G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 Mayor Pablo P. Magtajas & The City of Cagayan de Oro, Petitioners, Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. & Philippine Amusement and Gaming CORPORATION, Respondents

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P.
MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents. Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners. R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that: Sec. 1. That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits. Sec. 2. That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities. Sec. 3. PENALTIES. Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit: a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses. Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR. WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295; WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of CASINO; WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO; WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of the community; NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that: Sec. 1. The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited. Sec. 2. Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties: a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof; b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO. Sec. 3. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2 Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits. 2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling." 3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point. 4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point. 5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. 6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5 The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code. It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State. The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos. The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned; xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, 7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." This is the opportune time to stress an important point. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in
fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed. (b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed. (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects. (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government. It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary. This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983. In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public
policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy." (Emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country. That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral character. It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means. As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same is true of gambling. In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much
against it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of values?
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on certain aspects of this case. I. It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy the challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs which, but
for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
II. The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled, "Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on 19 November 1990 nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992. The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the general welfare clause) which reads:
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is concerned. I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869. III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR. IV. From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. (emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country. That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral character. It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means. As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same is true of gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of values? DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on certain aspects of this case. I. It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy the challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs which, but
for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
II. The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled, "Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on 19 November 1990 nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992. The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the general welfare clause) which reads:
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is concerned. I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869. III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR. IV. From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.
G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992 CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.
NOCON, J.: This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products against the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No 29 1 of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the said municipality a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution. It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. 2 His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. The issue then boils down on whether petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows:
1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid permit issued by the municipality of Virac in accordance with existing regulations and may not be destroyed or removed from its present location; 2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Virac is not (sic) unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner; 3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse is not only in violation of the provisions of the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and properties of the residents of the neighborhood due to accidental fire and constitutes a public nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the New Civil code of the Philippines and may be abated; 4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said warehouse all abaca and copra and other inflammable articles stored therein which are prohibited under the provisions of Ordinance No. 13, within a period of two (2) months from the time this decision becomes final and that henceforth, the petitioner is enjoined from storing such prohibited articles in the warehouse. With costs against petitioner.
Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a quo:

1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the Municipal Council, and therefore, constitutional; 2. In giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses. 3. In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are not prosecuted.
We find no merit in the Petition. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads:
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. 4
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in
consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. 5 Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria. As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, the trial court did not give the ordinance in question a meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29, 1952, 6 reads:
AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT.
Section 1 provides:
It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons, entity, corporation or merchants, wherein to keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline, petroleum, alcohol, crude oil, oil of turpentine and the like products or materials if not within the distance of 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios to avoid great losses of properties inclusive lives by fire accident.
Section 2 provides: 7
Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said warehouses this ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided however, that if those warehouses now in existence should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the above-described products in Section 1 of this ordinance after a lapse of the time given for the removal of the said warehouses now in existence, same warehouses shall be exempted from the spirit of the provision of section 1 of this ordinance, provided further, that these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be converted into non-inflammable products and materials warehouses.
In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government. This was also the observation of the trial court:
A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest disregard of the elemental rules of syntax. Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies in small towns where local authorities and in particular the persons charged with the drafting and preparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient education and training and are not well grounded even on the basic and fundamental elements of the English language commonly used throughout the country in such matters. Nevertheless, if one scrutinizes the terms of the ordinance, it is clear that what is prohibited is the construction of warehouses by any person, entity or corporation wherein copra, hemp, gasoline and other inflammable products mentioned in Section 1 may be stored unless at a distance of not less than 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios in order to avoid loss of property and life due to fire. Under Section 2, existing warehouses for the storage of the prohibited articles were given one year after the approval of the ordinance within which to remove them but were allowed to remain in operation if they had ceased to store such prohibited articles. The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid
loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government. 8
Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than or differrent from what was provided in the ordinance in question. It merely stated the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose. As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government. As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit in the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First Instance. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991 THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:p In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990. Subsequently, the following developments transpired: In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City. On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints. Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong. This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force. Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District. Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28, 1991. Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses. On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that: Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605. To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and 2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity. On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court. The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy. The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights. Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester. The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised. It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised. Now to the merits. The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5 Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6 But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7 A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update. xxx xxx xxx Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila. xxx xxx xxx Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court. If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges. xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction. In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared: From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions. xxx xxx xxx The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150194
March 6, 2007
ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE* y LANGA, FRANCISCO MAYUMIS y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA y CUYAHEN, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan dated June 25, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 17856; and its Resolution2 of September 28, 2001, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner Robert Tayaban (Tayaban) was the Municipal Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. His co-petitioners, namely: Francisco Maddawat, Artemio Balangue, Francisco Mayumis, and Quirino Pana, were Municipal Councilors of the same municipality. The facts of the case are as follows: Sometime in 1988, then Mayor Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial governor Benjamin Cappleman for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market. Subsequently, Tayaban was informed by the Governor that his proposal was approved and that the project shall be funded by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB).3 Subsequently, a bidding was conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong (Pugong) won the contract for the construction of the said public market. On March 1, 1989, a formal contract4 was executed by and between Pugong, as the contractor, and the CEB, as the project owner. Actual construction of the public market was commenced in June 1989. On August 15, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20 which reads: R E S O L U T I O N NO. 20 Series of 1989 WHEREAS, upon thorough discussion as regards the construction of the Public Market; it was found out that the constructors despite the several instructions, memoranda issued by the Municipal Mayor and the negotiations made by this body they insisted to erect the building pedestals on the site [that] pleases them and not on the site identified by this duly constituted body who has direct administration of the municipal ground; WHEREFORE, on motion duly seconded be it RESOLVED, as it is hereby done to adopt this resolution manifesting this bodys decision to uphold and maintain the trust and confidence of the people upon this body; RESOLVED, finally that this body agrees, and decides to demolish the erected structures for the purpose of erecting the Public Market building as identified and decided by this body; and further resolved as it is hereby done that this be a precedent for other future leaders.5
On that same day, Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded to the construction site and demolished the structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a result, Pugong filed an AffidavitComplaint6 against herein petitioners. Subsequently, in an Information dated June 26, 1992, herein petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: That on August 17, 1989 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Tinoc, Ifugao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Robert Tayaban, Municipal Mayor of Tinoc, Francisco Maddawat, Artemio Balangue, Francisco Mayumis and Quirino Pana, are all public officers being Municipal Councilors of Tinoc, Ifugao and in the performance of their official functions acting in evident bad faith and conspiring with each other, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully pass and unanimously approve Resolution No. 20, thereby vesting upon themselves powers and authority to demolish the half-finished Tinoc Public Market construction whereby respondents themselves personally and actually demolish [sic] it, to the damage and prejudice of the government particularly the Cordillera Executive Board, being the owner of the project.7 Upon arraignment on December 14, 1992, herein petitioners pleaded not guilty.8 After trial, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the presently assailed Decision,9 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting all the accused ROBERT TAYABAN Y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT Y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE Y LANGA, FRANCISCO MAYUMIS Y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA Y CUYAHEN of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended, and in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum and are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the government the amount of P134,632.80 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. SO ORDERED.10 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan denied it in a Resolution11 dated September 28, 2001. Hence, herein petition for review with the following assignment of errors: I WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 AS AMENDED, AND THEREFORE ACCUSED SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT. II THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESOLUTION NO. 20 IS A VALID LEGISLATION AND THAT THE DEMOLITION OF THE FIVE POSTS WAS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF LOI NO. 19 AND AN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER VESTED IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT.
III THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ERRED IN CONSIDERING FACTS WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.12 In their first assigned error, petitioners argue that one of the elements of the offense which constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is that the government or any private party suffers undue injury by reason of the prohibited acts committed by the public officer being charged. Petitioners argue that this element was not proved because the CEB, which was supposed to be the injured party as alleged in the Information, did not complain or participate in the trial of the case. Petitioners go on to conclude that the existence of undue injury cannot be proven without the alleged injured party testifying. Petitioners further contend that the itemized list of expenses submitted in evidence by Pugong should not have been made a basis of the presently assailed Decision because such list is not supported by receipts and, therefore, self-serving. Moreover, Pugong was never mentioned in the Information as one of the injured parties. Petitioners assert that undue injury could only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence. Petitioners also contend that the element of bad faith on their part was not proved. On the contrary, they argue that their act of exerting efforts to communicate with the contractor and his foreman, by sending three letters in order to remind them of the proper site of construction, only shows that they were acting in good faith; that the eventual passage of Resolution No. 20 is also an additional evidence of good faith on their part because it was adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan as a collective body acting within the scope of its authority. Petitioners further contend that the CEB saw the propriety of the Sangguniang Bayans action to stop the construction of the market that was why it issued an order suspending the said construction; and that the CEB, realizing its mistake in not coordinating with petitioners, did not pursue any action against them. In their second assigned error, petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in applying Sections 5613 and 59(a)14 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which provide, respectively, for the review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of component city and municipal ordinances and resolutions approving local development plans and public investment programs and for the posting in conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned of the said resolutions and ordinances. They argue that the applicable law at the time of the passage of Resolution No. 20 is Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337 or the Local Government Code of 1983. Claiming that Pugong failed to obtain the requisite building permit pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096,15 petitioners assert that their act of demolishing the structures erected on the construction site is an implementation of the provisions of the Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1916 which empowers certain public officials, like the municipal mayor, to remove illegal constructions which were built, either in public places or private property, without permit. Petitioners further contend that the demolition is a valid exercise of police power and that their act is justified by the general welfare clause under the LGC which empowers them to enact and implement measures for the general well-being of their constituents. In their third assigned error, petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in relying on the testimony of prosecution witness Abe Belingan considering that he is not a disinterested witness because he is given the contract of cementing the supposed second floor of the public market. Moreover, petitioners contend that the testimony of Belingan regarding the reason why Mayor Tayaban demolished the structures is mere hearsay and as such should not be given any probative value. Petitioners assert that the complaint was filed against them for purposes of political harassment considering that Pugongs political allies who also signed Resolution No. 20 were not included in the said complaint. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that, as properly held by the Sandiganbayan, undue injury has been caused to the Government and that it is immaterial whether the CEB filed a complaint against herein petitioners because the real party-in-interest is the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. The OSG also argues that private complainant Pugong also suffered undue injury because he already incurred expenses for labor, tools, equipment, and materials for the construction project. As to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the OSG asserts that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is a function most competently performed by the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on record. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) also filed its Comment, contending that it is not necessary for the CEB to initiate a complaint against herein petitioners because the real party-in-interest is the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that there is actual injury on the part of the Government as shown by the fact that construction was commenced and that petitioners did not deny that they demolished the structures which were erected; and that the list of expenses presented by Pugong cannot be considered self-serving because the latter testified thereon. The OSP further claims that petitioners were guilty of bad faith when they demolished the erected structures as evidenced by various acts committed by herein petitioners prior to and during the construction of the public market; and that the fact that witness Belingan has contracted the cementing of the second floor of the supposed public market is not sufficient evidence of his bias against herein petitioners. As to petitioners contention that the criminal complaint filed against them was merely a political harassment considering that the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan who signed the questioned Resolution but who are allies of Pugong were not included in the complaint, the OSP avers that, while the said members of the Sangguniang Bayan signed Resolution No. 20, they were not included in the complaint because they did not take part in the demolition of the public market. The Court finds the petition without merit. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads: Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended: 1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty in relation to his public position; 3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.17 Herein petitioners contention that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that they are guilty of bad faith and that they caused undue injury to the Government is not plausible. With respect to the element of bad faith, the Court, in a number of cases, held: Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.18 The Court agrees with the findings of the Sandiganbayan that petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition. Evidence of this is the fact that Resolution No. 20 was implemented on the same day that it was adopted without due notice of the planned demolition given to the CEB and the private contractor. In fact, Raymundo Madani, one of the Municipal Councilors who signed Resolution No. 20, testified that the said Resolution was passed only in the afternoon of August 15, 1989, after the subject demolition was conducted in the morning of the same day.19 Proof of petitioners bad faith is also shown by Pugongs testimony, which was given credence by the Sandiganbayan, that the site where his laborers began construction of the demolished public market was pointed out by petitioner Tayaban himself when the former asked the latter where they were going to erect the said market.20 Tayabans letter and memorandum dated July 31, 198921 and August 3, 1989,22 respectively, addressed to the laborers of Pugong directing them to stop construction may not be considered as evidence of good faith on the part of petitioners considering that they know fully well that it is the CEB which implements the said project and any grievance or complaint on their part should have been addressed to the said Board. No evidence was presented to show that petitioners made their objections known to the CEB. At the least, petitioners should have furnished the CEB or the Governor, in his capacity as a regular member of the CEB,23 a copy of the above-mentioned letter and memorandum. But they never did. The letter and memorandum were not even addressed to Pugong and there is no proof to show that he was informed of the contents thereof. Moreover, even if Pugongs men had received the letter and memorandum, they may not be totally blamed for ignoring the letter and the memorandum because under their contract, the owner of the project is the CEB and there is nothing therein which requires them to comply with whatever directive the Mayor or the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc may issue. In fact, the contract signed on March 1, 1989 specifically states that the contractor shall construct the Tinoc Public Market as per plan and specification provided by the CEB technical staff.24 In consonance with the said provision in the contract, Pugong testified that the CEB sent a representative to supervise the construction.25 The following admissions made by petitioners bolster Sandiganbayans finding of bad faith on their part: First, petitioner Tayaban admitted that when he submitted the project proposal for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market, he did not indicate the exact location where the market should be put up saying that he shall specify the location when the budget for the project shall have been approved.26 However, despite meeting the Governor twice in 1989, and being informed by the latter that the project had already been approved and funded, Tayaban still did not suggest to the Governor nor mention to him the specific place where he and the Sangguniang Bayan desire to have the public market erected.27 Worse, when the construction
was commenced and petitioners discovered that the public market was being built allegedly in a place where it should not be, petitioner Tayaban even admits that he still did not inform the Governor of such fact.28 Second, Tayaban admits that they never bothered to check with the CEB where the latter intended to put up the public market.29 There is no evidence to show that, when the construction was commenced, petitioners informed the CEB of the alleged mistake in the location of the project. In fact, petitioner Tayaban testified that it was only in the first or second week of August, 1989 that he informed the CEB regarding the supposed error,30 even when he came to know the exact site where Pugong intended to build the market as early as April 1989.31 Moreover, when the Sangguniang Bayan convened on August 15, 1989 and passed Resolution No. 20, they did not invite any representative from the CEB.32 Third, while petitioners aver that they have come up with a Site Development Plan wherein the exact location of the public market was specified, Tayaban admits that the blue print of the said development plan was completed only in August 1989.33 However, the construction of the public market was commenced as early as June 1989. From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners were moved by a manifest and deliberate intent to cause damage. It is clear from the Information filed that the injured party in the instant case is the Government, as represented by the CEB. The fact that the CEB did not initiate the filing of the instant criminal action is of no moment considering that a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party".34 The rule has been that, unless the subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person.35 In the present case, it is sufficient that private contractor Pugong was the one who filed an affidavit-complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the OSP. Moreover, the failure of the CEB to participate in the trial of the case does not necessarily mean that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines did not suffer any injury or that such injury cannot be proven. As to whether the Government suffered undue injury, it cannot be denied that the unceremonious demolition of the five concrete posts and the other improvements built as part of the foundation of the supposed public market resulted in damage to the Government. Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that, at the time of the questioned demolition, the CEB had already disbursed in favor of Pugong the amount of P134,632.80.36 Any further effort to rebuild the destroyed structures or to proceed with the construction of the market would necessarily entail additional expenses on the part of the Government. Hence, undue injury to the Government was proven to the point of moral certainty. Petitioners reliance on Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan37 is misplaced as the factual milieu in the said case is not on all fours with the present case. In Llorente, the petitioner, a municipal mayor, was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for having allegedly delayed or withheld the salaries and other emoluments due to the private complainant who is a municipal employee, causing her undue injury. In acquitting petitioner, this Court ruled that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that the private complainant suffered undue injury after it has been proven that she subsequently received the salaries and allowances which, she claimed, were withheld from her. The Court held that, other than the amount of the withheld salaries and allowances which were eventually received, the prosecution failed to specify and to prove any other loss or damage sustained by the complainant. Moreover, the Court ruled that the alleged financial stress which complainant suffered was inadequate and largely speculative and that the long period of time that her emoluments were withheld does not constitute the kind of undue injury contemplated by law. In the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction of the five concrete posts and the other improvements in the construction of the Tinoc public market is clear and substantial evidence to prove that the Government suffered undue injury. Under prevailing jurisprudence, proof of the extent or quantum of damage
is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or benefits received can be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.38 Pugong may not be made liable to answer for the injury suffered by the Government considering that it was not he who caused the subject demolition. Neither was it alleged nor proven that he breached his contract with the CEB as to justify the destruction of the structures which were already built. On the other hand, the prosecution has sufficiently established the individual participation of petitioners in carrying out the demolition.39 In fact, petitioners do not deny that, in their capacity as public officials, they caused the actual demolition of the structure built on the project site. Hence, they should be held answerable for the injury suffered by the Government. Anent the second assigned error, the Court agrees with the petitioners and the OSG that Sections 56 and 59(a) of the 1991 LGC (R.A. No. 7160) are not applicable in the present case. The Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc enacted the questioned resolution on August 15, 1989, more than two years before the effectivity of the said Code.40 The prevailing law at that time was the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337). The Court agrees with the OSG that Sections 56 and 59(a) of the 1991 LGC have no similar or counterpart provisions in the 1983 LGC. In addition, the Court agrees with petitioners that Sections 56 and 59(a) of the 1991 LGC find no application in the present case because these provisions refer, specifically, to ordinances and resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development council. However, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners reliance on the provisions of P.D. No. 1096 and LOI No. 19 as their legal bases in conducting the questioned demolition. A careful reading of Resolution No. 20 reveals that petitioners only basis in deciding to carry out the demolition was because the supposed public market was being erected in a place other than that identified by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc. There was no mention whatsoever in the said Resolution that the private contractor failed to secure the requisite building permit. Neither was there any mention that the demolition was being conducted pursuant to the power vested upon the Mayor by the provisions of LOI No. 19. Even the letter sent by petitioner Tayaban to the head laborer of Pugong dated July 31, 1989, the letter to the Station Commander of the INP, Tinoc of even date,41 and the memorandum sent to the laborers of Pugong dated August 3, 1989 uniformly state that the only reason why petitioners wanted to stop the construction was because the supposed public market was being erected in the wrong place. Hence, petitioners reliance on the provisions of P.D. No. 1096 and LOI No. 19 was merely an afterthought and as a means of justification for their acts which, in the first place, were done in bad faith. Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right.42 In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This principle applies to nuisances per se, or those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.43 Petitioners claim that the public market would pose danger to the safety and health of schoolchildren if it were built on the place being contested.44 However, petitioners never made known their supposed concerns either to the Governor or to the CEB. Instead, they took the law into their own hands and precipitately demolished the subject structures that were built without the benefit of any hearing or consultation with the proper authority, which in this case is the CEB. As to the Sandiganbayans act of giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Abe Belingan, the settled rule is that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is primarily the function of a trial court, which
had the benefit of observing firsthand the demeanor or deportment of the witness.45 It is well-settled that this Court will not reverse the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses in the absence of arbitrariness, abuse of discretion or palpable error.46 It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to weigh the evidence presented by the parties, as well as to accord full faith to those it regards as credible and reject those it considers perjurious or fabricated.47 Moreover, the settled rule is that absent any evidence showing a reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure their testimonies, the logical conclusion is that no improper motive exists, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. In the present case, the fact that Belingan was contracted to cement the supposed second floor of the public market is not a compelling evidence to prove that his testimony is biased. Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the Sandiganbayan with respect to the credibility of Belingan. The penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as provided under Section 9 of the same law, is imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than 15 years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to the salary and other lawful income of the accused. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by special law, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same.48 In the present case, the Court finds no error in the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan, except that the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office should also be imposed. It bears to reiterate that the injury suffered by the Government consists in the fact that it had already disbursed the amount of P134,632.80 for the purpose of commencing the construction of the Tinoc Public Market which was reduced to nothing by reason of petitioners destruction of the structures built and the eventual stoppage of the project. On this basis, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioners are liable to reimburse the said amount lost by the Government. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office is imposed upon petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148408
July 14, 2006
CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner, vs. JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN,* respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court questioning the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a preliminary and mandatory injunction, filed by petitioner Concepcion Parayno against respondents Jose Jovellanos and the Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared: a) xxx the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law to wit: The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44,1 the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989. b) The gasoline station remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire. Moreover, additional selling and storing of several LPG tanks in the station (sic). c) The residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents especially children to frequent colds, asthma, cough and the like nowadays. d) xxx the gasoline station violated Building and Fire Safety Codes because the station has 2nd floor storey building used for business rental offices, with iron grilled windows, no firewalls. It also endangers the lives of people upstairs. e) It hampers the flow of traffic, the gasoline station is too small and narrow, the entrance and exit are closed to the street property lines. It couldn't cope situation (sic) on traffic because the place is a congested area.2 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied. Hence, she filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44 against respondents. The case, docketed as SP Civil Case No. 99-03010-D, was raffled to the sala of Judge Crispin Laron.
