PEOPLE v.

LACSON [May 28, 2002] Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA Facts: Soon after the announcement on May 18, 1995 that the Kuratong Baleleng gang had been slain in a shootout w/ the police, 2 witnesses surfaced providing the testimony that the said slaying was a rub-out. On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against 97 officers & personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. On Nov. 2, 1995, after 2 resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the SB 11 informations of murder against the defendant & 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman & in a re-investigation, the informations were amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of charges, the case was later transferred from the SB to the RTC not due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by RA 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of the prosecution recanted their statements while the 7 private complainants submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, & (3) dismiss the cases should the TC find lack of probable cause. The cases were dismissed. It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the DOJ new affidavits of new witnesses w/c it began to investigate & to file w/ the RTC. The respondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed w/ the CA a petition stating that 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Crim. Pro. bans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the CA denied. On June 6, 2001, 11 Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the RTC QC. The new Informations charged as principals 34 people, including respondent Lacson & his 25 other co-accused in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant filed for determination of probable cause & an outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be provisionally dismissed & the new cases as mere revivals. Under 8 2000 RCP 117, the cases were dismissed. Issue: WON 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the 11 informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. Held: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case should be dismissed. There is no question that the new rule can be given retroactive effect given RPC A22. There can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is need of proof to show the ff. facts: (1) provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused (2) whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party (3) whether the 2 year period to revive the case has already elapsed (4) whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 yr period. The respondent expressed consent, but the records dont reveal whether the notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive w/ regards to the 2-year bar, if w/in or without. Because of this, both prosecution & defendant must be given ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the adduced evidence.

PEOPLE, et al. v. LACSON [April 1, 2003] Facts: Before the court is the petitioners MFR of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of 8 RCP 117 on the dismissal of the cases Q-99-81679 & Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting & killing of 11 male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant. Issues:

1.

WON the requisites for the applicability of 8, 2000 RCP 117 were complied w/ in the Kuratong Baleleng cases a. Was express consent given by the respondent? b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims? Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal, 2) offended party notified, 3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally, 4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, w/c in this case hasnt been done. a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.

b. victims.

No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the

2.

WON time-bar in 8 RCP 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively. Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved & the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, & the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 yr & 3 months to work instead of 2 yrs. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The 2-yr period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State & the accused. It shouldnt be emasculated & reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state & adversely affect the administration of justice.

Held: Motion granted

PEOPLE v. LACSON [October 7, 2003] Facts: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial. Issues: 1. WON the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the MFR given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments. The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while 8 secures the rights of the accused, it doesnt & shouldnt preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application.

2.

WON the application of the time-bar under 8 RCP 117 be given a retroactive application w/o reservations, only & solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. The Court isnt mandated to apply rules retroactively just because its favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State & the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust & oppressive consequences to the State & to the victims of crimes & their heirs. U.S. v. AH CHONG [15 Phil. 488 (1910)]

Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, Who is there, but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door, & believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife & struck & fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Held: Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact. Ratio: Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intruder under A11, par. 1, of the RPC, which requires, to justify the act, that there be: unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, & lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no provocation at all. Under A11 of the RPC, there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well as in the act of the person making the defense.

PEOPLE v. BERONILLA [96 Phil. 566 (1955)]

Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Abra, convicting the accused of murder. Facts: Arsenio Borjal was mayor of La Paz Abra at the outbreak of war and continued to serve as mayor during the Japanese occupation. Dec 19, 1944 accused-appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col Arnold. Simultaneously, he received a memorandum issued by Arnold authorizing them to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage or aiding the enemy. He also received a list of all puppet government officials of Abra, with a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions placed Borjal under custody and asked residents of La Paz to file case against him. He also appointed a 12-man jury composed of Labuguen as chairman and others, plus Alverne and Balmaceda were prosecutors; Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Inovermo as counsel for the accused, later Atty. Barreras voluntarily appeared as counsel for Borjal. The jury found Borjal guilty on all counts and imposed death penalty. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to Headquarters of Infantry for review. Records were returned on April 18, 1945 with approval of Arnold. On the same day, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the execution to Arnold, the latter complementing Beronilla. Two years later, Mayor Beronillo and others involved in the Borjal case were indicted by CFI of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Borjal. Pres. Roxas issued E.P. no. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized, under RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. All the accused (except Labuguen who filed and granted amnesty by the AFP), filed their application to Second Guerilla Amnesty Commission, which denied their application on the ground that they were inspired by purely personal motives, thus remanding case to CFI for trial on merits. On July 10, 1950 Beronillo, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico were convicted as conspirator and co-principals of crime murder. They appealed. Issue: WON accused appellants are guilty of murder; and WON they should be granted amnesty. Held: The records are ample to show that Beronilla acted pursuant to the orders of the Infantry Headquarters. Although it was alleged by the state that there was a radiogram from certain Col. Volkmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, on the illegality of Borjal's execution, there are no sufficient evidence to show that it was known to Beronilla. Furthermore, the messages of Col. Arnold approving the decisions of Beronilla prove otherwise. The testimony of Rafael Balmaceda, relative of Borjal was also unreliable. The state claims that the appellants held grudges against late Borjal, but court said that the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that they were impelled by malice. In fact, prior to the execution, Beronilla sent the decision for review. The lower court also found that Borjal was really guilty of treasonable acts. The court held that the accused-appellants just acted upon the orders of superiors and criminal intent was not established. Even assuming the accused-appellant are guilty of murder, they should not be denied of the amnesty on the ground that the slaying took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control. The court held that any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the amnesty proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused. US v. TANEDO [15 Phil. 196 (1910)] Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Tarlac Facts: On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some workers to work on the dam on his land, carrying with him his shotgun & a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, the accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the victim, Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother & Uncle. The accused went into the forest upon the recommendation of the deceased to continue his search for the elusive wild chickens. Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, he heard a human cry out in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one, Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst the tall cogon grass, & later burying in an old well. Only 1 shot was heard that morning & a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime. There was no enmity between the accused and the deceased. Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The lower court found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the deceased into the forest & intentionally shooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos & 1 day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused appealed. Issue: WON the accused is guilty Held: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is negated by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired. Also, according to: Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.

Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.

In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, nor is it disputed that the accused was engaged in a legal act, nor is there evidence that the accused intended to kill the deceased. The only thing suspicious is his denial of the act and his concealment of the body. The court quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the state to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the state and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit." Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of conviction. Decision: Judgment of Conviction is reversed, the accused acquitted, and discharged from custody.

vda. da Bataclan v. Medina Facts: The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of MedinaTransportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. Onits way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal.Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, whilethere were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard inthe neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire wasdue to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in hername and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals forwardedthe case to the Supreme Court due to the amount involved. Issue: What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers? Held: We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial courtthat there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, thedriver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the factthat according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense,from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the busoverturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. Thechauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, itsmomentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canaland turned turtle.There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate causeis found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legalcause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chainof events, each having a close causal connection with its immediatepredecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as anatural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under suchcircumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as anordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect atthe moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do nothesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this forthe reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call forhelp, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and theconductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a ruralarea where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was morenatural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extendthe aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of theoverturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call foroutside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributedto the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According tothe witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back andforth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in theposition in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leakedfrom the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside fromthe fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt anddirected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor wouldappear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring thelighted torch too near the bus.