the time of finality of this judgment with legal interests until fully paid, representing
compensatory damages due to plaintiff’s loss of income for one (1) year as a direct result of defendant’s breach of contract of carriage;

2) P15,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing plaintiff’s actual incurred damages as a consequence of his failure to avail of
defendant’s Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989;

3) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing moral damages suffered and sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
defendant’s breach of contract of carriage;

4) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing exemplary or punitive damages due to plaintiff from defendant, owing to the
latter’s breach of contract of carriage with malice and fraud; and

5) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, for and as attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. Identical to the RTC’s findings, those of the CA were as follows: on April
1, 1989, Chiong was at the MIA three hours before the 10:15 a.m. departure time for Northwest Flight No. 24. Contrary to Northwest’s
claim that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, the CA likewise concluded, as the RTC did, that Chiong was not allowed to check-in and
was not issued a boarding pass at the Northwest check-in counter to accommodate a certain W. Costine. As for Northwest’s defense
that Chiong had left the country after April 1, 1989 and worked for M/V Elbia, the CA ruled that Northwest’s failure to raise this
defense in its Answer or Motion to Dismiss is equivalent to a waiver thereof. The CA declared that, in any event, Northwest failed to
present any evidence to prove that Chiong had worked under the original crew agreement.

Hence, this recourse.

Northwest ascribes grievous errors to the CA when the appellate court ruled that: (1) Northwest breached the contract of
carriage with Chiong who was present at the MIA on April 1, 1989 to board Northwest’s Flight No. 24; (2) As a result of the breach,
Northwest is liable to Chiong for compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit; and (3)
Northwest’s Exhibits "2" and "3," the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record, respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought
to be excluded from the records.

The petition must fail.

We are in complete accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that Northwest breached the contract of carriage with
Chiong, and as such, he is entitled to compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

Northwest contends that Chiong, as a "no-show" passenger on April 1, 1989, already defaulted in his obligation to abide by the
terms and conditions of the contract of carriage;18 and thus, Northwest could not have been in breach of its reciprocal obligation to
transport Chiong. In sum, Northwest insists that Chiong’s testimony is a complete fabrication, supposedly demonstrated by the
following: (1) Chiong’s seaman service record book reflects that he left the Philippines after April 1, 1989, specifically on April 17, 1989,
to board the M/V Elbia, and was discharged therefrom upon his personal request; (2) the Information filed against Chiong for False
Testimony; and (3) the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record both indicate that he was a "no-show" passenger.

We are not convinced.

The records reveal that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of proof required in civil cases, i.e.,
Page1

preponderance of evidence. Section 1 of Rule 133 provides:

 SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved
lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though preponderance is not necessarily with
the greater number.

In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiong’s evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket for the April
1, 1989 Flight No. 24, Chiong’s passport and seaman service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of
Calvo, Florencio Gomez,19 and Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified the signature
and stamp of the PCG on Chiong’s passport.

We have scoured the records, and found no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that factual findings of the lower courts
deserve the utmost respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal.20 Indeed, Chiong’s Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1,
1989, coupled with the PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he was present at MIA on said date
as he intended to fly to the United States on board that flight. As testified to by POEA personnel and officers, the PCG stamp indicates
that a departing seaman has passed through the PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied with government
requirements for departing seafarers. Calvo, Philimare’s liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at the airport, corroborated Chiong’s
testimony on the latter’s presence at the MIA and his check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further testified that she
purposely stayed at the PCG counter to confirm that Chiong was able to board the plane, as it was part of her duties as Philimare’s
liaison officer, to confirm with their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the seafarer had left the country and commenced travel to
the designated port where the vessel is docked.21 Thus, she had observed that Chiong was unable to check-in and board Northwest
Flight No. 24, and was actually being given the run-around by Northwest personnel.

It is of no moment that Chiong’s witnesses – who all corroborated his testimony on his presence at the airport on, and flight
details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was subsequently bumped-off – are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an interest
in the outcome of this case. We intoned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,22 thus:

(T)his Court has repeatedly held that a witness’ relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her
testimony. While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in
nature. If a witness’ relationship with a party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the quantum of
evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where
the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence.

The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, amply establish the fact that Chiong was present at MIA
on April 1, 1989, passed through the PCG counter without delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but when he presented
his confirmed ticket thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 on that
day.

In stark contrast is Northwest’s bare-faced claim that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, and was scheduled to leave the
country only on April 17, 1989. As previously discussed, the records belie this assertion. It is also noteworthy that Northwest did not
present any evidence to support its belated defense that Chiong departed from the Philippines on April 17, 1989 to work as Third
Engineer on board M/V Elbia under the original crew agreement.

It is true that Chiong’s passport and seaman service record book indicate that he had left the country on April 17, 1989 and come
back on October 5 of the same year. However, this evidence fails to debunk the facts established to have transpired on April 1, 1989,
more particularly, Chiong’s presence at the airport and his subsequent bumping-off by Northwest despite a confirmed ticket. Although
initially, the burden of proof was with Chiong to prove that there was a breach of contract of carriage, the burden of evidence shifted
to Northwest when Chiong adduced sufficient evidence to prove the facts he had alleged. At that point, Northwest had the burden of
going forward23 to controvert Chiong’s prima facie case. As the party asserting that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, Northwest
then had the burden of evidence to establish its claim. Regrettably, Northwest failed to do so.

Furthermore, it has not escaped our attention that Northwest, despite the declaration in its Pre-Trial Brief, did not present as a
witness their check-in agent on that contentious date.24 This omission was detrimental to Northwest’s case considering its claim that
Chiong did not check-in at their counters on said date. It simply insisted that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger and totally relied on
the Flight Manifest, which, curiously, showed a horizontal line drawn across Chiong’s name, and the name W. Costine written above it.
The reason for the insertion, or for Chiong’s allegedly being a "no-show" passenger, is not even recorded on the remarks column of the
Flight Manifest beside the Passenger Name column. Clearly, the categorical declaration of Chiong and his other witnesses, coupled with
the PCG stamp on his passport and seaman service record book, prevails over Northwest’s evidence, particularly the Flight Manifest.
Thus, we are perplexed why, despite the evidence presented by Chiong, and the RTC’s specific order to Northwest’s counsel to present
the person(s) who prepared the Flight Manifest and Passenger Name Record for a proper identification of, and to testify on, those
documents, Northwest still insisted on presenting Gonofredo Mendoza and Amelia Meris who were, admittedly, not competent to
testify thereon.25

In its desperate attempt to evade liability for the breach, Northwest claims that Chiong worked at M/V Elbia when he left the
Philippines on April 17, 1989. The argument was not only belatedly raised, as we have repeatedly stated, but is off-tangent.

On this point, we uphold the RTC’s and CA’s ruling that the failure of Northwest to raise the foregoing defense in its Motion to
Dismiss or Answer constituted a waiver thereof. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.— Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred
by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

Page1

SECTION 8. Omnibus Motion.— Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment,
or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
 Moreover, Northwest paints a scenario that ostensibly transpired on a different date. Even if Chiong left the Philippines on April
17, 1989, it would not necessarily prove that Chiong was a "no-show" on April 1, 1989. Neither does it negate the already established
fact that Chiong had a confirmed ticket for April 1, 1989, and first passed through the PCG counter without delay, then reached and
was at the Northwest check-in counters on time for the scheduled flight.

Essentially, Northwest argues that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger on two (2) separate occasions, March 28 and April 1, 1989
because he was actually scheduled to depart for the US on April 17, 1989 as ostensibly evidenced by his passport and seaman record
book. Had this new matter alleged been proven by Northwest, it would prevent or bar recovery by Chiong. Unfortunately, Northwest
was unsuccessful in proving not only the "no-show" claim, but that Chiong, likewise, worked under the original crew agreement.

Northwest likewise insists – now that there is a pending criminal case for False Testimony against Chiong – that a falsified part of
Chiong’s testimony would indicate the falsity of his entire testimony, consistent with the "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus"26 doctrine.
Following Northwest’s flawed logic, this would invariably lead to the conclusion that the corroborating testimonies of Chiong’s
witnesses are also false.

The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive rule of law and is not strictly applied in this
jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material
points. The principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the
testimony. However, the records show that Chiong’s testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet,
Northwest never even attempted to explain or impugn the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, and
that his passport was accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.

As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final determination, as yet, of Chiong’s guilt by the courts. But even if
Chiong is adjudged guilty, it will have little effect on the outcome of this case. As we held in Leyson v. Lawa:27

The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts
established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.

It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one question may be supplied or explained as
qualified by his answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. The
doctrine deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal
application. The testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others:

xxxx

Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:

It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless— first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains
in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others, it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly,
in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore
it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper
force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points
wholly unimportant in themselves.

From the foregoing disquisition, the ineluctable conclusion is that Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong.

Time and again, we have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case, air transport, is primarily intended to serve the
traveling public and thus, imbued with public interest. The law governing common carriers consequently imposes an exacting standard
of conduct. As the aggrieved party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by
Northwest, as carrier, in order to be awarded compensatory and actual damages.

We reiterate that Northwest failed to prove its claim that Chiong worked on M/V Elbia from April 17 to October 5, 1989 under
the original crew agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s finding on Chiong’s entitlement to actual and compensatory
damages.

We, likewise, uphold the findings of both courts on Northwest’s liability for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an award of moral damages, in breaches of contract, is in order upon a
showing that the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.28 It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.29 It means breach of a known duty through
some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.30 Bad faith is in essence a question of intention.31

In the case at bench, the courts carefully examined the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts of Northwest indicative of
its inward motive. It is borne out by the records that Chiong was given the run-around at the Northwest check-in counter, instructed to
deal with a "man in barong" to obtain a boarding pass, and eventually barred from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 to accommodate
an American, W. Costine, whose name was merely inserted in the Flight Manifest, and did not even personally check-in at the
counter.32

Under the foregoing circumstances, the award of exemplary damages is also correct given the evidence that Northwest acted in
an oppressive manner towards Chiong.33

As for the award of attorney’s fees, while we recognize that it is sound policy not to set a premium on the right to litigate,34 we
sustain the lower courts’ award thereof.

Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest,35 or where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim.36 In the
case at bench, Northwest deliberately breached its contract of carriage with Chiong and then repeatedly refused to satisfy Chiong’s
valid, just and demandable claim. This unjustified refusal constrained Chiong to not only lose income under the crew agreement, but to
Page1

further incur expenses and exert effort for almost two (2) decades in order to protect his interests and vindicate his right. Therefore,
this Court deems it just and equitable to grant Chiong P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The award is reasonable in view of the time it has
taken for this case to be resolved.37

Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwest’s Exhibits "2" and "3" need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that the RTC and
CA correctly excluded these documents as hearsay evidence. We quote with favor the CA’s holding thereon, thus:

As a rule, "entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty". [Rule 130, Section 43,
Revised Rules of Court]

Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is necessary that: (a) the person who made the
entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (c) the
entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty; and (e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere hearsay evidence. While there is no
necessity to bring into court all the employees who individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person who supervised them
while they were making the entries testify that the account was prepared under his supervision and that the entries were regularly
entered in the ordinary course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has
no personal knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he did not supervise the preparation thereof. More importantly, no
evidence was presented to prove that the employee who made the entries was dead nor did the defendant-appellant set forth the
circumstances that would show the employee’s inability to testify.38

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50308 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.

HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at
their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-
witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
"Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact.
Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against
Webb, et al.1

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the
accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the
others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security
guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and
Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented
the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to
show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness
Page1

in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The
trial court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no
lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she
would get the support and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their
defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence
corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused
guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded
damages to Lauro Vizconde.3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years
minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that
the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered
Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing
her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five members voted three against two to
deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the
safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the
prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been
turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to
preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the
government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that
would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately,
the controlling issues are:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in
committing the crime.

The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its commission.

The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due
process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken
from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It
is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her
credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela
cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA
fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then
he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying
that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing,
the ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the
accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical
expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have
the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently,
the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither
Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he
had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken
Page1

against him and the other accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the
trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done
pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test.
Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would
be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaro’s Story

Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at
around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey
P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro
recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Parañaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in
December 1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl, whom she later identified
as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan
Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and
Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed
the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When
Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet
since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to
drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons
Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue.
Carmela was at their garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a
while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the
kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her car’s headlights twice when she approached the
pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.

Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre
Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and
relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro
told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela’s male companion, Webb’s mood changed for the rest of
the evening ("bad trip").

Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time
for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others
responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third
time. They arrived at Carmela’s house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez
approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout
("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo."
When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but
he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On
entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it
("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for
the dining area.

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going and she replied that she
was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro
smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro
immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked
her, "Okay ba?"

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route. The interior of the
house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining
table. When she asked him what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he
wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the
bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a
static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom
from where the noise came, opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she
saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of
the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining area. He told her,
"Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in
her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
Page1

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told
him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they
reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down.
Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.

The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village.
They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who
remained outside the Vizconde house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and finally,
Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him
molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall,
and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up
someone on his cellular phone.

At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and
said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We don’t
know each other. We haven’t seen each other…baka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house.12

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by
relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an
"asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She
had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force
(AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her
handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious
drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that
killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the
privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she
unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed
interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press
her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?

xxxx

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre
of the Vizconde family. That’s what she told me, Your Honor.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what did you say?

xxxx

A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she promised that in due time, she will
bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.

xxxx

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. No, sir.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could
not and the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what happened after that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong…"

COURT:

How was that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:
Page1

A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang ‘yan."
 xxxx

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang yan?"

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.

(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene
of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was talking about what the police
found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and charged them with the crime. The police
prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided.
Alfaro’s NBI handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices
and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.

Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as
fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some
of its details with the physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone
wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend.
Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up
some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense.
From Alfaro’s narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get
away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the
neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang
members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a
kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and
the car key.

Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never
mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on
the table for the front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the
crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light.
The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This
made sense since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some
passersby might look in and see what they were doing.

Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the car’s
hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do
in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make
sense for Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work.lavvphil After claiming that they had
solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the
preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not
pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the
trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely.
She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez,
a drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro
at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a
disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this
Page1

case.13
 Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with him but it was too late to
change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of
the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.

One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were supposed to be Webb’s co-
principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had
hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when
they got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car, which was parked on the street between
Carmela’s house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the
street light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house.
Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.

Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a
mall. So why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More
inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?

They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to
gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there
until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to
think clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-free mind
can?

Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that
Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own
car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s boyfriend.
Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical
witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.

Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they
were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a
woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others
into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On
hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came
on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away
because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of
getting involved in what was not her business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to
change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to
watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the master’s bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her
young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she
hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on
the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified
that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that
they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing
indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution presented six additional witnesses:

Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds
they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmela’s genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991.
He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the
dead bodies in the master’s bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set.16

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan
Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could
not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not
notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.

But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group
enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of
cars went back the second time in the direction of Carmela’s house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse
without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.
Page1

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when
he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom
before Alfaro’s first visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not
notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s testimony about the movements of
the persons involved.

Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle convoy,17White claimed it
was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that
Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony.1avvphi1

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May or
the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the
guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would
see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided there. Cabanacan
replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted
on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed
Webb to pass without being logged in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.18

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to challenge a
Congressman’s son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to
prescribed procedure, record the visitor’s entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of
seeing Webb’s ID but not in recording the visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she
saw Webb at his parents’ house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two
brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and
shorts, passing through a secret door near the maid’s quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service
at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She
could not remember any of the details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic
memory and this only damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’'s testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20
She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have
been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muñoz, the Webbs' security
aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was
not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the
rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the
laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called
Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt
home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.

Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was
with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m.
This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong
returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief.
She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong
supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision
guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following
morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal
valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?

At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for
failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to
connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a
rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a Parañaque politician’s son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to
insist on finding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and
Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight.
She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.

5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that Carmela and Webb had been
sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-
rape her is totally uncorroborated!

