CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 1.

THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM. GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (237 SCRA 279) FACTS: In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Ba taan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Speci al Economic Zone (SSEZ) in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Devel opment Act of 1992. May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg . 10, Serye 1993. In the said petition, they set some conditions which they want to be compl ied with before they include their municipality with SSEZ. Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days af ter its submission, which prompted the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the L ocal Government Code of 1991 whereby they started to solicit the required number of signatures t o cause the repeal of said resolution. Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang B ayan Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denia l of the petition for a local initiative as it will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility. July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor , Atty. Benjaminn Casiano, to hold on the authentication of signatures being gathered by the petitioners ISSUE: Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong B ataan the proper subject of an initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can be ex ercised even what is questioned is only a resolution and not an ordinance?) HELD:

Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. RATIO: In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power: 1. ORIGINAL-possessed by the sovereign people 2. DERIVATIVE-delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is sub ordinate to the original power of the people. One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering th e power to make laws to the legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of people s initiative was thus installed which endows the people with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, i t approved RA no. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appr opriating ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Funds Therefor. Which spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum; procedure of the local initiative and referendum; and their limi tations. It was also intended for the acts to be included as appropriate subjects of local initiative s. LOCAL INITIATIVES-legal process whereby the registered voters of a local governm ent unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropri ate subjects of a local initiative. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an a ct as "an expression of will or purpose...it may denote something done...as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards and determinat ions." The law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art 1 that the power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to e nact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of l ocal initiatives to ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the l egal powers of the Sanggunians to enact. Resolution vs. Ordinance RESOLUTION-used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which to have only a temporary effect ORDINANCE-intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general. Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, a nd economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO (39 PHIL. 660) FACTS: The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It was alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of thei r liberty by the provincial officials of that province. The petitioners were said to be held on the reservat

ion established at Tigbao, Mindoro and one Dabalos is said to be under the custody of the provincial sherif f in the prison of Calapan for having run away from the reservation. In a resolution adopted by the provincial board of Mindoro it was stated that se veral attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindor o which were all a failure, and that unless other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of the prov ince, no successful result will be obtained toward educating those people, and that it is deemed nec essary to oblige them to live in one place, designated in Tigbao, in the interest of law and order .. It was also provided that any mangyan who shall refuse to comply with the order shall be imprisoned upon convi ction. The said resolution has been duly approved by the Secretary of Interior and subsequently, the provincial governor approved of the same pursuant to Administrative Order of 1917, enacted by the le gislature, ordering the non-Christians to take up their habitation on the site provided and their failur e to abide shall be a ground for imprisonment. Petitioner Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fix ed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable in accordance with Sec. 2759 of Act 2711. T he provincial governor and the provincial board directed the Manguianes in question to take up their ha bitation in Tigbao. Petitioner however, challenges the validity of the said Administrative Code. It shall be noted that that the substance of the law in question is not new to Philippine law. Antecedent laws m ake use of the term nonChristians with reference to uncivilized elements of the islands. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT The court made a long enumeration of antecedent laws before and after the acquis ition of the United States of the Philippine Islands. These laws denote an anxious regard for the we lfare of the non Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and settled and consistent practice with referenc e to the method to be followed for their advancement. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Whether or not Sec 2145 of Administrative Oreder of 1917 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the Petitioners were not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained o f their liberlty. More so, Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. RATIO: ***Constitutional Issues*** Delegation of Legislative Power. Petitioner contends that the order of the governor, directing the Maguianes to h abitate themselves in Tigabo, is an undue delegation of legislative power. The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power s hould be zealously protected. Judge Ranney in the case of Ohio stressed that: The true distinction t herefore is between the delegation of power to make the law which necessarily involveds a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and pursuance of the law. The first cannot be delegated; the latter no objection can be made. As held in W ayman vs. Southard, Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive department or off icial. In the case at hand, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board, and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law and such discretion is indeed necessary. Furthermore, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by i mmemorial practice, permits the central legislative to delegate powers to local authority. As offici als charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are b etter fitted to select sites which are favorable for improving the people who have misfortunes of being backw ard in the society. Religious Discrimination

The words non-Christian have a en used in the Philippines statute books as a descriptive ts dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces ivilization of the individuals included in the class to which

clear, definite and well settled signification wh adjective applied to tribes, people, or inhabitan throughout the islands. It denotes low grade of c they apply.

Liberty: Due Process of Law; Equal Protection Clause Liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avoca tion, an for that purpose to enter into contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carryin g out these purposes to a successful conclusion. Liberty as understood in democracies is liberty regulated by law. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint, d eprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such as assumed rights must yield to the reg ulation of law. The authority conferred upon executive officials by the law in question does not und uly interfere with the liberty of the citizen when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. Due process of law and equal protection clause are not violated by the law in qu estion. There exist a law ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT wich is reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; an d it applies to all members of the same class. Slavery and Involuntary Servitude Slavery and Involuntary Servitude denote a condition of enforced, compulsory ser vice of one to another. Confinement in the reservations in accordance with the said Administrative Code of 1917 does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. Police Power The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self preservation. The Philippines has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the pro motion of the general welfare and the public interest. Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Order of 1917 i s a pure exercise of police power and the court cannot declare that the Legislature has exceeded its rightfu l authority in enacting the said law. Legislative Intent The fundamental objective of government policy is to establish friendly relation s with the so-called nonChristians and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and econo mic development and advancement in civilization. In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerne d, the purposes of bthe Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals to begin the process of civilization. In so far as the relation of the Mang uianes to the Stae is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the execu tive branch in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of the g reat Island. PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL (15 SCRA 569) FACTS: September 4 to October 29, 1964: President of the Philippines issued EO Nos. 93121, 124 and 126-129 which created 33 municipalities. November 10, 1964: Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President of the Philippines, institute d a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against Auditor General, to restrain hi m from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any

disbursement by said municipalities ISSUE: EO Nos. 93-121, 124 and 126-129 are null and void upon the ground that said Sect ion 68 of the Revised Administrative Code has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and con stitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of publi c funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalitie s above referred to. It is so ordered. RATIO: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT January 1, 1960: RA No. 2370 was enacted. This act states that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by an Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the a reas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order defin e the boundary, or boundaries, separate or merge any province, name any new subdivision created and change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the publi c welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congre ss of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or sub province is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When act ion by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes nec essary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and adv ice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistric t the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so forme d. Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foreg oing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby aff ected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General an d approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines. The power to fix common boundaries may partake of an administrative nature since it involves the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating sa id municipalities. But the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of the law, it is essential that said law should be:

1. Complete in itself o must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate 2. Fix a standard o The limits of which are sufficiently determinate must conform in the performance of his functions. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enfor cement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to . if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, ther e would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the Presiden t to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Suc h grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executiv e, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the e xecutive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act i n lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT are concerned. Thus, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions ther eof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vest ed in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, Section 68 of the Revised Ad ministrative Code reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him mo re power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departmen ts, bureaus or offices. EASTER SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. POEA (166 SCRA 533) FACTS: Private respondent s husband, Vitaliano Saco, was the chief officer of M/V Eastern Polaris. He was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages with the P OEA under EO No. 1985 and Memorandum Circular No. 2. Thus, she was hereby awarded the sum of P192, 000. The owner of the vessel, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI), argued that the PO EA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband wasn t an overseas worker but a domestic employee and consequently, his widow s claim should have been filed with SSS, subject to ap peal to the Employees Compensation Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum circular issued by the POEA on which they based th eir decision in favor of private respondent, a valid delegation of legislative power? HELD: The petition is DISMISSED. RATIO: Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be deleg ated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforces, not what t he law shall be.

The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. Thi s prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. There are 2 accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegati on of legislative power. 1. COMPLETENESS TEST-the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegates the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 2. SUFFICIENT TEST-there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to m ap out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from r unning riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delagate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power es sentially legislative. The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the 3 major power s of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power beca use of the many ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT instances when its delegation is permitted. Thus the delegation of the legislati ve has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason for the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growi ng inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding it attention . The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated probl ems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Reasons for delegation of legislative powers are particularly applicable to admi nistrative bodies. Delegated power to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statur e is called power of subordinate legislation. With such power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid dow n in a statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or compe tence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementa ry regulations. These regulations have the force and effect of law. Thus, Memorandum Circular No . 2, issued by the POEA, is an exercise of administrative regulation wherein the POEA is mandat ed to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable employment practic es. It was also contended that ESLI has been denied due process because of POEA s Memo randum sustained and applied it as an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself . Administrative agencies are vested with 2 basic powers, 1. quasi-legislative-enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations 2. quasi-judicial-enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Such arrangement cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the ca rdinal rights in the ANG TIBAY vs CIR case are observed. Whatever doubts regarding the rights of the parties are resolved in favor of pri vate respondent under the principle that those with less in life should have more in law. ARANETA vs. GATMAITAN (101 SCRA 329) FACTS: On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that using a trawl in fishing c aused the

depletion of the marine resources of that area. There arose a general clamor amo ng the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San M iguel Bay. Dec 18, 1953: Municipal Mayor s League passed a resolution condemning the operatio n of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to pet ition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year. March 27, 1954: Municipal Mayor s League sent another resolution praying that the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation o f trawls therein. As a response, President issued the following: EXECUTIVE ORDER DATE PURPOSE EO no. 22 April 5, 1954 Prohibits the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay EO no. 66 (amended EO no. 22) September 23, 1954 Prohibits the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, EXCEPT during the typhoon season EO no. 80 (revived EO no. 22) November 2, 1954 (to take effect after Dec. 31, 1954) ISSUE: 1. Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, a cting in their capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a bo nd in an action ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT against them; 2. Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay; 3. Whether Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President. HELD: Declared EO Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, valid for having been issued by authority of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and Fisheries Act. RATIO: [Issue # 1] There are 2 requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue: 1. The existence of the right sought to be protected 2. Acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. The action being one against the petitioners as such Government officials, is es sentially one against the Government, and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government, for as regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines. [Issue # 2]: Agriculture and Natural Resources, an executive department and which by law, is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions su bject to the general supervision and control of the President. Executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters und er the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is express ly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department. Consequently, the promulgation of the questioned executive orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resou rces. Thus, SC declare that EO Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, of the President, a

re valid and issued by authority of law. [Issue # 3]: DELEGATION OF THE POWER TO LEGISLATE CONFERRING OF AUTHORITY OR DISCRETION AS THE EXECUTION OF THE LAW CONSISTS Involves a discretion as to what the law shall be The authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law Can t be done No valid objection can be made From the provisions of Act no. 4003 as amended by Commonwealth Act no. 471, Cong ress 1. Declared it unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines 2. It authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by t he regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be imposed on the us e of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish or fry eggs. 3. It authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside an d establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries ot be administere d in the manner to be prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any person to ta ke. Destroy or kill in any of the said places, or in any manner disturb or drive awa y or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs 4. Penalize the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in violation of this A ct (no. 4003) or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Act no. 4003 is complete in itself and provides sufficient standard to guide the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in implementation of the said law. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT When the President issued EO No. 80, he did nothing but show an anxious regard f or the welfare of the inhabitants of San Miguel Bay and dispose of issues of general co ncern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. SECTION 5. 1.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NOT MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY MEMBERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED BY LAW, WHO SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES, AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS, AND ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGRESSIVE RATIO, AND THOSE WHO, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL BE ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. 2.THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST. FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. 3. EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT SHALL COMPRISE, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, CONTIGUOUS, COMPACT, AND ADJACENT TERRITORY. EACH CITY WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, OR EACH PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE REPRESENTATIVE. 4. WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF EVERY CENSUS, THE CONGRESS SHALL MAKE A REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS BASED ON THE STANDARDS PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION. MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211) FACTS: 1. Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional. 2. GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and as sailing the statute as unconstitutional on the following grounds: a. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Artic le X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code. b. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. c. Section 52: i.

Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) violates the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census ii. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title iii. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution the population of Makati is 450,00 0 3. GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional o n the same grounds as aforestated. ISSUE: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional. HELD: Yes. Petitions dismissed. RATIO: a. D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government unit cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercis e powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the p roposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territor ial jurisdiction of a local government unit. Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati. b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a l aw are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality mus t be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest pos sible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the det ermination of the case itself. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run again, etc.) Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical issue. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, s uch as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Consti tution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for

an increase in Makati s legislative district. D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one sub ject rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should b e sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitutio n provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719) FACTS: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT COMELEC issued the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where it approv ed the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections. April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted from the Certified List of Political parties/ Sect oral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvasses, and that latter s nominees not be proclaimed April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a petition for Cancel lation of Regisration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resoluti on no. 3785 May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it ISSUES: 1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections 2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepres ented sectors and organizations 3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating O mnibus Resolution No. 3785. HELD: This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately co nduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participant s. RATIO: [for issue # 1] Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified f rom the partylist elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the members of the Hou se of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national , regional and

sectoral parties or organizations. Under sections 7 and 8 of Article XI(C) of the Constitution, political parties m ay be registered under the party-list system. During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian Monso d pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may be a regional party, a sectora l party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao. o Comm. Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place 3rd or 4th in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress and consequently, hav e a voice in the Assembly. RA 7941 provides us with the definitions of the following: o POLITICAL PARTY-an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platfo rm, principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the m ost immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports cer tain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. o SECTORAL PARTY-an organized group of citizens belong to identifiable sectors, su ch as those enumerated in Art. 6 Section 5(2) of the Constitution, which includes l abor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those added b y RA 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers an d ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT professionals. o SECTORAL ORGANIZATION-a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns o COALITION-an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral perties or organizations for election purpose. [for issue # 2] The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent wit h the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 79 41. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportio ned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the numbe r of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, an d those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered n ational, regional and sectoral parties or organizations (2) The party-list representatieves shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For 3 consecutive terms after the ratifica tion of this Constitution, of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be fill ed, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, exce pt the religious sector. Said provision on the party-list system is not self-executory and is thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves: . The key words in this policy are proportional representations , marginalized and underrepresented and lack of well-defined constituencies . PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Sec. 5 of the law. . The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Sec. 5. . The persons nominated by the party-list candidate organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations

and parties . LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCEY refers to the absence of traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territo rial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the marginalized and underrepresented . Role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list, Filipino-style . Intent is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more la w to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. . Thus the policy of the implementation of the law will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, to become members of the House of Representatives. . Sec 5 of RA 7941 demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors c an be represented under the party list system. The Party-list System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions . RA no. 7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marg inalized and underrepresented sectors of society ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT . It contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Sec. 6 of RA no. 7941 may participate in the elections. . The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marg inalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory principle. Its claim that even t he super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the paty-list syste m. . The OSG s position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. . While the mega-rich and overrepresented are numerically speaking, a tiny minorit y, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. . Allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the ma rginalize and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. . The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. . This Court, therefore cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prost ituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. [for issue # 3] What is needed under the present circumstances is a factual determination of whether respondents therein and all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Const itution and the law. The court deems it proper therefore to remand the case to the Comelec to determi ne after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations comply with the requirements of law. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719) FACTS: Motion for proclamation filed by various party-list participants. 4 unique parameters of the Philippine party system:

o 1st, the twenty percent allocation --the combined number of all party-list congr essmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Represen tatives, including those elected under the party-list. o 2nd, the two percent threshold --only those parties garnering a minimum of two p ercent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a sea t in the House of Representatives. chan robles virtual law library o 3rd, the three-seat limit --each qualified party, regardless of the number of vo tes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualify ing and two additional seats. o 4th, proportional representation --the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. June 26, 2001; the Court promulgated a decision requiring Comelec to commence he arings following the guidelines stated in the said decision. They are also directed by the court to start the hearing of those who look like they have garnered a certain number of votes to q ualify for a seat. Furthermore, they directed to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice. Finally, the May 9, 2001 resolution refraining comelec from declaring an y winner shall remain in force until after the comelec itself will have complied and reported i ts compliance. July 27, 2001; Comelec recommended certain parties have passed the 8 point guide line and certain parties disqualified. Aug 14, 2001; court issued a resolution partially lifting the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the party list election. Aug 24, 2001; court TRO to proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTI as ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, again issued a resolution partially lifting the may 9, 2001 winning party list groups. BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Jan 29, 2002; court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance Report. Thus, court lifted the may 9, 2001 TR O to proclaim apec and cibac as winners. To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approv ed the First Partial Compliance Report and its amendments, the following nominees were validl y proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBA YAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC (Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva). Comelec amended its Compliance Reports by adding 4 more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections. Nov 25, 2002; OSG contended that NCIA is not a qualified party under the july 27 , 2001 report. ISSUE: Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions of t his Court, are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners? Does the clause "total votes cast for the partylist system" include only those ballots cast for qualified party-list candidates ? DECISION: Having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes cast in the last p arty-list elections, the following qualified participants are declared elected with one nominee each: BUH AY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. RATIO: Comelec made a mistake in disqualifying COCOFED and BUHAY. COCOFED and BUHAY are qualified. Comelec report on BUHAY was merely anchored on conjectures or specula tions. On COCOFED, the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an a utomatic member of the COCOFED National Board has already been deleted as early as May, 1 988. The primary purposes of COCOFED's Articles of Incorporation authorize the organizati on to help explore and obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry deve lopment from private or governmental sources, this statement does not by itself constitute su

ch substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assiste d by the government. The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted i n determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during the May 14, 2 001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualif ied party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained a s compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide. The votes for these disqualified groups t otal 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14 , 2001 party-list elections. This new figure representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified part y-list participants will now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the num ber of seats the winners are entitled to. To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. The Commission r ecommended for qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants that were approved in our January 29, 2002 Resolution , plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED). The court found that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two p ercent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast. SECTION 6. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT NO PERSON SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND, ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, IS AT LEAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE, ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND, EXCEPT THE PARTYLIS T REPRESENTATIVES, A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND A RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC [G.R. 119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN] FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1st district of Leyte. Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1st dist rict of Leyte, filed a petition for Petitioner s disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the C onstitutional requirement for residency. Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed years and seven months . ____

Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amende d/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry seven months to since childhood . This w as not accepted for it was filed out of time. It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2nd Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with the resolution: 1. Finding the private respondent s Petition for Disqualification meritorious 2. striking off petitioner s Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 1995 3. Canceling her original Cert. of Candidacy Even the MR to COMELEC was denied. Petitioner s o It should be o She moved to cos who was then he followed her o reasons for the change: noted that she was born and raised in Leyte. Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Mar the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, s husband throughout his political career.

Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace. o After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to h er ancestral home as it was sequestered by the PCGG, forcing her to live in differe nt residences. Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purpo ses. Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections. HELD: 1. Qualification on 1 yr residency No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile. In the case Ong vs. Republic, the Court s concept of domicile is to mean an indivi dual s permanent home . She has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got mar ried. When ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT she got married, the husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of law but regained such domicile when her husband died. It was furthe r decided that when her husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was n o interruption. Furthermore, on basis of another opinion, upon the death of her husband, she had the freedom to choose her domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained res idences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile 2. bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue. 2. Qualification on 1 yr residency The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Elec toral Tribunal and not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Repre sentatives in accordance with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is g enerally construed to be merely directory, so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the jud gment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indic ated it. Mandatory vs. Directory provision o Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general pub lic by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law o Statute is construed to be merely directory when the statutory provisions which m ay be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory pr oceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essent ial to

effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. AQUINO VS. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) FACTS: Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Represe ntative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he stated his residency period as 0 years and 10 months) Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to disqualify Aquin o for lacking residence qualification. COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration. On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910 votes. COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thu s disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the remaining legible candidates. ISSUE: WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position WON Declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional HELD: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT NO to both issues. RATIO: Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing for at least one year before the elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not evident of a strong intention to establish a domicile. Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winn er because the choice of the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the peop le. DOMINO VS. COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS (310 SCRA 546) FACTS: Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of May 6, 1998 of the Second Division of the COMELEC, declaring petitioner Juan Domino dis qualified as candidate for representative of Sarangani in May 11, 1998 elections and the Deci sion of May 29, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO s motion for reconsideration. On March 25, 1998, Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Sarangani, indicating that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one year and two months immediately preceding the election. On March 30, private responde nts Narcisio Raglifo Jr, Eddie Java, JuanBayonito Jr, Rosario Samson and Dionisio Lim filed with the COMELEC petition to deny due course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that Domino is not a resident much less a registered voter of Sarangani. They had substantiated evidences which inc lude: the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent wherein he claims he have resided in the constituency wh ere he seeks election for one year and 2 months and that he is a registered voter of Sarangani; Voter s Registration Record dated June 22, 1997 indication registration in Balara, QC. Respondent s Community Tax Certificate dated Jan 15, 1997. Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congres sman in the 3rd district if QC where he stated his residence in the constituency where he seeks to be electe d immediately preceding the election as 3 years, 5 months an d that he is a registered voter i n Balara QC; a copy of the application for transfer of registration records due to change of residence and copy of the sworn

application for cancellation of voter s previous registration. For his defense, Domino maintained that he had compled with the one year residen ce requirement and that he has even residing in Sarangani since Jan1997 he showed a copy of the con tract lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and respondent as Lessee executed in January 15, 1997, copy if the application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence, CTC of the notice of approval of Application. On May 6, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution declaring D omino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one year residence requirement a likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy He negates all his protestations that he established residence in SAranganias early as Jan 1997. He lacks one year residence requirement. On May 11, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution 3046 ordering that the cast votes for Domino be counted but to suspend proclamation of winning since the resolutio n disqualifying him has not yet become final and executor. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT On September 15,1998 Lucille Chionbian-Solon, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes was allowed by the Court to intervene. Intervenor asks the court to uphold Domino s disqualification and to proclaim her as the representative of Sarangani. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the judgment of MTC of QC declaring the petitioner as resident of Sarangani, not QC is final 2) Whether or not petitioner resided in Sarangani, one year preceding the electi ons 3) Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition DECISION: the petition is DISMISSED RATIO: The COMELEC has the jurisdiction to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy that will include the residence of the cand idate. A decision in an exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters, even if final and unappe alable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. The MTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared Domin o a resident of Sarangani. The term residence as used in law means the same thing as domicile which imports not only intention to reside but also personal presence in the place. Three rules must be born in mind ,1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; 2) when once established, it remains until ne w one is acquired; 3)a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. Domicile requires not just bodily presence but also a declared probable intent t o make it one s fixed abode. The lease contract entered in Jan 1997 does not support a change of domic ile. Domino s lack of intention to abandon his residence in QC is further that he was a qualified cand idate strengthened by his act of registering as voter in QC. Domino still falls short of one year residenc y requirement. The COMELECunder Sec 78 Art 9 of the Omnibus Election Code has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy and continues even after electi on, if for any reason no final judgment or disqualification is rendered before the election and the candi date facing the disqualification received the highest number of votes.

It is now settled that the candidate who received the second highest number of v otes MAY NOT BE PROCLAIMED WINNER in case the WINNER IS DISQUALIFIED. Thus the votes cast for DO MINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief. DOMINO V. COMELEC (310 SCRA 546) FACTS: This is a special civil action in the Supreme Court where a petition for certior ari is filed. Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pang asinan in the May 1998 elections, and won over the petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac o n April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he enlisted in the U S Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegian ce to the US. On March 17, ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippines Citizenship through repatriatio n. After losing in the May 1998 elections, petitioner Bengson III filed a case of Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was n ot qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI Sec. 6 of the Constitution, which reads: No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natura l-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declarin g respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. Hence, this pe tition for certiorari. Petitioner Bengson III argue that HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, (1) when it ruled that the private responde nt is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact the fact that he has ceased being such in vi ew of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part; (2) when it considered the private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship; (3) when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legall y and constitutionally restore his natural-born status. He also asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be c onsidered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to th e US and had to reacquire the same by repatriation, based from Article IV Sec. 2 of the Constitution, whic h expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to pe rform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American c itizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizens hip. HELD:

YES. Petition is dismissed. RATIO: There are 2 ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalizati on, which results to the 2 kinds of citizens the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A perso n, who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. O n the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have been Filipino citizens through naturalization where an applicant has to prove that he possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provide d by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship become executory only after 2 years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to the a lawful calling or profession ; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed an y act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Filipinos who lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same (1) by natur alization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; ( 2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WW II; (3) service in the armed forces of the US at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipina woman to an alien, and (5) political and economic necessi ty. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the takin g of an oath of allegiance to ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Reg istry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. In the case at bar, respondent Cruz, is deemed to have recovered hi s original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as a son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen s ince he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET i n decision, the term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III Sec. 4 of the 1973 Constitut ion where there are two categories of Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born: (1) those w ho were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the a ge of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. However, in the present Constitution, those born of Fili pino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Arti cle IV adds a sentence: those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3, Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Consequently, under the present constitution, there are t wo classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with the law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e. did not have to undergo the process of naturali zation to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. As respondent Cruz was not re quired by law to go through the naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perf orce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member o f the House of Representatives. CODILLA V. DE VENECIA (150605, 393 SCRA 639) FACTS: These are petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the House of Repres entatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Petitioners, Sixto Balinguit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong Jr. vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 1987 congressional election. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected represent ative of the said

district. Petitioners filed election protests. Petitioners contend his qualifica tion as a member of the House of Representatives on the basis of Article VI Sec. 6 of the present Constitution . The HRET declared that the respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was h owever, denied. Hence, these petitions for certiorari. On the issue of jurisdiction The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Trib unal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualification s of the respective members, as stated in Article VI Sec. 17. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Trib unal is full, clear, and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdictio n of these tribunals. It has been argued that under Article VI Sec. 17 of the present Constitution, the situa tion may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Ele ctoral Tribunals. On the issue of citizenship The grandfather of private respondent, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from Ch ina in 1895 and was able to obtain a certificate of residence from then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te brought the private respondent s father, Jose Ong Chuan, to Samar from China. The respondent s father, J ose Ong Chuan filed with Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization, a nd the same court declared him to be a Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong was then 9 years old. The house of the respondent in Samar was burnt twice and they rebuilt it twice in the same district twice. Ong, after completing his elementary ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT education in Samar, went to Manila to acquire his secondary and college educatio n. He took and passed the CPA Board Examinations and since employment opportunities were better in Man ila, Ong found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his full brother, Emil Ong, was elected as a d elegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention where his status as a natural-born citizen was challen ged. Emil was declared a natural born Filipino. Respondent Ong s situation is argued to rest on Article IV Sec. 1(3) of the 1987 C onstitution which provides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the majority are citizens of the Philippines. Section 2 of the same article also reads in its last sentence: Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens . There is no dispute that the respondent s mo ther was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Thus, the contention lies on whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. The aforementioned provision was enac ted to correct the anomalous situation where, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution, they were both con sidered as natural-born citizens with legislative intent to correct an unfair position which discriminat es against Filipino women. The petitioners also argue that the respondent s father was not validly, a natural ized citizen because of his premature taking of oath of citizenship. On the issue of residency The petitioners argue that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoa ng, Samar, he cannot, therefore be a resident of the said place. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision on the grounds that (1) respondent Ong is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and (2) respond ent Ong is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. HELD: NO. Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision of the HRET is affirmed. Resp

ondent Ong is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Sam ar. RATIO: On the issue of jurisdiction In the exercise of Article VIII Sec. 1 of the present Constitution, the Court is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to the lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRE T to decide. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative membe rs of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same manifest grave abuse of d iscretion. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on th e part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Cou rt. On the issue of citizenship In relation to Article IV Sections 1 and 2, to expect the respondent to have for mally or in writing elected ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his fa ther had been naturalized. According to jurisprudence that defines election , the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of electio n of Philippine citizenship. The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has e stablished his life here in the Philippines. There is no doubt in this case about respondent Ong s being Filip ino when he turned 21. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral appr oach. This cannot be done. An attack on person s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to the respondent s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process, as he has already been laid to rest and that he ha s no opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of his father is relevant only to det ermine whether or not the respondent chose to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father of the respondent were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elect ed any other citizenship. The same issue on natural-born citizenship has already been decided in the case of the full blood brother of the respondent Ong, which is another reason why the Court cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. On the issue of residency The petitioners argument on this issue is misplaced. It is not required that a p erson should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. The legislative intent is to a dhere to the earlier definition of the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile . ile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one i ntends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithst anding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. It is characterized by animus revertendi and tha t in the case at bar, the periodical journeys made by the respondent to his home province, while studying and later on practicing his profession in Manila, reveal that he always had the animus revertendi. In co

Domic

nsidering the residence of a person, It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented ho use or that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citize nship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate shou ld also own property in order to be qualified. SECTION 7. THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FOR A TERM OF THREE YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION. NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. DIMAPATRO VS. MITRA JR.(202 SCRA 779) FACTS: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimapatro was elected Representative for the Second Legis lative District of ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Lanao del Sur in 1987 and thereafter took his oath of office, performed the duti es and enjoyed the rights and privileges of being an elected Representative. On January 15, 1990, petition er filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Regional Governor o f ARMM. COMELEC informed the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps (respondents) of Dimapatro s filing. The respondents excluded the name of Dimapatro from the Roll of Members of the H ouse of Reps pursuant to Sec. 67, Article 9 of the Omnibus Election Code. He was then exclude d from all the proceedings of the House of Reps; was not paid the emoluments due his office; hi s staff was dismissed and disbanded; his office suite was occupied by another. Petitioner lost in the ARMM elections. He wrote a letter to respondent Speaker a nd expressed that he intends to resume performing his duties and functions as elected Member of Congr ess. He failed to regain his seat in Congress. Thus, petitioner filed this petition praying that t he decision of the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps be reviewed. ISSUES: 1.) Whether Section 67, Article 9, of BP Blg. 881 is operative under the present Constitution? 2.) Whether the respondent Speaker and/or Secretary CAN exclude the petitioner f rom the rolls of the House of Reps, thereby preventing him from exercising his functions as congr essman, and depriving him of his rights and privileges as such? HELD: 1.) Yes. Sec. 67, Art. 9 of BP Blg 881 is still operative under the present Constitu tion, as the voluntary act of resignation fall within the term voluntary renunciation of office enunciated in Par. 2, Sec 7, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Its constitutional basis remains written in the 1987 Constitution that once an elective official files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term as expressed in Se c 7, Article 6 of the Constitution. Thus, even when the provisions concerning the shortening of th e terms of congressmen were omitted in the 1987 Constitution, the said issue is still cover ed by Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. 2.)

