Chapter Two

PHYSICAL INJURIES

Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, or some essential organ of reproduction.

Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods.

Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall
be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the
injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in

consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of
speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm,
or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated
for the work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in

consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become
deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof,
or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as
habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;

4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or
incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article 246, or
with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by
subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case covered by subdivision
number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; and the case covered by
subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict
physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.

Art. 264. Administering injurious substances or beverages. — The penalties established by the
next preceding article shall be applicable in the respective case to any person who, without intent
to kill, shall inflict upon another any serious, physical injury, by knowingly administering to him
any injurious substance or beverages or by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity.

Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party for
labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty
of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with the manifest intent to kill or
offend the injured person, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense in addition to
the penalty of arresto mayor, a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender's parents, ascendants, guardians,
curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, provided that, in the case of persons in
authority, the deed does not constitute the crime of assault upon such person.

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall
be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the offender has
caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his
habitual work nor require medical assistance.

3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when the
offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.

People v Adil and Fama Jr.

Fact:
When Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of January, the charge against Fama Jr. had to
be for slight physical injuries only, because according to the certification of the attending
physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would require medical attendance
from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications."

When the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in
which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury
or consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No.
3335 had already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the
alleged deformity became apparent.

Issue: WON the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No. 5241
constitutes a supervening element.

Held:

In Silva, there was no question that the extent of the damage to property and physical injuries
suffered by the offended parties therein were already existing and known when the prior minor
case was prosecuted, What is controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766,
in which it was held:

This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was
 charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following effect:

Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and
giving rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

In People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a deformity may be considered as a
supervening fact. Referring to the decision in People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil. 829, We held:

No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was mentioned in
the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the right
hand, we presumed that such fact was not apparent or could have been
discernible at the time the first examination was made. The course (not the
length) of the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand; it can only
be definitely known after the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why
the court considered that there was a supervening fact occuring since the filing of
the original information.

In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private
respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for
respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.

ACCORDINGLY, the orders of September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975 herein complained of are
hereby set aside and respondent court is ordered to proceed with the trial and judgment thereof
according to law. Costs against private respondent Fama Jr.

People v Buling

Facts: The crime of less serious physical injuries for having inflicted wounds (on Isidro Balaba)
which according to the complaint would "require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15
days and will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance of his customary labors for
the game period of time." However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated,
and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious physical injuries. The
information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the accused on Isidro Balaba require medical
attendance and incapacitated him for a period of from 1 ½ months to 2 ½ months. After trial the
accused was found guilty of serious physical injuries and sentenced in the manner indicated in
first paragraph hereof. This is the decision now sough to be set aside and reversed in this appeal.

Issue: WON there was a supervening effect for double jeopardy not to apply.

Held:

has a new fact supervened, like death in the case of Melo vs. People, which changes the character
of the offense into one which was not in existence at the time the case for less serious physical
injuries was filed? We do not believe that a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into
existence. What happened is that the first physician that examined the wounds of the offended
party certified on December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound, incised, wrist lateral,
right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and
incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same period of time from his usual work (Exh. 3). It was
on the basis of this certificate that on December 8, 1956, defendant-appellant was found guilty of
less serious physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto
mayor, etc.

But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the offended party, taking an X-ray picture
of the arm of the offended party which had been wounded. The examination discloses, according
to the physician, the following injuries:

Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end arm, right. X-ray plate finding
after one month and 12 days — Fracture old oblique, incomplete distal end, radius right,
with slight calus. (Exh. "E").

and the certification is to the effect that treatment will take from 1 ½ months to 2 ½ months
barring complications.

Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in the case at bar, as a result of
which another offense had been ommitted. It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof
was the same when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956, as when the
examination was made on January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact had been disclosed in the
latter examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in the previous examination may be
attributed to the incompetence on the part of the examining physician. We find much reason in
this argument. What happened is no X-ray examination of the wounded hand was made during
the first examination, which was merely superficial. The physician who made the first
examination could not have seen the fracture at the distal end of the right arm, and this could
only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography.

The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first
examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made. As we
have stated, we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which justifies the
application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason
we are constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy.

We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the prosecuting officers that before filing
informations for physical injuries, thorough physical and medical examinations of the injuries
should first be made to avoid instances, like the present, where by reason of the important
Constitutional provision of double jeopardy, the accused can not be held to answer for the graver
offense committed.

People v Yorac
Fatcs: Rodrigo Yorac was prosecuted for frustrated murder arising allegedly from having
assaulted, attacked, and hit with a piece of wood the offended party, Lam Hock, for which he had
been previously tried and sentenced for slight physical injuries (a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident
physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since April 8, 1968 up to
the present time for head injury.”), his plea being one of guilt. The later information for frustrated
murder was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week from the former
previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was much more thorough the second
time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained (another
medical certificate dated April 17, 1968 issued by the same Dr. Zulueta. In the medical certificate
of April 17, 1968, it was made to appear that the confinement of the offended party in the hospital
was the result of: "1. Contusion with lacerated wound 4 inches parieto-occipital region scalp mid
portion. 2. Cerebral concussion, moderately severe, secondary." Moreover, it further contained a
statement that the X-ray finding did not yield any "radiographic evidence of fracture." The healing
period barring complications, was declared to be from eighteen to twenty-one days.).
Issue: WON there is a supervening event that would justify that the second case is not within the
constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy.

Held:

(Considering: People v Buling) The opinion of Justice Labrador explained with clarity why the
constitutional right against being put twice in jeopardy was a bar to the second prosecution. Thus:
"If the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture
must have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is
therefore, no view or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the
filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by us in
the cases if Melo vs. Peopleand People vs. Manolong ... . We attribute the new finding of fracture,
which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and
inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at
the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in
healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was, caused by
the very superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no
supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs.
People and People vs. Manolong for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of
double jeopardy." It is quite apparent, in the light of the foregoing, why the lower court,
submitting to the compulsion of the Buling decision, had to sustain the motion to quash and to
dismiss the information against appellee Yorac. No error could therefore be rightfully imputed to
it.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of June 21, 1968 of Judge Nestor B. Alampay granting the motion
to quash, ordering the dismissal of the case and the immediate release of the appellee Rodrigo
Yorac, is affirmed. Without costs.

Aguirre v Sec. of DOJ

Facts: Adopted Larry under went vasectomy (psychologically impaired) by which consent was
given by Pedro Aguirre the adopting father.

Issue: WON mutilation was committed in castration.

Held: "the element[s] of castration or mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is

completely absent as he was not deprived of any organ necessary for reproduction, much less the
destruction of such organ." Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned that though the
vasectomy rendered Larry unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated
under the pertinent provision of the penal code.

Art. 262. Mutilation. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him,
either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.

Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.

the elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1)
that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the
mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some
essential organ for reproduction. Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or
partially, of some essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas deferens,
through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they
combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely tied. That
part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system
of the male reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ,i.e., a highly organized unit of
structure, having a defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of a range of
tissues. Be that as it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be considered an
organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential organ of
reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of
the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped back into
the incision.

Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not
deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction." Notably, the
ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the
body), with the operative expression being "deprivation." In the same manner, the word
"castration" is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries. Such being the case in this present
petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of
mutilation as defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
And no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist who
performed the procedure, much less the other respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to
explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they did. Verily, We agree
with the Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not be issued.

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not
a pronouncement of guilt.