FIRST DIVISION Thus, in Afialda v.
Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to
G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.
Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because
she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they
had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the
trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys.
The Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent
court and to reinstate that of the trial court.
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F.
Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she
was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an
anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was
readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August
15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to
them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had
witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was
appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so
should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by
the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for
causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils
were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of
Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the
house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and
there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even
her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply
because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be
determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in
question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The
complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the
carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly
credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to
him ("one way or the other") and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by
some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She
mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time or
another although they did not appear to be close kin. 8 She at least implied that they
did not pay any rent, presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda
notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very well.
There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of
boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and
accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-
as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother,
Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared that the
petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a
dog. 10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that
the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita
denied paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents submitted
documentary evidence of her application for water connection with the Cebu Water
District, which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six
kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and
her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was
playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog
itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until
1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners
offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she
knew them only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog
that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the
contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which
had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized.
The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal
connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note
that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog
bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her
death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she
was bitten by the dog is established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:
COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the
second admission?
A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred
to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and then the father, because the
child was asking for water, the father tried to give the child water
and this child went under the bed, she did not like to drink the
 water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For this reason, because According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
I was in danger there was rabies, I called Dr. Co. based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user
Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia? of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
18
A: Yes, sir. answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 21
As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the following to We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards
say under oath: except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to
A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring
physical, chemical and bacterial means. ... It can be the result of back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be
infection, now, so if you have any other disease which can lower assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.
your resistance you can also get pneumonia. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is
xxx xxx xxx DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
complication which is broncho-pneumonia?
A: Yes. Footnotes
Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the 1 Exhibit "2."
witness is know as CURRENT DIANOSIS & TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry 2 Exhibit "17,"p. 3.
3 Exhibit "7-A."
Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your 4 Decision, rollo, p. 32.
attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book under the title "Rabies." 5 Campos, Jr., J., with Pascual, Camilon and Juado, JJ., concuring.
There is on this page, "Prognosis" as a result of rabies and it says: 6 85 Phi1. 67.
Once the symptoms, have appeared death inevitably occurs after 2- 7 TSN, October 28, 1978, pp. 17-18.
8 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
3 days as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized 9 TSN, October 4, 1975, pp. 58-59.
paralysis. After a positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a 10 Ibid. pp. 66.
suspected animal if the animal cannot be observed or if the bite is 11 TSN, January 19, 1976, pp. 30-31.
on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you believe in 12 Exhibit "J."
this statement? 13 Rollo, P. 18.
14 TSN, January 19, 1976, p. 53.
A: Yes. 15 TSN, October 3, 1978, p. 17.
16 TSN, October 28, 1976, pp. 14-15.
Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die of 17 Exhibit "7."
respiratory failure which leave in the form of bronco-pneumonia? 18 TSN, January 19, 1976, pp. 11-12.
19 19 TSN, November 10, 1977, pp. 34-37,
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. 20 47 O.G. 1954. 21 Sangco, Torts and damages, 1978 Ed., p. 227.
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the
dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also
reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the
death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of
death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that
she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected
to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the
Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and
so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners
also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her.
The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as
they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness
was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for
whatever she might have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied
rejection of their original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their
father's house that bit Theness.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47033 April 25, 1941
JOSE DINGCONG, recurrente-apelante,
vs.
HALIM KANAAN, NASRI KANAAN, y MICHAEL KANAAN, dedicados al comercio bajo la
razon social de "American Bazar," recurridos-apelados.
Sres. Ezpeleta y Salvosa en representacion del recurrente.
D. Felipe Ysmael en representacion de los recurridos.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
Segun la decision del Tribunal del Tribunal de Apelaciones, los hermanos Loreto
Dingcong y Jose Dingcong son coarrentadarios de los altos de la casa de Emilia Saenz
situada en la Calle Jose Ma. Basa de la Ciudad de Iloilo, donde establecieron el Central
Hotel, siendo la primera la dueña y el ultimo su manager. El demandado Francisco
Echevarria ocupo, mediante pago de P30 al mes, el cuarto No. 10 de dicho hotel. Los
demandantes acupaban, a su vez los bajos de este hotel donde tenian establecido su
"American Bazar" dedicado a la compra y venta de articulos y mencancias. Hacia las
once de la noche del 19 de septiembre de 1933, Echevarria, al retirarse a la cama,
dejo abierto descuidadamente el grifo que daba sobre una palangana ordinaria sin
desague. Como las tuberias del hotel en aquel tiempo estaban en reparacion, cuando a
la media noche el agua descorrio por las tuberias, se esparcio por el suelo,
traspasandolo y mojando los articulos y mencancias en los bajos en el establecimiento
"American Bazar," causando una perdida, que el Juzgado de Primera Instancia estimo
en P1,089.61.
Se presento esta accion por Halim Kanaan, Nasri Kanaan y Michael Kanaan en nombre
del nombre del "American Bazar" contra Loreto Dingcong, Jose Dingcong y Francisco
Echevarria por daños y perjuicios causados a los demandantes. El Jusgado sobreseyo la
causa en cuanto a Loreto Dingcong por haber fallecido, y condeno a Francisco
Echevarria, absolviendo a Jose Dingcong. Los demandantes apelaron de esta decision
en cuanto absuelve a Jose dingcong. El Tribunal de Apelaciones, revocando la decision
del Juzgado de Primera Instancia, declaro a Jose Dingcong responsable y le condeno a
pagar a los demandantes el importe de los daños y perjuicios causados a los mismos
como fue estimado por el Juzgado. Se presenta ahora ante esta Corte,
mediante certiorari, apelacion de esta decision del Tribunal de Apelaciones.
Siendo Jose Dingcong coarrendatario y manager del hotel, con completa posesion de
los altos de la casa, debe responder por los daños causados por las cosas que se
arrojaron o cayeron de la misma (articulo 1910 del Codigo Civil). Francisco Echevarria
era huesped del hotel y fue el que directamente, por su descuido, al dejar abierto el
grifo, permitio que el agua de la tuberia descorriera por el suelo y se filtrara hacia los
bajos, mojando los articulos y mercancias de los demandantes. Jose Dingcong, por otra
parte, no practico la diligencia de un buen padre de familia para prevenir estos daños,
no obstante de que sabia que podian causarse por estar entonces en reparacion las
tuberias, pues, debiendo presumir que Echavarria podia usar el grifo no le proveyo de
algun recipiente con desague, y si solo puso debajo del mismo una palangana que, al
llenarse, hizo que el agua se esparciera por el suelo.
Se confirma la decision apelada, con las costas al apelante.
Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, y Horrilleno, MM., estan conformes.
Moran, M., no tomo parte.
EN BANC
GR No. L-47033 April 25, 1941
DINGCONG JOSE, appellant-appellant,
vs.
HALIM Kanaan, Kanaan NASRI, and Michael Kanaan, devoted to trade under the firm
name of "American Bazaar" -appellees appealed.
Mr. Ezpeleta and Salvosa in representation of appellant.
D. Felipe Ysmael in representation of the respondents.
AVANCEÑA, J. :
According to the decision of the Court of the Court of Appeals, brothers and Jose
Loreto Dingcong Dingcong are coarrentadarios of high Emilia Saenz's house located on
Calle Jose Ma Basa Iloilo City, where he established the Central Hotel, where the first
the owner and his manager last. Francisco Echevarria occupy the defendant upon
payment of P30 per month, room No. 10 of the hotel. The plaintiffs acup turn the lows
of this hotel where they had established their "American Bazaar" dedicated to the
purchase and sale of articles and mencancias. About eleven o'clock on the night of
September 19, 1933, Echevarria, retiring to bed, carelessly left open the faucet was on
a regular bowl with no drainage. As the pipes of the hotel at that time were in repair,
when midnight drew water from the pipes, spread the floor, passing and dunking the
articles and mencancias on low setting "American Bazaar," causing lost, that the Court
of First Instance estimated at P1, 089.61.