For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news among her circle of
Page1

friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if
Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had
become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.
 But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her friends’ friends would testify ever hearing of such
relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is like
an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit
into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor
concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought
the way it looked was also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again,
none of Carmela’s relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come
forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a
role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere
ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to
learn the value of independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to
San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his
travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the
eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy
Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida
party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.24

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight
808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared
and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest.27

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the
U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on
March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,28 the
computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated August
31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to
Gloria’s house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In
April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same
month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in the
Philippines.32

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills, California.33 During his stay there,
he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest control
company.35 Webb presented the company’s logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other
employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license38 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39

On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same day, his father
introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and
Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman’s,
Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of
California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic
citations.45

On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center
issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had
a lakeside picnic.49

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for
Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time,
playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary
Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the Rodriguez’s home in August
1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26,
1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his
departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the
U.S. Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of
Page1

the US-INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the
Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
 When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his
passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who
processed Webb’s reentry.56 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again
saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot
stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother
and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other
defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head
that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that
such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For
how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from
a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime
should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a
truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the
truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies
about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency
for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals
themselves. She was the prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play
the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She
took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at
the front door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene feature.
She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical
evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward
position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light and foot
prints on the car hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to
take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a
street light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to
rape Carmela. Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the
bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.

To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a lover on
Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her
swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she nonetheless
returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite inexplicable.

Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive
identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.

f. A documented alibi

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place
at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58

The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Parañaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was
not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29,
1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations,
smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically
makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this
unjust and inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for
the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But
this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign
airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could
Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly
departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and
Page1

plausible answer to these questions.

 The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record.
But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to
examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice when a party does not want to
leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a
faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure from that country were
authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to
accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this
was unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the
official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true.60

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s
passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify
on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and
disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record.61

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it
had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court
of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful
admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo
Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper
diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate
in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting
Chief of the Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State
Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all available
information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the
appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are
entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the
Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not
have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and
not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as
well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible
for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took
only about twelve to fourteen hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books
and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the
presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport and the certifications of the
Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the
unknown that it planted in the lower court’s minds.

7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano,
Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the
crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the
evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused
since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it
would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of
meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her
handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention
unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this
Decision.
Page1

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
 G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966

THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants,

vs.

CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.

Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for the respondents.

Bernabe Africa, etc. for the petitioners.

MAKALINTAL., J.:

This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dismissing petitioners' second amended complaint against respondents.

The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. It appears that in the afternoon of March 18, 1948
a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was
being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose
was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them.
Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the
station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the
fire.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised
due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.

The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire
Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Portions of the first two reports are as follows:

1. Police Department report: —

Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948, while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a tank truck,
plate No. T-5292 into the underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street,
this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of the said underground tank.
Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the truck
with the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the flames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was
spouting. It burned the truck and the following accessorias and residences.

2. The Fire Department report: —

In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic) subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand,
the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which is submitted herewith. it appears in this
picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which according to information gathered in the neighborhood
contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the gasoline pumps and the underground tanks.

The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline
station and what the chief of the fire department had told him on the same subject.

The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by the Court of Appeals and hence inadmissible. This ruling is now
assigned as error. It is contended: first, that said reports were admitted by the trial court without objection on the part of respondents;
secondly, that with respect to the police report (Exhibit V-Africa) which appears signed by a Detective Zapanta allegedly "for Salvador
Capacillo," the latter was presented as witness but respondents waived their right to cross-examine him although they had the
opportunity to do so; and thirdly, that in any event the said reports are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under section 35
of Rule 123, now Rule 130.

The first contention is not borne out by the record. The transcript of the hearing of September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170) shows that
the reports in question, when offered as evidence, were objected to by counsel for each of respondents on the ground that they were
hearsay and that they were "irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent." Indeed, in the court's resolution only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6
were admitted without objection; the admission of the others, including the disputed ones, carried no such explanation.

On the second point, although Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand, he was not examined and he did not testify as to
the facts mentioned in his alleged report (signed by Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was one of those who investigated "the
location of the fire and, if possible, gather witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he brought the report with him. There was nothing,
therefore, on which he need be cross-examined; and the contents of the report, as to which he did not testify, did not thereby become
competent evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony would still have been objectionable as far as information gathered by
him from third persons was concerned.

Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves, that is, without further testimonial evidence on their contents, fall
within the scope of section 35, Rule 123, which provides that "entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated."

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
Page1

Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to
the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? As to some facts the sources thereof are not even
identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro
Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at the time to the underground tank of the station; and to
respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their
statements as "official information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only
must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.1

The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the
reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.

The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should
apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees. Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine in
the instant case on the grounds that "as to (its) applicability ... in the Philippines, there seems to he nothing definite," and that while
the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, "in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine." The
question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine has actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu
vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. (CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949), wherein the decision of the Court of Appeals was
penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes now a member of the Supreme Court.

The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows:

In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while the plaintiff-appellee and other companions were loading grass between the
municipalities of Bay and Calauan, in the province of Laguna, with clear weather and without any wind blowing, an electric
transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development Co., Inc. alongside the road, suddenly
parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received the
full shock of 4,400 volts carried by the wire and was knocked unconscious to the ground. The electric charge coursed through his body
and caused extensive and serious multiple burns from skull to legs, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and causing intense pain
and wounds that were not completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after the mishap.

The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence, but
the appellate court overruled the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said:

The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to place appellant on its defense. While it is the rule, as
contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principal that "where the
thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendant's want of care."

And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit
Co. v. Requena, 244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680.) This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself), and is
peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every right to be on the highway, and the electric
wire was under the sole control of defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair
weather and injure people, unless they are subjected to unusual strain and stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance
and supervision; just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure passersby, unless some one was
negligent. (Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & Co. 722; 159 Eng. Reprint 299, the leading case that established that rule). Consequently, in the
absence of contributory negligence (which is admittedly not present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable
presumption of negligence in its installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock, "if there are any
facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove."

It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not lay down doctrines binding on the Supreme Court, but we do not
consider this a reason for not applying the particular doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a highly combustible
material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as
it arises almost invariably from some act of man. A case strikingly similar to the one before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation,
et al., 171 So. 447:

Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city of Hammon which in the year 1934 was leased to the Shell Petroleum
Corporation for a gasoline filling station. On October 8, 1934, during the term of the lease, while gasoline was being transferred from
the tank wagon, also operated by the Shell Petroleum Corporation, to the underground tank of the station, a fire started with resulting
damages to the building owned by Jones. Alleging that the damages to his building amounted to $516.95, Jones sued the Shell
Petroleum Corporation for the recovery of that amount. The judge of the district court, after hearing the testimony, concluded that
plaintiff was entitled to a recovery and rendered judgment in his favor for $427.82. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
this judgment, on the ground the testimony failed to show with reasonable certainty any negligence on the part of the Shell Petroleum
Corporation or any of its agents or employees. Plaintiff applied to this Court for a Writ of Review which was granted, and the case is
now before us for decision.1äwphï1.ñët

In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:

Plaintiff's petition contains two distinct charges of negligence — one relating to the cause of the fire and the other relating to the
spreading of the gasoline about the filling station.

Other than an expert to assess the damages caused plaintiff's building by the fire, no witnesses were placed on the stand by the
defendant.

Taking up plaintiff's charge of negligence relating to the cause of the fire, we find it established by the record that the filling
station and the tank truck were under the control of the defendant and operated by its agents or employees. We further find from the
uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff's witnesses that fire started in the underground tank attached to the filling station while it was
being filled from the tank truck and while both the tank and the truck were in charge of and being operated by the agents or
Page1

employees of the defendant, extended to the hose and tank truck, and was communicated from the burning hose, tank truck, and
escaping gasoline to the building owned by the plaintiff.
 Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of defendant's failure to explain the cause of the fire or to show
its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the doctrine
may be successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them.

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J. #768, p.
1193).

This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely approved and adopted by the courts of last resort. Some of the
cases in this jurisdiction in which the doctrine has been applied are the following, viz.: Maus v. Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25 So. 977;
Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, etc., Co., 111 La. 522, 35 So. 731, 64 L.R.A. 101, 100 Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 115 La.
63, 38 So. 892; Bents v. Page, 115 La. 560, 39 So. 599.

The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano of the Manila Police Department (Exh. X-1 Africa) the following appears:

Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed that the Caltex Gasoline Station complained of occupies a lot approximately 10 m x
10 m at the southwest corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo. The location is within a very busy business district near the Obrero Market,
a railroad crossing and very thickly populated neighborhood where a great number of people mill around t

until

gasoline

tever be theWactjvities of these peopleor lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded and this constitute a secondary hazard to its
operation which in turn endangers the entire neighborhood to conflagration.

Furthermore, aside from precautions already taken by its operator the concrete walls south and west adjoining the
neighborhood are only 2-1/2 meters high at most and cannot avoid the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.

Records show that there have been two cases of fire which caused not only material damages but desperation and also panic in
the neighborhood.

Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated, this gasoline service station is also used by its operator as a garage and
repair shop for his fleet of taxicabs numbering ten or more, adding another risk to the possible outbreak of fire at this already small but
crowded gasoline station.

The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal
observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the
location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the presumption of
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those
which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. There is no more eloquent demonstration of this than
the statement of Leandro Flores before the police investigator. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and
without assistance, was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said: "Before
loading the underground tank there were no people, but while the loading was going on, there were people who went to drink coca-
cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank was
almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he, heard someone shout
"fire."

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the
part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was
the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would
predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the
cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.

There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the second amended complaint that "the fire was
caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant, passed through the gasoline
station and negligently threw a lighted match in the premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the allegation to
be true — certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken against Boquiren — it does not extenuate his
negligence. A decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the present case, states the rule which we find
acceptable here. "It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of protection to the public
proportionate to and commensurate with a danger involved ... we think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the
effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and
substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor from liability.' (Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, p. 1184, #439). Stated in
another way, "The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of
negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury." (MacAfee, et al.
vs. Traver's Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)

The next issue is whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants. This issue depends on whether
Boquiren was an independent contractor, as held by the Court of Appeals, or an agent of Caltex. This question, in the light of the facts
not controverted, is one of law and hence may be passed upon by this Court. These facts are: (1) Boquiren made an admission that he
was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised
Page1

control over Boquiren in the management of the state; (4) the delivery truck used in delivering gasoline to the station had the name of
CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees. (Exhibit
T-Africa; Exhibit U-Africa; Exhibit X-5 Africa; Exhibit X-6 Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa).

In Boquiren's amended answer to the second amended complaint, he denied that he directed one of his drivers to remove
gasoline from the truck into the tank and alleged that the "alleged driver, if one there was, was not in his employ, the driver being an
employee of the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the owners of the gasoline station." It is true that Boquiren later on amended his answer, and
that among the changes was one to the effect that he was not acting as agent of Caltex. But then again, in his motion to dismiss
appellants' second amended complaint the ground alleged was that it stated no cause of action since under the allegations thereof he
was merely acting as agent of Caltex, such that he could not have incurred personal liability. A motion to dismiss on this ground is
deemed to be an admission of the facts alleged in the complaint.

Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted at the
service station in question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would
reveal the nature of their relationship at the time of the fire. There must have been one in existence at that time. Instead, what was
presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case, since it was entered into shortly before the expiration
of the one-year period it was intended to operate. This so-called license agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on November 29,
1948, but made effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This retroactivity provision
is quite significant, and gives rise to the conclusion that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility with respect to
the fire, as shown by the clause that Caltex "shall not be liable for any injury to person or property while in the property herein
licensed, it being understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an employee, representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."

But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under that
agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein. He
could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, of
Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed
to be from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex
could at any time cancel and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct the business
with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex. Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to
Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter
was virtually an employee of the former.

Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his position to the company and the latter could remove him or
terminate his services at will; that the service station belonged to the company and bore its tradename and the operator sold only the
products of the company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged to the company and were just loaned to the operator
and the company took charge of their repair and maintenance; that an employee of the company supervised the operator and
conducted periodic inspection of the company's gasoline and service station; that the price of the products sold by the operator was
fixed by the company and not by the operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator indicated that he was a mere agent, the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the operator was an agent of the company and not an independent contractor should not be
disturbed.

To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the
contracting parties, should thereby a controversy as to what they really had intended to enter into, but the way the contracting parties
do or perform their respective obligations stipulated or agreed upon may be shown and inquired into, and should such performance
conflict with the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former must prevail over the latter. (Shell Company of the
Philippines, Ltd. vs. Firemens' Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil. 757).

The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of creating the apparent relationship of employer and independent
contractor, and of avoiding liability for the negligence of the employees about the station; but the company was not satisfied to allow
such relationship to exist. The evidence shows that it immediately assumed control, and proceeded to direct the method by which the
work contracted for should be performed. By reserving the right to terminate the contract at will, it retained the means of compelling
submission to its orders. Having elected to assume control and to direct the means and methods by which the work has to be
performed, it must be held liable for the negligence of those performing service under its direction. We think the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. (Gulf Refining Company v. Rogers, 57 S.W. 2d, 183).

Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in the station belonged to Boquiren. But no cash invoices were presented to show
that Boquiren had bought said gasoline from Caltex. Neither was there a sales contract to prove the same.

As found by the trial court the Africas sustained a loss of P9,005.80, after deducting the amount of P2,000.00 collected by them
on the insurance of the house. The deduction is now challenged as erroneous on the ground that Article 2207 of the New Civil Code,
which provides for the subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the insured, was not yet in effect when the loss took place. However,
regardless of the silence of the law on this point at that time, the amount that should be recovered be measured by the damages
actually suffered, otherwise the principle prohibiting unjust enrichment would be violated. With respect to the claim of the heirs of
Ong P7,500.00 was adjudged by the lower court on the basis of the assessed value of the property destroyed, namely, P1,500.00,
disregarding the testimony of one of the Ong children that said property was worth P4,000.00. We agree that the court erred, since it is
of common knowledge that the assessment for taxation purposes is not an accurate gauge of fair market value, and in this case should
not prevail over positive evidence of such value. The heirs of Ong are therefore entitled to P10,000.00.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants, and
ordered to pay them the aforesaid sum of P9,005.80 and P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of the complaint, and
costs.

G.R. No. L-48727 September 30, 1982

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
Page1

JOSEPH LEONES y DUCUSIN alias JESSIE, defendant-appellant.

 GUERRERO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, convicting the accused-appellant, Joseph
Leones y Ducusin, of the crime of rape charged in the following information, to wit:

The undersigned offended party after having been duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law hereby accuses JOSEPH LEONES
y DUCUSIN alias Jessie of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1973, in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused Joseph Leones y Ducusin alias Jessie, by means of violence and use of force
compelled the offended party to swallow tablets and consequently thereafter while she fell into semi-consciousness the said accused
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Irene Dulay against her will in the house of the accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence.

San Fernando, La Union, May 8,1973.

(SGD.) IRENE DULAY Offended Party

WITH MY CONFORMITY:

(SGD.) GAUDENCIO DULAY

(Father of the Offended Party)

and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the cost.

The facts are narrated in the People's brief as follows:

Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of Mr. & Mrs. Pepito Leones at San Fernando, La Union where she
resided.

On April 22, 1973, the complainant who had headache stayed in her room. Earlier that day, the members of the Leones family,
including the accused-appellant Joseph Leones and his sister Elizabeth, had gone to nearby beach resort for a picnic.

At about past noon the appellant and Elizabeth returned to their house. While there, the appellant and Elizabeth entered the
room where complainant was lying down and forced her to take three tablets dissolved in a spoon which according to them were
aspirin. The complainant refused to take the tablets but was forced to do so when the appellant held her mouth while his sister pushed
the medicine. Then the appellant and Elizabeth left the room and after a while the complainant felt dizzy.

Later, the appellant returned to the complainant's room and took of her panty. Then the appellant went on top of her. The
complainant tried to push him but as she was weak and dizzy, the appellant succeeded in abusing her (pp. 2-8,15-16, tsn, June 27,
1975).

At about 4:30 P.M. of the same date, Natividad Leones, the stepmother of the appellant, found the complainant unconscious
near her room without any panty on. She was then taken to the La Union Provincial Hospital by the driver of the Leones family (pp. 3-5,
tsn, June 10, 1976).

When admitted to the hospital at about 6:00 P.M. of the same date (April 22, 1973), the complainant was semiconscious,
incoherent and hysterical. She refused to talk and to be examined by the doctors. She was irritated when approached by a male figure
(Exhibit "B", Records, pp. 280-281). The complainant was first attended to by Dr. Antonino Estioco who found out that she had vaginal
bleeding (Exhibit "2", Records, p. 786). The complainant was then referred to Dr. Fe Cayao who was informed by Dr. Estioco that she
might have been a victim of rape (p. 28, tsn, May 15, 1974). In the presence of the complainant's father, Dr. Cayao examined her on
April 26, 1973 after which she issued a medical certificate with the following findings:

1. Presence of erythema of the vestibular portion of external genitalia;

2. Healing lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock;

3. Easily admit one finger with pain;

4. Unclotted blood at the vaginal cavity;

5. Smear exam for sperm cell-negative;

6. D'plococci-negative

7. Florence test-reagent not available.

(Exhibit "A", Records, p. 3).

