38. Bautista vs. CA Facts: Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D.

Bautista issued to private respondent Susan Aloa Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated 8 May 1998 drawn on Metrobank Cavite City Branch. According to private respondent, petitioner assured her that the check would be sufficiently funded on the maturity date. On 20 October 1998 private respondent presented the check for payment. The drawee bank dishonored the check because it was drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Cavite City. Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that presentment of the check within ninety (90) days from due date thereof was an essential element of the offense of violation of BP 22. Since the check was presented for payment 166 days after its due date, it was no longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit. On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner for violation of BP 22, which was approved by the City Prosecutor. On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV a petition for review of the 22 April 1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the petition. On 5 July 1999 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied. According to the ORSP, only resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable for review by that office, citing Department Order No. 223. On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the resolution of the ORSP as well as the order denying reconsideration. The appellate court issued the assailed Resolution dated 26 October 1999 denying due course outright and dismissing the petition. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not all the elements are sufficient to prosecute the petitioner for violation of BP 22. Holding: Yes. The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check presented within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of the offense. The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. Applying this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The prosecutor has ruled that there is probable cause in this case, and we see no reason to disturb the finding. WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 1999 which dismissed the petition for review questioning the resolution of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999, and its order dated 31 August 1999 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. 28. US vs. Marasigan Facts: About 4 oclock of the afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco Mendoza, while engaged in examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, in the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to approach them. On arriving near them the accused, he told Mendoza that he wanted to change the line separating their land because it was curve. Mendoza disagreed and told the couple that if they would change the line it will put certain logs and trees on the land of the latter. The accused disagree to Mendozas statement drew his knife and struck at Mandoza. On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the left hand. The accused continued the attack, whereupon Mendoza seized the accused by the neck and the body and threw him down. While both were lying upon the ground the accused still sought to strike Mendoza with his dagger. The latter seized the hand which held the dagger and attempted to loosen his hold upon it. While they were thus fighting for the possession of the knife, the wife of the accused came forward and

took the dagger from her husbands hand, throwing it to one side. She then seized who after various maneuvers, struck Mendoza a blow which knocked him senseless. As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter being the most serious, the extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of about P45, but the middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless. Issue: WON the action done by the appellant is considered as direct, natural, and logical consequence of felonious act. Holding: Yes. The wrong done is considered the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed, although the offended party refused to submit to surgical operation. Mendoza is not obliged to submit to a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary result of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting there from without aid from Mendoza. 29. People vs. Angeles Facts: Accused-appellant Samina Angeles y Calma was charged with four (4) counts of estafa and one (1) count of illegal recruitment. That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Marceliano T. Tolosa, Precila P. Olpindo, Vilma S. Brina, Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to the complainants to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ him as contract worker in Paris, France and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof. The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50. In her defense, accused-appellant averred that, contrary to the prosecutions allegations, she never represented to the complainants that she can provide them with work abroad. She insisted that she was a marketing consultant and an international trade fair organizer. In June 1994, she went to Paris, France to organize a trade fair. After trial on the merits, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment and four (4) counts of estafa and correspondingly sentenced. Accused-appellant appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt for estafa and illegal recruitment by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant points out that not one of the complainants testified on what kind of jobs were promised to them, how much they would receive as salaries, the length of their employment and even the names of their employers, which are basic subjects a prospective employee would first determine. Issue: WON the accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of estafa. Holding: Yes. Samina Angeles argues that the element of deceit consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused made prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the sums of money is lacking in the instant case. She claims that she never deceived complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment. Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of estafa are: (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly, these elements are present in this case. Although Samina Angeles did not deceive complainants into believing that she could find employment for them abroad, nonetheless, she made them believe that she was processing their travel documents for France and Canada. They parted with their money believing that Samina Angeles would use it to pay for their plane tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel requirements. Upon receiving various amounts from complainants, Samina Angeles used it for other purposes and then conveniently disappeared. Clearly, Samina Angeles defrauded complainants by falsely pretending to possess the power and capacity to process their travel documents. WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED. She was Guilty for the three (3) counts of estafa and Acquitted for Illegal recruitment. 40. People vs. Pilones Facts: In the evening of April 9, 1970 a wake or vigil for the dead (lamayan) was held in a house near Jossie Bakery, located at J.(F.) Posadas Street, Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila. Among the many persons present at that vigil were Nicanor Ilagan, and Antonio G. Renolia (Renolla). Shortly after midnight or in the early morning of April 10, 1970, the house, where the vigil was being held, was stoned. Ilagan and the others came out of the house and went to the street to find out who had hurled the stones. As Ilagan stood on the lighted street, he was shot in the knee and fell on the ground. Tony as well came out and was also shot. The

assailant and his companions, Danny Banlag, Milo and others, who were armed with arrows and carried stones, ran away. Tony or Antonio G. Renolia died on the way to the hospital. Ilagan was also brought to the hospital where he was treated for two weeks. Fifty days after the shooting, or on May 30, 1970, Manuel Pilones. Identified as the person who had shot him after midnight on April 10, 1970. At that confrontation, Pilones was just one arm's length from Ilagan. At the trial Pilones relied on an alibi. He testified that when the shooting occurred, he was in the house of his aunt, Marilou Campbell, at Olongapo City. Manuel Pilones appealed from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in Criminal Cases, convicting him of murder and frustrated murder. Issue: WON the accused was properly sentenced in terms of execution of his crime committed to Nicanor Ilagan. Holding: No. The court was convinced that Pilones was sufficiently Identified by Ilagan as the person who shot him and Renolia. Pilones has not shown any reason as to why Ilagan would accuse him of murder and frustrated murder. No motive was established as to why Pilones shot Ilagan and Renolia. The shooting can be characterized as purely a mischievous act of deviltry committed by a jobless and lawless person who did not know of any better way of using his time. The trial court erred in holding that the crime as to Ilagan is frustrated murder. The wound in his knee was not Sufficient to cause his death. The crime is only attempted murder. The accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would bring about the death of Ilagan. WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that in Criminal Case No. 171(70), Pilones is convicted of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor Minimum, as maximum, and to pay an indemnity to Nicanor Ilagan.