This action was filed by Halim Kanaan, Kanaan and Michael Kanaan Nasri on behalf of
the name of "American Bazaar" against Dingcong Loreto, Francisco Jose Echevarria
Dingcong and damages caused to the applicants.The Judging from the case dismissed
as to Loreto Dingcong to have died, and condemn Francisco Echevarria, Jose Dingcong
acquit. The plaintiffs appealed this decision as Jose dingcong acquitted. The Court of
Appeals, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance declared Jose Dingcong
responsible and ordered to pay the plaintiffs the amount of damages caused to them as
assessed by the court. Is now before this Court, by certiorari , appeal of this decision
of the Court of Appeals.
As Jose Dingcong joint tenant and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the
heights of the house, must answer for the damage caused by the things that were
thrown or fell from it (Article 1910 of the Civil Code).Francisco Echevarria was a guest
of the hotel and was the one who directly by their neglect, by leaving the tap, allowed
water from the pipe pull back on the ground and seeps into the low, dipping items and
goods of the plaintiffs. Jose Dingcong, moreover, do not practice the diligence of a
good father to prevent this damage, however, that he knew that could be caused by
then repair the pipes, therefore, must presume that Echavarria could not use the tap
provided some container with adequate drainage, and if they just put a pan under it
that, when filled, the water was spread on the ground.
Confirming the decision appealed from, with costs against the appellant.
Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, MM., are satisfied.
Moran, M., took no part.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36858 March 6, 1933
JUSTA AFABLE and the minors POTENCIANO MADLANGBAYAN and ROSA
MADLANGBAYAN, by JUSTA AFABLE, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
Bernabe Butalid and Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.
William F. Mueller for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of Judge Pedro Concepcion of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the complaint, without a special finding as
to costs.
The appellants make the following assignments of error:
I. El Juzgado a quo incurrio en error al considerar que los hechos probados
por los demandantes caen fuera de las disposiciones del articulo 2 de dicha
Ley No. 3428 tal como ha sido enmendada por la Ley No. 3812 de la
Legislatura Filipina;
II. Erro tambien al sobreseer de una manera definitiva la demandada;
III. Incurrio finalmente en error al no conceder la compensacion reclamada en
la demanda a que tienen derecho los demandantes, segun las disposiciones
de dicha Ley.
It appears from the evidence that Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the
Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of
the limits of the City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district
according to the records of the company. His compensation was a commission of eight
per cent of all collections made by him. On the afternoon of Sunday, November 16,
1930, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at
the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by
Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso Street
in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was
returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to
the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were
required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning.
On November 21, 1930, Vitaliano Sumoay, the driver of the truck within caused the
death of Leopoldo Madlangbayan, was convicted for the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence, and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day, and
to indemnify the heirs of Leopoldo Madlangbayan in the sum of P1,000.
On February 19, 1931, the widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought the
present action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as
amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation.
Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under
sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12
plus P100 for burial expenses.
In its answer to the plaintiffs' last amended complaint, the defendant denied all the
allegations thereof, and as special defenses alleged that prior to the filing of this
complaint the plaintiffs had obtained a judgment against Vitaliano Sumoay for the
damages caused by him; that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the
injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which
prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and
void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs the
obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and
deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of
deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the
Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. As the deceased Leopoldo
Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not approved
until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428,
section 23 of which reads as follows:
When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in
the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by
such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his
employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter
specified.
The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance
of his employment. At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan
was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was
on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory
where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. The employer is not an
insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the
course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to
recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going
to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise
out of and in the course of his employment.
The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was
changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this phrase,
the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial
Board (283 III., 148; 118 N.E., 1028; 1 W.C.L., 943), said:
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are
descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the
time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place.
(Fitzgerald vs. Clarke & Sons, 1 B.W.C.C., 197; Dietzen Co. vs. Industrial
Board, 279 Ill., 11; 116 N.E., 684.) By the use of these words it was not the
intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all
accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of
the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the
risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's
employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is
possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is
exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all
persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some
special degree to the particular employment are excluded.
Although some courts have held otherwise, we think the better rule is as we have
stated it. We do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for
injuries suffered while of his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his
employment. In the case at bar, if the deceased had been killed while going from
house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the
plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover.
The appellants cite the syllabus in Stacy's case (225 Mass., 174), in support of their
contention, but an examination of that case shows that it differs materially from the
case at the bar. Stacy was drowned by reason of breaking through the ice of Colburn's
Pond while of his way home from work. Up to the time of his death he had been Rosenberg, 2nd A.R.U.S.C.C., 263; Kirby Lumber Co. vs. Scurlock, Tex. Civ.
employed in the ice-house, in the work of storing ice which was cut from the pond. App.- [1921], 229 S.W., 975.)
The ice-house was situated at the southerly end of the pond and the deceased lived An employee who was paid by the hour was furnished a bicycle for his work,
directly north from the ice-house, across the pond. He followed the reasonable and and while riding home one evening on the main road he was run into and
customary way of leaving his employer's premises. The path around the pond was not killed by a motor lorry. It was held that, since it was no part of his duty to
used in winter. He was on his employer's premises when he met his death and was ride home on the bicycle the accident did not arise in the course of his
leaving those premises by a reasonable way. There was no other convenient way of employment. (Edwards vs. Wingham Agriculture & Imp. Co. [1913], W.C. &
going home. The pond was the premises of his employer, under his employer's control. Ins. Rep., 642; 109 L.T. Rep. 50; 82 L.J.K.B., 998; 6 B.W.C.C., 511; 4
It was as a result of the working operations of his employer that he met his death. The N.C.C.A., 115; Cook vs. Owners of "Montreal," 108 L.T. Rep., 164; 29 T. L.
court said. "The finding that the pond was in the control of the employer and that Rep. 233; 6 B. B.C.C., 220 [1913], 4 N. C.C.A., 115.)
crossing over it upon the ice was the "reasonable and customary way" for the deceased
to reach his home, and that he and other employees who lived in the same direction An employee had quit work and left the promises. He was sitting in his buggy
"crossed by this way regularly", warranted the further finding that the injury occurred waiting for his son, when the horse took fright and ran away. It was held that
in the course of the employment." The court added: "It also could have been found the injury sustained in the runaway did not arise out of or in the course of
that the death of the employee was due to his employment as a contributing the employment. (In re McCall, Ohio I. C. No. 121401, Nov. 4, 1915;
proximate cause, incidental to the nature of the work in which he was engaged. There Hilding vs. Dept. of Labor & Ind.[Wash.], 298 Pac., 321 [1931].)
was evidence from which the board could have found that Stacy's death occurred by Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant
reason of the special hazard incident to the work which it was his duty to perform ." corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the
The court said that Stacy's case was clearly distinguishable from Fumiciello's case (219 company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the
Mass., 488): defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or
Fumiciello was employed by Lathrop & Shea, who were doing some contract work for require its agents to use bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the
the Boston & Albany Railroad Company near Middlefield. He lived about one mile west accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the
where he was employed, and it was necessary for him to pass over the tracks of the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and
Boston & Albany Railroad Company to go from his work to his home. While returning to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the
home at the close of the day's work, Fumiciello entered upon the railroad track where defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he
he was struck by a train and killed. The question for decision was whether the injury made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his
arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court said: "It is plain that if, as employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.
the record states, it was necessary for him to pass over the railroad location, it formed For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs
no part of the employers' plant; nor was it in any way connected therewith or in their against the appellants.
control as was the common stairway used by employees in Sundine's Case, 218 Mass.,
1. The contract of employment did not provide for transportation or that the employee Villamor, Villa-Real, Hull and Imperial, JJ., concur.
should be paid for the time taken in going and returning to his place of employment,
and when the day's work had ended the employee was free to do as he pleased. If he
had chosen to use the public ways and had been injured by a defect or passing vehicle
the administrator could not recover against the employer because there would be no
causal connection between the conditions of employment and the injuries suffered."
This subject is considered at length in Workmen's Compensation Law by Schneider,
Second Edition, pp. 745 et seq.
In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance.