Petitioner claimed that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code since it was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21 thereof. She added that the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),3 in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno), barred the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. In the HLURB case, respondent Jovellanos opposed the establishment of the gas station on the grounds that: (1) it was within the 100-meter prohibited radius under Section 44 and (2) it posed a pernicious effect on the health and safety of the people in Calasiao. After the hearing on the propriety of issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, the trial court ruled: There is no basis for the court to issue a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Albeit, Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of respondent municipality does not mention a gasoline filling station, [but] following the principle of ejusdem generis, a gasoline filling station falls within the ambit of Section 44. The gasoline filling station of the petitioner is located under the establishment belonging to the petitioner and is very near several buildings occupied by several persons. Justice dictates that the same should not be allowed to continue operating its business on that particular place. Further, the gasoline filling station endangers the lives and safety of people because once there is fire, the establishment and houses nearby will be razed to the ground.4(emphasis supplied) Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied by the trial court. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,5 with a prayer for injunctive relief. She ascribed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of Judge Laron who dismissed her case. After the CA dismissed the petition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal. Before us, petitioner insists that (1) the legal maxim of ejusdem generis did not apply to her case; (2) the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latter's police powers and (3) it was the principle of res judicata that applied in this case.6 We find merit in the petition. The Principle of Ejusdem Generis We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between "gasoline service station" and "gasoline filling station." The pertinent provisions read: xxx xxx xxx
Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.7 xxx xxx xxx
Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease, batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the following services may be rendered and sales and no other.
a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts; b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving; c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like; d. Radiator cleaning and flushing; e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing materials; f. Grease and lubricating; g. Emergency wiring repairs; h. Minor servicing of carburators; i. Adjusting and repairing brakes; j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or raising the motor.8 xxx xxx xxx
It is evident from the foregoing that the ordinance intended these two terms to be separate and distinct from each other. Even respondent municipality's counsel admitted this dissimilarity during the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Counsel in fact admitted: 1. That there exist[ed] an official zoning code of Calasiao, Pangasinan which [was] not yet amended; 2. That under Article III of said official zoning code there [were] certain distinctions made by said municipality about the designation of the gasoline filling station and that of the gasoline service station as appearing in Article III, Nos. 21 and 42, [respectively]; 3. That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code; 4. That under Section 44 of the official zoning code of Calasiao, the term filling station as clearly defined under Article III, Section 21, [did] not appear in the wordings thereof;9(emphasis supplied) The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them.10 Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the legal maxim of ejusdem generis11 which means "of the same kind, class or nature." Under this maxim, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will apply only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.12 Instead, what applied in this case was the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.13 Hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station"
under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a "gas service station" did not automatically embrace those in a "gas filling station." The Exercise of Police Powers Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner's gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160,14 the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.15 The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.16 Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either. Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property,17 hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location. As a rule, this Court does not pass upon evidence submitted by the parties in the lower courts.18 We deem it necessary, however, to recall the findings of the HLURB which petitioner submitted as evidence during the proceedings before the trial court, if only to underscore petitioner's compliance with the requirements of law before she put up her gasoline station. Another factor that should not be left unnoticed is the diligence exercised by [petitioner] in complying with the requirements of the several laws prior to the actual implementation of the project as can be attested by the fact that [petitioner] has secured the necessary building permit and approval of [her] application for authority to relocate as per the letter of the Energy Regulatory Board xxx.19 On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: Relative to the allegations that the project (gasoline station) is hazardous to life and property, the Board takes cognizance of the respondent's contention that the project "is not a fire hazard since petroleum products shall be safely stored in underground tanks and that the installation and construction of the underground tanks shall be in accordance with the Caltex Engineering Procedures which is true to all gasoline stations in the country. xxx Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander, after studying the plans and specifications of the subject proposed construction, recommended on 20 January 1989, "to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185." It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is "in the heart of the thickly populated residential area
of Calasiao." Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance. xxx20 (emphasis supplied) The findings of fact of the HLURB are binding as they are already final and conclusive vis--vis the evidence submitted by respondents. The Principle of Res Judicata Petitioner points out that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the principle of res judicata. We agree. Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.21 For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.22 Respondent municipality does not contest the first, second and third requisites. However, it claims that it was not a party to the HLURB case but only its co-respondent Jovellanos, hence, the fourth requisite was not met. The argument is untenable. The absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to apply.23 A shared identity of interests is sufficient to invoke the application of this principle.24 The proscription may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party.25 Res judicata may lie as long as there is a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the second case although the latter may not have been impleaded in the first.26 In the assailed resolution of respondent municipality, it raised the same grounds invoked by its co-respondent in the HLURB: (1) that the resolution aimed to close down or transfer the gasoline station to another location due to the alleged violation of Section 44 of the zoning ordinance and (2) that the hazards of said gasoline station threatened the health and safety of the public. The HLURB had already settled these concerns and its adjudication had long attained finality. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject matter already fully and fairly adjudged. Furthermore, an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.27 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150763
July 2, 2004
RURAL BANK OF MAKATI, INC., ESTEBAN S. SILVA and MAGDALENA V. LANDICHO, petitioners, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI and ATTY. VICTOR A. L. VALERO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.: In its decision1 dated July 17, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision2 dated October 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 91-2866 dismissing petitioners complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages. Petitioners now assail said CA decision as well as the Resolution3 dated November 9, 2001, which denied their Motion for Reconsideration. The facts are as follows: Sometime in August 1990, Atty. Victor A.L. Valero, then the municipal attorney of the Municipality of Makati, upon request of the municipal treasurer, went to the Rural Bank of Makati to inquire about the banks payments of taxes and fees to the municipality. He was informed, however, by petitioner Magdalena V. Landicho, corporate secretary of the bank, that the bank was exempt from paying taxes under Republic Act No. 720, as amended.4 On November 19, 1990, the municipality lodged a complaint with the Prosecutors Office, charging petitioners Esteban S. Silva, president and general manager of the bank and Magdalena V. Landicho for violation of Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3 in relation to Sections 105 and 169 of the Metropolitan Tax Code. On April 5, 1991, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 140208, for violation of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 122 and 39 for non-payment of the mayors permit fee, was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati against petitioners. Another Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 140209, for non-payment of annual business tax, in violation of Metro Manila Commission Ordinance No. 82-03, Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3, was likewise filed with the MeTC. While said cases were pending with the municipal court, respondent municipality ordered the closure of the bank. This prompted petitioners to pay, under protest, the mayors permit fee and the annual fixed tax in the amount of P82,408.66. On October 18, 1991, petitioners filed with the RTC of Makati a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2866. Petitioners alleged that they were constrained to pay the amount of P82,408.66 because of the closure order, issued despite the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 140208-09 and the lack of any notice or assessment of the fees to be paid. They averred that the collection of the taxes/fees was oppressive, arbitrary, unjust and illegal. Additionally, they alleged that respondent Atty. Valero had no power to enforce laws and ordinances, thus his action in enforcing the collection of the permit fees and business taxes was ultra vires. Petitioners claimed that the bank lost expected earnings in the amount of
P19,778. Petitioners then assailed the municipal ordinances of Makati as invalid for want of the requisite publication. In its Answer, respondent municipality asserted that petitioners payment of P82,408.66 was for a legal obligation because the payment of the mayors permit fee as well as the municipal business license was required of all business concerns. According to respondent, said requirement was in furtherance of the police power of the municipality to regulate businesses. For his part, Atty. Valero filed an Answer claiming that there was no coercion committed by the municipality, that payment was a legal obligation of the bank, and that its claim of exemption had no legal basis. He further alleged that petitioners action was clearly intended to harass and humiliate him and as counterclaim, he asked for moral and other damages. On October 22, 1996, the RTC decided Civil Case No. 91-2866 as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. On the counterclaim, the plaintiffs are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay to defendant Victor Valero the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. The counterclaim of defendant Municipality is dismissed. Cost against the plaintiffs. SO ORDERED.5 In finding for respondents, the RTC ruled that the bank was engaged in business as a rural bank. Hence, it should secure the necessary permit and business license, as well as pay the corresponding charges and fees. It found that the municipality had authority to impose licenses and permit fees on persons engaging in business, under its police power embodied under the general welfare clause. Also, the RTC declared unmeritorious petitioners claim for exemption under Rep. Act No. 720 since said exemption had been withdrawn by Executive Order No. 936 and the Rural Bank Act of 1992.7 These statutes no longer exempted rural banks from paying corporate income taxes and local taxes, fees and charges. It also found petitioners claim of lack of publication of MMC Ordinance Nos. 82-03 and Municipal Ordinance No. 122 to be mere allegations unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. In awarding damages to Atty. Valero, the RTC found that he had been maliciously impleaded as defendant. It noted that Atty. Valero, as a municipal legal officer, was tasked to enforce municipal ordinances. In short, he was merely an agent of the local chief executive and should not be faulted for performing his assigned task. Petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the RTC in its Order dated January 10, 1997.8 Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214. The appellate court sustained the lower court in this wise: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.9 The Court of Appeals found the order of closure of the bank valid and justified since the bank was operating without any permit and without having paid the requisite permit fee. Thus, declared the Court of Appeals, "it is
not merely a matter of enforcement and collection of fees, as the appellants would have it, but a violation of the municipalitys authority to regulate the businesses operating within its territory."10 The appellate court also brushed aside petitioners claim that the general welfare clause is limited only to legislative action. It declared that the exercise of police power by the municipality was mandated by the general welfare clause, which authorizes the local government units to enact ordinances, not only to carry into effect and discharge such duties as are conferred upon them by law, but also those for the good of the municipality and its inhabitants. This mandate includes the regulation of useful occupations and enterprises. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its Resolution11 of November 9, 2001 denied the same. Hence, this instant petition alleging that the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in: 1) .HOLDING THAT THE CLOSURE BY THE APPELLEE, VICTOR VALERO, OF THE APPELLANT BANK WAS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER BY THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI; 2) .NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT MAKATI ORDINANCE 122 REQUIRING MAYORS PERMIT FOR OPERATION OF AN ESTABLISHMENT AND MMC ORDINANCE NO. 82-03 WERE ADMITTED AS NOT PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED IN TAADA, ET AL., vs. TUVERA, NO. L-63915, DECEMBER 29, 1986 AND THAT NO TAX ASSESSMENT WAS PRESENTED TO THE BANK; 3) .AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE VICTOR VALERO IN THE AMOUNT OF P200,000.00 AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE SUM OF P50,000.00; 4) .NOT AWARDING TO THE APPELLANT BANK, THE AMOUNT OF P57,854.00 REPRESENTING THE AMOUNT UNJUSTLY AND ILLEGALLY COLLECTED FROM THE APPELLANT BANK; 5) .NOT AWARDING THE AMOUNT OF P10,413.75 YEARLY REPRESENTING THE UNREALIZED PROFIT WHICH THE APPELLANT BANK IS BEING DEPRIVED OF IN THE USE OF THE AFORESAID AMOUNT PLUS LEGAL INTEREST ALLOWED IN JUDGMENT FROM THE TIME OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL DEMAND. (DEMAND LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 4, 1991, EXHIBIT "O" FOR THE APPELLANTS); 6) .NOT GRANTING TO APPELLANTS ESTEBAN S. SILVA AND MAGDALENA LANDICHO MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P15,000.00; 7) .NOT AWARDING TO APPELLANTS, P1,000,000.00 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; 25% OF THE APPELLANTS CLAIM AS AND FOR ATTORNEYS FEE AND COSTS OF SUIT.12 Essentially, the following are the relevant issues for our resolution: 1. Whether or not petitioner bank is liable to pay the business taxes and mayors permit fees imposed by respondent; 2. Whether or not the closure of petitioner bank is valid; 3. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to an award of unrealized profit and damages;
4. Whether or not respondent Atty. Victor Valero is entitled to damages. On the first issue, petitioner bank claims that of the P82,408.66 it paid under protest, it is actually liable only for the amount of P24,154, representing taxes, fees and charges due beginning 1987, or after the issuance of E.O. No. 93. Prior to said year, it was exempt from paying any taxes, fees, and charges by virtue of Rep. Act No. 720. We find the banks claim for refund untenable now. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 4106,13 approved on July 19, 1964, had exempted rural banks with net assets not exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000) from the payment of all taxes, charges and fees. The records show that as of December 29, 1986, petitioner banks net assets amounted only to P745,432.2914 or below the one million ceiling provided for in Section 14 of the old Rural Banking Act. Hence, under Rep. Act No. 720, petitioner bank could claim to be exempt from payment of all taxes, charges and fees under the aforementioned provision. However, on December 17, 1986, Executive Order No. 93 was issued by then President Corazon Aquino, withdrawing all tax and duty incentives with certain exceptions. Notably, not included among the exceptions were those granted to rural banks under Rep. Act No. 720. With the passage of said law, petitioner could no longer claim any exemption from payment of business taxes and permit fees. Now, as to the refund of P57,854 claimed by petitioners allegedly because of overpayment of taxes and fees, we note that petitioners have not adequately substantiated their claim. As found by the Court of Appeals: As to the computation of the payable fees, the plaintiffs-appellants claim an overpayment and pray for a refund. It is not clearly shown from their argument that such overpayment exists. And from their initial complaint, they even asked for the refund of the whole P82,408.66 paid, which complaint was instituted in 1991. They claim having paid the fees and charges due since 1991, which is irrelevant, since the P82,408.66 was paid for the period before 1991, and thus no deduction can be made for payments after that period. It is not clear where their computation of P57,854.00 owed them came from, and lacking solid support, their prayer for a partial refund must fail. Plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show that the payment of fees and charges even covered the period before their exemption was withdrawn.15 Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which are supported on record, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. As repeatedly held, such findings will not be disturbed unless they are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.16 Moreover, in a petition for review, only questions of law are properly raised. On this score, the refund sought by petitioners could not be entertained much less granted. Anent the second issue, petitioner bank claims that the closure of respondent bank was an improper exercise of police power because a municipal corporation has no inherent but only delegated police power, which must be exercised not by the municipal mayor but by the municipal council through the enactment of ordinances. It also assailed the Court of Appeals for invoking the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 1617 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect in 1992,18 when the closure of the bank was actually done on July 31, 1991. Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered petitioner banks closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause invoked by the Court of Appeals is not found on the provisions of said law alone. Even under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)19 which was then in effect, a general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7 thereof. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation.20 The authority of a local government unit to exercise police power under a general welfare clause is not a recent development. This was already provided for as early as the Administrative Code of 1917.21 Since then it has been reenacted and implemented by new statutes on the matter. Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the general welfare clause contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law governing local government units. No reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of respondent municipalitys exercise of police power for the general welfare is concerned. The general welfare clause has two branches. The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.22 In the present case, the ordinances imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati, fall within the purview of the first branch of the general welfare clause. Moreover, the ordinance of the municipality imposing the annual business tax is part of the power of taxation vested upon local governments as provided for under Section 8 of B.P. Blg. 337,23 to wit: Sec. 8. Authority to Create Sources of Revenue. (1) Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. ... Implementation of these ordinances is vested in the municipal mayor, who is the chief executive of the municipality as provided for under the Local Government Code, to wit: Sec. 141. Powers and Duties. (1) The mayor shall be the chief executive of the municipal government and shall exercise such powers, duties and functions as provided in this Code and other laws. (2) He shall: ... (k) Grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws or municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which they have been granted; ... (o) Enforce laws, municipal ordinances and resolutions and issue necessary orders for their faithful and proper enforcement and execution; (p) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected, and that municipal funds are spent in accordance with law, ordinances and regulations; ...
(t) Cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances, for the collection of taxes, fees and charges, and for the recovery of property and funds of the municipality, and otherwise to protect the interest of the municipality; 24 (Emphasis supplied) ... Consequently, the municipal mayor, as chief executive, was clothed with authority to create a Special Task Force headed by respondent Atty. Victor A.L. Valero to enforce and implement said ordinances and resolutions and to file appropriate charges and prosecute violators.25 Respondent Valero could hardly be faulted for performing his official duties under the cited circumstances. Petitioners contend that MMC Ordinance No. 82-03 and Municipal Ordinance No. 122 are void for lack of publication. This again raises a factual issue, which this Court may not look into. As repeatedly held, this Court is not a trier of facts.26 Besides, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found lack of sufficient evidence on this point to support petitioners claim, thus: And finally the matter of the lack of publication is once again alleged by the plaintiffs-appellants, claiming that the matter was skirted by the trial court. This argument must fail, in the light of the trial courts squarely finding lack of evidence to support the allegation of the plaintiffs-appellants. We quote from the trial courts decision: The contention that MMC Ordinance No. 82-03 and Municipal Ordinance No. 122 of Makati are void as they were not publishced (sic) is untenable. The mere allegation of the plaintiff is not sufficient to declare said ordinances void. The plaintiffs failed to adduce clear, convincing and competent evidence to prove said Ordinances void. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, an ordinance is presumed to be valid unless declared otherwise by a Court in an appropriate proceeding where the validity of the ordinance is directly put in issue.27 On the issue of the closure of the bank, we find that the bank was not engaged in any illegal or immoral activities to warrant its outright closure. The appropriate remedies to enforce payment of delinquent taxes or fees are provided for in Section 62 of the Local Tax Code, to wit: SEC. 62. Civil Remedies. The civil remedies available to enforce payment of delinquent taxes shall be by distraint of personal property, and by legal action. Either of these remedies or both simultaneously may be pursued at the discretion of the proper authority. The payment of other revenues accruing to local governments shall be enforced by legal action.28 Said Section 62 did not provide for closure. Moreover, the order of closure violated petitioners right to due process, considering that the records show that the bank exercised good faith and presented what it thought was a valid and legal justification for not paying the required taxes and fees. The violation of a municipal ordinance does not empower a municipal mayor to avail of extrajudicial remedies.29 It should have observed due process before ordering the banks closure. Finally, on the issue of damages, we agree with both the trial and the appellate courts that the bank is not entitled to any damages. The award of moral damages cannot be granted to a corporation, it being an artificial person that exists only in legal contemplation and cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system.30 There is also no sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages. There being no moral damages, exemplary damages could not be awarded also. As to attorneys fees, aside from lack of adequate support and proof on the matter, these fees are not recoverable as a matter of right but depend on the sound discretion of the courts.31
Under the circumstances of this case, the award of damages to Atty. Valero is also baseless. We cannot ascribe any illegal motive or malice to the bank for impleading Atty. Valero as an officer of respondent municipality. The bank filed the case against respondent municipality in the honest belief that it is exempt from paying taxes and fees. Since Atty. Valero was the official charged with the implementation of the ordinances of respondent municipality, he was rightly impleaded as a necessary party in the case. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 17, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, so that (1) the order denying any claim for refunds and fees allegedly overpaid by the bank, as well as the denial of any award for damages and unrealized profits, is hereby SUSTAINED; (2) the order decreeing the closure of petitioner bank is SET ASIDE; and (3) the award of moral damages and attorneys fees to Atty. Victor A.L. Valero is DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138810
September 29, 2004
BATANGAS CATV, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR, respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: In the late 1940s, John Walson, an appliance dealer in Pennsylvania, suffered a decline in the sale of television (tv) sets because of poor reception of signals in his community. Troubled, he built an antenna on top of a nearby mountain. Using coaxial cable lines, he distributed the tv signals from the antenna to the homes of his customers. Walsons innovative idea improved his sales and at the same time gave birth to a new telecommunication system -- the Community Antenna Television (CATV) or Cable Television.1 This technological breakthrough found its way in our shores and, like in its country of origin, it spawned legal controversies, especially in the field of regulation. The case at bar is just another occasion to clarify a shady area. Here, we are tasked to resolve the inquiry -- may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Batangas CATV, Inc. (petitioner herein) against the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Mayor of Batangas City (respondents herein) assailing the Court of Appeals (1) Decision2dated February 12, 1999 and (2) Resolution3 dated May 26, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 52361.4 The Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Judgment5 dated October 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Batangas City in Civil Case No. 4254,6 holding that neither of the respondents has the power to fix the subscriber rates of CATV operators, such being outside the scope of the LGUs power. The antecedent facts are as follows: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 2107 granting petitioner apermit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the
maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod."8 Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter9 threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210. Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 4254. It alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. On October 29, 1995, the trial court decided in favor of petitioner, thus: "WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the defendants, their representatives, agents, deputies or other persons acting on their behalf or under their instructions, are hereby enjoined from canceling plaintiffs permit to operate a Cable Antenna Television (CATV) system in the City of Batangas or its environs or in any manner, from interfering with the authority and power of the National Telecommunications Commission to grant franchises to operate CATV systems to qualified applicants, and the right of plaintiff in fixing its service rates which needs no prior approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Batangas City. The counterclaim of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs. IT IS SO ORDERED."10 The trial court held that the enactment of Resolution No. 210 by respondent violates the States deregulation policy as set forth by then NTC Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz in his Memorandum dated August 25, 1989. Also, it pointed out that the sole agency of the government which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC, and that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation. Unsatisfied, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52361.