Because of the lack of facilities in the hospital, Dr. Cayao was not able to make any examination to determine whether drug was
given to the complainant. (pp. 23- 24, tsn, May 15, 1974. 1

The accused-appellant denied the charge imputed to him, claiming that at the time of the alleged rape between 2:00 o'clock and
3:00 o'clock p.m. on April 22, 1973, he was at the beach resort with the other members of the family, namely his sister Elizabeth, his
stepmother Natividad Leones, his younger brothers and sisters named Marivic, Theresa, Carol, Pinky and Bongbong together with
other companions, for a picnic and had lunch thereat, swimming and picture-taking.

As indicated earlier, the trial court, holding that "viewed from all legal aspects of this case, in the light of the recorded
evidence, ... is fully convinced that the crime of rape charged in the criminal complaint was committed by the accused. The evidence
presented by the prosecution is not only clear and convincing but has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."
Page1

From this sentence, the accused appeals to Us, strongly submitting that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crime
charged since the evidence presented against him did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 At the outset, We note a number of significant facts from the recorded evidence of the prosecution which materially and
substantially debunks and derails the theory of the Government and correspondingly impresses considerable merit to the defense.

1. The clinical case record of Irene Dulay's admission and confinement at the Provincial Hospital of La Union, marked Exhibit "2",
contain entries which totally and completely belle the claim of the complainant that she was raped by the accused in the afternoon of
April 22, 1973. The same is reproduced hereunder:

LA UNION PROVINCIAL HOSPITAL

San Fernando, La Union

CLINICAL CASE RECORD

Fiscal Yr.: 1973 Physician: Physician:

Adm. No.: 275 Admitted by: Dr. Estioco

File No. or Rec. No. Approved by:

Ped.: City Free:

Surg.: Transient free:

Dept. Obs.: Classif. Govt. free;

Med.: Prvt. free:

EENT: Hosp. pay:

C.U. Off. Hosp. pay:

Dental: Off. Prvt. pay:

Name of Patient: Irene Dulay

Maiden name: ____________________

Residence: San Fernando, La Union

In case of accident or death notify Natividad Leones, (employer)

Charge Hosp. Acct. to: _______________________________________

Age: 16 yrs. Single: Married; Widowed: Nationality Fil.

Admitted: 6:00 P.M. 4-22-1973 Assgd PR: I Bed by Dr. Estioco

Transf: P.M.____19____ to Dept: PR Ward #: ______ Bed # ______

Complaints: Vaginal bleeding

Diagnosis in full:

Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen.

Results: Rec.: Disposition:, Disch:

Imprv: Disd:

Unimprov: Abcond: 3:45 P.M.

Died: Transf Hosp. 5-12-73

Operation: _____________________________________

Anesthesia: _____________________________________

History written by: APPROVED:

(SGD.) ESTIOCO (unintelligible)

(Resident Physician) Dept. Head

The entry written in the above clinical record when Irene Dulay was admitted under the item "Complaints" reads: Vaginal
Bleeding, and below this entry appears the Diagnosis-Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen. Assuming that the
victim was raped between 2 and 3 o'clock p.m., April 22, 1973 (the same day she was admitted in the hospital), then the lacerations of
the hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock would not have been described and indicated to be Healing in the clinical case record. It would
be described as "laceration fresh" or by similar words like "bloody or new lacerations." There is no instant formula, technique or
process known to medical science or by human experience to hasten the healing of a lacerated hymen within three (3) hours or so
after defloration.

Citing from the book, Legal Medicine by Pedro P. Solis, M.D., Ll B Medico Legal Officer, National Bureau of Investigation,
Department (now Ministry) of Justice, We have the following comment on:

Healing time of laceration of the hymen:

Page1

Superficial laceration of the hymen may heal in two or three days.

 More extensive tear may require longer time, usually seven to ten days.

Complicated types and those with intervening infection may cause delay in the healing depending upon the extent of the
involvement of the surrounding tissue and the degree of infection. Complicated laceration may even require surgical intervention." (p.
302, Emphasis supplied.)

Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock of the hymen which was then already healing on April 22,
1973, it follows reasonably that the defloration occurred several days before, which may have happened when Irene Dulay took a
week-long vacation to her hometown in Pugo, La Union (tsn, p. 10, June 27, 1975) and there is evidence that she had a suitor named
Ferdinand Sarmiento who is from nearby Agoo, La Union. And when she returned to the house of her employer in San Fernando, La
Union, she had already chest and stomach pains and a headache.

The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her admission in the hospital on April 22, 1973, her
complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance
of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital. (Rule 130, See. 38, Rules of Court). In the
case at bar, Dr. Antonino Estioco was the admitting physician but unfortunately, he was not presented as a witness for the
government.

In connection with Exhibit "2", there is one piece of damaging evidence which not only derogates the theory of the prosecution
but also cannot be explained by the government, and that is the frank testimony of Dr. Fe Cayao herself, thus:

Q — The question is: did you not discover through reading the clinical history of the patient that the woman was not complaining
of alleged rape?

A — It was not indicated here that she was complaining of an alleged rape.

Q — There was not a single word in the clinical record of the victim that she was the victim of an alleged rape, is that correct?

A — Yes. (tsn, pp. 27-28, May 15,1974)

2. From the same clinical case record, Exhibit "2", it appears clearly that the alleged victim, Irene Dulay, was having her
menstrual period when she was supposedly raped for the Complaint indicated that she had vaginal bleeding. She herself admitted in
her testimony that on April 22, 1973, she was having her menstruation. (tsn, p. 9, June 27, 1975).

It is quite abnormal and unnatural, almost unheard of in human experience and behavior that a man would have sexual
intercourse with a woman then having her menstrual period, as was the admitted condition of the complainant when she was allegedly
abused by the accused. And because of this universal abhorrence, taboo and distaste to have sexual contact with a menstruating
female and this is so however passionate and lustful the man way be unless he is depraved or demented. We cannot believe that the
accused-appellant, a young fourth year college student of civil engineering studying in Baguio City, would break or violate such a taboo
by drugging the complainant girl with the help of her sister and afterwards have sex relations with her in her menstrual condition.

3. When the complainant was investigated by the police, she declared in her affidavit, Exhibit "5", the following answers to these
questions:

5. Q — Why are you in this office?

A — I came here with the purpose of giving my voluntary statement in connection with the incident that happened to me in the
house of my employer and I want to file a formal complaint against the persons who offended me, sir.

6. Q — Who are those persons who offended you, if you know?

A — They are Joseph alias Jessie and Elizabeth both surnamed Leones, the son and daughter of Mr. Pepito Leones, my employer.

7. Q — When did that incident happened?

A — At about between the hours of 2:00 & 3:00 in the afternoon of April 22, 1973, sir.

8. Q — What did these Joseph and Elizabeth do against you?

A — Because I was suffering headache at that time because it was the first day of my menstrual period, they were inviting me to
go with them to Wallace and I told them that I have a headache then later they forced me to take in aspirin tablets, three (3) tablets
then after a few seconds, I begun to feel dizzy and halfconscious.

9. Q — Do you know if what you have forcely taken and given by the two, Joseph and Elizabeth were really aspirin tablets?

A — I do not know, but they were white in color similar to aspirin tablets but after I have taken them I felt dizzy then
unconscious.

10. Q — In what manner did Joseph Leones and Elizabeth Leones force you to take in the tablets?

A — At about that time and date I mentioned above, I was then lying on my bed in my room at their residence, then Jessie and
Elizabeth came in. Joseph alias Jessie took hold of my throat with one hand and pressed it hard that I was almost choked up, his other
hand held my both cheeks his thumb and forefinger pressed hard to forcely. open my mouth while Elizabeth held a spoon containing
the three (3) tablets then I was told by them to swallow the pills. I could not resist so I swallowed the pills then later I felt dizzy as if the
world was turning around.

Thus, it would appear from the above recorded evidence that the accused Joseph Leones and his sister Elizabeth, helped and
conspired with each other in the commission of the crime of rape against the offended party, an assumption that is hardly believable
for it would lead to the absurb conclusions that Elizabeth was a principal by cooperation and that both Joseph and Elizabeth had
planned the rape for they conveniently provided themselves beforehand with the necessary drug.
Page1
 It further appears in the record that the Philippine Constabulary in La Union did not believe the existence of rape when Felicidad
Boado reported the incident (tsn, p. 25, June 18, 1974), which disbelief may reasonably be attributed to the unnatural and unusual
version of the complainant that another of her own sex had conspired and confabulated in the commission of the alleged defilement.

4. The complainant, Irene Dulay, had declared in her affidavit, Exhibit " 5 ", in answer to question No. 9 that after she had taken
the tablets that were white in color similar to aspirin tablets, she felt dizzy, then unconscious. In her testimony at the trial, however,
she testified that after she had taken the tablets, she felt dizzy and felt the removal of her panty and that when he went on top of her,
he inserted his private parts into her private parts (tsn, pp. 6-7, June 27, 1975), but on cross-exmination, she said that she became
unconscious when Joseph Leones was already on top of her (tsn, p. 22, June 27, 1975). If she became unconscious when Leones was on
top of her and yet she felt pain when he placed his private parts into hers, then this is incredible for how could she have known what
was done to her and how she felt when she was already unconscious as admitted by her.

5. The record is replete with testimonies of the very witnesses of the prosecution itself revealing the irrational, if not immoral
behavior and conduct of the complainant which cuts deep into the morality, character and credibility of the complaining witness. To
cite a few of her immoral acts, when the police came to visit her, Irene Dulay took hold of the penis, of the policeman (Testimony of
Felicidad Boado, tsn, p. 20, June 18, 1974). Whenever she sees a man, she goes after him and takes hold of his hand and places it in her
private part (Testimony of Leonida Dulay, p. 5, tsn, Sept. 20, 1974). Sometimes she is seated, sometimes she is standing and there are
moments that she goes around and whenever she sees a man, she calls for him and says "darling Jessie" (Cross-examination of Leonida
Dulay, tsn, p. 14, Sept. 20, 1974). She even said "have sexual intercourse with me," making particular mention of the person who
wanted to do that to her as Joseph Leones (Cross-examination of Leonida Dulay, tsn, pp. 27-28, Sept. 20, 1974). There are times when
she gets a pillow and imitates the sexual act (tsn, p. 29, Sept. 20, 1974). There are moments when she takes hold of a pillow, embraces
it, and makes movements imitating the sexual act (tsn, Testimony of Leonida Dulay, p. 5, Sept. 20, 1974).

6. The circumstances of persons, time and place attendant in the commission of the crime do not build up the case for the
People. On the contrary, We find facts and circumstances which contradict and contravene the theory of the prosecution, rendering it
highly improbable and questionable. Thus, the room of the complainant where the alleged rape was committed was at the ground
floor of the house where her employer lives with his family and maintains a canteen at the premises, the room being very near the
washing place and had a door with only wooden jalousies. There were several persons present in the house at the time of the alleged
rape and they were Evelyn Estigoy, the secretary of Natividad Leones, the cook Inocencia Gangad and her daughter, Mantes. With the
presence of these persons at the premises and the complainant's room was not secluded nor completely closed, the opportunity to
commit the rape is hardly present. More than that the alleged time being between 2:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
with the supposed attendance of the perpetrator's elder sister, Elizabeth the element of secrecy had been totally ignored or
disregarded which is quite unbelievable and incredible in such a crime as rape.

Indeed, rape is a most detestable crime. It should be severely and impartially punished. But a rape charge is easy to make, hard
to prove and harder to defend by the party accused, though innocent. Experience has shown that unfounded charges of rape have
frequently been preferred by women actuated of rape have frequently been preferred by women actuated by some sinister, ulterior or
undisclosed motive. Convictions for such crime should not be sustained without clear and convincing proof of guilt. On more than one
occasion, it has been pointed out that in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be received with
precipitate credulity. When the conviction depends on any vital point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted
unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging matters of this
kind. (Cornelio Flores, 26 Phil. 262, 268; Ignacio Landicho, 8 ACR 580; Rafael Lacson, CA 53 O.G. 1823; Francisco Salvador, CA 52 O.G.
7290; Lago, CA 45 O.G. 1356; Barbo, 56 SCRA 459; Bay, 27 Phil. 495; Pantaleon Ramos, 35 Phil. 671; Brocal, CA 36 O.G. 857; Topacio, CA
36 O.G. 1358; Fernando Fausto, 51 Phil. 852; cited in Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1977 Ed., Vol. III, pp. 1679-1680).

After carefully analyzing and weighing the evidence presented by the prosecution in the light of the legal principles above
outlined and now well-established in Our jurisprudence and guided by a little insight into human nature, We are persuaded and
convinced that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. That moral certainty or degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (Rule 133, Section 2, Rules of Court) has not been established by the prosecution. The
constitutional mandate that the accused is presumed innocent must prevail and, therefore, the accused-appellant, Joseph Leones, is
entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of conviction is hereby REVERSED and the accused Joseph Leones y
Ducusin is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103292 January 27, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

MODESTO CABUANG y FLORES, NARDO MATABANG y SALVADOR, JOHN DOE and RICHARD DOE,defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Carlito M. Soriano for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Accused Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57 of San Carlos
City, Pangasinan finding them guilty of robbery with rape and homicide, and imposing upon each of them a prison term of reclusion
perpetua. They were also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the mother of the victim an indemnity of P50,000.00; the sum of
Page1

P400.00 as the amount of money taken by the accused from the victim; the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages; the sum of
P46,495.00 as funeral expenses; and the costs of the suit.
 The facts as found by the trial court may be summarized as follows.

On 14 October 1988, at around 11 o'clock at night, Evelyn De Vera and her cousin Maria Victoria Parana, both 19 years of age,
having come from a house of a common friend, one Mia Colisao, were walking home along an uninhabited place in Barangay Buenlag I
of Bayambang, Pangasinan. Suddenly, from out of the rice paddies along the road, Modesto Cabuang emerged with a flashlight and
asked them where they were going. Evelyn became very anxious and started walking faster. Upon the other hand, Maria Victoria
started talking to Modesto. When Evelyn was about ten (10) feet ahead of the two, she looked back and saw Modesto turn and shift
his flashlight to the rear, illuminating the figure of Nardo Matabang, who had also suddenly appeared behind them from the rice fields
alongside the road. Modesto then put off and pocketed his flashlight, grabbed Maria Victoria and covered her mouth. Nardo Matabang
in turn pursued Evelyn, who had started to run away. She ran and ran until she entered the yard of a house along the road and hid in
the shadows of the plants and shrubs inside the yard where she could not seen by Nardo, but from where she could see him. After
some time, having lost sight of Evelyn, Nardo went back and rejoined Modesto.

Sometime later, Evelyn from her hiding place saw a tricycle pass by with her cousin Maria Victoria, and Modesto Cabuang, Nardo
Matabang, the tricycle driver and another person who was seated at the back of the tricycle. Evelyn heard her cousin crying and
pleading for help. After the tricycle had passed by, Evelyn emerged from her hiding place and proceeded to the house of her sister.
There she was scolded by her sister for coming home late. Evelyn, confused by the scolding and frightened by what she had just seen
and experienced, was not able to tell her sister what had just occurred. She stayed in the sala and there tried to go to sleep, without
success.

The following morning, Maria Victoria was found dead along the road, naked, with stab wounds in different parts of her body
including the pubic area. In the course of their investigation, the police interrogated Evelyn de Vera. Evelyn executed a sworn
statement where she identified two (2) of the suspects as Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang. She stated that she could readily
identify them because the latter were her barangay mates and hence knew them well. Moreover, when Modesto Cabuang suddenly
emerged from the rice paddies, he was only about two (2) meters away from her. Nardo Matabang was clearly seen by Evelyn from
behind the plants in the yard where she crouched in concealment, there being lights illuminating the road in front of the yard. 1 Later,
Evelyn was again able positively to identify and point out Cabuang and Matabang from a police line-up. However, the two (2) other
suspects, i.e., the tricycle driver and the person who rode at the rear of the tricycle remained unknown and at large.

On 17 October 1988, the third day after the tragic night, the police found a book ("Laboratory Manual in Organic Chemistry") and
some articles of feminine underwear and other personal belongings of a woman scattered some 50 to 100 meters away from where
they had first found Maria Victoria's body. Evelyn viewed these belongings and identified them as owned by her cousin Maria Victoria
who was a student at the Philippine Women's University (PWU). Examination of the personal belongings so found also showed that
cash in the amount of P400.00, in Maria Victoria's possession the night before, was missing.