An employee quit work, mounted his motorcycle and started for home. When
riding down the street he collided with an automobile driven by another
employee. He sustained injuries which resulted in his death. In holding that
the accident did not arise out of in the course of the employment, the court
said: "To come within the term "injury received in the course of employment
" it must be shown that the injury originated in the work, and, further, that it
was received the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the
affairs of the employer. If it be conceded that the injury originated in the
work, it would still be necessary, in our opinion, to show that the employee
was engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business." (Indemnity
Co. vs. Dinkins [Tex. Civ. App.], 211 S.W., 949 [1919]; 18 N.C.C.A., 1034; 4
W.C.L.J., 294; In rePeter S. Winchester, 2nd A.R.U.S.C. C., 262; In re Julius
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO,
respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.
Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close down as a
consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of
foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it. The interesting issue posed is
whether the subsequent action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden
defects or merchantability, as claimed by the manufacturer, the petitioner herein
which must therefore be filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold
pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public
respondent, which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same
Code.
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in her complaint that she was
the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan
City, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and
other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on or about
12 August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and
Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances
or particles; he then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of
some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a
plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said
bottles to the Regional Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La
Union, for examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the Department of
Health informing her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a
consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her sales of
soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3
cases per day resulting in losses of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and not long after
that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989; she became jobless and destitute; she
demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She
prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her P5,000.00 as actual damages,
P72,000.00 as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, the amount equal to 30% of the damages awarded as attorney's
fees, and the costs. 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground, the petitioner
argued that since the complaint is for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the
said Code. In her Comment 4 thereto, private respondent alleged that the complaint is
one for damages which does not involve an administrative action and that her cause of
action is based on an injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought within four years
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the complaint was seasonably filed.
Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter filed by the parties. 5
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply as the
existing administrative remedy is not adequate. It also stated that the complaint is
based on a contract, and not on quasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties; thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article
1562, the complaint should have been filed within six months from the delivery of the
thing sold.
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial court
in its Order of 17 April 1991, 7the private respondent came to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari which we referred to the public respondent "for proper
determination and disposition. 8 The public respondent docketed the case as CA-G.R.
SP No. 25391.
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent annulled the
questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in Civil
Case No. D-9629. In holding for the private respondent, it ruled that:
Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach
of warranty as respondent contends, the applicable prescriptive
period is four years.
It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly
show that it is an action or damages arising from respondent's act of
"recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items
intended to be sold or public consumption" (p. 25, rollo). It is truism
in legal procedure that what determines the nature of an action are
the facts alleged in the complaint and those averred as a defense in
the defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445;
Alger Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).
Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil
code, the existence of contractual relations between the parties
does not absolutely preclude an action by one against the other
forquasi-delict arising from negligence in the performance of a
contract.
In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:
It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a
contract between the parties does not bar the commission
of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent
recovery of damages therefor
. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held
that) although the relation between a passenger and a
carrier is "contractual both in origin and in nature the act
that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on
Sales was taken, the authorities are one in saying that he
availability of an action or breach of warranty does not bar an
action for torts in a sale of defective goods. 10
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the public
respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took his recourse under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL
 PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASEDON BREACH OF A
SELLER'S IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.
II.
CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S
ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD
PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 12
The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that the
primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delict — for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or
wrongful conduct on its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a
seller's implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends the existence of a
contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the
application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since private respondent's cause of
action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have been
filed within six months room delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 171 of the
Civil Code.
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of the seller's
implied warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the Civil Code, elect
between withdrawing from the contract or demanding a proportionate reduction of the
price, with damages in either case. She asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an
action for rescission nor for proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages
arising from a quasi-delict and that the public respondent was correct in ruling that
the existence of a contract did not preclude the action for quasi-delict. As to the issue
of prescription, the private respondent insists that since her cause of action is based
on quasi-delict, the prescriptive period therefore is four (4) years in accordance with
Article 1144 of the Civil Code and thus the filing of the complaint was well within the
said period.
We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of
action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant
to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the
allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes
reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items
intended to be sold for public consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden
defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in
Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566,
the vendee may elect between withdrawing from the contract and
demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages
either case. 13
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or
fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under the
law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations
and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from
negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by
the courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay in the performance of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof are liable for damages. 16
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be
true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the
applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise
from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.
Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, inAir France
vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi
first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-
carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although
the relation between the passenger and a carrier is "contractual
both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may
also be a tort.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-
causing products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of
warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.24 Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
(which is known in Spanish legal treaties asculpa aquiliana, culpa extra-
contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical to tort under
the common law, 26 which includes not only negligence, but also intentional
criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. 27
It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent
should by no means be understood as suggesting that the private respondent's claims
for moral damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 46-49.
2 Rollo, 46-48.
3 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 58-59.
4 Annex "E" of Petition; Rollo, 58-59.
5 Reply to the Comment (Annex "F" of Petition); Rejoinder to Reply (Annex "G" of
Petition); Surrejoinder (Annex "H" of Petition).
6 Annex "I" of Petition; Rollo, 77-78. Per Judge Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
7 Annex "J" of Petition; Rollo, 79-81.
8 Rollo, 13, 39.
9 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 36-43. Per Associate Justice Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr.,
concurred in by Associate Justices Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr. and Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago.
10 Rollo, 40-41. Citing CJS Supp. Products Liability § 9; Guarino vs. Mine Safety
Appliance Co., 44 ALR 3d 470, 255 N.E. 2d 173; Goldberg vs. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 436, 191 N.E. 2d 82-83; Greco vs. S.S. Kresge Co. 12 N.E. 2d
557, 561.
11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 45.
12 Rollo, 14-15.
13 The first remedy is known as the redhibitory action and the second, the accion
quanti minoris. (TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1992 ed., 123).
14 TOLENTINO, supra.
15 Article 1171 and 1172, Civil Code.
16 Article 1170, Civil Code.
17 23 SCRA 1117 [1968]. See also Araneta vs. De Joya, 57 SCRA 59 [1974].
18 Citing Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada vs. Manila Railroad, 33
Phil. 8; Vasquez vs. Borja, 74 Phil. 560.
19 18 SCRA 155 [1966].
20 PARAS, E.L., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1990 ed., 995-996, citing Air
France vs. Carrascoso and Singson vs. Bank of Philippine Islands, supra.
21 63 AM JUR 2d Products Liability, §25.
22 Id., § 91.
23 Id., § 123.
24 Id., §153.
25 Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines,
161.
26 Vasquez vs. De Borja, 74 Phil. 560 [1944].
27 Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines,
162.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9356 February 18, 1915
C. S. GILCHRIST, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
E. A. CUDDY, ET AL., defendants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA, appellants.
C. Lozano for appellants.
Bruce, Lawrence, Ross and Block for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
An appeal by the defendants, Jose Fernandez Espejo and Mariano Zaldarriaga, from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, dismissing their cross-complaint upon
the merits for damages against the plaintiff for the alleged wrongful issuance of a
mandatory and a preliminary injunction.
Upon the application of the appellee an ex parte mandatory injunction was issued on
the 22d of May, 1913, directing the defendant, E. A. Cuddy, to send to the appellee a
certain cinematograph film called "Zigomar" in compliance with an alleged contract
which had been entered into between these two parties, and at the time an ex
parte preliminary injunction was issued restraining the appellants from receiving and
exhibiting in their theater the Zigomar until further orders of the court. On the 26th of
that month the appellants appeared and moved the court to dissolve the preliminary
injunction. When the case was called for trial on August 6, the appellee moved for the
dismissal of the complaint "for the reason that there is no further necessity for the
maintenance of the injunction." The motion was granted without objection as to Cuddy
and denied as to the appellants in order to give them an opportunity to prove that the
injunction were wrongfully issued and the amount of damages suffered by reason
thereof.
The pertinent part of the trial court's findings of fact in this case is as follows:
It appears in this case that Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and that
on the 24th of April he rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125, and it
was to be delivered on the 26th of May, the week beginning that day. A few
days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, which he had
forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had made other arrangements
with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to these defendants
Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the injunction was asked by
Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for the week beginning the
26th of May.
It appears from the testimony in this case, conclusively, that Cuddy willfully
violated his contract, he being the owner of the picture, with Gilchrist
because the defendants had offered him more for the same period. Mr.