On February 12, 1999, the Appellate Court reversed and set aside the trial courts Decision, ratiocinating as follows: "Although the Certificate of Authority to operate a Cable Antenna Television (CATV) System is granted by the National Telecommunications Commission pursuant to Executive Order No. 205, this does not preclude the Sangguniang Panlungsod from regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under the powers vested upon it by Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983. Section 177 (now Section 457 paragraph 3 (ii) of Republic Act 7160) provides: Section 177. Powers and Duties The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall: a) Enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for health and safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve the morals, and promote the prosperity and general welfare of the community and the inhabitants thereof, and the protection of property therein; xxx d) Regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or profession being carried on and exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the city, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringement on the taxing and regulatory powers of the city government; Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, Local Government Units can perform just about any power that will benefit their constituencies. Thus, local government units can exercise powers that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is expressly granted; (3)necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4) essential to the promotion of the general welfare of their inhabitants. (Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991, p. 46)
Verily, the regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided in the Local Government Code. The fixing of service rates is lawful under the General Welfare Clause. Resolution No. 210 granting appellee a permit to construct, install and operate a community antenna television (CATV) system in Batangas City as quoted earlier in this decision, authorized the grantee to impose charges which cannot be increased except upon approval of the Sangguniang Bayan. It further provided that in case of violation by the grantee of the terms and conditions/requirements specifically provided therein, the City shall have the right to withdraw the franchise. Appellee increased the service rates from EIGHTY EIGHT PESOS (P88.00) to ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P180.00) (Records, p. 25) without the approval of appellant. Such act breached Resolution No. 210 which gives appellant the right to withdraw the permit granted to appellee."11 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.12 Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error: "I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AUTHORIZES RESPONDENT SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD TO EXERCISE THE REGULATORY FUNCTION SOLELY LODGED WITH THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 205, INCLUDING THE AUTHORITY TO FIX AND/OR APPROVE THE SERVICE RATES OF CATV OPERATORS; AND II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM AND DISMISSING PETITIONERS COMPLAINT."13 Petitioner contends that while Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, extends to the LGUs the general power to perform any act that will benefit their constituents, nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the
authority to regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates. Respondents counter that the Appellate Court did not commit any reversible error in rendering the assailed Decision. First, Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Section 177(c) and (d) of Batas Pambansa Bilang337, the Local Government Code of 1983, which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses. The term "businesses" necessarily includes the CATV industry. And second, Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a contract between petitioner and respondents, it being a grant to the former of a franchise to operate a CATV system. To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its terms would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.14 The petition is impressed with merit. Earlier, we posed the question -- may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? A review of pertinent laws and jurisprudence yields a negative answer. President Ferdinand E. Marcos was the first one to place the CATV industry under the regulatory power of the national government.15 On June 11, 1978, he issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 151216 establishing a monopoly of the industry by granting Sining Makulay, Inc., an exclusive franchise to operate CATV system in any place within the Philippines. Accordingly, it terminated all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments or by any instrumentality or agency of the national government.17 Likewise, it prescribed the subscriber rates to be charged by Sining Makulay, Inc. to its customers.18 On July 21, 1979, President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 894 vesting upon the Chairman of the Board of Communications direct supervision over the operations of Sining Makulay, Inc. Three days after, he issued E.O. No. 54619 integrating the Board of Communications20 and the Telecommunications Control Bureau21to form a single entity to be known as the "National Telecommunications Commission." Two of its assigned functions are: "a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities and services, radio communications systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph systems, radio and television broadcasting system and other similar public utilities;
b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;" Although Sining Makulay Inc.s exclusive franchise had a life term of 25 years, it was cut short by the advent of the 1986 Revolution. Upon President Corazon C. Aquinos assumption of power, she issued E.O. No. 20522 opening the CATV industry to all citizens of the Philippines. It mandated the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. On September 9, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos issued E.O. No. 43623 prescribing policy guidelines to govern CATV operation in the Philippines. Cast in more definitive terms, it restated the NTCs regulatory powers over CATV operations, thus: "SECTION 2. The regulation and supervision of the cable television industry in the Philippines shall remain vested solely with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). SECTION 3. Only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives, granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the Commission may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area." Clearly, it has been more than two decades now since our national government, through the NTC, assumed regulatory power over the CATV industry. Changes in the political arena did not alter the trend. Instead, subsequent presidential issuances further reinforced the NTCs power. Significantly, President Marcos and President Aquino, in the exercise of their legislative power, issued P.D. No. 1512, E.O. No. 546 and E.O. No. 205. Hence, they have the force and effect of statutes or laws passed by Congress.24 That the regulatory power stays with the NTC is also clear from President Ramos E.O. No. 436 mandating that the regulation and supervision of the CATV industry shall remain vested "solely" in the NTC. Blacks Law Dictionary defines "sole" as "without another or others."25 The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
But, lest we be misunderstood, nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs of their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the "regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the "regulatory power" over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence, such as, the: (1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of "certificates of authority, (3) establishment of areas of operation, (4) examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial qualifications of applicant operators, (5) granting of permits for the use of frequencies, (6) regulation of ownership and operation, (7) adjudication of issues arising from its functions, and (8) other similar matters.26 Within these areas, the NTC reigns supreme as it possesses the exclusive power to regulate -- a power comprising varied acts, such as "to fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws."27 Coincidentally, respondents justify their exercise of regulatory power over petitioners CATV operation under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code of 1983. The Court of Appeals sustained their stance. There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983. That it continues to posses such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991). Section 16 thereof provides: "SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among others, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant, scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants." In addition, Section 458 of the same Code specifically mandates:
"SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, x x x:" The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs.28 Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly, we have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling,29 the occupation of rig drivers,30 the installation and operation of pinball machines,31 the maintenance and operation of cockpits,32 the exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds,33 and the operation of hotels, motels, and lodging houses34 as valid exercises by local legislatures of the police power under the general welfare clause. Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.35 This is the same regulation that it exercises over all private enterprises within its territory. But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry. I. Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.36 Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs. Abendan,37 Justice Moreland said: "An ordinance enacted by virtue of the
general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right." In De la Cruz vs. Paraz,38 we laid the general rule "that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436 insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators. As earlier discussed, the fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs exclusive domain. In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct.39 In Keller vs. State,40 it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation.41 Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law. It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid.42 The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state.43 In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general
law.44 In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, inMagtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,45 ruled that: "The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it." Respondents have an ingenious retort against the above disquisition. Their theory is that the regulatory power of the LGUs is granted by R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), a handiwork of the national lawmaking authority. They contend that R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205 (issued by
President Aquino). Respondents argument espouses a bad precedent. To say that LGUs exercise the same regulatory power over matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence is to promote a scenario of LGUs and the NTC locked in constant clash over the appropriate regulatory measure on the same subject matter. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC. At any rate, we find no basis to conclude that R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205, either expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that R.A. No. 7160 repealing clause, which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed, does not include E.O. No. 205, thus: "SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code." Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed. (b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed. (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects. (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Neither is there an indication that E.O. No. 205 was impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 7160. It is a settled rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intentions. In Mecano vs. Commission on Audit,46 we ruled: "Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment." As previously stated, E.O. No. 436 (issued by President Ramos) vests upon the NTC the power to regulate the CATV operation in this country. So also Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7925 (the "Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines"). This shows that the NTCs regulatory power over CATV operation is continuously recognized. It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the government.47 On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. No. 205 and R.A. No. 7160, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This recourse finds application here. Thus, we hold that the NTC, under E.O. No. 205, has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting CATV operation, including specifically the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing herein precludes LGUs from exercising its general power, under R.A. No. 7160, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of their constituents. In effect, both laws become equally effective and mutually complementary. The grant of regulatory power to the NTC is easily understandable. CATV system is not a mere local concern. The complexities that characterize this new technology demand that it be regulated by a specialized agency. This is particularly true in the area of rate-fixing. Rate fixing involves a series of
technical operations.48 Consequently, on the hands of the regulatory body lies the ample discretion in the choice of such rational processes as might be appropriate to the solution of its highly complicated and technical problems. Considering that the CATV industry is so technical a field, we believe that the NTC, a specialized agency, is in a better position than the LGU, to regulate it. Notably, in United States vs. Southwestern Cable Co.,49 the US Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Communications Commissions (FCCs) jurisdiction over CATV operation. The Court held that the FCCs authority over cable systems assures the preservation of the local broadcast service and an equitable distribution of broadcast services among the various regions of the country. II. Resolution No. 210 violated the States deregulation policy. Deregulation is the reduction of government regulation of business to permit freer markets and competition.50Oftentimes, the State, through its regulatory agencies, carries out a policy of deregulation to attain certain objectives or to address certain problems. In the field of telecommunications, it is recognized that many areas in the Philippines are still "unserved" or "underserved." Thus, to encourage private sectors to venture in this field and be partners of the government in stimulating the growth and development of telecommunications, the State promoted the policy of deregulation. In the United States, the country where CATV originated, the Congress observed, when it adopted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, that there was a need to provide a pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition. The FCC has adopted regulations to implement the requirements of the 1996 Act and the intent of the Congress. Our country follows the same policy. The fifth Whereas Clause of E.O. No. 436 states: "WHEREAS, professionalism and self-regulation among existing operators, through a nationally recognized cable television operators association, have enhanced the growth of the cable television industry and must therefore be maintained along with minimal reasonable government regulations;"
This policy reaffirms the NTCs mandate set forth in the Memorandum dated August 25, 1989 of Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz, to wit: "In line with the purpose and objective of MC 4-08-88, Cable Television System or Community Antenna Television (CATV) is made part of the broadcast media to promote the orderly growth of the Cable Television Industry it being in its developing stage. Being part of the Broadcast Media, the service rates of CATV are likewise considered deregulated in accordance with MC 06-2-81 dated 25 February 1981, the implementing guidelines for the authorization and operation of Radio and Television Broadcasting stations/systems. Further, the Commission will issue Provisional Authority to existing CATV operators to authorize their operations for a period of ninety (90) days until such time that the Commission can issue the regular Certificate of Authority." When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To rule otherwise is to render the States policy ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State, LGUs cannot defeat national policies through enactments of contrary measures. Verily, in the case at bar, petitioner may increase its subscriber rates without respondents approval. At this juncture, it bears emphasizing that municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state.51 The legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was granted.52 Respondents likewise argue that E.O. No. 205 violates the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts, Resolution No. 210 of Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod being a grant of franchise to petitioner. We are not convinced. There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 "terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments." Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, "only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives
granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area." It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.53Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.54 One last word. The devolution of powers to the LGUs, pursuant to the Constitutional mandate of ensuring their autonomy, has bred jurisdictional tension between said LGUs and the State. LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole. Thus, when the Drafters of the 1987 Constitution enunciated the policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments,55 it was never their intention to create an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign state. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 12, 1999 as well as its Resolution dated May 26, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52461, are hereby REVERSED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997]
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA, ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES, DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN TABANG, PANGANIBAN, ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT, PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL, BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MELCHOR J. LAYSON, MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASET A., JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGA, ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG, NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILDREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B. BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YABANEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON, ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON, BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL, ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF PALAWAN, petitioners, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN, namely, VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA, ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A. CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C.
BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C. FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA, NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND METROPOLITAN, respondents. DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.
[1]
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. The following is petitioners summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to the petition: 1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which reads as follows: Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF. Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are [sic] directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.
Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby defined: A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP; B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as HITO-HITO; C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s] use for food and for aquarium purposes. E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine crustaceans of the genus Homarus that are alive and breathing not necessarily moving. Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES. Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court. Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found vilating the provisions of this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager, as the case maybe [sic]. Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this ordinance is deemed repealed. Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993. SO ORDAINED. xxx 2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows: In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft. The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter. Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held for proper disposition. In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support and cooperation. Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in the conduct of the inspection. Please be guided accordingly. xxx 3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS(SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWNBREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS, the full text of which reads as follows: WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five (5) percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a] habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms; WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of our province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities; WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others. NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon unanimous decision of all the members present; Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit: ORDINANCE NO. 2 Series of 1993 BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION ASSEMBLED: Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters. Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for [a] more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. 2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall be liberaly interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower government units. Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit concerned. 3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community. 4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with [the] proper perspective and consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is [sic] shall be unlawful for any person or any business entity to engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years; Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion of the Court; Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason, a Section or provision of this Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other provisions hereof. Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any ordinance inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or repealed. Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication. SO ORDAINED. xxx 4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes A and C hereof thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade; 5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal case no. 9305-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex D; while xerox copies are attached as Annex D to the copies of the petition; 6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the respondent PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, a xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached as Annex E;
Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors office and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that: First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit. Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed. In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition, and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy thereof. In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate. Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of
selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class. On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223. On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, considering that as claimed by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents were already represented by counsel. The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition. In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment on the petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
[2]
On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in light of the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of time to file the comment which would only result in further delay, we dispensed with said comment. After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of merit, on 22 July 1997, and assigned it to the ponente for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
I
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the 1 Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan; and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa. All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.
st [3] [4] [5]
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan -- an
alleged private association of several marine merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be fishermen. The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the ordinances. As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional. It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed that even if the petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. And , even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances. Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not, and could not have , alleged any of such grounds.
[6] [7] [8] [9]
As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity ... for being unconstitutional. As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.
[10] [11] [12]
II
Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma:
[13]
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. In Santiago v. Vasquez, this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction.
[14]
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised. It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
[15] [16] [17]
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having been transgressed by the Ordinances. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads: SEC. 2. x x x
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. xxx SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status. Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. Amarginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines amarginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his
[18] [19] [20]
immediate family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991 which pertinently provides: SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x (b) The sangguniang bayan may: (1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges .... In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed the guidelines on the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such fishery right. Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal fisherman, the following exchange between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at the plenary session of the Constitutional Commission: MR. RODRIGO: Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes of our people, and afterwards fail in the implementation. How will this be implemented? Will there be a licensing or giving of permits so that government officials will know that one
is really a marginal fisherman? Or if policeman say that a person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his permit, to prove that indeed he is one. MR. BENGZON: Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned and this particular question could be tackled when we discuss the Article on Local Governments -- whether we will leave to the local governments or to Congress on how these things will be implemented. But certainly, I think our Congressmen and our local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to implement this mandate. x x x MR. RODRIGO: So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds. MR. BENGZON: Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed, may be existing or will be passed. (underscoring supplied for emphasis).
[21]
What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran, this Court declared:
[22] [23]
While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second , the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment ...
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right: SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied). Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muroami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.
[24] [25]
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned, Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
[26] [27] [28] [29]
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.
[30]
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised
within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it. Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.
[31]
These fishery laws which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b), (2), (i) in municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a closed season in any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization, and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie called gobiidae or ipon during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR. To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the protection of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the following:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters; Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters; Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters; Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal waters; Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters; Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters; Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and Establishment of closed season in municipal waters.
These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province.
[32]
At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier. It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government. The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.
[33]
The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are among the natures life-support systems. They collect, retain, and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for marine plants and animals; and serve as a protective shelter for aquatic organisms. It is said that [e]cologically, the reefs are to the oceans what forests are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and plant species that will disappear without them.
[34] [35] [36]
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon of live-fish trade which entails the catching of so-called exotic tropical species of fish not only for aquarium use in the West, but also for the market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable in ever more affluent Asia. These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen catch them by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are immobilized [merely stunned] and then scooped by hand. The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff . Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally. Back on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide from their system and are ready to be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater tanks or packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major markets for live food fish. While the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for their former home as [a]fter the fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its function as habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral. The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the waves. It has been found that cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated application.
[37] [38] [39] [40] [41]
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted. As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayors Permit. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in accordance with P.D. No. 704. The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no. 704, over the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned, except insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal centers are concerned. This section provides, however, that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval.
[42]
Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister (formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the regional offices of the MAF. In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987, the BFAR is placed under the Title concerning the Department of Agriculture.
[43] [44]
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 insofar that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.
[45]
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.
[46] [47]
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.;
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS,respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping his family alive. How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal interests of people, on the other? Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for
the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general public over: the environment impact of development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include: Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows: xxx xxx xxx (j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to conduct studies and make experiments, whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that until modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the following subparagraph, the present laws, rules and permits or authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay,the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared between the Authority and other government agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take into consideration among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fishpen construction and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery projects; (l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same with the assistance of the Authority; (m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in establishing water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA Board. 2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees: Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila. Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be
collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied) It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner: Sec 41. Definition of Terms. (11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may: (1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . . (2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . . xxx xxx xxx (XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry orkawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal waters. xxx xxx xxx Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that: In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that: 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal. 2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing. 3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court. All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled. One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70,
Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation. The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as partiesrespondents are concerned regional trial courts and respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs,viz.: (A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566; (B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the Authority which is a co-equal body; (C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units concerned. Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the following errors: 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY. 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the
Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." 3 Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 4 Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance." "Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the intergenerational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources." "Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5 The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote: xxx xxx xxx As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. xxx xxx xxx . . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency. there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region. The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aquaculture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered cancelled. The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118533 October 4, 1995 MAYOR PABLO R. OLIVAREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the HON. OMBUDSMAN, Special Prosecutor ANIANO DESIERTO and Deputy Special Prosecutor JOSE DE G. FERRER, respondents.