Petitoner s filing of COC is an act of resignation and he is presumed to be aware of the existing laws. The Speaker and/or Secretary of HR are/is authorized to exclude the petiti oner from the Roll of Members since they are the administrative heads who perform ministerial functions including the removal of the petitioner s name. The mere act of filing the COC for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being p resently held and it is not necessary that the other position be actually held since the said fili ng is an act of voluntary resignation. SECTION 10. THE SALARIES OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW. NO INCREASE IN SAID COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE FULL TERM OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROVING SUCH INCREASE. SECTION 11. A SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT MORE THAN SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT, BE PRIVILEGED FROM ARREST WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. NO ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MEMBER SHALL BE QUESTIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR IN ANY COMMITTEE THEREOF. ANTONINO VS. VALENCIA (57 SCRA 70) The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action-that is actions tha t are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress. FACTS: Gaudencio Antonino then a Senator and Liberal Party head of Davao attributed the loss of LP candidate to the support given by defendant Brigido Valencia then Secretary of Public Work s and Communications to the independent LP candidate which divided the LP votes. Antonino was quoted in metropolitan newspapers when he said that had not Valencia sabotaged and double-crossed the LP, i ts official candidate would have won. On 28 Feb 1964, Antonino while attending a Senate session filed a formal request with a Senate Committee to investigate the actions of Valencia as Sec. of Public Works and Com munications in connection with acquisitions of public works supplies and equipments. Copy of th e formal request was furnished to the Commission on Appointments with the request that they be consid ered in passing upon Valencia appointment to the Cabinet. Two-page press release was issued by the office of the Sec of Pub Works and Com and the contents were published or reported on the front pages of 6 metropolitan newspapers. The press release depicted Antonino as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as mo netary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices A ct. Antonino then filed the present civil action against Valencia. Valencia filed a counterclaim and claims that he did not issue or cause the publ ication of the press release and that they were made in good faith and in self defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character. Lower court ruled against Valencia holding that he caused and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press release and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of qua lified privilege and defensive libel.

Valencia appealed to SC. During the course of the appeal, Antonino died in a pla ne crash. Sen. Magnolia Antonino as adminastrix substituted her husband as plaintiff-appelle. ISSUE: Whether or not the press release is libelous? Whether or not the press release i s protected as a qualified privilege communication? HELD: Press release is libelous. Statements released were defamatory and libelous in n ature where malice in law is presumed because they were against the honor, integrity and reputation o f plaintiff. Defendant Valencia made his imputations against the plaintiff publicly and unofficially as to be qualifiedly privileged. The malice in the act of the defendant was proven when the Court observed that h ad the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty and not because of malice, the charges should have b een filed with the Senate or any of its Committees and not publicized widely by all metropolitan ne wspapers. DefendantALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT appellant s claim of defensive libel is likewise rejected because his argument tha t he had been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the former justified to hit back with another libe l is based upon a wrong premise. Plaintiff Antonino s act was not libelous because the letter he sent was a privileged communication because the defendant was charged by the plaintiff in his capacity as a Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same were filed privately and officially to the Senate and Commission on Appointments. Judgment affirmed. JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 87) The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action-that is actions tha t are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress. FACTS: Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter to the President o f the Philippines, and caused this to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The co ntents of the letter were mainly to inform the president of the so-called three operational plans under se rious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians. It also describes these plans a s an insidious plan or a massive political build-up of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means that has already been mopped out to ensure the success of these operational plans. The le tter also suggested that the planners already have in their control several officers of the AFP, inc luded are the petitioners. It was mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as already in con trol of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no k nowledge. An ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by petitioners against respo ndent for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter. The trial court dismissed this complaint. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the letter was privileged communication? 2.) Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous? HELD: No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution provides for a ny member of Congress not to be questioned for any speech or debate therein, in the halls of Congress

or elsewhere, this publication doesn t fall into this category. The said expression refers to utteran ces made by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in session. In the case a quo, the letter was made while Congress was presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasn t performing his offici al duty either as a member of Congress or any officer of any committee. No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may be unwilling tool s of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in a way exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiff s in the said plans if ever they have any part in the same. This is not derogatory to the petitioners to ent itle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational plans were already clearly sugge sted. PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689) FACTS: The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He wa s confined in the ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT National Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confi nement was depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress? HELD: No. Election to high government offices doesn t free the accused from the common r estraints of general law. The constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is p rivileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Secti on 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charg ed with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a f ree man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress con tinues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the position isn t reasonable classification in crim inal law enforcement. Instant motion is denied. SECTION 14. NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AS COUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT OF JUSTICE OR BEFORE THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, OR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. NEITHER SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BE INTERESTED FINANCIALLY IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION, OR ITS SUBSIDIARY, DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE. HE SHALL NOT INTERVENE IN ANY MATTER BEFORE ANY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR HIS PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE. PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31)

FACTS: On May 14, 1979, an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industr ies Corporation was held. Petitioner Puyat was among those elected. On May 25, 1979, the other group of di rectors, led by Acero, instituted a proceeding questioning the said electioj on the ground that the vot es were not properly counted. Thereafter, Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of Interim Bata sang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for Acero to which Puyat objected due to Const itutional Gorunds which provides that: SEC 11. ART VIII No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel .

ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly, or indirectly be interested financially in any contr act with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Govenrment, or any subdivision, agency, or inst rumentality thereof, including any government-owned or conrolled corporation during his term of offic e. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called on account of his office. Assemblyman Esatnislao Fernandez did not continue his appearance as counsel but instead filed a Motion for Intervaention. SEC granted the motion on account that Fernandez had 1 0 shares on the corporation. Thereafter, the Court en banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining SEC from allowing the participation as intervenor of Assemblyman Fernandez. Solicitor Gen eral supported the allowing of the intervention. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, may intervene in the SEC Case without viol ating the Constitution. HELD: The Order granting Fernandez to intervene in SEC Case is reversed and set aside. RATIO: Fernandez acquired a mere 10 shares out of 262, 843 shares. He acquired said sha res after the institution of the contested election, after the suit has been filed and a day b efore he filed a motion to intervene. Realizing that the objection of petitioner Puyat as valid, Fernadez d ecided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those fact s and circumstances, the Court found that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before and adm inistrative body and it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention was an af terthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding th e intervention would make the Constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need to do, if he w ants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the interest of the client and then intervene in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done in indirection which is

intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. In brie f, the Court held that the intervention of Assemblyman in SEC case falls within the ambit of the prohibitio n contained in Section 11. Art. VIII of the Constitution. SECTION 16. 1. THE SENATE SHALL ELECT ITS PRESIDENT AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ITS SPEAKER, BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY. 2. A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO DAY AND MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ABSENT MEMBERS IN SUCH MANNER, AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUCH HOUSE MAY PROVIDE. 3. EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR, AND, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER. A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED, SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS. 4. EACH HOUSE SHALL KEEP A JOURNAL OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, AND FROM TIME TO TIME ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT PUBLISH THE SAME, EXCEPTING SUCH PARTS AS MAY, IN ITS JUDGMENT, AFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY; AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ON ANY QUESTION SHALL, AT THE REQUEST OF ONEFIFT H OF THE MEMBERS PRESENT, BE ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL. EACH HOUSE SHALL ALSO KEEP A RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS. 5. NEITHER HOUSE DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER, ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAN THAT IN WHICH THE TWO HOUSES SHALL BE SITTING. AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17) FACTS: Petition of quo warranto. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare hi m the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano Jesus Cuenco. Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges against the then senate president Avelino. On the d ay that Tanada was supposed to speak on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not imme diately open the session, and read slowly the resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada. When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelino s follower, opposed the motion because of the plan of Avelino s group to delay the s ession to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly cond uct broke out in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelino s follower, moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to prevent Tanada s privilege speech. Sanidad o pposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the ga vel, abandoned the chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senator Francisco, Tor res, Magalona, Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was designated to chair the session. Tanada wa s finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Sanidad s resolution no. 68 was read and approved . Tanada yielded the chair to senate president pro-tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduc ed resolution no. 67 entitled Resolution declaring vacant the position of the president of the senate and designating the honourable Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate. R esolution no. 67 was approved. ISSUES: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were resolu tions nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

DECISION: Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. RATIO: The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its own president. The selection of the presidi ng officer affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, cha nge, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only acceptable if the majorit y of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presid ed by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of the minority senators does n ot prevent the remaining majority senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endors ement. OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863) FACTS: In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investig ate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months. ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutional HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed RATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity i n his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legis lator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it do es NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are di sorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. The question of whether Osmena s speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because no preliminary injunction was issued, the special committee performed its task, rep orted to the house and the latter approved the suspension order. UNITED STATES VS. PONS (34 PHIL. 725) FACTS:

Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were convicted of the crime of ill egal importation of opium. It was alleged in the information that the accused, conspiring together, plottin g among themselves did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and fraudulently, bring from a fo reign country and import and introduce in the City of Manila 520 tin cans containing 125 kgs of opium. Each w ere found guilty of the charged. The accused appealed, but Beliso withdrew his appeal and the judgment h as been final to him. On appeal, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1941 was on February 28; that the Act 2381, under which Pons mus t be punished was not passed or approved on the 28th but on March 1 of that year; that the same is nul l and void. ISSUE: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Whether or not the accused may be convicted under Act 2381. Whether the adjournment of the legislature be proved by legislative journals or by extraneous evidences. DECISION: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. RATIO: Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. Under Rules 1 5 and 16 of Legislative Procedure of Philippine Commission the proceedings of the Commission shall be bri efly and accurately stated in the journal. Furthermore, on page 793 of the Commission Journal, it is stated that: The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914 was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the Philippines. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Philippine Legislature adjourned sine die. The Courts of the Philippines are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is, and to enable them to determine whether the legal requisites as to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals. When t he legislative journal show with certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguo us respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a differ ent date of adjournment. In the instant case, the journal says that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midni ght on February 28, 1914. This settles the question and the court did not err in declining to go behind th e journals. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268) FACTS: Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senat e which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral confe

rence committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on No vember 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on W ays and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. R ep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll c all, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he wa s going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never di d. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1 996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996: MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference co mmittee report. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker? THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved. (Gavel) MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know w hat is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for app roval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion. MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute. (It was 3:01 p.m.) (3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed. MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o clock, Wednesday, next wee k. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o clock, Wednes day, next week. On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representat ives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Cong ress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petit ioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceed ing of the House. HELD: It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutio nal requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the

latter declared Rep. Albano s motion approved. But what happened is that, after Re p. Arroyo s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo A lbano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called o ut for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair a nd Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects mea ns a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a law in accordance with the law. Th e Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore , no violation of the Constitution was shown. In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a m ember who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Supreme Court . The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown. CASCO PHILIPPINES CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (7 SCRA 347) FACTS: There was enacted a Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchan ge Act. The Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95 fixing the a uniform margin fee o f 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner, Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc, engaged in the man ufacture of synthetic resin glues bought imported urea and formaldehyde which are main raw materials i n the production of its products and has paid the margin fee. Thereafter, petitioner sought to refund th e said margin fee pursuant to to Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board which declared that urea and for maldehyde is exempt from said sale. The Central Bank issued the corresponding vouchers for the refun d but failed to give the money on the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not with in the purview of the said RA. The pertinent provisions of the Republic Act provide: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of secti on one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importatio n of the following: XXX

XVII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when import ed byand for the exclusive use of end-users. Petitioner contends that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. It shall be noted that the National Institute of Science and Technology has express ed that urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is a finished product distinct and d ifferent from urea and formaldehyde ISSUE: Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the a foresaid margin fee. HELD: Denied the petition. RATIO: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the meas ure passed by the Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the pri nting of a bill before it was certified by the officers of the Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. The importation of ur ea and formaldehyde is not exempt from payment of margin fees being distinct and different from urea formal dehyde as provided in the law. SECTION 17. THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL EACH HAVE AN ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL WHICH SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NINE MEMBERS, THREE OF WHOM SHALL BE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE, AND THE REMAINING SIX SHALL BE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO SHALL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE SENIOR JUSTICE IN THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE ITS CHAIRMAN. SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC (153 SCRA 67) FACTS: Augusto Sanchez prayed that COMELEC after due hearing, be directed by the Court to conduct a recount of votes cast three months ago in the May 11, 1987 senatorial elections to deter mine the true number of votes to be credited to him and prayed further for the restraining order directi ng Comelec to withhold the proclamation of the last four winning candidates on the ground that votes intend ed for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his surname with a disqualified candi date named Gil Sanchez whose name had not been crossed out from the Comelec election returns an d other election forms. He further alleged that he filed an urgent Petition to Recount and/or Re-a ppreciate Ballots with the Comelec. The Court sustained Comelec s position that it be allowed to complete the canvass of the returns of the senatorial elections estimated to be at 240,000 votes which would then be subjec t to its resolution of Sanchez pending petition. Restraining order was not issued by the court. Santanina Rasul also a senatorial candidate filed her motion for intervention an d opposition to Sanchez petition for recount before Comelec. Rasul and Enrile (ranked 23rd and 24th resp ectively) prayed in their petition with Comelec that they be proclaimed immediately as duly-elected senato rs. Comelec deferred action on the two petitions. Motions for intervention were granted filed separat ely by Rasul and Enrile were granted days after. Sanchez petition for recount was dismissed by the COmelec. Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by intervenors Rasul and Enrile. Rasul was proclaimed as 23rd

senator. Enrile therafter filed with the Supreme Court his petition. Comelec announced its decision reversing its decision to dismiss Sanchez for recount. Enrile filed his second petition. ISSUE:

petition

Whether or not the petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered a summary proclamation controversy falling within the Comelec s exclusi ve jurisdiction or properly pertains to the realm of election protest failing within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to thee election, r eturns, and qualifications of the members. (Art. 6, Sec 17, Constitution) HELD: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Court rules that Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the ballo ts cast in the senatorial elections does not present a proper issue for a summary pre=proclamation controv ersy. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raise d in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegations of Sanchez votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor sta tute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof once satisfied of their authenticity. Sanchez petition for recount is set aside. ROBLES VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (181 SCRA 780) FACTS: Robles and Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st Dis trict of Caloocan City in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Robles was proclaimed the winner on De cember 23, 1987. Santos filed an election protest with the HRET, alleging frauds and irregulariti es in the counting of votes and canvassing of election returns. The HRET issued an order commencing the revi sion of contested ballots on September 1, 1988. On September 8, Robles filed a Motion to Suspend the revision of ballots. Santos followed with a Motion to Withdraw Protest on September 12. Upon the filing of Santos s motion, the revis ion of ballots was stopped. Beyond that, no action on the two motions was taken by the HRET when Sa ntos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Protest on September 14. In effect, Santos, who h ad backed out from the revision of the ballots, was now pushing again for its revision. On September 19, the HRET granted Santos Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Pr otest and the revision of ballots was resumed. Robles filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari with a prayer for injunction of the revision proceedings was brought to the Supreme Court. ARGUMENTS: Petitioner contended that when private respondent Santos filed his Motion to Wit hdraw protest dated September 12, public respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case. Hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the revision on September 19 despite the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without

jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not HRET lost jurisdiction over the case upon Santos s filing of a Moti on to Withdraw Protest (September 12) 2. Whether or not the resumption of revision of ballots despite the filing of a Mot ion to Withdraw Protest constituted grave abuse of discretion by HRET HELD: 1. NO. HRET retains jurisdiction over the case. 2. NO. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion. REASONS: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT The mere filing of the Motion to Withdraw Protest, without any action on the par t of the Tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Mot ion is granted. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunals sh all be the sole judge ofall contests relating to the election, returns and quali fications of the members of the legislativebody. The use of the word sole emphasize s the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It has been intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legi slature. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pe rtaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot b e corrected by certiorari. Judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the HRET is possible only u pon a determination that the tribunal s decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdi ction, or upon showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, that there has t o be a remedy for such abuse. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceiv ed entitlement to the office. The Electoral Tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/manda te to a public office may be fully resolved vis--vis the popular will. The resumption of the revision of th e ballots did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion as it was intended to resolve beyond doubt who the peo ple have rightfully chosen as their representatives. ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651) FACTS: Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal sha ll be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remainin g six shall be Members of the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be. On October 9, 1987, Petitio ners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressi onal elections. The respondent tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supre me Court and six (6) senators.