Espejo at the trial on the permanent injunction on the 26th of May admitted
that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He was trying to get it
through his agents Pathe Brothers in Manila. He is the agent of the same
concern in Iloilo. There is in evidence in this case on the trial today as well as
on the 26th of May, letters showing that the Pathe Brothers in Manila advised
this man on two different occasions not to contend for this film Zigomar
because the rental price was prohibitive and assured him also that he could
not get the film for about six weeks. The last of these letters was written on
the 26th of April, which showed conclusively that he knew they had to get
this film from Cuddy and from this letter that the agent in Manila could not
get it, but he made Cuddy an offer himself and Cuddy accepted it because he
was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist
for. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, the defendants failed signally to
show the injunction against the defendant was wrongfully procured.
The appellants duly excepted to the order of the court denying their motion for new
trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision rendered.
There is lacking from the record before us the deposition of the defendant Cuddy,
which apparently throws light upon a contract entered into between him and the
plaintiff Gilchrist. The contents of this deposition are discussed at length in the brief
of the appellants and an endeavor is made to show that no such contract was entered
into. The trial court, which had this deposition before it, found that there was a
contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist. Not having the deposition in question before us,
it is impossible to say how strongly it militates against this findings of fact. By a series
of decisions we have construed section 143 and 497 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
to require the production of all the evidence in this court. This is the duty of the
appellant and, upon his failure to perform it, we decline to proceed with a review of
the evidence. In such cases we rely entirely upon the pleadings and the findings of fact
of the trial court and examine only such assigned errors as raise questions of law.
(Ferrer vs. Neri Abejuela, 9 Phil. Rep., 324; Valle vs. Galera, 10 Phil. Rep., 619;
Salvacion vs. Salvacion, 13 Phil. Rep., 366; Breta vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 15 Phil. Rep.,
446; Arroyo vs. Yulo, 18 Phil. Rep., 236; Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co., 19
Phil. Rep., 102; Blum vs.Barretto, 19 Phil. Rep., 161; Cuyugan vs. Aguas, 19 Phil. Rep.,
379; Mapa vs. Chaves, 20 Phil. Rep., 147; Mansvs. Garry, 20 Phil. Rep., 134.) It is true
that some of the more recent of these cases make exceptions to the general rule.
Thus, in Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co., (19 Phil. Rep., 102), that portion of
the evidence before us tended to show that grave injustice might result from a strict
reliance upon the findings of fact contained in the judgment appealed from. We,
therefore, gave the appellant an opportunity to explain the omission. But we required
that such explanation must show a satisfactory reason for the omission, and that the
missing portion of the evidence must be submitted within sixty days or cause shown for
failing to do so. The other cases making exceptions to the rule are based upon peculiar
circumstances which will seldom arise in practice and need not here be set forth, for
the reason that they are wholly inapplicable to the present case. The appellants would
be entitled to indulgence only under the doctrine of the Olsen case. But from that
portion of the record before us, we are not inclined to believe that the missing
deposition would be sufficient to justify us in reversing the findings of fact of the trial
court that the contract in question had been made. There is in the record not only the
positive and detailed testimony of Gilchrist to this effect, but there is also a letter of
apology from Cuddy to Gilchrist in which the former enters into a lengthy explanation
of his reasons for leasing the film to another party. The latter could only have been
called forth by a broken contract with Gilchrist to lease the film to him. We,
therefore, fail to find any reason for overlooking the omission of the defendants to
bring up the missing portion of the evidence and, adhering to the general rule above
referred to, proceed to examine the questions of law raised by the appellants.
From the above-quoted findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a resident of Manila, was
the owner of the "Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the owner of a cinematograph theater in
Iloilo; that in accordance with the terms of the contract entered into between Cuddy
and Gilchrist the former leased to the latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his
(Gilchrist's) theater for the week beginning May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully
violate his contract in order that he might accept the appellant's offer of P350 for the
film for the same period. Did the appellants know that they were inducing Cuddy to
violate his contract with a third party when they induced him to accept the P350?
Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He received a
letter from his agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he could not get the
film for about six weeks. The arrangement between Cuddy and the appellants for the
exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th of May were perfected after April 26, so
that the six weeks would include and extend beyond May 26. The appellants must
necessarily have known at the time they made their offer to Cuddy that the latter had
booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April 26. Therefore, the inevitable
conclusion is that the appellants knowingly induced Cuddy to violate his contract with
another person. But there is no specific finding that the appellants knew the identity
of the other party. So we must assume that they did not know that Gilchrist was the
person who had contracted for the film.
The appellants take the position that if the preliminary injunction had not been issued
against them they could have exhibited the film in their theater for a number of days
beginning May 26, and could have also subleased it to other theater owners in the
nearby towns and, by so doing, could have cleared, during the life of their contract
with Cuddy, the amount claimed as damages. Taking this view of the case, it will be
unnecessary for us to inquire whether the mandatory injunction against Cuddy was
properly issued or not. No question is raised with reference to the issuance of that
injunction.
The right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with Cuddy for the lease of
the film must be fully recognized and admitted by all. That Cuddy was liable in an
action for damages for the breach of that contract, there can be no doubt. Were the
appellants likewise liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and
Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of one of the contracting parties?
The appellants claim that they had a right to do what they did. The ground upon which
the appellants base this contention is, that there was no valid and binding contract
between Cuddy and Gilchrist and that, therefore, they had a right to compete with
Gilchrist for the lease of the film, the right to compete being a justification for their
acts. If there had been no contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist this defense would be
tenable, but the mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally
inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights.
Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin (107 Mass., 555), said: "Everyone has a right to
enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has
no right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance.
If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by
others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or
otherwise is interfered with."
In Read vs. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons ([1902] 2 K. B., 88), Darling, J.,
said: "I think the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendants, unless the
court is satisfied that, when they interfered with the contractual rights of plaintiff,
the defendants had a sufficient justification for their interference; . . . for it is not a
justification that `they acted bona fide in the best interests of the society of masons,'
i. e., in their own interests. Nor is it enough that `they were not actuated by improper
motives.' I think their sufficient justification for interference with plaintiff's right must
be an equal or superior right in themselves, and that no one can legally excuse himself
to a man, of whose contract he has procured the breach, on the ground that he acted
on a wrong understanding of his own rights, or without malice, or bona fide, or in the
best interests of himself, or even that he acted as an altruist, seeking only good of
another and careless of his own advantage." (Quoted with approval in
Beekman vs. Marsters, 195 Mass., 205.)
It is said that the ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering with a
contract between others rests, is that the interference was malicious. The contrary
view, however, is taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Angle vs. Railway Co. (151 U. S., 1). The only motive for interference by the third
party in that case was the desire to make a profit to the injury of one of the parties of
the contract. There was no malice in the case beyond the desire to make an unlawful
gain to the detriment of one of the contracting parties.
In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist — Cuddy
contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the
film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not
relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its
breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable to
Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from such
liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the
original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.
The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual
obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it
would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that
code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when
there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage do done. There is
nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-
feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact,
the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is
required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
But the fact that the appellants' interference with the Gilchrist contract was
actionable did not of itself entitle Gilchrist to sue out an injunction against them. The
allowance of this remedy must be justified under section 164 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which specifies the circumstance under which an injunction may issue.
Upon the general doctrine of injunction we said in Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep.,
273):
An injunction is a "special remedy" adopted in that code (Act No. 190) from
American practice, and originally borrowed from English legal procedure,
which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of
equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to
cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law,"
which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties are
undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable
injury will be done,"which cannot be compensated in damages, and where
there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted,
to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of
anotherwhose title has not been established by law.
We subsequently affirmed the doctrine of the Devesa case in Palafox vs. Madamba (19
Phil., Rep., 444), and we take this occasion of again affirming it, believing, as we do,
that the indiscriminate use of injunctions should be discouraged.
Does the fact that the appellants did not know at the time the identity of the original
lessee of the film militate against Gilchrist's right to a preliminary injunction, although
the appellant's incurred civil liability for damages for such interference? In the
examination of the adjudicated cases, where in injunctions have been issued to
restrain wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts, we have
been unable to find any case where this precise question was involved, as in all of
those cases which we have examined, the identity of both of the contracting parties
was known to the tort-feasors. We might say, however, that this fact does not seem to
have a controlling feature in those cases. There is nothing in section 164 of the Code
of Civil Procedure which indicates, even remotely, that before an injunction may issue
restraining the wrongful interference with contrast by strangers, the strangers must
know the identity of both parties. It would seem that this is not essential, as
injunctions frequently issue against municipal corporations, public service
corporations, public officers, and others to restrain the commission of acts which
would tend to injuriously affect the rights of person whose identity the respondents
could not possibly have known beforehand. This court has held that in a proper case
injunction will issue at the instance of a private citizen to restrain ultra vires acts of
public officials. (Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil. Rep., 366.) So we proceed to
the determination of the main question of whether or not the preliminary injunction
ought to have been issued in this case.