Dr. Nario Ferrer, a physician resident in Bayambang, Pangasinan, conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim. He rendered
an autopsy report which show the following findings:

Incised wound, 4.0 cm superficial, antero-lateral aspect neck (R);

Contusion hematoma, 1 x 1 cm. mid clavicular area (L);

Stab wound, 1.5 cm. 5th ICS, parasternal line (L), penetrating, perforating the heart at the ventricular level, lacerating the lingular
part of the (L) lung;

Hematoma, mediastinum;

Hemopericardium, 300 cc;

Hemothorax (L) — 2 liters;

Stab wound, 1.5 cm. 7th ICS, para-vertebral line (R), penetrating and lacerating the posterior basal part of (R) lung;

Hemothorax (R) 1 liter;

Incised wound, 3.0 cm. 2 points, parallel to each other, mons pubis;

Incised wound, 3.0 cm. posterior fourchet of the vagina, transecting the perineum down to the anal canal;

Vagina with blood clots with fecaloid material;

Hymen — carunculated.

The report also noted the stab wounds in the pubic region including the area between the vagina and the anal canal, as well as
the presence of lacerations and spermatozoa in the victim's vagina, indicating that Maria Victoria had been raped and mutilated. Dr.
Ferrer identified four (4) of the wounds as mortal in character, which wounds were produced by a sharp edge and a pointed object.
The cause of the death was listed as "hypovolemic shock" resulting from severe decrease in the volume of blood supply, producing
death about six (6) hours before the autopsy. 2

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, and primarily on Evelyn de Vera's sworn statement which she later repeated in
substantially identical terms before the trial court, Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang were convicted of the crime of robbery
with rape and homicide.

In the present appeal, appellants principally urge that the trial court had erred in finding that prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera
had positively identified Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as the assailants of Maria Victoria. Appellants point to the entry in the
Bayambang police blotter found on page 483, Entry No. 4436, Volume IV, Series of 86 (Exhibit "I") which stated that the assailants were
"still unidentified" although the entry was made after prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera was questioned by the police. Accused
accordingly argue that Evelyn de Vera had never identified the appellants as the assailants of Maria Victoria, who in fact had later to
identify them from a police line-up.
Page1

We consider this contention bereft of merit. Upon receiving the report that a dead body was found in Barangay Buenlag I,
members of the Bayambang Police Station immediately proceeded to the reported crime scene on the morning of 15 October 1988.
The police investigator, Pfc. Elegio Lopez, who initially questioned witness De Vera that morning, noticed that she was in a state of
shock. 3 He accordingly chose to defer further questioning until the afternoon of the same day when Evelyn had calmed down
sufficiently to be able to give a sworn statement to the police. Thus, there was the initial report prepared and recorded in the police
blotter 4 at around 11 o'clock in the morning, stating that the assailants were still unidentified; there was, upon the other hand, Evelyn
de Vera's sworn statement 5 made and completed in the afternoon of the same day, where she revealed the identifies of the men she
had seen the night before and who she believed were responsible for the rape and death of her cousin Maria Victoria.

The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the doers of the horrific rape, killing and robbery of Maria Victoria the
first time she was questioned by the police, does not adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly settled case law that the delay of a
witness in revealing to the police authority what he or she may know about a crime does not, by itself, render the witness' testimony
unworthy of belief. 6

In People v. Savellano, 7 appellant Savellano argued that since the complaining witness had reported to the police authorities the
matter of her husband's death and identified the Savellanos' as her husband's killers only after the lapse of two (2) days, rather than
immediately when she had the very first opportunity to do so while the police was conducting an "on the spot" investigation, the
credibility of her testimony was greatly weakened. This Court rejected this argument stating that:

It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately report the identity of the offender after a startling occurrence
more especially when they are related to the victim as they just had a traumatic experience. . . . [A] delay of about a few hours before
the identification of the offender by the prosecution witnesses does not thereby affect their credibility. 8

In People v. de Guzman, 9 the accused-appellant sought to capitalize upon the fact that the prosecution witness did not
volunteer the information covered by her testimony to the policeman who had investigated the crime immediately after the murder
was committed. Disposing of this contention, this Court ruled that:

The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and unwillingness to be involved in criminal
investigations due to fear of reprisal [are] common occurrence(s) and [have] been judicially declared as not affecting their credibility, . .
..

xxx xxx xxx

The testimony of Gloria should be given full weight and credit. Her failure to give a sworn statement to the police should not be
taken against her. There is no law which requires that the testimony of a prospective witness should first be reduced into writing in
order that her declaration in Court at a later date may be believed by the Judge. 10

The above rulings apply squarely to the case at bar. Evelyn de Vera was clearly traumatized, in a state of shock, upon finding out
that her cousin who had been with her just the night before, was brutally raped and killed. She could not then and there clearly and
calmly recount the events she had experienced and witnessed that dreadful night in a logical sequence. The few hours delay which
lapsed from the time the entry in the police blotter was made, up to the time Evelyn gave her sworn statement on the afternoon of the
same day, did not have the effect of eroding the intrinsic credibility and strength of that statement. It may be noted that significantly
longer delays in informing investigating officers of what witnesses had seen, have been held understandable by this Court and as not,
in themselves, destructive of the otherwise credible character of such testimony, especially where the witnesses' fear of possible
retaliation from the accused could not be dismissed as merely fanciful. 11

It remains only to note that entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty are not
conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. In People v. Santito, Jr., 12 this Court held that entries in official records like a police
blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out, since the entries in the police blotter could well be incomplete or
inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial is commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in
the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence
gathered in the course of the police investigation and presented in court. 13 In the case at bar, we conclude that prosecution witness
Evelyn de Vera did positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among those who had raped and killed and
robbed the hapless Maria Victoria Parana.

Appellants also set up the defenses of denial and alibi. Cabuang denied having had anything to do with the rape and killing of
Mari Victoria. He said that he was at the wake of the daughter of one Ben Juinio of Barangay Buenlag I, the whole night of 14 October
1988 and until 6:30 in the morning of the following day. Cabuang was, however, unable to offer any details in elaboration or
corroboration of his claim of alibi. Matabang, for his part, testified that on 14 October 1988, he was in his house in Karanglaan,
Dagupan City, with his wife, his sister-in-law, and his child and had never left his house. He testified further that he left his home for
Bayambang only on the next day 15 October 1988. His testimony was, however, found by the trial court to be flawed by discrepancies
and inconsistencies and by lack of sufficient corroboration.

The firmly settled doctrine is that the defense of alibi cannot prosper, unless the accused is able to prove that he was at some
other place during the commission of the crime and that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. 14 Clearly, neither of the appellants was able to do so in the case at bar. Modesto Cabuang was supposedly attending
the wake held in the same barangay where Maria Victoria was ravished and killed and robbed. Nardo Matabang, upon the other hand,
was allegedly at home in a town no more than an hour or so by bus from Bayambang.

It is equally settled doctrine that positive identification must prevail over simple denials and unacceptable alibis. Appellants have
not even tried to suggest that Evelyn de Vera might have had some ill motive to testify falsely against them. To the contrary, she had all
the reasons to speak the truth with respect to her cousin's ravishers and killers. When there is no evidence to indicate that the
principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that such witness was not so moved, and
that her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 15

It is, of course, true that Evelyn de Vera did not witness the actual sexual assault and slaying of Maria Victoria nor the talking of
the P400.00 missing from Maria Victoria's belongings. The evidence presented by the prosecution witness was circumstantial in nature.
But circumstantial evidence can be and often is entirely sufficient to support a conviction, where the multiple circumstances are proven
and are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
Page1

accused is innocent, as well as incompatible with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the accused. 16 In brief,
the circumstances must produce conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 17
 In the case at bar, the circumstances forming an unbroken chain and leading to the conviction beyond reasonable doubt that
Cabuang and Matabang, among others, were guilty of robbery with rape and homicide, were the following:

1. While Evelyn de Vera and Maria Victoria Parana were walking home through an uninhabited place at about 11 o'clock at night
on 14 October 1988, accused Cabuang and Matabang suddenly appeared from the surrounding rice fields. Cabuang grabbed Maria
Victoria and covered her mouth. Evelyn ran away because she became terribly frightened and Matabang followed in pursuit. Matabang
lost sight of Evelyn along the road.

2. From her hiding place in the front yard of a house along the road, Evelyn saw Maria Victoria pass by in a tricycle with the
accused Cabuang, Matabang and two (2) other men and heard Maria Victoria crying and pleading for help. Evelyn clearly recognized
Cabuang and Matabang, but not the other two (2).

3. Early the next morning, on 15 October 1988, the body of Mario Victoria was found in the barangay traversed by the road on
which Maria Victoria were walking the night before.

4. The claims of alibi by Cabuang and Matabang were not successfully established. Cabuang acknowledged that he was in the
same barangay where Maria Victoria had been assaulted and killed, while Matabang asserted that he was in his house in Dagupan City
which was no more than an hour or so by bus from the scene of the crime. Neither Cabuang nor Matabang offered and presented
independent and reliable corroboration of their presence far away from the scene of the crime at the time of occurrence of the crime.

The trial court found the circumstances, considered together, as adequate to prove appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court agrees, having been unable to find any reason for overturning this conclusion of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the accused-appellants Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with rape and homicide and sentencing the accused toreclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED in toto
except that the indemnity is hereby INCREASED from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00 considering that Maria Victoria Parana was not only
raped but also brutally mutilated and killed by the accused. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 107735 February 1, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

RICARDO SAN GABRIEL Y ORTIZ, defendant-appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

RICARDO O. SAN GABRIEL was charged with murder in an Information alleging that on 26 November 1989, armed with a bladed
weapon, in conspiracy with "Ramon Doe," with treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill, he assaulted and stabbed to death
Jaime A. Tonog.1

The trial court convicted the accused as charged and sentenced him "to life imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Jaime Tonog
the sum of P30,000, plus costs."2

The accused is now before us on appeal.

The evidence shows that at around seven o'clock in the evening of 26 November 1989, within the vicinity of Pier 14 at North
Harbor along Marcos Road, Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together
with "Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon
then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously,
surrounded him and simultaneously stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after which the assailants ran towards the highway
leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought to Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police District, autopsied the cadaver of the victim and reported that
it sustained two (2) penetrating stab wounds each caused by a single-bladed instrument. He opined that both wounds were fatal.3

The accused has a different version. He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; Tonog even attempted to box him but he parried his
blow; Tonog continued walking but when he chanced upon Ramon he suddenly and without provocation boxed and kicked Ramon;
Ramon fought back but was subdued by his bigger assailant so the former ran towards the highway; when Tonog met a certain
"Mando" he boxed the latter who however fought back despite his (accused) warning not to; at this moment he saw Ramon return
with a bolo on hand; he warned Ramon not to fight but his advice went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand Ramon struck Tonog on
the belly; when "Mando" saw what happened he ("Mando") pulled out his knife and also stabbed Tonog at the back; Ramon and
"Mando" then fled towards the highway.

The accused further claimed that he even stayed with the victim and called out the latter's companions to bring him to the
hospital; that prosecution witness Brenda Gonzales only arrived at the crime scene after Tonog was already taken to the hospital; that
Brenda even inquired from him what happened and then prodded him to testify; that his refusal coupled with the fact that he owed
Gonzales some money earned him the ire of the latter and that was why he was charged for the death of Tonog.

Accused-appellant claims in this appeal that the trial court erred: (a) in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Brenda Gonzales and Pio Ochobillo, and for discrediting his; (b) in finding that the killing was attended with evident
premeditation; (c) in ruling that he committed treachery and, (d) in convicting him of murder.4

We sustain the conviction of the accused for murder. It is settled that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded greatest
respect by the appellate court absent any abuse of discretion,5 and none is perceivable in the case at bench; hence we affirm the
Page1

factual findings of the trial court.

 The accused contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are incredible and conflicting. We however find
otherwise. Gonzales and Ochobillo, as observed by the trial court, testified in a direct and candid manner. No evil motive is attributed
to them as to testify falsely against the accused. That Gonzales harbored a grudge against the accused because he owed her some
money, and even enticed her customers into patronizing another carinderia, can hardly be believed. We are not convinced that Brenda
Gonzales would testify against accused-appellant for a crime so grave simply because he owed her a measly sum of P300.00. That he
enticed the customers of Gonzales into patronizing another carinderia is belied by the fact that on the night of the incident he was, as
he claimed, eating at the carinderia of Gonzales. If there be any testimony that should be considered incredible and illogical it must be
that of the accused. His assertion that "Mando" stabbed the victim should not receive any evidentiary value when weighed against the
positive assertion of the prosecution witnesses that the accused was the assailant of Jaime Tonog.

Quite interestingly, the accused did not offer any information regarding the person and circumstances of "Mando." Up to this
date "Mando" remains a myth. Not a single witness was presented by the defense to prove who "Mando" was, nor even a hint of his
personal circumstances. During the entire proceedings in the court below "Mando" was never mentioned by the prosecution
witnesses. Nobody ever implicated him except the accused. In fact, there should have been no difficulty procuring witnesses to testify
on the part of the accused as the incident was viewed openly by a multitude of bystanders. His failure to present any witness pointing
to "Mando" as the perpetrator of the crime convinces us that "Mando" in fact existed only as a figment of the mind.

The accused also asserts that Gonzales arrived at the crime scene only after the victim was brought to the hospital and that she
even inquired from him about what happened.

Again we are not persuaded. The statement contradicts the earlier version of the accused that Gonzales was prejudiced against
him as he owed her some money. For, granting that Gonzales had a grudge against him it was not likely that she would inquire from
him about the incident as there were other persons then present who could shed light on the startling occurrence.

Equally dubious is the avowal of the accused that Gonzales arrived at the crime scene only after the victim was rushed to the
hospital considering that the incident took place just in front of her store. Besides, this claim was easily demolished by Gonzales'
detailed account of the fight.

The fact that the witnesses did not immediately report the incident to the police does not necessarily discredit them. After all,
reports were made albeit by different persons. The accused banks on the apparent inconsistency as to why Gonzales failed to give
immediately her account of the killing to the authorities. But the discrepancy is so minor that it cannot undermine her credibility nor
detract from the truth that she personally witnessed the incident and positively identified the accused.

The accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet6 prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all
and named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and candid testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and
inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may
be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy
and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter7 Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by
the defense during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the document must fail since the court
cannot consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.8

Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only after interviewing Camba, an alleged
eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to
present Camba on the part of the accused should militate against his cause.

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.9 But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites
must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the
public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c)
The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information. 10

The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The public officer who
prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was
acquired from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as official information because in order to be classified as such the
persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such
statements for the record. 11 In the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such statements.

The accused enumerates discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Thus, according to him, it was testified
that the victim was stabbed by the accused at the back but failed to point out its precise location. The stabbing admittedly occurred at
around seven o'clock in the evening but the Advance Information Sheet reported "6:30 p.m." One witness testified that the fistfight
was only between the victim and "Ramon Doe," while another reported that it involved the victim, "Ramon Doe" and the accused.
Further, it was not accurately determined whether Ramon and the accused returned to the scene of the crime within five (5) minutes
or after the lapse thereof.

As previously stated, the discrepancies do not militate against the fact firmly established by the prosecution that Tonog was
stabbed at the back by the accused and by "Ramon Doe" in the abdomen. Any discordance noted is so minor and insignificant that no
further consideration is essential. The most honest witnesses make mistakes sometimes, but such innocent lapses do not necessarily
impair their credibility. The testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions
thereof or isolated passages therein. 12

The presence of the accused in the vicinity even after the commission of the crime does not in any way extricate him from his
dilemma. Certainly, it is no proof of his innocence.
Page1

The court a quo properly considered the aggravating circumstance of treachery in convicting the accused of murder. Treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. 13 Alevosia or treachery presumes an attack that is deliberate and unexpected. There is no treachery when the victim is
placed on guard, as when a heated argument preceded the attack, especially when the victim was standing face to face with his
assailants, and the initial assault could not have been foreseen. 14

It is true that in the case at bench the attack was preceded by a fistfight. It was however established that they were already
pacified by onlookers when the accused and Ramon returned. Lulled into complacency the victim simply stayed where he was before
the fistfight when after a brief moment the accused together with Ramon returned with bladed weapons. Both approached the victim
and circled him surreptitiously. The attack was sudden and simultaneous that the victim was never given a chance to defend himself.
As we have held in People v. Balisteros,15 where a victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind and had no
weapon to resist it, the stabbing could not but be considered as treacherous. The evidence proved that the victim was caught unaware
by the sudden assault. No weapon was found, nor even intimated to be, in his possession.

