Ars Disputandi Volume 5 (2005) ISSN: 1566 5399

Allan Bck
KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY, USA

Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context

By Robert Wisnovsky
London: Duckworth, 2003; ix + 305 pp.; hb. 50.00; ISBN: 0 7156 3221 3

Robert Wisnovsky discusses two topics, the soul as cause and God as cause, `in order to analyze the sources and evolution of Avicenna's metaphysics.' [265] Not surprisingly, he nds the sources in Greek philosophers, notably Aristotle and Plotinus, and their commentators, Islamic philosophers like Al-Farab , and the Islamic theologians of the Kalam. Wisnovsky perhaps places more emphasis on the theologians and less on the Greek philosophers than others do. I suggest below that he does so on account of his de-emphasis of the logical writings of Avicenna. [2] The book is well produced, albeit with some typos. [Omission top 84?] The Bibliography, like Wisnovsky's use of secondary sources, seems rather incomplete. E.g., works by Concetta Luna and John Martin seem quite pertinent but are omitted. Howard Curzer is cited, p. 55 n. 20, but does not appear in the Bibliography. Above all, despite being mentioned [2] and used [170 n. 20], Goichon's Lexique for Avicenna does not appear. I wonder also generally why Wisnovsky did not make greater use of Goichon's works in his book. He does assert, rightly, that we have progressed beyond her work in having some of the dictionary of Endress and Gutas done. Still, she does cite a lot of passages and has the only lexicon speci c to Avicenna. [3] This book has two main themes. First, it claims that Avicenna inherited an `Ammonian synthesis' and then created an `Avicennean synthesis'. The former consists in formulating a consistent, internal theory of Aristotle's philosophy from a Neoplatonist perspective; the latter synthesized the Kalam and Islamic philosophy, especially that of Al-Farab , with Aristotle. [15 6; 64; 266] Second, it claims that Avicenna's doctrine of the necessary being and its causing possible quiddities to exist in re comes from his view of the soul as an entelechy. [3 7; 9 13] [4] Wisnovsky claims that how to understand Aristotle's use of entelechy (ntelqeia) became a major concern among the Greek commentators. [20 5] `Entelechy' appears in Aristotle's de nition of the soul: the soul is `an entelechy of the rst kind of a natural body having life potentially in it'. [An. 412a27 8] Is this entelechy a process or a state? I should note that `entelechy' appears quite rarely in Aristotle, and seems to be used at least coextensively with the much more common `actuality'(nrgeia), which the Revised Oxford Translation uses to translate `ntelqeia' at 412a27. [Cf. 21; 26; Physics 201a28; 201b5 12] In
November 1, 2005, Ars Disputandi. If you would like to cite this article, please do so as follows: Allan Bck, `Review of Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context,' Ars Disputandi [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] 5 (2005), paragraph number.

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Allan Bck: Review of Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context

terms of the root meaning of the terms, an entelechia would be a perfecting or completion, an attainment of the end [telos], whereas an energeia connotes much more an operation or working (ergon). Wisnovsky goes into great detail about different nuances of `entelechy': to what extent does it connote a completeness or an incompleteness? [28] The payoff, I guess, concerns what we are to make of our souls: if they need completion but do not get there, do they dissolve at death? (Indeed there was a Muslim cult following Averroes who held that only those who perfected their souls had any kind of immortality, with the rest, the hoi polloi, being extinguished like animal souls. [Cf. Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna & Averroes on Intellect (Oxford, 1992), pp. 128ff.] [5] Wisnovsky nds the discussion of `entelechy' becoming crucial above all in Plotinus and then in Islamic philosophers. [61 5; 80 3] Alexander distinguishes teleiosis and teleiotes, with the latter always signifying a state of perfection, while the former can sometime signify the process as well. [43; 45; 48] Wisnovsky then charges Alexander with inconsistency in trying to use teleiotes for both energeia and entelechia. [50 1] Alexander says that the rst teleiotes is energeia, and the last is entelechia. [51 7] Wisnovsky thinks that Themistius did a bit better. [61] Philoponus follows Proclus and not Aristotle, Wisnovsky says, in taking teleiotes as higher than entelechia and making the soul the nal cause and not the formal cause. [84 93] [6] The Ammonian synthesis affected how Aristotle's Greek was translated into Arabic. [99] In particular, telos and entelechia were confused by the translators and later by Al-Farab , Wisnovsky says. [101 5; 108 12] Avicenna inherited this confusion but saw through it. His solution was just to ignore the issue whether perfection in the world and the perfection of the One/God are univocal. [113] Avicenna then follows Philoponus for better or for worse. [114; 137; 146] Still, Wisnovsky concludes, Avicenna does not end up confused or rejecting Aristotle for Neoplatonism. Rather he has a legitimate interpretation of Aristotle's theory of soul. [7] I nd this picture of Philoponus a bit bewildering. In logic Philoponus doesn't follow Ammonius in accepting the canon of Proclus in his Prior Analytics commentary. Philoponus often follows Alexander instead. Again, Philoponus is well known for his originality in physics. It's thus not clear to me how orthodox a Plotininan or an Ammonian Philoponus is. Likewise Avicenna does not follow Al-Farab on all logical issues and also rejects the Platonist theory of universals. Avicenna seems to follow Philoponus mostly in logic (and also in physical science, where they both diverge from Aristotle in taking space as a three-dimensional continuum). [8] Of course, many of these claims depend upon having given an objective standard of the correct interpretation of Aristotle et al.! I myself wasn't convinced. Again, why does Wisnovsky say that it is unacceptable for Aristotle to have a view of our souls as incomplete entelechiai? But certainly the passive intellect is incomplete, our actual knowledge imperfect. [Cf. Aristotle, An. 43014 5; Alexander, in De An. 88,5 7; 88,23 4; 89,6; 89,19 21] [9] Moreover, I nd a lot of Wisnovsky's discussion of a lot of this material
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Allan Bck: Review of Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context