As a rule, injunctions are denied to those who have an adequate remedy at law. Where
the choice is between the ordinary and the extraordinary processes of law, and the
former are sufficient, the rule will not permit the use of the latter. (In re Debs, 158 U.
S., 564.) If the injury is irreparable, the ordinary process is inadequate. In
Wahle vs.Reinbach (76 Ill., 322), the supreme court of Illinois approved a definition of
the term "irreparable injury" in the following language: "By `irreparable injury' is not
meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond possible
compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or great damage, but that
species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one
hand or inflicted on the other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small
on the other, is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable
redress can be had therefor in a court of law." (Quoted with approval in Nashville R. R.
Co. vs.McConnell, 82 Fed., 65.)
The case at bar is somewhat novel, as the only contract which was broken was that
between Cuddy and Gilchrist, and the profits of the appellee depended upon the
patronage of the public, for which it is conceded the appellants were at liberty to
complete by all fair does not deter the application of remarked in the case of the
"ticket scalpers" (82 Fed., 65), the novelty of the facts does not deter the application
of equitable principles. This court takes judicial notice of the general character of a
cinematograph or motion-picture theater. It is a quite modern form of the play house,
wherein, by means of an apparatus known as a cinematograph or cinematograph, a
series of views representing closely successive phases of a moving object, are
exhibited in rapid sequence, giving a picture which, owing to the persistence of vision,
appears to the observer to be in continuous motion. (The Encyclopedia Britanica, vol.
6, p. 374.) The subjects which have lent themselves to the art of the photographer in
this manner have increased enormously in recent years, as well as have the places
where such exhibition are given. The attendance, and, consequently, the receipts, at
one of these cinematograph or motion-picture theaters depends in no small degree
upon the excellence of the photographs, and it is quite common for the proprietor of
the theater to secure an especially attractive exhibit as his "feature film" and advertise
it as such in order to attract the public. This feature film is depended upon to secure a
larger attendance that if its place on the program were filled by other films of
mediocre quality. It is evident that the failure to exhibit the feature film will reduce
the receipts of the theater.
Hence, Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of
the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had
counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimate with any decree
of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would
be quite difficult if not impossible. If he allowed the appellants to exhibit the film in
Iloilo, it would be useless for him to exhibit it again, as the desire of the public to
witness the production would have been already satisfied. In this extremity, the
appellee applied for and was granted, as we have indicated, a mandatory injunction
against Cuddy requiring him to deliver the Zigomar to Gilchrist, and a preliminary
injunction against the appellants restraining them from exhibiting that film in their
theater during the weeks he (Gilchrist) had a right to exhibit it. These injunction saved
the plaintiff harmless from damages due to the unwarranted interference of the
defendants, as well as the difficult task which would have been set for the court of
estimating them in case the appellants had been allowed to carry out their illegal
plans. As to whether or not the mandatory injunction should have been issued, we are
not, as we have said, called upon to determine. So far as the preliminary injunction
issued against the appellants is concerned, which prohibited them from exhibiting the
Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion
that the circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the
court.
We are not lacking in authority to support our conclusion that the court was justified
in issuing the preliminary injunction against the appellants. Upon the precise question
as to whether injunction will issue to restrain wrongful interference with contracts by
strangers to such contracts, it may be said that courts in the United States have usually
granted such relief where the profits of the injured person are derived from his
contractual relations with a large and indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing
him to the necessity of proving in an action against the tort-feasor that the latter was
responsible in each case for the broken contract, or else obliging him to institute
individual suits against each contracting party and so exposing him to a multiplicity of
suits. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. vs. Mechanics' Clothing Co. (128 Fed., 800); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. vs. Louis Weber & Co. (161 Fed., 219); Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. vs. Pommer (199 Fed., 309); were all cases wherein the respondents were inducing
retail merchants to break their contracts with the company for the sale of the latters'
trading stamps. Injunction issued in each case restraining the respondents from
interfering with such contracts.
In the case of the Nashville R. R. Co. vs. McConnell (82 Fed., 65), the court, among
other things, said: "One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and,
for the purpose of gain to himself induces one of the parties to break it, is liable to the
party injured thereby; and his continued interference may be ground for an injunction
where the injuries resulting will be irreparable."
In Hamby & Toomer vs. Georgia Iron & Coal Co. (127 Ga., 792), it appears that the
respondents were interfering in a contract for prison labor, and the result would be, if
they were successful, the shutting down of the petitioner's plant for an indefinite
time. The court held that although there was no contention that the respondents were
insolvent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary
injunction against the respondents.
In Beekman vs. Marsters (195 Mass., 205), the plaintiff had obtained from the
Jamestown Hotel Corporation, conducting a hotel within the grounds of the Jamestown
Exposition, a contract whereby he was made their exclusive agent for the New England
States to solicit patronage for the hotel. The defendant induced the hotel corporation
to break their contract with the plaintiff in order to allow him to act also as their
agent in the New England States. The court held that an action for damages would not
have afforded the plaintiff adequate relief, and that an injunction was proper
compelling the defendant to desist from further interference with the plaintiff's
exclusive contract with the hotel company.
In Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. vs. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co. (171
Fed., 553), the court, while admitting that there are some authorities to the contrary,
held that the current authority in the United States and England is that:
The violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and
that it is a violation of a legal right to interfere with contractual relations
recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justification for the interference.
 (Quinn vs. Leatham, supra, 510; Angle vs. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 151 U. S.,
1; 14 Sup. Ct., 240; 38 L. Ed., 55; Martens vs. Reilly, 109 Wis., 464, 84 N. W.,
840; Rice vs. Manley, 66 N. Y., 82; 23 Am. Rep., 30; Bitterman vs. L. & N. R.
R. Co., 207 U. S., 205; 28 Sup. Ct., 91; 52 L. Ed., 171; Beekman vs.Marsters,
195 Mass., 205; 80 N. E., 817; 11 L. R. A. [N. S.] 201; 122 Am. St. Rep., 232;
South Wales Miners' Fed. vs. Glamorgan Coal Co., Appeal Cases, 1905, p.
239.)
See also Nims on Unfair Business Competition, pp. 351- 371.
In 3 Elliot on Contracts, section 2511, it is said: "Injunction is the proper remedy to
prevent a wrongful interference with contract by strangers to such contracts where
the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. And where there
is a malicious interference with lawful and valid contracts a permanent injunction will
ordinarily issue without proof of express malice. So, an injunction may be issued where
the complainant to break their contracts with him by agreeing to indemnify who
breaks his contracts of employment may be adjoined from including other employees
to break their contracts and enter into new contracts with a new employer of the
servant who first broke his contract. But the remedy by injunction cannot be used to
restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation
of a contract. Nor will equity ordinarily enjoin employees who have quit the service of
their employer from attempting by proper argument to persuade others from taking
their places so long as they do not resort to force or intimidations on obstruct the
public thoroughfares."
Beekman vs. Marster, supra, is practically on all fours with the case at bar in that
there was only one contract in question and the profits of the injured person depended
upon the patronage of the public. Hamby & Toomer vs.Georgia Iron & Coal Co., supra,
is also similar to the case at bar in that there was only one contract, the interference
of which was stopped by injunction.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed, with costs, against the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., concurring:
The court seems to be of the opinion that the action is one for a permanent injunction;
whereas, under my view of the case, it is one for specific performance. The facts are
simple. C. S. Gilchrist, the plaintiff, proprietor of the Eagle Theater of Iloilo,
contracted with E. A. Cuddy, one of the defendants, of Manila, for a film entitled
"Zigomar or Eelskin, 3d series," to be exhibited in his theater in Iloilo during the week
beginning May 26, 1913. Later, the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga, who were also
operating a theater in Iloilo, representing Pathe Freres, also obtained from Cuddy a
contract for the exhibition of the film aforesaid in their theater in Iloilo during the
same week.
