Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC G.R. No.

147571 May 5, 2001 FACTS: On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan Publishing Corp., on the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially section 5.4 which provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days before the election. SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001. ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint RULING/RATIO: Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among candidates. Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the Obrient test for content related regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials, etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment. Note: Justice Kapunans dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use in order to test the validity of this section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other considerations (for example, prevention of last minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of freedom of expression.