On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for D isqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of th e above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqu alification, in effect, would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for certiorari. ARGUMENTS: Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play an d due process require the mass disqualification. Further, necessity dictates that an amendment of the Trib unal s Rules of procedure permitting the contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable and unconstitutionally unobjectable solution. ISSUE: Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3) Justices o f the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution HELD: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution. REASONS: Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitut ion, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of all contests relat ing to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the SET is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the le gislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial el ection contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the t ribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot l awfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of senators. The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility o f an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations. Li tigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may recuse himself from participating in the resolution of a case w here he sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its entire membership of Senators or Justices. LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391) FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative o f the first district of Pampanga in the May 11, 1987 elections. During the canvassing of the votes, resp ondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC. On Ma y 19, The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed the winner.

Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b) prevent pe titioner from taking office. However, the COMELEC did not act on the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assume d office. On September 15, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set a side the revocation on January 25, 1988. On January 28, Respondent received a copy of the Court s decision and consequently filed an election protest with the HRET on February 8. ARGUMENTS: In moving to dismiss private respondent s protest on the ground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code: A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa. ..shall be filed...within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the electi on. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until February 6 to file a protest. Since the protest was filed on February 8, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it. However, the HRET argued that petitioner was able to file the protest on time, c iting Sec. 9 of the HRET rules: Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed.. .within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclama tion has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed w ithin fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation. Using the above rule, the HRET argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was filed on February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and thus , had jurisdiction over the matter. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest 2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of decisions/fina l resolutions of the HRET HELD: 1. YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the peri od prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. 2. NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Court s extraordinary jurisdicti on. REASONS: Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar: Und er the 1973 Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to petitions file d before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congre ss. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elec tion, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective Electoral Tribunals .

Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunal s Power: The power of the HRET, as t he sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as c omplete and unimpairedas if it had remained originally in the legislature. Its r ule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its co nstitutional function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral protests. A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the m embers of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935 Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legisl ature and specially created for that singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral conte sts was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of election for al l elective national and local officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the resp ective Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives. Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET: So long as the Const itution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisd iction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective power extends only to decisions and resolu tions constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals. BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792) FACTS: Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Ermigidio B ondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the congressional elections held on May 11, 19 87. Pineda was the proclaimed winner, but Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representative s Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members, 3 of whom are Justice s of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are members of the House of Representatives cho sen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties and party list. A decision ha s been reached by the HRET where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the LDP members in the tribunal insisted o n a reappreciation of votes and recount of ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four months. The reexamination resulted in increase of Bondoc s lead over Pineda from 23 to 107 vot es. It shall be noted that Congressman Camasura, a member LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices t o proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No . 25 declaring Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco informed Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party on the ground of betrayal to the cause and objectiv

es, and loyalty to LDP. Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the said Congressmen and their decision to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a Resolution canceling the previous decision on the ground that without t he vote of Congressman Camasura, who was relieved from the Tribunal, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Sec. 24 of the Rules of Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly p romulgated. A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Bondoc seeking the following reliefs: 1.) to annul the decision of HRET to withdraw the nomination of Camasura to the HRET.; 2.) issue a writ of prohibition restraining whoever may be designated in place o f Camasura from assuming, ossupying, and discharging functions as a member of the HRET,; 3.) writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to return and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET; In his answer, Pineda asserts that the Congress being the sole authority that no minates and elects the members of the HRET; hence, it has the power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in representation of the political parties materially changed. ISSUE: Whether of not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant part y, change the party s representation in the House Representatives Electoral Tribunal to thwart the pro mulgation of a decision freely reached by the said tribunal in an election contest pending therein. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT DECISION: SC ruled in favor of Bondoc. RATIO: (Read Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution) The tribunal was created to function as a non partisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Tribunal was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislat ive office, devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to that tribunal all powers in matter pertaining t o contested election of its members. The Tribunal is a body separate from and independent from the legislatu re. Resolution of House of Representatives violates the independence of HRET. The Resolution of House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from th e HRET for disloyalty to LDP, because he cast a vote in favor of Nacionalista party, is a c lear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election cont est between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference would reduce the HRET as a mere tool for t he advance ment of a party in power. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HR ET As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from politic al party to which they belong. In expelling Camasura from HRET for that ground, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Such resolution i s therefore null and void. Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as judges, are entitled to security of tenure, just as memb ers of judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec 2.,Art VIII, 1987 Constitution). Membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for just cause, such as, expiration of the members c ongressional term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from political party which he r epresents, formal affiliation with anither political party, removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof that he has formally affilia

ted with another political group. The records shows that Camasura has not formally affiliated with another political group; thus, his termination from HRET was not for valid cause, hence, it violated his right to s ecurity of tenure. CHAVEZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (211 SCRA 315) FACTS: Petition for review of the decision of the Commission on Elections. May 5, 1992; court issued a resolution in GR no. 104704 entitled Francisco Chave z v. Comelec, et al. Disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for the office of senator. Fran cisco Chavez filed a motion with comelec to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qual ified candidates and count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor Chavez in favour of Franci sco Chavez. May 8, 1992; comelec issued a resolution to remove the name of Melchor Chavez in the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez vo tes to Francisco Chavez. Comelec also failed to cancel the name of Melchor Chavez in the list of qualified ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT candidates. Confusion arose as the Chavez votes were either declared stray or in validated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEI). May 12, 1992; comelec issued a resolution to credit all the Chavez votes in favo ur of Francisco Chavez. Francisco Chavez was not satisfied of the resolution because he maintain s that it did not reach all the precincts. June 4, 1992; court issued a TRO enjoining comelec from proclaiming the 24th win ning senatorial candidate. TRO was subsequently lifted. ISSUE: Did COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion due to its inaction in deleting M elchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates? Was there cause of action on the part of the p etitioner? Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? DECISION: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. RATIO: The alleged inaction of COMELEC in ordering the deletion of the name of Melchor Chavez does not call for the exercise of the courts function of judicial review. The court c an review the decisions or orders of the comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion co mmited by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exerci se of its administrative functions. The failure of comelec to implement its own resolution is administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference. Art. 6, Sec. 17 of the constitution provides that the senate and the house of rep resentatives shall each have an electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests re lating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. x x x The word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the tribunals jurisdiction over election contests. In this case, the senate electoral tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over the case and not the c ourt. Petitioner has no cause of action. The controversy presented being one in the na ture of preproclamation. Pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for president, vice-president,

senator, and member of the house of representatives according to sec. 15 of repu blic act 7166. Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as any question pertaining to or affectin g the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or b y any registered political pary or coalition of political paries before the board or d irectly with the commission in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and a ppreciation of the election returns. (sec. 241, omnibus election code) ARROYO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (246 SCRA 384) FACTS: Petition for review of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Trib unal. Congressional Candidate private respondent Augusto Syjuco filed an election prot est before public respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) 5 days after the M akati Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner Joker Arroyo the duly elected Congressman for M akati in May 11 19992 elections. Essentially premised on alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes and massive fraud, private respondent Syjuco sought the revision and recou nting of ballots cast in 1292 out of total 1714 precincts of Makati from which result he aimed to be decl ared as the duly elected congressman of Makati. Petitioner filed a counter-protest, questioning the resid ence qualification of ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT private respondent but the case was dismissed by public respondent HRET. Revisions of the ballots was undertaken but not without serious irregularities h aving been unearthed in the course thereof. Tasked by public respondent HRET to investigate on the matte r, former SC Justice Emilio Ganvcayo confirmed the irregularities and that Arroyo was the classic vic tim of the unlawful exercise. At or about time the revision was completed and the three precincts le ft unaccounted for, private respondent Syjuco moved for the withdrawal of these remaining unrevised proteste d precincts on the ground that he has presumably overtaken Arroyo s lead of 13559 votes. Reception of evidence followed: Private respondent s evidence were all documentary and voluminous at that consisti ng of over 200,000 pages which are mere photocopies of the original. On the other hand, petitioner s evidence consisted of certified true copies of the Revision Reports and election turns. Despite the pe titioner s objection about the probative value of the respondent s exhibit, HRET admitted the evidence for wh atever worth they may have. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective memoranda simultaneousl y. Private respondent now called upon public respondent HRET to decide the case on the basis of what p rivate respondent admits as a truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process -their precinct-level docu ment-based evidences. By reason of the private respondent s allegations, public respondent HR ET ordered him to cause why his protest should not be dismissed. By a 6-3 vote, public respondent HRET resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the examination and evaluation of the evid ence on record, and thereafter to decide and case on the merits. The Resolution was issued on Feb 15 1994. In their dissenting opinion, the 3 justices had to say that the protestant s radical shift has no legal precedent; the instant protest shall be decided in accordance with the tradition process of rec ounting and revision of ballots as provided by the Rules of the Tribunal and by any innovative and non-t raditional process denominated as precinct-level document-based evidence alleged in protestant s memo randum. Nonetheless, protestant was candid enough to admit in his memorandum that to ove rcome a substantial margin of well over 12, 000 votes the revision of ballots alone would not suffic e and to keep his protest alive has to devise the broader non-traditional determination of the existence o f precinct-level-documentbased anomalies even is the same is unauthorized by law. Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were conduc

ted thereafter. The judgements were declared annulling the proclamation of Arroyo, declaring Syjuco as the duly elected representative in view of the massive fraud, irregularities and violation of ele ction laws in conformity with the mandate of COMELEC. to prosecute cases of violation of election laws, includi ng acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices. (par (6) Sec 2 Article9 -c 1987 Constitution) Without filing a motion for reconsideration of pubic respondent HRET s decision, p etitioner Arroyo filed the instant petition setting the ff issues: ISSUES: Whether or not: Public respondent acted with grave abuse discretion and without jurisdiction whe n it refused to dismiss HRET Case after Syjuco belatedly changed the theory of his cases and introduced new issues The HRET s decision dated Jan25 1995 was rendered in violation of the petitioner s r ight Public respondent acted capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion when it rejected long-standing legal doctrines on elections and annulment; disregard the people s right to suffra ge; ignored the basic rules of evidence; gravely or deliberately misapprehended the facts. DECISION: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT The petition was GRANTED and public respondent HRET s majority decision was set as ide. Syjuco guilty of indirect contempt is fined the amount P1000 to be paid within 5 days from the receipt of the decision. RATIO: However guised or justified by private respondent , this innovative theory intro duced for the first time broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he originally sought-the mere revision of ballots. Private respondent intended to completely abandon the process and results of the revision and sought to rely on precinct-level document-based evidence . This is clearly substantial amendm ent of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules After the expi ration of the period for filing of the protest; counter-protest or petition for quo warranto, substantial amendments which broaden the scope of the action or introduce an additional cause of action shall not be allowed. The least that HRET could have done thereafter was to conduct further hearing so that Arroyo may have examined, objected to and adduced evidence controverting private respondent Syju co s precinct-level document-based evidence: despite the time within which the parties are allowed t o present their evidence as already lapsed. Petitioner s right to due process was clearly violated. In an election protest, the protestant, or counter-protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statu tory period for the filing of protest or counter protest. Syjuco is bound by Arroyo s victory over him by 13092 votes. He cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on-appeal. Mere photocopied documents as evidence violate the best evidence rule. Certain v ital election documents were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority decision which as the Tribunal readily admitted, were never offered in evidence by either of the parties. The majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal w/o the participation of the 3 Justices declared that 10484 of the contested signatures are fake. This violates Rule 68 of Tribunal s own rules which requires that all questi ons be submitted to the Tribunal as a body but also in Rule 5 which further requires the presence of at least (1) justice member to constitute a valid quorum. Annulment of election results is done only in extreme cases of fraud. As a guide , Election Tribunal itself

has laid down 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns. 1) m ore than 50% of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involves2) the votes must be s hown to be affected by fraud, irregularities and anomalies. HRET annulled 50,000 votes w/o a dint of co mpliance with these requisites. It also disregarded election results on several precincts on the bas is of omissions committed either through mere oversight ot plain negligence on the part of election offici als or employees. The bulk of omissions consisted of lack or absence of the signature of the Chairman of th e Board of Election Inspectors and SC found that these omissions, administrative in nature, cannot b e used a ground to nullify results. This maked private respondent argument that the petition should be dismissed for failure to first fielm a motion for reconsideration untenable. The concerted action of the Tribunal to disregard the rules of evidence makes the recourse for reconsideration nugatory . it is well-s ettled that a prior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with is as in the case petitioner s fundamental r ight to due process was violated. Rules and uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure truth and exactnes s in elections as in anything else. Thus with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before the public respondent HRET and its majority decision in the election protest field by private respondent, p etitioner s proclamation as the winning congressman deemed not to have been challenges at all. And finally, in a Resolution dated March 14, 1995, the Court required Syjuco to explain why he should not be held f or indirect contempt since his Addendum which he prepared appear to undermine treh integrity of some Court members: there may also be linkages between protestee Arroyo and Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, a bout whom unkind ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT rumors are rife that Her Honor is gumagapang in the Supreme Court, for Arroyo. in h is explanation, private respondent averred that he merely expressed a simple citizen s grievance i n accordance to his observations and based on his firm convictions and that his statements were not aimed to undermined the integrity of some Members of the Court. Want of intention is no excuse for language use for it s taken in the ordinary m eaning attached to them by impartial observers. Finding respondent statement s guilty of indirect contempt. GUERRERO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (336 SCRA 458) FACTS: Special civil action. Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. May 8, 1998; Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy with the comelec, substi tuting candidate Chevylle Farinas. May 11, 1998; Farinas was proclaimed winner as a member of the house of representatives. May 16; 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration stating that Farinas canno t validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas because he is an independent candidate and Chevylle Farinas is from Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino. June 3, 1998; Farinas took his oath of office as a me mber of the house of representatives. June 10, 1998; petitioner Guerrero filed his petition-in-interv ention in comelec asking that the position of representative of the first district of ilocos norte be declared vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Farinas. Jan 6, 1999; comelec dismi ssed Ruiz s motion and Guerrro s petition-in-intervention. ISSUE: Did the comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determinati on of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive j urisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the house of representatives? DECISION: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. RATIO: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the comelec when it declare d that it ceased jurisdiction over the case when Farinas assumed office. While the comelec is ves ted with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise tha t power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the j