The plaintiff commenced this action against Cuddy and the defendants Espejo and
Zaldarriaga for the specific performance of the contract with Cuddy. The complaint
prays "that the court, by a mandatory injunction, order Cuddy to deliver, on the 24th
of May, 1913, in accordance with the aforesaid contract, the said film 'Zigomar, 3d
series, or Eelskin,' to the plaintiff Gilchrist, in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, so that plaintiff can exhibit the same during the last week beginning May
26, 1913, in the Eagle Theater, in Iloilo; that the court issue a preliminary injunction
against the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga prohibiting them from receiving,
exhibiting, or using said film in Iloilo during the last week of May, 1913, or at any other
time prior to the delivery to the plaintiff ; that, on the trial, said injunction be made
perpetual and that Cuddy be ordered and commanded to specifically perform his
contract with the plaintiff ."
On the filing of the complaint the plaintiff made an application for a mandatory
injunction compelling the defendant Cuddy to deliver to plaintiff the film in question
by mailing it to him from Manila on the 24th of May so that it would reach Iloilo for
exhibition on the 26th; and for a preliminary restraining order against the order two
defendants prohibiting them from receiving or exhibiting the said film prior to its
exhibition by plaintiff.
The court, on this application, entered an order which provided that Cuddy should "not
send said film 'Zigomar, 3d series, or Eelskin,' to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga
and that he should send it to the plaintiff, Gilchrist, on the 24th day of May, 1913, in
the mail for Iloilo," This order was duly served on the defendants, including Cuddy, in
whose possession the film still was, and, in compliance therewith Cuddy mailed the
film to the plaintiff at Iloilo on the 24th of May. The latter duly received it and
exhibited it without molestation during the week beginning the 26th of May in
accordance with the contract which he claimed to have made with Cuddy.
The defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga having received due notice of the issuance of
the mandatory injunction and restraining order of the 22d of May, appeared before the
court on the 26th of May and moved that the court vacate so much of the order as
prohibited them from receiving and exhibiting the film. In other words, while the order
of the 22d of May was composed of two parts, one a mandatory order for immediate
specific performance of the plaintiff's contract with the defendant Cuddy, and the
other a preliminary restraining order directed to Espejo and Zaldarriaga prohibiting
them from receiving and exhibiting the film during the week beginning the 26th of
May, their motion of the 26th of May referred exclusively to the injunction against
them and touched in no way that portion of the order which required the immediate
performance by Cuddy of his contract with Gilchrist. Indeed, the defendants Espejo
and Zaldarriaga did not even except to the order requiring Cuddy to specifically
perform his agreement with the plaintiff nor did they in any way make an objection to
or show their disapproval of it. It was not excepted to or appealed from and is not
before this court for review.
The motion of Espejo and Zaldarriaga to vacate the injunction restraining them from
receiving the film was denied on the 26th of May. After the termination of the week
beginning May 26th, and after the exhibition of the film by the plaintiff in accordance
with the alleged contract with Cuddy, the plaintiff came into court and moved that, in
view of the fact that he had already obtained all that he desired to obtain or could
obtain by his action, namely, the exhibition of the film in question during the week
beginning May 26th, there was no reason for continuing it and moved for its dismissal.
To this motion Cuddy consented and the action was dismissed as to him. But the other
defendants objected to the dismissal of the action on the ground that they desired to
present to the court evidence showing the damages which they had suffered by reason
of the issuance of the preliminary injunction prohibiting them from receiving and
exhibiting the film in question during the week beginning May 26. The court sustained
their objection and declined to dismiss the action as to them, and, on the 8th of
August, heard the evidence as to damages. He denied defendants the relief asked for
and dismissed their claim for damages. They thereupon took an appeal from that
order, and that is the appeal which we have now before us and which is the subject of
the opinion of the court with which I am concurring.
We thus have this strange condition:
An action for specific performance of a contract to deliver a film for exhibition during
a given time. A preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the delivery of the film in
accordance with the contract. The delivery of the film in accordance with the
preliminary mandatory injunction. The actual exhibition of the film during the time
specified in the contract. No objection to the issuance of the mandatory injunction, to
the delivery of the film, or to the ground that the plaintiff had obtained full relief by
means of the so-called preliminary remedy by virtue of which the contract
was actually specifically performed before the action was tried. No objection or
exception to the order requiring the specific performance of the contract.
Under such conditions it is possible for the defendant Espejo and Zaldarriaga to secure
damages for the wrongful issuance of the preliminary injunction directed against them
even though it be admitted that it was erroneously issued and that there was no
ground therefor whatever? It seems to me that it is not. At the time this action was
begun the film, as we have seen, was in the possession of Cuddy and, while in his
possession, he complied with a command of the court to deliver it to plaintiff. In
pursuance of that command he delivered it to plaintiff, who used it during the time
specified in his contract with Cuddy; or, in other words, he made such use of it as he
desired and then returned it to Cuddy. This order and the delivery of the film under it
were made in an action in which the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga were parties,
without objection on their part and without objection or exception to the order. The
film having been delivered to defendants' competitor, the plaintiff, under a decree of
the court to which they made no objection and took no exception and from which they
have not appealed, what injury can they show by reason of the injunction restraining
them from making use of the film? If they themselves, by their conduct, permitted the
plaintiff to make it impossible for them to gain possession of the film and to use it,
then the preliminary injunction produced no injury for the reason that no harm can
result from restraining a party from doing a thing which, without such restraint, it
would be impossible for him to do. Moreover, the order for the delivery of the film to
plaintiff was a complete determination of the rights of the parties to the film which,
while the court had no right to make, nevertheless, was valid and binding on all the
parties, none of them objecting or taking exception thereto. Being a complete
determination of the rights of the parties to the action, it should have been the first
point attacked by the defendants, as it foreclosed them completely and, if left in
force, eliminating every defense. This order was made on May 22d and was not
excepted to or appealed from. On the 8th of August following the defendants appealed
from the order dismissing their claim to damages but the order for the delivery of the
film to plaintiff was final at that time and is now conclusive on this court.
Section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for appeals by bill of exceptions,
provides that "upon the rendition of final judgment disposing of the action, either
party shall have the right to perfect a bill of exceptions for a review by the Supreme
Court of all rulings, orders, and judgment made in the action, to which the party has
duly excepted at the time of making such ruling, order, or judgment." While the order
for the delivery of the film to plaintiff was in one sense a preliminary order, it was in
reality a final determination of the rights of the parties to the film, as it ordered the
delivery thereof to plaintiff for his use. If it had been duly excepted to, its validity
could have been attacked in an appeal from the final judgment thereafter entered in
the action. Not having been excepted to as required by the section just referred to, it
became final and conclusive on all the parties to the action, and when, on the 8th day
of August following, the defendants presented their claim for damages based on the
alleged wrongful issuance of a temporary restraining order, the whole foundation of
their claim had disappeared by virtue of the fact that the execution of the order of the
22d of May had left nothing for them to litigate. The trial court, on the 8th of August,
would have been fully justified in refusing to hear the defendants on their claim for
damages. Their right thereto had been adjudicated on the 22d of May and that
adjudication had been duly put into execution without protest, objection or exception,
and was, therefore, final and conclusive on them on the 8th of August.
I have presented this concurring opinion in an attempt to prevent confusion, if any,
which might arise from the theory on which the court decides this case. It seems to me
impossible that the action can be one for a permanentinjunction. The very nature of
the case demonstrates that a permanent injunction is out of the question. The only
thing that plaintiff desired was to be permitted to use the film for the week beginning
the 26th of May. With the termination of that week his rights expired. After that time
Cuddy was perfectly free to turn the film over to the defendants Espejo and
Zaldarriaga for exhibition at any time. An injunction permanently prohibiting the
defendants from exhibiting the film in Iloilo would have been unjustifiable, as it was
something that plaintiff did not ask and did not want; and would have been an invasion
of the rights of Cuddy as, after the termination of the week beginning May 26, he was
at liberty, under his contract with plaintiff, to rent the film to the defendants Espejo
and Zaldarriaga and permit its exhibition in Iloilo at any time. The plaintiff never
asked to have defendants permanently enjoined from exhibiting the film in Iloilo and
no party to the action has suggested such thing.