Conversely the court a quo should have disregarded evident premeditation. Evident premeditation requires a showing that the
execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 16 Evidence for the prosecution showed that after the fight was broken up the
accused and "Ramon Doe" proceeded towards the highway. They returned only after a lapse of approximately five (5) minutes. From
the foregoing we cannot conclude that the accused had sufficient time within which to meditate on the consequences of his acts.
Meditation necessitates that it be evident and proven. Be that as it may, treachery as a qualifying circumstance having attended the
killing, the conviction of the accused for murder still holds.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo in Crim. Case No. 90-81744 dated 25 July 1991 convicting accused-appellant
RICARDO SAN GABRIEL Y ORTIZ of murder is AFFIRMED. The penalty of life imprisonment however is MODIFIED to reclusion perpetua,
17 while the award of P30,000.00 as indemnity is INCREASED to P50,000.00 conformably with existing jurisprudence. Costs against
accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169204 March 23, 2007

ADELAIDA ESCOBAR and LOLITA ESCOBAR, Petitioners,

vs.

LIGAYA OLIGARIO LUNA, CLARITA LUNA, EMMA LUNA, TERESITA AMBROSIO LUNA, OMER LUNA, EFREN LUNA, PATRIA LUNA,
PINKY LUNA, and PACQUING and PORTIA LUNA as heirs of deceased Clodualdo Luna, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66548 and its Resolution2
dated August 4, 2005 denying reconsideration. The appellate court reversed the June 25, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 that dismissed the complaint to nullify Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and
(T-21295) T-13362.

The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows.

Petitioners Adelaida Escobar and Lolita Escobar separately bought two parcels of land located in Barrio Tolentino, Tagaytay City
on February 28, 1979 and were issued TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362, respectively, on the same date.

Eleven years later, on September 11, 1990, Clodualdo Luna filed a complaint before the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, seeking
to nullify TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362 of the Escobars. Luna claimed that he had been in actual, public, adverse,
continuous, and notorious physical possession of an unregistered parcel of land located in Barrio Tolentino, Tagaytay City since March
21, 1941, as shown in Tax Declaration No. GR-019-0173, which was issued to him in 1985.4

Sometime in 1990, when he engaged the services of a geodetic engineer to survey the same parcel of land to have his title
confirmed under the provisions of Act No. 496,5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529,6 he alleged that he discovered that the
land had been illegally and fraudulently titled in the names of the Escobars by the use of fictitious and simulated documents and court
records.

The Escobars allegedly made it appear that the two titles originated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5483, which
however, did not exist in the records of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Batangas per certification7 of Atty. Eva Cainza-
Valenton, Acting Register of Deeds, issued on June 11, 1990. Additionally, Decree No. 3465,8 on which OCT No. 5483 appeared to have
been issued, pertained to a parcel of land located in San Juan, Batangas, not to the subject properties located in Tagaytay City.
Similarly, Survey Plan Psu-24039, which supposedly technically described the land mentioned in OCT No. 5483, did not pertain to the
subject properties but to a different parcel of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, per letter of Privadi JG. Dalire, Chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, DENR.9 Luna further alleged that the Escobars acted with knowledge of
the infirmity and defect of OCT No. 5483 as nonexistent and knew that he was in actual possession of the subject land in the concept of
an owner for 50 years.

On October 9, 1990, the Escobars filed a motion to dismiss. They alleged that the complaint was barred by prior judgment or by
statute of limitations; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the claim set forth in the complaint had been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. On February 1, 1991, Luna filed an amended complaint which the trial court admitted
on February 5, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, the trial court, upon reiteration by the Escobars of their motion, dismissed the
amended complaint on the ground that it was insufficient in form and substance and that certain indispensable parties were not
impleaded.

Luna filed a motion for reconsideration and a second amended complaint impleading as party defendants the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority, the Director of the Bureau of Lands, the National Treasurer, the Registry of Deeds and City Assessor of
Page1

Tagaytay City.10
 Said amended complaint was admitted on May 28, 1991. But, on June 28, 1991, the trial court granted a subsequent motion to
dismiss by the Escobars and dismissed the second amended complaint without hearing. The trial court held that the titles issued to the
Escobars had acquired incontrovertibility and indefeasibility by mandate of Act No. 496.11

Aggrieved, Luna filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision on May 18, 1995 reversing the dismissal. The
appellate court held that the trial court should have conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss considering that Luna’s complaint
alleged that OCT No. 5483, from which the TCTs of the Escobars were derived, was nonexistent. The appellate court ruled:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Order dated June 28, 1991, is hereby SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. TG-1155 is ordered
REINSTATED and REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.12

The Escobars elevated the appellate court’s decision to the Supreme Court, but the petition was denied in a Minute Resolution
dated February 12, 1996. The case was then remanded to the trial court on October 8, 1996.

During trial, Luna died and was substituted by his heirs, herein respondents.13 They submitted the case on the basis of the
documentary evidence, arguing that, allegedly, the Court of Appeals had already ruled on the first appeal that the Escobars’ titles were
void.

On June 25, 1999, the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, rendered its decision. It rejected respondents’ argument that the
appellate court’s ruling in the first appeal constituted the law of the case, and proceeded to find the Escobars as purchasers in good
faith and for value who were accordingly entitled to the benefits of the principle of indefeasibility of title. The trial court further ruled
that respondents failed to prove their case for cancellation of TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362 since the
documentary evidence they submitted, not being supported by testimonial evidence, were hearsay. The dispositive portion of the trial
court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint
filed in the instant case for utter lack of merit, with costs against the plaintiffs.14

The trial court also denied respondents’ subsequent motion for reconsideration.15

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court’s June 25, 1999 Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362 are hereby DECLARED VOID AB INITIO. The Register of Deeds of
Tagaytay City is hereby DIRECTED to cancel said Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362 and all titles
derived therefrom.

SO ORDERED.16

The appellate court ruled that the trial court should have resolved the issue framed in the decision in the first appeal, that is,
whether OCT No. 5483 was valid. It was error for the court a quo to resolve the question of whether the Escobars were purchasers in
good faith, which would be irrelevant if said OCT was found invalid. The appellate court added that respondents’ documentary
evidence, having been issued by government offices and duly certified by the appropriate personnel, were competent evidence and
sufficiently proved that OCT No. 5483 was fictitious.17 Hence, this petition.

In the petitioners’ Memorandum, the following issues were presented for our disposition:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE FIRST APPEAL THAT THE TRIAL COURT MUST ASCERTAIN THE
TECHNICAL AUTHENTICITY OF OCT [NO.] 5483 AMOUNTED TO THE "LAW OF THE CASE" WHICH BARS THE TRIAL COURT FROM
CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE OF THE ESCOBARS THAT THEY WERE PURCHASERS OF THE PROPERTIES IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS RIGHT IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE CERTIFICATIONS LUNA SUBMITTED AT
THE TRIAL AND IN DRAWING A CONCLUSION FROM THEM THAT OCT [NO.] 5483 WAS NON-EXISTENT AND FICTITIOUS;

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ESCOBARS ARE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM SUITS TO ANNUL THEIR TITLES, THEY BEING
PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE; AND

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT LUNA HAS THE RIGHT TO FILE THE SUIT TO ANNUL A REGISTERED TITLE ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD IN ITS
ISSUANCE.18

Simply, the issues before us are: First, what is the law of the case here? Second, are respondents’ evidence admissible to prove
the nullity of the TCTs in question? And third, are petitioners, being purchasers in good faith, entitled to protection from suits to annul
their titles?

On the first issue, petitioners state that the law of the case is that Luna had a cause of action based on his allegation that OCT
No. 5483, the source of the titles of the Escobars, did not exist.19 Respondents counter that the law of the case is the determination of
the intrinsic validity of the titles.20

In Kabankalan Catholic College v. Kabankalan Catholic College Union-PACIWU-TUCP,21 we said that under the principle of the
law of the case, whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continues. Otherwise stated, the
Page1

principle holds that once an appellate court has declared the law in a case, that declaration continues to hold even in a subsequent
appeal. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness and economy require such stability in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of
competent jurisdiction.22

In Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines,23 we reiterated that the law of the case is the opinion delivered on a former
appeal. It applies to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. As a rule, a decision on a prior
appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the casewhether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming
himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.24

In this instance, the records show that the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37139, the first appeal, resolved only the issue of
whether the Order dated June 28, 1991 dismissing the second amended complaint was valid or not. The appellate court did not resolve
any issue bearing on the merits of the cancellation case. As regards the merits of the case, therefore, there is no law of the case to
speak of. The appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 37139 merely ordered the trial court to determine the intrinsic validity of the titles by
probing into the technical data of OCT No. 5483, Decree No. 3465, and Survey Plan Psu-24039 among others. The appellate court said:

Hence, an extensive investigation on this matter should have been pursued by the trial court. If it turns out that OCT No. 5483 is
really non-existent, then the subject land could not be considered as having been covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title.

Such being the case, it follows that the protection of the Land Registration Law given to purchasers in good faith of parcels of
land covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title does not apply to the subject land.

The rule is well settled that the Torrens System of land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against
the rightful owner of the real property. The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title will be disregarded when the transferee
who took it had notice of the flaws in the transferor’s title. No right passed to a transferee from a vendor who did not have any in the
first place.

Likewise, it can be said that the action filed by plaintiff-appellant is not barred by prescription and laches, if it will be proven that
OCT No. 5483 is void ab initio, for actions seeking for the annulment or cancellation of said fraudulent title do not prescribe.25

With regard to the second issue, petitioners state that respondents’ evidence are inadmissible for being hearsay.26 Respondents
counter that they constitute exceptions to the hearsay rule.27

We rule for respondents. Respondents’ evidence are competent evidence, having been issued by government offices, certified to
by authorized personnel who were clothed with authority and duty to issue such certifications. In the case of People v. Lazaro,28 we
held that the certification, without testimony of the person giving the certification, is sufficient and competent evidence which is an
exception to the hearsay rule as provided in Section 44,29 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 44 should be read in
conjunction with Section 28,30 Rule 132 of the same Rules which allows the admission of the said document.31

Thus, applying People v. Lazaro to this case, the certification dated June 11, 1990 issued by Atty. Cainza-Valenton, who was duly
authorized to issue the certification, stating that OCT No. 5483 was not existing in the files of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Batangas and which confirmed that OCT No. 5483 was fictitious, making the titles derived from it spurious, is sufficient evidence for the
stated purpose. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas is the repository of all records regarding OCTs issued in that
province, and the certification is therefore competent and admissible evidence to prove that the titles of the Escobars derived from it
are from a fictitious source.

The same holds true for (1) the certification32 of Mr. Felino M. Cortez, Chief of the Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, Land
Registration Authority, stating that per CLR Record No. 3995, Decree No. 3465 was issued on February 23, 1909; and a copy of Decree
No. 3465 which states that it was issued by the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Case No. 29, G.L.R.O. Record No. 2379 and that
the subject matter of that Case No. 29 was the land situated in San Juan, Batangas – not the land situated in Barrio Tolentino, Talisay,
Batangas; (2) the reply-letter of Mr. Privadi JG. Dalire addressed to Engr. Ruperto T. del Carmen, stating that plan Psu-24039 was a
survey of property located at Pinmaludpod, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which is a long way from the Barrio Tolentino, Talisay, Batangas
property; (3) the certification33 dated August 6, 1993 issued by Mr. Jose C. Mariano, Chief of the Records Management Division, Lands
Management Bureau, DENR, certifying to the fact that his office has no available record of the alleged plan Psu-24039, which shows
that Psu-24039 does not exist and it cannot serve as basis for the two titles; and (4) the certification34 dated July 29, 1993 issued by
Mr. Felino M. Cortez, certifying to the true and correct reproduction of page 140 of Survey Record Book No. 3, that there appears to be
no entry corresponding to plan Psu-24039 indicating that said plan does not appear to have been the subject of an application for
original registration under Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529, which shows that the titles are spurious, having had spurious
sources.

Most significantly, these documents, which constitute certifications from government officials who are responsible for
safeguarding the TCTs and OCTs in their possession because of their official capacity, have not been controverted as to their existence
and due execution. Their existence was also never denied under oath.35

On the third issue, petitioners state that the law insulates registered titles obtained under the Torrens system from the dangers
of frivolous suits.36 Respondents did not even bother to discuss the issue, and for good reason. Even if petitioners were innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith, no right passed to a transferee from a vendor who did not have any right in the first place. Void
ab initio land titles issued cannot ripen into private ownership.37A spring cannot rise higher than its source.38

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 19, 2005 and Resolution dated August 4,
2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 157064 August 7, 2006

BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC. (now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) Petitioner,
Page1

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

 DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60209 dated 11 July 2002, 1 ordering the petitioner to pay the Government the amount of P826,698.31 as
deficiency income tax for the year 1987 plus 25% surcharge and 20% interest per annum. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,
reversed the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) dated 17 May 2000 2 in C.T.A. Case No. 5662.

Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the trading of
securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1987. After an audit investigation conducted
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency
income tax in the amount of P826,698.31 arising from the disallowance of the item on salaries, bonuses and allowances in the amount
of P1,219,093,93 as part of the deductible business expense since petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and allowances to
withholding taxes. This assessment was covered by Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 dated 1 February 1991, which,
respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner through registered mail on 6 February 1991. However, petitioner denies receiving the formal
assessment notice. 3

On 17 March 1992, petitioner was served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to enforce collection of the deficiency income
tax for the year 1987. Petitioner filed a formal protest, dated 25 March 1992, against the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy, requesting
for its cancellation. On 3 July 1998, petitioner received a letter dated 30 April 1998 from the respondent denying the protest with
finality. 4

On 31 July 1998, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA. After due notice and hearing, the CTA rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner on 17 May 2000. The CTA ruled on the primary issue of prescription and found it unnecessary to decide the issues
on the validity and propriety of the assessment. It maintained that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the
course of mail, this is merely a disputable presumption. It reasoned that the direct denial of the petitioner shifts the burden of proof to
the respondent that the mailed letter was actually received by the petitioner. The CTA found the BIR records submitted by the
respondent immaterial, self-serving, and therefore insufficient to prove that the assessment notice was mailed and duly received by
the petitioner. 5 The dispositive portion of this decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 1988 deficiency tax assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED. Respondent
is hereby ORDERED TO DESIST from collecting said deficiency tax. No pronouncement as to costs. 6

On 6 June 2000, respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but was denied by the CTA in a Resolution
dated 25 July 2000. Thereafter, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 August 2001. In reversing the CTA decision, the
Court of Appeals found the evidence presented by the respondent to be sufficient proof that the tax assessment notice was mailed to
the petitioner, therefore the legal presumption that it was received should apply. 7 Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated May 17, 2000 as well as the Resolution dated July 25, 2000 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new on entered ordering the respondent to pay the amount of P826,698.31 as deficiency
income tax for the year 1987 plus 25% surcharge and 20% interest per annum from February 6, 1991 until fully paid pursuant to
Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code. 8

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
Resolution dated 30 January 2003. 9

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT LEGAL BASES EXIST FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS’ FINDING THAT THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS COMMITTED
"GROSS ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF FACTS."

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN REVERSING THE SUBJECT DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO ASSESS PETITIONER FOR ALLEGED DEFICIENCY
INCOME TAX FOR 1987 HAS PRESCRIBED.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO COLLECT THE SUBJECT ALLEGED DEFICIENCY INCOME
TAX FOR 1987 HAS PRESCRIBED.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCY INCOME TAX ASSESSMENT FOR 1987.

VI

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT ASSESSMENT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS. 10

This Court finds the instant Petition meritorious.

The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent’s right to assess petitioner’s alleged deficiency income tax is barred by
prescription, the resolution of which depends on reviewing the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the CTA.
Page1
 While the general rule is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court, there are, however, recognized
exceptions 11thereto, such as when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court or, in this case, the CTA. 12

In its Decision, the CTA resolved the issues raised by the parties thus:

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that if the taxpayer denies ever having received an assessment from the BIR, it is
incumbent upon the latter to prove by competent evidence that such notice was indeed received by the addressee. The onus probandi
was shifted to respondent to prove by contrary evidence that the Petitioner received the assessment in the due course of mail. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is merely
a disputable presumption subject to controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts the burden to the party favored by the
presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 351). Thus
as held by the Supreme Court in Gonzalo P. Nava vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 104, January 30, 1965:

"The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are (a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid, and (b)
that it was mailed. Once these facts are proved, the presumption is that the letter was received by the addressee as soon as it could
have been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of the mail. But if one of the said facts fails to appear, the presumption does not
lie. (VI, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed, 56-57 citing Enriquez vs. Sunlife Assurance of Canada, 41 Phil 269)."