REGALADO, J.: In this original action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner Mayor Pablo R. Olivarez seeks to annul the following:
1. Resolution dated February 9, 1994 issued by Special Prosecutor (SP) Aniano Desierto and approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on February 15, 1994 reversing Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) I Cornelio Somido's recommendation to dismiss the case against petitioner; 1 2. Resolution dated December 9, 1994 issued by Deputy Special Prosecutor (DSP) Jose De G. Ferrer and approved by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez on December 23, 1994 reversing SPO III Angel Mayoralgo's recommendation to withdraw the case against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence; 2 and 3. Resolution dated January 16, 1995 issued by the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of Reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. 3
The facts are succinctly summarized in the Comment 4 of the Solicitor General as follows: 1. On December 15, 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Paraaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to implement Paraaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 744, Series of 1992 which petitioner himself approved on October 6, 1992. Resolution No. 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer's fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from November 11, 1992 to February 15, 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard from the corner of Opena to Rivera Streets (Annex "D", Petition). Attached to the affidavit-complaint were: (i) a letter dated October 29, 1992 of Councilor Winnie Esplana to Arch. Vita of Paraaque Engineering Department;
(ii) four letters all dated November 13, 1992 of BCCI General Manager Mr. Steve Espina to petitioner, Arch. Vita, Municipal Health Officer Dr. Oscar de Leon and Municipal Treasurer Silvestre de Leon requesting assistance for the issuance of a mayor's permit; (iii) Letter dated November 24, 1992 of BCCI counsel Atty. Renato Dilag to petitioner formally demanding implementation of Res. 744 (Annex "H"); (iv) petitioner's reply letter dated November 27, 1992 to Atty. Dilag stating among others that the non-implementation of Res. 744 was due to BCCI's failure to apply for appropriate permit and license to operate the Night Manufacturer's Fair which was one of the conditions in the authorization (Annex "I"). 2. On March 12, 1993, petitioner filed his counter-affidavit stating that the charge of violation of Sec. 3(f) of RA 3019 has no legal and factual basis because (a) HCCI, which actually started operation, never applied for a mayor's permit as evidenced by his letter reply to Atty. Dilag and the affidavit dated March 11, 1993 of Business Permit and License Office Officer-In-Charge Mrs. Elenita T. Paracale (Annex "J"). Moreover, the four letters of Mr. Steve Espina requesting assistance in the issuance of mayor's permit were not filed with the municipal office concerned. 3. In his Reply Affidavit dated April 1, 1993, complainant BCCI denied conducting actual operations but only commenced soliciting participants and would-be sponsors to the fair. Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but petitioner simply refused to issue the same unless it gives money to petitioner. Attached to the Reply-Affidavit was a copy of Executive Order dated Nov. 23, 1992 issued by petitioner granting a group of Baclaran-based organizations/associations of vendors the holding of "Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair sa Baclaran" from November 28, 1992 to February 28, 1993 using certain portions of the National and Local Government Roads/Streets in Baclaran for fund raising (Annex "L"). 4. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Rogelio A. Ringpis conducted a preliminary investigation and issued on September 22, 1993 a resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019 as amended. The recommendation was approved by EPIB Head Raul Arnau and endorsed by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera to Special
Prosecutor (SP) Aniano Desierto for review and possible preparation of criminal information. The endorsement was duly noted by Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa. 5. On December 22, 1993, Special Prosecutor (SP) II Luz L. Quinones-Marcos, upon review of the Ringpis resolution, recommended the filing of information against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(e) instead of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor (DSP) Jose De G. Ferrer and SP Desierto. On January 11, 1994, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the report and recommendation and directed the government prosecutors to file the necessary information against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan. 6. The Information for Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 filed on February 16, 1994 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 20226, reads as follows:
That in or about the month of November, 1992 or for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Paraaque, Metro Manila, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the exercise of his administrative and official functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, without valid reason, refuse to issue a mayor's permit and/or refuse to act favorably on the application of the Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI) to operate a "night fair" along the service road of Roxas Boulevard (Baclaran) for a period of sixty (60) days in accordance with Resolution No. 744 series of 1992 of the Municipal Council of Paraaque, and that instead the accused issued and signed an executive order on November 23, 1992 granting an unknown or unidentified group of Baclaran-based organizations/associations of vendors the privilege to operate a "night fair" at certain portions of the national and local roads/streets in Baclaran, thus, causing undue injury to the Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Annex "P"). 7. On January 17, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law and on ground of newly discovered evidence (Annex "O"). Although opposed by the prosecution on January 24, 1994, the same was granted. 8. On February 7, 1994, Special Prosecu(tion) Officer (SPO) I Cornelio Somido to whorn the reinvestigation was assigned, issued an order recommending the withdrawal of the information against
petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. This recommendation approved by DSP de G. Ferrer was however disapproved by SP Desierto noting that: Respondent does not refute the allegation and evidence that complainant and representative approached him and he refused to issue the permit despite follow up. Neither does respondent claim that in refusing to issue the permit, he advised complainant and representatives that they had failed to comply with requirements. Bad faith is, therefore, evident in the respondent's persistent refusal to issue permit. On February 9, 1994, Ombudsman Vasquez concurred with Special Prosecutor Desierto and disapproved the recommendation (Annex "A"). 9. On February 18, 1994, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan for his temporary release. 10. On February 21, 1994, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for a re-examination and re-assessment of the prosecution's report and documentary evidence with a view to set aside the determination of the existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of the case (Annex "Q"). 11. On March 3, 1994, the Sandiganbayan, after finding that sufficient probable cause exist(s) against petitioner, denied for lack of merit petitioner's Omnibus Motion in open court and proceeded to arraign him as scheduled that day. But in view of petitioner's refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not guilty" entered into his record. 12. On March 8, 1994, the prosecution filed a Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite. 13. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With Entry of Appearance) (Annex "R"), Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused and Supplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused
(Annex "S"), respectively. Petitioner sought the following relief, to wit: a) to set aside plea of "not guilty" entered for him by the court during the arraignment on March 3, 1994; b) to dismiss the case after a re-study of probable cause; c) to order preliminary investigation for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019;. d) to deny the motion for suspension. 14. On March 23, 1994, the prosecution opposed the supplemental motions and prayed that the denial of petitioner's Omnibus Motion be maintained. 15. On April 4, 1994, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion but in the interest of justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of the case due to technicalities, it set aside the proceedings conducted on March 3, 1994 including petitioner's arraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty" entered in his record. The arraignment was set to April 7, 1994 but further action on the prosecution's motion to suspend petitioner pendente lite was deferred, without prejudice to the reiteration or revival thereof at the proper time and upon notice (Annex "T"). 16. On April 20, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted on May 15, 1994 (Annex "V"). Consequently, the case was remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for another reinvestigation to be terminated within 30 days from notice. Petitioner's arraignment was again reset to July 13, 1994 in the event of adverse resolution on the re-investigation. 17. During this reinvestigation, petitioner filed a Memorandum with Additional Evidence to SP(O) III Berbano to whom the case was assigned (Annex "W"). Meantime, several scheduled arraignments were deferred on the ground that the reinvestigation has not been terminated and, later, the recommendation has yet to be acted upon by superior officers. 18. On September 23, 1994, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr. issued a memorandum recommending the withdrawal of the Information on the ground that no probable cause exist(s) to indict petitioner for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. (3019). He alleged that to grant an exclusive mayor's permit demanded by BCCI will subject petitioner to liability for violation of R.A. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefit to BCCI. Moreover, BCCI failed to show compliance with the requirements of Res. 744, hence petitioner had all the reasons to refuse issuance of mayor's permit. Also, the issuance of Executive Order dated November 23, 1992 allowing Baclaran-based vendors associations to hold a night fair did not in any manner cause injury to BCCI as the authority given to them under Res. 744 was not exclusive. Petitioner merely considered the best interest of the municipality. 19. On October 3, 1994, complainant Manuel A. Vizcarra, formally requested the Ombudsman to disqualify SP(O) Berbano on the ground of lack of confidence, bias and undue delay in the reinvestigation of the case. 20. The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on November 3, 1994 recommended the dismissal of the case stating that petitioner "cannot be held liable for violation of either Section 3(f), the original charge, or Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, the pending charge against Mayor Olivarez, because he neither neglect[ed]/refuse[d] to act without sufficient justification on the letter request addressed to him, nor acted through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence causing undue injury to BCCI. If ever the latter sustained injury for the nonimplementation of Council Resolution No. 744, S-92, the same is due to the fault and indiscretion of its officers." 21. On December 9, 1994, DSP de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation with the following observation: Even discounting evident bad faith on the part of respondent for the sake of argument, he is liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit THRU MANIFEST PARTIALITY, to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business permit. The merits of respondent's justification (insufficient as it is) should be passed upon by the court. (Annex "B")
The reversal was concurred (in) by SP Desierto and approved by Ombudsman Vasquez, who on December 27, 1994, directed the prosecution to proceed under the existing information. 22. On January 13, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP Jose de G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. 23. On January 16, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of Reinvestigation praying that: (a) the Ombudsman's Resolution of January 9, 1995 sustaining his original finding that probable cause (exists) against petitioner be stricken off the record; (b) the information be dismissed (c) or in the alternative, for the court to review Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him" (Annex "X"). 24. On January 16, 1995, the motion was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. . . . (Corrections in parentheses supplied.) Hence, this petition. Petitioner assails the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve or disapprove the same through a mere marginal note, without conducting another preliminary investigation. Similarly, petitioners fault respondent Sandiganbayan for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to review the finding of the Ombudsman that there exists probable cause to hold petitioner liable for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, considering that the Ombudsman did not comply with the guidelines set forth by respondent court in the conduct of the reinvestigation. We shall first deal with the propriety or impropriety of the questioned marginal notes, dated February 9, 1994 and December 9, 1994, issued by then Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto (now Ombudsman) and Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de G. Ferrer, respectively. Petitioner contends that these marginal notes are null and void on the ground that the same were issued without the benefit of a new preliminary investigation and that the findings therein were not based on the facts and the evidence presented. It is likewise
averred that the above-named government prosecutors were engaging in a fishing expedition when they changed theories, that is, from "evident bad faith" to "manifest partiality," but only after the Sandiganbayan had issued a Resolution declaring that the original finding of bad faith was unwarranted. After a careful scrutiny of the issues raised in the petition for certiorari, the arguments in support thereof, as well as the comments of the public respondents thereon, we are not convinced that herein public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction. The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was contained in a marginal note is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of respondent special prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they gravely abused their discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors to dismiss or withdraw the case against petitioner. Neither are these marginal notes tainted with or indicative of vindictiveness or arbitrariness as imputed by petitioner. Public respondents disapproved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors because they sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict the accused. The Ombudsman's conformity thereto is but an exercise of his powers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 5 It may be true that, on the face thereof, the marginal notes seem to lack any factual or evidentiary basis for failure to specifically spell out the same. However, that is not all there is to it. What is actually involved here is a situation wherein, on the bases of the same findings of fact of the investigating prosecutors, respondent special prosecutors were of the opinion that, contrary to the former's recommendation, petitioner is probably guilty of the offense charged. Obviously, therefore, since it is merely a review of the conclusions arrived at by the investigating prosecutor, another or a new preliminary investigation is no longer necessary.
The case of Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al., 6 which involves substantially the same issues, has ruled on the matter in this wise: It may seem that the ratio decidendi for the Ombudsman's order may be wanting but this is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented. What is actually involved here is merely a review of the conclusion arrived at by the investigating prosecutor as a result of his study and analysis of the complaint, counter-affidavits, and the evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman here is not conducting anew another investigation but is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation given by the investigating prosecutor, that is, whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of the latter. Verily, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter's report and recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that "where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary investigation." With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different from that of the investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot be said that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion simply because he opines contrarily to the prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining in the case, there is probable cause to believe that herein petitioner is guilty of the offense charged. . . . (f)rom the tenor of respondent Ombudsman's statement, it is clear that he agreed with thefindings of facts of the investigating prosecutor but disagreed with the latter's conclusion on theimport and significance of said findings. On the basis of the findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor, which were not disputed by petitioner, respondent Ombudsman believed that there was sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
had been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof. (Italics in the original text.) The alleged shift in theory from "evident bad faith" to "manifest partiality" fails to present a sufficient indicium that respondent prosecutors gravely abused their discretion. Manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence are but elements of the offense defined in and punishable under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for which petitioner stands charged. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Thus, the issue of whether there was bad faith or manifest partiality on the part of petitioner should best be determined, not in the preliminary investigation, but during the trial proper. 7 It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be seasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against whom it is taken in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 8 Consequently, petitioner's asseveration that the reinvestigation is null and void because the respondent prosecutors failed to consider all the evidence presented in his defense has no leg to stand on. A perusal of the records will show that all the documentary evidence, as well as the additional documents submitted by petitioner during the reinvestigation, were thoroughly examined and fully evaluated in the determination of probable cause. Probable cause, as explained in the aforecited case of Pilapil, is
. . . a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and whether the same was done with manifest partiality or evident
bad faith can only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the case has already proceeded on sufficient proof.
. . . the court should not be guided by the rule that accused must be shown to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether there is sufficient evidence which inclines the mind to believe, without necessarily leaving room for doubt, that accused is guilty thereof. 9
We have meticulously analyzed the arguments raised by the parties in the various pleadings and motions, together with their documentary evidence, which all formed the basis for the issuance of the questioned resolutions, and we are convinced that there exists probable cause as to warrant the filing of charges against herein petitioner for a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner's main defense is that BCCI was not issued a mayor's permit by reason of its failure to apply therefor and to comply with the conditions set forth in Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 744. There are several flaws to this argument. First. The purported absence of an application for the issuance of a permit is actually more apparent than real. Initially, petitioner claims that he could not grant a permit to BCCI, which was allegedly demanding an exclusive authority to operate, on the pretext that he can be held liable for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefits to BCCI to the detriment of other Baclaran-based vendors' associations. Subsequently, but in the same vein, petitioner tries to justify the issuance of an executive order granting a permit to the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations, in that the same did not cause injury to BCCI since the authority to operate given to the latter is not exclusive. It would appear, therefore, that petitioner had taken it upon himself to categorize and determine the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of the authority to operate granted to BCCI, depending on whether or not it would suit his purpose or predilection. The inconsistent stand taken by petitioner with regard to the true character of BCCI's authority to operate is indeed quite perplexing and suffices to cast sufficient doubt on the real motive behind the nonissuance of the required permit. Second. It is asserted that the executive order granting a permit to the Baclaran-based vendors' associations was issued by petitioner supposedly in the best interest of the municipality as evidenced by its earnings from the night fair in the total amount of P13,512,948.00. While the avowed purpose may prove noble, still it miserably pales in contrast to what appears to be bad faith
or manifest partiality on the part of petitioner in refusing to grant a permit to BCCI. Petitioner could not plausibly demonstrate how the issuance of a permit to BCCI would so adversely affect public interest as to warrant its denial. On the contrary, the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque had even passed a resolution, which notably was approved by herein petitioner, expressly allowing BCCI to hold the night fair. This is concrete proof that the grant of authority to operate in favor of BCCI was not at all contrary to law and public policy, nor was it prejudicial to public interest. Petitioner's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of herein petitioner. Petitioner likewise submits that no permit could be issued because BCCI never filed an application therefor with the proper office, that is, the Business Permit and Licensing Office. This is actually begging the question. It is not denied that on November 13, 1992, BCCI, through its general manager, wrote petitioner requesting for a permit to operate, but this was rejected outright by him on the theory that the application should be made with the proper municipal official. The indifference shown by petitioner to BCCI's application taints his actuations with dubiety. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letter-application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether petitioner was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond us for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section
444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letterapplication of BCCI.. On the basis of the foregoing, we are reasonably convinced that there is enough evidence to warrant the filing of a formal charge in court against herein petitioner for a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Considering that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, the same should be considered conclusive. Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for the offense charged, the petition at bar clearly raises questions of fact. The arguments therein are anchored on the propriety of or error in the Ombudsman's appreciation of the facts of the case. Petitioner cannot be unaware of our oft-repeated injunction that this Court is not a trier of facts, more so in an application for the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor even of law are entertained, since only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion are authorized. 10 On this issue, therefore, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari, especially where the circumstances attending the recourse therefor are strongly suggestive of dilatory purposes. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.;
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS,respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping his family alive. How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal interests of people, on the other? Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for
the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general public over: the environment impact of development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include: Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows: xxx xxx xxx (j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to conduct studies and make experiments, whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that until modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the following subparagraph, the present laws, rules and permits or authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay,the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared between the Authority and other government agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take into consideration among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fishpen construction and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery projects; (l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same with the assistance of the Authority; (m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in establishing water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA Board. 2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees: Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila. Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be
collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied) It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner: Sec 41. Definition of Terms. (11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may: (1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . . (2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . . xxx xxx xxx (XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry orkawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal waters. xxx xxx xxx Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that: In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that: 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal. 2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing. 3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court. All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled. One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70,
Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation. The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as partiesrespondents are concerned regional trial courts and respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs,viz.: (A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566; (B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the Authority which is a co-equal body; (C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units concerned. Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the following errors: 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY. 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the
Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." 3 Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 4 Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance." "Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the intergenerational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources." "Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5 The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote: xxx xxx xxx As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. xxx xxx xxx . . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency. there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region. The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aquaculture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered cancelled. The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991 HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. Jejomar C. Binay for himself and for his co-petitioner. Manuel D. Tamase and Rafael C. Marquez for respondents.
PARAS, J.:p The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, reenacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The pertinent facts are: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads: A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A" p. 39) Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41) Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 43).
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44) Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent in its Decision No. 1159, in the following manner: Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following grounds, to wit: 1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of Makati and the intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police power and parens patriae and 2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a Certification, dated June 5, 1989, has already appropriated the amount of P400,000.00 to implement the Id resolution, and the only function of COA on the matter is to allow the financial assistance in question. The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that: a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational relation to the public safety, health, morals, or general welfare to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power. The mere assertion by the legislature that a statute relates to the public health, safety, or welfare does not in itself bring the statute within the police power of a state for there must always be an obvious and real connection between the actual provisions of a police regulations and its avowed purpose, and the regulation adopted must be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained. 16 Am. Jur 2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis supplied). Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati. Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered
thereby should be for a public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of P500.00 as burial assistance to a bereaved family of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case. On this point government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes. (Cf. Section 4[2], P.D. 1445). (pp. 50-51, Rollo) Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati, through its Council, passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60 (Rollo, Annex "H", p. 52). However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power
is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102). Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra). In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51). Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51). COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12) The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been
passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenantfarmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31249 August 19, 1986 SALVADOR VILLACORTA as City Engineer of Dagupan City, and JUAN S. CAGUIOA as Register of Deeds of Dagupan City, petitioners, vs. GREGORIO BERNARDO and HON. MACARIO OFILADA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan respondents. Victor T. Llamas, Jr. for respondents.
CRUZ, J.: This is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. The ordinance reads in full as follows: ORDINANCE 22 AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITY OF DAGUPAN. Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City in session assembled: Section 1. Every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shalt before the same is submitted for approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission, be previously submitted to the City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on any portion of the public domain, that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations are observed. Section 2. As service fee thereof, an amount equivalent to P0.30 per square meter of every lot resulting or win result from such subdivision shall be charged by the City Engineer's Office. Section 3. It shall be unlawful for the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to allow the registration of a subdivision plan unless there is prior written certification issued by the City Engineer that such plan
has already been submitted to his office and that the same is in order. Section 4. Any violation of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred (P200.00) pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both in the discretion of the judge. Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval. In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared: From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions. xxx xxx xxx The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimidated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. We affirm. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them.
Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. So many excesses are attempted in the name of the police power that it is time, we feel, for a brief admonition. Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes more and more complex, the police power becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has to be so for the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good, on the time honored justification of Salus populi est suprema lex. In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and owns affects the public interest directly or at least vicariously, unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the police power. Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory, administrative and municipal requirements and restrictions that he may find officious and even oppressive. It is necessary to stress that unless the creeping interference of the government in essentially private matters is moderated, it is likely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtue of the free society: individualism. Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be deprived of the right to be left alone or, in the Idiom of the day, "to do his thing." As long as he does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed. We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness. Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance
No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements. WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court annulling the challenged ordinance is AFFIRMED, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58794 August 24, 1984 SPOUSES LYDIA TERRADO & MARTIN ROSARIO, and DOMINGO FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON, Judge, CFI of Pangasinan, Deputy Sheriff OSCAR SIBUNA of Pangasinan, and GERUNCIO LACUESTA, respondents. G.R. No. L-64489 August 24, 1984 SPOUSES LYDIA TERRADO & MARTIN ROSARIO, DOMINGO FERNANDEZ, and EMILIANO GARLITOSpetitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN FELIPE M. AQUINO, and GERUNCIO LACUESTA, respondents. Gerry Calub and Ricardo Perez for petitioner in L-58794. Rogelio Terrado for petitioner in L-64489. Geruncio Lacuesta for and in his own behalf as private respondent in 58794 and 64489.