urisdictional boundaries separating the comelec and the electoral tribunal of the house of representative s. Under, article 6, sec. 17 of the constitution, the electoral tribunal of the house of representatives has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualification of member s of the house of representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, a nd assumed office as a member of the house of representatives, comelec s jurisdiction ceases and the juri sdiction of the electoral tribunal of the house of representatives begins. GARCIA VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL FACTS: Special civil action. Petition for certiorari. Harry Angping was proclaimed as duly elected representative for the 3rd district of manila. Petitioners, all registered voters in the district, contested this on the grounds that he was not a natural-born citizen of the ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Philippines. They asked that Angping be declared ineligible. Upon filing the pet ition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000 filing fee. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRE T) issued a resolution dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay P5,000 cash deposit required by its rues. Upon receiving the said notice, petitioners paid the P5,000 cash deposit and attached the receipt to the motion for reconsideration they filed with the HRET. Their petition was denied by the H RET on the grounds of rule 32 of the 1998 HRET rules which required a P5,000 cash deposit in addition to the filing fees for quo warranto cases. ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? Did HRET commit grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners and refusing t o reinstate the same een after the payment of the required P5,000 cash deposit? DECISION: Decision set aside. RATIO: The court may inquire into the issue of HRET by virtue of Art. 8, Sec. 1 of the constitution which has expanded judicial power to include the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. According to rule 32 of the 1998 rules of the HRET, if the cash deposit is below P75,000 payment shall be made within 10 days after the filing of the protest. Petitioners filed their pet ition with a 28 day delay. In dismissing the petition, the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and certainly wit hin its jurisdiction. The attack of ineligibility is a serious charge. The observance of the HRET rules of procedure must be taken seriously if they are to attain their objective. The litigants are expected to p roperly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal without being formerly ordered to do so. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its rules strictly in dismissing th e petition for quo warranto. SANDOVAL II VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (338 SCRA 770) FACTS: Special Civil Action. Petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone congressio nal district of MalabonNavotas during the May 14, 2001 elections. Sandoval won by a margin of 19,200 vo tes. May 22, 2001; he was proclaimed by the district board of canvassers of Malabon-Navotas. After tak ing his oarth of office, he assumed the post at noon of June 30, 2001.June 1, 2001; Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against Sandoval. June 7, 2001; HRET process server Lim served the summons by su bstituted service upon a certain Gene maga who signed the process server s copy of the summons. July 12, 2001; HRET issued a resolution which took note of Sandoval s failure to file an answer to the election protest within 10 days from date of service of the summons. Aug 6, 2001; Sandoval move for reconsi deration for the admission of his answer with counter-protest because Gene Maga who received the summon was neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at his office. HRET denied the petiti on. ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? Was substituted servic e of summons validly effected on Sandoval II in the election protest filed by Aurora Oreta before the HRET? ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT DECISION: Petition granted. Resolutions of HRET are modified to effect that the answer wit h counter-protest of Sandoval be admitted to form part of the record. RATIO: Court has jurisdiction by virtue of Art. 8, Sec. 1 of the constitution which exp ands the judicial power of the court to include the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abus e of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality o f the government. It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be ser ved by handing a copy thereof to him in person. If efforts to find him personally would make prompt se rvice impossible, service may be completed by substituted service. Under section 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure, substituted service can be done by leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by leav ing the copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. There is absolutely nothing in the process server s affidavit of service indicating the impossibility of perso nal service of summons upon Sandoval within a reasonable time. Furthermore, Sandoval was a very visible and active member of congress which would only take the process server a little extra work to locate Sandoval. The element of a summon being served on a competent person in charge of petitioners office is m issing. Gene Maga was a maintenance man who offered his services not only to Sandoval but to anyone wh o was so minded to hire his assistance. Thus, not being an employee thereof, he would be an incompe tent person to receive the summons in petitioner s behalf. Furthermore, Maga was not in charge of petitio ner s office. Maga had obviously no control and management of the district office as noticeably shown b y his occupation as maintenance man. It is unmistakable that the process server hastily served the s ummons upon petitioner Sandoval by substituted service without first attempting to personally serve the process. In light of the defective and irregular substituted service of summons, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and consequently the period within wh ich to file his answer with counter-protest did not start to run. PIMENTEL, JR. VS HRET (393 SCRA 227)

FACTS: In the May 1998 elections, 14 representatives from 13 party-lists are entitled t o occupy seats in the House of Representatives. Subsequently, the House nominated contingents for the House of Representatives E lectoral Tribunal (HRET) and Commission on Appointments (CA) however, no party-list representative is nominated for the said constitutional bodies. Sen. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to the Senate requesting the rest ructure of HRET and CA. No response from the Senate. Pimentel files petition for h this court. He contends that under the Constitution tives are entitled at least seat in HRET and 2 seats in ISSUE: WON the exclusion of party-list representatives in the HRET and CA is unconstitu tional HELD: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA mandamus, prohibition and preliminary injunction wit and the Party-List System Act, party list representa 1 the CA.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT No. Petition dismissed RATIO: Sec 17 & 18 Art VI of the Constitution provides that in the composition of HRET (6 members of the House) and CA (12 members of the House) there must be a proportional representat ion from the political parties and the party-list. Since according to the Party-List System Act, the pa rty-list representatives must constitute 20% of the seats in the House, party-list representatives must have 1 and 2 seats for HRET and CA respectively. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court rules tha t it cannot interfere with the exercise by the house of this constitutionally mandated duty unless there is an abuse in discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Party-lists are not unlawfully depr ived of the opportunity to be nominated in the HRET or CA. Party-list has no locus standi. Furthermore, HRET a nd CA have no constitutional powers to reconstitute themselves. SECTION 18. THERE SHALL BE A COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONSISTING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AS EX OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, TWELVE SENATORS, AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTED BY EACH HOUSE ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION SHALL NOT VOTE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE. THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT ON ALL APPOINTMENTS SUBMITTED TO IT WITHIN THIRTY SESSION DAYS OF THE CONGRESS FROM THEIR SUBMISSION. THE COMMISSION SHALL RULE BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS. DAZA V. SINGSON (180 SCRA 496) FACTS: From the May 1987 elections, Raul Daza was chosen as one of the members of the C ommission on Appointments (CA) as a representative of the Liberal Party (LP). In September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives (HR). 24 members of the LP shifted t o LDP resulting to the swelling of the latter with 159 members and leaving only 17 members with the for mer. HR revised its representation in the CA withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza an d giving this to the newly formed LDP in the person of Luis Singson. The petitioner challenges this reappointment and the court issued a TRO for Daza

and Singson from serving in the CA. ISSUE: WON the reappointment of members of the CA is constitutional HELD: Yes. Petition Dismissed ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT RATIO: Sec 18 Art VI of the constitution provides that there shall be a Commission on A ppointments consisting of, among others, 12 members of the HR elected by the House on the basis of prop ortional representation. Since there was a shift in the number of members of the LP to ma intain proportional representation the House reconstituted CA and awarded LDP the seats. The petitioner argues that LDP is not a stable and permanent party so it is not entitled for seats in the CA. Court held that when COMELEC granted the registration of LDP as a registered pol itical party, LDP is qualified to have seats in the CA maintaining proportional representation. GUINGONA, JR. V. GONZALES (214 SCRA 789) FACTS: In the May 1992 elections, senate composed of the following members with their r espective political affiliations and their respective number of proportional representatives in the Commission on Appointments (CA). Political Party Membership Proportional Representatives in CA LDP 15 7.5 NPC 5 2.5 LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 LP-PDP-LABAN 1 0.5 Sen. Tolentino proposed that for the 12 available seats in the CA, 8 seats be gi ven to LDP, 2 for NPC, 1 for LAKAS-NUCD and 1 for LP. It was approved. Sen. Guingona, Jr. files a petition to prohibit the Senate President Gonzales to recognize Sen. Romulo (LDP) and Sen. Tanada (LP) as members of the CA. ISSUE: WON appointment of Romulo and Tanada were constitutional HELD: No. Appointments of Romulo and Tanada are null and void. RATIO: Sec 18 Art VI of the Constitution provides that 12 senators are to be appointed in the CA by proportional representation however, it was not expressly stated that the 12 seats must be fi lled in order for CA to function. CA can function even if only 10 senators are elected as long as the qu orum exists. The election of Romulo and Tanada violates the proportional representation clause of Sec 18 A

rt VI since 0.5 of a representative do not count as 1. SECTION 21. THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR ANY OF ITS RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES MAY CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT RIGHTS OF PERSONS APPEARING IN, OR AFFECTED BY, SUCH INQUIRIES SHALL BE RESPECTED. ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO (87 SCRA 29) FACTS: Buenavista Estate Original San Juan de Dios Hospital owner: Philippine Gov t has the option to purchase this property for Php3,000,000 within this period if the Philippine Gov t will not purchase this property, it will be disposed in co urt on June 21, Jan 1, 1939 to 1944 Jan 1, 1964 But if Philippine Gov t will opt to purchase the said property, they'll pay the ow ner the sum of Php3,000,000 San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the property to Ernest Burt for Php 5,000,000 who made a down payment of Php 10,000 and agreed to pay Php 500,000 within one year and the June 29, 1946 remainder in annual installments of Php 500,000 each Failure to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down paym ent of Php 10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind the sale to him. Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Buenavis ta Estate for Php 4,500,000. Php 1,000,000 was paid to Burt through his attorney-in-fact i n the Latter part of Philippines, the Assoc. Estates Inc. represented by Jean L. Arnault for BUENAVIS TA October, 1949 ESTATE Tambobong Estate

Original Philippine Trust Company owner: Philippine Trust Company sold this to Burt for Php 1,200,000, who paid Php 10,00 0 and May 14, 1946 promised to pay Php 90,000 within 9 months and the balance of Php 1 ,100,000 in 10 successive annual installments of Php 110,000 each 9 month period expired without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount t hen or Feb. 14, 1947 afterwards Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the estate to RURAL PROGR ESS Sept. 4, 1947 ADMINISTRATION by an absolute dead of sale in consideration of the sum of Php 75 0,000 Rural Progress Administration made a notarial demand upon Bert for the resolutio n and February 5, 1948 cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Tr ust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of Php 90,000 within the period of 9 months CFI of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt s certificate of title and the issua nce of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration. the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Tamb obong Latter part of Estate for the sum of Php 500,000, which was all paid to Burt thr ough his other attorney-inOctober, 1949 fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault for the TAMBOBONG ESTATE. October 29, 1949: 2 checks payable to Burt aggregating Php 1,500,000 were delive red to Arnault. o That same day, Arnault opened a new account in Burt s name with the Philippine National Bank where he deposited the two checks aggregating Php 1,500,000 ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT o On the same occasion, he drew on the same account 2 checks . One check for Php 500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc. . Another check for Php440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the Senate to determine the ultimate recipient of the sum o f Php440,000 o Feb 27, 1950, Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8 to investigate the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estate Deals. o A special committee was created by the said resolution to work on the investigat ion Arnault refused/ don t want to mention who was the ultimate recipient of the sum o f Php440,000 because o His answer might be used against him. Also, he said that it is his constitutiona l right to refuse to incriminate himself. According to him, such question violates his righ t as a citizen to have privacy in his dealings with other people. o I don t remember the name; he was a representative of Burt I am not sure; I don t remember the name . Without securing a receipt, he turned over the Php440, 000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt s verbal instruction made in 1946; that, as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do with the negation s for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the money on Oct. 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again 2 or 3 items. The last time being in Dec, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39-40 years old, bet. 5 2-5 6. Senate deliberated and hereby committed the petitioner to the custody of the Ser geant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the Php 440,0 00. ISSUES: 1. The Senate has no power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal th e name of the person to whom he gave the Php 440,000, because such information is immaterial t

o, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the quest ion has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. 2. Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period o f legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950 3. Petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. HELD: The petition must be denied. RATIO: [for issue #1] Subject of the inquiry was the questionable expenditure of the Government of Php 5,000,000 of public funs. Thus, it s been decided that it s within the jurisdiction of the Senate . Power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has ju risdiction to institute the inquiry/ investigation Once an inquiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative bo dy to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any que stion pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Also, once the jurisdiction is conceded, the SC cannot control the exercise of t hat jurisdiction or the use of Congressional discretion Inquiry should be within the jurisdiction, material/ necessary for the exercise of a power ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT vested by the Congress and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the i nquiry The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry The ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the information sought from the witness is presumed to be correct. The investigation had not been completed, because due to the contumacy of the wi tness, his committee had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous trans action as required by Resolution no. 8 The bills recommended by this committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation. Those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it ne cessary to pass after the investigation is finished This atmosphere of suspicion must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appr opriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000 and answer the questions which will de finitely establish the identity of that person [for issue #2] Court finds no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative body to punish f or contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. Exercising the power to punish for contempt is enables the legislative bod y to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committee charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting heari ng relative to any proposed legislation. To deny such committees the power of inquiry with proc ess to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function. There is no limit as to time to the Senate s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruct ion by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty unt il he shall have answered them. o This power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. Also, it s an absurd, unnecessary and vexatious procedure if we are to hold that t he power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate w ould have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the cont empt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed. [for issue # 3] The ground upon which the witness ry to afford him safety. claim is based is too shaky, infirm, and slippe

His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the na me he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. It s also unbeliev able that he gave Php440,000 to a person unknown to him Since according to the witness himself, the transaction was legal, and that he g ave the Php440, 000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter s verbal instruction , court can t find a basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person mig ht incriminate him. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to test ify and is punishable as contempt assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable . ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT It is the witness s clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere and truthful te stimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen s obligation; consistent of course with is right under the Constitution. BENGZON V. DRILON (235 SCRA 630) FACTS: RA 910 was amended by RA 1797 which provides for the adjustment of salaries or r etired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. RA 3595 amended RA 1568 provided for identic al benefits as RA 1797 provided for members of the Constitutional Commission. Retirement benefits to Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Justices. PD 578 was enacted by President Marcos which extended similar benefits to the members of the AFP. Two months later, PD 644 was issued by President Marcos repealing Section 3-A of RA 1797 and RA 3595. Under PD 1638, President Marcos restored the readjustment of the retiremen t benefits of enlisted men and officers. A later decree, PD 1909 was also issued providing for the read justment of the pensions of members of the AFP who are retired prior to Sept. 10, 1979. adjustment for re tirement benefits was not restored for retired Justices of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. Congress ap proved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of RA 1797 and RA 3595 which Presiden t Aquino vetoed. Believing that Congress Act was trying to circumvent her veto back in 1990, the President vetoed some of sections she believed would bring back RA 1797. ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential veto of items in the GA Act providing for adjust ed retirement benefits for members of the judiciary is constitutional? HELD: No, not known to President Aquino, PD 644 never became law because it was not pu blished prior to its promulgation in accordance to the ruling in Tanada v. Tuvera. Therefore, it foll ows that RA 1797 continues to be in effect not having been repealed by PD 644. In vetoing the sai d sections Pres. Aquino is in effect vetoing RA 1797 which was passed 35 years prior to that date. Also, the invalidity of PD 644 was ruled upon with finality by the Supreme Court

and a veto of the said items in the GA Act is tantamount to a reversal of that decision. Clearly, the P resident has no power to do both. For it to do so would be to give it legislative powers to repeal laws as w ell as allow it to diminish the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary by dictating how its money should be spent in s pite of its powers of augmentation. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is n ot absolute. The power to disapprove any item in the GA Act does not grant the authority to veto a part of the item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. Petition granted. The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitution al. NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF DUMAGUETE (155 SCRA 421) FACTS: ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT NORECO II is an electric cooperative having its principal place of business in D umaguete. Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete conducted an investigation in connection with pending leg islation related to the operations of public utilities in the City of Dumaguete. The inquiry was to focu s on the alleged installation and use by NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city. Petitioners were r equired to attend and testify at the investigation which they failed to do. Petitioners were being held liable for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear in the said investigation. A subpoena and the Order c omplained of were signed by Respondent Antonio Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on Public Utiliti es and Franchises and Co-Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee. The petitioners moved to quash t he subpoena alleging that Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete has no power to investigate the alleged inefficient power lines. ISSUES: Whether or not the Congress has the power to punish non-members for contempt. Whether or not the subpoena is validly issued. HELD: There is no constitutional grant to Congress to punish non-members for contempt. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit l ike the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legisl ative power. However, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Vocal Government Code granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Therefore, the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete is devoid of pow er to punish the petitioners for contempt. Since the respondent Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete and respondent Ad Hoc Co mmittee are without power to punish non-members for contempt, the subpoena issued compelling the petitioners to attend and testify in the investigation was declared null and void for being ult ra vires SECTION 25. 1. THE CONGRESS MAY NOT INCREASE THE APPROPRIATIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE BUDGET. THE FORM, CONTENT, AND MANNER OF PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL BE PRESCRIBED