In the instant case, Respondent utterly failed to discharge this duty. No substantial evidence was ever presented to prove that
the assessment notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 or other supposed notices subsequent thereto were in fact issued or sent to the
taxpayer. As a matter of fact, it only submitted the BIR record book which allegedly contains the list of taxpayer’s names, the reference
number, the year, the nature of tax, the city/municipality and the amount (see Exh. 5-a for the Respondent). Purportedly, Respondent
intended to show to this Court that all assessments made are entered into a record book in chronological order outlining the details of
the assessment and the taxpayer liable thereon. However, as can be gleaned from the face of the exhibit, all entries thereon appears to
be immaterial and impertinent in proving that the assessment notice was mailed and duly received by Petitioner. Nothing indicates
therein all essential facts that could sustain the burden of proof being shifted to the Respondent. What is essential to prove the fact of
mailing is the registry receipt issued by the Bureau of Posts or the Registry return card which would have been signed by the Petitioner
or its authorized representative. And if said documents cannot be located, Respondent at the very least, should have submitted to the
Court a certification issued by the Bureau of Posts and any other pertinent document which is executed with the intervention of the
Bureau of Posts. This Court does not put much credence to the self serving documentations made by the BIR personnel especially if
they are unsupported by substantial evidence establishing the fact of mailing. Thus:

"While we have held that an assessment is made when sent within the prescribed period, even if received by the taxpayer after
its expiration (Coll. of Int. Rev. vs. Bautista, L-12250 and L-12259, May 27, 1959), this ruling makes it the more imperative that the
release, mailing or sending of the notice be clearly and satisfactorily proved. Mere notations made without the taxpayer’s intervention,
notice or control, without adequate supporting evidence cannot suffice; otherwise, the taxpayer would be at the mercy of the revenue
offices, without adequate protection or defense." (Nava vs. CIR, 13 SCRA 104, January 30, 1965).

xxxx

The failure of the respondent to prove receipt of the assessment by the Petitioner leads to the conclusion that no assessment
was issued. Consequently, the government’s right to issue an assessment for the said period has already prescribed. (Industrial Textile
Manufacturing Co. of the Phils., Inc. vs. CIR CTA Case 4885, August 22, 1996). 13

Jurisprudence has consistently shown that this Court accords the findings of fact by the CTA with the highest respect. In Sea-Land
Service Inc. v. Court of Appeals 14 this Court recognizes that the Court of Tax Appeals, which by the very nature of its function is
dedicated exclusively to the consideration of tax problems, has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, and its conclusions
will not be overturned unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. Such findings can only be disturbed on
appeal if they are not supported by substantial evidence or there is a showing of gross error or abuse on the part of the Tax Court. 15
In the absence of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court must presume that the CTA rendered a decision which is
valid in every respect.

Under Section 203 16 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), respondent had three (3) years from the last day for the
filing of the return to send an assessment notice to petitioner. In the case of Collector of Internal Revenue v. Bautista, 17 this Court
held that an assessment is made within the prescriptive period if notice to this effect is released, mailed or sent by the CIR to the
taxpayer within said period. Receipt thereof by the taxpayer within the prescriptive period is not necessary. At this point, it should be
clarified that the rule does not dispense with the requirement that the taxpayer should actually receive, even beyond the prescriptive
period, the assessment notice which was timely released, mailed and sent.

In the present case, records show that petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1987 on 14 April 1988. 18
The last day for filing by petitioner of its return was on 15 April 1988, 19 thus, giving respondent until 15 April 1991 within which to
send an assessment notice. While respondent avers that it sent the assessment notice dated 1 February 1991 on 6 February 1991,
within the three (3)-year period prescribed by law, petitioner denies having received an assessment notice from respondent. Petitioner
alleges that it came to know of the deficiency tax assessment only on 17 March 1992 when it was served with the Warrant of Distraint
and Levy. 20

In Protector’s Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 21 this Court ruled that when a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there
exists a presumption, set forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 22 that it was received in the regular course of mail.
The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are: (a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b)
that it was mailed. While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a
disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by
the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee. 23

In the present case, petitioner denies receiving the assessment notice, and the respondent was unable to present substantial
evidence that such notice was, indeed, mailed or sent by the respondent before the BIR’s right to assess had prescribed and that said
notice was received by the petitioner. The respondent presented the BIR record book where the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax
assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR records custodian, Ingrid Versola, also testified that
Page1

she made the entries therein. Respondent offered the entry in the BIR record book and the testimony of its record custodian as entries
in official records in accordance with Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, 24 which states that:
 Section 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The foregoing rule on evidence, however, must be read in accordance with this Court’s pronouncement in Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),
Inc., 25where it has been held that an entrant must have personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were acquired by
him from reports made by persons under a legal duty to submit the same.

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information x x x.

In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that
she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes 26 how and from
whom she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons
under a legal duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present case. Thus, the evidence offered
by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.

Furthermore, independent evidence, such as the registry receipt of the assessment notice, or a certification from the Bureau of
Posts, could have easily been obtained. Yet respondent failed to present such evidence.

In the case of Nava v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 this Court stressed on the importance of proving the release,
mailing or sending of the notice.

While we have held that an assessment is made when sent within the prescribed period, even if received by the taxpayer after
its expiration (Coll. of Int. Rev. vs. Bautista, L-12250 and L-12259, May 27, 1959), this ruling makes it the more imperative that the
release, mailing, or sending of the notice be clearly and satisfactorily proved. Mere notations made without the taxpayer’s
intervention, notice, or control, without adequate supporting evidence, cannot suffice; otherwise, the taxpayer would be at the mercy
of the revenue offices, without adequate protection or defense.

In the present case, the evidence offered by the respondent fails to convince this Court that Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-
1-87-91-000649 was released, mailed, or sent before 15 April 1991, or before the lapse of the period of limitation upon assessment
and collection prescribed by Section 203 of the NIRC. Such evidence, therefore, is insufficient to give rise to the presumption that the
assessment notice was received in the regular course of mail. Consequently, the right of the government to assess and collect the
alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
60209 dated 11 July 2002, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 5662,
dated 17 May 2000, cancelling the 1988 Deficiency Tax Assessment against Barcelon, Roxas Securitites, Inc. (now known as UPB
Securities, Inc.) for being barred by prescription, is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. 1Indeed, basic is the
rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. 2 The
claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. 3 A
court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages 4 as well as hearsay 5 or
uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. 6 Such are the jurisprudential precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the
instant petition.

The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro
Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).

After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro
rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, 7
private respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan
City, paying thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred fifty-two pesos (P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of two pesos
(P2.00). 8 In particular, private respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets,
boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had
already acquired ownership of the Petroparcel. 9

For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the ground that the original complaint failed to
Page1

plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. 10 Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private
respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of
P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from
the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes,
such that there should be a reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private
respondent supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven. 11

Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include petitioner as a defendant 12 which the lower court granted in its
order of September 16,

1985. 13 After petitioner had filed its answer to the second amended complaint, on February 5, 1987, the lower court issued a
pre-trial order 14 containing, among other things, a stipulations of facts, to wit:

1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat "M/V MARIA EFIGENIA" owned by plaintiff was navigating in the vicinity of
Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas, on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker "Petroparcel"
causing the former to sink.

2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation of this marine accident and on 21 November 1978, the Commandant
of the Philippine Coast Guard, the Honorable Simeon N. Alejandro, rendered a decision finding the cause of the accident to be the
reckless and imprudent manner in which Edgardo Doruelo navigated the LSCO "Petroparcel" and declared the latter vessel at fault.

3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO), executed in favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation a Deed of Transfer involving several tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping stations, among which was the LSCO
Petroparcel.

4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic), defendant PNOC STC again entered into an Agreement of Transfer with co-defendant
Lusteveco whereby all the business properties and other assets appertaining to the tanker and bulk oil departments including the
motor tanker LSCO Petroparcel of defendant Lusteveco were sold to PNOC STC.

5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that PNOC-STC assumes, without qualifications, all obligations arising from
and by virtue of all rights it obtained over the LSCO "Petroparcel".

6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between defendant LUSTEVECO and PNOC-STC was executed wherein Board of Marine
Inquiry Case No. 332 (involving the sea accident of 21 September 1977) was specifically identified and assumed by the latter.

7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of Marine Inquiry was affirmed by the Ministry of National Defense, in its decision
dismissing the appeal of Capt. Edgardo Doruelo and Chief mate Anthony Estenzo of LSCO "Petroparcel".

8. LSCO "Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated by PNOC-STC and likewise Capt. Edgardo Doruelo is still in their employ.

9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused by the reckless and imprudent manner in which LSCO Petroparcel was
navigated by defendant Doruelo, plaintiff suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets, boat equipments (sic) and cargoes,
which went down with the ship when it sank the replacement value of which should be left to the sound discretion of this Honorable
Court.

After trial, the lower court 15 rendered on November 18, 1989 its decision disposing of Civil Case No. C-9457 as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC
Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the plaintiff:

a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint
at the rate of 6% per annum;

b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

c. The costs of suit.

The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Likewise, the case against defendant Edgardo Doruelo is hereby
DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence presented by private respondent consisting of the
testimony of its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. Private respondent's witness testified that M/V Maria
Efigenia XV was owned by private respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of ownership issued by the Philippine Coast Guard showing
that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in 1965 with 128.23 gross tonnage. According to him, at the time
the vessel sank, it was then carrying 1,060 tubs (bañeras) of assorted fish the value of which was never recovered. Also lost with the
vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower), radar, pathometer and compass. He further added that with the loss of his
flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of fourteen (14) vessels, he was constrained to hire the services of counsel whom he paid P10,000 to
handle the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00 for commencing suit for damages in the lower court.

As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into account the following pieces of documentary
evidence that private respondent proffered during trial:

(a) Exhibit A — certified xerox copy of the certificate of ownership of M/V Maria Efigenia XV;

(b) Exhibit B — a document titled "Marine Protest" executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 stating that as a result
of the collision, the M/V Maria Efigenia XVsustained a hole at its left side that caused it to sink with its cargo of 1,050 bañerasvalued at
P170,000.00;

(c) Exhibit C — a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong
Engineering and Construction on January 26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction of such trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;

(d) Exhibit D — pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D. Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987
Page1

to Del Rosario showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would cost
P1,160,000.00;
 (e) Exhibit E — quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that a unit of Furuno
Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D, would cost P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model FCV-501 would
cost P45,000.00 so that the two units would cost P145,000.00;

(f) Exhibit F — quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls of
nylon rope (5" cir. X 300fl.) would cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3" cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1) binocular (7 x 50),
P1,400.00, one (1) compass (6"), P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total of P197,150.00;

(g) Exhibit G — retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong Associates Law Offices stipulating an acceptance fee of
P5,000.00, per appearance fee of P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00, contingent fee of 20% of the total amount recovered and that
attorney's fee to be awarded by the court should be given to Del Rosario; and

(h) Exhibit H — price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to Del Rosario showing the cost of poly
nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18 3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50 rolls of
400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P146,500 and bañera (tub) at P65.00 per
piece or a total of P414,065.00.

The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing boat and all its equipment would
regularly increase at 30% every year from the date the quotations were given.

On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard &
Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro
testified that the price quotations submitted by private respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert witness, he used the
quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of prices from his suppliers, saying
that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme." For this reason, the lower
court concluded:

Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the replacement value of the fishing boat and its
equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence of the herein defendants were not
rebutted by the latter with sufficient evidence. The defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on said witness'
bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or bloated, but they did not bother at all to present any documentary evidence to
substantiate such claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of the credible witness, but it must be credible
in itself. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus Co., Inc. L-26810, August 31, 1970).

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the lower court's decision contending that: (1) the lower court
erred in holding it liable for damages; that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by paying only P1,252.00 as docket
fee; (2) assuming that plaintiff was entitled to damages, the lower court erred in awarding an amount greater than that prayed for in
the second amended complaint; and (3) the lower court erred when it failed to resolve the issues it had raised in its memorandum. 16
Petitioner likewise filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration expounding on whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case despite therein plaintiff's failure to pay the prescribed docket fee. 17

On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of merit. 18 Apparently not having received the order
denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner still filed a motion for leave to file a reply to private respondent's opposition to said
motion. 19 Hence, on February 12, 1990, the lower court denied said motion for leave to file a reply on the ground that by the issuance
of the order of January 25, 1990, said motion had become moot and academic. 20

Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the
same in toto on October 14, 1992. 21 On petitioner's assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by
competent and admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness
because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment
installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented as in the nature of market reports or
quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the Court of Appeals held, thus:

Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of
evidence, the reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In
fact, where the lower court is confronted with evidence which appears to be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor
of admissibility rather than of non-admissibility (The Collector of Palakadhari, 124 [1899], p. 13, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of
Court, Evidence, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. 18). Trial courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence which crystallized through constant use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in the search for truth and for the
effective administration of justice. But in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or
admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are
thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or ignoring them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et al.,
C.A. No. 4142, May 31, 1950; cited in Francisco, Supra). [Emphasis supplied].

Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily rebutted by appellant's own sole witness
in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the
fact that its own witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price quotations) appellant has
so vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence." Hence, it concluded:

. . . The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of appellee's documentary exhibits (price
quotations) which stood uncontroverted, and which already included the amount by way of adjustment as prayed for in the amended
complaint. There was therefore no need for appellee to amend the second amended complaint in so far as to the claim for damages is
concerned to conform with the evidence presented at the trial. The amount of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly within the relief
prayed for in appellee's second amended complaint.

On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court held that following the ruling in Sun Insurance Ltd. v. Asuncion, 22 the
Page1

additional docket fee that may later on be declared as still owing the court may be enforced as a lien on the judgment.

Hence, the instant recourse.

 In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that the award of P6,438,048 as actual damages should
have been in light of these considerations, namely: (1) the trial court did not base such award on the actual value of the vessel and its
equipment at the time of loss in 1977; (2) there was no evidence on extraordinary inflation that would warrant an adjustment of the
replacement cost of the lost vessel, equipment and cargo; (3) the value of the lost cargo and the prices quoted in respondent's
documentary evidence only amount to P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondent's failure to adduce evidence to support its claim for
unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) private respondent's failure to prove the extent and actual value of damages
sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of the vessels. 23

Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for,
loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to
compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. 24 In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. 25 There are two kinds of actual or compensatory
damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that
which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). 26 Thus:

Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction,
that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper
case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has
to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in
the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements, . . .

. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable employment, then nothing
can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would bepro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over.
On the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its profit-earning
potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which
it was unable to fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine
not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances," without, of course, taking into account considerations which were too
remote at the time of the loss. 27 [Emphasis supplied].

As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. 28 The burden
of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. 29 In
other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. 30

In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's general manager and certain pieces
of documentary evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the value of the 1,050 bañeras of fish were pegged at their September 1977 value
when the collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to items and
equipment lost show similar items and equipment with corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the
collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and equipment.
In objecting to the same pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del
Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof. 31
Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to
arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.

The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's testimony. Private respondent did not present any other
witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in the price quotations that became the bases of the award. We hold, however,
that the price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along with
the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though
he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.

For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be
admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence.
Moreover, because he was the owner of private respondent corporation 32 whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value
of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given credence 33 considering
his familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself
should be accepted as gospel truth. 34 We must, therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del Rosario's
claim as regards the amount of losses.

The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued
them were not presented as witnesses. 35 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on
the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule. 36On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37
to 47 of Rule 130. 37

It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals considered private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It
added, however, that these exhibits should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because "the reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as
evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court." 38 Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, however, would show that the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily arrived at. This rule states:
Page1

Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in
a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them there.
 Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said
compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in
the same occupation.

Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H 39 are not "commercial lists" for these do
not belong to the category of "other published compilations" under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem generis,
"(w)here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned." 40The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for
them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register,
periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of
"commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon
in the work of the occupation." 41 These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. Thus, take for example Exhibit D
which reads:

January 20, 1987

PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV

MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION

Navotas, Metro Manila

Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO

Gentlemen:

In accordance to your request, we are pleated to quote our Cummins Marine Engine, to wit.

Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm., 6-cylinder in-line, 4-stroke cycle, natural
aspirated, 5 1/2 in. x 6 in. bore and stroke, 855 cu. In. displacement, keel-cooled, electric starting coupled with Twin-Disc Marine
gearbox model MG-509, 4.5:1 reduction ratio, includes oil cooler, companion flange, manual and standard accessories as per attached
sheet.

Price FOB Manila P580,000.00/unit

Total FOB Manila P1,160,000.00

TERMS : CASH

DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order.

VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.

WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory defect.

Very truly yours,

POWER SYSTEMS, INC.

(Sgd.)

E. D. Daclan

To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are, however, subject to the general principles of evidence
and to various rules relating to documentary evidence. 42 Hence, in one case, it was held that a letter from an automobile dealer
offering an allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a new automobile after repairs had been completed, was not a "price
current" or "commercial list" within the statute which made such items presumptive evidence of the value of the article specified
therein. The letter was not admissible in evidence as a "commercial list" even though the clerk of the dealer testified that he had
written the letter in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer. 43

But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility of those letters or communications when it
held that unless "plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent," evidence should better be admitted rather than rejected on "doubtful
or technical grounds," 44 the same pieces of evidence, however, should not have been given probative weight. This is a distinction we
wish to point out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at
all. 45 On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. 46 Thus, a letter
may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence.
Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to
question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents
suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Thus:

The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted without objection. Some hold that when hearsay has
been admitted without objection, the same may be considered as any other properly admitted testimony. Others maintain that it is
entitled to no more consideration than if it had been excluded.

The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme Court held that although the question of admissibility of
evidence can not be raised for the first time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no probative value and should be
disregarded whether objected to or not. "If no objection is made" — quoting Jones on Evidence — "it (hearsay) becomes evidence by
reason of the want of such objection even though its admission does not confer upon it any new attribute in point of weight. Its nature
Page1

and quality remain the same, so far as its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned, and as opposed to
direct primary evidence, the latter always prevails.
 The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that
violates the rules of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative
value. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has
no probative value. 47

Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. 48

Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives private respondent of any redress for
the loss of its vessel. This is because in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 49 the Court said:

In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is "entitled to nominal damages which, as
the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated
and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered." [Emphasis supplied].

Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by
law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded. 50 Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the
parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."

Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an
equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. 51However, the amount to be awarded
as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept
and purpose of such damages. 52 The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on certain special reasons extant
in the case. 53

Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioner's vessel Petroparcelwas at fault as
well as private respondent's complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes
that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value of
P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00.
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his
complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that
such allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages
inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of

action. 54 Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.

With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the amended complaint increasing
the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
case when private respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee
corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower
court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 55 the unpaid docket fee should be
considered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in
its amended complaint.

Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground of insufficient docket
fees in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 56 participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative
relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the
second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, 57 petitioner did not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29,
1989 58 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower
court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact,
however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2)
this case has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) 59 in favor of private
respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.

MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
Page1

The factual antecedents are as follows:

 The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI
and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.

At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his
way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped
7 to 8 meters from point of collision.

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Manila Central
University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the
Veterans Memorial Medical Center.

By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2
December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City,
docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case
were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.

In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:

1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles
involved;

2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;

3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;

4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the medical certificate;

5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;

6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on the right side where the
jeep fell into.3

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil
case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.

Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not
returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia
Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her
husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husband’s hometown to
look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net

The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89
was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case,
together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court
Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent
documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be
adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs
and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.

For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban,
investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he
was already dead.

Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs10 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban,
Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.

The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?

Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was the former who
caused the smash up.

The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff and his
driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine
Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left
side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza.
He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said,
the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running
very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff
swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so
that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved
Page1

to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
 Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question.
However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep
swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the
criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was
correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.

On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the said defendants to pay
plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used
for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00
as attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs.12

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13

In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial court,
affirmed it in all respects.14

Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors
the following:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN
EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE
RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN
PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.

With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we granted the Motion for
the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita
Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15

In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting
petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a
photocopy thereof.

On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo
Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his
testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes
of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse
party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22

Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a
former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No.
684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.23

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are
still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.

It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence;
otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a
failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may
be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish
a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.25
Page1

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the
TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of
plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of
Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue
that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time
insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due process when the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner
PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section
47.

In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the
testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioner’s assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the
TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for
objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said
ground.

Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case because
Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks
only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said
documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given
the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.29

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is
more credible than respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court
of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.

To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil case.

From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30
Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The
allegations read:

"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a
moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then
driving the same;

"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly
bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio
Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his
vehicle;

"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way
towards the rightside where it fell on its driver’s side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which
maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-
trial and trial of this case;

"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition
and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as
Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;

"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic)
sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine
Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;

"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31

Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals
that there was an absence of negligence on his part?

In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:

To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped
the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following
the jeep"; x x x

We do not agree.

The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.

xxxx

Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
Page1

to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
 From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure which reads:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil
action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused.33

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to
speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other
than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be
on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence
in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that of respondent’s.
Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly
swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.

As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not
allow a review thereof unless:

(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.39

After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our departure from the
general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who
was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the
trial court has this say:

x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who
between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.

In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator
CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision
took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No.
684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on
the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away
from the truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV
Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind
the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and
testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with
caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned
by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the
Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic
gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would be significant
enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between
his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10,
1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not
mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question
and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
Page1

xxxx
 If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been
somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than
having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by
Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40

Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption
that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article
218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.43

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that
petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its
employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due
diligence in the supervision of its employees.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and
service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:

Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom
the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case
of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer.
To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of
the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible,
it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has
been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such
presumption.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various company policies on safety
without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its
employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.

The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but not in the
supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:

From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its
driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel.
There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation
of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in
the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents
similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been
negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI
from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-
mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is,
prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen
by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the
drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the
drivers?

For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages
representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary
damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be
reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.49 The amount
awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation is in order and authorized by law.51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
Page1

No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the
award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
 SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153911 December 10, 2004

MELANIO MALLARI y LIBERATO, petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To warrant conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the totality of the circumstances must eliminate beyond reasonable
doubt the possibility of innocence; otherwise, the accused must be acquitted.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 125 of the Rules of Court, seeking "to reverse,
set aside, nullify and/or modify" the December 18, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 18051. The dispositive
portion of that Decision states:

"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants Melanio Mallari and
Zaldy Bontia, as well as Leonardo Bontia are found guilty of Attempted Murder punishable under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code for which they are SENTENCED to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. The award with respect to damages and costs stand."3

In its May 14, 2002 Resolution,4 the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The factual background of the case, as related by the Court of Appeals5 based on prosecution evidence, is as follows:

"The records show that private complainant Erlinda Boyose was a teacher at the Bustamante High School, Davao City from 1977
up to 1989. At the start, she had a good working relationship with the school principal, appellant Melanio Mallari. However, their
relationship turned sour when she began to question appellant Mallari on alleged unaccounted school funds.

"On June 29, 1989 at about 9:00 o’clock in the morning, while Boyose was at the Guidance Office, a man approached her and
asked if he can still enroll his nephew. As enrollment was already closed, she advised the man to see Mallari, who is the school
principal.

"Thereafter, Boyose went to her classroom. About twenty minutes later, the man approached her again. Meeting him by the
door, she asked the man if he was able to talk to Mallari. The man answered that the principal was not in his office. So, she advised the
man to just return the following day.

"In the afternoon, Boyose rode on a jeepney bound for Sasa, Davao. She observed that the man who talked to her in the morning
was also in the same jeepney. She then inquired from him if he was able to talk to the principal regarding the enrollment of his nephew
but the man just ignored her.

"While they were near Km. 13, Panacan, Davao City, the said man drew and pointed a gun at Boyose’s temple. Boyose heard two
successive clicking sounds of the gun but it did not fire. She heard the man utter in the Cebuano dialect, ‘Unsa man ni, dili man ni
moboto’, meaning ‘What’s this, this will not fire.’ She then grabbed the gun and grappled for its possession. But she failed. Eventually,
she was able to get out of the jeepney and ran away but the man followed her and shot her repeatedly.

"Boyose was hit in the lower mouth and at her back. She shouted for help. A man helped her and brought her to the San Pedro
Hospital where she was treated and confined.

"Policeman Remo Pagal of the Sasa Police Station was one of those who went to the crime scene on June 29, 1989 to investigate.
But nothing came out of it. He was only able to get the description of the gunman the following day when he interviewed the victim at
the hospital.

"The police investigators were able to get the lead when a certain Andy Magdadaro went to the Sasa Police Station and told
Policeman Pagal that he knew something about the shooting of Erlinda Boyose. He told the said police investigator that he was asked
by one Edwin Amparado to kill Boyose but the plan was not carried out. He pointed to accused-appellant Zaldy Bontia as the man who
hired Amparado to look for a triggerman.

"Thus, Edwin Amparado was picked up by the police. While in the police station where he was brought, he told the police
investigators that in one occasion, he went to the house of appellant Mallari and the latter asked him to kill Boyose who used to be his
neighbor at Doña Pilar Village but the same did not push thru. He later offered this job to Andy Magdadaro who was his neighbor in
Agdao. They talked about the plan to kill Boyose and Magdadaro was only waiting for his go-signal. At the police station, he executed
an affidavit regarding the offer of Mallari to kill Boyose.

"On August 1, 1989, at around 3:00 p.m., Pagal together with other policemen from the Sasa Police Station arrested appellant
Zaldy Bontia near the house of accused-appellant Mallari. Zaldy allegedly admitted participation in the incident and implicated his
Page1

brother Leonardo Bontia as the gunman. The police lost no time in going to Asuncion, Davao del Norte to arrest Leonardo Bontia.
 "Leonardo Bontia was brought to the Sasa Police Station at about 2:00 p.m. of August 2, 1989. Later that day, a police line-up
was conducted and Boyose identified accused Leonardo Bontia as the gunman. She likewise identified accused-appellant Zaldy Bontia
to be the constant companion and protégé of accused-appellant Mallari.

"When the custodial investigation was about to start, the Bontia brothers were apprised by police investigators Anastacio Naive
of their rights under the Constitution. When asked by Naive if they had a lawyer to assist them, they told him that they had none. Naive
then stopped the investigation and called the PAO office for assistance. At around 5:00 p.m. on that day, Atty. Jonathan Jocum,** a
PAO lawyer arrived. Pfc. Naive then asked the Bontia brothers if they wanted to be represented by Atty. Jocum and they said they are
agreeable.

"During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Bontia admitted to be the gunman. He pointed to appellant Mallari as the one who
hired him to kill Boyose. On the [other] hand, Zaldy Bontia admitted to have been hired by Mallari to look for a gunman to kill Erlinda
Boyose and that he was the one who recommended to Mallari his brother Leonardo Bontia to do the job for a fee.

"Melanio Mallari, Leonardo Bontia and Zaldy Bontia, were accordingly charged by Asst. City Prosecutor Jose Emmanuel M.
Castillo of the crime of Frustrated Murder, in an Information alleging –

‘That on or about June 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused Melanio Mallari, directly interested in the death of Erlinda P. Boyose, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, accused Melanio Mallari induced his co-accused Leonardo Bontia and Zaldy Bontia, the latter convincing his brother Leonardo
Bontia of the plan to kill said Erlinda P. Boyose by giving price and/or offering a reward to kill said Erlinda P. Boyose and which price
and/or offer was accepted by said Leonardo Bontia and Zaldy Bontia; that in pursuance of said conspiracy said accused Leonardo
Bontia, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assaulted, and shot with a caliber 22 Magnum
homemade revolver and hit said Erlinda Boyose, thereby inflicting upon her the following, to wit:

‘AVULSION. LOWER LIP AND NAPE SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND WITH DISPLACEMENT OF TEETH ON MANDIBLE; FOREIGN
BODY, G-4-5 LEVEL which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the said Erlinda Boyose, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is the timely shout and cry for help of Erlinda Boyose that as a result of which immediate assistance was
had from a member of a coast guard and by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Erlinda Boyose which
prevented her death.’"6

During their arraignment,7 all the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, herein Petitioner Mallari moved for a separate trial,
which was granted by the trial court in its Order dated September 18, 1990.

In his separate trial, Mallari did not present evidence to establish his innocence or to refute the prosecution’s evidence against
him. Instead, he moved for dismissal by way of demurrer to evidence which, however, the trial court denied in its Order dated July 2,
1992. Thereafter, although given ample time and granted numerous postponements over about a year, petitioner failed to present any
witness in his favor.

Even in its Memorandum, the defense did not present its version of facts.

Ruling of the Trial Court

After evaluating the evidence on record, the RTC concluded that there was conspiracy among the three accused, although
Leonardo Bontia was alone when he shot Erlinda Boyose. It held herein Petitioner Mallari liable as principal by inducement, Leonardo
Bontia as principal by direct participation, and Zaldy Bontia as principal by indispensable cooperation, based on the following
circumstances supposedly establishing their complicity:

"1. Accused Mallari has an axe to grind against victim Boyose therefore, has an interest of silencing her because of her persistent
inquiries regarding the use or misuse of school funds under the custody of Mallari as principal of Bustamante Barangay High School.
This is the motive for the shooting of Erlinda Boyose.

"2. The contact man Zaldy Bontia is beholden to Melanio Mallari being a protégé and a man Friday of the latter who exercised
moral ascendancy considering that he promised Zaldy a steady government job and have been extending cash advances in the form of
allowances to tide him over till such time that he can receive a regular salary from the government.

"3. Leonardo Bontia is the older brother of Zaldy who at that time the job was offered to him by Mallari to kill Boyose was in dire
need of money having eight (8) children and wife to support.

"4. Leonardo Bontia when confronted by the victim at the police station readily admitted he shot Erlinda Boyose because of the
money he hopes to receive from Mallari afterwards.

"5. Zaldy Bontia gave P900.00 to Leonardo Bontia which came from Mallari so Leonardo can hide.

"6. That Zaldy Bontia likewise confessed of his participation of the crime after being confronted by the victim at the police
station.

"7. Both Leonardo and Zaldy Bontia voluntarily executed an extra-judicial statement regarding their complicity to the crime.

"8. A letter marked exh. ‘I’ addressed to the victim Erlinda Boyose which clearly came from Leonardo Bontia because it contained
narration of events anent the crime and full of explicit details which only the author of the shooting has personal knowledge of and
asking for forgiveness."8

Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused Melanio Mallari as principal by inducement, Leonardo
Bontia as principal by direct participation and Zaldy Bontia as principal by indispensable cooperation beyond reasonable doubt, the
court finds the aforesaid three accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder as charged in the information. They are hereby
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sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months and 20 days of prision correccional as the minimum to 11 years 6
months and 21 days of prision mayor as the maximum and to solidarily indemnify the victim Erlinda Boyose in the amount of
P15,000.00 representing loss of income, P8,000.00 representing hospital and medical expenses, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the cost."9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA essentially upheld the findings and conclusions of the trial court, except as to the stage of the crime
committed.

The appellate court was convinced that petitioner was the one who had induced the Bontia brothers to kill Boyose, despite the
absence of direct evidence showing his participation in the crime charged. It ratiocinated that the accused could be convicted on the
basis of circumstantial evidence. There was more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences were derived had been
proven, and the combination of all the circumstances was such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

It further held that, in the separately held trial of petitioner, there was "no need for the prosecution to offer the evidence
adduced during the trial of the Bontia brother[s,]" considering that only one criminal Complaint had been filed against all the accused.
Moreover, the issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Hence, as stated earlier, the CA modified the trial court’s disposition and convicted the accused-appellants of attempted murder.

This Petition10 was filed only by the alleged mastermind, Melanio Mallari.

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

"I.

Whether the questioned CA Decision and the refusal by the Court of Appeals to reconsider it in its CA Resolution [are in] – accord
with the ‘circumstantial evidence rule’ and the controlling jurisprudence thereon;

"II.

Whether the questioned CA Decision and the refusal by the Court of Appeals to reconsider it in its CA Resolution, upholding the
trial court’s admission of an irrelevant, immaterial and improper evidence (coming from Edwin Amparado) which was among the basis
for conviction – was in accordance with law and jurisprudence;

"III.

Whether the questioned CA Decision and the refusal by the Court of Appeals to reconsider it in its CA Resolution, correctly
sustained the trial court’s consideration of an evidence given in a separately conducted trial (not as against the petitioner) which was
among the basis for conviction; and

"IV.