GUERRERO, J.: Pursuant to Act No. 4041 of the Philippine Legislature approved January 21, 1983, the Fisheries situated in the locality known as Mangabul, Bayambang, Pangasinan, and falling within Plan No. Ipd Ninety-two of the Bureau of Lands and recently declared by the courts as public land was reserved and the usufruct thereof ceded to the municipality of Bayambang, Province of Pangasinan, to be used or disposed of in accordance with the general municipal law relative to the letting of fisheries in municipal waters: Provided, That the timber and other forest products therein shall be placed under the administration and control of the forest service; Provided further, that the cession shall not be interpreted as limiting the power of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to prescribe rules and regulations for the protection of game birds, mammals or fish within the area ceded to the
municipality of Bayambang. (Section 1, Act 4041. This Act was declared enforced by Proclamation No. 545 (1933). On May 15, 1974, the Sanggunian Bayan of Bayambang, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 35 enacting Ordinance NO. 8, series of 1974, establishing the Bayambang Fishery and Hunting Park and Municipal Water Shed embracing all the vast area of the Mangabul Fisheries consisting of about 2,061 hectares with 19 fishponds and not less than 1,500 hectares of watershed area. In the said ordinance, the municipality designated appointed and constituted private respondent Geruncio Lacuesta as Manager-Administrator for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, under the condition that said respondent shall pay the municipality. a sum equivalent to 10% of the annual gross income that may be derived from the sale of forest products, wild game and fish, which amount shall not be less than P200,000.00 annually. He was further required to post a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to guaranty payment of the 10% due the municipality. Municipal Ordinance No. 8 was approved by the Provincial Board of Pangasinan on October 11, 1974 and thereafter was forwarded to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for approval pursuant to the provisions of the Fisheries Act, Act No. 4003. On April 4, 1975, the Secretary disapproved the Ordinance because it grants fishery privileges to respondent Lacuesta without the benefit of competitive public hearing in contravention of the provisions of Act 4003 as amended. Respondent Lacuesta interposed an appeal from the disapproval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the Office of the President but the appeal was withdrawn by said respondent in his letter dated July 14, 1977. The Municipality then informed respondent Lacuesta of the disapproval of the Ordinance by the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources and directed him to refrain and desist from acting as Administrator-Manager under the contract but the latter refused and insisted in maintaining possession of the fisheries. Inspite of such refusal, the Sanggunian Bayan of Bayambang, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 31, series of 1977, resolving to advertise for public bidding all fisheries at the Mangabul area for four years and to direct the Municipal Treasurer to prepare the necessary notices of public bidding, and accordingly, the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer caused to issue a Notice of Public Bidding scheduled July 5, 6, and 7, 1977. Among the winning bidders were the petitioners herein, the spouses Lydia Terrado and
Martin Rosario and Domingo Fernandez who were immediately placed in possession of the Mangabul fisheries as of July 6, 1977. Private respondent Geruncio Lacuesta immediately filed on July 8, 1977 a petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch IX in San Carlos City, presided by Judge Augusto Saroca against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, the Sanggunian Bayan and the members thereof, praying that the respondent municipal officials named therein be prohibited from executing any contract of lease with the winning bidders and from enforcing Resolution No. 31, series of 1977, and further asked that a temporary restraining order be issued against said respondent officials from performing the acts enjoined. Pursuant to the prayer in the petition for prohibition in Civil Case No. 516, Judge Saroca issued a restraining order enjoining and prohibiting all the respondents, their agents, representatives and/or anybody acting for and on their own behalf, from executing any contract of lease with the winning bidders in the biddings conducted on July 5, 6, and 7, 1977 and from enforcing Resolution No. 31, series of 1977 until further orders from the court. Respondents in this Civil Case No. 516 filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order but was denied on August 17, 1977. Upon ex-parte motion by Lacuesta asking that the Sheriff of the court be authorized to enforce the restraining order of July 11, 1977 and to arrest and keep in his custody all persons violating the same, Judge Saroca issued on October 7, 1977 an order directing Deputy Sheriff Alberto V. Soriano to proceed to the Mangabul fisheries and enforce the restraining order of July 11, 1977 against the respondent municipal officials, their agents and representatives and to arrest and keep in custody any and - all persons found to be violating said order. Thereafter, the Deputy Sheriff informed the court on October 26, 1977 that he served copies of the restraining order dated July 11, 1977 on all parties concerned and that they peacefully vacated and gave the possession of the fisheries without interposing any formal objection, to the plaintiffs, Geruncio Lacuesta, et al. Still in Civil Case No. 516, Lacuesta filed a petition dated September 16, 1977 asking that the defendants named in said petition including the spouses Lydia Terrado Rosario and Martin Rosario and others be ordered to explain why they should not be punished for contempt and that they be arrested immediately and kept in custody until they stop violating the restraining order of July 11, 1977, further alleging that said spouses employing misrepresentation, strategies, deceit, threat and force took over the Mayor fishery and illegally fished therein and are continuing to fish the same including the Manansan
Alangigan, Tubor and Banawang na Dueg Fisheries which they had previously took over from the movant Lacuesta. The situation became serious as on October 10, 1977 the Sanggunian Bayan passed Resolution No. 34, series of 1977 "requesting the assistance from the Department of Natural Resources, the Philippine Constabulary, Department of Justice, the Provincial Fiscal, the Provincial Governor and other agencies, for them to enjoin respondent from disturbing and interfering with the administration by the Municipality of Mangabul Fisheries and other areas." In the meantime that these incidents were pending before Judge Saroca, the members of the Sanggunian Bayan as petitioners filed on November 15, 1977 a petition for certiorari with the defunct Court of Appeals against Judge Saroca, the INP Station Commander, Deputy Sheriff Soriano, and Geruncio Lacuesta and others assailing the order issued on July 11, 1977 as well as the order issued October 7, 1977 as null and void, the same having been issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, the case docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-07252-R. The appellate court denied the petition for certiorari and held that Judge Saroca did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order of July 11, 1977. The Sanggunian Bayan members elevated the case on a petition for review on certiorari, G.R. No. 49064 but was denied for lack of merit per Our resolution dated October 16, 1978. While the certiorari proceeding was pending before the Court of Appeals, the resolution on the motion for contempt before Judge Saroca was held in abeyance but upon final decision by the court, Lacuesta moved the court on July 15, 1979 to resolve the contempt motion as well as for the order of their arrest. After hearing, Judge Saroca issued the order dated August 30, 1979 holding that the continued possession of the spouses Lydia Terrado Rosario and Martin Rollo Rosario as winning bidders constituted disobedience to and unlawful interference with the temporary restraining order of July 11, 1977 and directed Deputy Sheriff Soriano to enforce the July 11 and October 7, 1977 orders, to cause the arrest of said Rosario spouses including their agents and representatives and any and all person representing themselves as winning bidders in the public bidding held on July v, 1977 and to hold them in custody until further orders of the court, unless said spouses and their agents and the winning bidders voluntarily refrain from disobeying and interfering with the process of the court, in which case they may be discharged from custody. In the same order, Judge Saroca set a pre-trial conference and hearing on the merits on September 25, 26, and 27, 1979.
Having been adjudged in contempt of court and their immediate arrest ordered by Judge Saroca in the order mentioned above dated August 30, 1979, the spouses Lydia Terrado Rosario and Martin Rosario filed the petition for prohibition with the prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction assailing the questioned order as null and void, having been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying that respondent Judge Saroca be restrained from implementing the same, the petition docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09724. Resolving the petition (CA-G.R. No. SP-09724), the Court of Appeals, acting through the Former Eleventh Division with Justices Victoriano, J., ponente, and Reyes and Nocon, JJ., concurring, ruled and set aside the assailed order of August 30, 1979, holding that the Rosario spouses were not parties to the case, hence, they could not be bound by the restraining order of July 11, 1977 which enjoined and prohibited the parties: "(1) from executing any contract of lease with the winning bidders in the bidding conducted on July 5, 6, and 7, 1977; and/or (2) from enforcing resolution No. 31, series of 1977 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bayambang, Pangasinan, until further orders from this court." The order of Judge Saroca dated August 30, 1979 was, therefore, ordered set aside as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-09724 was promulgated January 24, 1980 thereby upholding the possession of the spouses Lydia Terrado and Martin Rosario. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bayambang, represented by Mayor Jaime P. Junio and the Sangguniang Bayan of Bayambang represented by the members thereof, filed on September 5, 1979 Civil Case no. SCC-648 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch X, San Carlos City against Geruncio Lacuesta for annulment of the contract entered into between the Municipality and Lacuesta under Ordinance No. 8 hereinbefore mentioned, injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. After the hearing of the incident for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Judge Saroca issued an order dated November 15, 1979 granted the writ as prayed for and ordered the defendant Lacuesta, his agents, lawyers, representatives, laborers and other person or persons under his employ to refrain and desist from interfering with and molesting the plaintiffs in the use of and in the exercise of plaintiffs' usufructury rights until further orders from the court. On November 16, 1979, the day Judge Saroca retired from the service, he issued another order to the sheriff to cause defendant Lacuesta to refrain from and desist from enforcing and implementing Resolution No. 35 enacting Ordinance No. 8, series of 1974 and the contract of management and administration, restraining them further from
interfering with and molesting the plaintiffs in the use of and in the exercise of the latters' usufructuary rights until further orders from the court. On November 23, 1979, Lacuesta elevated to the Supreme Court the November 15 and 16 orders of Judge Saroca in a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as G.R. No. 51984. In Our resolution of January 14, 1980, the petition for certiorari was denied for lack of merit. His motion for reconsideration was also denied in Our resolution of February 18, 1980. With the retirement of Judge Saroca, the case was transferred to Branch III, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Dagupan City, presided over by Judge Felicidad Carandang-Villalon, the case now docketed and numbered as D5118. Lacuesta then filed a Motion to Dissolve the Injunction and to Order Plaintiffs to Vacate and Turn All the Fisheries to Defendants (the injunction previously issued by Judge Saroca dated November 15, 1979). The Motion was granted by Judge Carandang-Villalon on the ground that 6 4 after the plaintiffs have recognized and confirmed the validity of the resolution and the contract, and after the defendant had started to perform his duties and obligations under the contract, the legal and factual ground which led the court to issue the writ has ceased to exist, and consequently, the dissolution of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated November 15, 1979 appears warranted by prevailing circumstances." Plaintiff Municipality moved for reconsideration which was denied in the court's order of March 9, 1981 which also ordered the issuance of the writ of execution after the approval of defendant Lacuesta's bond of P200,000.00. The plaintiff Municipality thereafter assailed the above orders of Judge Carandang-Villalon dated November 8, 1981 and March 9, 1981 in the former's petition for certiorari with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the petition filed in the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. 12586, dated June 16, 1981. In the decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, promulgated September 29, 1981, the court held that "being bereft of merit, as shown above, the instant petition is hereby denied due course and outrightly dismissed. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is hereby lifted and the urgent motion to lift restraining order filed on August 19, 1981 and on August 27, 1981 are hereby left unconsidered for having been rendered moot and academic by the resolution." The motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by resolution of the appellate court on November 11, 1981.
Meanwhile, when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, Judge Carandang-Villalon presiding, received copy of the decision in SP-12586 promulgated September 29, 1981, the court issued an order on October 5, 1981 for the ex-prosecution of its previous order to dissolve the preliminary injunction and place Lacuesta in possession of the contested fisheries and accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on October 7, 1981. Another petition for certiorari was filed by the spouses Lydia Terrado and Martin Rosario and Domingo Fernandez docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-13175, assailing the issuance of the order and writ dated October 5 and 7, 1981 respectively for allegedly violating due process as they were issued before the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period. In this petition, SP-3175, the court required respondent Judge and Lacuesta to comment, the same time issuing a temporary restraining order against the assailed order and writ of October 5 and 7, 1981 of the respondent court. On November 7, 1981, the appellate court (through the Seventh Division and ponente who handled both SP-12586 and SP-13175), rendered its resolution in SP-13175 dismissing the petition for lack of merit and setting aside the order of October 14, 1981 to include the lifting of the restraining order of even date. The appellate court ruled that: Our decision in said CA-G.R. No. SP-12586 held in effect that the impugned orders (like the order of January 8, 1981), were properly issued by the respondent court. Hence, those interlocutory orders, the effectivity of which were suspended by the certiorari proceedings in CA-G.R. No. SP-12586, presumed to be immediately executory upon the lifting of the restraining order as done in the decision of September 29, 1981. This must be so, notwithstanding the filing on October 21, 1981 of an "Urgent ExParte Motion For Extension" to file motion for reconsideration of said decision because an injunction, once dissolved, cannot be revived except by a new exercise of judicial power, and no appeal by a dissatisfied party can of itself revive it. (Watcon vs. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 480; Sitia Teco vs. Venture, 9 Phil. 497; II Martin, Rules of Court, 1969 Ed., p. 84). Thus, when respondent court issued its herein impugned order of October 5, 1981 and the Writ of Execution pursuant thereto on October 7, 1981, it was merely putting into effect the immediately operative interlocutory order dissolving the injunction. There was therefore, no abuse of discretion.
When the resolution in SP-13175 was received in the lower court, Judge Villalon issued on November 6, 1981 an "Alias Writ of Execution and Possession" which reiterated its writ of October 7, 1981. The alias writ was received by the Municipality, through counsel, on November 12, 1981. On November 16, 1981, the Municipality of Bayambang, represented by its Mayor, filed another certiorari petition to annul the alias writ of November 6, 1981, in CA-G.R. No. 13353 against Judge Carandang-Villalon and Geruncio Lacuesta, the petition being signed by Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. Since CA-G.R. No. SP-12586 and CA-G.R. No. SP-13353 involve the same subject matter, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals to which CAG.R. No. SP-13353 was assigned or raffled, resolved in its Resolution of November 27, 1981 to consolidate the case with CA-G.R. No. SP-12586 then pending with the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals as to the plaintiff Municipality's motion for reconsideration. The two certiorari petitions, CA-G.R. No. 12586 and CA G.R. No. SP-13353, now consolidated in the Seventh Division, were resolved in the Resolution dated December 4, 1981, thus: "WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition in 13353 is hereby dismissed for being a scrap of paper, the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is hereby lifted, and the scheduled hearing on December 10, 1981 hereby discontinued. The motion for reconsideration in SP-12586 is hereby denied for lack of merit. Since the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, dismissed the petition in CAG.R. No. SP-13353 as a mere scrap of paper because Atty. Oliver O. Lozano was not authorized to represent the petitioner Municipality, Atty. Lozano submitted the required authority in his Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition, further praying that the resolution of the Sixth Division giving due course to the petition as well as the temporary restraining order issued therein be reinstated or restored. Acting on the motion of the Municipality entitled "Ex-Parte Reiteration of Motion for Restoration of Temporary Restraining Order" filed on December 22, 1981 and the "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Stop Arrest of Petitioner's Laborers" filed on December 23, 198 1, the court in its Resolution of December 24, 1981 set the hearing of the first motion on January 15, 1982 and as to the second motion, the court deemed "it wise and proper in the spirit of love and compassion this Christmas time, to order that no arrests be ordered by the respondent court against persons involved in 'those fisheries in areas covered by existing lease contracts executed by plaintiff Municipality in favor of entities and/or persons before November 15, 1979' until after the results of the
November 15 hearing are received. ... In effect, therefore, we are ordering, as it is hereby ordered that a partial temporary restraining order be issued only as involved the areas with existing lease contract entered into by the Municipality prior to November 15, 1979. After the hearing on January 15, 1982 as alluded to above, the court promulgated its Resolution dated January 28, 1982, holding that the pleadings signed by Atty. Oliver O. Lozano are deemed valid for purposes of considering the incidents therein and that the impugned alias writ of execution issued by respondent court on November 6, 1981 is hereby declared void only insofar as it has deleted the exception involving "those fisheries and areas covered by existing lease contract executed by the plaintiff Municipality in favor of entities and/or persons before November 15, 1979. Further, the respondent court was directed to conduct a factual determination of (a) who are the persons or what are the entities involved, and (b) the clearly specified areas covered by their contracts, and that prior to the holding of such factual determination however, the respondent court was ordered to settle the nature of those "lease contracts" i.e., whether ordinary lease contract over a fishery area or contract of lease of services. Finally, the Court of Appeals ordered that "in case the respondent court finds, after putting to rest the nature of those lease contracts referred to in the original order of dissolution and after making the factual determination herein ordered, that such contracts no longer exist, then the Partial Temporary Restraining Order above mentioned shall be deemed ineffective for having then become moot and academic The Motion for Contempt of Court filed by Lacuesta on January 13, 1982 was also denied by the court. Pursuant to the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1982 and in compliance therewith in conducting a factual determination of who are the persons or what are the entities involved and the clearly specified areas covered by their contracts, Judge Villalon, after conducting hearings, submitted to the appellate court in her Ist Indorsement dated April 30, 1982, stating that "it is definite that there are admittedly no areas covered by any existing lease contract executed by the plaintiff Municipality in favor of entities and/or persons before November 15, 1979 within the contemplation of the Order dated January 8, 1981 which order has ordered the dissolution of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated November 15, 1979 issued by then retired Hon. Judge Augusto Saroca for reasons set forth in the Order. Acting upon the above report of Judge Villalon, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Resolution dated July 7, 1982, resolving that "in view of the above, the partial temporary restraining order has become ineffective for having then become moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the motion filed by
private respondent is hereby granted (Motion Ex-Parte for Total Lifting of Partial Restraining Order). The Partial Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 24, 1981 is hereby lifted and set aside. Two other petitions for certiorari were also filed with the Court of Appeals assailing the October 8, 1982 Order of Judge Villalon which ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and implementation of the Order of January 8, 1981, the first being CA-G.R. No. 15033 entitled "Spouses Lydia Terrado and Martin Rosario, et al. vs. Hon. Felicidad Carandang-Villalon, et al.," filed October 18, 1982 and the second, CA-G.R. No. 13175, "Spouses Lydia Terrado, et al. vs. Hon. Felicidad Carandang-Villalon, et al." dated October 9, 1981. CA-G.R. No. 15033 was dismissed on March 22, 1983, while CA-G.R. G.R. No. 1317 5 on November 5, 1981. The five (5) cases relating to the same subject matter, which are CA-G.R. No. 15033-SP, CA-G.R. 14501-SP, CA-G.R. 13353- SP CA-G.R. No. 13175-SP and CA-G.R. No. 12586-SP, were then consolidated in the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated March 22,1983. The dismissal of the petition in CA-G.R. No. 13175 and the issuance of the alias writ of execution and possession issued by respondent Judge Villalon in Civil Case No. D-5118 is now elevated to Us in G.R. No. 58794. Likewise, the decision of the appellate court dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. No. 15033-SP and the Order issued by the trial court dated January 8, 1981 have been raised to Us in G.R. No. 64489. Both petitions at bar, G.R. No. 58794 and G.R. No. 64489, have been consolidated per Our Resolution of August 24, 1983. The records of the petition before Us in G.R. No. 64489 disclose that upon written request of Judge Felicidad Carandang-Villalon that she be relieved from taking further cognizance of Civil Case No. SCC-648 (D-5118) entitled "Geruncio Lacuesta, et al. vs. The Municipality of Bayambang, the Supreme Court in its Resolution en banc dated June 7, 1983 granted the request of the Judge and directed the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan to transfer the records of the case to the Clerk of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City for raffling among the two branches thereat. Accordingly, Judge Carandang-Villalon issued an Order dated June 17, 1983 directing the Stenographer who took the proceedings 30 days to make complete transcript of the same and the Officer-in-Charge of the court to prepare the voluminous exhibits and thereafter effect the transmittal of the full records of the case. Notwithstanding her relief, the same Judge issued a further order dated September 2, 1983 commanding the Sheriff and the Commanding Officer of
the 153rd PC Company to restore defendant Lacuesta and his men to possession of all the fisheries and areas covered by his contract pursuant to the Order of the court dated October 8, 1982. This Order was implemented according to the Sheriff's Return dated September 20, 1983. Through the maze and muddle of this protracted legal controversy, it is plain and clear that the complaints and petitions including all legal incidents and motions filed in the trial court, the appellate court and before this Tribunal are traceable. in origin to the enactment and implementation of Municipal Ordinance No. 8, series of 1974, of the Municipality of Bayambang, Pangasinan, establishing the Bayambang Fishery & Hunting Park and Municipal Watershed coveting the so-called Mangabul Fisheries. As stated in Section of the Ordinance, the purposes of the Park are: 1. To attract tourists to Bayambang and thus increase the income of the municipality and create new employment and new sources of income for the people; 2. To restore and conserve the natural environment of the area by means of reforestation of the forest or timberland reserved, thru engineering works, and other means within the Ipd-92 area; 3. To restore or improve, conserve and develop the fisheries, zones, and exploit the fish resources of all the fisheries therein; 4. To supply agro-industrial enterprises that may be established in Bayambang with raw materials from the area; and 5. To provide sports and recreation facilities and wholesome sports and recreational activities for the people. Further, under the Ordinance, the Municipality designated, appointed and constituted private respondent Lacuesta as Manager-Administrator for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years upon mutual agreement (Section 4). Among the powers, duties and obligations of the Manager-Administrator are: 1. To reforest with woods or economic value all the timberland portions indicated in Plan Ipd-92 and those that need to be reforested for ecological purposes; 2. To stock the forest with wildlife or economic value, protect the forest products and wildlife and regulate their multiplication in accordance with existing laws; 3. To deepen the fisheries, swamps and tributary streams by dredging, employing modern scientific and technological methods to restore or improve and develop the fisheries to increase the fees yield; 4. To conduct and regulate sports fishing and hunting in the park and collect fees therefrom; 5. To use or dispose of the fisheries portion in accordance with the general law on municipal waters; 6. To establish in a suitable site within the park a fishing and hunting camp to be called "Camp Imelda." In Section 7 of the Ordinance, the Manager-Administrator shall pay to the municipal government the sum equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the annual gross income derived from an fees charged for fishing and hunting in