BY LAW. 2. NO PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE EMBRACED IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL UNLESS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO SOME PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN. ANY SUCH PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION TO WHICH IT RELATES. 3. THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS SHALL STRICTLY FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE FOR APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES. 4. A SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED, AND SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE AS CERTIFIED BY THE NATIONAL TREASURER, OR TO BE RAISED BY A CORRESPONDING REVENUE PROPOSAL THEREIN. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 5. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED AUTHORIZING ANY TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATIONS; HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE HEADS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS MAY, BY LAW, BE AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT ANY ITEM IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER ITEMS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROPRIATIONS. 6. DISCRETIONARY FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS SHALL BE DISBURSED ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES TO BE SUPPORTED BY APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND SUBJECT TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW. 7. IF, BY THE END OF ANY FISCAL YEAR, THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE FAILED TO PASS THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR THE ENSUING FISCAL YEAR, THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THE PRECEDING FISCAL YEAR SHALL BE DEEMED RE-ENACTED AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IS PASSED BY THE CONGRESS. GARCIA VS. MATA (85 SCRA 208) FACTS: Eusebio Garcia is a reserve officer on active duty of the Armed Forces of the Ph ilippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain. On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 day s of accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; On July 11, 1956, t he date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Petitioner s reversion to inact ive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reve rsion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings; From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has neither rece ived any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Govern ment in any capacity; As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the neces sary petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the Pr esident, respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General. Th e petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to compe l the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Phil ippines to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readj ust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to i nactive status basing his

allegations on Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is constitutional. HELD: Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines pr ovides: After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve office r of the Armed Forces of ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years d uring any period of five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the Phil ippines on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval of this Act except those whose milita ry and educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve o fficers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proce edings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's a uthorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of active commissione d service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under the provisions of this Ac t shall not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who are qualified military pilots and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savin gs in the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding an y provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of certification to accounts payable since 1 July 194 9 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND PRO VIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. The said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in qu estion or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Se c. 19, par. 2 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill un less it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation. A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevan ce or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. It was indee d a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibiti on against "riders" to the

general appropriation act. The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacte d into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This c onstitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject. if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this re stricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inacti ve duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect. Upon the foregoing dissertation, Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the A rmed Forces of the Philippines was declared as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being unc onstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it has n ever been passed. Petitioner no longer having legal basis for such claims, his petition was denied. DEMETRIA VS. ALBA (148 SCRA 208) FACTS: Petitioners, who filed petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of prelim inary injunction questioning the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No . 1177 as concerned citizens of the Philippines, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa represe nting their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the P hilippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interest may be affected. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 p rovides: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT bureaus, offices and general agencies of the Executive Department, which are inc luded in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, office inclu ded in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Petitioners claim that it is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUES: Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Whether or not the Judiciary may encroach with the exercise of functions of the legislative and executive departments. HELD: (1)The first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in viola tion of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitut ion provides: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the P resident, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for thei r respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Section 16 authorizes the President to augment any item in the general appropria tions law for their respective offices; however, first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decre e No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to ind iscriminately transfer funds from one departments, bureaus, offices and general agencies of th e Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, office included i n the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Indeed, such provision in qu estion is null and void. (2)The law provides the doctrine of Separation of Powers as well as Checks and B alances to ensure that no abuse of power shall take place. Therefore, where the legislature or the exec utive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interf ere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional pow ers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed t o do, as void.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ (235 SCRA 506) FACTS: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) e ntitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realig n his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec . 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special pr ovision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National T reasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in t he items of the GAA of 1994 ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the approp riation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and m andamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU s, DPWH, and Nat l Highway Au thority. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitut ional and valid? HELD: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed b y the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the enti re item/appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU s said provision allows for the use o f income & creation of revolving fund for SCU s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte Sta te Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pre s. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to t he subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approv al of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be su bj. of a separate law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to au gment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exe rcise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU s use of special fund f or the compensation of the said CAFGU s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amen dment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID. SECTION 26. 1. EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF. 2. NO BILL PASSED BY EITHER HOUSE SHALL BECOME A LAW UNLESS IT HAS PASSED THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS, AND PRINTED COPIES THEREOF IN ITS FINAL FORM HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ITS MEMBERS THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE, EXCEPT WHEN THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO THE NECESSITY OF ITS IMMEDIATE ENACTMENT TO MEET A PUBLIC CALAMITY OR EMERGENCY. UPON THE LAST READING OF A BILL, NO ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT AMENDMENT THERETO SHALL BE ALLOWED, AND THE VOTE THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD (151 SCRA 208) FACTS: Tio filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the vi deogram industry on the following grounds: (1) Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject ma tter thereof; (2) The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of t rade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution; (3) There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6; (4) There is undue del egation of power and authority; and (5) There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not. ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree Bo. 1987 is constitutional. HELD: (1)Section 10 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the acco mplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry thro ugh the Videogram Regulatory Board. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory an d control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The express purpose of the decree to include ta xation of the video industry is to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videogr ams and is therefore not a rider. (2) A tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or ev en definitely deters the activities taxed. The tax imposed by the decree is not only a regulat ory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primari ly to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes.

And while it was also an objective of the decree to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid i mposition. (3)The 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that gr ave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery prog ram necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. (4)The grant in Section 11 of the decree of authority to the BOARD to "solicit t he direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Bo ard" is not a delegation ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. (5) Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the decree is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no q uestion that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by ramp ant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availabili ty of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally vio lent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to m ention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of M ayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business. Therefore, the decree in question is constitutional. For reference: PREAMBLE OF PD 1987: 1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms includin g, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in t heatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, c ontractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues; 2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million pe r annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been su bjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year; 3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also aff ected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters t hroughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown o f numerous moviehouses and theaters; 4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all business indust ries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion; 5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will n ot only alleviate the dire

financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families a nd 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue fo r the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms ; 6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features co nstitutes a clear ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impai rs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficie ncy and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being; 7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures t o curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws; 8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must b e adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied). PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO (227 SCRA 703) FACTS: This is a petition to declare the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7354. The main target of this petition is Section 35 of RA 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corpor ation. SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instruct ions, rules and regulation or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or mo dified accordingly. All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those prov ided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, republic acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087, and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice-President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof. These measures withdraw the franking privilege (free mail) from the Supreme Cour t, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other gov ernment offices. The first objection is based on Art. VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution, which p rovides that Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed i n the title thereof. RA 7345 is entitled An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purpose s Connected Therewith . It is the submission of the petitioners that Sec. 35 of RA 7345 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purp

oses. The second objection was that the second paragraph of the repealing clause was n ot included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. It appeared o nly in the Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitutio n, which provides that: (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate e nactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto sha ll be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately after, and the yeas and nays entered in the J ournal. Petitioners stress that Section 35 was never a subject of any disagreement betwe en both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment. The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal pr otection clause. It is alleged that RA 7345 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking pr ivilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, Vice-Presid ent, Senators and Members of the House of Representative, COMELEC, former Presidents of the Philippines, w idows of former Presidents, National Census and Statistics Office, and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers. Equal protection of the laws, embodied in a separate clause in Article III ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Sec. 1 of the Constitution, simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The respondents argue that the considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be w ithdrawn from it. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 7345 is unconstitutional on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes [ Article VI Sec. 26(1)]; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage [Articl e VI Sec. 26(2)]; (3) and it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary [eq ual protection of laws in Article III Sec. 1]. HELD: YES. The petition is partially granted. The franking privilege of the Supreme Co urt, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Co urts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other gov ernment offices shall be restored. On the first objection, the title of the challenged act does not violate the Con stitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonabl y covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there i s sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. According to Cooley, author of Constitutional Li mitations, the repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a ne w statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwiths tanding that the title is silent on the subject . The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such rep eal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, whic h is required to be briefly expressed in its title. On the second objection, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court m ay not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congr ess. The Court declines to look into the petitioners charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of

the bill that eventually became RA 7354 and that the copies thereof in its final form were not distribute d among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted in accordance with Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. On the third contention on equal protection of laws, the argument of the respond ents that the considerable volume of mail of the Judiciary justifies the withdrawal of its fra nking privilege, is selfdefeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege shou ld be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all (like the widows of former Preside nts) but not to those who need it badly. The Court states, at this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem . The Court is unable to disagree with the respondents that Sectio n 35 of RA 7345 represents a valid exercise of police power. On the contrary, the Court finds it s repealing clause to be discriminatory and that it denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. In sum, the Court sustains RA 7345 against the attack that its subject is not ex pressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, the Cour t annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution that no person sh all be deprived of the equal protection of the laws . ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO, JR. (237 SCRA 324) FACTS: These are two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G .R. No. 109298, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, known as Simplified Net Income Taxat ion Scheme (SNIT), amending the certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, and in G. R.109466, the validity of Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations, promulgated by public respondents pursuant to the s aid law. G.R. No. 109289 Petitioner claims that the enactment of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Tax ation Scheme violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Article VI Sec. 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one s ubject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Article VI Sec. 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The C ongress shall embrace evolve a progressive system of taxation. Article III Sec. 1 No person Shall be deprived of x x x property without due pro cess of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. The full text of the title of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Sche me reads: An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For the Self-Employed a nd Professionals Engaged In the Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Revenue Code, as Amended. Section 21(f) Tax on Citizens and Residents indicate, a tax is imposed upon the t axable net income of self-employed and/or professionals engaged in the practice of their profession i n accordance to the tax schedule provided by the law. The Schedular approach is a system employed where the income tax treatment varies and made to depend on the kind or category of taxable income of the taxpayer. Section 29 Deductions from Gross Income indicate specific direct costs that are allowed to be deducted from the taxable income. Petitioner asserts that RA 7496 attempts to tax single proprietorship and profes sionals differently from the manner it imposes tax on corporations and partnerships and thus violates Article VI Sec. 28(1) of the Constitution. The Court views the legislative intent of the amendatory law to in creasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual t axpayers and to

maintain, by large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. Global treatment is a system where the tax treatment views indifferently the tax base and generally treats in common all categories of taxable income of the taxpayer. Petitioner gives an extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating, what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those covered and those who are not by the amendatory law. G.R. No. 109446 The questioned regulation reads: Sec. 6. General Professional Partnership The general professional partnership (G PP) and the partners comprising the GPP are covered by RA 7596. Thus, in determining the net profit o f the partnership, only the direct costs mentioned in said law are to be deducted from partnership income. A lso, the expense paid or incurred by partners in their individual capacities in the practice of their pro fession which are not reimbursed or paid by the partnership but are considered direct costs, are not deductible f rom his gross income. The objection of the petitioner lies is focused on the administrative interpreta tion of public respondents that would apply RA 7496 or SNIT to partners in general professional partnership s. According to the National Internal Revenue Code, partnerships are either taxable partnerships or exempt partnerships . The GPP is an example of an exempt partnership and that it cann ot be similarly ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT identified as corporations nor even considered as independent taxable entities f or income tax purposes. The Code states that a general professional partnership must be formed for the s ole purpose of exercising a common profession, no part of the income of which is derived from i ts engaging in any trade business; otherwise, it is subject to tax as an ordinary business partnership or , which is to say, as a corporation and thereby subject to the corporate income tax. A general professio nal partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership (which is treated as a corporation for income t ax purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an income taxpayer. Here, pa rtners themselves, not the partnership (although it is still obligated to file an income tax return [mainly for administration and data]), are liable for the payment of income tax in their individual capacity computed i n their respective and distributive shares of profit. ISSUES: In G.R. No. 109289, whether or not RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme is unconstitutional. In G.R. No. 109446, whether or not public respondents have exceeded their author ity in promulgating Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations, to carry out RA 7496. HELD: NO. Petitions are dismissed. G.R. No. 109289 Article VI Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to preve nt log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subject s of legislation. The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us have been sufficiently met. The contention that RA 7496 violates Article VI Sec. 28(1) clearly forgets that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496. Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (a) the stan dards that are used are substantial and not arbitrary, (b) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (c) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and

(d) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class. This classification impli ed in the legislative intent of the amendatory law to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the sched ular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by large, the present g lobal treatment on taxable corporations is not arbitrary and inappropriate. On the point raised by the petitioner on what he views as an imbalance between t he tax liabilities of those covered and not covered by the amendatory law, the court cannot freely delve int o those matters which, by constitution fiat, rightly rests on the legislative department. With the legi slature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), cove rage (subjects), and situs (place) of taxation. The due process clause may be correctly invoked only when there is a clear contr avention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of tax power. No such transgression i s so evident to the Court. G.R. No. 109446 Under the Tax Code, the general professional partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere mechanism or a flow-through entity in the generation of income by, and the ultim ate distribution of such income to, respectively, each of the individual partners. Section 6 of the Reven ue Regulation, alleged to carry out RA 7496, did not alter, but merely confirmed, the above standing rule as now so modified by RA 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individua l income taxpayers on their ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professio nals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general pro fessional partnership. TOBIAS VS. ABALOS (239 SCRA 106) FACTS: This is a petition to render Republic Act No. 7675 unconstitutional. RA 7675 is also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized City to be Kn own as the City of Mandaluyong . Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities o f Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislat ive district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675. Pres. Ramos signed it into the law on Feb. 9, 1994. Pres. Ramos signed RA 7675 into the law on Feb. 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held on Apri l 10, 1994 where the people of Mandaluyong was asked whether they approved of the conversion of the M unicipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under RA 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.18,621 voted yes whereas 7,911 voted no . By vir tue, of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Article VIII Sec.49 of RA 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislativ e district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legisla tive district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election . Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Sec.49 of RA 7675 embraces two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2)t he division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. The second aforestated subject is not germane tot the subject matter of RA 7675 since the said law trea ts of the conversion of

Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Thus, the one subject-one bill rule has not been complied with. Petitioners assert that there is no mention of the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, which is allegedly violative of Artic le VI Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution. Petitioners also argue that Section 49 has resulted in an increase in the compos ition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI Sec. 5(1). ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7675, specifically Artivle VIII Sec.49, is unconstitutional fo r being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution: It contravenes the ) of the Constitution. one subject one bill rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Sec. 26(1

Article VI Sec. 5(4) states Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section . Article VI Sec. 5(1) states the present limit of 250 members in the House of Rep resentative. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT HELD: NO. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Contrary to petitioner s assertion, the creation of a separate congressional distr ict for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of RA 7675 necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regar ding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. The constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article Vi Sec. 26(1) should be given a practical rather than a technical constru ction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general s ubject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject. The contention that there is no mention of a census to show compliance with mini mum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify the separation into two legislative districts of San Juan/Mandaluyong does not suffice to strike down the validity of RA 7675. The said Act enjoys the pres umption of having passed through the regular congressional process, including due consideration by the me mbers of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts , At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. As to the contention that Section 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the right of congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since the petitio ners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon, and enacted the ass ailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which per tains to itself. A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI Sec. 5 ent limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the s shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by se in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 must be (1) shows that the pres House of Representative law . Therefore, the increa allowed to stand.