The action is one for specific performance purely; and while the court granted plaintiff
rights which should have been granted only after a trial of the action, nevertheless,
such right having been granted before trial and none of the defendants having made
objection or taken exception thereto, and the order granting them having become
final, such order became a final determination of the action, by reason of the nature
of the action itself, the rights of the parties became thereby finally determined and
the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga, being parties to the action, were precluded
from further litigation relative to the subject matter of the controversy.
No damages are claimed by reason of the issuance of the mandatory injunction under
which the film was delivered to plaintiff and used by him during the week beginning
the 26th of May. While the opinion says in the first paragraph that the action is "for
damages against the plaintiff for the alleged wrongful issuance of a mandatory and
preliminary injunction," the opinion also says in a latter portion that "It will be
unnecessary for us to inquire whether the mandatory injunction against Cuddy was
properly issued or not. No question is raised with reference to the issuance of that
injunction;" and still later it is also stated that "as to whether or not the mandatory
injunction should have been issued, we are not, as we have said, called upon to
determine." I repeat that no objection was made by the defendants to the issuance of
the mandatory injunction, no exception was taken to the order on which it was issued
and no appeal has been taken therefrom. That order is now final and conclusive and
was at the time this appeal was taken. That being so, the rights of the defendants
were foreclosed thereby. The defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga cannot now be heard
to say that they were damaged by the issuance of the preliminary restraining
injunction issued on the same day as the mandatory injunction.
From what has been said it is clear, it seems to me, that the question of a breach of
contract by inducement, which is substantially the only question discussed and
decided, is not in the case in reality and, in my judgment, should not be touched
upon. Courts will not proceed with a litigation and discuss and decided question which
might possibly be involved in the case when it clearly appears that there remains
nothing about which to litigate, the whole subject matter of the original action having
been settled and the parties having no real controversy to present. At the time the
defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga offered their claim for damages arising out of the
wrongful issuance of the restraining order, there was nothing between them and the
plaintiff to litigate, the rightfulness of plaintiff's demand having already been finally
adjudicated and determined in the same action.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999
SO PING BUN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISES CORP. and MANUEL C.
TIONG, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari challenges the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
October 10, 1994, and the Resolution 2 dated June 5, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
35, except for the award of attorney's fees, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appeal of respondent-
appellant So Ping Bun for lack of merit is DISMISSED. The appealed
decision dated April 20, 1992 of the court a quo is modified by
reducing the attorney's fees awarded to plaintiff Tek Hua
Enterprising Corporation from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00. 3
The facts are as follows:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into
lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4)
lease contracts were premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C, Soler
Street, Binondo, Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles. The contracts
each had a one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy
the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua
continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later,
the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek
Hua Enterprising Corp., herein respondent corporation.
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek Giok's
grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business,
Trendsetter Marketing.
On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises,
informing the latter of the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. The rent
increase was later on reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees'
demand. Again on December 1, 1990, the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase.
Enclosed in these letters were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that
failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest on
the lessee's part, and agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents
did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.
On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner which reads as
follows:
March 1, 1991
Mr. So Ping Bun
930 Soler Street
Binondo, Manila
Dear Mr. So,
Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades
with your late grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So
Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek
Hua Enterprising Corp. for several years to generate your personal
business.
Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse
immediately for my stocks. Therefore, please be advised to vacate
all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse. You are
hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have good
reasons that you have the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be
constrained to take measure to protect my interest.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid
inconvenience on your part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) Manuel C. Tiong
MANUEL C. TIONG
President 4
Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested formal contracts
of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the
death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been occupying the premises for his
textile business and religiously paid rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioner's request. The
lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed.
In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease
contracts between DCCSI and petitioner. They also claimed damages.
After trial, the trial court ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Annulling the four Contracts of Lease (Exhibits A, A-1 to
A-3, inclusive) all dated March 11, 1991, between
defendant So Ping Bun, doing business under the name and
style of "Trendsetter Marketing", and defendant Dee C.
Chuan & Sons, Inc. over the premises located at Nos. 924-
B, 924-C, 930 and 930, Int., respectively, Soler Street,
Binondo Manila;
2. Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on June 21, 1991;
3. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the aggrieved
party, plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation, the sum
of P500,000.00, for attorney's fees;
4. Dismissing the complaint, insofar as plaintiff Manuel C.
Tiong is concerned, and the respective counterclaims of
the defendant;
5. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the costs of this
lawsuit;
This judgment is without prejudice to the rights of plaintiff Tek Hua
Enterprising Corporation and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc.
to negotiate for the renewal of their lease contracts over the
premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C Soler
Street, Binondo, Manila, under such terms and conditions as they
agree upon, provided they are not contrary to law, public policy,
public order, and morals.
 5
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied.
On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court modified the decision by reducing the award of
attorney's fees from five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred
thousand (P200,000.00) pesos.
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION FINDING SO PING BUN GUILTY OF TORTUOUS
INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT?
II. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF P200,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the correct interpretation of the applicable
law on tortuous conduct, particularly unlawful interference with contract. We have to
begin, obviously, with certain fundamental principles on torts and damages.
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. 6 One becomes liable
in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges
with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial,
(c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is
either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general
negligence rules. 7
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge
on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the
third person is without legal justification or excuse.8
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others,
and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by
one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private
property. 9 This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to
renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the case before us,
petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor,
and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter's property
right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of
tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant case.
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts
for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. 10 One view is
that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of
another exists where the actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does
not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some
authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that
of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic
interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious
motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. 11 Moreover justification for
protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of
his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. 12 It is sufficient if the
impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives. 13
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 14 we held that where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest
motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious
intermeddler. 15
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease
the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though
petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from
it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
Sec. 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, "Any third person who
induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party." Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort
interference, and since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private
respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that
he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney's fees.
It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the
extent of damages was not quantifiable. We had a similar situation in Gilchrist, where
it was difficult or impossible to determine the extent of damage and there was nothing
on record to serve as basis thereof. In that case we refrained from awarding damages.
We believe the same conclusion applies in this case.
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude
into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct
herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for
damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain
to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes
damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into
contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court
correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction
saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's
interference.
Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory
damages, is allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. 16 One such occasion is when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest. 17 But we have consistently held that the award of considerable damages
should have clear factual and legal bases. 18In connection with attorney's fees, the
award should be commensurate to the benefits that would have been derived from a
favorable judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages by the
trial court calls for appellate review such that the award if far too excessive can be
reduced. 19 This ruling applies with equal force on the award of attorney's fees. In a
long line of cases we said, "It is not sound policy to place in penalty on the right to
litigate. To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful
opponent would throw wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party and his
counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions." 20
Considering that the respondent corporation's lease contract, at the time when the
cause of action accrued, ran only on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on
a yearly basis, we find even the reduced amount of attorney's fees ordered by the
Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the light of prevailing
jurisprudence. 21Consequently, the amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00)
awarded by respondent appellate court should be reduced to one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award or attorney's fees in favor of private
respondent corporation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784 are hereby AFFIRMED, with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is reduced from two hundred thousand
(P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos. No pronouncement as to
costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 41-55.
2 Id. at 57-58.
3 Ibid.
4 Rollo, pp. 45-46.
5 Id. at 41-42.
6 Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483, 490 (1996).
7 Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, Sec. 822.
8 30 Am Jur., Section 19, pp. 71-72; Sampaguita Pictures Inc. vs. Varquez, et al. (Court of
Appeals, 68 O.G. 7666).
9 74 Am Jur 2d Torts, Section 34. Interference with property rights, p. 631.
10 45 Am Jur 2nd Interference, Justification, Privilege Section 30. Furtherance of one's own
interests, p. 307.
11 Zoby vs. American Fidelity Co. 242 Federal Reporter, 2d Series, 76, 80 (1957).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 29 Phil 542, 549 (1915).
15 Kurtz vs. Oremland, 33 N.J. Super. 443, 111 A.2d 100; Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d,
Sec. 769.
16 People vs. Bergante, 286 SCRA 629, 645 (1998).
17 Art. 2208 (2), Civil Code of the Philippines.
18 De la Paz Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 65, 76 (1987); Rubio vs. Court of
Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 (1986).
19 Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 446, 460 (1987).
20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433, 442 (1988).
21 Mayer Steel Pipe Corp. vs. CA, 274 SCRA 432 (1997); Fortune Express vs. CA, G.R. 119756,
March 18, 1999; RCBC vs. CA, G.R. 133107, March 25, 1999; Urquiaga vs. CA, G.R. 127833,
January March 22, 1999.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Nolan R. Evangelista for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a civil action 1 for recovery of damages filed by the petitioner Florentina A.
Guilatco, the following judgment was rendered against the respondent City of
Dagupan:
xxx
(1) Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual
damages in the amount of P 15,924 (namely P8,054.00 as hospital,
medical and other expenses [Exhs. H to H-60], P 7,420.00 as lost
income for one (1) year [Exh. F] and P 450.00 as bonus). P
150,000.00 as moral damages, P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, plus costs
and to appropriate through its Sangguniang Panglunsod (City
Council) said amounts for said purpose;
(2) Dismissing plaintiffs complaint as against defendant City Engr.
Alfredo G. Tangco; and
(3) Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant City of Dagupan and
defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco, for lack of merit. 2
The facts found by the trial court are as follows: 3
It would appear from the evidences that on July 25, 1978, herein
plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City, while
she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at
Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of
the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on
said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a
result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at
first at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, from July 25 to August 3,
1978 (or for a period of 16 days). She also incurred hospitalization,
medication and other expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 (Exh. H to
H-60) or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were either
lost or misplaced; during the period of her confinement in said two
hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on
her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body;
the pain has persisted even after her discharge from the Medical
City General Hospital on October 9, 1978, to the present. Despite
her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing
crutches and the Court has actually observed that she has difficulty
in locomotion. From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to
the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs
of her office, located near the city hall in Dagupan City. She earns
at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other
means of income, but since July 25, 1978 up to the present she has
been deprived of said income as she has already consumed her
accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several
pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former
jovial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and
other activities which she used to do prior to the incident.
Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial
Hospital, as well as Dr. Antonio Sison of the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal (Exh. I; see also Exhs. F, G, G-1 to G-
19) have confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the
fracture and injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
mishap. On the other hand, Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap
and they have confirmed the existence of the manhole (Exhs. A, B,
C and sub-exhibits) on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time
of the incident on July 25, 1978 which was partially covered by a
concrete flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. long by 1 1/2
feet wide or 42 cms. wide by 75 cms. long by 150 cms. deep (see
Exhs. D and D-1).
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and
admittedly ex-officio Highway Engineer, City Engineer of the Public
Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted the
existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd.,
admittedly a National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges. He also
admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in Perez
Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on
which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the
National Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he
supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system
and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is
specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera
(Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a
maintenance Engineer. In his answer defendant Tangco expressly
admitted in par. 7-1 thereof, that in his capacity as ex-officio
Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and
control over National roads, including the Perez Blvd. where the
incident happened.
On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court 4 reversed the
lower court findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff-
appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez
Boulevard. 5
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a
national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan.
Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry
of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer
which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the
City Engineer of Dagupan.
After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the
appellate court, as well as the arguments presented by the parties, we agree with
those of the trial court and of the petitioner. Hence, we grant the petition.
In this review on certiorari, we have simplified the errors assigned by the petitioner to
a single issue: whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of
Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with
article 2189 of the Civil Code.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by
pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as
follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city
or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. 6
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan
and is exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties:
Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-
There shall be a city engineer, who shall be in charge of the
department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a
salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall
have the following duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of
waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and shall
control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance
with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the
use of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its
inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their connection with the
public sewer system.
xxx
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and
improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use
thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board . 7 Thus the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the
open drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries
sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the
provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar.8
The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the
other hand article 2189 appliesin particular to the liability arising from "defective
streets, public buildings and other public works." 9
The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits that he exercises control or
supervision over the said road. But the city can not be excused from liability by the
argument that the duty of the City Engineer to supervise or control the said provincial
road belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of
Public Highway than as a city officer. This is because while he is entitled to an
honorarium from the Ministry of Public Highways, his salary from the city government
substantially exceeds the honorarium.
We do not agree.
Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio
Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last
but not the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the following monthly
compensation: P 1,810.66 from Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public
Highways; P 100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D.
1096, respectively." 10This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and
other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance
Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.11 Although these last two officials are
employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan
and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision
over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner
under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P
10,000.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court
should not have rounded off the amount. In determining actual damages, the court can
not rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the
actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous. 12
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary
loss, inasmuch as the determination of the amount is discretionary on the
court.13 Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages are in the nature
of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for some
reason can not be proven. However, in awarding moral damages, the following should
be taken into consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's
acts.14
(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as
satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages.15
(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of
the cases enumerated in the Civil Code. 16
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner
were proven. Witnesses from the petitioner's place of work testified to the
degeneration in her disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She refrained from
attending social and civic activities.17
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive. Her handicap
was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one
year. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the award of
damages,18 the moderating hand of the law is called for. The Court has time and
again called attention to the reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award
damages without basis,19 resulting in exhorbitant amounts.20
Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial
court 21 under preceding jurisprudence, the amount of moral damages should be
reduced to P 20,000.00.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed out the basis:
To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the
Court, through this case, should serve warning to the city or cities
concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to
their constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction
work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets
 which are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order to 20 R & B Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No.
minimize or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.22 64515, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 736.
21 Pleno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 56505, May 9, 1988.
Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives, 22 Rollo, 25 (Record on Appeal, pp. 55-56). See also De Leon and Gonzales De Leon
the end is more important than the manner in which the work is carried out. Because v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31931, August 31, 1988.
23 Rollo, 29.
of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced flower pots betray 24 Rules of Court, Rule 39, sec. 2.
the careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting
accidents.
Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the trial court to the appellate
court, the petitioner was able to secure an order for garnishment of the funds of the
City deposited with the Philippine National Bank, from the then presiding judge, Hon.
Willelmo Fortun. This order for garnishment was revoked subsequently by the
succeeding presiding judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and became the basis for the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration which was also denied. 23
We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court pending appeal was
premature. We do not find any good reason to justify the issuance of an order of
execution even before the expiration of the time to appeal .24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of
the trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby
REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded:
(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual
damages in the amount of P 15,924 (namely P 8,054.00 as hospital, medical
and other expenses; P 7,420.00 as lost income for one (1) year and P 450.00
as bonus); P 20,000.00 as moral damages and P 10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
The attorney's fees of P 3,000.00 remain the same.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chaiperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Florentina A. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan and Alfredo G. Tangco, RTC (Lingayen,
Pangasinan), Civil Case No. 15463, March 12, 1979.
2 Rollo, 25 (Record on Appeal, 57).
3 Id., (Record on Appeal, 47-49).
4 Florentina A. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan, CA-G.R. No. 65470-R, May 31, 1982;
De la Fuente, B.S. J., ponente; German, Milagros A. and Cuevas, Serafin R., JJ.,
concurring.
5 Rollo, 29.
6 City of Manila v. Teotico, No. L-23052, January 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 267.
7 RA. 170, sec. 15(y).
8 RA. 170, sec. 5.
9 Jimenez v. City of Manila, No. 71049, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 510.
10 Rollo, 25 (Record on Appeal, 25).
11 Rollo, 25 (Record on Appeal, 61).
12 Medelo v. Gorospe, G.R. 41970, March 25, 1988.
13 Civil Code, Article 2216.
14 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, No. 54598, April 15, 1988.
15 San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, No. L-21879, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA
300.
16 Bagumbayan Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 66274, September 30,
1984, 132 SCRA 444.
17 Record on Appeal, 55.
18 Guita v. Court of Appeals, No. 60409, November 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 576.
19 Felisilda v. Villanueva, No. 60372, October 29, 1985, 139 SCRA431.