Whether the questioned CA Decision and the refusal by the Court of Appeals to reconsider it in its CA Resolution, which failed to
tackle all the issues raised on appeal was consistent with ‘due process’."11

In brief, the issues raised before this Court will be discussed seriatim as follows: (1) whether the trial and the appellate courts
erred in taking cognizance of evidence given in the separate trial of petitioner’s co-accused; (2) whether there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals failed to accord
due process to petitioner.

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. The prosecution failed to adduce the quantum of evidence needed for a criminal conviction.

First Issue:

Evidence Proffered in Separate Trial

Petitioner alleges that the trial and the appellate courts convicted him on the basis mainly of evidence adduced at the separately
held trial of his co-accused. He submits that absent such evidence, there would have been no sufficient proof to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) simplistically contends that in the trial against petitioner, there was
no need to offer anew the evidence separately proffered against the Bontias, because "the case [filed against them] involved only one
case number."12Respondent fails to cite jurisprudence in support of such logic or to give even a semblance of a sound rationale
therefor.

As a rule, a court should not take judicial notice of evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been brought
before it or have been heard by and are actually pending before it. This rule is especially true in criminal cases, in which the accused
have the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses presented against them.13 Moreover, when a separate trial
is granted, the testimony of the accused imputing the crime to the co-accused is not admissible against the latter, who has had no
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.14

Parenthetically, the object of conducting a separate trial would be rendered naught if evidence proffered at the trial of one of
the accused would be considered likewise adduced in the distinct trial of the other accused. What then would be the rationale for
requesting and being granted separate trial? While the grant of separate trials for persons jointly accused of an offense is discretionary
upon the court, the motions therefor are usually found meritorious when antagonism is apparent in the respective defenses of the
accused.15
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In the case before us, petitioner’s co-accused -- Zaldy and Leonardo Bontia -- executed, prior to trial, their respective extrajudicial
confessions admitting their complicity in the crime charged and implicating petitioner as the mastermind. On the other hand, in
denying their accusations, petitioner stood his ground and refused to execute a statement. Precisely, their antagonistic defenses must
have impelled him to seek, and the trial court to grant him, a separate trial.

Records show, however, that most of the prosecution witnesses presented during the trial of the Bontias were likewise
presented during the separate trial of petitioner. Testifying against him on December 20, 1990, was Pfc. Danilo Carvajal. The latter said
that, as police investigator of the Sasa Patrol Station, he had conducted an investigation of the shooting incident involving Erlinda
Boyose, leading to the arrest of Zaldy and Leonardo Bontia and Melanio Mallari. He had allegedly taken the supposed extrajudicial
confession of Leonardo Bontia who, after being apprised of his constitutional rights, voluntarily executed his Sworn Statement in the
presence of an inquest lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).16

On the same day, Atty. Jonathan Jocom testified that he was the PAO lawyer who had assisted the Bontias while each of them
was under custodial investigation on August 2, 1989; that prior to their investigation, he had apprised them of their constitutional
rights to counsel and not to be compelled to make any statement against their interests; and that despite his repeated warnings about
the negative consequences of their statements, they nevertheless voluntarily executed and signed their statements confessing to the
crime.17

On April 19, 1991, Pfc. Anastacio Naive testified that he had also investigated the shooting incident; interviewed the victim
(Erlinda Boyose) and the witness (Edwin Amparado) who was an alleged friend of petitioner; and that he had reduced the statement of
Zaldy Bontia into writing after informing the latter of his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Jocom. Zaldy named Melanio
Mallari as the mastermind who had asked him to look for a triggerman who would "eliminate" Boyose.18

The testimonies of Policemen Antonio Ysulat and Victoriano Padilla were admitted by herein petitioner, according to the
stipulation of his counsel.19 Ysulat was the Sasa Patrol Station’s exhibit custodian, to whom the gun that had allegedly been used in the
shooting incident was turned over. Padilla was the desk officer who had recorded the Complaint regarding the incident on June 29,
1989, the appearance of Erlinda Boyose, her identification of Zaldy and Leonardo Bontia from a police lineup, and the appearance of
Petitioner Mallari at the patrol station on August 2, 1989.

Erlinda stated20 that she was a classroom teacher and guidance counselor of Bustamante High School, where petitioner was the
principal from 1983 to 1989; and that initially, they had a good working relationship, which turned sour when she began inquiring
about school funds that had remained unaccounted for. On March 22, 1989, she personally handed over to him a letter21 she had
written, reminding him of, among other things, some basic needs of the school that had remained unmet, such as blackboards, chairs
and comfort rooms for the students; and his failure, as the school administrator in the past five years, to account for fees collected
from students.

She then admonished him in that letter for his moral indiscretions in office;22 recommended that he conduct
dialogues/discussions with teachers, students and their parents, to disclose financial reports so as to avoid suspicions of fund misuse;
and, finally, apologized for having to bring up all these matters, but expressed hope that it would all be for the improvement of the
school administration. Boyose further testified that after reading the letter, Mallari told her sarcastically that he had been to so many
schools, but that it was only she who had written to him in such a manner; he warned her that she "made a mistake in writing this
[letter]."

Boyose also attested to the incidents of that fateful day, June 29, 1989, which culminated in the attempt on her life by Leonardo
Bontia. He had asked her earlier that day in school about how to enroll his nephew at the Bustamante High School. Because of the
gunshot injuries that she sustained, she had to undergo hospitalization for which she incurred expenses.

While the instant case was pending trial, Leonardo Bontia supposedly wrote her a letter23 asking for "forgiveness for the crime
[he] had done against [her,]" saying that he was in dire need of money at the time. Allegedly, he had to go to Mallari, hoping to be able
to ask for some, but the latter instead "dared [him] to discipline Mrs. Boyose," "gave [him] food and drinks until [he] got drunk," and
also promised to give him money and a job. Because the accused was drunk and, thus, "out of his mind," he supposedly gave in to the
prodding of Mallari.

Only two other witnesses against the Bontias were not presented against Petitioner Mallari. They were (1) Pfc. Remo Pagal, who
had also participated in the investigation and allegedly received an informer’s tip that led to their arrest; and (2) Dr. Roberto Alabado,
who had treated the injuries of the victim.24

The remaining witnesses at the separate trial of the Bontias were petitioner’s co-accused, Zaldy and Leonardo Bontia. It is worth
noting that despite their earlier confessions -- as attested to by Witnesses Carvajal, Jocom and Naive -- the Bontia brothers, assisted by
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Moreover, during their trial, the brothers denied committing the crime; admitted to having signed
their respective statements; but alleged that these had been procured without the assistance of counsel and with the police officers’
use of force, intimidation and violence.25

After reading the testimonies of Pagal, Alabado and the two Bontias and reviewing the rulings, we find that the trial and the
appellate courts could not have taken those testimonies into substantial consideration, if at all, in convicting the petitioner. In fact, the
testimonies of Pagal and Alabado were merely corroborative of those of the other witnesses who were presented during petitioner’s
trial. On the other hand, the declarations of Zaldy and Leonardo Bontia in open court were, on their face, favorable to him. And the
lower courts’ cognizance of those declarations would not have prejudiced him, as petitioner asserts. However, despite the denials by
the Bontias, the lower courts still found them, including petitioner, guilty.

We therefore find no basis at all for the allegation of petitioner that the trial and the appellate courts convicted him on the
ground of evidence adduced at his co-accused’s separate trial, but supposedly not during his own trial.

Second Issue:

Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence

A close perusal of the testimonies of the witnesses presented against petitioner reveals the absence of direct evidence
establishing his criminal participation. Nonetheless, in the absence of direct proof, a conviction may still be based on circumstantial
evidence. But to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts
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from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.26
 Corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.27 Hence, if the totality of the
circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of innocence, conviction is proper; otherwise, the accused must be
acquitted.28

With the above jurisprudential premises in mind, we examined the circumstances on the basis of which petitioner had been
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and, consequently, convicted.

According to the CA, the following circumstances were sufficient to establish the criminal culpability of the three accused (Zaldy
and Leonardo Bontia, as well as Petitioner Mallari):

"x x x. First, appellant Mallari had an axe to grind against the victim because of her persistent inquiries regarding the use or
misuse of school funds under the custody of Mallari as principal of Bustamante Barangay High School. This fact shows the motive of
Mallari in silencing her. Second, Zaldy Bontia, the person who looked for a killer, is beholden to Melanio Mallari, considering that the
latter had promised him a steady government job and had been giving cash advances in the form of allowance to tide him over till such
time that he could receive a regular salary from the government. Third, Leonardo Bontia is the older brother of Zaldy. When the job to
kill Boyose was offered by Mallari to Leonardo Bontia, the latter immediately acceded considering that he was in dire need of money
having eight (8) children and a wife to support. Thus, when confronted by the victim at the police station, he readily admitted that he
shot Erlinda Boyose because of the consideration he hoped to receive from Mallari afterwards. Fourth, the money in the amount
ofP900.00 which Zaldy Bontia gave to his brother Leonardo so that he can hide came from Mallari. Fifth, the confession made by Zaldy
Bontia concerning his participation to the crime after he was confronted by the victim at the police station. Sixth, both Leonardo and
Zaldy Bontia voluntarily executed extra-judicial statements regarding their involvement in the crime. In their respective extra-judicial
confession, they pointed to Mallari as the person who induced them to kill Boyose. Finally, the letter of Leonardo Bontia marked as
Exhibit ‘I’, addressed to the victim asking for forgiveness, contained narration of events with full of explicit details regarding the
commission of the crime."29

In its Memorandum,30 the OSG substantially repeats the above circumstances in support of the conviction of petitioner.

The first circumstance -- that "Mallari had an axe to grind against the victim because of her persistent inquiries regarding the use
or misuse of school funds" -- appears to be a conclusion based merely on the impression of the victim herself. Other than the one
letter31 she wrote to petitioner, only her self-serving statement supported her allegation that she had questioned persistently (several
times) his supposed administrative malpractices as school principal.

Be that as it may, a reading of that letter, which was indeed replete with denigrating statements against him, probably served as
a motive for a reprisal from him, if its contents were not treated as constructive criticism. To the extent that it tends to establish
motive, this circumstance may be taken into consideration in the overall assessment of the evidence against him.

The second to the fourth circumstances32 are not directly established by the evidence against petitioner. None of the
prosecution witnesses testified thereon. A scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that those circumstances were derived from the
"Written Statements"33 that had been made by petitioner’s co-accused and presented when Prosecution Witnesses Carvajal and Naive
testified. These witnesses were the police investigators who had reduced into writing the statements of Leonardo and Zaldy Bontia at
the time of the arrest of the latter two.

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that witnesses can testify only with regard to facts of which they have
personal knowledge; otherwise, their testimonies would be inadmissible for being hearsay.34 In the present case, neither of the said
witnesses had personal knowledge of the second to the fourth circumstances considered by the appellate court, or of the rest of the
statements made by the declarants in their respective Written Statements. The witnesses merely attested to the voluntariness and due
execution of the Bontias’ respective extrajudicial confessions. Thus, insofar as the substance of those confessions is concerned, the
testimonies of the police witnesses are mere hearsay.35

The fifth and the sixth circumstances refer to the aforementioned Written Statements of petitioner’s co-accused who did not,
however, testify against him. Well-settled is the rule that extrajudicial declarations are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant’s
co-accused.36 The admission by the court of such declarations violates the incriminated person’s right to due process. This principle
holds if, as in the case before us, the declarants fail to take the witness stand and thereby deny the accused-petitioner the fundamental
right to confront and cross-examine them face-to-face, in order to test their truthfulness and credibility.

True, there are exceptions to this rule, such as when the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
the participation of the co-accused in the crime, or when the confession is corroborated by other pieces of evidence.37 In such
instances, the significance of the confession comes to the fore, but only in relation to the other circumstantial evidence establishing
the guilt of the person incriminated. In the instant case, the merits of the fifth and the sixth circumstances mentioned by the appellate
court depend, therefore, on the strength of the other circumstantial evidence against petitioner.

But, as discussed so far, just the first circumstance, establishing petitioner’s motive, may be given due weight. Only one more
remains to be considered, as the three other circumstances have been discounted as hearsay.

This last circumstance cited by the appellate court pertains to a supposed letter of Leonardo Bontia addressed to the victim,
containing explicit details regarding the commission of the crime and asking for forgiveness. The latter was presented as part of the
testimony of the victim, Erlinda Boyose. However, Leonardo was not presented in court to identify it. No other witness testified as to
its genuineness or as to the fact that it had personally and voluntarily been written by him. Incidentally, Boyose received it through the
mail, and no one ever attested that it had in fact been written and sent by the same Leonardo Bontia, petitioner’s co-accused.38

As we have said earlier, witnesses can testify only with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge. Testimonial or
documentary evidence is hearsay if it is based, not on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence -- whether objected to or not -- has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, as provided in the Rules of Court.39
Clearly, none of the exceptions apply to the present case.
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Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value. It is precluded because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings
are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to
question its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of no
probative value.40

There is another circumstance, not mentioned by the appellate court but advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General: that
Prosecution Witness Edwin Amparado declared that he had been contacted by petitioner to kill Boyose. Let us first recall the testimony
of that witness, as related by the trial court:

"On December 11, 1990, Edwin Amparado testified that he personally knows accused Mallari because he studied at F. Bangoy
Barangay High School where Melanio Mallari was the principal from 1983 to 1984, that he also knows Zaldy Bontia, that the last time
he saw Zaldy Bontia was in February 1989 in the house of Melanio Mallari located at Juan Luna, corner Chavez Streets, that he went to
the house of Melanio Mallari to pledge his electric fan, that Melanio Mallari asked him to kill Mrs. Boyose who used to be his neighbor
at Doña Pilar Village but nothing came out of it, that later he heard over the radio that Mrs. Boyose was shot, that he knows Andy
Magdadaro who was his neighbor in Agdao, that they talked about the plan to kill Mrs. Boyose, that Andy Magdadaro was only waiting
for his go-signal, that he executed an affidavit regarding the offer of Melanio Mallari to kill Mrs. Boyose. He said on cross-examination
that he did not feel disgusted when Mallari asked him to kill Mrs. Boyose, that he thought of killing Mrs. Boyose and relayed the offer
to Andy Magdadaro the same job, that he is close to Mr. Mallari, that the job of killing Mrs. Boyose was the only illegal job offered to
him by Melanio Mallari, that during that time he needed money because his wife was pregnant, that he relayed the offer to Andy
Magdadaro because he is a rebel returnee."41

It appears that the prosecution presented Amparado merely to show that petitioner had criminal intent against the victim. The
testimony of the witness, however, concerned petitioner’s alleged proposal to him (not to the Bontias) to kill Boyose -- an act that, by
his own admission, did not materialize. Even if indeed petitioner made such a proposal, it did not necessarily mean that it was also
made to the Bontias, absent any strong supporting evidence. The witness does not in fact appear privy to any conspiracy between
petitioner and the Bontias.

Thus, insofar as the actual attempt on the life of Boyose is concerned, Amparado’s testimony is clearly irrelevant or of no
probative weight. It does not tend to establish, to any reasonable degree, the probability of a fact in issue42 -- whether petitioner had
induced or conspired with the Bontias to kill Boyose. Hence, the testimony is worthless in establishing the guilt of petitioner of the
crime charged against him.

In the final analysis, other than the victim’s letter to petitioner tending to establish his ill motive, there is hardly any evidence to
corroborate his co-accused’s extrajudicial confessions (later recanted) or to establish the probability of his actual participation (by
inducement) in the commission of the crime. Considering that the strength of the prosecution evidence against him falls short of the
required quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, his constitutional right to be presumed innocent must prevail.

The Court has repeatedly held that when the circumstances shown to exist yield at least two inferences -- one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other with the finding of guilt -- the Court must acquit the accused, because the
evidence does not then fulfill the test of moral certainty or suffice to support a judgment of conviction.43

Consistent with the above principles, and in view of the dearth of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
petitioner must be acquitted.

Third Issue:

Due Process

Petitioner also claims that he was denied due process by the Court of Appeals, because it allegedly failed to tackle all the issues
raised in his appeal brief.

While it is no longer necessary to resolve this issue in view of our disposition of the second one, it is enough to say that
petitioner has neglected to substantiate this allegation in his Petition. He did not, in fact, even care to point out -- much less discuss --
what issues the appellate court had failed to resolve. In any event, a wrong disposition by the court is not tantamount to denial of due
process.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision insofar as it pertains to Petitioner is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. On reasonable doubt,
Petitioner Melanio Mallari y Liberato is ACQUITTED. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the
reasons for his continued confinement, within ten days from notice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
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