The petitioners additional argument that RA 7675 resulted in gerrymandering , which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worth of credence. Hon. Zamora s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly

be considered as favorable to him. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSN., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (15 SCRA 479) FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association Inc, a non profit civic organization, duly i ncorporated under the Philippine law, filed a petition for preliminary injunction enjoining Auditor Ge neral of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of the House of Congress from passing in audit vouchers a nd from countersigning the checks of treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator of former members of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Ac t No. 3836. Petitioner contends the following: 1. the provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of Sec 2(1) of Art VI of the Co nstitution; 2. the provision on retirement and gratuity is a circumvention of the Constitutiona l ban on increase of salaries of the members of the Congress during their term, contrary to Art VI, Sec 14. of the Constitution 3. the provision is a class legislation because it allows members and officers of t he Congress to retire after 12 years of service while all other officers and employees of the g overnment can ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT retire only after 20 years of service. 4. the provision on sick and vacation leave is a another attempt of legislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Solicitor General filed its answer and contends that: 1. the grant of retirement pensions and benefits does not constitute forbidden comp ensation. 2. the title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of th e Constitutions which provides that no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one s ubject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 3. the law does not constitute class legislation 4. certain indispensable parties were not included in the petition 5. the petitioner has no standing to institute the action 6. the payment of the commutable sick and vacation leave is not an indirect scheme to increase the salary. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to institute the petition Whether of not the law in question is violative of the Constitution. RULING: 1st point: Petitioner s standing to institute the suit. The Petitioner can validly institute the suit. In the determination of the degre e of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionalit y pf statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. 2nd point: Whether or not RA 3836 violates Sec 14, Art VI of the Constitution. The Constitutional provision in Section 14, Art Vi includes in the term of compe nsation other emoluments . This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question . Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; th at which is received as compensation for services which is annexed to possession of an office, salary , fees, and perquisites. It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, be cause it is a part of

compensation for services of one possessing any office. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until the expiration of the fu ll term of all members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Hou se of Representatives, to take effect upon approval of the said Act. Retirement benefi ts were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all Me mbers of the Senate and the House of representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs co unter to the prohibition in Sec 14, Art Vi of the Constitiution. 3rd point: Violation of equal protection clause. RA 3836 is patently discriminatory and therefore violate the equal protection cl ause. Firstly the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of representativ es who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as governors of pro vinces and the members of the provincial boards and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities. Secondly, all members of the Congress under RA 3836 are given retirement vbenefi ts after serving 12 years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and emplpye es aee given retirement benefits after 2o years . ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT In the third place, all government officials and employees are given only one re tirement benefits irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under RA 383 6 Members of the Congress will b entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years o f salary. Lastly, RA 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of t he GSIS. Most grantees of the retirement benefits under various retirement laws have to be a member or mus t al least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to GSIS 4th point: Title of the RA 3836 not germane to the subject matter. Par 1 Sec 21, Art VI of the Constitution provides: No bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of Sec 12, subsection of t he Commonwealth Act 186, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the GSIS who have ren dered at least 2o years of service regardless of age. This provision is related and germane to the subje ct of the Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836 refers to member s of the Congress and to elective officers who are not members of the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits therefore, for these officials would relate to subject not germane to the Commonwealth Act 186. In short, RA 3836 violates three constitutional provisions namely: the prohibiti on regardingincrease in salaries of Members of the Congress; equal protection cl ause; and prohibition that thetitle of the bill shall not embrace more than one subject. INSULAR LUMBER CO. VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS (104 SCRA 710) FACTS: These two cases are appeals by way of certiorari from the previous decision of t he Court or Tax Appeals ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund to the Insular Lumber co mpany the amount of P10,560,20 instead of P19,921.37, representing 25% of the specific tax paid on m anufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by the said company in the operation of its forest concessio n in the year 1963. The undisputed facts: Insular Lumber Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of N ew York, USA, and duly authorized to do business in the Philippines, is a licensed forest concessi onaire. The company

purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession, sawmill, planning mills, power units, vehicles, dry kilns, water pumps, lawn mowers, and in furnishing free water and light to its employees, on which specific tax was paid. The company filed wi th the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a claim for refund of P19,921.37 representing 25% of the speci fic tax paid on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its operations pursuant to the provisions of S ection 5, Republic act No. 1435. Commissioner denied the Company s claim for refund on the ground that the pr ivilege of partial tax refund granted by Sec. 5 of RA 1435 to those using oil in the operation of fores t and mining concessions is limited to a period of five years from June 4, 1946, the date of effectivity of said Act. Consequently, oil used in such concessions after the said date are subject to the full tax prescri bed in the National Internal Revenue Code. The Company filed a petition for review before the respondent court. The Court o f Tax Appeals ruled that the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession , hence, the refund provision of Sec. 5 of RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaire s cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. Out of the P19,921.37 claimed, representing 25% of s pecific tax paid, respondent court found out that only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil ut ilized in logging operations. However, respondent court did not allow the refund of the full amoun t of P14,598.08 because the Company s right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those p aid during the period from ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, the Company was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. The Commissioner contends the unconstitutionality of the first proviso in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 based on Article VI Sec. 21(1) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill . RA 1435 is entitled An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund . The Commissioner argues that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Sec. 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers, and that this part ial exemption is not clearly expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. The Company argues that the operation of the sawmill is not merely incidental to the operation of the forest concession but is indispensable thereto, or forms part thereof. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals erred in their decision on the following grounds: In the Appeal by the Commissioner That the first proviso in Section 5 of RA 1435 invoked by Insular Lumber Company as legal basis for its claim for tax refund is null and void for being unconstitutional in rela tion to Article VI Sec. 21 (1) of the 1935 Constitution. In not holding that the partial exemption under RA 1435 is limited only to five years counted from June 14, 1956, the date of approval and effectivity of the said act. In not holding that Insular Lumber Company used the questioned oils and fuels af ter the exemption has already lapsed or expired and hence, no longer in force. In holding that the Company is entitled to the tax refund of P10,560.20 In the Appeal by the Company That the Company is not entitled to claim a partial refund of the specific tax p aid on manufactured oils used in the operation of its sawmill. That the Company s claim for refund on the specific tax paid on oils used during J anuary 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 has already prescribed.

In ordering that the Company is entitle only to the tax refund of P10,560.20 ins tead of P19,921.37 as claimed by the petitioner. HELD: NO. Petition denied and the judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals affirmed. Appeal by the Commissioner The Court finds no merit on the argument on the unconstitutionality of RA 1435. The said Act deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely the necessity for increas ing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. T he proviso in Section 5 of RA 1435, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of Article VI Sec. 21(1) of the 1935 Constitution i s to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. This does not seem to this C ourt to have been ignored in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by the Congress which passed it. Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged t o be defectively titled, every presumption favors the validity of the Act. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT It is very apparent that the partial refund of specific tax paid for oils used i n agriculture and aviation is limited to 5 years while there is no time limit for the partial refund of specif ic tax paid for oils used by miners and forest concessionaires. The Court finds no basis in applying the limi tation of the operative period provided for oils used in agriculture and aviation to the provision on th e refund to miners and forest concessionaires. Appeal by the Company The Court agrees with the Court of Tax Appeals that the operation sawmill is dis tinct from the operation of a forest concession. By the very nature of their operations, they are entirely d ifferent business ventures. It very clear form the language of Section 5 that only miners or forest concessiona ires are given the privilege to claim the partial refund. SECTION 27. 1. EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL, BEFORE IT BECOMES A LAW, BE PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT. IF HE APPROVES THE SAME HE SHALL SIGN IT; OTHERWISE, HE SHALL VETO IT AND RETURN THE SAME WITH HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATED, WHICH SHALL ENTER THE OBJECTIONS AT LARGE IN ITS JOURNAL AND PROCEED TO RECONSIDER IT. IF, AFTER SUCH RECONSIDERATION, TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF SUCH HOUSE SHALL AGREE TO PASS THE BILL, IT SHALL BE SENT, TOGETHER WITH THE OBJECTIONS, TO THE OTHER HOUSE BY WHICH IT SHALL LIKEWISE BE RECONSIDERED, AND IF APPROVED BY TWOTHIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT HOUSE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. IN ALL SUCH CASES, THE VOTES OF EACH HOUSE SHALL BE DETERMINED BY YEAS OR NAYS, AND THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS VOTING FOR OR AGAINST SHALL BE ENTERED IN ITS JOURNAL. THE PRESIDENT SHALL COMMUNICATE HIS VETO OF ANY BILL TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF RECEIPT THEREOF, OTHERWISE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW AS IF HE HAD SIGNED IT. 2. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO VETO ANY PARTICULAR ITEM OR ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATION, REVENUE, OR TARIFF BILL, BUT THE VETO SHALL NOT AFFECT THE ITEM OR ITEMS TO WHICH HE DOES NOT OBJECT. GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, JR. (191 SCRA 452) FACTS: Petition for prohibition/mandamus attacking the constitutionality of presidentia l veto of section 55. Section 55 of the General Appropriations Bill FY 1989 Sec. 55. Prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropri ations disapproved and/or reduced by congress: no item of appropriation recommended by the president in the budget submitted to congress pursuant to article VII, section 22 of the constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations

authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the presided in the budgetshall be deemed to have been disapproved by congress if no corresponding a ppropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this act. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Dec 16, 1988; congress passed general appropriations bill for FY 1989. Dec 29, 1 988; president signed the bill into law but vetoed 7 special provisions and section 55 which is a gene ral provision. The reason of the president in vetoing such section is because it violates Article 6, Section 25 (5) of the constitution. Furthermore, section 55 not only nullify the constitutional and statutory author ity of the president, but also the senate president, speaker of the house, chief justice, and the heads of the constitutional commissions to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offic es from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Feb 2, 1989; congress mentioned in a r esolution that the veto by the president of section 55 is unconstitutional which means section 55 will be i n effect. April 11, 1989; petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed. A similar provision was vetoed by t he president. It appears in the general appropriations act of 1990. Instead of section 55, such provision wa s located in section 16 of the said bill. It must be noted that the 1989 appropriations act, the use of savi ngs appears in section 12, separate and apart from section 55; whereas in the 1990 appropriations act, the u se of savings and the vetoes provision have been comingled in section 16 only, with the vetoed provisi on made to appear as a condition or restriction. The petitioners cause is anchored on the following: 1. The president s veto power does not Cover provisions, that she exceeded her author ity when she vetoed sec 55 (FY 89) and sec 16 (FY 90) because they are provisions 2. When the president objects to a provision, she cannot item-veto but instead veto the entire bill 3. The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions 4. The power of augmentation in article 6, section 25 (5) of the constitution has t o be provided for by law, which means the congress has also the power to determine restrictions The veto power of the president can be found in article 6, section 27, of the co nstitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the president of section 55 of the 1989 appropriation s bill and subsequently of its counterpart section 16 of the 1990 appropriations bill, which are all provis ions, is unconstitutional and without effect. DECISION:

Petition dismissed. The questioned presidential veto is constitutional. RATIO: The argument that the president may not veto a provision without vetoing the ent ire bill disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The same argument also overlooks the constitutional mandate that such provision is only l imited in its operation to some particular appropriation which it relates as stated in article 6 section 25 (2) of the constitution. The constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative, and in this respect it is a grant of power in the executive. The legislative has the affirmative power to enact laws; the chie f executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature. It follows that the chief executive must find his authority in the constitution. Thus, such act of the president is constitutional and does not hamper with the legislative function. Settled is the rule that the executive is not allowed to veto a condition or res triction of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. For this rule to apply, condit ions or restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matter which are more properly deal t with in a separate ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. With this, section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are held to be inappropriat e conditions. They are general law measures more appropriate for separate legislation. They do not show the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Considering that section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are not really conditions, they can be vetoed by the president. If the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executiv e were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the constitution is crystal clear. A presidential veto may b e overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of congress as stated in article 6, section 27 (1) of t he constitution. SECTION 28. 1. THE RULE OF TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE. THE CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXATION. 2. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO FIX WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY IMPOSE, TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT QUOTAS, TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND OTHER DUTIES OR IMPOSTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT. 3. CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND PERSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS, ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION. 4. NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE PASSED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (211 SCRA 219) FACTS: Nov 27, 1990, President issued EO 438 which imposed, additional 5% taxes and cha rges for imports including crude oil and other oil products. Subsequently increased to 9% by EO 4 43 on Jan 3, 1991. On July 24 1991, Dept of Finance requested Tariff Commission (TC) to initiate the p rocess required by the Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a levy for crude oil and other pet roleum products covered by Sec 104 of Tariff and Customs Code as amended. TC scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of their r espective positions. Meantime, EO 475 was issued on Aug 15, 1991 reducing taxes to 5% except for the crude oil and other products which remained at 9%. After the hearing, the President issued EO 478 on Aug 23, 1991 which

levied a special duty of P.95/liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imptd oil products. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 475, 478 and argues that they are violativ e of Sec 24, Article VI of 1987 Constitution which states that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills for the increase of public debt, bills of local application and private bills shall originate exclusively i n the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Not the president). Vilative ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT also of Sec. 401 which authorizes the president for such act only to protect loc al industries but not the purpose of raising addtl revenue for the govt. ISSUE: 1) constitutionality of EO 475 and 478 2) legality of EO 475 and 478 DECISION: Prohibition and /mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the peti tioner RATIO: 1) it does not follow that EO 475 and 478 are prohibited to the President. Accdg to, Sec28, (2) of Article VI of the Constitution , the Congress may by law authorize the President to fix wit hin special limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, imp ort and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues and other duties or imposts within the framework of th e national development program of the Government. The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Sec 104 and 401 are the provi sions which the President invoked in promulgating EO 475 and 478 Sec 104-imptd articles have to pay the rates of duty indicated in this Section Sec 401-A.for the interest of national economy, general welfare/ national securi ty and subject to the limitations, the president, upon the recommendation of NEDA is empowered to a) i ncrease not lower than the basic of 10% nor higher than 100% or remove rates b) to establish quota 30 t o impose addtl duty B. public hearing by the Commission before recommendation C. the power of the President to increase or decrease rates There is nothing in Sec 104 or of 401 that suggests an absolute authority. Custo m duties in the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities. the levying of custom duties protects local industries and simultaneously produces govt revenues. Increased tariffs in the case at bar must have protected the local crude oil industry as well. Protection of consumers is an impt dimension of the national economy, general welfare and national security and so customs duties ma y be reduced or removed for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices that may be otherwise impose upon the community. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFROM ADJUDICATION BOARD ( 215 SCRA 86)

FACTS: Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated S ept 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision of the CA dated Aug 20, 1990 affirming the decision of th e DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of Central Mindanao University (CMU) land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to disqua lified beneficiaries on the ground of lack of jurisdiction Complainants, calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural L aborers Organization (BIFFALO) under the leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU , before the Department of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CA RP. CMU is an agricultural educational institution run by Bukidnon province. It star ted as a farm school in 1910 and expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was tr ansferred to its new ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT site in Managok Malaybalay, Bukidnon. In the early 1960 s it was converted into a college with Campus at Musuan, until it became what is known as the CMU. Jan 16 1958, Carlos Garcia, issued a Proclamation 476 withdrawing from sale or s ettlement and reserving the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future ca mpus what is now the CMU. Several tribes belonging to the cultural communities opposed the petition c laiming ownership of certain ancestral lands. So the grant to school was reduced from 3401 hectares t o 3000 hectares. Resolution 160, had kilusang SArilign Sikap Program under which the land resources were leased to its faculty and employees .the faculty and staff combined themselves to groups of fi ve members each to cultivate 4-5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project and the CMU provided technical know-how and training. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and land use participation fee. This carries out its educational objectives, train its students and maintain various activities which the government appropriation could not adequately support. The contract prohibits the establish ment of houses and to use the land as a collateral for any loan. Petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became president of the CMU in July 1986, he discon tinued the business project for production of corn, rice and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Manag ement and Training Project due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU pers onnel, among whom where the complainants were laid-off when this project was discontinued. Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of EO 17m the reorganization law of the CMU. In 1968, Chua launched a self-help project called CMU-income enhancement program ( CMU_IEP) to develop unutilized land. The CMU would provide the use of 4-5 hectares of land t o a selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and P1000/hectare as land rental fee; 400 kg of the produce per year would be donated to the CMU Integrated Development Foundation. In the middl e of 1987, CMU allowed the former employees and workers to participate in the CMU-IEP as specia l participants. The one year contract expired on June 30 1988. Some were renewed some were asked to vacate and this led to the filing of the complaint. DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore b e beneficiaries under the CARP.