Byzantine. I confess that I happen to have been reading these Greek commentaries and Plotinus recently. I cannot agree that their main focus was on the philological and the conceptual analysis of terms nor even that the understanding of entelechia was a central issue for them. Also Wisnovsky makes it sound as if the commentators had a comprehensive theory. Rather, I think, the Greek commentators tend to incorporate quotes and doctrines from a wide variety of sources and mix the different terminologies into their discussions. They tend to quote a lot and to react to those quotes en passant. They do not agonize over word choice but do at times give statements about what a word means. Had I no rst-hand acquaintance with the Greek commentators, reading Wisnovsky, I would have acquired a much different picture of their methods and activities than the actual ones. Likewise I would have thought that Avicenna agonized over word choice, instead of being rather slap-dash in his writing. [10] Then, on the other hand, Wisnovsky is proceeding as an Orientalist and I as a philosopher. But then was not Avicenna a philosopher primarily (despite his famous foray into philology mentioned in his autobiography)? [11] Wisnovsky has a long discussion of the history of the use of `thingness' and how Avicenna replaces it later with Al-Farab 's mahiyyat (a direct translation of the Greek t t n enai; the Latin quidditas). [9; 147 64; 179] After arguing for retaining `thingness' in the text of Ilahiyyat 6.5, Wisnovsky claims that Avicenna takes it as a cause because of the Kal?mic usage of a thingness being an idea in God's intellect. [173] [12] To be sure God has such quiddities (in se) in His intellect. However Avicenna is leery about claiming God causes them: the logically possible is a standard even for what God can think. Also, on moral grounds, if God creates what is possible, then He would be responsible for the possibility of serial killers! [see my `Avicenna and Averroes: Modality and Theology,' in Potentialitt und Possibilitt, ed. T. Buchheim et al. (Stuttgart, 2001)] All that is required is that quiddities in themselves be the formal cause, which for Aristotle too often is the same as the nal cause. Again I don't nd Wisnovky's interpretation convincing. It is far simpler to think that Avicenna is following Aristotle directly, not indirectly via an Ammonian synthesis. The simplest explanation for Avicenna's use of `thingness' is that it means literally: what it is to be a thing. Focussing on `thingness' could be misconstrued as a request for both what the thing is, its quiddity, as well as for its conditions of existence. Avicenna in moving to mahiyyat makes the separation clearer. [13] Wisnovsky likewise takes Avicenna's distinction of essence and existence to have Neoplatonist sources. [181; 198] Again, I admit the possibility but nd it far simpler to think that he is following texts like Posterior Analytics II.1 2. He also claims, contra Goichon, that Avicenna's views on essence and existence evolved. [198] Yet again he barely discusses her views and the passages that she quotes and cites. [14] Wisnovsky makes very little use of Avicenna's psychological or logical theory. These materials would help the discussion a lot. For instance, Wisnovsky does not discuss the role of the imagination serving as a bridge for both reverArs Disputandi 5 (2005), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org

Allan Bck: Review of Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context

sion and progression between the perceptibles and the intelligibles. The Greek commentators spend a lot of time developing a theory of imagination in order to explain how we can connect up our sensory experience to the universal intelligibles, and how the universal intangibles, of scienti c theory and moral practice, can in uence our particular lives. This, I believe, is the true bridge between the human soul and the divine, noumenal soul, for Avicenna as well as later for Kant. [See the forthcoming issue of Topcos.] The commentators spend far more effort and space discussing this issue than the terminology for entelechia etc. So does Avicenna. All this may be wrong, but surely Wisnovsky needs to say why. [15] Let me give a central example of how the neglect of the logical materials hampers Wisnovsky's exegesis. Wisnovsky claims that Avicenna derives his two main word groups for `necessity', the stems d-r-r and w-j-b, from the Kalam, the . latter having the root sense of `obligation' and covering `necessity' in most of its logical senses; the former meaning `compulsion'. [238; 245 6; 260 2] To be sure, Avicenna does have this theological background and the w-j-b group gives necessity a wider compass than the d-r-r group does. However, Avicenna states . explicitly that the d-r-r group has to deal with logical necessity while the w-j-b . group has to deal with what we would call physical or hypothetical necessity. [Al-`Ibara, ed. M. El-Khodeiri (Cairo, 1970), 119,1 8; Al-Q yas, ed. S. Zayed (Cairo, 1964), 166,16; 168,8 10; 169,16] In this way too w-j-b words will describe more things as necessary than d-r-r words do but only because of additional . hypotheses so as to make hypothetical necessities. I agree with Wisnovsky that Avicenna does not always follow Al-Farab 's views on necessity and existence. [220 3] Yet again, he doesn't consider the option that Avicenna is working from and developing the tradition of Alexander and Philoponus who often do not agree with Ammonius on these logical matters either. [16] Again I nd the big lacuna in Wisnovsky's discussion of modality that, apart from some use of the `commentaries' of Al-Farab and Avicenna keyed to On Interpretation, he gives us little discussion of the logical works concerning modality and existence: above all, Avicenna's Q yas. Wisnovsky might reply that he is pursuing theological and metaphysical issues instead. Yet Avicenna, like Aristotle himself, regularly starts a discussion in the logical work and then continues the discussion explicitly in his metaphysics. [E.g., on relations] So looking there seems legitimate. [17] In sum, I nd the book interesting, incomplete, and requiring a lot of background. I nd Wisnovsky's approach intriguing, but wish that he had worked his claims out further through more texts.

Ars Disputandi 5 (2005), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org