Canon 22 Mercado vs. Ubay G.R. No.

L-35830 July 24, 1990 Facts: A civil case was filed by the petitioners against the Samonte siblings in the CFI of Cavite. The defendants filed their answer and amended answer through Atty, Pine. On July 31, 1970, the court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, and since no appeal was made, it became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued by the court. But before the said writ be executed, Pine filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus but was dismissed for lack of merit. On May 27, 1972, Lucina and Trinidad Samonte, 2 of the defendants in the civil case, filed with the CFI of Rizal seeking for the annulment of the writ of execution alleging that they didnt authorized anyone, including Atty. Pine to file an answer and the petition for certiorari in their behalf. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss said case, thus the petition in the SC. Issue: Whether or not a lawyer need a written power of attorney in order to appear in the court in behalf of his client. Held: No. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court). The fact that private respondents had not personally appeared in the hearings of Case TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The filing of the answer by and appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are sufficient to give private respondents standing in court. It is hard to believe that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he had not been authorized or employed by the party concerned. It is obvious that since the appellate court had decided adversely against private respondents in their petition for certiorari, the latter filed the annulment suit for a second chance at preventing petitioners from enforcing the decision rendered by the Cavite court in favor of the latter.

Canon 21

Uy Chico vs. The Union Life Assurance Society, Limited G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915 Facts: In 1897, petitioners father died. He continued the business still in the name of his father after buying the share of his brother in the said business. Petitioner filed a case seeking the recovery of the proceeds of 2 insurance policies on stock of dry goods that was destroyed in a fire. These policies were surrendered by the petitioners lawyer to the administrator of his fathers estate, who had compromised with the defendant for of the face value of the insurance that was paid to the court. He alleged that said policies belong to him and that he was not bound by the compromised agreement made by the administrator. The company introduced evidence showing that the petitioner had agreed to the settlement of the policies when his lawyer surrendered the same to the estates administrator. Petitioner, on the witness stand had been asked if he had any objection as to his lawyer testifying concerning the surrender of the policies to which he negatively replied. Whereupon, the lawyer of the petitioner formally withdraw the waiver given by the petitioner and objected to the testimony on the ground of privileged communication. Issue: Whether or not instruction of the client to be delivered to a third person is considered privilege Held: No. A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act. It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.

Canon 20

Perez vs SCOTTISH UNION AND NATIONAL INSURANCE CO C.A. No. 8977 March 22, 1946 Facts: Petitioner was seeking the payment of attorneys fees in the criminal case of arson and other cases against defendant, who had in a written contract, agreed to pay the same out of the proceeds of a fire insurance policy issued by defendant insurance company. Defendant Mitre acknowledged the professional services rendered by Perez but alleged that the agreement as to the payment of attorneys fees out of the insurance proceeds was only a simulation to bar other claims against the said policy. The CFI of Albay rendered a judgment in favor Perez, from which Mitre now appeals. Issue: Whether or not a written contract for services shall be controlling. Held: Yes. Exhibit D should be given its full force and effect. "A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid thereof unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable." (Rule of Court 127, section 22.) The arson case required several days of trial. The gravity of the situation confronted by the appellant after the rendition of the judgment of the court of first instance is shown by the fact that he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for the period of from ten to twelve years and to pay an indemnity of P101,115. That the plaintiff had handled appellant's defense with competence and success cannot be gainsaid, it being enough to state that the appellant was acquitted in the Court of Appeals before which the plaintiff orally argued, in addition to a 78-page brief which had filed therein. We are thus not prepared to rule that the amount of P6,000 is excessive or unjust, especially because said fee is in a sense contingent upon the acquittal of the appellant, since no insurance money (P6,000 of which was ceded to the plaintiff under Exhibit D) was of course forthcoming if the fire which destroyed the insured property could be proven to have resulted from incendiarism for which the appellant was criminally liable.
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Canon 19

Galofa VS Nee Bon Sing G.R. No. L-22018 January 17, 1968 Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent in the CFI of Sorsogon for the recovery of possession and to quiet title over a parcel of land in the said province. He alleged prior ownership and possession of his father and that the same was adjudicated to him in an oral partition among his co-heirs. Respondent on the other hand alleged that he has title to the property by virtue of a deed of conveyance issued in his favor by Fe Nicolas. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner based on the pleadings declaring petitioner as owner of the property. (pre mar, hnd ko makuha kung alin ang dapat n issue sorry)

Canon 18 Alcala vs De vera A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974 Facts: An action for annulment of sale of 2 parcels of land was filed against petitioner in the CFI of Albay. Petitioner engaged the services of respondent lawyer who represented them in the civil case. On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the buyer rescinding the said sale. The lawyer received the copy of the decision but did not inform the petitioners of it. On July 17, a sheriff went to their house serving the writ of execution against them. Caught by surprise, they wrote inquiring about the status of their case, which the Clerk of Court replied that it was already been decided and since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued upon the motion. On September 12, they instituted a case for damages against de Vera for having failed to inform them of the trial courts decision thus, they lost their right to appeal. The trial court found that the respondent did not inform his client but denied damages. Thus, petitioner instituted this case for disbarment. Issue: whether or not a lawyer is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence. Held: No.An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Fallible like any other human being, he is answerable to every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge. Moreover, a party seeking damages resulting from a judgment adverse to him which became final by reason of the alleged fault or negligence of his lawyer must prove his loss due to the injustice of the decision. He cannot base his action on the unsubstantiated and arbitrary supposition of the injustice of the decision. (Tuzon vs. Donato, 58 O.G. 6480)."