ISSUES: Whether or not 1) DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Declaration of Status of Tenants an d Coverage of land under Carp 2) CA committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack o f jurisdiction in affirming DARAB DECISION: The SC finds a grave of abuse of discretion by CA and DAR adjudication Board, he reby declares the decision of CA and DARAB affirming the decision of the quasi-judicial body as nu ll and void and hereby order that they be set aside with costs against the private respondents. RATIO: Obrique claimed that they are tenants of the CMU or landless peasants claiming a part of the CMU situated at Sinalayan Bukidnon and Musuan Bukidnon. The Supreme Court agree with the DARAB that Obrique et al are not tenants. There was not landlord-tenant relationship betwee n the CMU and the faculty. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land participant s f ee in consideration for the assistance given to the participants. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU s land was without legal authority. S quatters means any ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT person entering upon lands of other, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land. Illegal detainers may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agraria n reform. However, the Board held that the respondent University failed to show that it ac tually uses the questioned area tot the exclusion of others nor did it show that the same is directly used without any intervening agency or person and tjhat the use of land are essentially for educational purpo ses. The pertinent provisions of RA 6657 aka CAR lar of 1968 are as follows Sec4-the Comprehensive agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover regardless of ten urial arrangement and commodity produced all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and !) 229 including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture Sec 10-EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS-lands actually directly and exclusively used an d found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watershed, and mangroves, national defense , school sites, and campuses includin g experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds a nd seedlings research and production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosques s ites and Islamic Centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colon ies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, govt, and private search and quarantine centers and all lands with 18% slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this act The 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Ap peals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990 is not covered by the CARP because: 1) It is not alienable, and disposable land of the public domains 2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress 3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU 4) It is exempt from coverage under Sec 10 RA 6657 Under Section 4 and Section 10, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB i s limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. The DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU s titled scho ol site. The

DARAB s order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without lega l authority. EO 129 A Sec 13- AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD-there is hereby created an A grarian Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall ass ume the powers and functions with respect to adjudication of agrarian reform cases under EO 229 and the EO. Sec 17-QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR- the Dar is hereby vested with quasi0jud icial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive origin al jurisdiction over all matters including implementation of Agrarian Reform. Sec 5- the DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjud icate agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the impl ementation of agrarian reform. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not en titled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quas i-judicial body to order private property to be awarded for future beneficiaries. Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled tot eh relief prayed for, constitutes a g rave abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. CIR VS. LINGAYEN GULF ELECTRIC POWER CO, INC. (164 SCRA 27) FACTS: Respondent taxpayer, Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co, Inc operates an electric p ower plant serving Binmaley and Lingyen in Panagasinan, pursuant to the municipal franchise granted it by their respective municipal councils under Resolution Nos. 14 and 25 of June 29 and July 2, 1946, respectively. Sec 10 ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT provide that: The said grantee in consideration of the franchise hereby granted, shall pay qua rterly into the Provincial Treasury of Pangasinan, one per centum of the gross earnings obta ined thru this privilege during the first twenty years and two per centum during the remaining 15 years o f the life of said franchise. Feb 24, 1948-President approved the franchise Nov 21, 1955-BIR assessed against and demanded them from the private respondent P19293.43 as deficiency in taxes from 1946-1954 Sept 29, 1956-private respondent requested for a reinvestigation of the case tha t instead of incurring a liability, it made an overpayment The Commissioners denied the conference that the petitioner requested. Aug 21, 1 962-Commissioner demanded from private respondent P3616.86 as deficiency franchise tax Oct 5, 1962-private respondent protested the assessment and requested reconsider ation but was denied Pending the hearing RA 3843 was passed on June 22, 1963, granting the private re spondent, legislative franchise= 2% of the gross receipts payable quarterly Sept 15, 1964 the respondent court ruled that the provisions of RA 3843 should a pply and accordingly dismissed the claim of the CIR ISSUES: Whether or not: 1) the 5% tax prescribed in Sec259 of the National Internal Reve nue Code assessed against private respondent realized before the affectivity of RA 3843 2) Sec 4 of RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the uniformity an d equality of taxation 3)Sec 4 RA 3843 is valid, whether or not it could be given retroactive effect so as to render uncollectible the taxes in question which were assessed before its enactment 4) The taxpayer is liable for P3025.96 for Jan 1, 1946-Feb 29, 1948 DECISION: The decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED. RATIO: It is the contention of the CIR that the private respondent should have been lia ble for the 5% franchise tax on gross receipts prescribed in Section 259 of the Tax Code, instead of lower fr anchise tax because Sec 259 of the Tax Code was amended by RA 39 on Oct 1, 1946. The franchise of the re spondent was existing at the time of the amendment since the franchises were accepted on Marc h 1, 1948 after the

approval of the president on Feb 24, 1948. However, RA 3843 granted the private respondent a legislative franchise in June 196r, amending, altering or even repealing the sai d municipal franchises, providing only a 2% tax and effective further upon the date the original franchi se was grated. The privaterespondent was liable to pay only the 2% franchise tax , effective from the date the originalmunicipal franchise was granted. The petitioner submits that the said law was unconstitutional insofar as it prov ides 2% tax for the respondent while other taxpayers similarly situated were subject to 5%. A tax in uniform when it operates with the same force and affect in every place where the subject of it i s found. However, RA 3843transfered the petitioner s power plant from the class provided for in Act 3636. Thus it was only effected transfer of a taxable property from one class to another. The 5% tax in Section 259 was never intended to have a universal application. The Legislature considers and makes pr ovision for all the circumstances of a particular case, therefore holding the law constitutional. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law for it provi des that it is effective upon approval of the franchise. The private respondent therefore is only liable for t he payment of percentage ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT and fixed tax rates as seller of light, heat and power, P3025.96. But the respon dent paid the amount of P34, 184.36 which were very much more than the amount due. CIR vs. COURT OF APPEALS (298 SRCA 683) FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appe als that affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) allowing the Young Men s Christian Association o f the Philippines (YMCA) established as a welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporati on to claim tax exemption on the latter s income from the lease of its real property. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to Private Respo ndent YMCA in the total amount of P415,615.01 for taxes. YMCA filed a letter regarding their prote st on the assessment. CIR denied the claims of YMCA. YMCA filed a petition for review at CTA. The CTA issu ed a ruling in favor of YMCA. Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the case to the Court o f Appeals (CA), which initially decided in favor of CIR. YMCA asked for reconsideration and the CA rev ersed itself in favor of YMCA. The ruling reads: The court cannot depart from the CTA s findings of fact, as they are supported by evidence beyond what is considered as substantial . CIR s Motion for Reconsiderat ion was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner CIR argues that while the income received by the organizations enumer ated in Sec 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) is, as a rule, exempted from the payment o f tax in respect to income received by them as such, the exemption does not apply to income derived fr om any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for prof it, regardless of the disposition made of such income . Rentals, therefore, derived by a tax exempt orga nization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, is not, exempt from income taxation e ven if such income os exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives. Private respondent YMCA also invokes Art. VI Sec. 28 par. 3 of the 1987 Constitu tion, which exempts charitable institutions from the payment not only of property taxes but also of in come tax from any source. It also invokes Article XIV Sec. 4 par. 3 of the Constitution, claiming that the YMCA is a nonstock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used act ually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its propertie s and income .

ISSUE: Whether or not the income derived from rentals of real property owned by YMCA is subject to income tax under Sec. 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code and Article VI Sec. 28 par. 3 and Article XIV Sec. 4 par. 3 of the Constitution. HELD: YES. The petition is granted. The latter decision of the Court of Appeals in rev ersed and set aside. The initial decision of the Court of Appeals in reinstated, insofar as it ruled that the income derived by petitioner YMCA from rentals of its real property is subject to income tax. The exemption claimed by YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last paragraph of then Section 27 of the NIRC, which mandates that the income of exempt organizati ons (such as the YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax impo sed by the same code. On the constitutional issue, according to Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former c onstitutional commissioner, what is exempt is not the institution itself x x x; those exempted from real esta te taxes are lands, ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT buildings and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religiou s, charitable, or educational purposes . Fr. Bernas also adhered to the same view that the exemption created by the said provision pertained only to property taxes. The Court notes that not a scintilla of eviden ce was submitted by YMCA to prove that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educat ional institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exc lusively for educational purposes. Also, YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions within the purview of Article XIV Sec. 4 par. 3 of the Constitution because under the Education Act of 1982, t he technical meaning of educational institution which is the school system, is synonymous with formal educ ation. Thus, it refers to the hierarchically structured and chronologically graded learning s organized a nd provided by the formal school system and for which certification is required in order for the le arner to progress through the grades or move to the higher levels. The Court examined the Amended Articles of Incorporation and ByLaws of the YMCA, but found nothing in them that even hints that it is a school or an educational system. The Court finds no basis for granting YMCA exemption from income tax under the c onstitutional provision invoked. SECTION 29. 1. NO MONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW. 2. NO PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY SHALL BE APPROPRIATED, APPLIED, PAID, OR EMPLOYED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FOR THE USE, BENEFIT, OR SUPPORT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR OF ANY PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OTHER RELIGIOUS TEACHER, OR DIGNITARY AS SUCH, EXCEPT WHEN SUCH PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OR DIGNITARY IS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORCES, OR TO ANY PENAL INSTITUTION, OR GOVERNMENT ORPHANAGE OR LEPROSARIUM. 3. ALL MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY TAX LEVIED FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL FUND AND PAID OUT FOR SUCH PURPOSE ONLY. IF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH A SPECIAL FUND WAS CREATED HAS BEEN FULFILLED OR ABANDONED, THE BALANCE, IF ANY, SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE GOVERNMENT. PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (110 PHIL 331) FACTS: Wenceslao Pascual, Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted an action for declar atory relief, with injunction, assailing the approval of the Republic Act No. 920, entitled An Act A ppropriating Funds for Public Works and the Donation made by Jose Zulueta, who at the time of the passag e and approval of the said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines.

RA 920 (Act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an item (Section 1 c[a]) for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals (the projected and planned subdivision roads, which were not yet constructed, wi thin Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta). Antonio Subdivision was a private property of Zulueta. Zulueta donated said parcels of land to the Government 5 months after the enactment of RA 920, on the condition that if the Government violates such condition the lands would revert to Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal, Wenceslao Pascual, questioned the validity of the donation an d the Constitutionality of ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT the item in RA 920, it being not for a public purpose. ISSUES: Whether or not the item in RA 920 is constitutional. Whether or not the donation made by Zulueta was valid. HELD: It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohib iting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occupying, or acts performe d, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with ret rospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Herein, inasmuch as the lan d on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to Senator Zulueta at the time RA 9 20 was passed by Congress, or approved by the President, and the disbursement of said sum became effective on 20 June 1953 pursuant to Section 13 of the Act, the result is that the appropriating sou gh a private purpose and hence, null and void. The land on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a priv ate person, an appropriation made by the Congress for that purpose is null and void, and a dona tion to the Government, made over 5 months after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose of giving a semblance of legality to the appropriation, does not cure the basic effect. As a result, a jud icial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropr iation. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VS. QUIJANO-PADILLA (389 SCRA 353) FACTS: The Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Vo ter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters' reg istration list and the appropriate of funds therefore "in order to establish a clean, complete, permane nt and updated list of voters." Subsequently, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolut ion No. 00-0315

approving in principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System Projec t (VRIS). The VRIS Project envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004 Elections. Bidding for the supply and installation of information technology equipment and ancillary services was held . Private Respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation was declared the winning bidder, the bid amounti ng to P6.588 Billion Pesos and was given the Notice of Award. However, under Republic Act No. 8760 th e budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELEC s modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds ( CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos. Due to that fact, COMELEC can no longer pursue the project with Photokina since they do not have sufficient funds for th e said project. Meanwhile, Photokina wrote several letters requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no avail. Due to that fact, Photokina filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages against t he COMELEC and all its commissioners claiming that since it was the winning bidder and was given the No tice of Award, the COMELEC must formalize the contract and since the latter failed to perform its d uty under the contract has caused Photokina to incur damages in the preparation of the bid and draft of the contract. ISSUES: Whether or not Mandamus is the proper remedy of Photokina in the case at bar. Whether or not Photokina can compel COMELEC to formalize the contract. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT HELD: Mandamus applies as a remedy only when petitioner s right is founded clearly in la w and not when it is doubtful. Here, the alleged contract, relied upon Photokina as a source of right s which it seeks to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected b ut also it is illegal and against public policy. Since Photokina s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS P roject, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void, the petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where the disbursement of public funds is concerned. SECTION 30. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED INCREASING THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION WITHOUT ITS ADVICE AND CONCURRENCE. FABIAN vs. DESIERTO (295 SCRA 471) FACTS: Teresita Fabian was the major stockbroker and president of PROMAT Construction D evelopment Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private res pondent, Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED). PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects includin g those under the FMED, and Agustin, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inv eigled Fabian into an amorous relationship, which lasted for some time. During the said relationshi p, Agustin gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refuse d and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation an d threats. Eventually, Fabian filed an administrative case against him on July 24, 1995. Sh e sought Agustin s dismissal for violating Sec 19, RA no. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Sec 36 of PD no. 807 (Civil Service Decree)

Jan 31, 1996: Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the servic e with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. But Deputy Ombudsman, Hon. Jesus F. Guerrero, exo nerated private respondent from the administrative charges. Based from Sec 7 of Rule III of AO No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of th e Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved from all administrative charges, the decision of t he ombudsman is ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE. Fabian is arguing that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the la w to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Repub lic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. For Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770 state s that all administrative disciplinary cases of the Office of Ombudsman MAY BE APPEALED TO THE SC by filling a petition of certiorari within 10 days from the receipt of the writt en notice of the order in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But RA no. 6770 violates Sec 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which prov ides that no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC as provided in t his Constitution without its advice and consent. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate cou rt is involved in which case it may be raise at any time or on the court s own motion. Thus, if a statute on which a court s jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no juris diction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it ne cessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrativ e disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rul es of Court is valid. RATIO: Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be bro ught to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate proc edure for quasijudicial agencies. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decision s of the Office

of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appell ate jurisdiction of the SC. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its app ellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this C ourt under its rulemaking power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the ru le-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republi c Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the tes t is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights a nd duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disrega rd or infraction of them. o If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. But if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure o If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter. For this reason a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-mak ing power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with excl usive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. Therefore, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfe r of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. HELD: WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Sup reme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect. The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petitio n for review under Rule 43. ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODU CO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA