LCP vs COMELEC November 18, 2008 Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills

converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. Issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. Held: 1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus

unconstitutional. 2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

TAN VS COMELEC Facts: On 10 May 1992, Antonio Tan, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the Commission on Elections as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus Election Code. On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao City in the House of Representatives. Senforiano Alterado, another candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass. Meanwhile, the electoral protest of Alterado was dismissed by the HRET. The criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of therein respondents. An administrative charge was instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including Antonio Tan, for Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service. Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the Executive Department of the government and that COMELECs power to deputize public officers belonging to the executive department is for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. It does not include and comprehend administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over officials belonging to the executive branch of government. That jurisdiction over deputized executive officers cannot be deemed to include such powers as would allow encroachment into the domain of the executive branch under guise of administering laws relative to elections. . Motion to dismiss was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss Held: No. The COMELECs authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters. The administrative case against Tan, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to

the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELECs mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided than upon the COMELECs recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of due process to the official or employee concerned. The COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of government concerned over its own personnel.

BAGABUYO VS COMELEC FACTS: In 2006, RA 9371 was promulgated by Congress. It was entitled An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This was proposed by Rep. Jaraula from Cagayan de Oro. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. In the next election, Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On 13 March 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371. Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007 asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that 1.) Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 2.) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 3.) a voters sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire citys Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 4.) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 5.) government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit. Whether or not it violates the equality of representation doctrine. HELD: Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371 does not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod. Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000. The fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress. Bagabuyo further contends that RA 9371 violates the equality in representation doctrine as it appears that one district has a higher number of voters as compared to the other and that one is urbanized the other is rural. This is the clarification; the law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein

BORJA JR. VS COMELEC G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998 BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents. MENDOZA, J. Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor. On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision. Issue: Whether Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160): Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . . (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. A textual analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such official*s+ from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which *the official concerned+ was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary

Ruling: No. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides: SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

renunciation of office prior to its expiration. Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.

This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a query of Commissioner Suarez: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President? Commissioner Davide said: Yes, because we speak of term and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602] (Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule) Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections. Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 (Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit) Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides: Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.

LONZANIDA VS COMELEC FACTS: Lonzanida was elected as mayor and served two consecutive terms from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC, which ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this decision and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate his post. In the 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor but was protested against due to the reason that he allegedly had served 3 consecutive terms already. ISSUE: Whether or not it may be considered that petitioner had served 3 consecutive terms, granting that he did not finish his term in 1995. HELD: Negative. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term and became a private citizen. ADORMEO VS COMELEC FACTS: Ramon Talaga was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor. He then ran for a third term but lost to his opponent. In June 1998, his then opponent faced recall proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000, Talaga won and served for the unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his COC for the mayoralty post. This was questioned on the ground that he had already served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms. ISSUE: Whether or not an assumption to office through recall election should be considered as one term in applying the three-term limit rule. HELD: Negative. The court held that Talaga cannot be construed as having beenelected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the 1998 elections was considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years, Talaga lived as a private citizen. SOCRATES VS COMELEC FACTS: Edward Hagedorn had already served for 3 consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August 23 of the same year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4th consecutive term. ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The court ruled that the rationale behind the 3-term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election. BORJA VS COMELEC FACTS: Jose Capco was first elected as vice mayor but upon the death of the then incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for 2 more terms as mayor. He again filed his candidacy for mayor for the succeeding election but was protested against. ISSUE: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served that term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the constitution. HELD: Negative. The court held that when Capco occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of mayor, he served first as a vice mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other. LATASA VS COMELEC FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. During his third term, the municipality was declared as a component city. This event marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, since the post is vacant, Latasa was mandated to serve a hold-over capacity 1 as mayor of the new City of Digos. Latasa filed his COC for the 2001 elections but was protested against by Sunga, saying that Latasa is not eligible to run for mayor since he already served for three consecutive terms from 1992-2001. ISSUE: Whether or not Latasa is disqualified from running again for mayor, but this time, for the CITY OF DIGOS. HELD: Affirmative. Upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, Latasa continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There may be some changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as an LGU but no substantial changes occurred as to petitioners authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.