the park and entry into Camp Imelda, from the sale of forest products, wild games and fish from the area, but not less than P200,000.00. In accordance with the Ordinance, a Contract of Management and Administration was executed by the Municipality, represented by its Municipal Mayor as the Usufructuary and Atty. Geruncio Lacuesta as the ManagerAdministrator, setting forth therein the terms and conditions laid down in the Ordinance as well as the mode and manner of the payment of the sum of P200,000.00 annually due to the Municipality including the posting of a surety bond and other details of the management and administration of the fisheries by the Manager-Administrator, which contract was executed on January 28, 1975 at Bayambang, Pangasinan. Thus, the validity or legality of the Municipal Ordinance in question is the crucial and vital issue that must be resolved once and for all to put an end to this raging litigation that has become the tug-of-war between the Municipality and Lacuesta, together with other interested parties, over the vast and rich fishing grounds. In resolving said issue and ultimately the very root of the conflict, the following undisputed facts are controlling and decisive: 1. That Municipal Ordinance No. 8 has been disapproved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and 2. That private respondent has since died as shown in the Return of the Postmaster of Bayambang as noted in Our Resolution of July 2, 1984. 1. Ordinance No. 8, having been submitted to the Provincial Board of Pangasinan and approved by it by virtue of Resolution No. 171 dated October 11, 1974, the same was submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources as required by Section 4 of Act No. 4003, The Fisheries Act, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471 passed June 16, 1939, and further amended by RA No. 659 approved June 16, 1951, thus: Sec. 4. Instructions, orders, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, rules and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions; and all licenses, permits, leases and contracts issued, granted or made herein shall be subject to the same. All ordinances, rules or regulations pertaining to fishing or fisheries promulgated or enacted by provincial boards, municipal boards or councils, or municipal district councils shall be submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce for approval and shag have
full force and effect unless notice in writing of their disapproval is communicated by the secretary to the board or council concerned within thirty days after submission of the ordinance, rule, or regulation. From the evidence on record, it appears that a Master Plan for the Bayambang Fishing and Hunting Park and Municipal Watershed (Mangabul Fisheries Reservation) of Atty. Geruncio Lacuesta, Manager-Administrator of the said park, was submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. In the Indorsement of the Director of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources to the Secretary, Department of Natural Resources, the Comments, among others, state: "2. Records of this bureau show that Resolution No. 171, s. 174 of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan, embodying Resolution No. 35, s. 1974, enacting Ordinance No. 8, s. 1974 of the Municipal Council of Bayambang, Pangasinan and Resolution No. 24, s. 1975 of the same council requesting reconsideration and rectification of the 5th Indorsement of that department dated April 4, 1975, were returned DISAPPROVED and denied, respectively, by the Secretary of Natural Resources to the Municipal Council of Bayambang, Pangasinan . Upon the recommendation of the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources that "In the light, therefore, of the foregoing, the Master Plan for the Bayambang Fishing and Hunting Park and Municipal Watershed (Mangabul Fisheries Reservation), insofar as fishing and fisheries thereat are concerned should not be given due course and should be DISAPPROVED in the absence of adequate provisions thereon to the effect that the grant of the exclusive fishery privileges within its municipal waters shag be granted by the municipal council (now sangguniang bayan) to the highest bidder conformable with a fishery ordinance duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, pursuant to Sections 5, 67 and 69 of Act No. 4003, as amended (now sections 4, 29 and 30 of Presidential Decree No. 704)," the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources disapproved the Master Plan. The legal basis for the disapproval of the Ordinance No. 8 and the Master Plan mentioned above is clear and explicit in Sections 4, 67 and 69 of Act No. 4003 as amended by PD 704, Revising and Consolidating All Laws and Decrees Affecting Fishing and Fisheries. These Sections provide: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction of the Bureau. The Bureau shall have jurisdiction and responsibility in the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of an fishery and aquatic resources of the country except municipal waters which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned: Provided, That fish pens and seaweed culture in municipal centers
shall be under the jurisdiction of the Bureau: Provided, further, That all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval. The Bureau shall also have the authority to regulate and supervise the production, capture and gathering of fish and fishery/aquatic products. The Bureau shall prepare and implement, upon approval of the Fishery Industry Development Council, a Fishery Industry Development Program. Section 29. Grant of Fishery Privileges. A municipal or city council, conformably with an ordinance duly approved by the Secretary pursuant to section 4 hereof, may: (a) grant to the highest qualified bidder the exclusive privilege of construction and operating fish corrals, oyster culture beds, or of gathering "bangus" fry, or the fry of other species in municipal waters for a period not exceeding five (5) years: ... Section 30. Municipal concessions and leases concerning fisheries. lease or concession granted by a municipal or city council under authority of an ordinance approved pursuant to section 4 hereof, concerning fishing or fisheries in streams, lakes, rivers, in land and/or municipal waters, shall be valid and enforceable unless the Secretary, upon recommendation of the Director, approves the same. Indeed, the Ordinance is clearly against the provisions of the law for it granted exclusive fishery privileges to the private respondent without benefit of public bidding. Under the Fisheries Act, the Municipality may not delegate to a private individual as Manager-Administrator to "use or dispose of the fisheries portion in accordance with the general law on municipal waters" nor to charge foes for fishing and hunting in the park, much less sell forest products, wild games and fish from the area. Neither can the Municipality grant the exclusive privilege of fishing for a period more than five (5) years, whereas in the instant case, the period granted the Manager-Administrator was for twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five years. Moreover, under the specific provision of Act No. 4041, there is the proviso that the timber and other forest products therein shall be placed under the
administration and control of the forest service so that insofar as the ordinance relates to the timber and other forest products and the reforestation of the timberland portions indicated in Plan Ipd-92 including the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Manager-Administrator affecting the forestry portions are violative of Act No. 4041. It is of no moment that at the pre-trial hearing of Civil Case No. SCC-648 (which was transferred to Branch 111, CFI Dagupan and docketed as D-5118) the parties had admitted the legality of Ordinance No. 8. The issue as to the legality of Ordinance No. 8 is not a question of fact that the parties may stipulate and agree at the pre-trial hearing of the case which is for annulment of the contract under Ordinance No. 8. Such is a question of law for if the Ordinance is illegal and contrary to law, the contract executed in pursuance thereto is consequently illegal. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. (Art. 5, New Civil Code). From Our jurisprudence, We cite a number of cases ruling that a public bidding is essential to the validity of the grant of exclusive privilege of fishery to a private party, thus: The law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative Code) requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery or the right to conduct a fish-b reeding ground is granted to a private party, the same shall be let to the highest bidder in the same manner as is being done in exploiting a ferry, a market or a slaughter house belonging to the municipality (See Municipality of San Luis vs. Venture, et all 56 Phil. 329). The requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting competition and to guard against favoritism, fraud and corruption in letting of fishery privileges (See 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd Ed., p. 1170; Harles Gaslight Co. vs. New York, 83 N.Y. 309; and 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p. 1219) (San Diego vs. The Municipality of Naujan Province of Mindoro, 107 Phil. 118). It may thus be restated that the law that governs the award of fishery privileges in municipal waters is the provisions of Section 67 and 69 of Act No. 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 115 and 471. The provisions of Sections 2321, 2323 and 2319 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 have thereby been modified by Act 4003, as amended. Under the applicable law the Municipal Council may lease fishery privileges for a period not exceeding five years to the highest bidder in a public bidding held,
where the call for bid had specified the period for the lease. (San Buenaventura vs. Municipality of San Jose, Camarines Sur, et al, 121 Phil. 101, 114). The Municipal Council cannot extend the period of lease once it had been fixed on the basis of the period provided in the call for bids. In the lease of fishery privileges for a period not exceeding five years the previous approval of the provincial Board is not necessary. If the lease is for a period of more than five years, but not exceeding ten years, the previous approval of the Provincial Board is necessary. If the lease is for a period exceeding ten years, but not more than twenty years, the prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is necessary. In all cases the lease must be based on a competitive public bidding. (San Buenaventura vs. Municipality of San Jose, Camarines Sur, et all supra p. 115). While the respondent appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 12586-SP made the pronouncement that: Besides, Sec. 4, Act No. 4003 (which was then the law in force before being superseded by PD 704 on May 16, 1975) provides that an ordinance affecting fishing and fisheries "shall have full force and effect unless notice in writing of (its) disapproval is communicated by the Secretary to the Board of council concerned, within thirty days after submission of the ordinance." The ordinance was submitted for approval on January 2, 1975 and the disapproval came only 102 days after such submission, on April 14, 1975. Paragraph (a) of the pretrial stipulation (Annex "6" of Respondent's Comment) states that "the said ordinance was submitted to the then Secretary of Natural Resources who disapproved the ordinance, insofar as fishing and fisheries are concerned after 30 days from submission." We cannot sustain the above holding in view of Our holding in the case of Nepomuceno, et al. vs. Ocampo, et al.,supra, wherein We held that the only purpose in the enactment of Republic Act 659 which required the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to approve municipal ordinances pertaining to fishing or fisheries within 30 days after submission of the ordinance, rule or regulation is simply to expedite prompt action by the Department Chief concerned. Since Ordinance No. 8 granted fishery privileges exclusively to the private respondent without benefit of public bidding and for a period exceeding five (5) years, the said ordinance and the contract of management executed in accordance therewith were null and void ab initio, such that the failure of the
Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources to disapprove the same within 30 days from its submission does not render validity to the illegal legislation of the municipal council nor to the contract executed under the same. From the foregoing conclusion that the ordinance is illegal and void, per force the contract of management and administration between the Municipality and Lacuesta is likewise null and void. It also follows that the complaint filed by Lacuesta for prohibition in Civil Case No. 516 to enjoin the Municipal Council of Bayambang from leasing the Mangabul Fisheries upon public bidding as authorized in its Resolution' No. 31, series of 1977 is without legal basis and merit for Lacuesta has no right or interest under the void ordinance and contract. The suit must be dismissed and We hereby order its immediate dismissal. 2. We have noted earlier the death of Lacuesta in Our Resolution of July 2, 1984. His death is an irreversible fact that throws an entirely new bearing on the legal controversy at hand. For essentially, the contract of management and administration between the Municipality and Lacuesta is one of agency whereby a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. (Article 1868, New Civil Code). Here in the case at bar, Lacuesta bound himself as Manager-Administrator of the Bayambang Fishing & Hunting Park and Municipal Watershed to render service or perform duties and responsibilities in representation or on behalf of the Municipality of Bayambang, with the consent or authority of the latter pursuant to Ordinance No. 8. Under Article 1919, New Civil Code, agency is extinguished by the death of the agent. His rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmittable to his heirs. (Art. 1311 , New Civil Code). 3. Petitioners in both cases before Us, G.R. No. 58794 and G.R. No. 64489, anchor their claims to certain portions of the Mangabul Fisheries which they allege to have won in public bidding under the authority of Resolution No. 31, series of 1977 of the Municipal Council of Bayambang which leased the fisheries for a four-year period. The period has already lapsed, hence their fishing privilege is no longer effective as of June 30, 1981. To restore and place petitioners in possession of the fisheries would be an extension of their four-year period lease which is not authorized under the ordinance cited above. Nonetheless, the assailed order of Judge Villalon dated September 3, 1983 restoring possession of the fisheries to Lacuesta and his men which was issued after her relief from the case upon her own request is clearly irregular and without authority. There should be and there ought to be full obedience
and compliance by a subordinate court of the orders and resolutions of this Court. There cannot be any iota of discipline much less efficiency in the administration of justice if the lower echelons in the judicial hierarchy can freely act as they wish inspire of their relief. This should be a stem warning to all judges and personnel in all the courts. We brush aside the procedural aspects raised in the petitions before Us and in the interest of public welfare and speedy administration of justice, avoiding further multiplicity of suits, We consider the intrinsic merits of the controversy which as We pointed out previously, rest on the validity of the Municipal Ordinance in question. Thus, in sum and substance, We hereby pronounce the nullity of Ordinance No. 8, series of 1974 of the Municipal Council of Bayambang, Pangasinan and the contract of management and supervision executed between the Municipality of Bayambang and Geruncio Lacuesta as Manager-Administrator of the Bayambang Fishery & Hunting Park and Municipal Watershed. Since Ordinance No. 8 and the contract of management and supervision are both null and void, the Alias Writ of Execution and Possession dated November 6, 1981 and the Order of October 8, 1982 for the issuance of writ of execution and possession to place and restore possession of the Mangabul Fisheries, of portions thereof or fisheries therein to Geruncio Lacuesta, his agents, men and/or representatives under the said contract and by virtue of the ordinance are, including the writ also issued on October 8, 1982, without legal force and effect. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Alias Writ of Execution and Possession issued November 6, 1981 and assailed in G.R. No. 58794, as well as the Order and Writ dated October 8, 1982 raised in G.R. No. 64489, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28138 August 13, 1986 MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC., petitioner-appellee, vs. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, AMIR M. BALINDONG and HADJI PANGILAMUN MANALOCON, MUNICIPAL MAYOR and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, respondents-appellants. PURAKAN PLANTATION COMPANY, intervenor-appellee.
YAP, J.: On August 24, 1966, the Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, invoking the authority of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 45-46, entitled "AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION FEE OF P.30 PER SACK OF CASSAVA STARCH PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF." The ordinance made it unlawful for any person, company or group of persons "to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without paying to the Municipal Treasurer or his authorized representatives the corresponding fee fixed by (the) ordinance." It imposed a "police inspection fee" of P.30 per sack of cassava starch or flour, which shall be paid by the shipper before the same is transported or shipped outside the municipality. Any person or company or group of individuals violating the ordinance "is liable to a fine of not less than P100.00, but not more than P1,000.00, and to pay Pl.00 for every sack of flour being illegally shipped outside the municipality, or to suffer imprisonment of 20 days, or both, in the discretion of the court. The validity of the ordinance was challenged by the Matalin Coconut, Inc. in a petition for declaratory relief filed with the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur against the Municipal Council, the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Alleging among others that the ordinance is not only ultra vires,being violative of Republic Act No. 2264, but also unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner prayed that the ordinance be declared null and void ab initio, and that the respondent Municipal Treasurer be ordered to refund the amounts paid by petitioner under the ordinance. The petitioner also prayed that during the pendency of the
action, a preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the ordinance. The application for preliminary injunction, however, was denied by the trial court; instead respondent Municipal Treasurer was ordered to allow payment of the taxes imposed by the ordinance under protest. Claiming that it was also adversely affected by the ordinance, Purakan Plantation Company was granted leave to intervene in the action. The intervenor alleged that while its cassava flour factory was situated in another municipality, i.e., Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, it had to transport the cassava starch and flour it produced to the seashore through the Municipality of Malabang for loading in coastwise vessels; that the effect of the enactment of Ordinance No. 45-46, is that intervenor had to refrain from transporting its products through the Municipality of Malabang in order to ship them by sea to other places. After trial, the Court a quo rendered a decision declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and void; ordering the respondent Municipal Treasurer to refund to the petitioner the payments it made under the said ordinance from September 27, 1966 to May 2, 1967, amounting to P 25,500.00, as well as all payments made subsequently thereafter; and enjoining and prohibiting the respondents, their agents or deputies, from collecting the tax of P.30 per bag on the cassava flour or starch belonging to intervenor, Purakan Plantation Company, manufactured or milled in the Municipality of Balabagan, but shipped out through the Municipality of Malabang. After the promulgation of the decision, the Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, upon motion of petitioner, requiring the respondent Municipal Treasurer to deposit with the Philippine National Bank, Iligan Branch, in the name of the Municipality of Malabang, whatever amounts the petitioner had already paid or shall pay pursuant to the ordinance in question up to and until final termination of the case; the deposit was not to be withdrawn from the said bank without any order from the court. On motion for reconsideration by respondents, the writ was subsequently modified on July 20, 1967, to require the deposit only of amounts paid from the effectivity of the writ up to and until the final termination of the suit. From the decision of the trial court, the respondents appealed to this Court. A motion to dismiss appeal filed by petitioner-appellee, was denied by this court in its resolution of October 31, 1967. Subsequently, respondentsappellants filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the trial court on July 20, 1967. This motion was also denied by this Court on January 10, 1968. Of the assignments of error raised by the appellants in their Brief, only the following need be discussed: (1) that the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim of the petitioner in an action for declaratory relief; and (2) that the trial court erred in declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and void. The respondents-appellants maintain that it was error for the trial court, in an action for declaratory relief, to order the refund to petitioner-appellee of the amounts paid by the latter under the municipal ordinance in question. It is the contention of respondents-appellants that in an action for declaratory relief, all the court can do is to construe the validity of the ordinance in question and declare the rights of those affected thereby. The court cannot declare the ordinance illegal and at the same time order the refund to petitioner of the amounts paid under the ordinance, without requiring petitioner to file an ordinary action to claim the refund after the declaratory relief judgment has become final. Respondents maintain that under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the court may advise the parties to file the proper pleadings and convert the hearing into an ordinary action, which was not done in this case. We find no merit in such contention. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violation of an...ordinance, should take place." In the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid (Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Municipality of Sipocot, L-12680, March 20, 1959). In its petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the enforcement of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under protest the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by the respondents in their answer. During the trial, evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was introduced. Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
Respondents' contention, if sustained, would in effect require a separate suit for the recovery of the fees paid by petitioner under protest. Multiplicity of suits should not be allowed or encouraged and, in the context of the present case, is clearly uncalled for and unnecessary. The main issue to be resolve in this case whether not Ordinance No. 45-66 enacted by respondent Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, is valid. The respondents-appellants contend that the municipality has the power and authority to approve the ordinance in question pursuant to Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2264). Since the enactment of the Local Autonomy Act, a liberal rule has been followed by this Court in construing municipal ordinances enacted pursuant to the taxing power granted under Section 2 of said law. This Court has construed the grant of power to tax under the above-mentioned provision as sufficiently plenary to cover "everything, excepting those which are mentioned" therein, subject only to the limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform (Nin Bay Mining Company vs. Municipality of Roxas, Province of Palawan, 14 SCRA 661; C.N. Hodges vs. Municipal Board, Iloilo City, et al., 19 SCRA 28). We agree with the finding of the trial court that the amount collected under the ordinance in question partakes of the nature of a tax, although denominated as "police inspection fee" since its undeniable purpose is to raise revenue. However, we cannot agree with the trial court's finding that the tax imposed by the ordinance is a percentage tax on sales which is beyond the scope of the municipality's authority to levy under Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Under the said provision, municipalities and municipal districts are prohibited from imposing" any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon. " The tax imposed under the ordinance in question is not a percentage tax on sales or any other form of tax based on sales. It is a fixed tax of P.30 per bag of cassava starch or flour "shipped out" of the municipality. It is not based on sales. However, the tax imposed under the ordinance can be stricken down on another ground. According to Section 2 of the abovementioned Act, the tax levied must be "for public purposes, just and uniform" (Emphasis supplied.) As correctly held by the trial court, the so-called "police inspection fee" levied by the ordinance is "unjust and unreasonable." Said the court a quo: ... It has been proven that the only service rendered by the Municipality of Malabang, by way of inspection, is for the policeman to verify from the driver of the trucks of the petitioner passing by at
the police checkpoint the number of bags loaded per trip which are to be shipped out of the municipality based on the trip tickets for the purpose of computing the total amount of tax to be collect (sic) and for no other purpose. The pretention of respondents that the police, aside from counting the number of bags shipped out, is also inspecting the cassava flour starch contained in the bags to find out if the said cassava flour starch is fit for human consumption could not be given credence by the Court because, aside from the fact that said purpose is not so stated in the ordinance in question, the policemen of said municipality are not competent to determine if the cassava flour starch are fit for human consumption. The further pretention of respondents that the trucks of the petitioner hauling the bags of cassava flour starch from the mill to the bodega at the beach of Malabang are escorted by a policeman from the police checkpoint to the beach for the purpose of protecting the truck and its cargoes from molestation by undesirable elements could not also be given credence by the Court because it has been shown, beyond doubt, that the petitioner has not asked for the said police protection because there has been no occasion where its trucks have been molested, even for once, by bad elements from the police checkpoint to the bodega at the beach, it is solely for the purpose of verifying the correct number of bags of cassava flour starch loaded on the trucks of the petitioner as stated in the trip tickets, when unloaded at its bodega at the beach. The imposition, therefore, of a police inspection fee of P.30 per bag, imposed by said ordinance is unjust and unreasonable. The Court finally finds the inspection fee of P0.30 per bag, imposed by the ordinance in question to be excessive and confiscatory. It has been shown by the petitioner, Matalin Coconut Company, Inc., that it is merely realizing a marginal average profit of P0.40, per bag, of cassava flour starch shipped out from the Municipality of Malabang because the average production is P15.60 per bag, including transportation costs, while the prevailing market price is P16.00 per bag. The further imposition, therefore, of the tax of P0.30 per bag, by the ordinance in question would force the petitioner to close or stop its cassava flour starch milling business considering that it is maintaining a big labor force in its operation, including a force of security guards to guard its properties. The ordinance, therefore, has an adverse effect on the economic growth of the Municipality of Malabang, in particular, and of the nation, in general, and is contrary to the economic policy of the government.
Having found the ordinance in question to be invalid, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other errors assigned by the appellants. WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The decision of the court a quo is hereby affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10448
August 30, 1957
IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 3659 OF THE CITY OF MANILA. PHYSICAL THERAPY ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA and ARSENIO H. LACSON, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondents-appellees. Mariano M. de Joya for appellant. City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant Fiscal Arsenio Naawa for appellees. MONTEMAYOR, J.: The petitioner-appellant, an association of registered massagists and licensed operators of massage clinics in the City of Manila and other parts of the country, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3659, promulgated by the Municipal Board and approved by the City Mayor. To stop the City from enforcing said ordinance, the petitioner secured an injunction upon filing of a bond in the sum of P1,000.00. A hearing was held, but the parties without introducing any evidence submitted the case for decision on the pleadings, although they submitted written memoranda. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the petition and later dissolved the writ of injunction previously issued. The petitioner appealed said order of dismissal directly to this Court. In support of its appeal, petitioner-appellant contends among other things that the trial court erred in holding that the Ordinance in question has not restricted the practice of massotherapy in massage clinics to hygienic and aesthetic massage, that the Ordinance is valid as it does not regulate the practice of massage, that the Municipal Board of Manila has the power to enact the Ordinance in question by virtue of Section 18, Subsection (kk), Republic Act 409, and that permit fee of P100.00 is moderate and not unreasonable. Inasmuch as the appellant assails and discuss certain provisions regarding the ordinance in question, and it is necessary to pass upon the same, for purposes of ready reference, we are reproducing said ordinance in toto. ORDINANCE No. 3659
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF MASSAGE CLINICS IN THE CITY OF MANILA AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF. Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, that: Section 1. Definition. For the purpose of this Ordinance the following words and phrases shall be taken in the sense hereinbelow indicated: (a) Massage clinic shall include any place or establishment used in the practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage; (b) Hygienic and aesthetic massage shall include any system of manipulation of treatment of the superficial parts of the human body of hygienic and aesthetic purposes by rubbing, stroking, kneading, or tapping with the hand or an instrument; (c) Massagist shall include any person who shall have passed the required examination and shall have been issued a massagist certificate by the Committee of Examiners of Massagist, or by the Director of Health or his authorized representative; (d) Attendant or helper shall include any person employed by a duly qualified massagist in any message clinic to assist the latter in the practice of hygienic and aesthethic massage; (e) Operator shall include the owner, manager, administrator, or any person who operates or is responsible for the operation of a message clinic. SEC. 2. Permit Fees. No person shall engage in the operation of a massage clinic or in the occupation of attendant or helper therein without first having obtained a permit therefor from the Mayor. For every permit granted under the provisions of this Ordinance, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer the following annual fees: (a) Operator of a massage (b) Attendant or helper P100.00 5.00
Said permit, which shall be renewed every year, may be revoked by the Mayor at any time for the violation of this Ordinance.
SEC. 3. Building requirement. (a) In each massage clinic, there shall be separate rooms for the male and female customers. Rooms where massage operations are performed shall be provided with sliding curtains only instead of swinging doors. The clinic shall be properly ventilated, well lighted and maintained under sanitary conditions at all times while the establishment is open for business and shall be provided with the necessary toilet and washing facilities. (b) In every clinic there shall be no private rooms or separated compartment except those assigned for toilet, lavatories, dressing room, office or kitchen. (c) Every massage clinic shall "provided with only one entrance and it shall have no direct or indirect communication whatsoever with any dwelling place, house or building. SEC. 4. Regulations for the operation of massage clinics. (a) It shall be unlawful for any operator massagist, attendant or helper to use, or allow the use of, a massage clinic as a place of assignation or permit the commission therein of any incident or immoral act. Massage clinics shall be used only for hygienic and aesthetic massage. (b) Massage clinics shall open at eight o'clock a.m. and shall close at eleven o'clock p.m. (c) While engaged in the actual performance of their duties, massagists, attendants and helpers in a massage clinic shall be as properly and sufficiently clad as to avoid suspicion of intent to commit an indecent or immoral act; (d) Attendants or helpers may render service to any individual customer only for hygienic and aesthetic purposes under the order, direction, supervision, control and responsibility of a qualified massagist. SEC. 5. Qualifications No person who has previously been convicted by final judgment of competent court of any violation of the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Art. 202 and Arts. 335, 336, 340 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code, or Secs. 819 of the City of Manila, or who is suffering from any venereal or communicable disease shall engage in the occupation of massagist, attendant or helper in any massage clinic. Applicants for Mayor's permit shall attach to their application a police clearance and health certificate duly issued by the City Health Officers as well as a massagist certificate duly issued by the Committee or
Examiners for Massagists or by the Director of Health or his authorized representatives, in case of massagists. SEC. 6. Duty of operator of massage clinic. No operator of massage clinic shall allow such clinic to operate without a duly qualified massagist nor allow, any man or woman to act as massagist, attendant or helper therein without the Mayor's permit provided for in the preceding sections. He shall submit whenever required by the Mayor or his authorized representative the persons acting as massagists, attendants or helpers in his clinic. He shall place the massage clinic open to inspection at all times by the police, health officers, and other law enforcement agencies of the government, shall be held liable for anything which may happen with the premises of the massage clinic. SEC. 7. Penalty. Any person violating any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not less than six days nor more than six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. SEC. 8. Repealing Clause. All ordinances or parts of ordinances, which are inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed. SEC. 9. Effectivity. This Ordinance shall take effect upon its approval. Enacted, August 27, 1954. Approved, September 7, 1954. The main contention of the appellant in its appeal and the principal ground of its petition for declaratory judgment is that the City of Manila is without authority to regulate the operation of massagists and the operation of massage clinics within its jurisdiction; that whereas under the Old City Charter, particularly, Section 2444 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board was expressly granted the power to regulate and fix the license fee for the occupation of massagists, under the New Charter of Manila, Republic Act 409, said power has been withdrawn or omitted and that now the Director of Health, pursuant to authority conferred by Section 938 of the Revised Administrative Code and Executive Order No. 317, series of 1941, as amended by Executive Order No. 392, series, 1951, is the one who exercises supervision over the practice of massage and over massage clinics in the Philippines; that the Director of Health has issued Administrative Order No. 10, dated May 5, 1953, prescribing "rules and regulations governing the
examination for admission to the practice of massage, and the operation of massage clinics, offices, or establishments in the Philippines", which order was approved by the Secretary of Health and duly published in the Official Gazette; that Section 1 (a) of Ordinance No. 3659 has restricted the practice of massage to only hygienic and aesthetic massage prohibits or does not allow qualified massagists to practice therapeutic massage in their massage clinics. Appellant also contends that the license fee of P100.00 for operator in Section 2 of the Ordinance is unreasonable, nay, unconscionable. If we can ascertain the intention of the Manila Municipal Board in promulgating the Ordinance in question, much of the objection of appellant to its legality may be solved. It would appear to us that the purpose of the Ordinance is not to regulate the practice of massage, much less to restrict the practice of licensed and qualified massagists of therapeutic massage in the Philippines. The end sought to be attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the commission of immorality and the practice of prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a massage clinic where the operators thereof offer to massage or manipulate superficial parts of the bodies of customers for hygienic and aesthetic purposes. This intention can readily be understood by the building requirements in Section 3 of the Ordinance, requiring that there be separate rooms for male and female customers; that instead of said rooms being separated by permanent partitions and swinging doors, there should only be sliding curtains between them; that there should be "no private rooms or separated compartments, except those assigned for toilet, lavatories, dressing room, office or kitchen"; that every massage clinic should be provided with only one entrance and shall have no direct or indirect communication whatsoever with any dwelling place, house or building; and that no operator, massagists, attendant or helper will be allowed "to use or allow the use of a massage clinic as a place of assignation or permit the commission therein of any immoral or incident act", and in fixing the operating hours of such clinic between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. This intention of the Ordinance was correctly ascertained by Judge Hermogenes Concepcion, presiding in the trial court, in his order of dismissal where he said: "What the Ordinance tries to avoid is that the massage clinic run by an operator who may not be a masseur or massagista may be used as cover for the running or maintaining a house of prostitution." Ordinance No. 3659, particularly, Sections 1 to 4, should be considered as limited to massage clinics used in the practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage. We do not believe that Municipal Board of the City of Manila and the Mayor wanted or intended to regulate the practice of massage in general or restrict the same to hygienic and aesthetic only.
As to the authority of the City Board to enact the Ordinance in question, the City Fiscal, in representation of the appellees, calls our attention to Section 18 of the New Charter of the City of Manila, Act No. 409, which gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the City and its inhabitants. This is generally referred to as the General Welfare Clause, a delegation in statutory form of the police power, under which municipal corporations, are authorized to enact ordinances to provide for the health and safety, and promote the morality, peace and general welfare of its inhabitants. We agree with the City Fiscal. As regards the permit fee of P100.00, it will be seen that said fee is made payable not by the masseur or massagist, but by the operator of a massage clinic who may not be a massagist himself. Compared to permit fees required in other operations, P100.00 may appear to be too large and rather unreasonable. However, much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of said fee without considering it as a tax for revenue purposes: The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered in determining whether it is a tax or an exercise of the police power. The amount may be so large as to itself show that the purpose was to raise revenue and not to regulate, but in regard to this matter there is a marked distinction between license fees imposed upon useful and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes to regulate but not restrict, and those which are inimical and dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the latter case the fee may be very large without necessarily being a tax. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. IV, pp. 3516-17; underlining supplied.) Evidently, the Manila Municipal Board considered the practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a useful and beneficial occupation which will promote and is conducive to public morals, and consequently, imposed the said permit fee for its regulation. In conclusion, we find and hold that the Ordinance in question as we interpret it and as intended by the appellees is valid. We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the appeal. The order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 72969-70 : December 17, 1986 PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION AND HEE ACUSAR, Petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MAYOR CELESTINO E. MARTINEZ, JR., THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF BOGO (CEBU), and SANTIAGO SEVILLA, Respondents
CRUZ, J.: This case involves a conflict of jurisdiction between the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and the municipal government of Bogo, Cebu, both of which claim the power to issue licenses for the operation of cockpits in the said town. The issue arose when Hee Acusar, who was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, was ordered to relocate the same pursuant to P.D. No. 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974, on the ground that it was situated in a tertiary commercial zone, a prohibited area. 1 Although the period of grace for such relocation was extended to June 11, 1980 by P.D. 1535, Acusar failed to comply with the requirement, as a result of which the Philippine Constabulary considered the cockpit phased out. 2 To add to his troubles, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in a petition to compel the municipal mayor to issue Acusar a permit to operate a cockpit, declared that he had waived his right to a renewal thereof because of his failure to relocate. 3 On July 24, 1980, Santiago Sevilla, private respondent herein, was granted a license to operate a cockpit by Mayor Celestino E. Martinez by authority of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo and with subsequent approval of the PC Regional Command 7 as required by law. 4 As only one cockpit is allowed by law in cities or municipalities with a population of not more than one hundred thousand, 5 Acusar sued to revoke this license. He failed, however, first before the PC Recom 7 6 and later before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 7 His petition for certiorari challenging the decision of the lower court was dismissed by this Court. 8 Nothing daunted, Acusar went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking a renewal of his cockpit license and the cancellation of Sevilla's in what was docketed as PGC Case No. 10. He succeeded initially with the issuance by the PGC on August 16, 1984, of an interlocutory order allowing him to temporarily operate his cockpit. 9 This was challenged in two separate actions 10 filed by Sevilla and the municipal government of Bogo in the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, on petition of Acusar, were temporarily restrained by the Intermediate Appellate Court. 11 This same court also temporarily restrained the enforcement of the PGC order of August 16, 1984 pending consideration of the petition to nullify it filed by Sevilla and the Bogo municipal officials. 12
On December 6, 1984, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission issued its resolution on the merits of Acusar's petition and ordered Mayor Martinez and the Sangguniang Bayan "to issue the necessary mayor's permit in favor of Hee Acusar" and "to cancel and/or revoke the mayor's permit in favor of Engr. Santiago A. Sevilla." The Commission also "RESOLVED to issue the Registration Certificate of Hee Acusar for the current year 1984 and revoke the Registration Certificate of E ngr. Santiago A. Sevilla." 13 The above-stated resolution was on appeal declared null and void by the Intermediate Court of Appeals, 14 and its decision is now before us in a petition for review on certiorari. We shall first compare the powers vested respectively in the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and the city and municipal officials under the applicable laws, to wit, P.D. 1802, P.D. 1802-A and the Local Government Code. The pertinent powers of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission under Section 2 of P.D. 1802, which became effective on January 16, 1981, are the following. a) Promulgate and enforce rules and regulations relative to the holding of cockfight derbies and cockfights in the Philippines including the frequency sites, conduct and operation of such derbies and cockfights; b) Issue licenses for the holding of international derbies; xxx xxx xxx d) Fix and periodically revise whenever necessary, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance, the rates of license fees and other levies that may be imposed on local derbies and cockfights and international cockfight derbies, cockpit personnel and employees; e) To promulgate rules and regulations relative to the holding, methods, procedures, operations and conduct of cockfighting in general as well as accreditation of cockpit personnel and association of cockpit owners, operators and lessees, to elevate the standard of cockfighting; xxx xxx xxx By contrast, P.D. 1802, as amended by P.D. 1802-A, provides as follows: SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1802 is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective "Sanggunians" shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and supervision.
According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the power to "grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which they have been granted," 15 and the Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to "regulate cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to existing guidelines promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission." 16 A study of the above-cited powers shows that it is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Its power to license is limited only to internationalderbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review and supervision. We have consistently held that supervision means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." 17 Supervision is a lesser power than control, which connotes "the power of the officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. " 18 Review, on the other hand, is a reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction. 19 As thus defined, the power of supervision does not snow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate, for that comes under the power of control. What it can do only is to see to it that the subordinate performs his duties in accordance with law. The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinatemotu proprio corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review over him. At that, even the power of review vested in the Philippine Gamefowl Commission by P.D. 1802-A may have been modified by the Local Government Code, which became effective on February 14, 1983. Under the Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is supposed to examine the ordinances, resolutions and executive orders issued by the municipal government and to annul the same, but only on one ground, to wit, that it is beyond the powers of the municipality or ultra vires. 20 Significantly, no similar authority is conferred in such categorical terms on the Philippine Gamefowl Commission regarding the licensing and regulation of cockpits by the municipal government. The conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in the municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in Article II, Section 10, and Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. It is also a
recognition, as the Court of Appeals correctly points out, of the superior competence of the municipal officials in dealing with this local matter with which they can be expected to be more knowledgeable than the national officials. Surely, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission cannot claim to know more than the municipal mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo, Cebu, about the issues being disputed by the applicants to the cockpit license. At any rate, assuming that the resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the issuance of a cockpit license to Sevilla was subject to reversal by the PGC, such action could be justified only if based upon a proven violation of law by the municipal officials. It may not be made only for the purpose of substituting its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the municipal authorities in determining the applicant to which the lone cockpit license should be issued. In the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, the choice of the municipal authorities should be respected by the PGC and in any event cannot be replaced by it simply because it believes another person should have been selected. Stated otherwise, the PGC cannot directly exercise the power to license cockpits and in effect usurp the authority directly conferred by law on the municipal authorities. If at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it does not carry the authority to substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound discretion. In the instant case, the PGC did not limit itself to vetoing the choice of Sevilla, assuming he was disqualified, but directly exercised the authority of replacing him with its own choice. Assuming Sevilla was really disqualified, the choice of his replacement still remained with the municipal authorities, subject only to the review of the PGC. In ordering the respondent municipal officials to cancel the mayor's permit in favor of Santiago A. Sevilla and to issue another one in favor of Acusar, the PGC was exercising not the powers of mere supervision and review but the power of control, which had not been conferred upon it. The other issue raised by the petitioner is easily resolved. It appearing that they are supported by substantial evidence, we accept the factual findings of the respondent court that Acusar's cockpit was within the prohibited area and was therefore correctly considered phased out when its operator failed to relocate it as required by law. According to the Court of Appeals, "it is not controverted that Acusar's cockpit is near a Roman Catholic church near the Cebu Roosevelt Memorial College, near residential dwellings and near a public market." These circumstances should be more than enough to disqualify Acusar even under the prior-operator rule he invokes, assuming that rule was applicable. Under that rule, preference is given to the actual holder of the permit, but in the instant case Acusar could not be said to be actually holding the permit at the time it was given to Sevilla. Acusar had then already forfeited his right to renew it by reason of his non-compliance with the requirement to relocate.
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "selfreliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and, more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The decision of the respondent court of Appeals dated May 29, 1985, is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against petitioner Hee Acusar. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41053 February 27, 1976 FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, as Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch VII, and PABLO SAN MIGUEL, respondents. Victoriano R. Aldava for petitioners. Manuel P. Pun for respondents.
MARTIN, J.: The prime issue presented to Us in this special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus, which was certified by the Court of Appeals on July 15, 1975, involves the rule in determining whether an order is final and appealable or is merely interlocutory. Sometime in 1962, Pedro San Miguel, 1 the predecessorin-interest of the herein petitioners, commenced a "Complaint for Partition of Real Estate" before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against private respondent Pablo San Miguel. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2624, sought the partition of Lot No. 4543 of the Lolomboy Estate, which is a portion of original Lot No. 3237 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15369 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. Traversing the complaint, respondent Pablo San Miguel disclaimed coownership and asserted exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543. Subsequently, on March 19, 1964, the then trial judge, Ricardo C. Puno, ordered the dismissal of the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court for "apparent lack of interest in the prosecution of the respective claims of the litigants." Eleven years thereafter, another complaint for partition, docketed as Civil Case No. 4300-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, was instituted by the same Pedro San Miguel against private respondent Pablo San Miguel. This time, the complaint prayed for the partition of Lot No. 4543 (covered by TCT No. T-15369, Bulacan) and Lot No. 3269 (covered by TCT No. T-15370, Bulacan). In due time, Pablo San Miguel filed his answer, pleading therein the defense of res judicata. For him, the same subject matter and cause of action had already been litigate . d upon and resolved in the previous Civil Case No.
2624. After preliminary hearing, the respondent Judge issued an order on December 10, 1973, dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M "insofar as Lot 4543 is concerned" in view of the principle of res judicata. The case was ordered to proceed as regards Lot No. 3269, and on July 31, 1974, respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the parties "as COOWNERS to present to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, a PROJECT OF PARTITION, dividing Lot No. 3269 (Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15370, Bulacan) into two equal parts." Petitioners received a copy of this decision on August 13,1974. On September 12, 1974, petitioners interposed their appeal from this judgment of the trial court. On said date, their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal were filed. On December 9, 1974, respondent Judge approved petitioners' corrected record on appeal but "insofar only as Lot No. 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL, cannot be appealed anymore, and therefore any record on appeal thereon will be useless, moot and academic ... After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a "Petition for certiorari And/Or Mandamus" before the Court of Appeals on February 5, 1975, but the latter court elevated the petition to Us upon discovering that only questions of law are raised. It is readily discernible that the decisive question in this case is whether or not the order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973, dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M as regards Lot No. 4543, is final and appealable. Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "(o)nly final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal." Interlocuootry or incidental judgments or orders do not stay the progress of an action nor are they subject of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other." The test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the mertis of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, if is final." 2 A court order is final character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved or settles definitely the matter threin disposed of, 3 such that no further questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. 4 The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or direction for future determination. 5 The order or judgment may validly refer to the entire
controversy or to some definite and separate branch threof. "In the absence of a statutory definition, a final judgment, order decree has been held to be ... one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. 6 The central point to consider is, threfore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties. A court order, on the other hand, is merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. 7 The word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." 8 1. We find that the order of dismissal entered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 4300-M on December 10, 1973, is a clear final and appealable order. The said order is a final disposition of the whole controversy between the parties with respect to the ownership of Lot No. 4543. It is absolute and conclusive on all questions in regard thereto. 9 The trial court's order is not a mere narrow acceptance of private respondent's plea of res judicata. It has more the far-ranging effect of confirming private respondent's claim of exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543, as previously adjudicated in the prior Civil Case No. 2624. It imports that private respondent is the sole owner of this specific lot; as a result of which, the deceased Pedro San Miguel or his succesors-in-interest for that matter stand to suffer the loss of what they claim is their rightful share thereto. 10 After the issuance of this order, nothing more was left for the trial court to try or decide, as the conflicting claims of the parties over the subject lot have already been resolved. As a matter of fact, the final order of dismissal cannot even be assailed by certiorari. The remedy is appeal, which petitioners herein have failed to undertake. 11 The fact that the other lot, Lot No. 3269, remained under litigation and the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by the trial court would not affect the final nature of the subject order, because a decree, is nonetheless final although some independent branch of the case is reserved for future consideration . 12 2. Reason lies in the order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973, foreclosing the relitigation of Lot No. 4543 because of the March 19, 1964 order of the then trial Judge, Ricardo C. Puno, in Civil Case No. 2624, which involves the same lot, dismissing the case for lack of interest to prosecute. This dismissal order of the said trial Judge has the effect and consequences of a dismissal on the merits under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was neither without prejudice nor based upon lack of jurisdiction. 13 It is worthy to note that the deceased Pedro San Miguel
interposed no appeal therefrom. Instead, he attempted to revive the subject matter of that Civil Case No. 2624 (Lot No. 4543) eleven years threafter, when he commensed Civil Case No. 4300-M, praying for the partition of Lot No. 3629 and Lot No. 4543. This, the deceased Pedro San Miguel could not do so. Litigation on this particular Lot No. 4543 must reach a terminal point. The principle of estoppel by judgment, on of the aspects of the doctrine of res judicata, precludes the re-litigation in another action of a specific question actually litigated and determined in a former one. 14 The second casde, Civil Case No. 4300-M, is barred by the prior judgment in the first case, Civil Case No. 2624, insofar as it relates to Lot No. 4543. For, thre is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first case where the jdugment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred as far as Lot No. 4543 is concerned. Likewise, the judgment in the first case is a final one rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits. 15 3. There is no doubt that access to the courts is a constitutional guarantee. This is, however, subject to limitation s. Once the rights of a party-litigant have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, the partylitigant can no longer litigate the same again. 16 A right, question or fact distinctly placed in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the firs suit remains unmodified. 17 Public policy and sound practice jdemand that "at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law." 18Reipublicae ut sit finis litium. It results, thjrefore, that respondent Judge did not abusde his discetion when he issued the order of December 9, 1974, approving petitioners' corrected record on appeal "insofar only as Lot 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL ... ." ACCORDINGLY, the order of December 9, 1974, subject matter of this petition, issued by respondent Judge in his Civil Case No. 4300-M, approving petitioners corrected record on appeal with respect only to Lot 2369, is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. City Fiscal for petitioners. Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void. Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution: RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon
City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an
owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration. We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance: The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power? An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulatesuch other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537). The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be justified under subsection "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the City Council to'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing
funerals and disposal of the dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537). There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation' We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows: (00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section. We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not
recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with selfpreservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957). The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an
outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, more so, where the ma corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and general welfare. In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular ... municipality and with all the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.) We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra : ... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community. An property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression. but find them not applicable to the facts of this case. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities
with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983 TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES LOMIBAO, as component members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation to Republic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of Manila, respondents-appellees. Leonardo L. Arguelles for respondent-appellant.
FERNANDO, C.J.: This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." 1 As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. 2 Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops
and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." 3 This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." 5 As it was then, so it has continued to be. 6 There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979 ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee. Ramirez & Ortigas for appellant. Taada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellee.
SANTOS, J.: An appeal interposed on June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-appellant, Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at Pasig, Hon. Andres Reyes presiding, which dismissed its complaint in Civil Case No. 7706, entitled, "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, plaintiff, v. Feati Bank and Trust Company, defendant," for lack of merit. The following facts a reproduction of the lower court's findings, which, in turn, are based on a stipulation of facts entered into by the parties are not disputed. Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1 On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that: 1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be
entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines. 2
The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma Chavez. 3 Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092 issued in its name, respectively and the building restrictions were also annotated therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D', 5 while Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex "E". 6 TCT No. 101719 in the name of Republic Flour Mills likewise contained the same restrictions, although defendantappellee claims that Republic Flour Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good faith. free from all liens and encumbrances," as stated in the Deed of Sale, Annex "F" 7 between it and Emma Chavez. Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719, 101613, and 106092 were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiffappellant where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established. 8 Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 9 It alleges that plaintiff-appellant 'completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue" 10 and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area ... had been declared a commercial and industrial zone ... 11 On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day,
plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building and planning permits to proceed with the construction. 12 On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the lower court for decision. The complaint sought, among other things, the issuance of "a writ of preliminary injunction ... restraining and enjoining defendant, its agents, assigns, and those acting on its or their behalf from continuing or completing the construction of a commercial bank building in the premises ... involved, with the view to commanding the defendant to observe and comply with the building restrictions annotated in the defendant's transfer certificate of title." In deciding the said case, the trial court considered, as the fundamental issue, whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question. 13 The records do not show that a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27, supra. It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general interest and welfare. " In short, it upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendantappellee. 14 The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and void. 15 On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, 16 which motion was opposed by defendant-appellee on March 17, 1965. 17 It averred, among others, in the motion for reconsideration that defendant- appellee "was duty bound to comply with the conditions of the contract of sale in its favor, which conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Title issued in her (Emma Chavez) favor." It also invited the trial court's attention to its claim that the Municipal Council had (no)
power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant corporation." 18 The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965. 19 On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the complaint and from the order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal bond." 20 On April 14, the appeal was given due course 21 and the records of the case were elevated directly to this Court, since only questions of law are raised. 22 Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred I. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone, is valid because it did so in the exercise of its police power; and
II. When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it did not make a finding that the building was erected along the property line, when it should have been erected two meters away from said property line. 23
The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors. In this connection, We already had occasion to hold in Relativo v. Castro 24 that "(I)t is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies a purely defensive position, and is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error, " The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power; and (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendantappellee. 1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was never questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and are within the issues framed by the parties. 25 The object of requiring the parties to present all questions and issues to the lower court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable the lower court to pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal may determine
whether or not such ruling was erroneous. The requirement is in furtherance of justice in that the other party may not be taken by surprise. 26 The rule against the practice of blowing "hot and cold" by assuming one position in the trial court and another on appeal will, in the words of Elliot, prevent deception. 27 For it is well-settled that issues or defenses not raised 28 or properly litigated 29 or pleaded 30 in the Court below cannot be raised or entertained on appeal. In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below. when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated by the trial court was whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which declared lots Nos. 4 and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in question. 31 Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal. But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiffappellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," 32 empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; 33 for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... " An examination of Section 12 of the same law 34 which prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. 35 Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" 36 and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, 37 the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. 38 As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. 39 police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., 40 when We declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power. Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances, stressed this Court, speaking thru Justice Laurel in the leading case of Calalang v. Williams et al., 41 ThusAs was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 US 223, 238 49 L. ed. 169), 'the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good.' And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil. 440), it was observed that 'advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being with in such power yesterday. The development of civilization), the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. 42 (Emphasis, supplied.)
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state 43 and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. 44 The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the valid exercise of police power may also be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis 45 wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, resolved the conflict "between one welfare and another, between particular and general, thus
Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation What is critical or urgent changes with the times. 46
The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a " legitimate response to a felt public need," 47 not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it aptly when he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory." 48 Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General 49 that laws and reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the parties. Thus Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 50 through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that ... the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Reparations Commission, 51 written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice, restates the rule. One last observation. Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American jurisprudence and authorities 52 to bolster its theory that the municipal resolution in question cannot nullify or supersede the agreement of the parties embodied in the sales contract, as that, it claims, would impair the obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution. Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. 53 and Burgess, et al v. Magarian, et al., 55 two Of the cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e. that the municipal resolution supersedes/supervenes over the contractual undertaking between the parties. Dolan v. Brown, states that "Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the use of property by injunction where the property has so changed in character and environment as to make it unfit or unprofitable for use should the restriction be enforced, but will, in such a case, leave the complainant to whatever remedy he may have at law. 56 (Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the remedy of injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied on the specific holding that "A grantor may lawfully insert in his deed conditions or restrictions which are not against public policy and do not materially impair the beneficial enjoyment of the estate. 57 Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendants- appellees should be permitted, on the strength of the resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian et al. it was, held that "restrictive covenants running with the land are binding on all subsequent purchasers ... " However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended
"to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or other agreement between parties." 58 In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution. It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED. "without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees. Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners. The City Legal Officer for respondents-appeliees.
GANCAYCO, J.: At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below: ORDINANCE--640 ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET xxx xxx xxx Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that: SECTION 1It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets
intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets. SECTION 2Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or both such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court. If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager, Agent or Representative of such firm or corporation. SECTION 3This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval. Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. 1 Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July 14, 1969 by the court a quo enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing Ordinance No. 640. 3 On July 29, 1969, respondents filed their answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance. 4 On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 On June 4, 1973, the respondent court rendered its decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor of the respondents and against the petitioners, as follows: 1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid: Provided, however, that the fine for a single offense shall not exceed TWO HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep. Act No. 523; 2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and;
3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners. 4. SO ORDERED. 7 Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo which was denied in a resolution of the said court dated November 10, 1973. 9 Hence, this petition. Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states: Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: xxx xxx xxx (n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . . theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and all other performances and places of amusements ... xxx xxx xxx Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law, which provides: (nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act, and to fix the penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall not exceed a two hundred peso fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question which needs to be resolved is this: does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City? This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local government with the operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the prices of admission to these places. Previous decisions of this Court involved the power to impose license fees upon businesses of this nature as a corollary to the power of the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or theaters to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have been held to be invalid for these impositions were considered as not merely license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation which the cities have no power to exact, 10 unless expressly granted by its charter. 11 Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 12 where the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised. While in a New York case, 13 an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission tickets to public exhibitions or performances by virtue of the power of cities under the General City Law "to maintain order, enforce the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of said purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was considered not to be within the scope of any duty or power implied in the charter. It was held therein that the power of regulation of public exhibitions and places of amusement within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any authority to interfere with the price of admission to such places or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission. In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. 14 Thus, in People v. Chan, 15 an ordinance of the City of Manila
prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power. Still in another case, 16 the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting admission of two or more persons in moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety, and the general welfare. The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 17 The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. 18 Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge. In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 19 this Court held: The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power, Inasmuch as the same generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of persons, which are protected and even guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights the police power measure must be reasonable. In
other words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only and only to the extent--that may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640? A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the ordinance in question was passed shows that a certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken into account the complaints of parents that for them to pay the full price of admission for their children is too financially burdensome. The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out its raison d'etre in all probability the respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are entitled to share in the joys of their elders, but that considering that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and twelve cannot fully grasp the nuance of movies or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances, the admission prices with respect to them ought to be reduced. 19a We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. 20 The methods or means used to protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the legislative department. 21 We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. 22 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its
implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from the pernicious practice of movie operators and other public exhibitions promoters or the like of demanding equal price for their admission tickets along with the adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the interest of the City in the furtherance of the prosperity, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and the general well-being of its inhabitants. There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances. Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and necessary to lessen the economic burden of parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive nuisance being maintained by the petitioners. Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults. The supposition of the trial court that because of their age children cannot fully grasp the nuances of such entertainment as adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket price is justifiable. In fact, by the very claim of respondent that movies and the like are attractive nuisances, it is difficult to comprehend why the municipal board passed the subject ordinance. How can the municipal authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and children to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children? Perhaps, there is some ,truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the public good and the general welfare of
society for it encourages children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in school or be in their homes. Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these movie house and theater operators cannot be compelled to exhibit any particular kind of film except those films which may be dictated by public demand and those which are restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being able to share in the joys of their elders as envisioned by the trial court, there will be a dearth of wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy. There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States which upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar. A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. 23 Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. 24 So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of property. 25 In Collister vs. Hayman, 26 it was held: The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with a public interest, was without a franchise to accommodate the public, and they had the right to control it, the same as the proprietors of any other business, subject to such obligations as were placed upon them by statute. Unlike a carrier of passengers, for instance, with a franchise from the state, and hence under obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue the business year in and year out, the proprietors of a theater can
open and close their place at will, and no one can make a lawful complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They can preserve order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a part of the contract and condition of admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted, or that a woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of admission in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made, the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser impliedly promises to perform it. In Tyson and Bro. United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton, 27 the United States Supreme Court held: ... And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and quite as certainly, its activities are not such that their enjoyment can be regarded under any conditions from the point of view of an emergency. The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may be more nearly, and with better reason, assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for residence purposes; although in importance it fails below such an interest in the proportion that food and shelter are of more moment than amusement or instruction. As we have shown there is no legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or clothing, or the rental charges for houses and apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we are unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule in respect of amusements and entertainment ... We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of American courts. In this jurisdiction, legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods commodities and drugs during periods of emergency,28 limiting the net profits of public utility 29 as well as regulating rentals of residential apartments for a limited period, 30 as a matter of national
policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security and the general welfare of the people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In no sense could these businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. 31 People of all ages flock to movie houses, games and other public exhibitions for recreation and relaxation. The government realizing their importance has seen it fit to enact censorship laws to regulate the movie industry. 32 Their aesthetic entertainment and even educational values cannot be underestimated. Even police measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in order to safeguard public health and safety. Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. 33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. 36 Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. 37 The exercise of police
power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 38 Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989 JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,intervenors-petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 74376 August 30, 1989 BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA GONZALEZ,respondents. G.R. No. 76394 August 30, 1989 BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEAL and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents. G.R. No. 78182 August 30, 1989 BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents. G.R. No. 82281 August 30, 1989 BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. RESOLUTION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." 1 On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows: ...
This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a Brief for Ayala ...
2
... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and 3 corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary ...
...
The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted facts not put in issue, such as those summarily ignored in this case; the extraordinary efforts exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom, are 4 unparalleled in the history of this Court ...
...
... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel- Air Village, or rule that respondent Court's admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as Ayala's Counsel himself would like to do but did not even contend, is a 5 manifestation of this Court's unusual partiality to Ayala and puts to serious question its integrity on that account.
...
[i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is a blatant disregard of documented and incontrovertible and uncontroverted factual findings of the trial court fully supported by the records and the true significance of those facts which both the respondent court and this Court did not bother to read and consequently did not consider and discuss, least of all in the manner it did with respect to those in which it arrived at conclusions favorable 6 to Ayala. To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special membership in BAVA which clearly state that such membership is necessary because it is a new development in their relationship with respect to its intention to give its commercial lot buyers an equal right 7 to the use of Jupiter Street without giving any reason therefor, smacks of judicial arrogance ...
...
... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the current campaign of this Court against graft and 8 corruption in the judiciary be enhanced by such broad discretionary power of courts?
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an
inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general. As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the findings of the trial court (in which his clients prevailed). But if we did not agree with the findings of the court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior court.
lwph 1.t
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession." 9 We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of his clients. As we held in Laureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 10 And while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo. That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to ... challenge the thinking in the Decision, 11comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what is in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation. Certainly, it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask for reconsideration, but as we held in Laureta, litigants should not "'think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words' ". 12 As we indicated (see Decision denying the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding G.R. No. 60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants have raised no new arguments to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with inflammatory language. Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with grace criticisms of my decisions".13 Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court's rebuke.
In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows: CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Rule 11.01... Rule 11.02...
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. Rule 11.05... Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice. WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his record. IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 Mayor Pablo P. Magtajas & The City of Cagayan de Oro, Petitioners, Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. & Philippine Amusement and Gaming CORPORATION, Respondents

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G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 Mayor Pablo P. Magtajas & The City of Cagayan de Oro, Petitioners, Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. & Philippine Amusement and Gaming CORPORATION, Respondents

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G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

And in Vasquez, this Court said:

And in Vasquez, this Court said:

Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a quo:

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